Commentary: In Afghanistan, Taliban is still involved in gender apartheid

Orlando Sentinel
PUBLISHED: 
shaya mariji

In one corner of the world, the “TradWife” trend on social media promotes a return to 1950s gender roles and patriarchal social structures. Advocates generally support the idea of the husband acting as the sole breadwinner while the wife manages the household and raises children.

In another corner of the world, women live under gender apartheid — a system in which their presence in public life is treated as a violation. They face public punishment, severe restrictions on their freedoms, and compulsory dress codes that conceal nearly every aspect of their appearance. Yet these Taliban-imposed policies should not be conflated with Islam itself, as the burqa is not a universally mandated requirement of the faith.

Under Taliban rule, however, women are deprived of that choice and compelled to conform, stripping them of personal agency, access to formal education past the primary level, healthcare, humanitarian assistance and much more.

The Taliban regime has transformed courts and state institutions into tools for enforcing decrees that intensify the persecution of women. For instance, Decree 12 legitimizes domestic violence, while Decree 18 allows for child marriage. Women are tyrannized, and nearly three in four Afghans cannot meet their basic needs. Meanwhile, 35% of children under five suffer from stunting.

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Nonetheless, the European Union still manages to invite Taliban representatives to Brussels for discussions on migration and the deportation of Afghan nationals. While gender apartheid was not once the topic of such meetings, diplomacy appears to be moving forward regardless.

Where is the coordinated campaign to hold Taliban representatives accountable? This effort should rest on four principles.

First, we must acknowledge the role global powers have played in Afghanistan’s instability. The country became a battlefield for a proxy war. The Mujahideen were armed during the Soviet occupation and called freedom fighters. Neighboring states have long exerted influence.

Our world is globalized, and arguments such as “it’s their country, leave it up to them” are a logical fallacy. This is a global issue, not only because of human rights concerns but because of our collective role in shaping Afghanistan’s present reality.

Secondly, the withdrawal of the United States after 20 years in Afghanistan was viewed by many as the successful conclusion of a war. Yet when I see Afghan women stripped of their most basic freedoms, I struggle to describe the outcome as a success. While another military deployment is unrealistic and not desired, withdrawal should not mean abandonment.

We must not overlook that the Taliban’s pursuit of international legitimacy gives major powers leverage. Because it seeks to escape political isolation and access the global financial system, engagement should be conditioned on meaningful improvements in women’s and children’s rights.

Whenever the European Union engages with the Taliban, it should ensure that the concerns of Afghan women and children are represented. Nations must use diplomacy as leverage rather than complicity. Although coordination can be difficult, a unified approach would be far harder for the Taliban to ignore.

Lastly, history suggests that authoritarian regimes can fall through mass uprisings. Therefore, we must leave open the possibility that Afghanistan’s people may one day overturn the Taliban’s illegitimate regime. Will an ethnically, regionally and politically diverse population be able to unite? Will the international or regional community support? And at what human cost?

Perhaps the lesson we should draw from this contrast is not that women in the West and women in Afghanistan face the same reality — they do not. Yet both raise the same question: who gets to decide what a woman should be?

In Afghanistan, that decision is imposed by the state. In the West, it is often shaped by social expectations. These are not the same struggles, but they speak to the same human need: the desire to choose one’s own path.

In my opinion, the goal is neither a return to the 1950s nor the acceptance of a future in which every woman must pursue the same version of success.

The measure of a free society is not whether women choose tradition over modernity, careers over family, or public life over private life, but whether they are free to discover who they are before the world decides who they ought to be.

Shaya Mariji is a student at Rollins College, working toward a political science major and philosophy minor.

Commentary: In Afghanistan, Taliban is still involved in gender apartheid
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Preaching Without a Party: Independent religious figures find space under the Islamic Emirate

Sharif Akram

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below.

Our new report considers four online preachers – Rahmatullah Nowruz, Nasratullah Sahibi, Abdul Samad Qazizada and Jawed Ibrahimi – who have risen to prominence since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. Most were already active during the Islamic Republic, running small charities, posting religious content on Facebook and YouTube and quietly building schools and orphanages, but they were not particularly visible. In the last five years, that has changed, even as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) has sought to monopolise religious authority. It has banned or suppressed the various Islamist parties that were active under the Islamic Republic and moved to control religious discourse, including who may legally preach, how and on what. A large number of the Taliban’s own cadre, as well as mullahs affiliated with the movement, are now embedded in state structures, as ministers, members of the security forces, university chancellors and judges, becoming the public face of religion in Afghanistan.

Despite all this, these four preachers have emerged – young, urban, ‘online-first’ Islamic influencers who blend short videos on personal piety, family life and self-improvement with charitable and educational projects. The four are marked out by dress, language and subject matter from the Taliban and Taliban-aligned mullahs who prohibit and warn, dwelling on what people must not do and what punishments await sinners in the hereafter. Emirate discourse focuses on the failings of urban Afghans, of women’s dress, music and the influence of Western media. Traditional mullahs do not, by and large, address how a young man should manage his anger, how a husband and wife should communicate or how a person should cope with depression. The online preachers address precisely these questions, in a tone that is encouraging rather than chastising. As to their appearance, instead of robes, turbans and untrimmed beards, they look more like urban professionals. Their followers collectively number in the millions and include young women as well as men. Notably, as well, none of the four has gone through the full, rigorous madrasa education, which means they are dismissed by the religious establishment and more conservatively minded Afghans as unfit to speak about Islam. Yet, their popularity keeps on growing.

Part of their appeal is that, under the Islamic Emirate, religion and the state have become increasingly difficult to tell apart. Ordinary people used to look to mullahs as figures who could, at least in principle, stand apart from power. Now, their sermons sound less like religious counsel and more like state communication. Into this gap in religious authority and teaching have stepped the online preachers. This report draws on a review of the four figures’ online output, their televised interviews, audience comments on their posts and secondary reporting by other outlets. The analysis is based on what they have chosen to say in public. The report begins by examining how religious activism operated before the Emirate takeover and why, with its return, the space for independent religious voices has opened up. Sharif looks at what they preach and how their audiences receive them. He asks whether, ultimately, the four are helping the Emirate maintain its rule, or subverting it.

Edited by Kate Clark and Rachel Reid

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below.

 

Preaching Without a Party: Independent religious figures find space under the Islamic Emirate
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Indian influencer Sharanya Iyer opens up about travelling to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan

By Sanya Jain
Hindustan Times
July 8, 2026

In an era where social media travel feeds are saturated with picture-perfect photos, Indian travel content creator and filmmaker Sharanya Iyer — also known as ‘TrulyNomadly’ — chose a path less travelled. Speaking to Hindustantimes.com, the 36-year-old opened up about her recent two-week journey to Afghanistan, offering a raw, unfiltered look into a nation rarely traversed by tourists.

Sharanya Iyer with a Taliban soldier in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
Sharanya Iyer with a Taliban soldier in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

No whitewashing

The Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August 2021, following the withdrawal of US-led forces. Since returning to power, the Taliban has imposed a strict interpretation of Islamic law that has reshaped daily life, especially for women and girls.

Women have been banned from attending secondary schools and universities, barred from most jobs, restricted from travelling long distances without a male guardian, and required to follow strict dress codes. They have also been excluded from many public spaces, including parks, gyms and beauty salons.

“Does Afghanistan have beautiful places? Absolutely. Are the people warm and hospitable? Absolutely. But does that mean we stop talking about what’s happening to women there? I believe the answer is no.”

Why she chose Afghanistan

For Sharanya Iyer, the fascination with Afghanistan was deeply rooted in the literature and history she consumed growing up, ranging from Rabindranath Tagore’s Kabuliwala to Khaled Hosseini’s novels. She was drawn to the country’s ancient heritage and shared history with India.

Asked why she chose to travel to Afghanistan — a country facing boycott on several fronts because of its regime, the travel vlogger explained that her perspective on travelling to heavily sanctioned nations was first reshaped during a month-long solo backpacking trip through Iran in 2022.

From Kabul to Bamiyan: Cost and logistics

Departing from New Delhi in November 2025, Sharanya flew directly to Kabul on Kam Air, an Afghan airline, alongside a cabin filled mostly with Afghan locals returning home from working in India.

Architectural landmarks and archaeological heritage formed the core of Sharanya’s itinerary. She travelled to the valley of Bamiyan in the Hindu Kush mountains, exploring the empty niches where the world’s tallest Buddha statues stood before being destroyed by the Taliban in 2001.

The entire 12-to-13-day trip cost her approximately 2.1 lakh, an amount that covered flights, accommodation, meals, fuel, and entry tickets. Because she was filming her journey, she hired a private guide and driver.

“The Taliban, in the last year or more, has mandated travelling with a guide for tourists because you need permits to move between every province. My passport had to be shown, and all the permits had to be arranged before I landed in Afghanistan,” the travel vlogger explained.

“You have to have your route planned in advance, and you need a guide because they’re the ones who apply for the permits. At every checkpoint, they show the documents, and if the Taliban decides to call you out of the car, they’ll have a brief chat with you before letting you go. I had a local guide and a driver throughout my trip to travel between the provinces.”

The silent crisis

While Sharanya observed stunning landscapes and warm hospitality, the dark reality of systemic human rights abuses — particularly the extreme oppression of women — was not lost on her.

“So, if you’re not bound by the laws that Afghan women are bound by, you’ll see the warmth of the people. You’ll see them going out of their way to host you… The Afghan people are very hospitable. They love Indians. They won’t let you pay,” said the 36-year-old.

However, most of the women’s rights violations portrayed in the media are true. Women are not allowed to run businesses, can’t step out without being accompanied by a male relative, and as such have very little personal freedom.

“Women aren’t allowed to go to school beyond the sixth grade. I did see girls on their way to school in their uniforms, but they were young girls. Women are not allowed into universities anymore,” she revealed.

“In Kabul, I still saw women. They wore burqas but you could see them walking to the market in pairs. Outside of Kabul, I did not see any women unless they were accompanied by men.”

The Taliban strictly enforces the mahram rule, requiring women to be accompanied by a close male relative when in public spaces. This has severely restricted the movement of women in Afghanistan.

During her two-week stay, Sharanya saw parks and public places completely devoid of women. Men, on the other hand, could travel freely.

“Kabul is known to be a little more forward compared to the rest of Afghanistan. I went to a restaurant there at night where women were dining together with men. But everywhere else I travelled, there was a separate section for men and a separate section for women. Since I was with my guide, I sat in the men’s section rather than the women’s section,” said Sharanya.

Those for Taliban… and those seeking escape

During her interactions with ordinary citizens in local markets and restaurants, a recurring, heartbreaking theme emerged: an overwhelming desire to escape.

Many locals quietly approached her, asking for assistance with visas to India or seeking financial support to help them relocate their families. The desperation was especially profound among fathers who feared for the futures and education of their young daughters.

At the same time, she observed that many locals support the Taliban for bringing a sense of order to a war-torn country.

“For everything negative the Taliban has done—and there is a great deal that’s negative—they have also brought a degree of stability after decades of war,” she said.

“Afghanistan went through the Soviet invasion, years of civil conflict and then the American presence. People have lived with instability for decades.

“When I spoke to locals, many of them told me that, for the first time in years, they weren’t living with bombs, violence or constant war.”

“It’s easy for people outside Afghanistan to ask, “Why don’t the men rise up? Why don’t they fight the Taliban? Why aren’t they defending women? But it’s not that simple,” Sharanya continued.

“The Taliban is immensely powerful now and has deep financial backing. As outsiders, especially if we’re feminists, it’s very easy to condemn the Taliban—and I certainly do. But I also can’t ignore what ordinary Afghans told me.”

Why Afghanistan boycott is not the answer

Despite the inherent political risks and the potential that her critical social media commentary might restrict her from returning to Afghanistan, Sharanya Iyer stands firmly against the idea of completely boycotting or isolating the country. She believes that tourism provides a vital economic lifeline to ordinary citizens who are completely disconnected from the wealth of the ruling regime.

However, she issued a strong word of caution to aspiring travelers, noting that Afghanistan is not a standard vacation spot and requires a high level of travel experience and a willingness to handle extreme logistical uncertainty.

