The former Australian prime minister, John Howard, this week described Victoria Cross recipient and accused war criminal Ben Roberts-Smith as the “modern personification of the Anzac tradition”.
The broad-shouldered, blue-eyed Roberts-Smith was the hero of the battle of Tizak in Afghanistan, for which his actions earned Australia’s highest military honour.
He has yet to enter a plea and will likely face a bail hearing this month, with a trial to follow much later. He has always denied the allegations.
A civil court has already found, in 2023, that on the “balance of probabilities” Roberts-Smith had committed war crimes in Afghanistan, in a defamation case, brought by Roberts-Smith himself, that upheld the revelations of two investigative journalists from the Nine newspapers.
Still the arrest of a national war hero has cut deeply to core of the Australian psyche, in a country whose identity is often entwined with the exploits of young men on foreign fields.
Reactions from politicians, community leaders and the broader public have been deeply divided, often down long-established cultural and political fault lines.
Kerry Stokes, a billionaire former head of media company SevenWest, had bankrolled Roberts-Smith’s unsuccessful defamation case. Stokes has not publicly commented on the former soldier’s arrest. Australia’s richest person, Gina Rinehart, said she “didn’t understand” the rationale for charging Roberts-Smith and others who remain under investigation.
“Like many Australians, I hope that compassion and the Aussie spirit is extended to Ben and his family and his duty to our country in the hardship of war is never forgotten,” Rinehart said.
Pauline Hanson, whose rightwing One Nation party is surging in the polls, said she would not “abandon” Roberts-Smith.
“I remain steadfast in my support of Ben Roberts-Smith despite news of his arrest today,” the Queensland senator said.
Two former conservative prime ministers – Howard and Tony Abbott – each released more measured statements. Abbott said his “instinctive sympathy” remains with special forces soldiers from the Afghanistan campaign who “fought bravely and well for a just cause” and described the rules of engagement as “highly restrictive”.
“It’s wrong to judge the actions of men in mortal combat by the standards of ordinary civilian life,” Abbott said.
Howard said the arrest would “tug at the heartstrings” of many, but that one of Australia’s core values remained the rule of law.
Anzac tradition a ‘civil religion’
Ken Inglis, the late historian, described the Anzac legend as a “civil religion” in Australia, such is its connection to the national story. The term – an abbreviation of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps formed in 1914 – has become a shorthand for Australian forces in foreign conflict.
Prof Marilyn Lake, a historian from the University of Melbourne, says she created significant controversy when she co-authored a 2010 book that challenged some of that myth making, “What’s Wrong with Anzac?”
“I had people frequently accusing me of being a traitor,” says Lake.
“My feeling is that some of the heat has gone out of that particular worship of Anzac since then.
“But more generally society and politics seem more polarised. Those who want to defend old Australian traditions, what better symbol than the Anzac tradition?
“In some ways it’s a form of identity politics, the identification with old Australia. In that sense the Anzac tradition works really well as a touchstone.”
Dr Sebastian Svegaard, from the Digital Media Research Centre at the Queensland University of Technology, says the case has the potential, at least initially, to heighten existing cultural divisions.
“When it goes to a sense of identity or core beliefs people can get very emotional,” Svegaard said.
“From the point of view of someone who does believe Roberts-Smith is a hero, it might appear as if they’re suddenly being told to change their opinion of not just him, but also of themselves or those beliefs.
“That goes deeper than this being about whether a person has done something wrong.”
Support for Roberts-Smith has been particularly vocal from rightwing, nationalist and anti-immigration groups, including some far right figures such as Joel Davis, a former high-ranking member of the National Socialist Network.
Not all conservatives have been so steadfast. Andrew Hastie, a prominent Liberal who has campaigned for lower immigration, was among the cohort of former SAS soldiers to testify about Roberts-Smith during the defamation hearing.
He released a statement this week saying Roberts-Smith was entitled to the presumption of innocence but that “none of us are above the law”.
Conservative commentator Andrew Bolt – one of the most influential voices in the Australian right – asked those “angrily defending Ben Roberts-Smith” to consider the allegations, specifically,whether they think Australian soldiers should be allowed to shoot unarmed prisoners.
“Are you fine if our soldiers shoot prisoners in the back? Machine gun a one-legged man who’d surrendered? Murder a handcuffed man already injured after being thrown off a cliff?”
The answer, at least from some, appears to be: yes.
On Thursday the Australian flag society – a Christian nationalist group that has long campaigned for Roberts-Smith to be absolved – posted an image to its social media page depicting an Australian soldier, in the shadow of the national flag, kicking an Afghan man off a cliff.
The group asked its supporters if they felt the image was “acceptable as part of our campaign to save Ben Roberts-Smith from legal jeopardy”. Some commenters said they found the image in bad taste. Several others approved.
“I don’t care what he did to save Australian lives,” said one response.
“War is war, kill or be killed,” said another.
Arrest of national war hero Ben Roberts-Smith cuts deeply to core of Australian psyche
China appears to be standing firmly with its “iron brother” Pakistan, but there are good reasons to believe that all’s not as honky-dory as it seems
As Pakistan had been frequently warning Afghanistan of military action if it didn’t act against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan [TTP] terrorists (who Islamabad alleges operate from bases inside Afghanistan), the declaration of an “open war” against Afghanistan by Pakistani Foreign Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif in late February shouldn’t have come as a surprise.
But it did, because with Field Marshal Asim Munir at the helm of affairs, no one expected that Pakistan would pursue this extremely violent and inconclusive course of action. Furthermore, as the Pakistan army is already over-stretched due to its prolonged involvement in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan, opening yet another battlefront makes little military sense.
It’s inconceivable that Asif could have dared declare war without explicit authorisation from Pakistan’s Field Marshal. So, the question that arises is: Why did Field Marshal Munir decide to wage a war that wouldn’t achieve the terminal objective of forcing Kabul to oust TTP when both have not only common religious ideologies but have also fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan?
A probable reason could be Field Marshal Munir’s self-created compulsion to walk his talk. Pakistan’s chief of armed forces (CDF) has a habit of displaying belligerence and also saying things that incite ultra-nationalist fervour. For example, media reports from early 2004 quote him as stating that “The life of a single Pakistani is more important than the entire Afghanistan.” Needless to say, especially after this utterly repulsive alleged comment, the masses expect visible action from a man who has publicly declared that “God made me Pakistan’s protector.”
However, Field Marshal Munir’s woes don’t end here. While launching the military operations against Afghanistan (codenamed Operation Ghazab-lil-Haq, meaning “wrath for the truth/Fury for the sake of justice”), he had pompously declared that this operation would continue unabated until “terrorist safe havens and use of Afghan soil against Pakistan is decisively brought to an end.” However, instead of being pushed on the back foot by Pakistani airstrikes against attacks on its alleged bases, TTP has struck back hard, with both the intensity and frequency of its attacks.
In short, Field Marshal Munir’s plan of arm-twisting Kabul to get TTP evicted from Afghanistan has not only failed but also backfired, further aggravating the existing animosity between Pakistanis and the Afghan people. With the Pakistan army failing to achieve its slated military objectives, the Field Marshal has been forced to eat his words and settle down to negotiate with Kabul under a Beijing-brokered initiative. The contentious Durand Line is unlikely to remain peaceful in the foreseeable future, for which no one else but Rawalpindi is to be blamed.
China appears to be standing firmly with its “iron brother” Pakistan, but there are good reasons to believe that all’s not as honky-dory as it seems. While Islamabad’s cavorting with Washington would definitely be a matter of concern for Beijing, the Pakistan army’s abysmal failure to subdue armed sarmachars (freedom fighters) in Balochistan is adversely affecting its $60 billion investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor [CPEC] project and mineral mining activities in the province.
Pakistan’s emergence as the main peace broker between the US and Iran is a significant diplomatic achievement that would have definitely brought cheer to Islamabad. However, controversies and contradictions have emerged even here. The Pakistani Prime Minister’s initial post on X requested Washington to postpone its attack on Iranian infrastructure by allowing a two-week time window “to allow diplomacy to run its course.” It carried the transcription “*Draft-Pakistan’s PM Message on X*”, a clear indication that the text posted was composed and transmitted to Sharif by someone from outside Pakistan.
The fact that the otherwise obdurate US President Trump who showed no signs of reconsidering his announcement of bombing Iran to “the stone ages” and even declaring that “whole [Iranian] civilization will die tonight” accepted the Pakistani prime minister’s request in toto suggests that Sharif may well have used by Washington as a pawn to facilitate Trump’s honourable exit from the mess he himself created. But there’s more.
Secondly, according to media reports, while Sharif had announced that the US and Tehran had reached an agreement that was applicable “everywhere, including Lebanon and elsewhere,” US Vice President JD Vance has outrightly rejected the Pakistani Prime Minister’s assertion about Lebanon being included in the agreement.
How Sharif could commit such a humongous faux pas is difficult to comprehend, but since it’s apparent that Pakistan is, in fact, an American “proxy” disguised as a peace negotiator, one can expect a few more bloopers in the days to come. For starters, multiple reports, like WION’s, claim that a section of the “Pakistani media are [sic] of the view that Pakistan’s diplomacy and its role in brokering a ceasefire by stopping the war that could lead to devastation merit a Nobel Peace Prize.”
The author is a retired Indian Army officer
Pakistan’s faltering offensive in Afghanistan has pushed it towards negotiations
Afghans in the UK who do not have permanent residency are facing years of insecurity and hardship amid a hardening of British immigration policy. Those who were granted refugee status within the last five years may face a lengthy wait before they get settled status under new policies proposed in November 2025 that are intended to deter those seeking asylum coming to the UK. Around 38,000 Afghans had a chance to get special humanitarian resettlement after the fall of the Islamic Republic though these pathways are now closed. Thousands who have been refused asylum are stuck in limbo, without the right to work, but with the government unable to deport them. Rachel Reid and Francesca Gilks have been hearing from Afghans and lawyers, encountering a few positive experiences alongside a great deal of insecurity and frustration. In the dying days and aftermath of the Islamic Republic, the UK government offered two special routes for Afghans to come to the UK, via humanitarian resettlement. Most were selected by the UK government as being particularly worthy of protection or vulnerable to the new regime, including Afghans who had served with UK forces in Afghanistan. These safe routes were closed in 2025, leaving only the asylum route open. Between 2021 and 2025, there were almost 38,000 Afghans resettled in the UK through these three humanitarian routes (UK Home Office).
Outside such schemes, the UK does not make it easy for refugees to reach its island shores. There are no visas for those seeking asylum, so every year, tens of thousands make perilous journeys to get here, often making the final miles by boat with the help of unscrupulous smugglers. The hazards mean the make-up of Afghans seeking asylum in the UK is heavily skewed towards young men, who are culturally more likely to take the risks of clandestine travel.
However, for those seeking asylum, the initial generosity of the UK has waned. Following the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, in 2022, 98 per cent of Afghans who requested asylum were accepted as refugees; by 2025 that had dropped to 34 per cent (Home Office), as more stringent eligibility criteria were applied. The UK government considers the security situation in Afghanistan no longer as severe as previously assessed, and that risks to claimants must be judged on an individual basis (Guidance here). This means most Afghan claimants are no longer believed to be fleeing persecution. Afghans who are rejected are not – yet – being sent back to Afghanistan, but are left in legal limbo.
In November 2025, the government proposed radical changes to its immigration system, which will make refugees’ paths to British citizenship longer, more costly and more complex, including most of those Afghans who have arrived since 2021. It will also affect their chances for family reunion. As part of the same drive, as of March 2026, Afghans became one of four nations no longer eligible for student visas, while people from Afghanistan were singled out as no longer eligible for skilled worker visas either (Home Office).
This more hostile reception is not unique to Afghans trying to make a new life in the UK; similar struggles face migrants of most nationalities. While the UK has seen significant numbers of asylum seekers in recent years, stretching an already tight economy, the reforms say as much about a domestic — and global — wave of political populism which scapegoats refugees and migrant workers. The combined effect is that for Afghans seeking a new life, the UK is becoming an increasingly unwelcoming place.[1]
This report is based on thirteen interviews, conducted between September 2025 and February 2026 — eight with Afghans who have come to the UK since 2021 and five with immigration lawyers and people working with newly arrived Afghans, as well as a review of policy and data. Since the experiences of Afghans vary according to their path to legal status, the report will start by looking at the situation of those who got humanitarian resettlement, before looking at Afghan asylum seekers and refugees, followed by their shared problems around employment, study, mental health, as well as their contrasting experiences of welcome and hostility that Afghans receive. It does not address the situation of Afghans who came on work or family visas, or those who came prior to 2021.[2]
The easier path? Resettlement routes
A large group of Afghans came to the UK under resettlement routes, which, rather than providing refugee status, provided Indefinite Leave to Remain in the UK as soon as an application was approved. Almost 38,000 Afghans were resettled under three schemes: the Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP), run by the Ministry of Defence, for Afghans who worked with the UK, the Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (ACRS), mostly for vulnerable groups and scholars and a third, initially secret policy, described below (UK Home Office).
Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP)
ARAP was for Afghans who had worked for the UK government, such as military interpreters who would be at risk of Taliban retaliation. The largest number came in the initial evacuation in 2021, with the scheme closed in July 2025 (Ministry of Defence). Candidates were vetted by the UK’s defence and foreign ministries.[3]
The scheme was criticised by some human rights advocates for narrow or unclear parameters, including the requirement that to be eligible someone needed to have held a “publicly recognisable” role and have contributed to the “success of UK operations” (see this 2023 report by the legal organisation, Justice).
The closure of the scheme is being challenged by lawyers, including Jamie Bell, who said, “Its abrupt closure has left these individuals with no safe and legal routes to the UK” (Duncan Lewis Solicitors). The UK Defence Minister, John Healey, had, however, warned in December 2024 that he considered the scheme had “fulfilled its original purpose,” according to a Home Office briefing.
Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (ACRS)
From January 2022, ACRS offered resettlement to around 5,000 Afghans who had already been evacuated to the UK in 2021, with a ceiling of resettling up to 20,000 more. This scheme also closed in July 2025, having resettled more than 12,800 Afghans (Migration Observatory). The ACRS had three main categories:
At-risk individuals who were selected by the UK government, mostly evacuated or notified in 2021, as well as subsequent family reunifications.
Vulnerable groups such as women and girls at risk and members of ethnic and religious minorities, mostly referred by the UN’s refugee agency, the UNHCR, from third countries (mostly Pakistan or Iran).
Afghans who worked with the British Council, or the British security company GardaWorld, or Afghan alumni of the Chevening master’s programme. This pathway was suspended in June 2023.
The scheme was also criticised by NGOs and lawyers for its delays, inconsistent decisions and narrow eligibility criteria, as well as its failure to reach its ceiling of 20,000 (see reports by the Afghan Pro Bono Initiative and Safe Passage). A government minister, Luke Pollard, defended the UK’s efforts, telling the House of Commons that the combined relocation schemes had offered “one of the most generous Afghan resettlement programmes in the world.”
A third, ‘secret’ route – Afghanistan Response Route (ARR)
A third route for relocating Afghan nationals to the UK was only revealed by the government in July 2025, though it had been in operation since April 2024 (BBC). It was set up after the personal details of almost 19,000 Afghans who had asked for refuge in the UK after the Taliban takeover was accidentally leaked in February 2022 by the UK’s Ministry of Defence (BBC). This extraordinary data breach, which came amid widespread reports about assassinations of those associated with the Republic’ security forces and international military, put many Afghans at risk (NYT). The existence of this scheme, as well as the fact of the data breach, was subject to a ‘super-injunction’ – a media blackout, which also banned disclosure of the injunction itself (Guardian).
An estimated 7,355 Afghans will be resettled in the UK through ARR, including 1,531 individuals whose data was leaked, plus family members (National Audit Office). Since the data leak involved applicants to ARAP and ACRS, many of those affected were likely already included in one of the two other resettlement schemes.
This avenue was closed, along with ACRS and ARAP, in July 2025, despite concerns that some Afghans remain in jeopardy. The government argued that those at risk had been given years to apply (UK parliament). However, there are plausible reasons why some at risk might have been wrongly rejected, not least the low levels of documentation that is common in Afghanistan. There are also reasons why someone might not have previously applied for resettlement to the UK but now finds themselves in need of protection, including those who had decided to settle in Pakistan or Iran but are now at risk because of the mass forced returns of Afghans from those countries (FIDH). Others might have been waiting for humanitarian protection routes to other countries, some of which have closed, such as those to the United States in April 2025 (AAN).
Director of the Scottish based Afghan Human Rights Foundation, Naveen Asif, told AAN that he knew people affected by the data breach who remain “very worried,” both in the UK and in Afghanistan. “Even when people are here, they are worried about their families – in Afghanistan, there is a culture where if your enemy cannot find you, they go after your family. If you are in Britain, and if the Taliban find out, they will punish your family.”
Rona Panjsheri, who supports Afghan refugees in Suffolk, in eastern England, says she works with one woman whose husband’s name was leaked. She says the family was so worried that they stopped going out and became “very depressed and isolated.” A February 2026 survey by Refugee Legal Support found that of 231 respondents who had been notified of the leak by the British government, 49 reported that a family member or colleague had been killed as a direct result, while almost 90 per cent reported risks and threats to their family members, ranging from house searches to violence. Most respondents said the information provided by the government had not answered their security concerns, as captured by this respondent, who was relocated:
My family – who remain in Afghanistan – are terrified. They ask me every day: Are we in danger? Did you share our names, phone numbers, addresses, or photos in your emails to the UK? Could the Taliban find us because of this?
Afghan seeking asylum in the UK
In addition to the cohort of Afghans who received humanitarian resettlement, from 2021 to 2025, over 37,000 Afghans and their dependents claimed asylum in the UK (see table below). Individuals can only claim asylum on arrival in the UK and then will wait months or over a year for an initial decision (Migration Observatory).
While an individual waits to hear if they are eligible, they are an asylum seeker, with very limited rights or privileges (more on that later). If they are granted asylum and given refugee status, they can apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain. This is a non-revokable, settled status. A subsequent application for British citizenship can then be made as soon as one year after that.
There is no way to claim asylum from outside the UK, which means most Afghans seeking asylum make unofficial and often very dangerous journeys to reach the UK, travelling over 3,000 miles, typically involving getting across Iran, Turkey and continental Europe. Small numbers hide in vehicles to cross into the UK, but most end up in small boats to cross the English Channel. The numbers of Afghans arriving by small boats peaked in 2022, when over 9,000 made it to the UK. They remained the largest group of those arriving by boat until 2024 (Home Office, see also table below).
The boats — often no more than dinghies — are overcrowded and unsafe, but still set off to try and cross the busiest shipping lane in the world. Every year there are deaths, despite lifeboats and other vessels saving many in peril: in 2024, for example, British lifeboats rescued 1,371 people (RNLI).
