Turkish Airlines to Resume Flights to Afghanistan After Nearly 3 Years

Officials at Turkish Airlines told TOLOnews that there will be four flights a week between Kabul and Istanbul.

Turkish Airlines said that after a suspension of two years and eight months, it will resume its flights to Afghanistan on May 21.

Officials at Turkish Airlines told TOLOnews that there will be four flights a week between Kabul and Istanbul.

Mirshakib Mir, an economist, said: “The resumption of flights by international aviation companies can foster competition in the aviation sector and increase the revenue of the country’s aviation industry.”

Mohammad Nabi Afghan, an economist, said: “The start of international flights benefits several sectors; it facilitates travel for businessmen and reduces travel costs.”

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation welcomed the resumption of Turkish Airlines flights, pledging that they have provided all necessary facilities for aviation companies to restart their flights to Afghanistan.

Imamuddin Ahmadi, spokesman for the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, said: “The national and international airports are ready for flights; the country’s airports are equipped with the necessary equipment and operate according to international standards.”

The last flight by Turkish Airlines from Kabul Airport was on August 14, 2021, and following political changes in the country, the company also suspended its flights to Afghanistan.

This follows similar moves by Fly Dubai and Air Arabia, who have already resumed their flights to Afghanistan.

Turkish Airlines to Resume Flights to Afghanistan After Nearly 3 Years
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The State of Research on Afghanistan: Too many poor quality publications and some real gems

Christian Bleuer

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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With the publication of the newest edition of the Afghanistan Analyst Bibliography, Christian Bleuer, who has been compiling and adding to it since 2004/5, looks at what it says about the state of scholarship on Afghanistan and comments on the past and future of research in this area. The problems with integrating scholarship and research into policymaking is discussed and he also notes some interesting new research while offering suggestions for reading.

The Afghanistan Analysts Bibliography 2024 is available for download in the Resources section on our website.

Many publications, but not many good publications

That there is a massive volume of English-language publications on Afghanistan is undeniable. The Afghanistan Analyst Bibliography now stretches to almost 8,000 publications, including books, academic journal articles, research institute reports, university dissertations and other entries: the first edition, compiled in 2006 included just under 1,000 publications. What is also undeniable is that the average quality of these publications is low – an assessment particularly noticeable in relation to the author’s research interests, governance, conflict and identity. As for quantity, the annual volume of publications in English did rise sharply after 2001 as the West focussed on Afghanistan, and will likely decline precipitously as that attention and funding diverts to other crises.

That low-quality assessment is, however, an average. Certain rare publications stand out as higher quality – some of the author’s favourites are showcased below. Usually the better publications stem from field research or in-depth archival research, backed by fluency in local languages. On the other hand, low-quality publications are all very similar, with most based on a brief survey of secondary sources of poor to average quality. There is a relevant computer science concept here: GIGO – garbage in, garbage out, meaning, if you put dud data in, you get dud results out. It could be applied to many publications on Afghanistan. It is just not possible to make a satisfactory study if it is based on previous poor quality studies, unless your research is on the phenomenon of bad scholarship. The author has published several articles in this category, for example, his 2014 report for AAN, ‘From ‘Slavers’ to ‘Warlords’: Descriptions of Afghanistan’s Uzbeks in Western writing’.

The importance of languages

Some research projects related to Afghanistan do not require fluency or even proficiency in Pashto, Dari or the other languages of Afghanistan, nor do they need to be based on lengthy field research or archival research. Examples here include military studies that focus on NATO/ISAF forces, analysis of American foreign policy decision-making (when Washington is the subject of analysis, not Afghanistan), technical agricultural reports and critical feminist studies of representations of Afghans and Afghanistan in the Western media. At the opposite end of the scale would be studies that can only be sufficiently analysed with local language fluency and deep knowledge of local history and society, with examples including studies on the ethnic and/or religious factors in local identities and political action, push/pull factors in decisions to emigrate from Afghanistan, ethnographic case studies and the examination of rural livelihoods and economic survival.

The comparison to area studies in other regions puts Afghanistan studies in a poor light. There are academic journals and publishers that would absolutely outright reject any submission by an author without language fluency demonstrated in the references and citations. This is especially true in Russian, Chinese and Latin American studies, among many others. Some fields are even more rigorous, if much smaller. The following anecdote is illustrative of this. Years ago, this author spoke to one recent university graduate who was hoping to do a PhD in Mongolian studies (with a focus on the 13th century), only to be dissuaded by a professor who said that for his proposed research he would need to become fluent in reading not just multiple forms of Chinese and Mongolian from different eras, plus Old Uyghur, but also French, German and Russian to access secondary sources from the 19th and 20th century. Compare this to most articles in the bibliography whose list of references include only English-language publications.