“I think the biggest takeaway for me is that you cannot boycott an entire country because of its regime, however horrific its laws may be. If we completely stop visiting places like Afghanistan, I believe we’re further isolating ordinary people and taking away whatever little opportunity they have to earn a livelihood,” Sharanya Iyer concluded.

Indian influencer Sharanya Iyer opens up about travelling to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan
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The closure of Canberra’s Afghan embassy is another blow to people on the brink of losing hope

The Guardian
Thu 2 Jul 2026

After Kabul fell to the Taliban, consulates around the world became hubs of resistance. Now their light is dimming

The decision, by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, reportedly followed a request from the Taliban and has left members of Australia’s Afghan community on edge.

I was a cadet journalist working in Afghanistan in 2012 when the news broke of Julian Assange taking refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy in London. I was amazed that diplomatic rules barred the British police from entering the embassy and arresting him.

At the time, I was covering the bloody Afghan conflict. The US had just deployed the “mother of all bombs” and the Taliban ruthlessly fought back using child suicide bombers.

There seemed to be no end in sight to the bloodshed and misery. The Taliban would boast the Americans might have watches but “we have the time”. They would drag things on, with no regard for the amount of death and destruction caused.

Then came the day when a deal was signed in Doha, Qatar, between the Trump administration and the Taliban, and the nascent Afghan democracy fell apart. With it went all the rights and freedoms that Afghan citizens, especially women and girls, had become acquainted with thanks to efforts by the US and allies including Australia, who had built schools and nurtured democratic institutions in the war-ravaged country.

Before the Taliban stormed Kabul, most western countries shut their embassies there and flew staff out. For the hundreds of thousands of Afghan soldiers, rights activists and other officials who feared Taliban persecution, the country’s diplomatic missions in nearby Iran, Pakistan and other countries became safe havens.

When I embarked on my own journey out of the country, I saw women shedding tears outside the Afghan embassy in Islamabad as they looked at the tricolour flag still flying high. Unlike inside Afghanistan where the Taliban had replaced the flag with their own, and were enforcing their gender-apartheid policy, outside the country embassy staff kept the old flag and were still treating women as human beings. And they didn’t just offer momentary emotional support – consular services stayed busy beyond official working hours to issue and sort crucial documents to help citizens with their private, financial, educational and other needs.

In the first couple of years of Taliban rule in Kabul, Afghan embassies in most capitals around the globe remained hubs of resistance. They tried to keep the tricolour flag flying high and, with the support of host countries, act as de facto representatives of the fallen democracy.

The closure of the Canberra embassy is another blow for people on the brink of losing identity and hope. For the bustling diaspora, who include members of the Afghan female cricket and football teams living in exile, this represents a further erosion of trust.

On Australia’s part there seems to be reluctance to fight the Taliban on a diplomatic front, instead choosing to ignore the country altogether. But for those Australian soldiers, diplomats and aid workers who lived through the war, together with the Afghans who made huge sacrifices for the promise of a fair and free future, the embassy’s closure is heartbreaking.

Among Canberra’s political power brokers, the Afghan war and the fall of Kabul may now be a distant memory. But it is still possible to salvage a better future for the next generation by not abandoning modern diplomacy when it is needed the most.

  • Shadi Khan Saif is an editor, producer and journalist who has worked in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Germany and Australia

The closure of Canberra’s Afghan embassy is another blow to people on the brink of losing hope
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I was lucky. Other Afghan girls are still waiting for their chance.

By Sana Shinwari

Sana Shinwari is a student at Columbia University.

The Washington Post

July 6, 2026

My brothers started school in March. My sisters had to stay home.

On March 26, the new school year began in Afghanistan. In Kabul, my two younger brothers packed their bags, put on their uniforms and walked out the door — one heading to ninth grade, one to fifth. I listened over the phone from more than 6,000 miles away as they recounted their first day of class, and it struck me how much they had grown. The last time I saw them, they were still little kids. Now, the older one has a mustache.

My 17-year-old sister did not pack anything that morning. She has not been inside a classroom in five years. She would be starting college this year if the Taliban had not taken over the country in August 2021 and banned every girl from school above sixth grade.

I have a baby sister who will turn 3 in May. I have never met her. She is not old enough for school yet. But once she completes primary school, the door to further schooling will be closed to her, too — unless something changes.

Afghanistan is the only country in the world where girls and women are forbidden from secondary and higher education. According to UNICEF, that ban applies to more than 2.2 million girls. This is the fifth consecutive year that secondary school and university doors have opened for boys and stayed shut for girls.

When the Taliban recaptured Kabul in 2021, world leaders promised they would not abandon Afghan women. The United States, the European Union and the United Nations have denounced the Taliban’s anti-education decrees. The U.N. condemned the banning of women from universities, saying it may constitute “gender persecution,” a crime against humanity. The E.U. denounced a decree in 2024 as an “appalling violation of fundamental human rights.”

But none of it meant anything to the girls sitting at home. No government has made girls’ education a condition for engagement or coordination. No country has faced diplomatic or economic consequences for engaging — as have China and Turkey — with a regime that has banned half of its population from learning. According to UNESCO, the Taliban have now implemented more than 70 decrees stripping women of their rights, and the international response has been to object, denounce and wait. Years later, the girls are still waiting too.

My older sister, who is 21, was not so fortunate. For her, most days feel like a nightmare. She spent years working to secure a scholarship to a university in the United States. When she found out she had won the scholarship, I began to feel more hopeful. But that did not last long. A week after she received her university acceptance in May 2025, the U.S. enacted a travel ban on Afghan nationals, as well as nationals of several other countries. Her hope of coming here vanished. She has a seat in a classroom waiting for her, and she cannot reach it.

The U.S. cut off nearly all aid last year to my home country, but that has not improved living conditions or changed the Taliban’s decrees. Instead, it has punished ordinary Afghans while the Taliban continue doing what they want. Afghan girls deserve a more targeted response.

First, Western governments must fast-track visas and scholarships for Afghan girls who have already secured university placements abroad. Many Afghan girls, like my older sister, have been accepted to universities in the U.S. and Britain, but travel restrictions in both countries make it impossible for them to go. Afghan girls with confirmed university placements are not security risks. If Western governments and the U.N. care about girls’ education as much as they have declared, making them wait in Afghanistan — rather than welcoming them to universities that want them — amounts to abandonment. It is strange indeed for British officials to call for Afghanistan’s referral to the International Court of Justice while it bars Afghan girls from attending university in London and Manchester.

Second, the U.N. must create a specific accountability mechanism for the education ban — one with real consequences for the Taliban, not for the Afghan people. The current approach of issuing statements and expressing disappointment has failed. Five years of disappointment has not opened a single classroom door.

I am proud of my brothers. I am glad they are in school, and I want them to learn, grow and build their futures. But I cannot celebrate their first day back without thinking about my sisters, my cousins and the more than 2 million girls who stayed behind that morning.

Five years is long enough. The girls of Afghanistan have been patient and resilient. They have learned in secret and held on to hope longer than anyone should have to. They are not asking for sympathy; they are asking for what the Taliban took from them: a chance to learn.

I was lucky. Other Afghan girls are still waiting for their chance.
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The Afghanistan Reckoning

Carter Malkasian

Foreign Affairs

July/August 2026 

Forever Wars and the Costs of Collective Forgetting

Five years ago, the 20-year American war in Afghanistan came to an inglorious end. In April 2021, the United States had begun its final withdrawal, with the goal of pulling out the 2,500 U.S. troops that remained in the country by September. Within weeks of the first U.S. departures, the Taliban had swept up scores of positions as Afghan government forces melted away. By early August, the group had taken control of most provincial capitals. Finally, on August 15, 2021, the U.S.-backed government in Kabul collapsed. Hundreds of thousands of terrified Afghans besieged the city’s airport. Roughly 120,000 were evacuated in planeloads by the United States, its allies, and even groups of private citizens. In a heartbreaking final blow, 13 American service members died in a suicide bombing at the airport four days before the last U.S. soldier departed on August 30. Two decades of heroic effort had ended in shame.

Recriminations followed—some justified, some not. The same group that had harbored al-Qaeda while it planned and carried out the 9/11 attacks had triumphantly returned to power, and fears of a resurgent terrorist threat mounted. After all, the main reason that successive American presidents had decided to keep U.S. forces in the country for so long was the belief that without them, Afghanistan would once again become a safe haven for terrorists even if the Taliban did not manage to take full control.

Nothing of the sort occurred. Over the past five years, not a single act of terrorism against the United States was carried out by a group based in Afghanistan. Washington spent roughly $1 trillion on the war. More than 120,000 Afghan civilians were killed or injured. More than 775,000 American service members were deployed to Afghanistan, more than 20,700 were injured, and more than 2,400 died—all to defend against a threat that turned out to have been exaggerated.

If American officials had known then what they know now, many of them—including me—would have argued more strongly for an earlier withdrawal. This is an uncomfortable point of view to adopt. It calls into question the judgment of leaders, the effectiveness of the policy process, and the value of the entire effort. Washington might have seen a better outcome, or at least a shorter war, if officials had more seriously debated withdrawal earlier, considered a wider range of threat assessments, pursued negotiations sooner, and, in some cases, recognized the bias instilled by a distaste for defeat.

Five years on, the greatest danger is not that a terrorist safe haven might once again emerge in Afghanistan. A graver threat comes from the risk of collective forgetting. Today, the longest American war rarely figures in public discourse. Americans occasionally acknowledge the noble sacrifices that thousands of U.S. service members made in the conflict. But the country moved on, eager to forget those final days. The riskiest form of forgetting would be for American leaders to fail to recall how perilous it proved to accept high costs and terrible losses, all in response to the fears of the moment. Remembering that will help them avoid future anguish.

“YOU ARE WORTH PROTECTING”

On October 7, 2001, President George W. Bush invaded Afghanistan in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks that had stunned the world. Within months, a combination of U.S. airpower, special operations forces, intelligence operatives, and the Afghan militia known as the Northern Alliance had chased out al-Qaeda and upended the Taliban regime led by Mullah Omar. A new government was formed under the Afghan leader Hamid Karzai. For the next four years, the country was deceptively peaceful. This initial success helped tempt the Bush administration into invading Iraq in 2003, leading to a brutal war that captured most of Washington’s attention for the next five years. During that time, the Taliban regrouped. By 2006, they were regaining territory and seriously challenging the Afghan government.

Throughout this period, the United States was gripped by a fear of terrorism, its anxiety fed not only by the horrors of 9/11 but also by the anthrax attacks that followed in their wake and a series of lethal jihadist bombings and foiled plots in Europe in the mid-2000s. “The global war on terror” was raging, and Afghanistan was the main theater. Countering terrorism was unquestionably the center of U.S. military activity in the country, a mission articulated by presidents, secretaries of defense and state, military commanders, and intelligence chiefs.

The United States had other ambitions in Afghanistan, as well, including a nation-building mission that aimed to establish a sustainable democracy. Bush declared this goal explicitly, and in spite of his successors’ efforts to back away, it remained an implicit part of the American project. But without the terrorist threat, there would have been no war against the Taliban, no arming and training of the Afghan military, no nation building, and no democracy promotion. Terrorism was always the driving concern.

Washington understood little about the Taliban.

For many of the men and women on the ground, that mission justified their efforts and losses. As Ross Berkoff, a U.S. Army lieutenant stationed in Kandahar in 2003, wrote in his diary: “September 11, 2001, is a day that will live in infamy and the fact that Afghanistan became a new place for U.S. soldiers to deploy is directly tied to that infamous day. . . . I am here to respond. We’re here in response.” In a 2019 memoir, Kyle Carpenter, who fought in Afghanistan as a member of the U.S. Marine Corps and received the Medal of Honor, summed up his feelings about his service on behalf of Americans: “You are worth protecting, you are worth fighting for, you are worth time in a hospital bed and deep scars on my body.”

