The closure of Canberra’s Afghan embassy is another blow to people on the brink of losing hope

The Guardian
Thu 2 Jul 2026

After Kabul fell to the Taliban, consulates around the world became hubs of resistance. Now their light is dimming

The decision, by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, reportedly followed a request from the Taliban and has left members of Australia’s Afghan community on edge.

I was a cadet journalist working in Afghanistan in 2012 when the news broke of Julian Assange taking refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy in London. I was amazed that diplomatic rules barred the British police from entering the embassy and arresting him.

At the time, I was covering the bloody Afghan conflict. The US had just deployed the “mother of all bombs” and the Taliban ruthlessly fought back using child suicide bombers.

There seemed to be no end in sight to the bloodshed and misery. The Taliban would boast the Americans might have watches but “we have the time”. They would drag things on, with no regard for the amount of death and destruction caused.

Then came the day when a deal was signed in Doha, Qatar, between the Trump administration and the Taliban, and the nascent Afghan democracy fell apart. With it went all the rights and freedoms that Afghan citizens, especially women and girls, had become acquainted with thanks to efforts by the US and allies including Australia, who had built schools and nurtured democratic institutions in the war-ravaged country.

Before the Taliban stormed Kabul, most western countries shut their embassies there and flew staff out. For the hundreds of thousands of Afghan soldiers, rights activists and other officials who feared Taliban persecution, the country’s diplomatic missions in nearby Iran, Pakistan and other countries became safe havens.

When I embarked on my own journey out of the country, I saw women shedding tears outside the Afghan embassy in Islamabad as they looked at the tricolour flag still flying high. Unlike inside Afghanistan where the Taliban had replaced the flag with their own, and were enforcing their gender-apartheid policy, outside the country embassy staff kept the old flag and were still treating women as human beings. And they didn’t just offer momentary emotional support – consular services stayed busy beyond official working hours to issue and sort crucial documents to help citizens with their private, financial, educational and other needs.

In the first couple of years of Taliban rule in Kabul, Afghan embassies in most capitals around the globe remained hubs of resistance. They tried to keep the tricolour flag flying high and, with the support of host countries, act as de facto representatives of the fallen democracy.

The closure of the Canberra embassy is another blow for people on the brink of losing identity and hope. For the bustling diaspora, who include members of the Afghan female cricket and football teams living in exile, this represents a further erosion of trust.

On Australia’s part there seems to be reluctance to fight the Taliban on a diplomatic front, instead choosing to ignore the country altogether. But for those Australian soldiers, diplomats and aid workers who lived through the war, together with the Afghans who made huge sacrifices for the promise of a fair and free future, the embassy’s closure is heartbreaking.

Among Canberra’s political power brokers, the Afghan war and the fall of Kabul may now be a distant memory. But it is still possible to salvage a better future for the next generation by not abandoning modern diplomacy when it is needed the most.

  • Shadi Khan Saif is an editor, producer and journalist who has worked in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Germany and Australia

The closure of Canberra’s Afghan embassy is another blow to people on the brink of losing hope
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I was lucky. Other Afghan girls are still waiting for their chance.

By Sana Shinwari

Sana Shinwari is a student at Columbia University.

The Washington Post

July 6, 2026

My brothers started school in March. My sisters had to stay home.

On March 26, the new school year began in Afghanistan. In Kabul, my two younger brothers packed their bags, put on their uniforms and walked out the door — one heading to ninth grade, one to fifth. I listened over the phone from more than 6,000 miles away as they recounted their first day of class, and it struck me how much they had grown. The last time I saw them, they were still little kids. Now, the older one has a mustache.

My 17-year-old sister did not pack anything that morning. She has not been inside a classroom in five years. She would be starting college this year if the Taliban had not taken over the country in August 2021 and banned every girl from school above sixth grade.

I have a baby sister who will turn 3 in May. I have never met her. She is not old enough for school yet. But once she completes primary school, the door to further schooling will be closed to her, too — unless something changes.

Afghanistan is the only country in the world where girls and women are forbidden from secondary and higher education. According to UNICEF, that ban applies to more than 2.2 million girls. This is the fifth consecutive year that secondary school and university doors have opened for boys and stayed shut for girls.

When the Taliban recaptured Kabul in 2021, world leaders promised they would not abandon Afghan women. The United States, the European Union and the United Nations have denounced the Taliban’s anti-education decrees. The U.N. condemned the banning of women from universities, saying it may constitute “gender persecution,” a crime against humanity. The E.U. denounced a decree in 2024 as an “appalling violation of fundamental human rights.”

But none of it meant anything to the girls sitting at home. No government has made girls’ education a condition for engagement or coordination. No country has faced diplomatic or economic consequences for engaging — as have China and Turkey — with a regime that has banned half of its population from learning. According to UNESCO, the Taliban have now implemented more than 70 decrees stripping women of their rights, and the international response has been to object, denounce and wait. Years later, the girls are still waiting too.