Other fields of research have a much higher share of publications that have another strength seldom seen in publications on Afghanistan – time, and plenty of it. So much about publications on Afghanistan is ‘instant analysis’, that is hurried and shallow as a result. This is not to deny that many authors have works that are a decade in the making, even if they are not getting daily attention.

The problem of good and bad scholarship underpins another question: Can even good literature on Afghanistan have any beneficial effect or make some positive contribution to policymaking and governance?

Should policy-makers read the literature on Afghanistan?

One publication can, in certain circumstances, have a major effect. It does not mean, however, that the effect is necessarily positive. An example of this is when President Bill Clinton likely based his decision to not intervene early on in the Balkan conflicts after reading the book, ‘Balkan Ghosts’, by journalist Robert Kaplan, a person with no local language skills or in-depth research background in the Balkans. The book presented a deeply flawed ‘ancient hatreds’ argument, long ago disproven in academia. The argument in the book went that the people of the Balkans have hated and fought each other based on ethnicity forever and will continue to do so, making any intervention or engagement futile (see this reporting in The New York Times). The counterargument, that Clinton did not read, expressed in a book review by the journalist-turned-historian Noel Malcolm, was that “The Bosnian war was not caused by ancient hatreds; it was caused by modern politicians.” Whatever one’s view on the NATO interventions in the Balkans, it is clear that policy should not have been made based on ahistorical and deeply flawed publications.

Knowledge can also be used in a way that is not for the broader public good, for many British colonial administrators spoke local languages and understood regional history very well, all in the service of the empire. Moreover, knowledge is not always power (good short background on that issue here). Knowledge about a problem does not, in itself, allow for it to be fixed. It is dubious to suggest that, for example, the creation of more knowledge on the local history, language and social trends in Palestine and Israel is going to facilitate solving the Israel-Palestine conflict in the face of contemporary local political intransigence on one hand and the lack of will on the part of outside powers on the other (not because of ‘ancient hatreds’).

Could Afghanistan have benefitted from any studies, or do all paths lead to failure such as Israel-Palestine? Or is this just another faulty line of argument similar to that of ‘Balkan Ghosts’, even if not exactly an ‘ancient hatreds’ argument? It is not possible to prove that more knowledge could have worked out better for Afghanistan, but it is undeniable that there was an early lack of large-scale violence post-2001 that was squandered by the disinterest of Western power brokers (now transfixed by Iraq) and by many local leaders working in their own narrow personal interests.

Nobody in any position of power or influence over Afghanistan in 2001 was following the guidelines of ‘evidence-based policy’, a concept that “advocates for policy decisions to be grounded on, or influenced by, rigorously established objective evidence” versus “policymaking predicated on ideology, ‘common sense,’ anecdotes, or personal intuitions” (more information on this concept here). This concept is practiced in medicine, advocated for in regards to energy and climate change and thoroughly ignored in foreign policymaking and state-building. While there may have been experts on Afghanistan who were ignored in 2001, it cannot be argued that there was some vital, comprehensive publication that policymakers could have read at that time that would have pushed them towards more sustainable and effective policies. However, even a cursory reading of human rights reports from the 1990s could have woken the US and others up to exactly who they were putting into power and there were different Afghan voices arguing cogently for different types of governance structures they deemed appropriate for their country.[1] Neither research institutes nor universities have the foresight or funding to regularly produce such work before an issue becomes policy relevant. Publications that were intended to inform policymakers only became common after 2001.

There is even a case of a powerful leader ignoring their own academic work. Two presidents of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani and Hafizullah Amin, both have/had advanced degrees from Columbia University. While nothing is known of Amin’s academic work while studying for his master’s degree in education, Ghani wrote an excellent anthropology dissertation and then much later co-authored a book with Clare Lockhart titled Fixing Failed States. This book, which was received favourably by reviewers, was ignored by Ghani once he became president, in favour of politics as usual. If policymakers will not or cannot take their own advice – advice they built a career upon – how do we expect them to take advice from others?

The problem of expert advice and scholarly literature being ignored is clear enough. Academics and their work have consistently been ignored or just not useful for policymaking (not counting outliers such as the ignored book mentioned above). Added to this is the communication problem where academics and policymakers speak different languages. Academic work is often too dense and filled with jargon and obscure theory. It is indigestible for those outside the field (and sometimes even for fellow researchers).

Unfortunately, the environment of university-based research is declining precipitously. This will mean that opportunities for research that existed for Ghani (Columbia University PhD) and Lockhart (Harvard and Oxford degrees, plus a lengthy Yale fellowship) will exist but in lesser numbers and in poorer quality.