That is not to say that the strategy was always clearly communicated or convincing. Many U.S. troops on the ground were not directly involved in counterterrorism or special operations missions. For some, engaging in firefights in remote mountains and deserts with local Taliban, being targeted by improvised explosive devices, and trying to build up the troubled Afghan government and army seemed a far cry from fighting dreaded international terrorists. Some developed deep skepticism about the purpose of the war, which could turn to resentment when fellow service members died or were wounded.

From 2009 to 2011, I served as the U.S. State Department’s political officer in Garmser, a rural district in the southern province of Helmand. I was part of a small team of around half a dozen civilians attached to a U.S. Marine battalion, advising the district governor, the police, and local tribal and religious leaders. Just about every Afghan in the region believed that without U.S. forces backing a strong army and police force, the Taliban would return. A few claimed that al-Qaeda would come with them.

As far as I could tell, there was little to suggest that al-Qaeda was active in Garmser or elsewhere in the south. The truth was that the chances of the group’s reviving its Afghan stronghold were impossible to measure with any confidence—and such a nebulous threat scarcely seemed commensurate with the 100,000 U.S. troops then in the country. But by the time I left, I was heartened by the Marines’ accomplishments. The Taliban had been pushed out of the vast majority of the district. An Afghan government official could travel unarmed from the top to the bottom of the territory. Over 1,000 new Afghan soldiers and police officers were in place and active. I thought that it was unnecessary for tens of thousands of U.S. forces to stay in Afghanistan, as long as a smaller number remained for the long term. In 2012, Kael Weston and I wrote in these pages that 25,000 U.S. advisers, special operations forces, and air and support personnel should stay. Otherwise, “the Afghan central government would likely lose control of the Pashtun east and south” and, “thrown on the defensive, would be unable to prevent the return of al Qaeda to the vast Pashtun heartland.” The country, we warned, would “backslide, quickly and perhaps irrevocably, taking with it the United States’ ability to combat al Qaeda.”

From 2013 to 2014, I was back in Afghanistan as the civilian adviser to General Joseph Dunford, commander of all U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan. During those years, U.S. President Barack Obama had begun to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan, and by the time I left, fewer than 10,000 remained, and they were focused on turning the war over to the Afghan soldiers and police. In too many places, however, they were suffering setbacks: in the summer of 2014, at the strategic crossroads of Sangin, in Helmand, hundreds of well-armed Afghan police and soldiers had been overrun by a Taliban offensive. That defeat heralded worse reversals that came in 2015 and 2016, all of which U.S. officials took as indicators that the Afghan government could not hold back the Taliban on its own, nor prevent the subsequent establishment of an al-Qaeda safe haven. For me, it was a sign that the costs of staying in Afghanistan had possibly become greater than the danger of terrorism that would come in the wake of the government’s fall.

For the rest of Obama’s time in office, and during the first term of President Donald Trump, the Afghan war was the focus of constant debate in the White House. The particulars changed over time, but the basic choice was always the same: stay in the country with a small number of troops, a posture that was sustainable but potentially endless, or get out, meaning that sooner or later the government would fall and the terrorist threat would likely return. From 2012 onward, the intelligence community assessed that a terrorist capability to attack the United States could reconstitute in Afghanistan within one to three years after a U.S. withdrawal.

Trump retained the fundamentals of Obama’s strategy until mid-2018, when he decided it was time to leave Afghanistan and pursue direct negotiations with the Taliban. Obama had allowed for talks between 2010 and 2014, but the effort was a low priority for his administration. By 2018, the strategic context had changed. A U.S.-led coalition had defeated the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the global terrorist threat was ebbing, and a bipartisan consensus was at last forming that the United States should wind down the war in Afghanistan. Trump’s agreement with the Taliban, signed in February 2020, stipulated that Washington would withdraw all its military forces by May 2021. In return, the Taliban promised not to allow al-Qaeda to recruit, train, or conduct operations from Afghanistan—although the Taliban refused to break relations with the group.

THE BAD GUYS WON

On taking office in January 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden faced a hard choice: keep 2,500 troops in Afghanistan to suppress the terrorist threat, or leave in accordance with Trump’s agreement. Either strategy was viable. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, and senior U.S. generals favored staying. They argued that counterterrorism operations could be better maintained from inside Afghanistan and that the continued presence of American troops would prevent the defeat of the Afghan government. Biden himself was genuinely concerned about terrorism and acknowledged the possibility of a Saigon-like collapse, but he leaned toward escaping from a never-ending mission. For Biden, the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. contest with China, and the struggling American economy were far greater worries.

In April 2021, Biden announced that all U.S. military forces would withdraw by September 11 of that year. The administration believed the Afghan government would hold out for at least six months after that point. But Kabul fell in August, and the Taliban have governed Afghanistan ever since, led by their dour emir, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada. Before taking the top position in 2016, he had been the chief judge of the Taliban’s Islamic court, a position that endowed his leadership with religious legitimacy in the eyes of many Afghans. He is said to have endorsed a suicide bombing by his own son in Helmand in 2018. Following in Mullah Omar’s footsteps, Haibatullah rules not from Kabul but from the traditional Taliban stronghold of Kandahar, and assiduously stays out of the public eye. In Kabul, meanwhile, the minister of the interior is Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the terrorist group known as the Haqqani network and the mastermind of countless wartime suicide attacks, such as a truck bombing in front of the German Embassy in 2017 that killed 150 Afghans and injured 400 more.

The ascent of men like these is precisely the kind of outcome that U.S. officials feared when they contemplated a post-American Afghanistan. Yet far from ushering in a new age of chaos and carnage, Taliban rule has instead fostered a period of relative stability. The country has been at peace for five years, the longest stretch since 1979, when a Soviet invasion was followed by decades of war. Other than periodic attacks by the Islamic State, resistance to the regime has been minimal. Afghans consistently tell me that the country is now aram, or calm. Since retaking control, the Taliban have not ruthlessly oppressed the Afghan people. The group has not systematically imprisoned its former adversaries or those who worked with the United States, its allies, or the Afghan government. Taliban governors and judges have generally permitted those people to go on with their lives. The biggest danger for them is violence carried out by low-level Taliban members with a grudge, or local rivals looking for an excuse to settle old scores.

Perhaps the most unexpected element of Taliban governance has been its ban on the poppy cultivation that long made Afghanistan a major node in the international heroin trade. Poppy was a major source of revenue for the group during the war. But in 2022, Haibatullah banned the cultivation, sale, and consumption of all narcotics. Enforced by public floggings and long prison sentences and backed by eradication efforts, the edict reduced the cultivation of poppy by approximately 95 percent in 2023, according to UN estimates. The Taliban have accomplished this feat even though doing so sharply reduced the tax revenues they could collect and negatively affected the livelihoods of perhaps a fifth of the population.
Many who served in the war now see it as a waste.

Of course, there have also been significant setbacks. Economic growth has stagnated, and poverty has worsened. Health care has degraded with the cessation of international assistance. The most glaring fault is the plight of Afghan women. In 2022, Haibatullah issued edicts that banned girls from attending secondary schools and universities. Women also face restrictions on working and on venturing outside their homes without being escorted by a male relative. The deterioration of health care has hit women particularly hard because hospitals and clinics had been among the few places with personnel dedicated to their care. The cruelty of the policies is thrown into relief by the major strides in rights and opportunities that Afghan women in some parts of the country made in the decades that the Taliban were out of power. Female income per capita doubled between 2000 and 2013. In Kabul, at least, a generation of Afghan women grew up with access to education, job opportunities, and a sense that they could build lives of their own. The Taliban have extinguished those dreams.

By far the most important turn of events for American and Western interests, however, has been the absence of terrorism. There is little evidence to suggest that al-Qaeda is organizing, fundraising, or training on Afghan territory. Seemingly with the Afghan emirate’s permission, fighters and leaders from the Pakistani Taliban have taken refuge in Afghanistan, where they have launched 700 attacks on Pakistani soil. The resulting war has seen Pakistan bomb the Afghan cities of Bagram, Kabul, Paktia, and Kandahar, while Afghan forces have attacked Pakistani border posts. Meanwhile, the Islamic State maintains a few thousand fighters in Afghanistan who have conducted high-profile attacks on the Taliban government in Kabul. But for five years, no known terrorist attack has been mounted from Afghanistan against the United States. Despite the Taliban’s track record as enablers of al-Qaeda and their failure to manage their country’s economy, the group has not fostered global terrorism since 2021 but instead contained it.

A reversal cannot be entirely ruled out because Washington’s ability to monitor Afghanistan is not what it was in 2020, let alone 2011. The United States may be unable to detect terrorist plotting and training in mountain villages or in the backstreets of Kabul, Kandahar, or Jalalabad. And the past five years have not been without red flags. In 2022, a U.S. strike killed Ayman al-Zawahiri, who inherited the leadership of al-Qaeda from Osama bin Laden, at a guest house linked to Haqqani. In 2023, a team of UN investigators concluded that there were still around 400 al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan actively trying to rebuild a base of operations. Similarly, the Islamic State’s Afghan affiliate could be stronger than it currently seems and could shift its focus from undermining the Taliban to attacking Western interests.

But the unmistakable fact is that so far, Taliban rule has been manageable for American interests. Five years after the U.S. withdrawal, it is fair to say that the threat of terrorism, which drove American decision-making, was exaggerated.

LOSING IS NOT AN OPTION

The question that lingers, then, is why American officials so badly misjudged the risk of withdrawing and opted to stay for so long. One factor was domestic politics. Had ordinary Americans not been gripped by fears of jihadism after 9/11, and had they more acutely felt the effects of the war in their own lives, then popular protests, electoral politics, and congressional opposition might have compelled a president to withdraw much earlier. The war in Afghanistan never inspired much passion among ordinary Americans. Presidents confronted little popular opposition to staying and feared that a rapid collapse in the aftermath of a U.S. pullout would be a political disaster—as indeed it was for Biden, whose approval ratings fell sharply after dismayed Americans watched the 2021 evacuation devolve into chaos and bloodshed.

In retrospect, the years immediately following bin Laden’s death, in May 2011, offered the best opportunities to end the war. Washington’s most notorious enemy was dead, and his organization was decimated. Moreover, by that point, it was clear that the surge of troops that Obama had ordered to Afghanistan in 2009 would be too costly to sustain. About a month after bin Laden’s death, Obama announced that 33,000 American troops would withdraw from Afghanistan by September 2012, which would leave around 67,000 in the country. Those forces would continue to draw down until the end of 2014, the president said, when the United States would end its combat mission and shift to a training, advising, and counterterrorism mission. In May 2014, Obama announced that the withdrawal would be complete by the end of 2016. But he reversed that decision the following year amid the rise of the Islamic State, known as ISIS, and Taliban advances in Afghanistan.

If its timeline had been shorter, the withdrawal might have been completed by that point, and Obama might not have been able to reverse course. He did not demand precipitous withdrawal, but he seriously considered a “zero option.” The Pentagon, which was not bent on staying, could have presented the president with options for withdrawing more quickly, and Obama himself could have decided to execute faster.

Throughout the Afghan war, beneath the policy debates lay another, unstated reason to stay: the humiliation of losing. The military had understandable biases when confronting the painful topic of withdrawal. Many generals felt a professional duty to accept any outcome; for others, a Taliban victory carried a deep stigma. They did not want to lose. They did not want their soldiers to have fallen in vain.

U.S. soldiers and generals could not succeed in their daily operations if they were not ruthlessly determined to outfight the enemy. Nor could they succeed if they did not care about the Afghans—genuinely, not as pawns in some great game. Afghans had to put their lives on the line, too. This is a difference between the soldier or officer on the ground and a policymaker back home. Thinking objectively about strategy demands a degree of detachment that a person on the frontline must reject. Emotional commitment, with all its biases, is irreplaceable. It is hard for anyone who goes from the field back to Washington to detach from this kind of commitment. Simply put, one reason the Americans did not leave Afghanistan earlier is that the U.S. military fights to win.