One interviewee described the impact of losing two family members in one of these disasters, in which 18 others were lost:
It was probably the most difficult day of my life, learning about their deaths after hearing the voices of my loved ones in distressed voice messages, telling us they are alive. Every one of them, saying we’re alive. Each one of them sent those voice messages.
A new crime of endangerment of life, targeting smugglers and those piloting boats, came into force in January 2026 in the UK, with an Afghan national the first person charged with the new offence (Crown Prosecution Service). Advertising illegal journeys to the UK has also been criminalised.
As noted above, the difficulty of the journey, combined with particular dangers facing women, means that it is mostly young men making boat crossings. In the first nine months of 2025, only 5 per cent of Afghans arriving in small boats were adult women (compared to 25.5 per cent for all nationalities), while 85 per cent were men aged between 18 and 40 (UK Home Office).
A smaller number of Afghans claimed asylum after coming to the UK on study or work visas. However, as part of its wider effort to reduce what it called “visa abuse,” the government announced in March 2026 that Afghans would no longer be given student or work visas, noting that 95 per cent of Afghans on study visas claimed asylum between 2021 and September 2025. Afghanistan was the only country singled out for the work visa ban, though three other countries were also included in the study visa ban – Cameroon, Myanmar and Sudan.
After the return of the Taliban to power, several new schemes to help Afghan women study in British universities were set up. The government’s own global Chevening scholarship has also enabled many Afghans, men and women, to come and study in the UK. The ban on study visas closes yet another door for Afghan women wanting the higher education they are denied at home, and also – for now – blocks one of the few legal and safe ways for them to get to the UK and claim asylum, although the government described it as a “brake” that will be “regularly reviewed” (Home Secretary Shahbana Mahmood’s statement).
A long wait in ‘asylum hotels’
Even when someone makes it to the UK, they are far from secure. Many of those who claim asylum face over a year while they wait for their application to be considered. For the first year, asylum seekers have no right to work, but they can access free health care and children have a right to education. The UK government provides a subsistence level of financial support and temporary accommodation, mostly in budget hotels, often sharing rooms with strangers. To put this in context, however, there is a shortage of social housing generally in Britain and a problem with homelessness: as of 31 March 2026 (latest figures) 131,000 households in the UK were living in temporary accommodation (UK Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government), while the average waiting time for council housing is 2.9 years, increasing to 6.6 years in Greater London (LocalGov).
The use of hotels to house asylum seekers became a political flashpoint in 2024 and 2025. There was some justification for consternation about the increased use and expense of hotel accommodation: in 2019, there were 423 asylum seekers of all nationalities in hotels; four years later it had jumped to over 50,000, with Afghans among the largest number of those housed in hotels. The cost of hotel accommodation also soared: from £64 (USD 85) a night per person in 2020/21 to £170 (USD 234) 2022/23, falling back in 2025 to £119 (USD 159); at the same time, the daily cost of other accommodation types has remained broadly stable, at an average of £27 (USD 36) a night (Migration Observatory). (See also reports by the University of Bristol, University of Durham and a parliamentary enquiry report, including detail on eye-wateringly high profits made by four big hotel contractors.) Beyond the cost, however, public and political concerns were exacerbated by the fact that those housed in these hotels are predominantly male, given the demographic tilt of asylum seekers. The issue of asylum hotels was seized on by right-wing anti-immigrant groups, and there were simmering protests outside hotels all over the UK in the summers of 2024 and 2025 (Reuters, Al Jazeera).
For many Afghans, this has felt like a stark display of hostility to their very presence in the UK. Naveen Asif of the Afghan Human Rights Foundation, based in Scotland, said he understands how British people and the media can get the wrong idea about the hotels, which create an idea of luxury, “but living in that condition, isolated from their communities, not allowed to work, sharing rooms with strangers while their mental health gets worse and worse, it’s very difficult.”
While Scotland has a better reputation for tolerance towards refugees and newcomers than many parts of England, Asif said anti-immigrant mobilisation is also “spreading rapidly” in Scotland, with weekly protests against asylum seekers, often outside hotels. He recalled a protest in Falkirk in central Scotland in front of a hotel which was known to be housing asylum seekers, most of whom were Afghan. He said that right in front of police, “there were banners which said, ‘Kill them all and let god decide what to do with them.’” He said fear is widespread:
I get calls every day from asylum seekers who are scared that they might get attacked. You can’t provide security; you can only advise them to talk to the police. People shouldn’t feel what they felt in Syria or Iraq or Afghanistan, they shouldn’t be scared here, this is a free country. People have the right to express their views, but they have no right to beat or threaten people.
Former Afghan Minister of Women’s Affairs Hasina Safi spent three years housed in a hotel on the outskirts of London with her family. She is uncomplaining about it, telling AAN that after being forced to leave Afghanistan, “everywhere was the same for me.” She was initially worried by the protests, but found the counter-protests, in support of refugees, very moving: “On one side of the street, there were banners saying no to immigrants, other side, we welcome refugees… it was quite peaceful… I saw young children saying, ‘We welcome refugees,’ which made me cry.” Safi said the use of hotels that she witnessed was, if nothing else, highly inefficient:
To be honest, just in the hotel we were housed in – so much money was spent on this group, if that money was given to each person individually, they could have bought a house. It’s also about thinking about the efficiency of the budget which can help.
The government is phasing out the use of hotels to house asylum seekers in favour of cheaper alternatives such as disused army bases, which can house hundreds at a time (BBC). However, they are facing the same protests from local people near the new sites (BBC).
If an asylum seeker is still awaiting a decision on their status after a year, they can apply for the right to work, if the delay is judged not to be their fault. Even if successful, they are only granted the right to work in a narrow range of jobs where labour is deemed to be in short supply (UK Parliament). Although for government finances, it would be better for asylum seekers to be working and paying taxes, successive governments have feared it would incentivise migrants to come to Britain to seek asylum (House of Commons). However, the inability to work legally frustrates many. Hadia Azizi is an Afghan who was given settled status in 2023, who now works for a local council in London, supporting refugees, who said it is particularly hard for young men to remain jobless:
Employment is a huge challenge for many Afghans here. Officially, many cannot work but most work illegally because they need to send home remittances – they have to support their families back home. It’s a big emotional and financial burden, particularly on men. When you’re in Afghanistan, your expectation and imagination about life here is very different from reality. But these poor men, they have to work illegally and send money home.
Azizi says many end up in the informal economy, earning cash as van drivers, doing deliveries or removals, or working in Afghan restaurants or supermarkets, or in hawalas.
Legal support
Interviewees described how hard it is to navigate the complexities of UK bureaucracy. This is compounded by the current crisis in the UK’s immigration system, which has a massive backlog and a shortage of state supported legal aid (see this 2026 parliamentary report). Farhad Basharyar, a former diplomat under the Republic who came to the UK in 2021 and claimed asylum, found that even though he was a lawyer with fluent English, he still struggled: “There is a lack of legal aid, firstly. The second thing is – once you find legal aid, a lot of the solicitors aren’t helpful.”
One lawyer, Roberta Haslan from Bindmans, told AAN that the general shortage of legal aid lawyers means that, increasingly, they were seeing asylum seekers without any form of legal representation. Without language skills, or any legal education or understanding of the British system, “people are really struggling,” she said.
Asylum approvals plummet
The need for a lawyer is becoming more acute as acceptance rates for asylum seekers plummet. Following the fall of the Republic, the UK government gave near blanket approval to all Afghans who made it to the UK to claim asylum, assuming any Afghan fleeing was an opponent of the Taliban and had a legitimate fear of persecution Since October 2021, almost 36,000 Afghans have claimed asylum in the UK (Home Office briefing). The initial approval rate for Afghan claims peaked at 98 and 99 per cent in 2022 and 2023, but dropped to 34 per cent by the year ending December 2025 (Migration Observatory, figure 5).
The change is a result of a shift in UK guidance to immigration officers, which removed the default assumption that returnees would be at risk of reprisal from the Taliban. Rather than a blanket approval for Afghans, it placed the burden of proof on each person to demonstrate the individual risk they faced. Those deemed “likely to be at risk from the Taliban” include former members of the Republic’s security forces or who worked with the international military, as well as members of groups deemed to be at greater risk, including women, Hazaras, religious minorities, journalists and human rights defenders.
While the initial grant rate of 34 per cent has sunk to a low level for Afghans, many will appeal. At present, almost two thirds of (all) asylum rejections are overturned, either through a successful appeal or because the government withdraws its rejection (Guardian, Free Movement). Jamie Bell said that, for many Afghan cases, he has seen, “the quality of decision making is appalling,” with plenty of grounds for appeal. Bell represented one woman, known as Mina, whose initial rejection of an asylum claim was overturned in June 2025 (Guardian). For Afghan men, however, the prospects of rejections being upheld are far higher.
Rejected but not deported
For those Afghans who are rejected, the situation is grim. Already, thousands of Afghans have been refused asylum, leaving them without the right to employment and with limited access to financial support or education.[4] They are, at present, unlikely to be deported, since enforced and voluntary returns to Afghanistan have been suspended. This is partly because the UK government does not recognise the Islamic Emirate, which, in turn, does not recognise travel documents issued by the Afghan embassy in London (Guardian).
The UK did, however, deport at least eight Afghans who had been convicted of crimes between 2021 and 2024.[5] Growing numbers of European countries have been deporting Afghan offenders, including Germany, which announced a deal with the Emirate in February 2026 to allow it to deport Afghan offenders directly to Afghanistan, where previously they had sent them via Qatar (AFP/CTV). In October 2025, twenty countries called upon the European Union to seek a formal return agreement with Afghanistan, to allow for deportations (Euronews).
Deportation of failed asylum seekers who are not convicted of crimes is not inconceivable. While the UK has not yet crossed that line, some British opposition politicians have proposed that Afghans – even Afghan women – should be eligible for deportation (Sky).
Until something shifts politically, however, Afghans who are refused asylum face untold months or years in limbo, without any prospects of integration. In contrast, as soon as someone is granted refugee status, they get the right to work and study. This does not mean life is necessarily straightforward, as discussed next.
Afghans with settled status – rights with more hurdles
Once someone is granted refugee status, under the existing system, they enjoy the same rights as those Afghans who came via the resettlement schemes described above, in terms of the right to work, study, claim benefits and family reunion. Once recognised as refugees, they are asked to find their own housing, moving out of government-funded asylum accommodation, and to find work. They may also be eligible for the same benefits as UK citizens such as Universal Credit (if unemployed or on a low wage) or help with rent (housing benefit) (Citizens Advice).Both asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to free health care. Much of this will be more restrictive under the 2026 reforms.
Having a right to work or study, however, is often a long way from being able to realise that entitlement. Afghans interviewed by AAN talked about a myriad of difficulties, often interrelated, from limited opportunities for employment, to housing shortages and limited or slow educational opportunities.
Sorya is from Kabul, and arrived in the UK in December 2024 after a perilous crossing by boat at the age of 21. In Afghanistan, she had almost completed a diploma in midwifery in Herat when the Taliban ordered midwifery and female nursing students not to return to university in early December 2024, preventing her from taking her final exams. Getting into college in the UK has been a struggle:
Everywhere I ask how I can continue my studies. I left my family, I left everything just so I can come here and study in this country. But here I can’t find my way, it’s really stressful, it’s been 11 months that I’ve lived here, but I can’t manage anything here. … I’ve said to lots of organisations that I want to study, maybe training or university – anything at all. I want to work, I want to study, but it’s not important to them.
Getting her refugee status added to these problems, since it meant her temporary accommodation was withdrawn. She only got one months’ notice: “They said to me was: ‘This house is for asylum seekers, and now you are a refugee. You need to go and find a place for yourself.’” The council only offered her a house with three single men she did not know and which she could not accept. Then, when she was offered a place at a college, she lost it, because she did not have housing.
Educational opportunities can be hard to access. Naveen Asif says there are huge waiting lists to enrol in college, so Afghans he knows have waited “a year or more,” with similar access difficulties for community-based language classes. Educational or and professional qualifications may not be recognised as of similar standard, with similar problems faced with professional qualifications, meaning the need to re-train and re-qualify, often a very expensive and complicated process, and all that on top of getting the necessary fluency in English. Without adequate training or language-learning opportunities, Rona Panjsheri says refugees can only do the most menial jobs:
I work with a lady who’d studied at university, but she struggled with the official at the job centre, who said that “language can’t be an excuse” and told her to [take] a cleaning job. It was very hard for her to go from her high goals to cleaning toilets. She became depressed quite quickly. It was so humiliating for her. It’s not just her – many refugees face this.
Hassan (not his real name) was a medical doctor in Afghanistan who arrived in the UK in August 2024 and was granted refugee status. He was an experienced doctor in Afghanistan and had a medical degree which is recognised in the UK, though he needed to qualify as a General Practitioner (GP) before he can practice, which takes around 18 months. In the meantime, work opportunities have been a struggle:
After receiving my refugee status, I tried to find any type of work. I joined a company as a warehouse operative, but it was very difficult for me because I have no experience of that, though I have ten years’ experience as a medical doctor in Afghanistan. I worked in a warehouse for around two months until around Christmas, when they fired 25 employees and I was one of them.
For Hasina Safi, this is her second experience of being a refugee. Since arriving in the UK, she began and completed a masters’ degree and is more sanguine about the diversity of experiences:
I’m in contact with different women located in different parts of UK, and most of them have access to whatever they need – health, education, many things. There are women with big health needs, who had limited support there [Afghanistan] who’ve received far more support here, which is free, and there are women who can go out and go to the park. For them it’s fun, they have more freedom. But then there are women who were working there [Afghanistan] and came here and they became housewives, which leaves a big gap in their lives. So, there are very different experiences.
This challenge, of adjusting to a new life and identity in the UK, is something that another, Sonia Eqbal, who came through a resettlement programme, was open about experiencing. After a successful career in Afghanistan working in international development, she focused on supporting her family while they resettled, while her own mental health took a blow:
What I had discounted was the level of trauma I’d brought. I was trying to deny and suppress it, but it crept into me. That sense of purpose that had driven me for the past twenty years, that had driven me since I started college, I lost it. I’m trying really hard to find it again, and to find a sense of identity. Who am I anymore?… here I am with little ability to impact even my own life.
Some interviewees spoke of the difficulty in accessing mental health care, though this reflects wider shortages in the system, as Naveen Asif recognised: “I know asylum seekers who are begging to see someone about their mental health issues. But not even local people can access mental health specialists.”
The 2026 reforms: the road for refugees will be longer and harder
For Afghans who receive their refugee status the situation is – or was – brighter. Until late in 2025, someone whose asylum claim was recognised was granted refugee status for five years, after which they could apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR). As soon as a year after that, if they passed a citizenship test, they could apply for citizenship. However, the proposed reforms, issued in November 2025 and set to be brought into law in stages through 2026 and 2027, throw this system up into the air and would affect any migrant who has not yet secured an Indefinite Leave to Remain.
The most significant change is that it will take up to twenty years, rather than five, for a refugee to be granted settlement. Secondly, during that time, their status as a refugee, which is now described in the government’s proposals as “core protection,” would be reviewed every two-and-a-half years. This means that if the government’s assessment of risk in a home country alters over that twenty-year period, so do the prospects of an individual keeping their leave to remain.
The route to permanent settlement is also being tightened for migrants arriving on work, study or family visas, with higher language and earnings requirements for all and the standard wait time increased from five to ten years (with some notable exceptions, see this briefing by the Migration Observatory). The government is seeking to reduce the “pace and scale of migration,” as well as the assumption that settlement is “near automatic” (statement by the Home Secretary).
For Afghan refugees who have arrived since 2021, this means that they may be kept in a state of limbo for up to two decades, repeatedly having to prove their right to remain in the UK and unsure as to whether they will be granted the right to stay indefinitely. They may be able to “earn reductions,” according to the new policy proposal, by getting a job or being accepted for certain kinds of study. Automatic family reunion would not flow from core protection status, though historically, family reunification for refugees has been treated as a distinct right, as enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood is blunt about the policy changes, which she described in parliament as “the most sweeping asylum reforms in modern times,” designed to make the UK a less attractive place to seek asylum. The result will be that “refugee status becomes temporary – lasting only until a refugee can safely return home.”
The underlying assumption is that by raising the bar to asylum seekers, far fewer people will make the unauthorised journey to the UK. The factors that influence asylum seekers’ destinations, however, are highly complex and hotly contested (Electronic Immigration Network). Regardless of these new policies, pull factors of the English language and social networks in the UK will likely still be a draw for many.
For Afghans who already have refugee status in the UK, the greatest shock is that the government intends to apply the new policy to those who have arrived since 2021, even though, when they received their refugee status, they were told they would only have to wait five years to get settled status (Parliamentary Briefing).
Several interviewees told AAN that the prospect of losing their five-year pathway to settled status was devastating, including Farhad Basharyar, who was less than a year away from permanent status in the UK.
After a couple of years living in this country and our kids going to school here, we integrated in this country, so this, it’s a big punishment. It’s a big punishment for those who think of a bright future and are thinking “Once I get citizenship I can be more energetic to work, to settle in this country.” If we receive this news that the government is deciding to put more pressure on us, we lose our hope and we lose our energy to work hard.
As a lawyer, Farhad also believes the proposals would be unlawful:
I’ve already spent four years here. In one year, I will be applying for ILR [Indefinite Leave to Remain] so if they implement this white paper, or this new rule, of course it will impact on me and people like me, so it’s not fair and it’s not lawful as well… There is one principle that says that laws should not be retroactive, so that laws cannot be applied to those events, situations and acts which occurred in the past, and prior to the implementation of the law.
Another refugee, Sorya, was similarly dismayed that the reforms could mean a fifteen or twenty year wait for security:
If I’m not completely sure I can settle in this country, how can I start, how can I plan for the future? How can I plan my work? For someone who wants a car here, or a house here, how can they manage this if they don’t have citizenship? For me it’s a huge problem because I want to go to university. How can I take a loan without citizenship? I was very stressed when I heard about this, and all the people in my position are like me – they are stressed about this and saying, “What do we need to do? What about our future? What will happen to us?”
Family reunification
Another enormous blow for many was the suspension of the Refugee Family Reunion route in September 2025, which was already causing great difficulties for many Afghans. Under existing rules, refugees as well as those with settled status have the right to request family reunification for their immediate family, comprising spouse and child dependants. This was already a meagre definition of family for many Afghans, whose extended families tend to be more interdependent than is culturally typical the UK. So, for example, an individual’s parents, even if they are financially dependent, may not be eligible for reunification, except in “extreme circumstances,” often health related.