The death of the university

Universities in the West are failing in their traditional goals, with opposite ends of the ideological spectrum offering competing explanations for why, with the mundane reasons being budgets cuts combined with an out-of-control university bureaucracy funnelling money towards itself at the expense of students and faculty. Of the many failures, of which students are the primary victims, are the relatively minor concerns of those early career researchers wishing to make a living from their work. The problem here as related to research on Afghanistan is that there was and still is a need for in-depth and long-term analysis of Afghanistan, but is there a market for it? Should young students and researchers invest time and money in earning an advanced degree scrutinising some aspect of Afghanistan, or train in data management or dentistry?

There are now many disincentives to invest so much in studies and language training. What is at the end of such a rigorous course of study over a decade? The statistics say that you should prepare for the likely scenario of retraining and employment outside the field of study you chose – and indeed outside of university employment in general. Even if a researcher is particularly dedicated and sticks with their PhD studies despite the negative forecasts, they may find only employment at the fringes of academia in a role known in the US as ‘adjunct faculty’, a type of low-paid part-time and/or short-term contract employment that puts at least one-third of teachers in this scheme under the poverty line (according to a 2020 study by the American Federation of Teachers. The equivalent positions in Canada, Australia and western Europe are not much better when you factor in the extreme cost in living in some of the cities and towns where competitive research universities are based. At the opposite end of the scale are the full-time permanent faculty position that comprise only 25 per cent of instructors at American universities, a phenomenon with equivalents in most other countries to varying degrees (see this blog from Inside Scholar on the rise of part-time and short-term contracts in universities).

How about scholars on a fast track, who do not need so much time to become proficient in the languages of Afghanistan and who already have a strong base of knowledge to build on? Obviously, Afghan researchers whether in Afghanistan or in the diaspora have a strong head start and could be the source of much needed quality analysis. However, this does nothing to fix the long-term problem of the decline of university research as a viable career choice.

Some interesting research

Failures and faults of Afghanistan research aside, there are some bright spots. Below are some publications from the last five years that have caught the eye of the author due to his personal research interests. They touch on governance, religion and ethnicity. If you are looking for recommendations on agriculture, military operations, gender or macro-economics, you will need to ask somebody else. The works selected are interesting for their high quality, or as an example of a new trend in research – and in some cases both.

If in 2001 there were only a few professors and prominent exiled Afghan political figures whom you could ask for their opinions on what sort of structure the Afghan government should have, over 20 years later, we now have Afghans asking Afghans that question in a rigorous manner:

Mohammad Bashir Mobasher and Mohammad Qadam Shah, 2022, ‘Deproblematizing the Federal–Unitary Dichotomy: Insights from a Public Opinion Survey about Approaches to Designing a Political System in Afghanistan’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol 52, No 2.

In this article, Mohammad Qadam Shah (Seattle Pacific University) and Mohammad Bashir Mobasher (American University, Washington DC) argue that “concepts such as unitarism, federalism, centralization and decentralization are highly politicized and often misunderstood when they enter the public discourse.” So, if you were hoping for an answer to the question ‘What system of governance do Afghans prefer?’, you will get an accurate but complicated answer, and certainly not an easy one. You may consider this debate moot with the return of the Islamic Emirate (Afghanistan’s current rulers prefer a unitary and highly centralised state), but the article may be useful in the future when and if the Taleban no longer rule Afghanistan.

If you are not a student or faculty at a university with subscription access, you can have ‘short-term access’ from Oxford University Press to this article for the very unreasonable price of 55 USD, or you can email the authors directly and ask for a PDF – a good example of the difficulty in accessing research on Afghanistan. There is, however, an article on the same topic (a general introductory work) that is available for free:

Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2019, ‘Pathologies of Centralized State-Building’, Prism, Vol. 8, No. 2.

There are also an increasing number of collaborative works between local and foreign researchers; I choose to note this one as it is, unexpectedly, by two researchers based in China:

Ihsanullah Omarkhail and Liu Guozhu, 2023, ‘The Trajectory of Islamic State Khorasan Province and Afghan Taliban Rivalry’, Small Wars and Insurgencies.

Related to my interest in ethnicity and religion – specifically the interplay between the two – there is an entire issue of an academic journal with 11 articles by Afghan, Pakistani and Western scholars on the theme ‘Ethnic Nationalism and Politicized Religion in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Borderland’.

There are also several books I want to eventually read, but cannot assess at the moment (due to constraints of time, money and library access). One is an English translation of a book originally published in German in 1975, for those interested in the deep history of the region:

Karl Jettmar, 2023, Religions of the Hindukush: The Pre-Islamic Heritage of Eastern Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan, Orchid Press.