THE PERILS OF CONSENSUS

The Taliban did not make the prospect of withdrawal any easier to contemplate. Between 2010 and 2021, Taliban representatives told U.S. interlocutors that they had no intention of permitting anyone on Afghan soil to plan or carry out a terrorist attack overseas. But they muddied the waters by maintaining a relationship with al-Qaeda. In 2019, I was on the U.S. negotiating team that met with Taliban representatives in Qatar, and they admitted to working with al-Qaeda and wanting its members to be able to live in Afghanistan, all while resisting U.S. requests to offer written guarantees to ban al-Qaeda fundraising, recruiting, and training. If Washington’s great failure was overestimating or exaggerating the terrorism threat, the Taliban’s was keeping that threat alive by refusing, late in the game, to make a clean break with al-Qaeda.

The more important factor that kept Washington from better estimating the threat earlier was the seemingly sturdy conviction among various U.S. intelligence agencies that the threat of terrorism would rise if American forces withdrew. This view was the result of a process of producing national intelligence estimates that, by design, reflected a consensus. Various experts inside and outside government expressed skepticism about the general conclusion, but in an ad hoc fashion; in a consensus-driven process, contrary views were bound to be washed out.

The fault for that, however, does not lie with the intelligence analysts. Decision-makers, congressional representatives, and policy advisers (including me) should have asked the intelligence community for a wider set of forecasts. For the sake of simplicity, I accepted one rough forecast instead of asking for multiple predictions from different viewpoints that I could then present to the principals. It is likely that one such forecast would have described a fair chance of an indefinitely low terrorist threat to the American homeland. That might have weakened the case for staying—and might have caught the attention of Obama, Trump, Congress, and the media.

The United States did not predict the stability that Taliban rule would yield or the relative leniency the group would show toward Afghans who had opposed it. Washington understood little about the movement; its leaders stayed hidden, and few outsiders had access. (Mullah Omar died in 2013, but the rest of the world, as well as most of his own movement, did not even learn of his passing until two years later.) In retrospect, views of the movement were skewed by reports about its first time in power, when it ruled the country in the late 1990s. Executions, stonings, and other abuses were not as widespread as media accounts from that period suggested. Similarly, the maze of Afghan tribal politics—and distorted information from unreliable Afghan government sources—led U.S. officials to underestimate the level of unity and hierarchy within the movement, which partly explain its success in the past five years.

One way to mitigate these misperceptions would have been to prioritize a sustained dialogue with Taliban representatives much earlier. Attempts to reach out between 2010 and 2014 were sincere but underresourced. Contact with and knowledge of the Taliban—and confidence in that knowledge—would have increased dramatically, and might have created an earlier opportunity for the negotiations to end the war.

THE MINEFIELD AT HOME

The American war in Afghanistan had a tragic quality. The United States could not avoid entering the conflict but then had few chances to exit. Many who served in the war now see it as a waste. Some feel betrayed or let down by generals and civilians who, in spite of the futility of the war, continued to put them in harm’s way. An August 2021 Pew Research poll found that two-thirds of veterans from all American wars felt the United States had failed to reach its objectives in Afghanistan. “In the aftermath of 2021, many of us were gripped with existential questions about the meaning and legacy of our service,” Berkoff, the U.S. Army lieutenant, now retired, reflects at the end of his memoir. “We struggle with—and continue to unpack—feelings of guilt or regret, wondering if our sacrifices were really in vain.” Timothy Kudo, a retired Marine captain, is harsher: “I think of the star-spangled banner that flew over my old patrol base. . . . Five men died under that flag, for what?” It is deeply unsettling that thousands of service members who fought, were wounded, or lost friends in the war now see it as an unworthy endeavor.

Americans will not all share any single memory of the war in Afghanistan or accept any single explanation for the outcome. And in addition to those who feel it was a waste are the officers, enlisted personnel, and diplomats who feel the war was a duty and served their country, regardless of the reasons the government chose to wage it. There is also a smaller cohort of veterans of the Afghan campaign who believe that the war could have been won. In their view, the Afghan government could have stood on its own, and the Taliban could have been defeated—if only more U.S. troops had stayed in the country, special operations had been conducted more vigorously, the Afghan military had been better constructed, or Washington had not repeatedly told the Taliban it would withdraw.

These sentiments have created a minefield for military leaders. Today, officers must demonstrate to troops that they will not put lives at risk in endeavors that fall short of victory. To civilian leaders, they must demonstrate that they will not stand in the way of policy. A similar dynamic has not been seen since the aftermath of the Vietnam War, which caused Americans to lose confidence in their military leaders and led the military to refocus on fighting conventional wars and transform itself into a professional all-volunteer force. Perhaps that experience offers some solace: the many lessons from defeat may result in stronger armed forces, improved political judgment, and greater scrutiny of the rationales for putting lives in danger.

The value of a soldier’s life lies at the heart of debates about the meaning of the Afghan war. For much of the war, most American leaders and most ordinary Americans thought the benefit of security outweighed the cost of casualties. Today, hardly anyone believes that. Similar shifts took place after other American wars, most recently those in Vietnam and Iraq. In every case, it all seemed so important at the time. Years later, many people decided that if they had known how things would turn out, they would not have supported sacrificing so much.

Americans must not forget those changes of heart. They must remember what it feels like to look back at a war they once embraced and think, “If only I had known then what I know now.”

The Afghanistan Reckoning
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The Unraveling of Afghan Asylum

Tanvi Misra

Afghan asylum seekers fled a crisis the US had a direct role in fomenting—only to become targets in Trump’s immigration crackdown.

The New York Review of Books

June 28, 2026

We first met in the spring of 2025, at a gathering in the basement of the Hazrati Abu Bakr Siddique mosque in Flushing, two years after he and his family of eight crossed the US–Mexico border fleeing persecution by the Taliban. By the time we reunited this past March, at an iftar dinner hosted in Brooklyn by the grassroots organization Afghans For A Better Tomorrow, Monsef and his family had taken substantive steps toward building a life in the US; with support from a state program, they were about to move from a hotel shelter in the city to a house in Westchester. He and his wife both had jobs. Their two eldest children—both girls—were in college.

And yet the Trump administration kept putting new restrictions in their path. The judge assigned to their case was among the many that the federal government has fired since Trump retook office. Last fall the administration’s leading immigration bureaucrat announced an indefinite pause on approving asylum applications filed with his agency, including that of Monsef’s family, among other petitions in the pipeline for visas and immigration benefits. Then Immigration and Customs Enforcement started detaining Afghans in the city with pending asylum applications, many of whom had already been detained after crossing the border. “We don’t know what we can do,” Monsef told me on the phone in March. “It is a kind of unknown future.”

Monsef was born into a Shia Muslim family from the Hazara ethnic minority. Both groups were targeted under the Taliban, whose forces tortured Monsef’s father, a well-known community leader, when Monsef was young. Monsef came of age shortly after the Taliban fell during the US-led invasion in 2001, and after getting his degree he worked for the Afghan government as a civil engineer on projects funded by the US. That alone, he knew, made him and his family into targets when, in 2021, the Taliban returned to power.

With his wife, their six children, and his elderly mother, Monsef traveled around the world to the Americas, then made his way up, mostly on foot, to the US–Mexico border. The journey was an extreme ordeal. During the walk through the notorious jungles of the Darien Gap, one of the deadliest land migration routes in the world, Monsef at times held two of his younger children in his arms. At one point in their hike his elderly mother collapsed; she was unconscious for over an hour. It was so physically arduous that he sometimes felt he might not be able to push through.

When Monsef and his family finally crossed into San Diego, in the spring of 2023, they felt an immediate flush of relief, he told me. They thought they were safe: “We were not thinking about what will happen after.” Soon advocates in New York City arranged to fly them to the East Coast.

Among the advocates who came to help the family was Arash Azizzada, who founded Afghans for a Better Tomorrow in 2021 to coordinate the resettlement of Afghans who were evacuated after the US withdrawal. In early 2023, when Republican governors in border states started bussing migrants into New York City as a political ploy, Azizzada and other volunteers began showing up at Port Authority to greet them, set them up with legal assistance, give them a sense of community, and arrange other forms of mutual aid. Their first order of business was handing out cell phones. Some of the refugees they helped would later chip in to support others.

The Afghans who came through the southern border under Biden were a particularly vulnerable crowd, Azizzada said in an email when he first wrote to me in early 2024. Being asylum seekers who had crossed the border, often without permission, they didn’t qualify for certain benefits typically extended to resettled refugees. Nor did they all have a clear path to citizenship that took into account their special circumstances as people who had fled not just a shared enemy but a situation the United States had a direct role in fomenting. Because of new rules the Biden administration implemented at the time, if migrants crossed without an appointment on a glitchy app, they were barred from seeking asylum altogether (although they could still pursue certain other types of protections). These policies were already hurting asylum seekers, and Azizzada worried that a second Trump administration could spell disaster for Afghans, among other new arrivals. Two years later, the disaster is unfolding as a slow burn.

The US, which signed the international protocol on refugees in 1968, has an obligation to all asylum seekers when they arrive at or enter its borders: it cannot, by law, return them to harm. The right to asylum was formalized into US law in 1980, almost three decades after it was codified into international law as a response to the mass displacement caused by the Holocaust. It has never been fairly and consistently implemented, and it almost immediately came under attack. In the decades since, successive presidents—both Democratic and Republican—have both made it much more dangerous for people fleeing persecution to arrive at US borders in the first place and chipped away at the due process they can access inside the US if they manage to enter. (Accessing asylum requires the applicant’s presence on US soil, and anyone can, at least on paper, legally request it regardless of how they enter the country.) Asylum law was created for people fleeing political persecution and excluded so-called economic migrants, but in reality these were never mutually exclusive categories, as the historian Mae Ngai has explained in these pages. And yet under Trump, Ngai writes, even this flawed protection has been dissolved “for cynical ends.” No matter how deserving a migrant is under the law, they remain a target.

In his first term Trump launched an escalating assault on asylum. During the pandemic he started turning away asylum seekers at the border, citing public health reasons. On the campaign trail Biden vowed to bring back humanity to the southern border, but once he entered the White House he retained and even expanded this Trump-era ban. Human Rights First documented around 13,500 cases of murder, rape, and other violence against migrants who were blocked or turned back under this policy after Biden took office. Biden also, for the first time ever, put numerical limits on how many people could seek asylum at the southern border. These policies meant that “more people will die, or face persecution and abuse, after they are blocked from accessing safety,” Heidi Altman, the vice president of policy at the National Immigration Law Center, said in September 2024.

When Trump returned to office in 2025 he shut down the entry of all migrants—including asylum seekers—by declaring an “invasion” at the southern border. An appeals court recently blocked this measure, but this past week the Supreme Court issued a decision in a separate case allowing the administration to restrict asylum in other ways. Over the past year and a half, meanwhile, the Trump administration has developed a range of methods to weaponize a system already stacked against asylum seekers, cancelling many existing pathways and protections and rushing to deport people, including asylum seekers with pending cases. To an unprecedented degree, many have been sent to third countries with which they had no ties, from Panama to Ghana.

The Afghans caught up in this dragnet are not legally distinct from other types of asylum seekers: they have to demonstrate the same asylum paperwork, and they remain subject to the same border policies and shifts in courtroom due process. But because they come from a country in which the United States has directly waged war, the US government has a special obligation toward them. At the same time, it also scrutinizes them from a particular, racialized point of view that developed in the years after September 11. The US occupied Afghanistan for twenty years as one of the crucial arenas in its War on Terror, muddling on with its attempt at regime change and counterinsurgency. Faced with political instability at home, thousands of Afghans fled, many to the country that had sold itself as a haven of democracy and opportunity while it invaded and further destabilized theirs. Between 2000 and 2019 the Afghan immigrant population in the US almost tripled, from 45,000 to 132,000, according to the Migration Policy Institute. All this gives the current suspension of protections for Afghan asylum seekers an especially cruel tinge.