My older sister, who is 21, was not so fortunate. For her, most days feel like a nightmare. She spent years working to secure a scholarship to a university in the United States. When she found out she had won the scholarship, I began to feel more hopeful. But that did not last long. A week after she received her university acceptance in May 2025, the U.S. enacted a travel ban on Afghan nationals, as well as nationals of several other countries. Her hope of coming here vanished. She has a seat in a classroom waiting for her, and she cannot reach it.

The U.S. cut off nearly all aid last year to my home country, but that has not improved living conditions or changed the Taliban’s decrees. Instead, it has punished ordinary Afghans while the Taliban continue doing what they want. Afghan girls deserve a more targeted response.

First, Western governments must fast-track visas and scholarships for Afghan girls who have already secured university placements abroad. Many Afghan girls, like my older sister, have been accepted to universities in the U.S. and Britain, but travel restrictions in both countries make it impossible for them to go. Afghan girls with confirmed university placements are not security risks. If Western governments and the U.N. care about girls’ education as much as they have declared, making them wait in Afghanistan — rather than welcoming them to universities that want them — amounts to abandonment. It is strange indeed for British officials to call for Afghanistan’s referral to the International Court of Justice while it bars Afghan girls from attending university in London and Manchester.

Second, the U.N. must create a specific accountability mechanism for the education ban — one with real consequences for the Taliban, not for the Afghan people. The current approach of issuing statements and expressing disappointment has failed. Five years of disappointment has not opened a single classroom door.

I am proud of my brothers. I am glad they are in school, and I want them to learn, grow and build their futures. But I cannot celebrate their first day back without thinking about my sisters, my cousins and the more than 2 million girls who stayed behind that morning.

Five years is long enough. The girls of Afghanistan have been patient and resilient. They have learned in secret and held on to hope longer than anyone should have to. They are not asking for sympathy; they are asking for what the Taliban took from them: a chance to learn.

I was lucky. Other Afghan girls are still waiting for their chance.
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The Afghanistan Reckoning

Carter Malkasian

Foreign Affairs

July/August 2026 

Forever Wars and the Costs of Collective Forgetting

Five years ago, the 20-year American war in Afghanistan came to an inglorious end. In April 2021, the United States had begun its final withdrawal, with the goal of pulling out the 2,500 U.S. troops that remained in the country by September. Within weeks of the first U.S. departures, the Taliban had swept up scores of positions as Afghan government forces melted away. By early August, the group had taken control of most provincial capitals. Finally, on August 15, 2021, the U.S.-backed government in Kabul collapsed. Hundreds of thousands of terrified Afghans besieged the city’s airport. Roughly 120,000 were evacuated in planeloads by the United States, its allies, and even groups of private citizens. In a heartbreaking final blow, 13 American service members died in a suicide bombing at the airport four days before the last U.S. soldier departed on August 30. Two decades of heroic effort had ended in shame.

Recriminations followed—some justified, some not. The same group that had harbored al-Qaeda while it planned and carried out the 9/11 attacks had triumphantly returned to power, and fears of a resurgent terrorist threat mounted. After all, the main reason that successive American presidents had decided to keep U.S. forces in the country for so long was the belief that without them, Afghanistan would once again become a safe haven for terrorists even if the Taliban did not manage to take full control.

Nothing of the sort occurred. Over the past five years, not a single act of terrorism against the United States was carried out by a group based in Afghanistan. Washington spent roughly $1 trillion on the war. More than 120,000 Afghan civilians were killed or injured. More than 775,000 American service members were deployed to Afghanistan, more than 20,700 were injured, and more than 2,400 died—all to defend against a threat that turned out to have been exaggerated.

If American officials had known then what they know now, many of them—including me—would have argued more strongly for an earlier withdrawal. This is an uncomfortable point of view to adopt. It calls into question the judgment of leaders, the effectiveness of the policy process, and the value of the entire effort. Washington might have seen a better outcome, or at least a shorter war, if officials had more seriously debated withdrawal earlier, considered a wider range of threat assessments, pursued negotiations sooner, and, in some cases, recognized the bias instilled by a distaste for defeat.

Five years on, the greatest danger is not that a terrorist safe haven might once again emerge in Afghanistan. A graver threat comes from the risk of collective forgetting. Today, the longest American war rarely figures in public discourse. Americans occasionally acknowledge the noble sacrifices that thousands of U.S. service members made in the conflict. But the country moved on, eager to forget those final days. The riskiest form of forgetting would be for American leaders to fail to recall how perilous it proved to accept high costs and terrible losses, all in response to the fears of the moment. Remembering that will help them avoid future anguish.

“YOU ARE WORTH PROTECTING”

On October 7, 2001, President George W. Bush invaded Afghanistan in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks that had stunned the world. Within months, a combination of U.S. airpower, special operations forces, intelligence operatives, and the Afghan militia known as the Northern Alliance had chased out al-Qaeda and upended the Taliban regime led by Mullah Omar. A new government was formed under the Afghan leader Hamid Karzai. For the next four years, the country was deceptively peaceful. This initial success helped tempt the Bush administration into invading Iraq in 2003, leading to a brutal war that captured most of Washington’s attention for the next five years. During that time, the Taliban regrouped. By 2006, they were regaining territory and seriously challenging the Afghan government.