On the subject of religion, there are more publications worth mentioning. The question of what exactly is the status of Sufism in Afghanistan at the moment is addressed in this book:

Annika Schmeding, 2023, Sufi Civilities: Religious Authority and Political Change in Afghanistan, Stanford University Press.

I also noticed a recent English translation of a 1970s ethnography by an Afghan. It will certainly read like a classic ethnography – both in a good and bad way, as it is a product of its time. But regardless, it should provide an informative view of the understudied ethnic Baluchis before the beginning of decades of war.

Ghulam Rahman Amiri, 2020, The Helmand Baluch: A Native Ethnography of the People of SouthWest Afghanistan, Berghahn Books.

Published by Berghahn Books and available for purchase at a price (USD 135) set for university library buyers, this book serves as a model for moving knowledge from local languages into English – in terms of content although not price. There are many other works by local scholars that would merit translation if funding was available.

Another book from the same publisher is a study of Afghans as a global phenomenon:

Alessandro Monsutti, 2021, Homo Itinerans: Towards a Global Ethnography of Afghanistan, Berghahn Books.

Anthropological studies of Afghans can no longer confined to the village, or even just to the territory of Afghanistan. That has been true for decades and even more so now. Alongside this book, one should consider reading this study of Afghan traders who turn up in surprising places across the Eurasian continent:

Magnus Marsden, 2021, Beyond the Silk Roads: Trade, Mobility and Geopolitics across Eurasia, Cambridge University Press.

For some reason, this book went unnoticed by the author when compiling the bibliography – an unfortunate incident that illustrates the need for a researcher to do their own search for sources that is not just confined to this bibliography. On a more fortunate note, the publisher has made this book free to download.

Notable over the last five years, at least in areas of research that this author favours, is that European researchers have made more contributions worth mentioning than Americans (for unclear reasons). In addition to Schmeding, Monsutti and Marsden above, I noted with interest these two new books, one already published and one forthcoming, in June of this year:

Florian Weigand, 2022, Waiting for dignity: Legitimacy and authority in Afghanistan, Columbia University Press.

Jan-Peter Hartung, 2024, The Pashtun Borderland: A Religious and Cultural History of the Taliban, Cambridge University Press.

The (bleak) future of research

Despite the positive contributions listed above, universities cannot be relied upon in the future to produce a sufficient base of knowledge. Is there an alternative? Options exist, but in a deficient form that would need to be reformed. Government-controlled research services such as Australia’s Parliamentary Library, the United States’ Congressional Research Service and the UK’s House of Commons Library are focused on rearranging existing research into digestible shorter products for government. They do not produce new knowledge and much of their work is tailored to individual MPs, ie it is never destined to be public. Nor does it appear that any of the most important foreign policy decisions has ever been affected by research from these types of institutions.

On the independent side, research institutes and thinks tanks have short time frames and in many cases unreliable or short-term funding, some of which reduces their independence. It is clear that there is no model waiting to take over the research role that universities have performed, even if it is and has always been overwhelmingly an ineffective role. If governments want access to timely research before and at the beginning of a crisis, they will need to start funding projects that can provide the evidence that is needed to craft effective policy. This funding will need a long-term component focussed on researchers who need some guarantee of long-term job security if they are to invest so much time, effort and money into research on what many will consider irrelevant topics (until the topic becomes highly relevant). This could take place in a university or in an independent research institute, but in a manner that negates the short-comings listed above.

Unspoken in this article and a topic that would merit a much longer discussion, is the collapse in opportunities for field research (as in the 1980s and 1990s). Will communication technology and inter-connectedness overcome this problem and reach into Afghanistan in a methodologically sound manner, or will rigorous and scholarly studies on Afghanistan be limited to refugee and asylum studies based outside of Afghanistan? Furthermore, the ability of local researchers to freely do their work and publish is doubtful. A report from January that the Islamic Emirate had conducted a mass confiscation of locals’ books in Dari and Pashto was not encouraging. Maybe this state of affairs will not be permanent, but, sadly, I see no bright future for research on Afghanistan. I hope to be proven wrong.

You can download the bibliography here.

Edited by Kate Clark


Note about the author, written by the author: Christian Bleuer left the field of Afghanistan studies in 2009-10 when it became clear that his planned fieldwork among ethnic Uzbeks in Kunduz Province was, due to security concerns, no longer possible according to his university’s guidelines for doctoral research fieldwork. Preparation for that fieldwork can be seen in this article on the local history of the Kunduz river valley. The eventual plan would have been to work from these (overwhelmingly English-language) sources to expand into field interviews and translation of local language sources and documents. The resulting article – basically a salvaging of a literature survey for a failed research project – fits in very well amongst the many other articles on Afghanistan that are based almost entirely on English-language sources.