However, with the Refugee Family Reunion visa suspended for new applicants, existing refugees’ families are left in limbo. This is a temporary suspension: further Home Office announcements on the issue are expected, but the expectation is that it will become harder for refugees to bring their families to the UK (UK parliament). There is a lack of clarity around these reforms, but it appears the changes would bring family reunification for refugees into line with citizens and settled residents who, to bring a spouse into the country, need to show they have a combined annual income of £29,000 (USD 38,800), with additional costs for children, and for the partner to have a good knowledge of English (details here). That salary level, said Migration Observatory, is higher than comparable countries in Europe, which means some applicants “will never expect to find jobs that earn above the threshold.” For many refugee families, whose situations are typically far more precarious than most citizens, it will simply be an impossibly high bar (for more see this briefing by the NGO Right to Remain).
Hassan, the medical doctor who arrived in the UK in August 2024 has been granted refugee status. He is very worried about his wife and three young children, aged two, four and six, who are in Pakistan:
I have heard that there will be changes to family reunification rules and that family members will have to go through normal [visa application] routes, and pay fees, have at least 29 or 30,000-pound income and pass other requirements. It’s very difficult for families to be separated, especially when they have children under five years old… I find it very difficult because I’m very safe and secure in the UK – I have food here, I have access to healthcare here, but it depresses me and I can’t sleep because I think about my children who have nothing.
Racism and fear
The policy reforms are driven by a melange of factors, from legitimate concerns about strains on public services to distorted assumptions about the numbers of ‘legal’ versus ‘illegal’ migration routes, confusion about how the immigration system works, and a global backdrop of anti-immigrant sentiment becoming more politically mainstream across the UK, the rest of Europe and the United States (Guardian, Mixed Migration Centre).
Young men are often the focus of scaremongering, with tabloid newspapers jumping on stories of crimes that are said to involve asylum seekers or migrant workers. Afghans have sometimes been singled out in media and social media reporting, with one news cycle in the summer of 2025 exemplifying some of the problems with such reports. In August, a notoriously anti-immigration politician, Robert Jenrick MP, accused Afghans, wrongly, of being “twenty times more likely to be committed to a sexual crime than a British national” (Guardian). Jenrick was drawing on a report which used data from the Metropolitan police in London, which showed that Afghans were charged (rather than convicted) with a comparatively large number of sexual offences. However, the claim was based on dodgy statistics: it used sexual crime figures for 2018-2024, but population figures from 2021, thereby missing the subsequent significant increase in the number of Afghans living in the UK, and ignored the higher proportion of young men among Afghans than in the general population, important given the greater likelihood of offending by young men (InfoMigrants, Sky, New Statesman). Nor did the data take account potential biases in policing, with studies showing that ethnic minorities, particularly those in contact with immigration services, can face disproportionate police checks (BBC, Liberty).
Naveen Asif said the negative news reports have demonised all Afghan men:
Afghans in the UK are accused of being sex offenders, deemed to be backwards people, there’s hardly any support available, it is a shock to many who thought the British government had respect for Afghans. Many Afghans are highly talented, but they face a lot of discrimination, racism and scapegoating. All refugees face discrimination, but especially Afghans. Yes, we don’t deny that there are a few who maybe commit crimes, but there is the rule of law, it doesn’t need to be based on your race.
Hadia Azizi said the subject was hard to discuss, but acknowledged that
there is a lot of domestic violence in our community, as well as sexual abuse and harassment. It should be taken seriously. But this doesn’t mean that they should make the immigration laws stricter, they can use other measures to respond to crimes.
She fears that the debate overshadows why she and so many Afghans are in the UK:
I want people to understand that people who are fleeing war or a group of barbarians like the Taliban, they are fleeing to have a safe place to live… They are seeking refuge because they don’t have another place to go. Then you find you are being judged, being labelled in the news, being counted as a number not as a human being with emotions. You’re just a statistic in the news, it’s dehumanising.
While some settle, many face harder times ahead
The experience of Afghans in the UK is as diverse as the Afghans themselves. Some thrive, but many are struggling. Those who are in the UK as part of a humanitarian resettlement programmes had the good fortune to receive settled status upon arrival and to bring their families with them, something which looks even more halcyon given the uncertainty their countrymen and women with refugee status are now facing. Sonia Eqbal says she holds on to the feeling of relief she felt when she was first offered humanitarian protection:
While we see a lot of issues and problems with the policies here, there are lots of things that we’re not happy about. Still, we remember, coming from crisis, almost losing our hope and humanity, to receive an offer [of humanitarian protection] like that was massive. I remember telling myself that whether it works out or not, that gesture was big enough to make me feel some humanity again.
While acknowledging that many Afghans were having “tough times” because of the language barriers, employment and housing, Hasina Safi was determined “not to hide the good” that she’s encountered. She uses the garden of her new family house as an example:
When I came to this house, the garden of this house was like a trash corner, but today, it’s become a beautiful garden, because volunteers came, they brought roses, they planted them, it’s beautiful. This is humanity.
But for Afghans who might have been months away from getting settled status and the near prospect of applying for citizenship, it is hard to look ahead without trepidation. This has “a big impact on the mental health of people,” said Farhad Basharyar. “Some people are very stressed.” Not only might they face another fifteen or more years before they get settled status, but the assumption that they would also be able to see their family settle in the UK is in doubt. The greatest uncertainty, however, faces those Afghans whose refugee status has been rejected. For them, neither integration nor deportation is possible for the foreseeable future.
Edited by Kate Clark, Jelena Bjelica and Fabrizio Foschini
References
References
↑1
To give an idea of the numbers of Afghans living in the UK, the 2001 census recorded 14,875 people born in Afghanistan and living in the UK, with 7 in ten living in London (BBC). The 2011 census recorded 63,5000 people born in Afghanistan, overwhelmingly in England. The 2021 census recorded 86,000 Afghan-born residents in England and Wales (Muslim Council of Britain).
↑2
A note on terms: a refugee is someone who has fled war, violence, conflict or persecution and has crossed an international border in search of safety. A person seekingasylum is someone who has left their country of origin and has applied for protection, but whose claim has not yet been legally concluded. Leave to remain is the term used for non-UK nationals who are given permission to stay in the UK for a limited period of time. After a qualifying period of residency in the UK, someone may be eligible to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR), though this is in flux, as discussed in the report. For more, see The Truth About Asylum by the Refugee Council or these definitions by the United Nations.
↑3
There was some controversy about more than 2,000 Afghans who served in specialist units alongside UK special forces having their request for protection sponsorship denied, apparently by UK Special Forces officials, as well as delays in reviews of those rejections. There was speculation that this might relate to ongoing inquiries into alleged war crimes by UK special forces in Afghanistan, since the Afghan partner forces might have witnesses or been party to alleged war crimes. For more see a report by this author from December 2025, Who Dares, Kills? Alleged war crimes and cover-ups by Britain’s special forces, p29-30.
↑4
Failed Afghan asylum seekers who cannot be deported were entitled to basic accommodation and support, known as “Section 4,” which was more restrictive than the UK’s main welfare system. Claimants in private housing were given £49.18 to cover food, clothing and toiletries those in hotels where meals were provided got £9.95 (UK Home Office). This was replaced in March 2026 with a “conditional approach,” so that those caught working illegally, breaking the law, or refusing deportation can have support revoked (UK Home Office). This may not apply to Afghans, however, because they have no means of being deported. Education must be provided to children up to age 16 who are refused asylum, though they can still face deterrents (Asylum Information Database). The rules in Scotland are somewhat different (Scottish Refugee Council).
↑5
This is based on a Freedom of Information request by Hyphen journalist, Samir Jeraj, who shared the information he received from the Home Office with this author by email.
Over the past six months, the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan has extended from low-level border skirmishes to talk of “open war.” Pakistan conducted its first-ever air strikes in Kabul in October 2025, targeting Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and, more recently, on 16 March 2026, bombed the city, killing more than 140 civilians. Islamabad, for the first time in a decade, has seen major attacks by militant groups and accuses the Emirate of supporting the TTP’s growth since 2021, accusations that the Emirate has consistently denied. The deep-seated tensions between the two neighbours are also fuelled by longstanding disputes over regional diplomacy, sovereignty and territorial issues. Amid mounting casualties and warnings of looming humanitarian crises, multiple mediation attempts by regional countries and several ceasefires have failed to hold. In this report, AAN’s Fabrizio Foschini, Rachel Reid and Roxanna Shapour examine the state of the conflict, its historical roots and the regional and global response.
The Afghanistan–Pakistan relationship has entered one of its most volatile phases in decades, characterised by escalating cross-border attacks, failed diplomatic efforts and a rapidly worsening humanitarian crisis.
At the core of the crisis lies a complex mixture of immediate security concerns and enduring territorial and structural disputes. Since the establishment of the second Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan has increasingly accused militant groups—particularly Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – of operating from Afghan territory, while the IEA has denied these accusations and has, in turn, accused Pakistan of violating Afghan sovereignty, particularly through airstrikes across the border. The Emirate’s military has responded with attacks on Pakistani border posts as well as low-tech drone strikes inside Pakistan. These tensions are exacerbated by unresolved historical issues, including disagreements over the Durand Line and competing strategic interests that have shaped bilateral relations since 1947.
Despite several attempts at mediation by regional countries, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, successive ceasefires have not held and negotiations have not thus far been fruitful. The escalation of the conflict has resulted in high-casualty incidents in Afghanistan, with the United Nations estimating 289 killed or injured since the end of February.[1] The UN doesn’t track similar statistics on the Pakistani side of the border, though civilian casualties from militant attacks inside Pakistan are at a ten year high.[2] The gravity of the situation has been somewhat overshadowed by the conflict between Iran and the US and Israel, despite its potential ramifications for the region and beyond.
This report provides a brief overview of the latest stage of the conflict, placing recent events within their wider historical and geopolitical context. It outlines the causes of escalation, the involvement of regional and international actors and the humanitarian impacts of ongoing hostilities. It is based on publicly available sources, with an awareness that verification is difficult and misreporting is common.
How it all began: Initial strikes and ceasefire breakdown (October–December 2025)
The most recent Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict began with Pakistan’s first-ever airstrike on Kabul in the early hours of 9 October 2025. In retaliation for a Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which killed 11 Pakistani military personnel, the Pakistan military struck near Kabul’s Abdulhaq Square, reportedly targeting a TTP stronghold.[3] Early reports that they had killed the TTP leader, Noor Wali Mehsud, were denied, with an audio message attributed to Mehsud released soon after (Amu TV, Reuters, Times of India). Airstrikes were also reported in Khost and Paktia provinces on the same night, as well as in Jalalabad city (Daily Urdu).
The Defence Ministry of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) released a statement on 9 October condemning the attacks and warning that if the situation worsened, “the consequences will be attributable to the Pakistani army” (Al Jazeera). A more diplomatic tone was struck by the Emirate’s Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, who was in the Indian capital, New Delhi, for a six-day visit, who said “our issues can be solved by negotiation, not by war” (BBC). Pakistan, for its part, did not comment directly on the reports, but did reiterate that militant groups operating from within Afghan territory posed a threat to its security – an allegation that the Emirate has consistently denied. (Monitoring by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) suggests that the TTP was involved in over 1,000 attacks in Pakistan during 2025.)
Open fighting broke out in the following days, with Emirate forces launching retaliatory attacks on 11 October against Pakistani military posts along the border, prompting counterattacks from Pakistan and reported casualties on both sides (BBC Afghanistan). Emirate forces claimed that 58 Pakistani soldiers and nine IEA soldiers had been killed, as well as around 30 wounded, reported BBC Afghanistan, quoting IEA Spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed.
Pakistan, however, dismissed the Emirate’s claims, though it acknowledged that 23 of its soldiers were killed in clashes (Al Jazeera). It responded by closing major border crossings, including Torkham and Chaman, disrupting trade, movement of people and humanitarian aid (AP).
Despite a brief ceasefire of 48 hours that began on 15 October (Al Jazeera) and ended on 17 October when fighting resumed with Pakistan’s airstrikes on three locations in Paktika province (Amu TV), the five-day clashes from 10 to 17 October resulted in 47 civilians being killed and 456 injured in Afghanistan, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Spin Boldak in Kandahar province recorded the highest number of casualties, with additional civilian casualties reported in Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, Kandahar and Helmand provinces (UNAMA).
On 19 October 2025, negotiations in Doha, mediated by Qatar and Turkey, resulted in an immediate ceasefire and an agreement to establish “mechanisms to consolidate lasting peace and stability between the two countries” (Al Jazeera, Reuters).
This led to tense talks between the two countries from 25 to 30 October in Istanbul. Pakistani officials – includingDefence Minister, Khawaja Asif and Information Minister, Attaullah Tarar – accused Afghan negotiators of backtracking and warned that progress would be difficult (AP, Dawn). Meanwhile, Amu TV cited an unidentified Emirate official as saying that Pakistan had made “unreasonable demands” and had refused to address Afghan concerns, including alleged airspace violations and allowing extremist groups to stage attacks inside Afghanistan from Pakistani territory. The joint statement issued on 30 October stated that both sides agreed to continue the ceasefire and a new round of talks on 6 November.
However, on 6 November, as the peace talks began, the two sides exchanged fire at the Spin Boldak/Chaman border crossing (Reuters, Al Jazeera). On 8 November, the Emirate’s Deputy Interior Minister and member of the negotiating team, Rahmatullah Najib, attributed the breakdown of the talks to Pakistan’s demand that Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada issue a fatwa (religious decree) declaring all ongoing warfare in Pakistan as “illegitimate.” Najib said at a press conference that since Afghanistan had no right to approve war in Pakistani territory, “we also don’t have the right to declare these wars illegitimate, because they don’t belong to us … Then why should we issue such fatwa” (Amu TV). He added that the authority for such a fatwa lies with the Taliban-affiliated Dar al-Ifta (religious decree body) and that the Emirate “cannot dictate or influence the content of such religious rulings” (RTA).
The ceasefire ultimately collapsed on 11 November in the wake of a suicide bombing outside a courthouse in Islamabad, which Pakistani officials said killed 12 and injured 27, making it the first major attack in the capital for a decade (New York Times). Pakistani Defence Minister Asif declared on X: “We are in a state of war,” blaming Afghanistan, adding that “bringing this war to Islamabad is a message from Kabul.”
However, in a 15 November interview with the Pakistani daily The Express Tribune, Asif proposed that a way to mend the relationship between the two neighbours could be through a “written pledge,” which might be supported by friendly states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, China and Qatar. In subsequent remarks, however, Asif adopted a more pessimistic tone about talks with Emirate officials, stating that: “today, we are completely writing them off and we have no good hope from them” (Dawn).
Another round of talks was held on 3 December in Saudi Arabia, but these too failed to yield a breakthrough, although both sides agreed to maintain a ceasefire (Reuters). Sporadic clashes persisted throughout December 2025, including cross-border fighting on 5 December, which caused civilian casualties near Spin Boldak (BBC).
Renewed fighting and escalation (January–March 2026)
In January and most of February, the conflict remained sporadic. In Pakistan, an attack on 12 January 2026in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which killed six police officers (Dawn), was followed by a suicide bombing at the Shia Khadija Tul Kubra Mosque in Islamabad during Friday prayers on 6 February (BBC), further straining already tense relations between the two neighbours. A UN Security Council statement that condemned the attack in the strongest terms said that the mosque attack, which was claimed by “ISIL (Da’esh),” had killed 32 and injured 92 Pakistani nationals.
The Defence Minister, Khawaja Asif, said that the attacker had made several trips to Afghanistan before the incident, which was proof of an Indian-Afghan “collusion” (BBC). This was echoed by Pakistani Minister of State for Interior, Talal Chaudhry, who also told a news conference that the attacker had made several trips to Afghanistan before the attack (New York Times).
A 16 February attack against a security checkpoint in Bajaur district, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, killed eleven soldiers and one child. Pakistan responded by summoning Afghan diplomats and warning that it would take action against militant bases if necessary (Anadolu Agency, Express Tribune).
Pakistan launched a series of airstrikes on 21 February in several districts of Nangrahar and Paktika provinces, which the UN said killed at least 13 civilians and injured seven, including children (UNAMA). The Emirate warned of retaliation (Amu TV). Finally, Pakistan announced at a military briefing the start of Operation Ghazab lil-Haq (Righteous Fury) on 26 February, with the first wave of airstrikes hitting Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost and Nangarhar (Dawn). Pakistan’s Defence Minister, Khawaja Mohammad Asif, declared on the same day: “Our patience has now run out. Now it is open war between us” (Guardian).
Fighting intensified in the first week of March 2026, with Pakistan conducting strikes inside Afghanistan, including on the former US military base, Bagram, which Kabul said its air defences had thwarted (Guardian). Pakistani media, however, carried satellite images of what they said showed evidence of a successful strike on Bagram, located in Parwan province, about 40 kilometres north of Kabul International Airport (Geo News). Also in early March, the Emirate claimed it has used drones to hit Pakistani military targets in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, which Pakistan denied, but the Emirate’s ability to get its low-tech drones as far as the capital represents a new irritant for Pakistan (Al Jazeera).
One of the deadliest attacks came on 16 March 2026, when a Pakistani airstrike in Kabul targeted the Omid Drug Rehabilitation Facility and former NATO base, Camp Phoenix (UN News). As is often the case in such incidents, casualty figures remain contested, reflecting the difficulty in verifying figures in the early days after an incident. BBC Afghanistan quoted the Emirate’s Deputy Spokesman, Hamdullah Fitrat, as saying that “at least 400 people were killed and 250 wounded,” while Al Jazeera cited the United Nations as saying that it has recorded 143 deaths.[4] Pakistan claimed that the target was an ammunition depot and a drone storage facility.[5] Emirate officials dismissed this, describing the attack as a “crime against humanity” (BBC). In a statement published on 27 March, Human Rights Watch described the attack as “an unlawful attack and a possible war crime.” It noted that there was “no evidence that the Omid center was being used for military purposes,” rendering the strike unlawfully indiscriminate.
Following the 16 March strike, both sides continued exchanging fire. Afghan forces reportedly targeted Pakistani military positions, while Pakistan expanded its campaign with further strikes and reportedly intercepted drones near the border.
Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts to bring the two countries to the negotiation table continue, with countries in the region, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, pushing for de-escalation. These efforts led to a temporary ceasefire timed to coincide with Eid al-Fitr, the three-day holiday marking the end of the month of Ramadan, which fell on 20-22 March (AP).
The ceasefire, however, proved to be short-lived and fighting resumed along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border in eastern Afghanistan on 25 March, when Pakistani forces fired into Kunar province, killing at least two civilians and injuring several others (AP). The rapid collapse of this ceasefire, as well as earlier ones, highlights the volatile nature of the situation. With the unrelenting volley of attacks and counterattacks and no clear indication that either side is willing to de-escalate, the conflict continues to intensify in real time.
Humanitarian consequences
Amid these clashes, casualties have mounted, displacement has increased, with price rises and blocked humanitarian supply routes leading to growing food insecurity.