Throughout this period, the United States was gripped by a fear of terrorism, its anxiety fed not only by the horrors of 9/11 but also by the anthrax attacks that followed in their wake and a series of lethal jihadist bombings and foiled plots in Europe in the mid-2000s. “The global war on terror” was raging, and Afghanistan was the main theater. Countering terrorism was unquestionably the center of U.S. military activity in the country, a mission articulated by presidents, secretaries of defense and state, military commanders, and intelligence chiefs.

The United States had other ambitions in Afghanistan, as well, including a nation-building mission that aimed to establish a sustainable democracy. Bush declared this goal explicitly, and in spite of his successors’ efforts to back away, it remained an implicit part of the American project. But without the terrorist threat, there would have been no war against the Taliban, no arming and training of the Afghan military, no nation building, and no democracy promotion. Terrorism was always the driving concern.

Washington understood little about the Taliban.

For many of the men and women on the ground, that mission justified their efforts and losses. As Ross Berkoff, a U.S. Army lieutenant stationed in Kandahar in 2003, wrote in his diary: “September 11, 2001, is a day that will live in infamy and the fact that Afghanistan became a new place for U.S. soldiers to deploy is directly tied to that infamous day. . . . I am here to respond. We’re here in response.” In a 2019 memoir, Kyle Carpenter, who fought in Afghanistan as a member of the U.S. Marine Corps and received the Medal of Honor, summed up his feelings about his service on behalf of Americans: “You are worth protecting, you are worth fighting for, you are worth time in a hospital bed and deep scars on my body.”

That is not to say that the strategy was always clearly communicated or convincing. Many U.S. troops on the ground were not directly involved in counterterrorism or special operations missions. For some, engaging in firefights in remote mountains and deserts with local Taliban, being targeted by improvised explosive devices, and trying to build up the troubled Afghan government and army seemed a far cry from fighting dreaded international terrorists. Some developed deep skepticism about the purpose of the war, which could turn to resentment when fellow service members died or were wounded.

From 2009 to 2011, I served as the U.S. State Department’s political officer in Garmser, a rural district in the southern province of Helmand. I was part of a small team of around half a dozen civilians attached to a U.S. Marine battalion, advising the district governor, the police, and local tribal and religious leaders. Just about every Afghan in the region believed that without U.S. forces backing a strong army and police force, the Taliban would return. A few claimed that al-Qaeda would come with them.

As far as I could tell, there was little to suggest that al-Qaeda was active in Garmser or elsewhere in the south. The truth was that the chances of the group’s reviving its Afghan stronghold were impossible to measure with any confidence—and such a nebulous threat scarcely seemed commensurate with the 100,000 U.S. troops then in the country. But by the time I left, I was heartened by the Marines’ accomplishments. The Taliban had been pushed out of the vast majority of the district. An Afghan government official could travel unarmed from the top to the bottom of the territory. Over 1,000 new Afghan soldiers and police officers were in place and active. I thought that it was unnecessary for tens of thousands of U.S. forces to stay in Afghanistan, as long as a smaller number remained for the long term. In 2012, Kael Weston and I wrote in these pages that 25,000 U.S. advisers, special operations forces, and air and support personnel should stay. Otherwise, “the Afghan central government would likely lose control of the Pashtun east and south” and, “thrown on the defensive, would be unable to prevent the return of al Qaeda to the vast Pashtun heartland.” The country, we warned, would “backslide, quickly and perhaps irrevocably, taking with it the United States’ ability to combat al Qaeda.”

From 2013 to 2014, I was back in Afghanistan as the civilian adviser to General Joseph Dunford, commander of all U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan. During those years, U.S. President Barack Obama had begun to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan, and by the time I left, fewer than 10,000 remained, and they were focused on turning the war over to the Afghan soldiers and police. In too many places, however, they were suffering setbacks: in the summer of 2014, at the strategic crossroads of Sangin, in Helmand, hundreds of well-armed Afghan police and soldiers had been overrun by a Taliban offensive. That defeat heralded worse reversals that came in 2015 and 2016, all of which U.S. officials took as indicators that the Afghan government could not hold back the Taliban on its own, nor prevent the subsequent establishment of an al-Qaeda safe haven. For me, it was a sign that the costs of staying in Afghanistan had possibly become greater than the danger of terrorism that would come in the wake of the government’s fall.

For the rest of Obama’s time in office, and during the first term of President Donald Trump, the Afghan war was the focus of constant debate in the White House. The particulars changed over time, but the basic choice was always the same: stay in the country with a small number of troops, a posture that was sustainable but potentially endless, or get out, meaning that sooner or later the government would fall and the terrorist threat would likely return. From 2012 onward, the intelligence community assessed that a terrorist capability to attack the United States could reconstitute in Afghanistan within one to three years after a U.S. withdrawal.