During Trump’s first-term crackdown Afghans flew somewhat “under the radar,” Azizzada told me in a recent interview; perhaps because they were seen as useful to the War on Terror, they weren’t a primary target. That started to change after Biden pulled US troops out of Afghanistan in 2021, quickly reversing any meager gains the US may have made during its longest war. As the Taliban regained control, the hastily planned evacuation efforts left Afghans who had worked with the US scrambling to get on planes leaving Kabul. Reports from the time showed Afghans clinging to a military aircraft’s landing gears as the plane taxied towards takeoff; at least seven people died in the process. For days people rushed at the perimeter of the airport—which was manned by US Marines—waving their IDs and pleading to board. “Eleven years, I worked with the CIA,” one man said in English to the PBS correspondent Jane Ferguson, showing his paperwork. “No one is letting me in.”

After facing criticism from advocates and Democrats in Congress, Biden announced a program that would allow vulnerable Afghans who had already undergone vetting to enter the US. They would have temporary permission to stay as they waited to be processed for special visas meant for those who helped US forces during the war—or for asylum, if they were eligible. A year later, the program was renamed and reoriented toward a longer-term approach, offering Afghans who had been evacuated to US bases in Qatar and elsewhere fast-track refugee resettlement and a chance to obtain special visas.

Since the withdrawal, meanwhile, advocates had been doubling down on getting Congress to pass legislation guaranteeing a permanent pathway to citizenship for Afghans allied with the US. In 2024 Senator Jerry Moran of Kansas, then the top Republican on the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee, joined Amy Klobuchar to introduce an amendment along these lines in a national security package after Republicans blocked a broader border legislation that included the provision. “After the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, veterans extended the creed ‘leave no man behind’ and helped their Afghan partners flee to the United States for safety,” Moran said in a statement at the time. “Unfortunately, many of our Afghan partners are still overseas, and those who made it to the US face uncertainty as to whether they will be granted permanent residency.”

Moran saw securing a place in the US for Afghan allies as a matter of national security. “It sends a message to our allies that we’re dependable and a message to our adversaries that we’re united,” he told the military newspaper Stars and Stripes. But hardline Republicans, notably Chuck Grassley and Tom Cotton in the Senate, have refused to back bills with a citizenship pathway for Afghans unless they include more vetting and higher-order asylum restrictions at the border, arguing that Biden’s evacuation efforts prioritized haste instead of security. As evidence, they have pointed to oversight reports finding that US authorities did not always have data to fully vet admitted Afghans. A 2022 report found that two of the parole program’s beneficiaries (out of tens of thousands) “may have posed a risk to national security.” A 2025 audit of the FBI’s role in the process found that fifty-five evacuees were on watchlists, but that the agency “effectively communicated and addressed any potential national security risks” overall. The federal government has emphasized that these people were among the most vetted immigrants, screened by counterterrorism departments and the FBI.

On the other hand, many advocates have noted that the government’s approach to Afghan resettlement was not just uniquely stringent but willfully sluggish, especially in contrast with the reception of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the Russian invasion around the same time. The few existing pathways sometimes closed for nebulous reasons, even after months of agonizing waiting, and even for those Afghan families who seemed to otherwise present a slam-dunk case. Moran and Klobuchar’s 2024 proposal was never included in the final national-security package, and subsequent legislative efforts to create new pathways to citizenship for Afghans have been similarly bogged down. Earlier this year, Politico reported that House Speaker Mike Johnson quietly stripped language that would continue relocation efforts for Afghans from the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act. Even in 2026, five years after the withdrawal, some evacuees were still waiting to be resettled at the Camp As-Sayliyah military base in Doha, Qatar. When the US launched its war in Iran, many of them were stranded as debris from Iran’s retaliatory fire rained down.

Advocates also note that translators and other Afghans who worked directly with the US government were not the only ones whose lives were touched by—and continue to be affected by—US policies at home and abroad. Both the ground evacuation efforts and Biden’s special admission programs prioritized people allied with US war efforts, at least on paper. Bipartisan legislative pushes in Congress like the Afghan Adjustment Act (which attempted to create a pathway to citizenship and formed the basis of Moran and Klobuchar’s failed amendment) and the Enduring Welcome Act (which sought to continue resettlement efforts) have also emphasized the US’s obligations to those who helped its service members—to “protect those who protected us, and preserve our nation’s credibility for future generations,” as Representative Mike Lawler, a Republican, said when introducing that second piece of legislation in August 2025.

This left many asylum seekers without recourse. “There were activists, or just people who have marginalized identities, or ordinary Afghans who were impacted—as everyone was—by US foreign policy,” said Laila Ayub of Project ANAR (Afghan Network for Advocacy and Resources), which started in 2021 to provide legal support to Afghans. “We really view everyone as equally deserving of protection.” Those who were not immediately evacuated on US flights and who couldn’t risk waiting in Afghanistan for the monthslong refugee resettlement process fled to Pakistan or Iran—but they faced long delays there, during which they remained vulnerable to deportations. Many Afghans who were not eligible for special pathways to the US or who hit bureaucratic snags in these or other third countries eventually tried to make it to the US southern border and request asylum. When Trump retook office those waiting abroad saw their cases grind to a halt, and those who did make it found themselves caught in a political storm of their own.

After arriving in New York, Monsef and his family spent a few months at the Roosevelt Hotel in Manhattan, where thousands of new migrants from around the world were being housed. (Starting last spring the Trump administration targeted this shelter in particular, describing the hotel as a base for Salvadoran gang operations and announcing that it would pull millions in emergency management funding that allowed the city to use the building as temporary housing for the new arrivals.) After Roosevelt, Monsef’s family lived for a year and a half at another hotel shelter that was smaller, less crowded, and, in Monsef’s view, more hospitable.

But the shelter system still denied them a sense of agency and stability. They couldn’t cook their own food or even make their own tea; the government meals were bland and unappetizing; it wasn’t clear if the meat was halal. Only when Monsef got approved by a New York state initiative supporting the resettlement of migrants outside the city and moved to a single-family home, he told me, did he feel he had taken the “first step of starting my life in the US.”

In the suburbs Monsef had a backyard where his younger kids could play. The neighbors were friendly, and the family could finally buy groceries and cook their own meals. After an initial struggle, Monsef found a job suited to his training as an engineer; his wife also got part-time employment in food service. His oldest daughter, whose schooling was interrupted by their journey out of Afghanistan, graduated high school but couldn’t find a way into the elite colleges to which she had aspired. She started at community college. The second-oldest, who commuted every day to high school in the city, got into Georgetown.

And yet the family’s future remained unsettled. Throughout 2025 the Trump administration shut down legal pathways to the US and intensified restrictions on Afghan and other migrants. On January 20 Trump suspended the refugee program, pulling over a thousand Afghans already cleared to travel to the US off of flights. Then, in February, Trump’s Department of Homeland Security started terminating Temporary Protected Status and similar safeguards, which are given to people from countries that have suffered natural disasters or conflict, starting with Venezuela and Haiti. In May it terminated TPS for Afghanistan. (The administration has since also announced the end of TPS and a similar program known as Deferred Enforced Departure for people from several other countries, including South Sudan, Honduras, Palestine, and Yemen.)

Monsef’s TPS expired in May 2025, making him more vulnerable to deportation. His family had also applied for asylum, and they could legally stay and work in the country as long as their application was pending. But the process was drawn-out: Monsef’s first court appearance was scheduled for 2028 until his lawyer got it moved up to March of this year.

More restrictions on Afghan migrants followed, with particularly dire consequences for those who still had close family outside the US. In the summer, the president announced travel restrictions for twelve countries, including Afghanistan (although still with narrow exceptions for special visas meant to bring in allied Afghans). Soon after, the State Department started denying final travel documents for family members of Afghan asylees already in the US whose own “derivative” asylum cases had been remotely approved. The International Refugee Assistance Project sued, arguing that the travel ban did not apply to this subset of Afghans, and secured a temporary block. Recently a judge rejected the government’s request to throw out the case.

“These were lawful pathways that were already set up, and what we see time and time again is the Trump administration cutting them off,” Pedro Sepulveda of IRAP told me in an interview. As the case winds its way through an already circuitous legal process—made even more so by repeated government shutdowns in the US—the plaintiffs continue to suffer. Some remain in Afghanistan, fearing for their lives from the Taliban, while a regional conflict with Pakistan escalates. “At the core of this, it’s really about family reunification,” Sepulveda says. “We see a complete abandonment of Afghans, entirely.”

In September, as federal agents were conducting targeted raids around the state, Azizzada could claim a small victory: the government notified some families that their asylum cases had been approved. Among them was Nabila Mirjan, a thirty-year-old single mother I had met at the same 2025 mosque event where I first crossed paths with Monsef. A survivor of gender-based violence who had worked in Afghanistan at organizations for women’s rights, Mirjan spent a year in Iran with her family after fleeing the Taliban before traveling to Brazil and then—with her young son, adult brother, and sister—to the US border. (Three of her brothers and her elderly parents stayed behind in Brazil.) Upon entering the country in San Ysidro her brother was detained for seventy-five days, at which point he was released and told to attend his asylum court hearings and scheduled ICE check-ins. When we met, Mirjan was living at the Roosevelt Hotel with her six-year-old son and her sister, wondering where they would go once the city phased out its migrant shelters, as it had announced it would.

By the time I saw her again at the church iftar event in 2026, she had become a more confident English speaker. She now has a part-time job, and her son is getting used to life in the city, although he still has separation anxiety and cries from time to time because he misses his grandparents and uncles. She too is getting used to the US, but only after adjusting her expectations. When she first decided to come to America, she thought “all my dreams will turn to reality,” she told me. “When I came here, I saw that that is not true. It’s not easy.”

Last November the footing of Afghan asylum seekers already in the US got even more precarious. That month an Afghan man who had worked alongside the C.I.A. and previously been granted asylum in the US fatally shot a National Guard member in Washington, D.C., and injured another. When Monsef heard the news, he called his daughter at Georgetown and told her not to go out in case there was retaliatory violence against Afghans.

News reports suggested that the shooter was struggling with mental illness, but the Trump administration used the killing as a pretense both to impose a spate of new measures against Afghans and to initiate a crackdown for which the foundation had already been laid. Just days before the shooting, the administration had announced that it would be reviewing refugee cases already approved under Biden. Now, however, the Homeland Security agency that considers asylum applications announced that it was halting processing for all the asylum applications in its pipeline. It also suspended green-card and other immigration cases for countries subject to Trump’s travel ban, which had been announced in June 2025 and later expanded. When we spoke in March, the IRAP attorney Laurie Ball Cooper said that this “use of the travel ban domestically” was “unprecedented.” In essence, she continued, it was a “racist deployment of nationality as a restriction on immigration,” a tactic with its source in “the earliest roots of US immigration law.”

In New York City, ICE started calling Afghans waiting for their court dates and demanding they show up for non-routine check-ins, then arresting single men who arrived for their appointments. Among the first cases Azizzada got wind of in the area was that of Mirjan’s twenty-year-old brother, who was taken into custody at a check-in at 26 Federal Plaza on December 2. That evening Mirjan called Azizzada crying. Her brother’s first detention had been hard enough: by the time they reunited that time, she remembers, he had lost his appetite and developed a restless gait.

Two weeks later, with the help of a lawyer that Azizzada’s team helped find, her brother was released again. The family huddled together on a video conference with their siblings and parents in Brazil. “Some of us were crying with joy,” Mirjan told me over Whatsapp, translating her thoughts through an AI app. “My brother couldn’t speak.”

One of the next major threats to recent Afghan arrivals emerged not in New York but in Minnesota. In January 2026, as federal agents descended on the state, lawyers started noticing a disturbing trend: refugees who had already been approved but had not yet received their green cards were being detained. Again IRAP sued on behalf of plaintiffs—including some Afghans—who reported being swept up by masked agents, handcuffed, and aggressively shoved into unmarked vehicles. They were shuffled from building to building without being able to make a call, then put on a plane in shackles and taken out of the state. Some were released days later, on strange streets, far from home.

In February the judge responded to IRAP’s lawsuit by ordering a temporary pause to this practice. Government court filings in the proceedings revealed that the administration had claimed the authority to detain any refugee who was already approved but had not yet applied for their green card or attended the required interviews within a year of arriving in the country. They were clearly planning, civil rights lawyers understood, to take the Minnesota pilot nationwide—so IRAP and other organizations sued again and got a Massachusetts district court to order a stay. “Wide-scale roundup and detention of refugees for the sole reason that they have not yet received their green card? We have not in forty-six years of refugee resettlement seen anything of that kind,” Ball Cooper, who is on the team litigating these two lawsuits, told me.