Civilians have been killed and injured on both sides, although higher numbers have been recorded in Afghanistan, mainly as a result of Pakistani airstrikes.[6]
An update from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), covering 6 to 17 March, said 76 people had been killed and 213 injured, more than half of whom were women and children, in less than three weeks between 26 February and 17 March. It also drew attention to displacement, noting that in addition to large numbers displaced, more than 318 shelters destroyed or badly damaged, with displaced families in need of water, health services and food assistance. The UN’s Refugee Agency, the UNHCR, had previously warned on 5 March that the border conflict had displaced an estimated 115,000 people in Afghanistan and around 3,000 in Pakistan. This compounds the critical situation of Afghan returnees, with over one million forcibly returned by Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2025, according to UNHCR (for more on this see this AAN report).
OCHA also pointed to the impacts on food security, especially in Afghanistan, noting a 20 to 40 per cent price rise for key staples such as rice and vegetable oil since December. Humanitarian supply routes have been disrupted, with cargo trapped in Pakistani ports due to the border closure, as well as the Iran transit route being blocked amid its ongoing conflict. The World Food Programme warned on 3 March that around 160,000 people have been affected by the suspension of emergency food distributions.
Not surprisingly, UN officials have warned of dire humanitarian consequences and urged a diplomatic resolution. The Secretary-General, António Guterres, said on 27 February that he was “deeply concerned by the escalation… and the impact that violence is having on civilian populations,” and called for an immediate ceasefire (UN News). Senior UN officials have urged ceasefires, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, who called on 6 March for fighting to end, saying “Civilians on both sides of the border are now having to flee from airstrikes, heavy artillery fire, mortar shelling and gunfire.” In a statement issued on 24 March, United Nations experts urged Pakistan and Afghanistan to agree to a renewed ceasefire, warning of rising civilian harm.[7]
Ceasefire calls have also come from Islamic leaders, including Ali Mohiuddin al-Qaradaghi, head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, who encouraged Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to mediate talks (Ariana News, Amu TV). The head of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also called for a resolution, with Khalil Ibrahim Okur, Deputy Director General for Humanitarian Affairs at the OIC, stating: “Afghanistan and Pakistan are brotherly countries, and we hope the issue will be resolved through diplomatic channels” (Ilkha).
Origins of the dispute: The contested border and the Pashtunistan issue (1947–1970s)
Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been fraught since Pakistan came into being through partition from India in 1947.[8] Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, disputing the right of the newborn independent state to rule over the Pashtun-majority Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West Frontier Province – and later Balochistan.[9] Afghanistan argued that these areas had been occupied by the British and were never formally ceded by Afghan rulers. Instead, it maintained that the people in these areas should be given the opportunity to choose whether to join Pakistan, Afghanistan or become independent through a referendum.[10] Kabul asked Islamabad to negotiate a different border. Pakistan rejected any such negotiations and the so-called ‘Pashtunistan’ issue gained little traction with the international diplomatic community, where, in the context of the Cold War, Afghanistan remained relatively isolated.
Relations between the two countries never quite recovered from this initial shock.[11] Afghanistan still refuses to accept the current demarcation line as an official international border (the so-called Durand Line, named after the British diplomat who negotiated it with the Afghan ruler in the 1890s).[12] Over the decades, the Pashtunistan issue would remain a major focal point of Afghan political and intellectual debate (though often eclipsed during the most intense years of war in Afghanistan from the late 1970s).
A notable supporter of Pashtunistan was Prime Minister Daud Khan (1953-63), who pursued a proactive stance on the issue. Kabul supported Pashtun dissidents in Pakistan and lodged official protests when they were arrested. Pakistan reacted by blocking imports from Afghanistan, while respective embassies and consulates were often shut or ransacked by mobs. The two countries came close to military confrontation on several occasions, including an undeclared conflict in 1960-61 when Afghanistan provided military support to Pashtuns on the other side of the Durand Line opposed to Pakistani security forces.[13] The confrontation escalated into direct military involvement by both countries and led to the severing of diplomatic ties and a full blockade of commercial routes. Tensions were only defused in 1963, when the Afghan King Zaher Shah replaced Daud with a less aggressive prime minister.
The Afghan crises and Pakistani interference (1970s–2021)
The presence of a hostile Afghanistan on its northwestern border has long been a major concern for Pakistan, constantly focused on its enmity with India; the latter, on the other hand, generally maintained good relations with Kabul. Afghanistan never intervened in the wars between Pakistan and India (in 1948, 1965 and 1971, nor in a series of more recent minor conflicts, such as those in 1999 and 2025). However, the need to avert that possibility has remained at the core of Pakistan’s strategic security doctrines and has largely informed its policies towards Afghanistan.
When Daud Khan seized power in a coup against his cousin Zaher Shah, in 1973, Pakistan became directly involved in the political turmoil in its neighbouring country by hosting and supporting Afghan dissidents, namely militant groups expounding a version of political Islam inspired by both the Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistani ideologue Abu Ala Maududi. After a failed insurrection against the Afghan government in 1975, these militants regrouped in Pakistan and went on to play a more significant political and military role in 1978-79, after a group of Afghan communists wrested power from Daud and eventually Soviet troops entered the country to support the newly established government.[14]
Pakistani military commands and intelligence services played a pivotal role in supporting the mujahedin’s fight against the Soviets. After the Soviet withdrawal, they sought to help those factions they considered more aligned with their interests seize power in Kabul. In this quest for influence and leverage on a future Afghan government, Pakistan’s security establishment later spurred the country to support the first Taliban Emirate’s ascent to power in the mid-1990s.
After the 2001 US intervention and the toppling of the Taliban, Pakistan ostensibly joined the US campaign aimed at suppressing Islamic militancy in the border region but proved unable or unwilling to prevent the Afghan Taliban from taking shelter on its territory and using it to organise an insurgency against the new republican institutions in Afghanistan.
Pakistani support for the Taliban insurgency was a major bone of contention between Kabul and Islamabad during the two decades of the Islamic Republic, with occasional frustration also voiced by some international supporters of Afghanistan’s republican government. Meanwhile, having all but ceased to function during the civil war of the 1990s, the Afghan state lacked leverage with Pakistan and its once aggressive posture on the Pashtunistan issue had considerably weakened. Against the backdrop of heightened religious militancy spurred by decades of foreign armed interventions and financing of Islamist groups, the ethno-nationalist narrative behind the Pashtunistan issue seemed far less relevant. The ethnic solidarity among Pashtuns across the Durand Line instead played a role in the mobilisation for jihad against the Afghan government and its international backers between 2001 and 2021.
However, decades of violence and jihadi militancy in the frontier region were starting to take a toll on Pakistani society. From around 2007, the Pakistani Taliban, the TTP, emerged as an umbrella organisation for groups operating in western Pakistan. While supporting the Taliban insurgency was part of its original aims, its focus on the Pakistani state and its security forces grew in importance over the years.[15] The repression-insurrection spiral in the FATA and other Pashtun-inhabited areas of Pakistan escalated over time. After major Pakistani military operations in 2014, local Pashtuns started to flee to the Afghan side of the border and, as the territory controlled by their Afghan brethren expanded, the TTP militants followed suit. For Pakistan, long accused of supporting the Afghan Taliban, the growing presence of the TTP in Afghanistan meant it now faced a similar threat from a militant group with a secure base across the border.[16] Pakistani officials increasingly claimed that Kabul was using the TTP militants to destabilise Pakistan. While the extent of the Afghan government’s involvement, or even Kabul’s ability to effectively patronise TTP militants, remains unclear, the presence of TTP militants in Afghanistan became a major point of contention between the two countries.
The second Islamic Emirate and its relations with neighbours
The re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in August 2021 has not erased the underlying causes of tensions between the two countries. Despite prioritising a fundamentalist religious agenda and professing a lack of interest in matters relating to ethnicity, the IEA has not moved significantly away from the position of previous Afghan governments with respect to its border with Pakistan, although its wider regional relations have shifted.
The IEA has not changed Afghanistan’s longstanding position regarding the Durand Line, still actively opposing Pakistan’s fencing of the border (Reuters). Emirate Defence Minister, Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid, said in an interview with ToloNews in March that the Durand Line issue cannot be resolved, that the Emirate could not recognise it, but that it should be left “for the future” (transcription in English here by the Kabul Times).
Pakistan is more likely to cite the TTP, whose activities and presence on both sides of the border were boosted by the fall of the Republic and the withdrawal of NATO troops, with critics pointing to the Emirate’s more tolerant stance with regard to militant groups.[17] The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), which reported regularly on the TTP’s growing strength, told AP that this was partly driven by militant groups getting hold of U.S. military equipment left in Afghanistan after the American withdrawal in 2021.
The Emirate is clearly reluctant to act against the TTP and other jihadi groups, which Defence Minister Mujahid was quite frank about in the interview with ToloNews noted above. When asked about Pakistan’s demands for the TTP (and Afghan refugees in Pakistan) to be dealt with, he said (Kabul Times translation):
They wanted to create issues that would force us to stand against our own people or tribes (qabayil) in such a way that the war currently happening in Pakistan would be transferred to Afghanistan, or that we would take actions against migrants and tribal people so that instead of fighting Pakistan they would fight us.
The resolute position of the Emirate has added to Pakistan’s frustration, as it has realised that the leverage and goodwill it believed it could count on in its relationship with the isolated regime in Kabul might not be enough to compel the IEA to act against the TTP.
Moreover, since its return to power, the IEA has deliberately diversified its trade – once reliant on Pakistan for exports, Iran has emerged as the main destination for Afghan goods since 2024-25, while India has become Afghanistan’s biggest export partner.[18] The Emirate has also sought to reestablish closer diplomatic ties with India; something that cannot fail to antagonise Islamabad given its historical hostilities with Pakistan, which flared up during a four-day conflict between the two neighbours in May 2025 (BBC).
Relations with Afghanistan have long fed Indo-Pakistan tensions. Before 2021, India largely viewed the Taliban insurgency as a Pakistani proxy, but as Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have deteriorated, India has shifted towards rapprochement with the IEA (Asia Times, Chatham House). The Pakistani airstrikes in Kabul in October 2025 coincided with an unprecedented week-long visit to India by Muttaqi, which would lead to the reopening of the Indian embassy in Kabul shortly afterwards (BBC, Time). In March 2026, India and Pakistan exchanged sharp words during a UN Security Council debate on Afghanistan, with India condemning Pakistani airstrikes on Afghanistan and Pakistan accusing India of complicity with non-state groups operating in Afghanistan (Dawn, The Hindu, see also this AAN report featuring the tense exchange between the Pakistani and Indian representatives at the 16 March quarterly beefing of the UNSC on Afghanistan).[19]
Mediation efforts
Mediation efforts have been led by Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, including talks in Qatar, Istanbul and Riyadh. Gulf states, in particular Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have a longstanding engagement with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Qatari mediation has been prominent over the past decade, including the US-Taliban talks that led to the 2020 Doha Agreement (AAN). Saudi Arabia’s role was historically security-focused, with an eye on Afghanistan’s western neighbour, Iran, but has shifted towards humanitarian efforts since 2021, playing an instrumental role in the Afghanistan Humanitarian Trust Fund, which the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) inaugurated in 2022. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia agreed a defence pact with Pakistan in September 2025, another sign of the increasingly multipolar nature of the region, which India would have noted (BBC, Chatham House). However, the instability triggered by the Israel-US war with Iran can only reduce the bandwidth of Gulf countries for mediation efforts between Afghanistan and Pakistan, despite the evident spill-over effects.[20]
China, which has bilateral relations with both Pakistan and Afghanistan, plays a quieter role but has also been urging restraint and dialogue (International Crisis Group, BBC). The Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, reportedly held side meetings during the talks in Riyadh held in December 2025 (Afghanistan International). In mid-March 2026, Wang told his Afghan counterpart Muttaqi in a phone call that disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan should be resolved through dialogue and consultation, not force (Reuters). For China, good relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are vital to its economic expansion, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with Afghanistan brought into China’s Belt and Road framework in 2025 (ThinkChina).
Russia, which maintains diplomatic and economic relations with both the IEA and Pakistan, has frequently called for a diplomatic resolution to their conflict (Reuters, Al Jazeera). On 6 March, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke to the IEA Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amir Khan Muttaqi, emphasising “the need for settling the differences between Kabul and Islamabad by political and diplomatic means” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
From escalation to entrenchment: A conflict at risk of spiralling
The impact and broader ramifications of this cross-border conflict are already severe and could worsen. Military operations, previously confined to narrow strips along the border, have now expanded to larger areas in both countries. Pakistan has been targeting Kabul and blaming the Emirate for attacks in its own capital, as well as (less threatening) Emirate drones reaching Islamabad. The intensity of the confrontation comes at a time when the international community’s attention, commitment and capacity to operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan have greatly decreased due to the diplomatic impasse with the IEA and the distractions and shifts in priorities caused by other international crises.
Understanding the strategic goals of both Pakistan and Afghanistan can be hard given the taciturn nature of the IEA and Pakistan’s deeper state. Pakistan may simply be trying to curtail the TTP, given the intensity of attack levels in recent years, but there have been hints that their goal could be more ambitious and more dangerous. An unnamed security official told the Express Tribune in early March that “If there is actionable intelligence, no target will be off the table.” While a journalist from the same newspaper, Fahd Hussein, suggested that “regime change in Kabul should be the ultimate aim” (see his February 2026 post on X). While these statements may be propagandistic bluster, analysts have raised concerns. Political scientist Ayesha Siddiqa warned in The Print that “there is much talk of the necessity of an Islamabad-driven regime change in Kabul,” though she noted that this might require the “herculean task” of ground troops.
Similarly, analyst Timor Shahran, writing in Madras Courier, argues that “Pakistani’s strategy is aimed at degrading the depots, constraining resupply and diminishing the Taliban’s capacity to sustain a prolonged fight,” adding that a “second phase may involve targeting Taliban leadership directly, including the Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada.” He cites“unconfirmed reports” that “Taliban figures with historical ties to Pakistani intelligence have privately signalled to Islamabad and Washington that a post-Akhunzada Taliban would be more flexible,” but also cautions: “Afghanistan has defeated larger powers before—not through superior firepower, but by exhausting occupiers who underestimated the country’s internal complexity.”
In a move that highlights how multiple, overlapping crises in the region are shaping global priorities, Pakistan made an offer on 24 March to host talks between Iran and the United States (Al Jazeera, AP), although “Pakistan has been working the phones” as a mediator between the US and Iran, NY Times wrote, since early March. For Pakistan, which imports more than 85 per cent of its crude oil from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through the Strait of Hormuz, the energy crisis coupled with the risk of a sectarian spillover represents what one commentator in Dawn called a “polycrisis.” If Pakistan were to emerge as a global mediator, it would amount to “a major upgrade in Islamabad’s strategic standing,” a senior resident fellow at Washington’s Middle East Policy Council, Kamran Bokhari, told Reuters, adding that “Pakistan appears to be re-emerging as a major American ally in West Asia.”
At the same time, the leadership of the Emirate is not seasoned in participating in peace talks that lead to de-escalation. The hardliners at the centre may feel more ideological kinship with the TTP than their erstwhile friends in Pakistan, or not want to risk them turning on the Emirate, as the Defence Minister has indicated. The Emirate prides itself on its ability to outlast a superior force, though analyst Amira Jadoon, writing in War on the Rocks, warns that its “rationality is bounded by ideological solidarity, battlefield ties, and tribal obligation,” with a tendency to overlook “Pakistan’s enabling role” in that narrative. She concludes that the most likely scenario in the near term would be an “entrenched low‑grade confrontation along the Durand Line: recurring cross-border strikes, ground engagements, and retaliatory operations that normalize militarized rivalry without resolving the core dispute.”
In this light, the continuation of the conflict may be more the result of a convergence of interests rather than a failure of diplomacy. Pakistan may view a sustained conflict as a means of containing threats without risking a full-scale war, while the Emirate might tolerate an ongoing, controlled confrontation, rather than risk upsetting its jihadi brethren. Pakistani air aggression, combined with its harsh treatment of Afghan refugees, may win the Emirate more domestic legitimacy and strengthen its resistance to external demands. Forecasting, however, may be foolhardy, given the combination of old grievances, inscrutable, unpredictable or ideological leaders, economic instability and a volatile global arena.
The scale of casualties in the drug rehabilitation centre is closely tied to the nature of Afghanistan’s drug treatment system, which relies on large, highly concentrated rehabilitation facilities. In Kabul, these have historically housed hundreds to thousands of patients at a time (see AAN reporting here).
↑5
A report by Amu TV echoed this, reporting that there are Emirate military compounds adjacent to the facility, including one that “functions as a drone production hub.”
↑6
Comparable data is hard to find, partly because there is no agreement on the parties to the conflict, with the Emirate denying responsibility for TTP attacks, as well as the UN not having a mandate to monitor civilian casualties in Pakistan to compare with UNAMA’s data. Civilians killed or injured by Emirate military attacks in Pakistan are not systematically tracked, though they are more likely to hit small military posts in border areas with a lower risk of civilian harm than, for example, Pakistani airstrikes in urban areas. Analysis from ACLED suggests that the TTP tends to target Pakistani military and security personnel, though attacks on civilians “affiliated with the state” have increased since 2023. See also work by the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, mentioned earlier, which includes data on civilians killed in Pakistan by militant groups.
↑7
The experts are: Ben Saul, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; Richard Bennett, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan; George Katrougalos, Independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; Paula Gaviria, Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons and Morris Tidball-Binz, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.
FATA consisted of seven tribal agencies, created by the British colonial administration to act as a buffer between British India and Afghanistan and to contain the raiding and guerrilla activities of local Pashtun tribes through draconian laws. The agencies remained outside Pakistan’s administrative and legal system until 2018, when they were finally merged with the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which has a majority Pashtun population (on the merger, see this International Crisis Group report). Balochistan is the largest and least populated of the four administrative provinces of Pakistan, with residents fairly split between Pashtuns and Baloch. Some Baloch sections of its population have long fought for autonomy and, in some cases, outright independence from Pakistan, their leaders at times fleeing from Pakistan’s repression into Afghanistan, where various governments have offered them shelter over several decades.
↑10
A referendum was held in the North-West Frontier Province in 1947, shortly before the Partition, but only regarding accession to India or Pakistan, with no other choices available. Dorothea Seelye Franck, “Pakhtunistan: Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land”, Middle East Journal 6 (1), 1952, pp49–68.
↑11
For a summary of the Afghanistan-Pakistani relations in the 1950-70s, see Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton, 1980, pp485-494.