His other work on Afghanistan has often been alongside Afghan researchers, with this AAN report being an example of one of the types of collaborative research he feels can be useful. The bulk of his research (mostly unpublished or uncredited as an anonymous author) is on former Soviet Central Asia. He eventually co-authored a history of Tajikistan.

References

References
↑1 For example, in October 2001, Afghan-American anthropologist M Nazif Shahrani argued in the Canadian online governance policy forum, Federations, against a highly centralised form of government, while the Afghan-Canadian economist Omar Zakhilwal (and years later, Afghan minister of finance and ambassador to Pakistan) argued exactly for it:

M Nazif Shahrani, 2001, ‘Not “Who?” but “How?”: Governing Afghanistan after the conflict’, Federations, October issue, PDF.

Omar Zakhilwal, 2001, ‘Federalism in Afghanistan: A recipe for disintegration’, Federations, October issue PDF.

 

The State of Research on Afghanistan: Too many poor quality publications and some real gems
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Red Cross official seeks staggered return of Afghans from Pakistan

GENEVA —

Changes are being urged to plans for returning thousands of Afghan citizens from Pakistan to make the process more effective.

While Pakistan has delayed the expulsion of some 850,000 documented Afghan refugees to Afghanistan, a senior Red Cross official is appealing for the returns to occur “in a more staggered way” so Afghanistan can better absorb the enormous influx of people.

“It will be important to work with the government of Pakistan in 2024 to ask that if there are going to be returnees,” that they arrive “in smaller numbers at a time just so it is more manageable on the Afghan side,” said Alexander Matheou, regional director, Asia Pacific Region for the International Federation of the Red Cross.

Speaking in the Qatari capital, Doha, Matheou told journalists in Geneva on Friday that he had just concluded his fifth visit to Afghanistan since the autumn of 2021, shortly after the Taliban takeover of the country.

He said the challenges facing Afghan returnees from Pakistan was one of several pressing issues he discussed with de facto Taliban rulers.

“You will be aware that over half a million have crossed the border over recent months, and it is likely that we will see large numbers of new arrivals in the coming months,” he said.

“I imagine this is probably the largest population flow in a short period of time in Asia since the population movement from Myanmar into Bangladesh in 2017,” he added. “So, it is a significant event.”

Returnees ill-equipped to start over

Since October, Pakistan has expelled more than 500,000 Afghan refugees who lacked proper documentation. In a second phase of expulsions, which has been temporarily halted, more than 850,000 Afghans holding identification cards issued by the Pakistani government are slated to be forcibly deported.

Matheou notes many of the returnees have lived in Pakistan for decades and are ill-equipped to begin a new life in a country that to them is unknown, without government or international support.

The humanitarian effort is, he said, ” largely concentrated on trying to help people on arrival at transit stations near the border. He added that the real challenges start once people move away from those transit areas.

“When we interviewed the returnees themselves, it was also clear that most had no idea how they were going to settle in their point of destination or how they were going to build a livelihood with nothing,” he said. “They largely expected to be living with distant relatives, which would actually make very, very poor people some of the poorest communities in the world, even poorer.”

Children make up half of returning Afghans

Matheou described the returnees as being in generally poor health, especially the children, who account for nearly half of all returnees.

“The evidence of that was we visited clinics where they reported a real spike in cases of acute malnutrition coming from the arrivals from Pakistan.

“We visited routine immunization programs of the IFRC and the Afghan Red Crescent in the villages, and there it was clear looking at the children that as well as being anemic, you could see wasting and stunting among the children,” he said.

Wasting in a child is a condition that increases the risk of death and requires intensive treatment and care.

While Afghanistan is a country with multiple challenges, Matheou said there have been a few positive changes since the Taliban came to power.

“There are still plenty of security incidents going on in Afghanistan every day or most days, but the security on the whole is better than it has been for decades, and on the surface it is peaceful, and this is clearly deeply welcomed by a war-ravaged population,” he said, noting there is also a welcomed commitment to reduce theft and corruption.

Human rights crises remain

While security has improved, however, he said the country’s humanitarian and human rights crises remains severe. That is most clearly manifested in the mental health crisis afflicting the population.

“Beneath those crises, there is an invisible crisis of hopelessness, depression, desperation that stem from a collapsing health service, mass unemployment, barriers to education, and frustrated boys, girls, men, and women who are stuck at home all day.

He said the IFRC has a staff in two to three of the provinces of Afghanistan, but the work of ministering to the physical and mental health needs of the population was done primarily through the Afghan Red Crescent.

Despite the Taliban ban on women’s participation in work and education, he said, “We try to ensure that our work is gender balanced. We employ women in all our health, mental health, primary health services, as well as services for women-headed households.”