Trump retained the fundamentals of Obama’s strategy until mid-2018, when he decided it was time to leave Afghanistan and pursue direct negotiations with the Taliban. Obama had allowed for talks between 2010 and 2014, but the effort was a low priority for his administration. By 2018, the strategic context had changed. A U.S.-led coalition had defeated the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the global terrorist threat was ebbing, and a bipartisan consensus was at last forming that the United States should wind down the war in Afghanistan. Trump’s agreement with the Taliban, signed in February 2020, stipulated that Washington would withdraw all its military forces by May 2021. In return, the Taliban promised not to allow al-Qaeda to recruit, train, or conduct operations from Afghanistan—although the Taliban refused to break relations with the group.

THE BAD GUYS WON

On taking office in January 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden faced a hard choice: keep 2,500 troops in Afghanistan to suppress the terrorist threat, or leave in accordance with Trump’s agreement. Either strategy was viable. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, and senior U.S. generals favored staying. They argued that counterterrorism operations could be better maintained from inside Afghanistan and that the continued presence of American troops would prevent the defeat of the Afghan government. Biden himself was genuinely concerned about terrorism and acknowledged the possibility of a Saigon-like collapse, but he leaned toward escaping from a never-ending mission. For Biden, the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. contest with China, and the struggling American economy were far greater worries.

In April 2021, Biden announced that all U.S. military forces would withdraw by September 11 of that year. The administration believed the Afghan government would hold out for at least six months after that point. But Kabul fell in August, and the Taliban have governed Afghanistan ever since, led by their dour emir, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada. Before taking the top position in 2016, he had been the chief judge of the Taliban’s Islamic court, a position that endowed his leadership with religious legitimacy in the eyes of many Afghans. He is said to have endorsed a suicide bombing by his own son in Helmand in 2018. Following in Mullah Omar’s footsteps, Haibatullah rules not from Kabul but from the traditional Taliban stronghold of Kandahar, and assiduously stays out of the public eye. In Kabul, meanwhile, the minister of the interior is Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the terrorist group known as the Haqqani network and the mastermind of countless wartime suicide attacks, such as a truck bombing in front of the German Embassy in 2017 that killed 150 Afghans and injured 400 more.

The ascent of men like these is precisely the kind of outcome that U.S. officials feared when they contemplated a post-American Afghanistan. Yet far from ushering in a new age of chaos and carnage, Taliban rule has instead fostered a period of relative stability. The country has been at peace for five years, the longest stretch since 1979, when a Soviet invasion was followed by decades of war. Other than periodic attacks by the Islamic State, resistance to the regime has been minimal. Afghans consistently tell me that the country is now aram, or calm. Since retaking control, the Taliban have not ruthlessly oppressed the Afghan people. The group has not systematically imprisoned its former adversaries or those who worked with the United States, its allies, or the Afghan government. Taliban governors and judges have generally permitted those people to go on with their lives. The biggest danger for them is violence carried out by low-level Taliban members with a grudge, or local rivals looking for an excuse to settle old scores.

Perhaps the most unexpected element of Taliban governance has been its ban on the poppy cultivation that long made Afghanistan a major node in the international heroin trade. Poppy was a major source of revenue for the group during the war. But in 2022, Haibatullah banned the cultivation, sale, and consumption of all narcotics. Enforced by public floggings and long prison sentences and backed by eradication efforts, the edict reduced the cultivation of poppy by approximately 95 percent in 2023, according to UN estimates. The Taliban have accomplished this feat even though doing so sharply reduced the tax revenues they could collect and negatively affected the livelihoods of perhaps a fifth of the population.
Many who served in the war now see it as a waste.

Of course, there have also been significant setbacks. Economic growth has stagnated, and poverty has worsened. Health care has degraded with the cessation of international assistance. The most glaring fault is the plight of Afghan women. In 2022, Haibatullah issued edicts that banned girls from attending secondary schools and universities. Women also face restrictions on working and on venturing outside their homes without being escorted by a male relative. The deterioration of health care has hit women particularly hard because hospitals and clinics had been among the few places with personnel dedicated to their care. The cruelty of the policies is thrown into relief by the major strides in rights and opportunities that Afghan women in some parts of the country made in the decades that the Taliban were out of power. Female income per capita doubled between 2000 and 2013. In Kabul, at least, a generation of Afghan women grew up with access to education, job opportunities, and a sense that they could build lives of their own. The Taliban have extinguished those dreams.

By far the most important turn of events for American and Western interests, however, has been the absence of terrorism. There is little evidence to suggest that al-Qaeda is organizing, fundraising, or training on Afghan territory. Seemingly with the Afghan emirate’s permission, fighters and leaders from the Pakistani Taliban have taken refuge in Afghanistan, where they have launched 700 attacks on Pakistani soil. The resulting war has seen Pakistan bomb the Afghan cities of Bagram, Kabul, Paktia, and Kandahar, while Afghan forces have attacked Pakistani border posts. Meanwhile, the Islamic State maintains a few thousand fighters in Afghanistan who have conducted high-profile attacks on the Taliban government in Kabul. But for five years, no known terrorist attack has been mounted from Afghanistan against the United States. Despite the Taliban’s track record as enablers of al-Qaeda and their failure to manage their country’s economy, the group has not fostered global terrorism since 2021 but instead contained it.