↑12
The British India annexation of territories claimed by Afghanistan happened in different stages. The Anglo-Afghan Treaty (the Treaty of Gandamak), imposed by force on Afghanistan during the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1879, prepared the ground for the later negotiations between Sir Mortimer Durand and Afghan Amir Abdul Rahman (1880-1901). Regarding the latter, it is not the position of the demarcation line established under this agreement that Afghanistan has contested, but rather its status. The Afghans hold that the Durand Line had been agreed upon as a line of demarcation –not as a territorial boundary – and merely indicative of the respective spheres of influence between the Afghan Amir and the British Raj, in order to curtail Kabul’s patronage of the Pashtun frontier tribes living close to settled areas of British India. Conrad Schetter, “The Durand Line”, Internationales Asienforum, vol.44, 2013, pp47-70. (On the Durand Line and its impact on the people living across the border, see also this AAN report.) A full text of the treaty can be found on the New York Times Time Machine.
↑13
The dispute was sparked by Pakistan’s attempts to incorporate the small princely state of Dir, which was resisted by the local Pashtun ruling family and its retinues, while supported by other local tribesmen.
See the summary and para 7 of a November 2025 report by the UN’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which observes: “The de facto authorities continue to deny that any terrorist groups have a footprint in or operate from its territory. That claim is not credible,” noting TTP attacks.
The debate can be watched in full here. See also a tweet from the Indian Ambassador to the UN here and his Pakistani counterpart here.
↑20
There are multiple concerns for spillover effects from the Israeli-US war with Iran. Layers of tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan already overlap with Iran, in particular the role of Baloch separatists and Shia militancy, which could easily escalate given Iran’s growing instability (Chatham House, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Dawn). Similarly, tensions over resources are already being exacerbated, including soaring fuel prices (Friday Times, Al Jazeera), while the UN’s World Food Programme warned in March 2026 about the risks of growing food insecurity.
The mounting conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan
On March 16th, 2026, the UN Security Council took the rare step of extending the mandate of the UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) for just three months rather than the standard year. This puts the council on a 90-day countdown to review and redefine its strategy in Afghanistan.
While the United States, China, and Russia’s policies toward Afghanistan diverge in many regards, they unanimously agreed to the adoption of Resolution 2816 regarding the Afghanistan sanctions regime on February 12th. The resolution extended the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to support the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee for 12 months.
Yet to date, these sanctions have not brought about the change hoped for. It is time for the Security Council to review its sanctions against the Taliban and align them more clearly with political objectives in support of peace and security for the people of Afghanistan. The 90-day assessment window provides an opportunity to begin this process.
Evolution of the 1988 Sanctions
The sanctions regime under Resolution 1988 originated when these sanctions were separated from the 1267 ISIL/al-Qaida sanctions regime in 2011. Although counterterrorism remained the overall goal of both regimes, the purpose of this separation was to distinguish the Taliban from global terrorist organizations and treat them as a distinct Afghan political entity.
The logic of this action was to signal political support for an Afghan-led peace process. Resolution 1988 provided the then Afghan government with important leverage: it could initiate requests to list and delist individuals and request travel ban waivers, usually when these individuals supported peace efforts. However, the role and leverage of the then Afghan government was neutralized when it was bypassed by the US, which entered direct high-level negotiations with the Taliban, concluding in a 2020 deal.
The biggest change to the sanctions regime came with the 2021 collapse of the Afghan government. With the Taliban now taking over government institutions, concerns grew about the humanitarian impact of the sanctions regime. This led the Security Council to adopt Resolution 2615, inserting a humanitarian carveout in the sanctions regime to ensure aid could reach ordinary people across Afghanistan.
Yet apart from the carveout, the Security Council has defaulted to simply maintaining the status quo of the 1988 sanctions regime. The regime still includes an arms embargo, asset freeze, and a travel ban on 135 Taliban members and 5 entities, with the same criteria in place for listing and delisting. Most critically, while the regime remains a tool for the Security Council to pressure the Taliban, this tool is decoupled from a cohesive political strategy.
Stakeholders ranging from Afghan opposition groups to international observers have debated whether to increase sanctions on the Taliban or provide relief. Some groups advocate for increased use of targeted sanctions as the key tool for holding the Taliban accountable for human rights abuses and inadequate action to counter terrorism. Many, especially in the United States, argue that sanctions relief would equate to legitimizing the Taliban. On the other hand, Russia and China have argued for increased cooperation with the regime in Kabul.
Why Have the 1988 Sanctions Objectives and Conditions Not Been Updated
Given the shifts on the ground since 2021, the current sanctions objectives are not sufficiently clear, and several conditions for delisting are outdated. For example, a now defunct condition left in place since 2015 is to evaluate if a sanctioned individual completed reconciliation programs with the former Afghan government. More broadly, the listing criteria are left at any association “with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan. They do not reflect the council’s expectations for how the Taliban should behave with the Afghan people, particularly women, and the international community.
Reaching consensus on both adding benchmarks and updating listing and delisting criteria will require hard work to bridge the views of states like the US with those of states like Russia and China. Nonetheless, there has been a shortage of debate and deliberation, either publicly or in the council, on options for an update. It is time for the council to roll up its sleeves, given that simply maintaining the status quo of the 1988 sanctions is not delivering the desired policy objectives for Afghanistan.
Moving forward, the five permanent council members agree on maintaining the 1988 sanctions regime as a baseline. However, they differ over the conditions for adjusting the regime or adding specific objectives. The recent resolution, with the United States as penholder, incorporated topics beyond counterterrorism or reconciliation, such as condemnation of kidnapping and hostage taking and regressive decrees targeting women’s rights. This has been criticized by Russia as “oversaturated” with topics unrelated to the original purpose of the 1988 regime. China argued that reviewing and adjusting the 1988 sanctions should be specifically tied to supporting peace and stability in Afghanistan.
To address these differences on the topic and show support for the people of Afghanistan, it is only reasonable to begin a formal process of deliberation on updating the objectives of the sanctions. Such an update could reflect both the current realities of the country and the interests of Security Council members.
Linking sanctions to benchmarks and updating listing criteria to respond to political conditions are not uncommon. The council has made such adjustments in other recent sanctions regimes. It added benchmarks for the Somalia/al-Shabaab sanctions regime in 2022, including the adoption of action plans to combat sexual violence in conflict and road maps on children and armed conflict. In the sanctions regime for South Sudan, listing criteria have been updated in response to political developments, such as specifying that impeding free and fair elections are grounds for designation. At least seven sanctions regimes refer to sexual and gender-based violence in the listing criteria.
The council’s resolution delisting Ahmed al-Sharaa is its most high-profile case of delisting from the 1267 ISIL/al-Qaida sanctions regime. Here, without referencing a criterion, the council delisted al-Sharaa while recalling the expectations that Syria will “protect human rights and safety and security of all Syrians regardless of ethnicity or religion” and advance an inclusive political process. With the Assad government being replaced by al-Sharaa as the new leader, the council assessed that these were the conditions applicable to Syria’s current moment. While this is not a case of delisting according to new criteria, it provides a broader example of the council finding political will and bridging differences to adapt sanctions.
These examples demonstrate the council updating its sanctions measures and their objectives in dynamic situations. They further indicate that the council has been able to tie sanctions measures to human rights, political, and governance indicators or expectations. They were not easily adopted and resulted in abstentions from some members, but they provide models that can inform updates to the 1988 sanctions.
Why Updating the 1988 Sanctions Criteria Matters
The extension of the 1988 regime’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team in February reflects many states’ profound mistrust of the Taliban and concern that terrorism is being fostered within Afghanistan’s territory. Updating sanctions criteria can appear risky because the Taliban may interpret any shift as a softening of the Security Council’s resolve. To mitigate this, the update process should be anchored in safety mechanisms that protect the interests of both the Afghan people and member states. Robust deliberations, both publicly and in the council, should kick off an incremental process where the UN holds consultations with Afghan civil society on potential updated sanctions conditions for the council to consider. Council members could then communicate to the Taliban that they must reverse some of their most restrictive decrees against women before council members would consider adopting new benchmarks. This increases the likelihood that the council does not expend diplomatic capital without something to show in return.
Additionally, the strategic utility of sanctions, whether through relief or restrictions, is predicated on clearly defined political objectives. Considering that the sanctions have not coerced the Taliban to change policies, discussing conditions for relief could incentivize action. Both imposing and lifting sanctions depend on clearly stated behavioral objectives. In this context, it is incoherent, and even counterproductive, to argue for or against further restrictions or waivers to the 1988 regime.
As a more impactful alternative, adding benchmarks and reviewing the listing and delisting criteria would establish an initial frame of reference for UN member states. This approach would also provide the council with indicators for collective monitoring that reflect the current moment. At the same time, it would fully preserve the council’s ability to grant exemptions or impose further measures as the situation evolves.
But such an update is not just about the Taliban. It is an important opportunity to recenter marginalized voices. Resolution 2255 (2015) encourages the Monitoring Team and Sanctions Committee to consult with relevant stakeholders. Since the original consultative bodies like the High Peace Council no longer exist, the update process provides a specific UN platform for civil society, women, youth and other voices who are currently excluded from the Kabul-Kandahar power structures. The potential update process should be informed by those most affected by the Taliban’s policies.
An update will also counteract the Taliban’s accusations there is no discussion or way to move forward on sanctions. The Security Council can communicate to the Taliban which actions can result in specific sanctions relief and which could trigger further restrictions. Even if the Taliban refuse to change their behavior, which is likely, the Security Council would win the narrative battle by providing a clear and a reasonable path forward. The burden of impasse and isolation would fall squarely on the Taliban’s shoulders.
From a Static Legacy to a Tool for Diplomacy
Difficulty in reaching consensus on updating the 1988 regime is not an excuse for passivity. If it is linked to clear objectives, the sanctions regime could be an active tool for diplomacy rather than a static legacy of the past. The Security Council should move beyond passive engagement and grapple with what it intends to achieve for Afghanistan. Yet this is a heavy lift that would require political will on the part of council members—especially the US, Russia, and China—to find common ground, drawing on the vital first-hand perspectives of Afghans themselves. To begin this process, the Security Council should take three actions:
Leverage the 90-day review of UNAMA’s mandate.Following UNAMA’s three-month mandate renewal, the UN Security Council should utilize the review window to spark a debate on possible next steps in the evolution of the sanctions regime. After all, both UNAMA and the sanctions regime are part of the UN Security Council’s policy toolbox. It only makes sense that they reinforce one another, collectively contributing to a broader political vision for the UN in Afghanistan.
Initiate a process to develop specific benchmarks for the sanctions regime:This would clarify the behavior changes the council expects from the Taliban, which would also inform updated listing and delisting criteria. It would draw on the work of both UNAMA and the 1988 Monitoring Team, combining the former’s on-the-ground insights with the latter’s technical expertise to devise options.
Incorporate local voices and expertise:Building on Resolutions 2255 (2015) and other relevant resolutions, it is crucial that both UNAMA and the 1988 Monitoring Team consult with relevant Afghan stakeholders regarding updated criteria and work closely with Afghan subject-matter experts inside Afghanistan and in the diaspora to reflect their voices.
The time for updating the objectives and conditions of the 1988 sanctions regime has come—all the more so in light of the unfolding war between Pakistan’s army and the Taliban, which is subjecting the people of Afghanistan to even harsher conditions. It is imperative for the council to seize this opportunity to move past the status quo.
Aref Dostyar is the Director of the Afghanistan Program at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and former Consul General of Afghanistan in Los Angeles
CJ Pine is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University in Qatar. He is a former Political Advisor at the US Mission to the UN.
George A. Lopez is the Hesburgh Professor emeritus of Peace Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the Keough School of Global Affairs.
Moving Beyond the Security Council’s Impasse to Support Afghanistan
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When classrooms fell silent for older Afghan girls in 2021, millions were cut off from formal schooling, deepening long-standing inequalities between girls and boys. Yet learning did not stop – it adapted. Across the country, alternative avenues have emerged to try to help fill the gap. Among them, radio-based education has taken on particular significance, turning a medium, long embedded in daily life, into an unexpected classroom. Lessons broadcast over the airwaves are enabling girls – many confined to their homes by both policy and social norms – to have access to some sort of an education. In this report, Sharif Akram examines the rise of radio-based learning as one of the few remaining pathways for girls to learn. Drawing on interviews in Loya Paktia and neighbouring regions, he argues that radio – accessible, low-cost and culturally acceptable is helping reshape attitudes towards girls’ education in conservative communities. But he also raises questions about quality, reach and sustainability. Can radio learning truly bridge the gap left by closed schools – or is it only a fragile substitute?Education in Afghanistan, particularly for women and girls, has long been shaped by politics, conflict and social norms. While significant progress was made during the Islamic Republic to expand access, many communities – especially in rural areas – remained underserved. Schools did not exist everywhere, and corruption, insecurity and cultural barriers meant that millions of children were, in practice, excluded from formal education, with girls disproportionately affected.
Radio has long been used as a tool for education in Afghanistan, reaching communities where schools are absent or inaccessible. Since the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate, and in response to their clamping down on girls’ education, radio learning has seen a resurgence, becoming a critical lifeline for an unknown number of girls and women. Delivered through decentralised networks of local radio stations, it depends not only on educators and broadcasters, but also on families and communities, with interviewees often reporting the value of a better-educated, or at least literate parent, sibling or other relative helping girls follow lessons and complete assignments. In this way, interviewees from conservative communities where purdah is practiced, girls’ schools, including primary, were scarce and the idea of educating girls suspect, report that radio education is beginning to shift general attitudes towards girls’ education. In such deeply conservative communities, radio learning is reaching the ‘never educated’; for girls who had gone to school and whose schools are now closed, it also offers one of the few remaining pathways to learning.
For many, radio is not simply an alternative, but the only available option. In rural areas – where access to the internet and television is limited and where girls make up the overwhelming majority of learners – lessons broadcast into homes, often supported by textbooks, workbooks and interactive call-in sessions, are reshaping how Afghan girls learn.
Yet, this report asks, whether radio is just a stopgap measure rather than a long-term solution. Despite the best efforts of radio stations to mirror schooling – with curricula, lesson progression, workbooks and even exams, it cannot offer the depth, quality or social experience of formal schooling. It lacks consistent systems for accreditation and relies heavily on student motivation. While radio has preserved learning where it might otherwise have disappeared, it cannot provide the full, meaningful education needed for higher study, professional opportunities or economic independence. For millions of older Afghan girls, the right to education has effectively been reduced to what can be transmitted over a radio signal.
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Edited by Roxanna Shapour, Rachel Reid and Kate Clark
However difficult it may be, the world needs to re-engage with the troubled region
In the nearly five years since the Taliban retook power in Afghanistan the world has paid scant attention to developments in the region, still less managed to influence them. In that time the hardline Islamic movement has reimposed grim restrictions on women in public life and education. It has also fallen out badly with its old sponsor, neighbouring Pakistan. With the two states now close to all-out war the world has no option but to re-engage with the region — however difficult the options and distasteful the Taliban’s governing ethos.
There is a bleak irony to Pakistan’s dire relations with its neighbour. During the two decades of the ill-fated US-led Nato intervention in Afghanistan, which ended with an ignominious withdrawal in 2021, Islamabad played a double game: it worked with Washington while also backing the Taliban, assuming it would be able to control it. But since 2021, relations with its old proxy have deteriorated rapidly. Islamabad accuses Kabul of hosting separatist militants who have killed 4,000 people in Pakistan in the last four years. Taking advantage of the west’s disengagement from the region, Pakistan has in recent months taken matters into its own hands and launched a series of air strikes across the border. More than 1,000 people are estimated to have been killed in the past three weeks of fighting between the two states, and over 100,000 people have been displaced. In the single bloodiest incident, 400 people were killed last week, Afghan officials say, in an air strike on a Kabul drug rehabilitation centre. Pakistan denies responsibility.
The Taliban, just as unconvincingly, denies it shelters the militants who have been destabilising swaths of western Pakistan. Against the backdrop of the war in the Gulf, the west is distracted. So are the regional powers such as China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey who have tried ineffectually in the past few years to reduce the tensions. But this crisis cannot be allowed to metastasise. An all-out war in Afghanistan threatens stability across south and central Asia. There is also the very real risk that it becomes, again, an incubator for terrorism.
Pakistan seems to think it can shore up its security by a bombing campaign. But that will never quell the insurgencies. A shaky truce is in place for the festival of Eid al-Fitr. A first step is for this to endure. Then there have to be face-to-face talks. This will require the intervention of both the great powers, the US and China. The Trump administration has close ties with the most powerful figure in Pakistan, the military leader Field Marshal Asim Munir. It needs to lean on him to stop the cross-border attacks. Maybe privately it can make clear to Islamabad that the war with Afghanistan complicates the war on Iran. Simultaneously, if it is to crack down on the militants, the Taliban will have to be presented with both sticks and carrots; it is desperate for funds.
In all this there is also an important role and opportunity for China as the emerging superpower. Pakistan is a client state. Beijing equally has strategic interests in Afghanistan: it hopes to extend its Belt and Road Initiative south through Afghanistan. It also worries Afghanistan could become a haven for Uyghur separatists. China has long floated the idea of itself as a responsible great power and a leader of the global south. It has tried shuttle diplomacy, but could this be the moment for it to step forward and prove itself as a serious mediator on the world stage? The precedents for a settlement are not inspiring. A truce last autumn did not last long. The Taliban is a mercurial movement. Pakistan is enraged. But the stakes are too high for the world to keep looking away.
Pakistan and Afghanistan tensions reach breaking point
Few Afghan politicians from the era of the Soviet-backed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime combined technocratic skill with a clear focus on combatting ethnic inequality, as Sultan Ali Keshtmand did. Born into a modest Hazara family, he rose to the top echelons of the party, navigating imprisonment, internal PDPA purges and shifting Soviet strategies to twice become head of government during one of the country’s most turbulent decades. For some, he symbolised opportunity and the potential for political inclusion, but for critics, he remains inseparable from the broader record of the Soviet-backed PDPA – a loyal functionary complicit in its failures and excesses. AAN’s Thomas Ruttig, with contributions by Rohullah Sorush, examines Keshtmand’s legacy, which sits at the crossroads of ethnic politics, state-building and the Cold War, as well as his contested place in Afghanistan’s political memory.
PDPA leaders at a 1 May rally in Kabul, from left to right: Mir Akbar Khaibar, Anahita Ratebzad, Babrak Karmal, Sultan Ali Keshtmand. Photo: Archive Thomas Ruttig
Sultan Ali Keshtmand, who died aged 90 in exile in London on 13 March 2026 (Khaama Press), was an Afghan politician of Hazara origin who reached one of the highest positions ever attained by a Hazara in the Afghan government.[1] He served twice as head of the government, a position then officially called Chairman of the Council of Ministers. From May 1990 to 8 April 1991, he also served as Najibullah’s First Vice President.