Trump’s visa adjudication agency lifted its general pause on asylum processing in March. But a hold remained in place on any pending applications from Afghans and others who are on the list of expanded travel-ban countries. “Certainly in terms of policy, we’ve really seen a layering of one restriction on top of the other,” Julia Gelatt, associate director of the US immigration policy program at the Migration Policy Institute, told me in March. “Almost no Afghan can get almost any kind of status right now, either to come to the United States from abroad, or to renew their status in the United States, or to obtain a more secure status.”

The cumulative effect of these policies has been a kind of paralysis. People in the Afghan community worry about which events are safe to attend and whether they can go to the market. Many struggle to manage the anxiety of going about their daily lives. When Monsef leaves home for his office every day, he told me when we spoke in early March, he wonders whether he will return that evening, “or maybe I will go back to some detention center.”

In the past several months, court battles have yielded interim victories. On June 5 a court ruled in a separate case that the federal government’s pause on immigration applications, including from travel-ban countries, was unlawful. The development should, at least for now, mean that Monsef’s family and Mirjan’s siblings might finally see their cases start moving. The government will almost certainly appeal, but because the First Circuit may not side with the administration, the fate of these applications may ultimately fall in the hands of the Supreme Court.

In the meantime, amid the continuing uncertainty and anti-immigrant rhetoric in the US—as well as the eruptions of conflict around the world—small gestures of local communal support and solidarity take on even greater weight. The iftar where I caught up with Monsef and Mirjan this past March took place at St. Ann & The Holy Trinity Episcopal Church in Brooklyn Heights, an institution that was hosting this dinner for Afghan immigrants for the fourth year in a row. When I talked to Mirjan there, she told me that even with a document in hand that says they can stay in the country, she feels unsafe: she knows that paperwork hasn’t protected other refugees or asylum seekers from being detained in recent months. She worries even more for her two siblings whose asylum cases remain pending. In the last year or so, she said, she hasn’t had a “single night of decent sleep.”

As we were talking, the volunteers asked for the crowd’s attention, and Monsef got up to make a few remarks. “Events like this,” he read off his phone in English, “remind us that regardless of which religion we practice, we share common values of compassion, kindness and generosity.” On one end of the room sat large aluminum trays of Kabuli pulao, homemade okra, lentils, sabzi, kebabs, and at least two preparations of chicken; volunteers had used the church’s tremendous gothic sanctuary to lay out boxes and tote bags full of kitchen utensils, prayer mats, clothes, hygiene products, and children’s toys. The church is known for candlelit concerts of Bach and Debussy, among other composers, but earlier that evening the first thing I had heard when I ducked out of the rain and into the parish hall was the sound of three young Afghan boys sitting at a grand piano, smashing away cheerfully at the keys.

Tanvi Misra is a writer and investigative journalist who covers immigration and justice issues. 

The Unraveling of Afghan Asylum
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After the Schools Closed: For some Afghan girls, learning happens on the airwaves

One of the first things the Taliban did after returning to power in August 2021 was to ban girls from going to school beyond grade six. Nearly five years later, the ban remains in place. For many, the classroom they had sat in only days before was suddenly out of reach. In this instalment of The Daily Hustle, Freshta, a girl from Ghazni who was about to finish grade nine when the Taliban closed girls’ secondary schools, tells Rohullah Soroush how she refused to let her education come to an end. Unable to afford private tuition or reliable internet, she found an unexpected classroom on the radio. Through educational broadcasts, determination and the support of her family, she has continued to study, even without exams or certificates, while preparing for the day she hopes girls will once again be allowed back into school.

The last time I sat in a real classroom, with a teacher standing by the blackboard and my classmates sitting all around me, I was about to finish grade nine. Then the Taliban came back and the classroom door closed on me.[1] At first, they said it would only be temporary and that girls’ schools would reopen soon, but weeks turned into months, months into years and schools are still closed for girls like me.

Where my story begins

My name is Freshta and I’m 20 years old. I was born in Malestan district of Ghazni province, but my family has lived in Ghazni city since I was seven. My parents thought the provincial capital would give us better access to school and other services than our village could offer. I still live here with my parents and younger sisters and brothers. And it’s also where I started going to school.

We’re not a rich family. We have some land in Malestan, which my father used to farm, growing wheat and potatoes. After we moved to the city, he went back and forth to the village, working the land. The harvest paid for our expenses and he brought some home for the family. My mother used the wheat to make bread and we had potatoes to eat all year. But several years of drought have taken their toll and there is not enough water for my father to keep farming. So he had to take a job in the city and later he opened a small grocery shop in our neighbourhood. My brothers are still in school and too young to work, so my father is the only breadwinner in the family. Because of the wars during their own childhoods, neither of my parents had the chance to go to school. That is why it’s so important for them that all of us children to be educated.

The day classrooms fell silent 

I had just turned 15 and was about to finish grade nine when the Taliban returned to power. Almost immediately, they began putting restrictions on women and girls. One of the first things they did was stop girls going to school beyond grade six. From one day to the next, I could no longer go to school, and everything changed.

I remember the feeling that settled over our house in those early weeks. It was heavy and quiet in a way that is hard to describe. Everyone in the family was worried about the future. But for me, the main concern was that girls’ schools were closed. Every day, I asked my parents whether there was any news about schools reopening.

Here in Afghanistan, Nawruz is not only the start of the new year; it’s also the start of the school year. That year [March 2022], Nawruz didn’t feel the same. There were no celebrations, just waiting to see if girls would be allowed to go to school. We weren’t, and every year since then, Nawruz keeps coming and going without girls’ schools opening their doors.

When one door closes 

My parents looked to see if there was another way for me to keep learning. We knew there were online courses, but they weren’t an option for us. We couldn’t afford the cost of an internet connection. Even if we could, internet service in Ghazni is unreliable. Sometimes it’s so slow that pages won’t load and sometimes it stops working altogether. Trying to follow online lessons is almost impossible because they keep cutting out. So internet courses were out of the question for me.

I also knew that some teachers were secretly holding classes. I talked it over with my parents and with one of my former classmates. We worked out how many teachers we’d need to cover subjects like maths, science, Dari, history and English, but when we added up the cost, we realised there was no way we could afford it. And money wasn’t the only problem. If a teacher came to our house, or if we went to theirs, the neighbours would notice. In Afghanistan, people talk, and gossip spreads quickly. When you’re a girl, the gossip can follow you and it doesn’t have to be true to damage your reputation or your family’s standing in the community.

Finding hope on the airwaves

Then, one day, that same classmate told me she’d found some radio stations that air educational programmes. “We don’t need a classroom or a computer,” she said, “we can just listen to the radio. It’s a different way of learning.” Her words stayed with me and I started looking into what I could learn on the radio.

It seemed easy enough, but not all radio stations have a strong enough signal to reach Ghazni. In the end, I found only two that I could tune into consistently: the BBC’s Dars )Lesson(, a programme which teaches English, and Radio Arman FM, which airs lessons in other subjects. Now, I study English, science and other school subjects on the radio. For maths, physics and chemistry, I listen carefully and follow the lessons using the official school textbooks that my father buys for me.

I learn a lot from the programmes, but it’s not the same as being in a classroom. Nothing can replace having a teacher in front of you and classmates learning beside you.

I also follow a weekly psychology programme on Radio Arman FM. It’s not a school subject, but it helps me understand people and also manage my own anxieties – the ones that come when you don’t know what the future holds.

The way I learn from the BBC’s Dars programme, which airs on Saturdays, is different. There are no textbooks or handouts to go with it. I have to take extra care to make sure my notes are accurate. I listen carefully and write as quickly as I can because I don’t want to miss anything.

I’ve heard that some radio stations offer exams at the end of their courses, but none of the programmes I follow do, at least not in Ghazni. I’ve never heard the BBC’s Dars programme mention any exams. Anyway, I’m not sure it’s even possible to organise exams for girls learning through the radio. So I study without any certificate or official proof of what I’ve learned. I take notes. I review them. I keep going.

Making every second count

One challenge is that the programmes are broadcast at fixed times, but life at home doesn’t always follow a strict timetable. We often have guests visiting us from the village, people who come to the city to see doctors or for other business. As the eldest daughter, I have to help my mother with cooking, cleaning and other chores around the house. When guests arrive, everything else has to wait.

Fortunately, most of the programmes air again later in the week. That makes a huge difference because I don’t have to worry about missing a lesson, I can listen late at night or early in the morning when the house is quiet. I also record the lessons so I can listen again and check my notes to make sure I haven’t missed anything.

A father’s greatest gift 

For a while, things were going well. I listened to the education programmes on my phone. It was just a simple phone with an FM radio and I had to plug in my earphones to get a signal. For the first time since the schools closed, I felt as though I was moving forward again. Then one day, my phone broke. The screen went black. Just like that, the door to learning seemed to close on me once more.

I knew my father couldn’t afford to buy me another phone, so I didn’t even ask, but after a few days, he realised something was wrong.

“What’s going on?” he asked. “Why are you so upset?”

I told him my phone had broken and that I could no longer listen to my lessons. He didn’t say anything. He just reached into his pocket, took out his phone – his only phone, the one he uses every day to keep in touch with relatives, friends and the suppliers for his shop – and handed it to me.

“Here, use mine,” he said.

Waiting for the doors to reopen

Now my father and I share his phone and I’m back on track learning again. Every day I tune in, take notes and keep studying.

I don’t know when the Taliban will let girls back into school and going to university feels like a distant dream. Radio lessons have kept me learning and I’m very grateful for them, but I keep waiting for the day when schools reopen for girls. The radio can never replace the excitement of a real classroom – the sound of a teacher’s voice explaining a lesson, the questions from other students or the sound of chalk on a blackboard. These are the things I miss most.

For now, I keep my mind active. I read geography and history books, revise my school subjects and go over my notes again and again. I want to be ready for when girls are finally allowed back into school. I want to sit the exams for grades 10, 11 and 12. After that, I want to go to university. That is the future I am preparing for.

The classroom door may be closed to me today, but I will keep learning until the day it opens again.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour 

References

References
1 The Taliban announced the reopening of secondary schools on 17 September 2021, but only for boys and male teachers, effectively excluding girls from secondary education (Reuters). The ban was reaffirmed by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on 23 March 2022, when girls who had returned to school expecting classes to resume were sent home hours after schools reopened (ReutersAmnesty International).

 

After the Schools Closed: For some Afghan girls, learning happens on the airwaves
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The Guardian view on EU talks with the Taliban: selling out the rights of girls, women and other Afghans

25 Jun 2026 

Days after Kabul fell to the Taliban in August 2021, the EU’s top diplomat stressed the need to protect women and girls. “Cooperation with any future Afghan government will be conditioned on … respect for the fundamental rights of all Afghans,” Josep Borrell pledged. The regime’s attack on women’s rights began immediately, and has only intensified. The Taliban have barred girls from secondary school and university, legalised child marriage, prevented women from travelling without a male guardian and excluded them from jobs, parks and bathhouses. Women have been literally silenced: their voices are forbidden from being heard in public, even from within their own homes.

A new criminal code introduced last year permits men to beat their wives; even if women are able to prove the use of “obscene force”, a husband may still be sentenced to only 15 days in prison. (In contrast, harming an animal could mean five months in jail.) And restrictions on work, movement and contacts are not merely oppressive. They are often deadly in a country gripped by a humanitarian crisis. UN experts have said that this “widespread, systematic and all-encompassing” assault on women’s rights may amount to “gender apartheid”.

Yet the EU this week hosted Taliban representatives in Brussels for the first time since they returned to power. Officials said that it did not amount to recognition. But it risks “normalisation and implicit legitimisation”, as more than 80 Afghan and other human rights organisations wrote in a joint letter. Zakir Jalaly, a senior Taliban foreign ministry official, described the visit as “an important milestone in relations”.