A reversal cannot be entirely ruled out because Washington’s ability to monitor Afghanistan is not what it was in 2020, let alone 2011. The United States may be unable to detect terrorist plotting and training in mountain villages or in the backstreets of Kabul, Kandahar, or Jalalabad. And the past five years have not been without red flags. In 2022, a U.S. strike killed Ayman al-Zawahiri, who inherited the leadership of al-Qaeda from Osama bin Laden, at a guest house linked to Haqqani. In 2023, a team of UN investigators concluded that there were still around 400 al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan actively trying to rebuild a base of operations. Similarly, the Islamic State’s Afghan affiliate could be stronger than it currently seems and could shift its focus from undermining the Taliban to attacking Western interests.

But the unmistakable fact is that so far, Taliban rule has been manageable for American interests. Five years after the U.S. withdrawal, it is fair to say that the threat of terrorism, which drove American decision-making, was exaggerated.

LOSING IS NOT AN OPTION

The question that lingers, then, is why American officials so badly misjudged the risk of withdrawing and opted to stay for so long. One factor was domestic politics. Had ordinary Americans not been gripped by fears of jihadism after 9/11, and had they more acutely felt the effects of the war in their own lives, then popular protests, electoral politics, and congressional opposition might have compelled a president to withdraw much earlier. The war in Afghanistan never inspired much passion among ordinary Americans. Presidents confronted little popular opposition to staying and feared that a rapid collapse in the aftermath of a U.S. pullout would be a political disaster—as indeed it was for Biden, whose approval ratings fell sharply after dismayed Americans watched the 2021 evacuation devolve into chaos and bloodshed.

In retrospect, the years immediately following bin Laden’s death, in May 2011, offered the best opportunities to end the war. Washington’s most notorious enemy was dead, and his organization was decimated. Moreover, by that point, it was clear that the surge of troops that Obama had ordered to Afghanistan in 2009 would be too costly to sustain. About a month after bin Laden’s death, Obama announced that 33,000 American troops would withdraw from Afghanistan by September 2012, which would leave around 67,000 in the country. Those forces would continue to draw down until the end of 2014, the president said, when the United States would end its combat mission and shift to a training, advising, and counterterrorism mission. In May 2014, Obama announced that the withdrawal would be complete by the end of 2016. But he reversed that decision the following year amid the rise of the Islamic State, known as ISIS, and Taliban advances in Afghanistan.

If its timeline had been shorter, the withdrawal might have been completed by that point, and Obama might not have been able to reverse course. He did not demand precipitous withdrawal, but he seriously considered a “zero option.” The Pentagon, which was not bent on staying, could have presented the president with options for withdrawing more quickly, and Obama himself could have decided to execute faster.

Throughout the Afghan war, beneath the policy debates lay another, unstated reason to stay: the humiliation of losing. The military had understandable biases when confronting the painful topic of withdrawal. Many generals felt a professional duty to accept any outcome; for others, a Taliban victory carried a deep stigma. They did not want to lose. They did not want their soldiers to have fallen in vain.

U.S. soldiers and generals could not succeed in their daily operations if they were not ruthlessly determined to outfight the enemy. Nor could they succeed if they did not care about the Afghans—genuinely, not as pawns in some great game. Afghans had to put their lives on the line, too. This is a difference between the soldier or officer on the ground and a policymaker back home. Thinking objectively about strategy demands a degree of detachment that a person on the frontline must reject. Emotional commitment, with all its biases, is irreplaceable. It is hard for anyone who goes from the field back to Washington to detach from this kind of commitment. Simply put, one reason the Americans did not leave Afghanistan earlier is that the U.S. military fights to win.

THE PERILS OF CONSENSUS

The Taliban did not make the prospect of withdrawal any easier to contemplate. Between 2010 and 2021, Taliban representatives told U.S. interlocutors that they had no intention of permitting anyone on Afghan soil to plan or carry out a terrorist attack overseas. But they muddied the waters by maintaining a relationship with al-Qaeda. In 2019, I was on the U.S. negotiating team that met with Taliban representatives in Qatar, and they admitted to working with al-Qaeda and wanting its members to be able to live in Afghanistan, all while resisting U.S. requests to offer written guarantees to ban al-Qaeda fundraising, recruiting, and training. If Washington’s great failure was overestimating or exaggerating the terrorism threat, the Taliban’s was keeping that threat alive by refusing, late in the game, to make a clean break with al-Qaeda.

The more important factor that kept Washington from better estimating the threat earlier was the seemingly sturdy conviction among various U.S. intelligence agencies that the threat of terrorism would rise if American forces withdrew. This view was the result of a process of producing national intelligence estimates that, by design, reflected a consensus. Various experts inside and outside government expressed skepticism about the general conclusion, but in an ad hoc fashion; in a consensus-driven process, contrary views were bound to be washed out.

The fault for that, however, does not lie with the intelligence analysts. Decision-makers, congressional representatives, and policy advisers (including me) should have asked the intelligence community for a wider set of forecasts. For the sake of simplicity, I accepted one rough forecast instead of asking for multiple predictions from different viewpoints that I could then present to the principals. It is likely that one such forecast would have described a fair chance of an indefinitely low terrorist threat to the American homeland. That might have weakened the case for staying—and might have caught the attention of Obama, Trump, Congress, and the media.