Keshtmand’s first taste of government had come right after the PDPA seized power, when he briefly served as Minister of Planning, from April 30 to 23 August 1978, (AAN). He lost that position in one of the many factional PDPA power struggles (more about this below), but returned as head of government on 11 June 1981 during the presidency of Babrak Karmal (1979-86). This job had become vacant when state and party leader Babrak Karmal shed the dual role as head of state and head of government that he had held since the December 1979 Soviet invasion and the toppling of the Khalqi regime of Nur Muhammad Tarakay and Hafizullah Amin. Keshtmand held this position until 1986, when Najibullah replaced Karmal, and continued under Najibullah till 26 May 1988. His second tenure lasted only 15 months, from 21 February 1989 to 8 May 1990. Najibullah was then pursuing his National Reconciliation policy, a central plank of which was to bring in more non-party figures, resulting also in Keshtmand’s replacement by Fazl Haq Khaleqyar, the first non-PDPA member to hold that position.[2]
Keshtmand later served as First Vice President for a further five months (May 1990-January 1991), but later claimed he had virtually no authority in that role (quoted in Afghanistan International).
Keshtmand’s upbringing
In his memoir,[3] Keshtmand said he was born “in spring 1935” in the Chahardehi area of Kabul. Today the area, which was then countryside just south of Afghanistan’s capital, is part of Kabul’s urban Police District 6 (AAN). Keshtmand described his home village, Qala-ye Sultan Jan, as a “green island” in the middle of then uninhabited land on the eastern edge of Dasht-e Barchi. Today, Dasht-e Barchi has grown into a sprawling suburb of Kabul. The village was centred around a fort “with six towers,” owned by the largest local landowner – a Pashtun connected to the royal court.It was home to 20 families: two Tajik families and the rest Hazaras, most of whom were “landless or had little land.”
Keshtmand’s parents named him Sultan and added Ali, in keeping with a generations-long family tradition. His father was Najaf Ali. He doesn’t mention his mother’s name (AAN), but in his memoir, he spoke of her with warmth and respect. The family traced its origins to Ajrestan district in Ghazni province.[4] His great-grandfather, Sher Ali, and great-great grandfather Muhammad Ali, had migrated to the Kabul region after they were displaced from their lands in the wake of the Hazara wars during the reign of the ‘Iron Amir’, Abdul Rahman (1880-1901).[5] On their way, they spent some unspecified time in Daymirdad, today a district in Maidan Wardak province, in the village of Keshtmand’s mother’s ancestors.
Keshtmand wrote that his great-grandfather, Sher Ali, farmed other people’s land his entire life, and only managed to buy “a few jeribs”[6] of land in Chahrdehi late in life. From him, Keshtmand’s father inherited five and a half jeribs of irrigated land and eight jeribs of rain-fed land (lalmi). To make ends meet, he also worked on land belonging to a Kabul shopkeeper. In his youth, Keshtmand wrote, he and his brothers helped out by working and irrigating the land. Keshtmand described his family as a khanwada-ye dehqani (farming family) with “small” landholdings (kam-zamin) and referred to his father as a dehqan zahmatkash (toiling farm labourer). He later adopted the pen name, Keshtmand, as a nod to these roots (Khaama Press).
In his memoirs, he recounts the heavy tax burden imposed on Hazaras, which affected not only his family but also others, as well as the forced labour (begar) they had to endure. This burden was particularly high in Chahrdehi, he wrote, because of its geographical proximity to central government and its many local officials. As a result, his father lost his land, piece by piece, to the Pashtun nomads who traded daily necessities – such as cloth, salt or tea – often extending credit to the cash-strapped local population who thereby accumulated debts. Eventually, the family had to leave Qala-ye Sultan Jan and move to Kabul city proper, where his father ended up running a shop and the family had to live in a number of rented houses consecutively, reflecting a decline in social status in the Afghan context.
Keshtmand’s parents were illiterate, according to Anthony Arnold’s 1983 book, Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism, but – in Keshtmand’s words – they were “very keen to educate their children.” All of his five brothers and three sisters would reach at least the lisans level (class 13). Keshtmand wrote that his mother’s grandfather, Mirza Ghulam Haidar, had been an educated man (roshanfikr), which had bolstered the idea that the children in the family should also be educated. Mirza Ghulam, he wrote, learned to read and write from a mullah when both were in jail during Amir Habibullah’s (1901-19) reign and, after his release, found a job as a clerk (munshi) in a government office.
Education and political activism
Keshtmand was initially educated at home before attending primary school in Chahrdehi, starting in year four, and later Ghazi High School, one of Kabul’s most prestigious schools, where he also learned English, as the High School had been established by the British Council in 1944 (Rah-e Parcham).
He then enrolled in Kabul University’s Faculty of Law and Political Sciences in the economics department, which became a faculty in its own right during his time there. Keshtmand wrote that he earned a living by writing and translating for newspapers and working as a private tutor. After graduating in 1961, he found employment at the Ministry of Mines and Industry, where he worked in various departments overseeing the country’s industries until 1972.
His interest in political and social issues began when he was a student at Ghazi High School. In his memoirs, he recalls that this was influenced by some of his teachers who had been involved in the earlier political and student movements of the 1940s-50s (AAN). During his final years at Ghazi and later at university, he and a group of his fellow students realised that “things could not remain as they were,” he wrote in his memories. As there was only limited freedom of expression, they began by organising “semi-political conferences and performances” and meeting progressive politicians. From these activities, a “small study circle” emerged. (Keshtmand does not provide the exact year.) Some participants, such as Abdul Samad Azhar, Dr Shah Wali and Keshtmand himself, would later become ministers in PDPA governments.
These circles were part of a broader scene of emerging political groups, the most famous of which, according to Keshtmand, was led by Karmal, who also attended several other circles as a guest, and to network. This is how Keshtmand came to know Karmal. He later described the future president, in his memoirs, as a bridge builder between the newly politicised youth circles and older activists, who were remnants of earlier reformist movements, to which Karmal, then a student leader, had also belonged.
Entry into politics and the formation of PDPA
On 1 January 1965, at the age of 30, Keshtmand took part in the secret founding congress of the PDPA. He was elected to its seven-member Central Committee. Later that year, he ran unsuccessfully for a seat in Afghanistan’s parliament in his home district, Chahrdehi. While he did not win, five other PDPA members, including Karmal, were elected.
Around this time, Keshtmand, already working as a government employee, joined students and leftist groups in mass protests outside parliament during the so-called ‘decade of democracy’, which had begun with King Muhammad Zaher’s 1963 constitution, which introduced elements of parliamentarism. The protesters demanded ‘genuine democracy’, and after delivering a speech, Keshtmand was briefly imprisoned for the first time.
Before long, tensions emerged within the PDPA. In September 1966, Keshtmand was one of three Central Committee members to be dismissed as a result of their support for Karmal in his dispute with Hafizullah Amin, as recounted by two Russian authors, historian and journalist Vladimir Snegirev and retired KGB colonel Valery Samunin,[7] in their book Virus A: How we got into the torments of Afghanistan (published in English in 2012, as The Dead End: The Road to Afghanistan). These conflicts culminated in Karmal, Keshtmand and the other two Central Committee members formally leaving the party. In 1967, this split the PDPA into two main factions, Khalq and Parcham. Keshtmand aligned himself with the Parcham faction, led by Karmal.
PDPA rule, arrest, imprisonment and intrigues
In 1977, shortly before the ‘Saur Revolution’ of April 1978 that brought the PDPA to power, the party, pushed by the Soviet Communist Party through regional communist parties, reunited. Keshtmand became a member of the new PDPA Politburo following the reunification. However, soon after the PDPA capture of power, tensions between the two factions reemerged. The Khalqi leadership, headed by Nur Muhammad Tarakay, who was head of state and party, and his deputy, Hafizullah Amin, again moved to sideline the Parchamis. A handful of leading Parcham figures, including Karmal, were sent abroad as ambassadors; Keshtmand remained in the country as Parcham’s head in Karmal’s absence.
Facing increasing repression, Keshtmand turned to the Soviet embassy for help, according to Snegirev and Samunin. But Amin’s intelligence got wind of it, and in August 1978, he was arrested, along with the other remaining Parchami leaders and charged with participating in an alleged plot. He was tortured by the head of the country’s intelligence service (AGSA), Assadullah Sarwari. It was reported that his wife was also being tortured, which prompted him to sign a confession that was then published in the media. Keshtmand was sentenced to death. (In his memoir, he denied having confessed.)
After Amin overthrew and killed Tarakay in September-October 1979, he released many political prisoners and commuted the sentences of others, including Keshtmand, who was given 15 years. This was part of Amin’s efforts to shift the blame for the regime’s mass atrocities (AAN), which had cost it any initial popular support, solely onto his predecessor, Tarakay.
The Soviet invasion of Christmas 1979, which then removed Amin from power, also freed Keshtmand and many others from prison. He returned to the now Parcham-dominated PDPA Politburo and re-entered government. He became deputy head of the ruling Revolutionary Council (with Karmal at its top now), astonishingly serving alongside his erstwhile torturer Sarwari, who had managed to survive the transition.[8]
During his time in government, Keshtmand earned respect for his professional competence, even among those who opposed the PDPA regime and his political views. Keshtmand was an “able manager” with “excellent economic understanding,” an Afghan politician and economist in exile, told AAN. As de facto planning minister, from late 1979 onwards, the economist said, “he built up a large professional support staff that travelled with him to survey the situation in the provinces.” Notably, in 1988, when differences between him and Najibullah emerged, Keshtmand’s first premiership was cut short, but the president had to bring him back because he needed his economic management skills.
The distinguished Afghan Hazara writer, Sayed Askar Mousavi, also once said: “When you meet Sultan Ali Keshtmand, even if you are his opponent or enemy, you … respect him; because this person himself is a very excellent example of politeness and ethics” (Facebook). One such opponent, former second vice president Sarwar Danesh (a former member of the Shia/Hazara mujahedin party, Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami), wrote in his obituary for Keshtmand: “With his background in the political struggle, expertise in economic affairs, political thought and managerial experience,” he had “a character that set him apart from many of his contemporaries” (Afghanistan International).
The front page of Kabul New Times from 1 January 1980, showing the new Afghan leadership under Babrak Karmal after the Soviet invasion, Sultan Ali Keshtmand in the first row, second from left. Photo: Archive Thomas Ruttig
An advocate for Hazara rights
Another aspect of the respect Keshtmand earned, even among Hazaras opposed to the PDPA regime, was his commitment to Hazara empowerment. Immediately after the Saur coup in 1978, he reportedly said, “Brothers, today the five long centuries of Pashtun political domination has come to an end” (Khaama Press). In his memoirs, he wrote: “In the 1980s, the struggle to ensure legal and practical equality among all nationalities, tribes and ethnic groups was considered an inviolable and urgent duty of the party and the government,” reflecting what at the time was called “a principled approach to the national issue” in multi-ethnic Afghanistan. In a 2021 article published by the website Haqiqat,Keshtmand elaborated on the PDPA’s plans to federalise Afghanistan’s political system, noting that this “raised the question of autonomy for Hazaristan [as a first step].”[9]
During his time in government, several institutions were established to empower Hazaras politically, economically and militarily. The Shura-ye Ali-ye Melliyat-e Hazara (High Council of the Hazara Nationality)[10] as a political and social umbrella organisation, followed in 1989 by the Markaz-e Ensejam-e Omur-e Melliyat-e Hazara (Centre for the Coordination of the Affairs of the Hazara Nationality), a governmental structure, were designed to bring educated Hazaras into administrative and government positions.[11] Additionally, separate Hazara-only army units were created, some of which were composed of former mujahedin who had crossed over to the government side (Ibrahimi), and a new law on local government providing for elected local councils from the village to the provincial level was promulgated, although never implemented. There were also plans to create new ‘Hazara’ provinces. These, however, never came to fruition. In the end, only Sar-e Pul was created in 1988; only around one-third of its population is Hazara, but its first governor was from this community.
Efforts were also made during Keshtmand’s time in government to promote Hazara history and identity in the academic and public spheres. Research on Hazara history was advanced, notably through the academic journal, Gharjestan, whose editor, Professor Ali Akbar Shahrestani, headed Kabul University’s Faculty of Languages and Literature and later became Deputy Chairman of the Afghan Senate in 1988 (Facebook). New university teaching materials on Hazara history were introduced, largely based on a translation of Soviet-Tajik historian Lutfi Temirkhanov’s 1972 book, Khazareytsy, translated into English as National History of the Hazaras and in Dari as Tarikh-e Melli-ye Hazara.
For the first time, the media published articles about the repression and discrimination suffered by Hazaras under the monarchy, particularly after their violent incorporation into the Afghan state by Amir Abdul Rahman at the end of the 19thcentury.[12] The official media spoke of the ‘melliyat-e zahmatkash-e Hazara’ (the hard-working Hazara ‘nationality’), in order to counter deep-rooted societal biases.
On the war front, Keshtmand and other PDPA politicians had previously reached a tacit non-aggression agreement with Hazara mujahedin parties after they had liberated most of the Hazarajat. (The PDPA was only able to maintain a garrison in Bamyan that was barely active.) This allowed the Hazaras to develop local grassroots self-rule under the Coordination Council (Shura-ye Ettefaq), which was destroyed after four years by Iran-backed factions (Ibrahimi). This also kept the flow of food and other necessities open to the geographically isolated Hazarajat and spared the government from fighting on another front during the war with the mujahedin.
Responses, controversies and criticisms
Keshtmand’s initiatives have received widespread praise. Sarwar Danesh called him a “pioneer of federalism.” Another political activist, Jawad Waqar, recalled meeting Keshtmand, Najibullah and the president’s senior Soviet adviser in 1989, when, as an envoy sent by Abdul Karim Khalili (AAN), who was then a leader of Sazman-e Nasr (Victory Organisation), a Shia/Hazara mujahedin party (Ibrahimi), he travelled to Kabul to open a channel for negotiations (Etilaat-e Ruz, June 2026). Waqar said he expressed, in Khalili’s name, appreciation that Najibullah had said his government “has provided many privileges for the deprived and noble Hazara nationality, which is unprecedented” and even “recognised the right to autonomy in Hazarajat for the Hazara people, something that the Peshawar-based parties … will never accept.”
There was some convergence between Kabul – and Hazara politicians there such as Keshtmand – and the Shia mujahedin parties (AAN). Kabul was able to make political use of the fear among those parties about the widespread anti-Shia bias among their Pakistan-based and -supported Sunni counterparts (which became visible when they neglected the Shia parties in various mujahedin governments-in-exile formed in Pakistan). This enabled Keshtmand and others in Kabul to reach out to the Shia parties and drive a wedge into the mujahedin camp. At the same time, Kabul told envoys of the Shia parties that also Pakistan-based mujahedin parties were accepting arms and money from the government, as Waqar reported.
Keshtmand also claimed in his memoirs that Parcham had already prepared its own draft of a constitution based on a “federal parliamentary system” during President Muhammad Daud’s Republic (1973-78). According to his account, the Parcham draft was written largely by himself, “printed in a limited number,” and circulated directly and indirectly among party members, intellectual circles, members of the commission and other interested parties. The government was angry at the publication of this draft, but could not prevent its spread and instead, arrested and imprisoned several party activists for a while.
Danesh wrote that it was expected – among supporters of federalism – that Parcham would revisit the idea after coming to power. However, as he added, “political sensitivities and the circumstances of the time” prevented this and federalism was not included in the provisional constitution, “Basic Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,” nor in the formal constitution adopted later by Najibullah.
What was both locally driven and state-sponsored, top-down Hazara emancipation was resented by some as ethnic favouritism, with some opponents holding a less-than-favourable view of Keshtmand. Afghan historian Hassan Kakar called him “one of Moscow’s yes men.”[13] American journalist Henry S Bradshaw cited Anthony Arnold in his Cold War-time book Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, to say that Keshtmand “was known as excessively corrupt, even by Kabul’s low standards and he helped establish a wealthy merchant class of his fellow Hazara Shi’ites.”[14]
Yet there were many who had only praise for Keshtmand’s integrity. Malek Setiz, an MP during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2001-21), described him in a Facebook post as one of the cleanest politicians of his era, who lived in a simple apartment in Kabul. Ex-vice president Danesh, also a member of Khalili’s party, highlighted his struggles for federalism in Afghanistan (see Afghanistan International article cited above). Muhammad Mohaqeq, leader of a Wahdat breakaway party, also praised Keshtmand’s plans for the Hazara areas in his recently published memoir.
Other reactions following Keshtmand’s death included positive comments online about his integrity and humility, including from users who said they had worked under him (see, for example, this YouTube obituary by someone calling themselves an ‘Etahad (sic) Jawanan e Hazara’). Khaama Press editor Fidai Rahmati wrote that “Keshtmand was considered an important political figure within the country’s Hazara community and broader political landscape,” adding that his “leadership marked a historic moment for the Hazara community, representing a people who had long been marginalized from political power.”
Soviet withdrawal and transition of leadership
In 1982, as the Soviet leadership under Yuri Andropov (1982-84), for the first time, began to explore a possible withdrawal from and political solution for Afghanistan, Keshtmand was mentioned as a possible successor to the Soviet invasion-tainted Karmal, apparently even to Pakistan (which rejected the idea).[15] In early 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev invited the Afghan party leadership, including Keshtmand, to a private, unofficial meeting in Moscow, where he explained the Soviet Union’s plan to withdraw its forces and urged the party to prepare for this eventuality. While Karmal opposed Gorbachev’s plan, Keshtmand and others supported it, according to the memoirs of another PDPA co-founder and later minister, Karim Misaq, who was also a Hazara.
During this visit, Keshtmand also held separate discussions with Soviet Prime Minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, on economic issues, including the management of the continued promised Soviet aid. When the group returned to Kabul, Misaq wrote, the Central Committee assigned a group of members, including Keshtmand, to persuade Karmal to resign, but they failed. Ultimately, the Soviets worked through Khalqi generals such as Sayed Muhammad Gulabzoy and Nazar Muhammad to secure Karmal’s agreement to the leadership change (see also this AAN report).
Danesh wrote in his article, cited above, that “many expected Sultan Ali Keshtmand to take over the leadership of the party and the government in Karmal’s place. However, for reasons – perhaps including ethnic considerations – Najibullah … was chosen as Karmal’s successor.”
In exile after the fall
In July 1991, after President Najibullah replaced Keshtmand as head of government for the second time, Keshtmand “quit the party, which he accused of being authoritarian [he likely meant Najibullah personally, a view shared by many] and of not truly believing in political pluralism,” according to American journalist Henry S Bradshaw (p343). Keshtmand then went to the Soviet Union but returned to Afghanistan in early 1992. Shortly after his return, he was attacked at a fatiha (funeral) prayer ceremony, sustaining serious head injuries and was transferred to Moscow for treatment, as he wrote in his memoirs.