European Commission spokesman said that the meeting focused on returning irregular migrants “who have committed serious crimes or pose a security threat”. But Euronews reported that the invitation to the Taliban mentioned only the return of “Afghan nationals with no right to stay in the EU”.

European governments are ramping up deportation efforts in response to domestic political pressures. Last week, the European parliament backed plans to expedite removals of undocumented migrants. Measures could pave the way for ICE-style enforcement and would allow people to be detained for up to two years or sent to offshore centres. As the UN human rights chief, Volker Türk, pointed out when criticising the plans, international law prohibits returning individuals to a place where they would be at risk of serious human rights violations or other irreparable harm.

Internationally, more than 1.5 million Afghans were deported from Iran last year alone, and Pakistan has forcibly returned large numbers. Forced returnees reported threats, arbitrary detention and torture in interviews with UN officials last year.

European concerns about how Taliban rule would affect migration rates, not just Afghan lives, were voiced from the first. But even as the rights and humanitarian crises have deepened, anti-migration sentiment has come to dominate. Afghans, and especially women, are now fighting both Taliban persecution and international indifference. Governments that profess to care for them should be pushing for gender apartheid to be recognised as a crime under international law, funding essential relief efforts in Afghanistan and supporting those who have fled to create safe new lives where they can – not working with the Taliban to send more back, potentially to their deaths.

The Guardian view on EU talks with the Taliban: selling out the rights of girls, women and other Afghans
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Afghan Students in Pakistan: Lost dreams or a life in the shadows?  

Afghans studying in Pakistan had hoped they might avoid the collective expulsions that, since 2023, have upended life for over two million Afghans living there. However, as the scope of deportations has widened, students have found themselves unable to get study visas. Some have already been detained by Pakistani police and deported. Others have managed, for the time being, to evade the authorities or bribe their way out of danger, but live in fear of arrest and deportation. For female students, shut out of universities in their homeland, Pakistan has been an educational lifeline, and the threat of expulsion is catastrophic. To better understand the situation, Rama Mirzada heard from six students who have been deported or are living in fear of deportation.

The alert circulated to try and help three Afghan students detained in May. The three were subsequently deported. Source: Facebook

On 5 May 2026, Afghan students in Pakistan shared an alert calling for the release of three students who were enrolled at the University of Lahore and had been arrested in Islamabad. The call went unheeded: later that month, the three were deported to Afghanistan. They are not alone. Many Afghan students in Pakistan have faced the same fate – or fear it. Although the exact number of Afghan students in Pakistan is unknown, every year, a thousand Afghans are awarded scholarships by the Pakistan government and thousands more go to Pakistan as self-funders, while others are already living in Pakistan. Students on scholarships eventually got their visas, after several months of anxious waiting. It is those who fund themselves who have not been granted visas. They include Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, many of whom were born in the country and have lived nowhere else.

Pakistan has hosted Afghan refugees for decades, and there have also been mass expulsions before, most notably in 2016, when over half a million people were expelled amid an earlier security impasse between the two countries (AAN). However, the current campaign has been far more intense. Relations deteriorated between the neighbouring countries after the Taliban regained power in 2021, as Islamabad accused the group it had supported during the insurgency of supporting Pakistani anti-government armed groups, notably Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP has escalated attacks in Pakistan since 2021 and Islamabad accuses the Emirate of providing it with a safe haven. The Emirate denies these accusations and has, in turn, accused Pakistan of violating Afghan sovereignty, particularly, since autumn 2025, when Pakistan launched airstrikes across the border (AAN).

The mass returns of Afghans began after September 2023, when Pakistan launched its Illegal Foreigners’ Repatriation Plan. More than two million Afghans returned or have been deported from Pakistan since then, according to the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR, since then (data from October 2023 to 4 April 2026). The returns have continued despite warnings from UN officials and human rights organisations that collective expulsions are unlawful when, they say, Afghanistan cannot cope with an existing humanitarian crisis, and certain groups are at particular risk, for example girls unable to get an education beyond grade 6.[1]

In the first phase, the Pakistani authorities targeted undocumented Afghans, followed by those with Afghan Citizen Cards (ACC), which are a form of temporary residence permit. In the third phase, Afghans who were officially recognised as refugees and had a Proof of Registration (PoR) card, some 1.4 million people, were told that their cards would not be renewed after 30 June 2025 and that they too would be deported (Dawn).

The problems for Afghan students began in summer 2025 as they tried to secure visas for the new academic year, which begins in September. They included new students, as well as those who were already enrolled (Hasht-e Subh and Displaced International). Without visas, students midway through a course could not return to Pakistan, or if they were already there, have had to live with the risk of arrest and deportation. A representative of the Afghan Students Union in Pakistan, Anayat Ullah Momand, said that although the government of Pakistan “had not shared any official announcement,” for self-funded Afghan students, “they have stopped the visa process.”

This report is based on interviews with six Afghan students studying in different parts of Pakistan – Islamabad, Lahore and Balochistan province – as well as the representative of Afghan Students Union. Two of the interviewees were on partially funded scholarships and four were entirely self-financed. The students were enrolled in bachelor’s or master’s degree courses in a range of academic fields, including medicine, business administration, international relations, economics and cybersecurity. At the time the interviews were conducted (22-26 April 2026), two had already been deported to Afghanistan. The students’ names have been changed for their protection.

Pursuing education in Pakistan after 2021

Pakistan has been an important educational hub for Afghan students for decades. Earlier generations of Afghans who studied in Pakistan have gone on to work in senior positions inside Afghanistan, in government institutions, the health sector, NGOs and private companies. In particular, thousands of Afghan students have benefited from the Allama Iqbal scholarship for Afghan Students programme, which has run since 2009 (Tribune). Its most recent phase was launched in 2024, for 4,500 students over five years, and covers the costs of graduate and post-graduate students, including tuition fees, living expenses and a book allowance (Higher Education Commission of Pakistan). These students have been able to study at all levels at a wide range of universities in various fields, including medicine, engineering, agriculture, management, political science and computer science. Self-financed Afghan students, on the other hand, bear every expense themselves, including visa costs. Although pursuing higher education in Pakistan has not been without its challenges, it remained a valuable opportunity until tensions between the two countries escalated and Pakistan’s policy toward Afghans began to change. Until 2025, there were few restrictions imposed on Afghans getting study visas.

The hassle of getting a visa 

At the time of the interviews, none of the six had got a study visa and two of the six had already been deported to Afghanistan – one was in the last year of his master’s degree, the other in the third semester of her bachelor’s degree.

The experience of Somaya, who had been studying international relations in Pakistan since 2024, is typical. She had applied for a visa extension in January. It wasn’t given and four days after her visa ran out, on 8 March (ironically, International Women’s Day), she was deported. “As a result,” she told AAN, “I missed my exams. There might have been an option to request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help facilitate a visa, but the university staff refused to help.”

With so many Afghans desperate to get visas, middlemen have sprung up offering to help, often for hefty fees. Back in Afghanistan, Somaya has lost money twice in an attempt to get a visa so that she could return to Pakistan and sit her exams.

I contacted several individuals to help obtain a visa for me, but most told me it was impossible. Some promised to arrange a visa in exchange for money. In March 2026, one individual took 30,000 PKR [USD 107] from me and disappeared. Then another took 55,000 PKR [USD 197] and provided me with a visa that was fake. Both individuals took my money and vanished, but I couldn’t do anything because I was in Afghanistan and they were in Pakistan. 

Another student, Burhan, had completed a bachelor’s degree in Pakistan after four years of study, in 2025, and was hoping to do a masters, but ran into visa problems:

The study visas were for one year only and mostly ran out during the autumn so we had to re-apply for an extension one or two months before the expiry date. Normally, it took two months or less to get our visas. In June 2025, right after my graduation, my visa expired. I’d applied to extend it two months before it expired and prepared all the documentation. Since I was hopeful I’d get my visa extension, as I had in previous years, I came back to Afghanistan for the summer holidays. I waited for around four months, but didn’t get a visa.

Burhan realised he had to abandon his plans for post-graduate study and cancelled his application for a student visa. In the end, he only got a ‘visit visa’ just to return to get his graduation certificate. For that, the system worked efficiently. “I paid USD 1,000,” he said, “and got the visit visa within 72 hours.”

Abdullah was a postgraduate student, who has been studying in Pakistan since 2019. Every year, he’d applied for a study visa before it expired. 2025 was no different. “I applied one-and-a-half months before the expiry date, but never got the visa. I stayed on in Pakistan without a visa for six months, until March this year.” This is when Abdullah was deported to Afghanistan, more on which below.

Nasrin had been looking forward to starting her studies in Pakistan in October 2025 but her application for a visa was rejected. Fearing she’d miss her classes, she applied for a medical visa, a common workaround for thwarted students. It cost her USD 290. She came to Pakistan in November 2025, began her studies and restarted an application for a study visa:

I got a bona fide letter from my university, which meant I could apply for the study visa, but the letter also needed a stamp from the Ministry of Interior. … The Afghan students’ representative told me the ministry charges each student 10,000 PKR (USD 36) to stamp the letter, though if the number of requests for students’ letters is high, then the middleman (kamishan kar) at the ministry charges less. [But it could be more.] Some students have had to pay 25,000 to 30,000 PKR [USD 89-107] to get the stamp.

As Nasrin explained, being in Pakistan does not make it easier to complete the process, particularly for those with expired visas, given the fear of deportation that looms over Afghans there:

We can’t travel to stamp the letters ourselves because we don’t have a visa and the police might arrest and deport us. There were some students who went to the ministry in person and were deported to Afghanistan. So, there’s a person at the university who collects [the letters] from the students and [gives them to] a person at the ministry, who is also given the money from us [for the stamp].

Many Afghans caught up in the recent wave of deportations were born in Pakistan and have never lived in Afghanistan. Although Pakistan’s Citizenship Act of 1951 generally grants citizenship through birth or descent, Afghans are routinely denied this right. Hadya is one such Afghan. She was born, went to school and started university in Pakistan. She has a Proof of Registration (PoR) card, proof that she is a refugee – although the cards were not renewed after 30 June 2025: “I never even had a visa,” she explained. “I didn’t apply for one because the high court in this province announced that Afghan students could study on their PoR cards, so I can keep studying, even though my family’s PoR cards are expired.” Her status is tenuous. Even if she is able to finish her studies, her right to remain will then evaporate, as it already has for her parents. Until she can graduate, she worries for her family: “It’s a tough time for my family members in Pakistan. When they go out of the house, it’s with the fear of arrest or deportation.”

Managing everyday life without a visa

Some Afghan students stay in Pakistan to continue their studies while they keep trying to renew their visa or try to keep studying without documentation. This makes daily life difficult. They live in fear of being stopped and questioned by the police. The Pakistan authorities can deactivate students’ SIM cards, and restrict access to bank accounts and hospitals by insisting that a person’s ID and visa status are checked. The combined impact of these practical restrictions, combined with the risk of arrest, makes it difficult for students to step out of university grounds.

Khaled was due to start his last year of university in 2025 when, in Afghanistan for the holidays, he ran into problems renewing his visa. So, he and his friends returned to Pakistan illegally. “We waited for our visas for an extra month,” he said, “but since we still hadn’t got them, we decided we had no choice but to travel to Pakistan, via Spin Boldak, without a visa. For each of us, we paid 65,000 PKR [USD 233] to cross the border.” They did manage to get into Pakistan, but continuing their studies has not been easy, said Khaled, and they have had to deploy various ‘workarounds’ in the hope of avoiding arrest.

I’ve got bank accounts and SIM cards from Pakistani friends. Sometimes, we manage to go out by using a road where there is no checkpoint. But even if we get round the checkpoints, we’re on edge because of the fear of arrest. Some hospitals also ask for a visa, so we try to get basic treatments from the clinic inside the university. Every weekend, me and my friends plan to go out, but we never do because of the fear of deportation. Most of the time, we order food and clothes online.

Nasrin said she had, sometimes, to go without food during Ramadan because she didn’t want to take the risk of going shopping.