The United States did not predict the stability that Taliban rule would yield or the relative leniency the group would show toward Afghans who had opposed it. Washington understood little about the movement; its leaders stayed hidden, and few outsiders had access. (Mullah Omar died in 2013, but the rest of the world, as well as most of his own movement, did not even learn of his passing until two years later.) In retrospect, views of the movement were skewed by reports about its first time in power, when it ruled the country in the late 1990s. Executions, stonings, and other abuses were not as widespread as media accounts from that period suggested. Similarly, the maze of Afghan tribal politics—and distorted information from unreliable Afghan government sources—led U.S. officials to underestimate the level of unity and hierarchy within the movement, which partly explain its success in the past five years.

One way to mitigate these misperceptions would have been to prioritize a sustained dialogue with Taliban representatives much earlier. Attempts to reach out between 2010 and 2014 were sincere but underresourced. Contact with and knowledge of the Taliban—and confidence in that knowledge—would have increased dramatically, and might have created an earlier opportunity for the negotiations to end the war.

THE MINEFIELD AT HOME

The American war in Afghanistan had a tragic quality. The United States could not avoid entering the conflict but then had few chances to exit. Many who served in the war now see it as a waste. Some feel betrayed or let down by generals and civilians who, in spite of the futility of the war, continued to put them in harm’s way. An August 2021 Pew Research poll found that two-thirds of veterans from all American wars felt the United States had failed to reach its objectives in Afghanistan. “In the aftermath of 2021, many of us were gripped with existential questions about the meaning and legacy of our service,” Berkoff, the U.S. Army lieutenant, now retired, reflects at the end of his memoir. “We struggle with—and continue to unpack—feelings of guilt or regret, wondering if our sacrifices were really in vain.” Timothy Kudo, a retired Marine captain, is harsher: “I think of the star-spangled banner that flew over my old patrol base. . . . Five men died under that flag, for what?” It is deeply unsettling that thousands of service members who fought, were wounded, or lost friends in the war now see it as an unworthy endeavor.

Americans will not all share any single memory of the war in Afghanistan or accept any single explanation for the outcome. And in addition to those who feel it was a waste are the officers, enlisted personnel, and diplomats who feel the war was a duty and served their country, regardless of the reasons the government chose to wage it. There is also a smaller cohort of veterans of the Afghan campaign who believe that the war could have been won. In their view, the Afghan government could have stood on its own, and the Taliban could have been defeated—if only more U.S. troops had stayed in the country, special operations had been conducted more vigorously, the Afghan military had been better constructed, or Washington had not repeatedly told the Taliban it would withdraw.

These sentiments have created a minefield for military leaders. Today, officers must demonstrate to troops that they will not put lives at risk in endeavors that fall short of victory. To civilian leaders, they must demonstrate that they will not stand in the way of policy. A similar dynamic has not been seen since the aftermath of the Vietnam War, which caused Americans to lose confidence in their military leaders and led the military to refocus on fighting conventional wars and transform itself into a professional all-volunteer force. Perhaps that experience offers some solace: the many lessons from defeat may result in stronger armed forces, improved political judgment, and greater scrutiny of the rationales for putting lives in danger.

The value of a soldier’s life lies at the heart of debates about the meaning of the Afghan war. For much of the war, most American leaders and most ordinary Americans thought the benefit of security outweighed the cost of casualties. Today, hardly anyone believes that. Similar shifts took place after other American wars, most recently those in Vietnam and Iraq. In every case, it all seemed so important at the time. Years later, many people decided that if they had known how things would turn out, they would not have supported sacrificing so much.

Americans must not forget those changes of heart. They must remember what it feels like to look back at a war they once embraced and think, “If only I had known then what I know now.”

The Afghanistan Reckoning
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The Unraveling of Afghan Asylum

Tanvi Misra

Afghan asylum seekers fled a crisis the US had a direct role in fomenting—only to become targets in Trump’s immigration crackdown.

The New York Review of Books

June 28, 2026

We first met in the spring of 2025, at a gathering in the basement of the Hazrati Abu Bakr Siddique mosque in Flushing, two years after he and his family of eight crossed the US–Mexico border fleeing persecution by the Taliban. By the time we reunited this past March, at an iftar dinner hosted in Brooklyn by the grassroots organization Afghans For A Better Tomorrow, Monsef and his family had taken substantive steps toward building a life in the US; with support from a state program, they were about to move from a hotel shelter in the city to a house in Westchester. He and his wife both had jobs. Their two eldest children—both girls—were in college.

And yet the Trump administration kept putting new restrictions in their path. The judge assigned to their case was among the many that the federal government has fired since Trump retook office. Last fall the administration’s leading immigration bureaucrat announced an indefinite pause on approving asylum applications filed with his agency, including that of Monsef’s family, among other petitions in the pipeline for visas and immigration benefits. Then Immigration and Customs Enforcement started detaining Afghans in the city with pending asylum applications, many of whom had already been detained after crossing the border. “We don’t know what we can do,” Monsef told me on the phone in March. “It is a kind of unknown future.”