He warned, though, the outlook for Afghanistan is bleak. If the Taliban does not change its discriminatory policies against women, he said it will be difficult to get the kind of funding needed to turn Afghanistan into an economically viable society.

“The future of where the next generation of doctors and nurses will come from, where the next generation of teachers will come from, and where employment generated for families to be economically independent and hopeful about the future is looking quite grim,” he said.

Red Cross official seeks staggered return of Afghans from Pakistan
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US embassy emphasizes press freedom in Afghanistan

The U.S. Embassy for Afghanistan has underscored press freedom in a fresh note regarding Afghanistan.

The U.S. Embassy Office for Afghanistan, based in Doha, tweeted on Monday, April 29th, on the occasion of World Press Freedom Day: “We must ensure that every opinion is voiced and every perspective is heard.”

Every year, May 3rd is commemorated as World Press Freedom Day.

The U.S. Embassy’s note describes press freedom as vital to society’s vitality and adds, “With press freedom, people can be empowered.”

World Press Freedom Day comes as international institutions say that media remained “vulnerable” in 2023 and that breathing is still difficult for them.

Since the Taliban regained control in August 2021, they’ve clamped down on free media and expression, leading to over 80% of female journalists losing their jobs. Many fled the country, while economic struggles and oppressive policies leftover half of male journalists unemployed.

It’s worth mentioning that three journalists, solely in Khost province, were detained by local authorities on charges of broadcasting music and reaching out to female listeners via radio. They were released after six days.

US embassy emphasizes press freedom in Afghanistan
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Qomi: Occupiers Still Meddling in Afghanistan and Region

Hassan Kazemi Qomi, discussed the Daesh issue, saying that although the group holds no territory in Afghanistan, terror cells still exist there.

The Iranian ambassador and special representative for Afghanistan, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, said the United States is a common enemy of the countries in the region and that the US aims to destabilize Afghanistan and its neighbors.

Hassan Kazemi Qomi, in an exclusive interview with TOLOnews, discussed the Daesh issue, saying that although the group holds no territory in Afghanistan, terror cells still exist there.

“The Afghan government announces that we have taken serious action in suppressing Daesh; we definitely confirm this and we are helping to improve the security conditions, no doubt about it. But will the occupiers of yesterday, who still pursue a policy of intervention, a policy of destabilization, a policy of causing disturbances from Afghan soil by terrorists whom they themselves support, ever cease their actions?,” he asked.

The Iranian ambassador and special representative for Afghanistan also acknowledged the presence of the opposition to the Islamic Emirate in Iran but pledged that Iran’s policy poses no threat to Afghanistan’s sovereignty.

“Iran has been and will continue to be in contact with all Afghan groups, I state this clearly and explicitly. If Afghanistan is for all Afghans, then Iran’s hospitality is for the guests who come. Inshaullah, conditions here will improve and everyone will return. Every ethnic group, race, and religion from Afghanistan, for whatever reason they have come to Iran, do they reside in Iran? Yes, they do reside. But the question is, which group from Iran poses a threat to the security of Afghanistan? There is none, and there will not be. This is the firm policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” said Hassan Kazemi Qomi.

In part of his remarks, he said that last year, more than two billion cubic meters of water were lost as part of Iran’s water rights but expressed satisfaction over the flow of more than 100 million cubic meters of water to his country this year.

“In the two instances when water was released, it can be said that around one hundred million cubic meters of water entered Iran under the water rights that exist. Last year, there were some issues at the Kamal Khan dam. The government took two or three measures to repair the Kamal Khan dam, and the problems that existed with the gates of this dam were resolved,” Qomi said.

This Iranian official further added that Iran hosts over 6 million Afghan refugees and has taken steps to issue visas to applicants to prevent chaos at its borders.

Qomi: Occupiers Still Meddling in Afghanistan and Region
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500 Artifacts Restored at National Museum in 1402

Officials at the National Museum also expressed concerns about the scarcity of materials and equipment needed for the restoration.

Officials at the National Museum of Afghanistan reported the restoration of five hundred historical and archaeological artifacts in the past year, noting that the restored items include sculptures, coins, and utensils from various periods.

Mohammad Yahya Mohebzada, the deputy director of the National Museum, said: “Restoration and preservation is an everyday task for our colleagues. Last year, I mentioned that we should focus on the year 1402 (solar year), during which our colleagues managed to cover the restoration of five hundred historical and archaeological artifacts despite difficulties.”

Officials at the National Museum also expressed concerns about the scarcity of materials and equipment needed for the restoration of historical and archaeological artifacts in the country.

Islamuddin, an experienced restorer who has dedicated twenty years of his life to this profession, said that these restorations include various works, such as those from the Islamic period, made from different materials like stone and clay.