There were times when I had nothing to eat in my room and couldn’t go out because the police had a checkpoint in front of my dormitory. When I was on my period, I couldn’t go out to purchase my needs. I faced so many challenges getting to Pakistan for my education, I didn’t want to waste this opportunity and so I’m very cautious. … My primary need is food. Although the food inside the dormitory is quite expensive and not good quality compared to outside, I choose to buy it here to avoid being arrested. 

Still, she said, she lives in fear of the police.

Some people say: The police won’t disturb Afghan women, but I can’t trust them. Even if they don’t deport me, they’d ask me to give them money. Often the police release Afghan students after getting money from them. 

Nasrin says that many Pakistanis seem to blame Afghans for Pakistan’s weak economy and insecurity. Because of this, she began to conceal her identity: “I try to hide that I’m Afghan, I tell people that we’re Iranian. Other than my university classmates, nobody knows that I’m from Afghanistan because I fear being detained and deported.”

Hadya also said she’s struggling on many fronts, including accessing good healthcare:

It’s difficult to manage everyday life here. … It’s impossible for us to visit the public hospital because they ask for documents, although the private hospitals don’t require it. We can’t travel from one city to another because the police will deport us. Since mid-2025, our lives have become so difficult in Pakistan.

Burhan said that he and his friends stopped going out when he was in Pakistan in order to avoid the police. “We’re like prisoners.” He relied on friends who had visas to get him things like a SIM card. He said he and his friends had to pay bribes to the police many times to avoid being arrested, including the last time he arrived in Pakistan, in November 2025.

Right after I came out of the airport, the police stopped me at a checkpoint and asked to see my police registration stamp, which would have been impossible for a passenger to get right at the airport. They made me wait for two hours and threatened me, saying they would take me to Hajji Camp and deport me. Finally, they took 8,000 PKR [USD 28] and let me g. 

He and his friends now move around using side roads, or, he said, “go out with Pakistani friends to prevent being arrested or stopped by the police.” However, a week after his brush with the police at the airport, he and his Afghan friends were picked up by the police as they got out of a taxi on their way to get food. Although he had a visit visa and a police registration stamp and his friends had student visas, the police detained them:

The police put us into their vehicle and started abusing the Afghans among us, saying we’re all terrorists. They took us at nine at night and put us in the truck bed of their vehicle, then carried on patrolling the area. We remained in their car until three in the morning. The police were deliberately driving in a way that would hurt us in the truck bed, and forced us to pay them. Finally, one of them opened the conversation and asked each of us to pay them 50,000 PKR [USD 179] and they’d release us. But the head of our union found our location, intervened and got us freed us after we paid them 15,000 PKR [USD 53]. 

Abdullah was initially able to stay under the radar for a while in Pakistan because he was good at languages and had some connections in the police and Pakistani friends.

My visa expired in September 2025, but I stayed on in Pakistan without a visa for six months, until March 2026. Since my Urdu and English are good, whenever the police were speaking to me at checkpoints, they didn’t realise I was an Afghan. Some of the Pakistani police were also our friends because they’d graduated from the university where I’m studying. Also, because Afghan students can’t set up a bank account at Pakistani banks, I was getting SIM cards and a bank account from my Pakistani friends.

However, as will be seen, his luck eventually ran out.

Students deported

For many students, there is a limit to how long they can avoid (or bribe) the police. For Abdullah, the blow came when his friends were preparing for a graduation ceremony.

In March, nine of us students went out to have dinner. Afterwards, we went to a barbers because the next day there was a graduation ceremony at the Embassy of Afghanistan for Afghan students. The police arrested five of us. After bringing us to the police station, they initially agreed to release us in exchange for 70,000 PKR [USD 251] from each person, but then one of the police officials said: No. They transferred us to Hajji Camp [in Islamabad] and we spent a day there. The next day they transferred us to the border and deported us to Afghanistan via Torkham. All my belongings are still in Pakistan. My friends even brought my belongings to the camp, but the police didn’t allow me to take them. 

Somaya told AAN she was arrested just four days after her visa expired, in March 2026. Her parents were visiting Pakistan so that her mother could get surgery and she had gone to meet them.

After I was arrested, they took me to Hajji Camp. I tried to contact my parents so they wouldn’t worry, but the police seized my phone. I remained there for two days during Ramadan. We didn’t have the right to call our families nor leave the room. 

She described harsh conditions at the camp.

There were almost 60 people in one room. The windows were completely closed and the rest rooms were really dirty. It was Ramadan and they didn’t feed the children. For iftari [the evening meal when the Ramadan fast is broken], they were giving us only a few spoons of white rice in a plastic bag. They were throwing the food to us as if they were feeding animals. It was cruel. 

Because Somaya was alone and could not contact her family, they feared the worst.[2] Her mother tried to find her:

My mother followed the deportation route and came to Chaman after me. She stayed in Chaman for three days and waited for my deportation. After we returned to Afghanistan, my mother was hospitalised as she was already sick and spending the time in Chaman was not good for her health. 

Female students in Pakistan

Because of the Emirate’s ban on women going to university, those who had the financial means and family support began seeking alternative ways to continue their education, ranging from enrolling in online universities to traveling abroad to study. Despite an initial wave of support from many countries, refugee and migrant policy has hardened in Europe and North America. That includes putting restrictions on study visas or even, in the UK, stopping them completely for Afghans (AAN). Until 2025, Pakistan had been one of the few places where Afghan women could pursue higher education. For Somaya, being deported was the final blow in her efforts to complete her studies.

Before the ban on education by the Taliban, I was in the third semester of midwifery training. I then travelled to Pakistan to continue my education despite family and economic problems. Again and again, I’ve been blocked in the middle of my educational journey. The effect on me has been terrible.

Studying in Pakistan had set her family back hundreds of dollars for visas and university fees, but had felt worth the effort:

I was just about surviving with the living expenses, for example, the dorm fee was only 25,000 PKR [USD 89] for the Pakistani students, but for us, it was 95,000 PKR [USD 341]. It was really difficult for me to manage because the economic situation in Afghanistan is bad and it was hard for my family to support me. But I was happy to get the opportunity to study in Pakistan because I was denied this right in my own country.

When she was deported, she even lost the valuables that she had kept in her room. Being deported, she said, has left her feeling hopeless: “All my efforts to get an education have been wiped out. I’ve lost my education. I don’t know whether I will ever be able to continue it.”

Nasrin said the fear of deportation is affecting her academic performance: “All the problems mean we cannot go out of the university. It’s worst during exams when I should be relaxed and able to focus on my studies instead of facing all these difficulties.”

Hadya, the student who studies on her PoR card, said that if her family is deported, they will not allow her to stay on in Pakistan without them, so she’ll be forced to leave too: “My family is staying in Pakistan for my education. They won’t allow me to stay in a dormitory or continue my education [if they’re not here]. They’re conservative.” Like Nasrin, the insecurity felt by her and her family overshadows everything: “After the deportations increased in my area, I couldn’t focus on my studies. I could hardly think about the future of my education and whether I could finish or not. I was just worried about being sent to Afghanistan because women have no rights to study or work there.

Appeals to the Pakistani authorities go unheard

Complaints about visa problems and the detention or deportation of Afghan students tend not to get very far. Afghan Students Union Representative in Pakistan Anayat Ullah Momand has a visa for his final year of medical studies thanks to a scholarship and so is in a position to try and help others. He said he has received hundreds of requests for help from students who have been denied visas, but the authorities “have not taken any action for Afghan students.”

Khaled reported that despite the student union sharing its concerns with Pakistan’s Higher Education Commission (HEC), the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan Embassy, none had accepted responsibility: “The Ministry of Interior said that senior government officials banned them from issuing visas, HEC said the Ministry of Interior isn’t approving visas and the embassy said it was all was out of their hands and they could not do anything.” Burhan also said that he and his student union had tried to help other students:

The union never got a satisfactory response. I and several other students personally met the Pakistani official responsible for Afghan students and other officials at HEC, several times. They promised that our visas would be issued in a few weeks, but we never got our visas. We also visited Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior several times. The behaviour of the officials at the ministry wasn’t good towards us. Sometimes they used bad language against us. Once, they ejected me from the ministry when I’d asked them to resolve our problems. They just kept telling us to wait. 

Burhan said that, before 2025, they had given bribes to speed up the visa process, but that this stopped working:

Previously, we were paying 30,000 to 40,000 PKR [USD 107-143] as a bribe to the Ministry of Interior so that they would approve our visas, but even that failed to work. I paid twice to get a visa before the complete ban on student visas. If we paid the money, normally our visa was approved within 25 days, but if we didn’t pay, our visas were approved after three to four months. We had to pay up or we might miss our classes. … We paid the money to a middleman who had links at the ministry. In the first year, the price to approve our visas wasn’t that expensive, but later, they were demanding up to 70,000 PKR [USD 251] per student.

Somaya said that before she was deported, some friends had tried to get the university to intervene“but the university staff behaved harshly with them.” She said she doesn’t think that officials want to help, no matter who makes representations to them.

The government of Pakistan is 100 per cent aware of the challenges Afghan students face in Pakistan because we shared our problems with our university and several times, we provided all the documentation for the Pakistani authorities. When they deported me, I told them it was only four days since my visa had expired and that I’d applied for a new visa but that their government hadn’t issued it. They told me it had nothing to do with them, nor did they care about it.

Abdullah and his classmates had petitioned officials from the Ministry of Interior, but this had no impact. He says the problem is deeper than a bureaucratic visa issue: “The situation has changed a lot for Afghan students over the past eight months. The police don’t accept any documents, including university cards or other documents. When I was in the camp, I met Afghans who were arrested even despite having visas.” Abdullah speculated that the troubles faced by Afghan students related more to Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Based on my information, Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior has no authority anymore to issue visas for Afghans. Students, including myself, have received phone calls from an ‘unknown individual’ who told us to meet at a café and there he asked us questions about ourselves. We didn’t know that person, nor did he tell us who he was. The employees at the Ministry of Interior also told us they had no authority over issuing visas, so I think there is a possibility that Pakistan’s ISI [intelligence agency] is controlling visas. 

Hadya’s family is so determined to protect the ability of her and her sisters to finish their education in Pakistan, they have taken legal action.

Since my other sisters are also studying here, my father filed a case at the high court to allow us live here until we all graduate. We’ve not received a response yet, but we’ve a letter that prevents the police from deporting us until the court announces its decision. The lawyer we hired told us it was nearly impossible to get a stay order [temporary court directive to prevent harmful or unlawful acts]. It’s just a hope. 

She also thinks the Pakistani government is indifferent to their suffering.

The government is well aware of the problems that Afghan students face in Pakistan and they know that girls aren’t allowed to pursue their education in Afghanistan. But the Pakistani government doesn’t care about Afghans, whether you are happy or unhappy, they’ll deport you.

Conclusion

For many young Afghans, being denied the opportunity to study in Pakistan has been devastating. For young women in particular, the prospect of being deported to Afghanistan slams the door shut on their prospects to secure higher education. For Somaya, deportation has been a life-changing blow: “I’m so worried about my future now and fear that I’ll remain uneducated.” Khaled placed the blame squarely with politicians on both sides. “The two countries,” he said, “brought education into their political concerns.”

As long as relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan remain poor, Afghan students will lose out. Some may manage to cling on to their studies in Pakistan without a visa, but only by living in the shadows of their university grounds. For now, the scholarship route is the only viable option. Last year, more than 20,000 Afghans applied for the Allama Iqbal scholarship, competing for just 1,500 places (Ariana). Now that these scholarships are, for now at least, a golden ticket to getting a visa, one can only imagine the flood of applications in 2026, assuming, that is, that Pakistan keeps this last door open.

Edited by Rachel Reid and Kate Clark

References

References
1 See a statement by the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, Türk: States must halt involuntary returns to Afghanistan, OHCHR, 22 May 2026; see also a statement by eight UN experts and the UN’s Working Group on discrimination against women and girls: UN experts sound alarm on looming deportations of Afghans from Pakistan, 29 August 2025.
2 Amnesty International has raised concerns that some of the deportation centres deny Afghans basic legal rights, such as communicating with their families or speaking to a lawyer.

 

Afghan Students in Pakistan: Lost dreams or a life in the shadows?  
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