Monsef was born into a Shia Muslim family from the Hazara ethnic minority. Both groups were targeted under the Taliban, whose forces tortured Monsef’s father, a well-known community leader, when Monsef was young. Monsef came of age shortly after the Taliban fell during the US-led invasion in 2001, and after getting his degree he worked for the Afghan government as a civil engineer on projects funded by the US. That alone, he knew, made him and his family into targets when, in 2021, the Taliban returned to power.

With his wife, their six children, and his elderly mother, Monsef traveled around the world to the Americas, then made his way up, mostly on foot, to the US–Mexico border. The journey was an extreme ordeal. During the walk through the notorious jungles of the Darien Gap, one of the deadliest land migration routes in the world, Monsef at times held two of his younger children in his arms. At one point in their hike his elderly mother collapsed; she was unconscious for over an hour. It was so physically arduous that he sometimes felt he might not be able to push through.

When Monsef and his family finally crossed into San Diego, in the spring of 2023, they felt an immediate flush of relief, he told me. They thought they were safe: “We were not thinking about what will happen after.” Soon advocates in New York City arranged to fly them to the East Coast.

Among the advocates who came to help the family was Arash Azizzada, who founded Afghans for a Better Tomorrow in 2021 to coordinate the resettlement of Afghans who were evacuated after the US withdrawal. In early 2023, when Republican governors in border states started bussing migrants into New York City as a political ploy, Azizzada and other volunteers began showing up at Port Authority to greet them, set them up with legal assistance, give them a sense of community, and arrange other forms of mutual aid. Their first order of business was handing out cell phones. Some of the refugees they helped would later chip in to support others.

The Afghans who came through the southern border under Biden were a particularly vulnerable crowd, Azizzada said in an email when he first wrote to me in early 2024. Being asylum seekers who had crossed the border, often without permission, they didn’t qualify for certain benefits typically extended to resettled refugees. Nor did they all have a clear path to citizenship that took into account their special circumstances as people who had fled not just a shared enemy but a situation the United States had a direct role in fomenting. Because of new rules the Biden administration implemented at the time, if migrants crossed without an appointment on a glitchy app, they were barred from seeking asylum altogether (although they could still pursue certain other types of protections). These policies were already hurting asylum seekers, and Azizzada worried that a second Trump administration could spell disaster for Afghans, among other new arrivals. Two years later, the disaster is unfolding as a slow burn.

The US, which signed the international protocol on refugees in 1968, has an obligation to all asylum seekers when they arrive at or enter its borders: it cannot, by law, return them to harm. The right to asylum was formalized into US law in 1980, almost three decades after it was codified into international law as a response to the mass displacement caused by the Holocaust. It has never been fairly and consistently implemented, and it almost immediately came under attack. In the decades since, successive presidents—both Democratic and Republican—have both made it much more dangerous for people fleeing persecution to arrive at US borders in the first place and chipped away at the due process they can access inside the US if they manage to enter. (Accessing asylum requires the applicant’s presence on US soil, and anyone can, at least on paper, legally request it regardless of how they enter the country.) Asylum law was created for people fleeing political persecution and excluded so-called economic migrants, but in reality these were never mutually exclusive categories, as the historian Mae Ngai has explained in these pages. And yet under Trump, Ngai writes, even this flawed protection has been dissolved “for cynical ends.” No matter how deserving a migrant is under the law, they remain a target.

In his first term Trump launched an escalating assault on asylum. During the pandemic he started turning away asylum seekers at the border, citing public health reasons. On the campaign trail Biden vowed to bring back humanity to the southern border, but once he entered the White House he retained and even expanded this Trump-era ban. Human Rights First documented around 13,500 cases of murder, rape, and other violence against migrants who were blocked or turned back under this policy after Biden took office. Biden also, for the first time ever, put numerical limits on how many people could seek asylum at the southern border. These policies meant that “more people will die, or face persecution and abuse, after they are blocked from accessing safety,” Heidi Altman, the vice president of policy at the National Immigration Law Center, said in September 2024.

When Trump returned to office in 2025 he shut down the entry of all migrants—including asylum seekers—by declaring an “invasion” at the southern border. An appeals court recently blocked this measure, but this past week the Supreme Court issued a decision in a separate case allowing the administration to restrict asylum in other ways. Over the past year and a half, meanwhile, the Trump administration has developed a range of methods to weaponize a system already stacked against asylum seekers, cancelling many existing pathways and protections and rushing to deport people, including asylum seekers with pending cases. To an unprecedented degree, many have been sent to third countries with which they had no ties, from Panama to Ghana.