“We work in different sections, and currently, you see this is one of the artifacts I am working on. This piece is also from the Islamic period and in this branch, we restore artifacts made from both stone and clay,” said Islamuddin, the restorer.

Mohammad Ghafran Hanafi, the general manager of the restoration department at the National Museum, said: “We ask the government of the Islamic Emirate to pay more attention to the museum. We do not have advanced equipment in this department; there are no laboratory ventilation devices, which is why we are facing problems.”

Earlier, local officials in Bamyan announced the commencement of the second phase of the restoration of the cities of Zuhak and Gholghola by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESC

500 Artifacts Restored at National Museum in 1402
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Millions of Afghans made Pakistan home to escape war. Now many are hiding to avoid deportation

Riazat Butt,Adil Jawad

For more than 1 million Afghans who fled war and poverty to Pakistan, these are uncertain times

Born and raised in Pakistan to parents who fled neighboring Afghanistan half a century ago, an 18-year-old found himself at the mercy of police in Karachi who took his cash, phone and motorbike, and sent him to a deportation center.

Scared and bewildered, he spent three days there before he was sent back to Afghanistan, a place he has never been to, with nothing but clothes on his back.

The youth is one of at least 1.7 million Afghans who made Pakistan their home as their country sank deeper into decades of war. But they’ve been living there without legal permission, and are now the target of a harsh crackdown on migrants who Pakistan says must leave.

It’s harder for them to earn money, rent accommodation, buy food or get medical help because they run the risk of getting caught by police or being reported to authorities by Pakistanis.

The youth, who had been working as a mechanic in an auto shop since he was 15, spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of arrest and deportation.

He has applied for the same documentation that his family has, but he won’t get it. Pakistan isn’t issuing paperwork for Afghan refugees or their children.

“My life is here. I have no friends or family in Afghanistan, nothing,” the young man told The Associated Press. “I wanted to come back (to Pakistan) sooner, but things had to calm down first,” he said, referring to the anti-migrant raids sweeping the country at the time.

Six weeks later, he traveled from Takhar to the Afghan capital, Kabul, then to eastern Nangarhar province. He walked for hours in the dark before meeting up with human smugglers hired by his brother in Pakistan. Their job was to get him to Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan’s northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, for the price of $70.

Police have daubed numbers on homes in his neighborhood to show how many people live there and how many have documentation. Hundreds of Afghan families have fled the area since the operation began. There are fewer people to hide among.

Such neighborhoods in Karachi are easily home to tens of thousands of Afghans. But they have no drainage systems, health care or education facilities. There are few women on the streets, and those who venture out wear burqas, often the blue ones more commonly seen in Afghanistan.

Lawyer Moniza Kakar, who works extensively with the Afghan community in Karachi, said there are generations of families with no paperwork. Without it, they can’t access basic services like schools or hospitals.

Afghans were already under the radar before the crackdown, and rumours abound that Pakistan wants to expel all Afghans, even those with documentation. Pakistan says no such decision has been made.

In another Karachi neighborhood with a mostly Afghan population, people scatter when police arrive, disappearing into a maze of alleys. A network of informants spread news of the visits.

Kakar despairs at the plight of Afghans who remain in Pakistan. “Sometimes they don’t have food so we appeal to the U.N. to help them out,” she said. To earn money or get medical help, they would have previously traveled from such neighborhoods into the heart of Karachi, but they can’t afford these journeys anymore. They’re also likely to be arrested, she added.

Some show Kakar their ID cards from the time of Gen. Zia Ul-Haq, the military dictator whose rule of Pakistan coincided with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. “They wonder why they don’t have citizenship after 40 years. They don’t share their location. They don’t go out. They live in property rented in someone else’s name.”

There are children who were born in Pakistan who have grown up and have children of their own. “The children don’t have any identity paperwork. All of them have an undecided future,” said Kakar.

Syed Habib Ur Rehman works as a media coordinator at the Afghanistan Consulate General in Karachi. He spends a lot of time in these communities.

“There are empty homes, empty shops,” Rehman said. “Markets are empty. The Pakistanis we know don’t agree with what is happening. They say they have spent a good life with us. Their business has gone down because so many Afghan families have left.”

The Afghans interviewed by the AP had different reasons for never securing their status. Some said they were overseas working. Others didn’t have time. Nobody thought Pakistan would ever throw them out.

Mohammad Khan Mughal, 32, was born in Karachi and has three children. Before the crackdown started, the Afghan ran a tandoor business. Police told him to close down.

“My customers started complaining because they couldn’t buy bread from me,” he said. He and his family went to the southwestern city of Quetta in Baluchistan province to escape the raids.