From Russia, he went to the United Kingdom, where he was granted political asylum by the conservative government of John Major (The Guardian). There, he reportedly became even more outspoken about the rights of Hazaras and other minorities, arguing that the Pashtuns in Afghanistan had held too much power across successive Afghan regimes, past and present (Khaama Press). In the 2021 Haqiqat article quoted above, he joined those advocating for the establishment of a federal system in Afghanistan, arguing:
From my perspective, a political system that can provide the proper foundation for the convergence, solidarity and ensure unity of all peoples in the presence of different ethnic groups in Afghanistan, in a single and united country and to establish a lasting peace and justice, is a federal system.
He believed that such a system should be established by “the true and elected representatives from the villages to the cities,” and argued, “the time has come to end the practice and idea of centralism in the government structure.”
Marriage to Karima Badakhshi
In 1966, Keshtmand married Karima Badakhshi, who was born in September 1946 in Kabul and was the sister of Taher Badakhshi, like Keshtmand, a PDPA co-founder and a member of its first Central Committee.[16]
Keshtmand and Badakhshi had been classmates at Kabul University and their families were closely linked: Badakhshi married Keshtmand’s sister, Jamila. Karima Badakhshi had also studied at Kabul University’s faculty of economics. Later, she became a secondary school teacher and subsequently worked in the Ministry of Mines and Industries, like her future husband.
Under the PDPA government, Karima led the PDPA’s Democratic Organisation of Afghan Women and later served, until 1990, as head of the General Directorate of Kindergartens at the Ministry of Education. During her tenure, the ministry established 400 (up from 4) mainly workplace-based childcare facilities at government institutions and the few existing state-owned industrial enterprises, enabling women to find jobs – essential for both the PDPA’s policy of women’s emancipation and to the war effort, when many men were away fighting and labour was scarce. With support from East German advisors, Karima Keshtmand endeavoured to emulate the German Democratic Republic (GDR) kindergarten system.
Keshtmand’s life and career echoed both the possibilities and limits of reform within Afghanistan’s Soviet-backed state, as well as the enduring struggle for political inclusion among its marginalised communities.
Sultan Ali Keshtmand is survived by his wife, Karima, and their four children (Morning Star).
Edited by Roxanna Shapour and Kate Clark
References
References
↑1
The highest-ranking Hazaras before Keshtmand were two ministers during the monarchy: Abdul Wahed Sarabi, who served as Minister of Planning from 1969 to 1973 and Muhammad Yaqub Lali, the Minister of Public Works from 1969 to 1971. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Keshtmand joined the Revolutionary Council. In May 1988, during President Najibullah’s policy of national reconciliation, he was appointed one of two vice presidents and 1990, Deputy Prime Minister. Years later, in 2001, Sima Samar made history as the first Hazara woman to hold a senior government position when she was appointed Deputy Head of Afghanistan’s Transitional Authority under Chairman Hamid Karzai. There were also two Hazara Second Vice Presidents during the Islamic Republic – Abdul Karim Khalili, 2004-2014, under President Karzai and Muhammad Sarwar Danesh, 2014-2021, under President Ashraf Ghani.
↑2
Muhammad Hassan Sharq, who served from May 1988 to February 1989, between Keshtmand’s two tenures, was also officially not a member of the PDPA. However, he was widely viewed as close to the party and was rumoured to have been a secret member. Sharq was eventually sacked due to his perceived ineffectiveness, particularly in handling economic affairs
↑3
Sultan Ali Keshtmand, Yad-dasht-ha-ye siasi wa ruidad-ha-ye tarikhi [Political Notes and Historical Events], 2nd edition, Kabul, Maiwand, 2003, (online version).
↑4
Ajrestan, a district in the western part of Ghazni province, is according to Keshtmand, inhabited by Mullakhel and Akakhel Pashtuns.
↑5
See Sayed Askar Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan, Curzon, Richmond, 1998.
↑6
Five jeribs equals one hectare.
↑7
Vladimir Snegirev and Valery Samunin, Virus A: How we got into the torments of Afghanistan, published in English by the National Security Archive in 2012, as The Dead End: The Road to Afghanistan.
↑8
Sarwari, a pro-Tarakay Khalqi, was removed by Amin after his takeover and, in October 1979, was accused of plotting a coup and imprisoned. During the Soviet invasion, he was released and brought back into government to placate the anti-Amin Khalqis. Over the following years, Sarwari held and lost various positions, eventually ending up in quasi-exile as the Afghan ambassador to Mongolia. After returning to Afghanistan in 1992, he was arrested and spent 13 years in detention before finally being tried for crimes against humanity, albeit under unfair circumstances (AAN). He initially received the death penalty, but his sentence was later commuted to 19 years in prison. He was released from jail in January 2017, after serving his full sentence.
↑9
In his memoir, he uses “Hazaristan (Hazarajat)”.
↑10
According to Soviet-style ‘nationalities’ policy’, a nation – which could be multi-ethnic – was called ‘mellat’ in Dari/Persian, while a ‘melliyat’ would be one of the larger ethnic groups, referring to what in former times would be translated into English as ‘national minority’.
↑11
Other key Hazara politicians in the PDPA regime were Ewaz Nabizada, head of the Nationalities Affairs in the Council of Ministers’ administration under Keshtmand, and Sheikh Ali Ahmad Fakkur, head of the Centre for Coordination of the Affairs of the Hazara people. Both were in touch with Hezb-e Wahdat and their predecessor parties such as Sazman-e Nasr, Shura-ye Ettefaq, Harakat-e Islami and others.
↑12
See Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan, [FN 8], p176.
↑13
See M. Hassan Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982, University of California, 1995, p180.
↑14
Whether Arnold’s assessment was entirely unbiased is open to question, given that he had been “an intelligence officer specializing in Soviet affairs who served in Afghanistan in the 1970s” and “since his retirement in 1979 … has written and lectured on Russian-Afghan relations” (University of Nebraska). After all, US intelligence agencies were involved in the conflict over Afghanistan, including using forms of psychological warfare, at the time Arnold and Bradshaw were writing.
↑15
This is recalled former Washington Post foreign correspondent Selig S Harrison in Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal, a 1995 book, he co-authored with UN special envoy Diego Cordovez who negotiated the Soviet pullback. (Oxford University Press, p98, p128).
↑16
Taher Badakhshi left the party in 1967 (or 1968, according to some sources) to set up his own faction. It became known as Settam-e Melli([Against] National Oppression) as Badakhshi believed that ethnic divisions, rather than the class divide, as the main issue facing Afghanistan, in contrast to the mainstream PDPA. He was arrested in 1978 and murdered in jail in October 1979 during Amin’s rule.
Obituary for Sultan Ali Keshtmand (1935-2026): Afghanistan’s Soviet-era political leader and Hazara rights advocate
The mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is due to be renewed by the UN Security Council on Monday, 16 March. Although the penholder on Afghanistan, China, had not initially suggested any changes to the mandate, following urging by the United States, the mandate will be extended only for three months, until 17 June. The US had made several public calls for the mandate to be reassessed, including by US ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, who accused the Emirate of using ‘hostage diplomacy’, ie detaining Americans (and other foreigners) in the hope of extracting policy concessions. In light of this and in relation to UNAMA funding, Waltz said that international assistance and engagement in Afghanistan must be “carefully evaluated.” The US believes this should happen before the mandate comes up for renewal again. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica examines UNAMA’s mandate, recent budget cuts and the dynamics within the UN Security Council and what that might mean for the next three months of discussions. The Security Council meeting on the situation in Afghanistan. Photo: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe, 9 March 2026.
As the UNAMA mandate renewal approached, Afghanistan was receiving little international attention amid much larger crises in the Middle East. Security Council members, who began negotiations on a draft resolution on 3 March, had largely converged on a straightforward renewal of the mandate with no alteration to UNAMA’s priorities and tasks. The current mandate focuses on coordinating humanitarian aid, monitoring and reporting on human rights, advocating specifically for the rights of women, girls and children, providing “good offices” for dialogue, supporting inclusive governance and promoting the rule of law and regional cooperation. It had been expected that this mandate would be renewed for a year. However, on 11 March, the US requested a three-month technical rollover, arguing that a shorter extension would allow the Council to conduct a comprehensive review of UNAMA’s mandate before committing to a longer renewal (Security Council Report). Although the draft resolution will not be made public before it is voted on, Security Council Report, an organisation whose mission is to advance the transparency and effectiveness of the UN Security Council, has reported that members have agreed to the three-month technical rollover.
Although US policy on Afghanistan has yet to be defined, the US request for a short mandate and reassessment comes as no surprise. Since December 2025, the US has been openly calling for the mandate to be reassessed as part of a broader repositioning of the US towards the UN (more on this below). In this report, we take a closer look at the discussion at the recent UN Security Council’s regular quarterly briefing on the situation in Afghanistan, held on 9 March, the evolution of UNAMA’s mandate to date and budget cuts that affect the UN as a whole and UNAMA in particular.
UN Security Council quarterly briefing
Every three months, the UN Security Council meets for a briefing on Afghanistan given by the UN representative in Kabul, the head of UNAMA or his/her deputy. The frequency of these briefings is set out in the UNSC Resolution, which also defines UNAMA’s mandate and is usually renewed annually.
The latest briefing (UN Web TV), held on 9 March, was important because it preceded a decision on the mandate. Acting head of UNAMA Georgette Gagnon said: “Afghanistan’s continued alienation from the international system remains the central issue,” adding that this has hindered progress on economic recovery, counter-terrorism cooperation and human rights. She noted that regional instability, particularly tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and wider Middle Eastern conflicts, are increasing economic pressure on the country. Prices for basic goods are rising, humanitarian needs remain extremely high and international aid is falling short. While some positive developments exist – such as the Taliban maintaining a ban on opium poppy cultivation and starting infrastructure projects – serious concerns remain, especially the exclusion of women and girls from education and public life, including the ban on Afghan women working at the UN.
The US ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, castigated the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) for human rights abuses, restrictions on women, interference in humanitarian work and the detention of foreign nationals, terming this “hostage diplomacy”(USUN). “The Deputy SRSG,” he said, “cited a $1 billion shortfall, a requirement for humanitarian aid. I would submit that perhaps the international community would be more willing to fill that shortfall if the Taliban were not excluding half of its own population from basic rights and responsibilities.” He also said:
In light of the Taliban’s intransigence, we must carefully evaluate the utility of international assistance and engagement in Afghanistan. UNAMA’s budget is the largest of any special political mission in the world. Even after a reduction in its 2026 budget by 15%, this Council must consider carefully the funds we collectively provide for this mission’s budget when the mission’s female national staff are not even able to go into the office to work.
By contrast, China and Russia called for greater engagement with the Emirate.[1] China’s ambassador, Fu Cong, called for increased humanitarian aid, the return of Afghanistan’s frozen financial assets and the lifting of sanctions to support economic recovery, while also urging the IEA to improve women’s rights. “All concerned parties,” he said, “should work together to promote stabilisation and development in Afghanistan and its early integration into the international community.” Russia’s ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya, argued that pressure and isolation would not work and that pragmatic dialogue with the IEA was necessary to stabilise the country. “[D]espite all of the difficulties and the suffocating sanctions,” he praised the Emirate for undertaking “painstaking work … to solve the problems accumulated over the years of occupation.”
The briefing ended with sharp exchanges between Pakistan, India and (less so) Afghanistan over the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan fighting. Pakistan’s representative, Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, said Pakistan had acted in self-defence after witnessing “a surge in terrorist attacks, planned, financed and orchestrated from Afghan soil under the Taliban regime’s direct watch.” The more emollient Afghan representative to the UN, Naseer Faiq, a hangover from the Republic and not representing either it or the Emirate (AAN), rejected Taliban rule as illegitimate and argued that the Emirate’s repressive policies – especially against women and political opponents – had pushed Afghanistan towards isolation and instability. He urged Pakistan to cease strikes against civilian infrastructure and mourned Afghan civilian casualties, but also inferred that Pakistani attacks were “the dangerous spillover” of the Taliban having “provided a permissive environment for international terrorist groups.” Nevertheless, a furious Ahmad accused Faiq of being “sequestered in New York” and “completely cut off from ground realities,” and complained that Ahmad had said nothing about Pakistani casualties, including civilians.
The statement of India’s representative, Parvathaneni Harish, had mainly highlighted their humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, but also posited that only coordinated international efforts could deal with “terrorism … a global scourge afflicting humanity.” He also accused Islamabad of “flagrant violations of international law.” Ahmad then, in turn, accused India of complicity and collusion, asserting that India had “always played the role of a spoiler in Afghanistan,” while Pakistan had “engaged responsibly in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan.” Naseer Faiq, responding to his “dear friend Ambassador Ahmad,” said he just wanted to say that “the current status quo in Afghanistan is the result of the wrong policies of our neighbouring countries, particularly those who provided support to the same groups in the past two decades.”
These bitter and longstanding regional rivalries ended the discussion, but overall, it showed broad agreement that Afghanistan faced severe economic and humanitarian problems, and concern about the cross-border fighting. It had also revealed, however, deep disagreements among the Security Council members about how to deal with the Emirate and how the country might be reintegrated into the global community. It again showed that women’s rights and human rights do not bear the same priority and importance for all member states and that for some, such as Russia and China, these should not be used as conditionalities in UN resolutions.
Following further closed-door negotiations on the new UNAMA mandate, it appears, however, that the US view that the mandate needed to be reassessed had consequences – a three-month technical rollover.
The acting head of UNAMA, Georgette Gagnon, briefs the Security Council meeting on the situation in Afghanistan. Photo: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe, 9 March 2026.
UNAMA mandate to date and its renewal
UNAMA, established by UN Security Council Resolution 1401 in March 2002, was originally mandated to support the implementation of the Bonn Agreement (December 2001).[2] Key priorities included: political reconciliation; humanitarian coordination; human rights promotion; state-building; and security sector reform.[3] Over time, this mandate has evolved to reflect the country’s needs and UNSC priorities.[4]UNAMA has undergone several reviews and evaluations to adapt its role to changing conditions in Afghanistan.[5]
After the fall of the Islamic Republic and the re-establishment of the Emirate, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2596 (2021) on 17 September 2021, extending UNAMA’s mandate for a six-month ‘technical’ period rather than the standard year. The new technical mandate narrowly focused on humanitarian aid coordination and the safety of UN personnel, as the previous ‘state-building’ objectives had become obsolete. In March 2022, the renewed mandate for one year reaffirmed that UNAMA’s role should be centred on humanitarian coordination and human rights.
The Council has not comprehensively discussed or adjusted UNAMA’s mandate and priorities since 2022. However, the mandate did come under close scrutiny in early 2023, when complex negotiations over its renewal shone a light on longstanding divisions within the Security Council over certain issues – human rights, women’s rights, peace and security, and governance (AAN). On 16 March 2023, Council members resolved their differences by passing two Afghanistan-related resolutions: one extended the UNAMA mandate until 17 March 2024, the other requested an independent assessment of in-country efforts.
The independent assessment presented to the UNSC on 9 November 2023 was driven by a desire to establish consensus on how the Security Council should deal with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan (AAN). While it generated a dynamic discussion about Afghanistan, the responses to its recommendations have degenerated into regular UNAMA-convened working groups on the least contentious topics, counter-narcotics and the private sector, rather than anything like the grand pathway of political engagement leading to the full reintegration of Afghanistan into the international community envisaged by the assessment
The discussion on how to engage with the Emirate, which underpins policy decisions on the UNAMA mandate, has pitted permanent Security Council members China and Russia on one side and the US, UK and France on the other. This division of views on how to deal with the Emirate remains to this day and is often reflected in the UNSC debates, as shown above. While Russia became the first country to recognise the Islamic Emirate in July 2025 (BBC) and China continues to have a good working relationship with Kabul, especially concerning business, based also on security concerns (AAN), the US has become more uncompromising in its policies towards the Emirate since Donald Trump became president for a second time.
First, a series of orders made as soon as Trump got into office in January 2025 halted refugee admission programmes in general, and terminated temporary protection status for Afghans in particular (AAN). Second, as of mid-2025, the Trump Administration terminated all foreign assistance awards with activities in Afghanistan,” per the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), itself terminated in January 2026 (US Congress, AAN analysis). Other countries also suffered cuts in US aid, many severely, but only Afghanistan and Yemen saw all their aid cut in 2025.[6] (The US agency responsible for delivering civilian aid, USAID was also closed down in 2025, its remaining functions transferred to the State Department.)
A clearly defined US policy on Afghanistan has yet to be published and the discourse seems to be evolving, as evidenced by the US desire to see changes to UNAMA’s mandate already voiced at the UNSC’s previous quarterly briefing on Afghanistan in December 2025. The US representative to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, Jennifer Locetta, told the Security Council that international engagement with the Emirate had so far produced no meaningful results and that UNAMA’s mandate must be reassessed (USUN).“[T]he United States’ top priority in Afghanistan,” she said, “remains the protection of US citizens and the homeland, which includes mitigating terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan and securing the release of all of those unjustly detained.” As for UNAMA’s mandate, she said:
[W]e have to bear in mind the lack of results from international assistance and engagement in Afghanistan. As this Council considers the future of UNAMA, it must be sceptical of the Taliban.
All special political missions, including UNAMA, need to adapt to changing conditions on the ground. If Taliban conditions prevent UNAMA from carrying out these tasks, then the Council should consider realigning its mandate to these realities. In the future, it should focus on core peace and security issues guided by clear and achievable benchmarks.
Ambassador Locetta also called out the IEA for engaging in hostage-diplomacy, a curious accusation by a country which held 225 Afghan men and boys in Guantanamo, not charging them with any crime, nor holding them according to the laws of war, and indeed still detains one Afghan, Muhammad Rahim from Nangrahar, who was picked up by Pakistan in 2007, handed over to the US. He was the last man to be rendered by the CIA and tortured in one of its black sites before being taken to Guantanamo (AAN).
Locetta also complained about the Taliban’s lack of progress on “counterterrorism commitments.” Counterterrorism was one of the key issues negotiated in Doha in 2018-20 between the then-first Trump administration and the Taliban, talks from which the US also sidelined the then Afghan government and the UN, deciding to negotiate the unilateral pull-out of its troops and, consequently, other NATO troops from Afghanistan. What became known as the Doha Agreement, signed on 29 February 2020, included some promises by the Taliban not to allow individuals or groups that “pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies” to operate from Afghanistan.[7] If there was a more detailed, standalone counterterrorism agreement negotiated in Doha, it has never been made public.