Millions of Afghans made Pakistan home to escape war. Now many are hiding to avoid deportation
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Russia: Recognition of Taliban depends on formation of inclusive government

Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia says recognizing the Taliban as a comprehensive government depends on it including representatives of all “ethnicities, religions, and political currents of Afghanistan.”

According to Russian media reports, Mikhail Galuzin, who travelled to Uzbekistan on Friday, stated that Moscow maintains its working relationship with the Taliban.

Russia has also criticized America’s policies regarding Afghanistan. Referring to the US’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, he said: They abandoned the people of Afghanistan in the true sense of the word.

Russia, like other countries, does not officially recognize the Taliban but maintains relations with the group and has also handed over the Afghan embassy in Moscow to the Taliban.

The Russian Foreign Ministry also announced last month that the issue of removing the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations is under consideration.

Since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, no country has officially recognized their government, but there are unofficial diplomatic relations between the Taliban and some regional countries, including Russia.

Russia: Recognition of Taliban depends on formation of inclusive government
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Qomi: Iran Supports All Constructive Initiatives Concerning Afghanistan

By Mitra Majeedy
Tolo News
28 April 2024

He called the current cooperation between Tehran and Kabul “unparalleled,” in the interview.

The Iranian Ambassador and Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, stated that Iran supports any initiative, including appointing a special envoy for Afghanistan; however, the qualifications of this envoy must be clear.

In a special interview with TOLOnews, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, said he regards the recognition of the Islamic Emirate as an issue dependent on the will of the Afghan people, and added that the desires of the Afghan people are recognized by his country.

The Iranian official also said that addressing problems in Afghanistan and alleviating concerns about terrorism requires a regional consensus and the joint cooperation of countries regarding Afghanistan.

“Any constructive initiative, such as the selection of a representative with clearly defined qualifications, which aids in improving the conditions in Afghanistan, should be welcomed,” Hassan Kazemi Qomi said.

He called the current cooperation between Tehran and Kabul “unparalleled,” in the interview.

However, Qomi explained the reason for his country’s non-recognition of the Islamic Emirate in this way: “Recognizing governments is related to the will of the people of that country; what we have repeatedly stated is that whatever the Afghan people say will be endorsed by us.”

He also mentioned that developments in Afghanistan significantly impact the national security interests of neighboring countries, and that the world must accept that resolving problems in Afghanistan and concerns about terrorism require regional consensus and joint cooperation with Afghanistan.

“The international community should understand that to overcome the problems in Afghanistan, if there is a concern from the international community about the issue of terrorism, we must move in a direction that allows us to assist this government through joint cooperation, especially with neighboring countries,” said Hassan Kazemi Qomi.

This high-ranking official of the Islamic Republic of Iran also called for the strengthening of cooperation between Tehran and Kabul, which will require trust-building efforts.

Qomi: Iran Supports All Constructive Initiatives Concerning Afghanistan
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Experts Speculate on Purpose of John Bass’s Trip to Doha, Islamabad

The Islamic Emirate has not commented on this American official’s trip to Qatar and Pakistan.

The US State Department has announced the trip of acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs John Bass to Doha and Islamabad.

According to the department statement, Bass’s visit, which began on April 26 and is scheduled to continue until April 30, will include discussions with Qatari and Pakistani officials regarding support for Afghanistan and shared regional security interests.

The statement also said: “Acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs John Bass will travel to Qatar and Pakistan April 26-30. In Doha, Qatar, he will meet with senior Qatari government officials and other diplomatic missions to discuss support for Afghanistan and shared security interests in the region. In Islamabad, Pakistan, Under Secretary Bass will meet with senior Pakistani government officials to discuss a range of regional and bilateral issues as part of the US-Pakistani partnership.”

The Islamic Emirate has not commented on this American official’s trip to Qatar and Pakistan; however, it has previously stated that representatives and officials from other countries should first consult with the interim Afghan government to address some of the challenges.

Political analysts have described this American official’s trip to the region as an effort by the United States to prevent political rivals, including Russia, from gaining a foothold.

Wais Naseri, a political analyst, told TOLOnews: “John Bass, with his extensive experience in Afghan affairs, knows that Pakistan and Qatar are two very large and influential countries affecting developments in Afghanistan.”

Najib Rahman Shamal, another analyst, said: “It has been more than two and a half years since the United States left Afghanistan; however, it is never willing to lose its interests in Afghanistan and the regional countries.”

Thomas West, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan, had also traveled to India on the fourth of Hamal this solar year and discussed the development of diplomatic relations with Afghanistan with some officials of that country. The Islamic Emirate has requested that the US representative mention the achievements of the Islamic Emirate with countries during his travels.

Experts Speculate on Purpose of John Bass’s Trip to Doha, Islamabad
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