The country leading the way on negotiations to renew UNAMA’s mandate holds a very different position on Afghanistan. For the first time, China is the sole penholder on Afghanistan (SC Procedure).[8] Beijing has established greater vested interests in Afghanistan since the Taliban returned to power (AAN). When it indicated that it wished to act as a penholder on Afghanistan at the end of Japan’s mandate in late 2024/early 2025,[9] it almost turned into a major row between Beijing and Washington,[10] as the US, both under President Joe Biden and the newly-elected Donald Trump, firmly opposed China’s pitch (Just Security).
Despite such opposition, China has now officially assumed the penholder role, and negotiations on a new draft resolution to extend UNAMA’s mandate began on 3 March (Security Council Report). The initial draft of the resolution, originally by China to all members, sought a one-year renewal of the mission’s mandate and was largely identical to Resolution 2777 of 17 March 2025, with only minimal additions, mostly in the preamble. This was followed by an expert-level meeting on 5 March, one revised draft, and two rounds of comments. On Tuesday, 10 March, China placed a second revised draft under ‘silence procedure’, until the following day (11 March), meaning it would be assumed that members had accepted the draft unless they spoke up during that time period (Security Council Report). It was further reported by the Security Council Report on 13 March:
The US subsequently broke silence, requesting a shorter extension of the mandate. China then engaged in bilateral consultations with Council members before placing a third revised draft under the silence procedure on 12 March, which remained in effect until later that day, when it was again broken by the US. A further revised draft was subsequently placed under silence procedure until this morning (13 March). The draft text passed in silence and was put in blue [meaning the resolution was agreed] earlier today.
The current policy approach of the US administration towards UN special political missions is, as Locetta said, to “focus on core peace and security priorities guided by clear and achievable benchmarks.” US arguments over only giving UNAMA a three-month technical rollover had apparently centred on ‘value for money’. Security Council Report on 13 March, reported that:
It seems that the US argued that since UNAMA is one of the UN’s most costly special political missions and operates in a highly complex environment, the Council should first examine whether the mandate remains appropriate and fully implementable. In this regard, it apparently argued that a three-month technical rollover was the most viable path forward, providing the Council with additional time to hold discussions with all concerned stakeholders, including on streamlining the mandate and bringing it in line with current realities on the ground.
China and several other Council members objected to the US proposal, arguing, Security Council Report said, that a short-term renewal of UNAMA’s mandate could signal uncertainty about the mission’s future and might risk undermining its standing on the ground. Some members cautioned that such an approach might discourage engagement by the Taliban authorities if they perceive that the mission lacks firm backing from the Security Council, while also creating uncertainty among UNAMA staff. During the 9 March closed consultations on Afghanistan, UNAMA’s Georgette Gagnon made similar arguments, Security Council Report said. At that meeting, she called for support for a one-year extension of the mission’s mandate, noting that a short-term renewal could undermine confidence in the mission and the UN’s work in the country. Despite all of this, the US held firm to its position in favour of a short-term mandate, Security Council Report reported on 13 March that:
It [the US] also expressed scepticism about UNAMA’s role and its future. It seems that at the time of the expert-level meeting, there was limited clarity from Washington regarding its position on the question of UNAMA’s future. After China circulated the second revised text, it seems that the US permanent mission in New York received updated instructions from Washington, which indicated that the US was unable to support a year-long extension of UNAMA’s mandate, while indicating that its intention was not to end the mission. Rather, it apparently sought to streamline it so that it would better reflect the situation on the ground and allow the mission to effectively carry out its mandate.
What the US means exactly by ‘streamlining’ the UNAMA mandate is only likely to become clear in June and the lack of clarity about current US policy on Afghanistan makes it difficult to predict the ultimate consequences of it pushing for a three-month technical rollover.
Cuts in the budget
However, it is not only UNAMA’s mandate that has been under scrutiny; its funding has also been dwindling. UNAMA is funded through the regular UN budget, authorised by the General Assembly. The mission’s proposed budget for 2026 is USD 105 million (UN), a 15 per cent reduction from 2025. This represents a further decrease from previous years, for example USD 132.5 million approved for 2023 or over USD 140 million in 2019 and 2018. The proposed number of staff for 2026 across all UNAMA offices, both inside and outside the country, is 1,049 personnel, down from 1,136 in 2025 (UN).
This comes as no surprise, as the United Nations at large is struggling financially after the Trump administration refused to pay the annual contribution that about 60 member states normally make by the 8 February due date. President Trump has said the United Nations has not lived up to its potential and his administration has paid about USD 160 million of the nearly USD 4 billion it owes to the United Nations for 2025 and 2026 (AP). The US owes USD 2.196 billion to the UN’s regular operating budget from which missions like UNAMA are financed, including USD 767 million for 2026, Associated Press reported. The UN has said that 95 per cent of the arrears to the UN’s regular budget are owed by the United States (AP).
The US also owes USD 1.8 billion to the separate budget for UN peacekeeping operations (AP). On 2 March, Security Council Report said that “the US has sought to overhaul UN peace operations as part of a ‘go back to basics strategy’,[11] designed to cut costs and to reduce the UN to its vision of the UN’s core peace and security mandate.” Security Council Report also said that the US had pushed for some missions to wind down their operations and withdraw. It further said:
During several mandate renewal negotiations of missions … the US has also called for strategic reviews and benchmarks to assess mission progress and performance, as well as for the Secretary-General to present options for determining the future of specific missions. … [d]espite concerns expressed by some members about a hasty drawdown and the implementation of benchmarks that may not be in sync with realities on the ground, among others.
The US is not only shaping the future of UN peacekeeping, it has also effectively withdrawn from, or put under scrutiny, a number of UN entities dealing with development, climate change, humanitarian assistance and trade.[12] This followed two presidential actions. First, a 4 February Executive Order 14199 removed the United States from the UN Human Rights Council and initiated a review of US involvement in other entities such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). It also stopped funding these agencies and called for a broader review of other funding and membership devoted to international intergovernmental bodies. Second, a Presidential Memorandum, signed by Trump on 7 January 2026, ordered the US to withdraw from 66 international organisations that he said no longer served American interests (White House). Among these 66 organisations are 31 UN entities that, according to the White House, “operate contrary to US national interests, security, economic prosperity, or sovereignty.”
There are also other dynamics at play in the background. On 22 January 2026, President Trump launched the Board of Peace in January at the 57th World Economic Forum in Davos. Set up to oversee Gaza’s reconstruction, and with the US saying it will commit USD 10 billion towards establishing the Board (PBS). There was later talk that it would also address other global conflicts (White House press release, Reuters explainer, UK House of Commons Library explainer). This sparked fears that the new entity had been set up to undermine the UN (see, for example, The New York Times),[13] especially in light of the United States’ moves against the United Nations. For Human Rights Watch’s Executive Director, Philippe Bolopion, the US risks further undermining the rules-based multilateral system that has been the dominant world order since World War II, although it is not the only actor placing “the global human rights system is in peril,” (HRW World Report):
Under relentless pressure from US President Donald Trump, and persistently undermined by China and Russia, the rules-based international order is being crushed, threatening to take with it the architecture human rights defenders have come to rely on to advance norms and protect freedoms.
In this context, it can be seen that, as well as UNAMA’s mandate coming under scrutiny, the future of the UN, as a whole, in the current political climate is unclear.
Looking ahead to June
The 13 March Security Council Report said the recent discussions over renewing UNAMA’s mandate did appear to show “a shared understanding among Security Council members regarding the importance of UNAMA’s continued presence and the need to ensure effective implementation of its mandate.” Council members also seem to share some, but not all values and principles regarding human and women’s rights, as evident from the negotiated language of the resolution’s preamble. However, trying to discern the future of UNAMA, especially the tasks and priorities it may be mandated to carry out after June, remains unclear. Without a clear position on Afghanistan from Washington, it is a guessing game how this will all evolve. What can be said is that divisions in international forums, such as the UN, as well as an unclear US position on key issues, is not helping Afghans.
Edited by Kate Clark and Roxanna Shapour
References
References
↑1
Despite their political disagreements over how to engage with the Taliban, UNSC members still want to maintain some oversight of sanctions and security issues in Afghanistan, as seen on 12 February 2026 during the vote on a 12-month extension of the Monitoring Team supporting the Taliban Sanctions Committee (UNSC Resolution 2816). China, Russia and the US all voted anonymously for the resolution. The resolution highlighted the monitoring team’s vital role, including providing critical analysis and enhancing the Council’s understanding of the situation in Afghanistan, especially as it relates to human rights violations and the plight of women and girls. The Resolution also highlighted the unacceptable use of hostage-taking as a leverage point in negotiations. It said that the Security Council strongly condemns “kidnapping and hostage taking for any purpose, including with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions.”
↑2
The core of the UN mission’s mandate entailed: (a) Fulfilling the tasks and responsibilities, including those related to human rights, the rule of law and gender issues, entrusted to the United Nations in the Bonn Agreement; (b) Promoting national reconciliation and rapprochement throughout the country; (c) Managing all United Nations humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. See also UNSC Resolution 1401 (2002), 28 March 2002.
↑3
In fact, the UNAMA mandate consolidated the UN Special Mission on Afghanistan (UNSMA)’s political mandate (UNSMA was established by the UN Secretary-General at the request of the UN General Assembly in 1993) and all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan into a single mission.
↑4
For example, in 2003, election support and assistance to Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights Commission, as well as a counter-narcotics component, were emphasised as the mission’s priorities. In 2005, the mandate emphasised, among other things, the rule of law and justice reform, including the reconstruction and reform of the prison sector. The 2006 mandate focused on the Afghanistan Compact, the outcome of the London Conference on Afghanistan held in January 2006 and the establishment of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), an oversight mechanism for the implementation of the said Compact. In 2008, the UNAMA mandate was further sharpened by Resolution 1806 (adopted on 20 March 2008), which established a broad country presence, expanded field offices and placed the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) at the head of all UN activities in Afghanistan to ensure a more unified international approach. In 2010, the mandate included support for the Afghan-led reconciliation and transition process. In 2015, UNAMA was tasked with supporting the government in implementing its reform agenda, focusing on accountability, transparency and the rule of law. In 2019, the UNAMA mandate was renewed twice by the Security Council to maintain stability amid a high-stakes political transition and escalating conflict and in 2020 and early 2021, UNAMA was tasked with supporting the intra-Afghan negotiations.
↑5
In 2011, the UN Security Council requested a comprehensive review of the mission’s activities and field presence to align it with the evolving international presence and the transition of security responsibilities. In 2015, the Council called for a comprehensive examination of the roles, structures and activities of all UN entities in Afghanistan to support the country during the “Transformation Decade” and strengthen Afghan sovereignty and leadership. This led to the 2016 mandate, which emphasised a “One UN” approach aimed at improving coordination and effectiveness among UN agencies, funds and programmes in supporting Afghan national priorities. It also underwent a strategic review in 2017, which focused on optimising the UN’s structure and resources in Afghanistan and improving the mission’s field presence in line with the country’s evolving needs.
↑6
Seven African countries also lost all their US aid on 12 February 2025 – Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Somalia, and Zimbabwe – according to an email sent to US officials because “there is no strong nexus between the humanitarian response and U.S. national interests.” (The Atlantic).
↑7
Mentioning al-Qaeda by name and then only once, the text largely stuck to the formula of individuals or groups that “pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies.” The Taliban promised not to allow them to use the soil of Afghanistan, to cooperate with them, to give them visas, passports or travel permits and not to allow them to fundraise, recruit or train (see Part Two of the Doha Agreement).
↑8
As of 2026, China is the sole penholder on Afghanistan. A penholder at the UN Security Council (UNSC) is the member state leading the drafting and negotiation of resolutions on a specific agenda item. The nation that holds the pen on a given file has significant leeway to set the terms for how the Council approaches certain issues.
↑9
Japan was a penholder on Afghanistan in 2024.
↑10
In early 2025, China was a co-penholder with Pakistan on the Resolution extending UNAMA’s mandate up to March 2025. This caused major dispute at the UN, as Council members tussled over the penholdership of the file. See Richard Gowan, US-China Standoff on Who Runs the Afghanistan File at UN Signals Greater Tensions Ahead, Just Security, 14 February 2025.
↑11
The quote is from a 9 September 2025 letter from then acting US Representatives to the UN, John Kelley, to President Trump.
↑12
These include among others, UNESCO, UNHCR, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the International Law Commission, International Trade Centre, Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Fund, UN Conference on Trade and Development, UN Democracy Fund, UN Energy, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), UN Oceans, UN Population Fund, UN Water (see this Al Jazeera report for the full list).
↑13
The Board of Peace’s 20 founding members, in addition to the United States, include Argentina, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Qatar. Countries must contribute more than USD 1 billion to become permanent board members, but can join without cost for at least the first three years (New York Times).
US pressure on the UN: UNAMA gets only a three-month mandate renewal
The political situation in Afghanistan needs to be examined through its historical background and ethnic diversity which exists throughout the country. The area which now exists as Afghanistan contained various ethnic groups that included Pashtuns and Tajiks and Uzbeks and Hazaras before any central Afghan government established control over the territory. The groups operated through their tribal connections and family networks and their regional systems of governance instead of following a national government. The people maintained multiple power centers which operated independently from their centralized system of authority while their national identity developed through regional and ethnic ties that overshadowed any sense of shared national identity.
The 18th century saw Ahmad Shah Durrani establish modern Afghanistan through his unification efforts which created a new unified state. His consolidation of power relied on Pashtun tribal alliances and military expansion as his main sources of strength. The state framework created through this process established a system of governance which allowed Pashtuns to dominate all areas of power. The state included non-Pashtun groups as members, yet the groups maintained limited access to power within the governmental system. The resulting imbalance created a foundation which would later produce enduring complaints from the affected parties.
The death of Durrani led to Afghanistan experiencing difficulties in maintaining its national unity. The rulers who followed him maintained only superficial authority across territories that extended beyond primary cities. The majority of the country functioned as independent territory with local leaders sustaining control over their specific areas. The pattern of divided governance continued into current times which resulted in a weak central government that lacked the ability to enforce common regulations and preserve national cohesion.
The ethnic geography of Afghanistan creates additional challenges for the country’s political systems. The south and east regions of Afghanistan have been under Pashtun control since ancient times while Tajiks have held power over the northeastern regions and major cities and Uzbeks control the northern plains and Hazaras dominate the central highland areas. The spatial divisions between different groups have created separate identity groups who refuse to interact with each other which hampers the process of national integration. Central government’s attempt to change demographic patterns through forced migration and political manipulation but these methods create more tensions between groups instead of resolving conflicts.
The problem extends beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Afghanistan’s ethnic groups share deep cultural and linguistic connections with their respective neighboring nations. Tajiks share affinities with Tajikistan Uzbeks with Uzbekistan and Pashtuns with populations across the border in Pakistan. The cross-border relationships between countries have determined political alliances while they brought outside powers into Afghan internal matters. Domestic conflicts in Afghanistan extend into regional territories which makes it harder to achieve stabilization goals through conflict resolution.
The central authority of Afghanistan has faced persistent challenges during the last thirty years which resulted in serious security problems. Militant and extremist groups operate in territories that remain uncontrolled by government authorities according to existing conditions of the country. The country has become especially susceptible to becoming a base for such groups because of its challenging landscape, unguarded international boundaries, and disorganized governmental system. The internal unrest in Afghanistan has created dangers that extend beyond its borders to endanger regional and international safety.
Analysts have recommended a complete transformation of Afghanistan’s territorial organization as they assess the situation. One such proposal involves the peaceful reorganization of the country along ethnic and regional lines. The framework allows areas populated by Uzbek and Tajik majorities to connect with their neighboring states while Pashtun-majority regions have the option to join Pakistan. The remaining territories, which Hazaras and other minorities primarily inhabit, will establish a new state.
Proponents argue that such a restructuring could address the root causes of conflict by aligning political boundaries with ethnic realities. The proposal would diminish intergroup competition within a single state which would lead to better social harmony by stopping perception of one group dominating and another group being pushed to the sidelines. The smaller political units which contain similar populations will have greater chances to develop successful governmental systems which will protect their territories.
The method presents major operational difficulties which need to be resolved. The border redrawing process requires careful handling because it involves dealing with various complicated issues which touch upon delicate matters. The newly established entities would need to address various issues which include determining minority rights establishing resource allocation systems and handling potential conflicts that could arise in the future. The neighboring countries will probably refuse to cover additional territories because of their economic and political and security issues.
The idea demonstrates a growing trend which shows that traditional state-building methods in Afghanistan have failed to achieve success. The attempt to create centralized governance systems in Afghanistan has faced challenges because the country operates as a decentralized society which contains many distinct ethnical groups. The country requires a solution which needs to address its diverse ethnic groups and regional power structures at a fundamental level.
The Afghan future requires a solution which achieves equilibrium between national unity and ethnic diversity together with executive control and regional self-government. The fundamental factors that cause division in Afghan society must be resolved through either border adjustments or new governing methods to establish sustainable peace. The ongoing conflict will persist because Afghanistan needs to take action which will affect both its own security and the stability of its neighboring countries.
Umair Khan has a Master’s in International Relations from Quaid-e-Azam University and is an independent researcher from Islamabad, Pakistan.
Reimagining Afghanistan Through Ethnic Realities And Political Change
The United Nations says aid workers are still in a “race against time” to remove rubble and rebuild after the devastating earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan last month, killing at least 2,200 people and cutting off remote areas.
The 6.0-magnitude quake on Aug. 31 was shallow, destroying or causing extensive damage to low-rise buildings in the mountainous region. It hit late at night, and homes — mostly made of mud, wood, or rocks — collapsed instantly, becoming death traps.
Satellite data shows that about 40,500 truckloads of debris still needs to be cleared from affected areas in several provinces, the United Nations Development Program said Wednesday. Entire communities have been upended and families are sleeping in the open, it added.
The quake’s epicenter was in remote and rugged Kunar province, challenging rescue and relief efforts by the Taliban government and humanitarian groups. Authorities deployed helicopters or airdropped army commandos to evacuate survivors. Aid workers walked for hours on foot to reach isolated communities.
“This is a race against time,” said Devanand Ramiah, from the UNDP’s Crisis Bureau. “Debris removal and reconstruction operations must start safely and swiftly.”
People’s main demands were the reconstruction of houses and water supplies, according to a spokesman for a Taliban government committee tasked with helping survivors, Zia ur Rahman Speenghar.
People were getting assistance in cash, food, tents, beds, and other necessities, Speenghar said Thursday. Three new roads were under construction in the Dewagal Valley, and roads would be built to areas where there previously were none.
“Various countries and organizations have offered assistance in the construction of houses but that takes time. After the second round of assistance, work will begin on the third round, which is considering what kind of houses can be built here,” the spokesman said.
Afghanistan is facing a “perfect storm” of crises, including natural disasters like the recent earthquake, said Roza Otunbayeva, who leads the U.N. mission to the country.
Afghanistan Peace Campaign
The Security Council meeting on the situation in Afghanistan. Photo: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe, 9 March 2026.