The Afghans caught up in this dragnet are not legally distinct from other types of asylum seekers: they have to demonstrate the same asylum paperwork, and they remain subject to the same border policies and shifts in courtroom due process. But because they come from a country in which the United States has directly waged war, the US government has a special obligation toward them. At the same time, it also scrutinizes them from a particular, racialized point of view that developed in the years after September 11. The US occupied Afghanistan for twenty years as one of the crucial arenas in its War on Terror, muddling on with its attempt at regime change and counterinsurgency. Faced with political instability at home, thousands of Afghans fled, many to the country that had sold itself as a haven of democracy and opportunity while it invaded and further destabilized theirs. Between 2000 and 2019 the Afghan immigrant population in the US almost tripled, from 45,000 to 132,000, according to the Migration Policy Institute. All this gives the current suspension of protections for Afghan asylum seekers an especially cruel tinge.

During Trump’s first-term crackdown Afghans flew somewhat “under the radar,” Azizzada told me in a recent interview; perhaps because they were seen as useful to the War on Terror, they weren’t a primary target. That started to change after Biden pulled US troops out of Afghanistan in 2021, quickly reversing any meager gains the US may have made during its longest war. As the Taliban regained control, the hastily planned evacuation efforts left Afghans who had worked with the US scrambling to get on planes leaving Kabul. Reports from the time showed Afghans clinging to a military aircraft’s landing gears as the plane taxied towards takeoff; at least seven people died in the process. For days people rushed at the perimeter of the airport—which was manned by US Marines—waving their IDs and pleading to board. “Eleven years, I worked with the CIA,” one man said in English to the PBS correspondent Jane Ferguson, showing his paperwork. “No one is letting me in.”

After facing criticism from advocates and Democrats in Congress, Biden announced a program that would allow vulnerable Afghans who had already undergone vetting to enter the US. They would have temporary permission to stay as they waited to be processed for special visas meant for those who helped US forces during the war—or for asylum, if they were eligible. A year later, the program was renamed and reoriented toward a longer-term approach, offering Afghans who had been evacuated to US bases in Qatar and elsewhere fast-track refugee resettlement and a chance to obtain special visas.

Since the withdrawal, meanwhile, advocates had been doubling down on getting Congress to pass legislation guaranteeing a permanent pathway to citizenship for Afghans allied with the US. In 2024 Senator Jerry Moran of Kansas, then the top Republican on the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee, joined Amy Klobuchar to introduce an amendment along these lines in a national security package after Republicans blocked a broader border legislation that included the provision. “After the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, veterans extended the creed ‘leave no man behind’ and helped their Afghan partners flee to the United States for safety,” Moran said in a statement at the time. “Unfortunately, many of our Afghan partners are still overseas, and those who made it to the US face uncertainty as to whether they will be granted permanent residency.”

Moran saw securing a place in the US for Afghan allies as a matter of national security. “It sends a message to our allies that we’re dependable and a message to our adversaries that we’re united,” he told the military newspaper Stars and Stripes. But hardline Republicans, notably Chuck Grassley and Tom Cotton in the Senate, have refused to back bills with a citizenship pathway for Afghans unless they include more vetting and higher-order asylum restrictions at the border, arguing that Biden’s evacuation efforts prioritized haste instead of security. As evidence, they have pointed to oversight reports finding that US authorities did not always have data to fully vet admitted Afghans. A 2022 report found that two of the parole program’s beneficiaries (out of tens of thousands) “may have posed a risk to national security.” A 2025 audit of the FBI’s role in the process found that fifty-five evacuees were on watchlists, but that the agency “effectively communicated and addressed any potential national security risks” overall. The federal government has emphasized that these people were among the most vetted immigrants, screened by counterterrorism departments and the FBI.

On the other hand, many advocates have noted that the government’s approach to Afghan resettlement was not just uniquely stringent but willfully sluggish, especially in contrast with the reception of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the Russian invasion around the same time. The few existing pathways sometimes closed for nebulous reasons, even after months of agonizing waiting, and even for those Afghan families who seemed to otherwise present a slam-dunk case. Moran and Klobuchar’s 2024 proposal was never included in the final national-security package, and subsequent legislative efforts to create new pathways to citizenship for Afghans have been similarly bogged down. Earlier this year, Politico reported that House Speaker Mike Johnson quietly stripped language that would continue relocation efforts for Afghans from the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act. Even in 2026, five years after the withdrawal, some evacuees were still waiting to be resettled at the Camp As-Sayliyah military base in Doha, Qatar. When the US launched its war in Iran, many of them were stranded as debris from Iran’s retaliatory fire rained down.

Advocates also note that translators and other Afghans who worked directly with the US government were not the only ones whose lives were touched by—and continue to be affected by—US policies at home and abroad. Both the ground evacuation efforts and Biden’s special admission programs prioritized people allied with US war efforts, at least on paper. Bipartisan legislative pushes in Congress like the Afghan Adjustment Act (which attempted to create a pathway to citizenship and formed the basis of Moran and Klobuchar’s failed amendment) and the Enduring Welcome Act (which sought to continue resettlement efforts) have also emphasized the US’s obligations to those who helped its service members—to “protect those who protected us, and preserve our nation’s credibility for future generations,” as Representative Mike Lawler, a Republican, said when introducing that second piece of legislation in August 2025.

This left many asylum seekers without recourse. “There were activists, or just people who have marginalized identities, or ordinary Afghans who were impacted—as everyone was—by US foreign policy,” said Laila Ayub of Project ANAR (Afghan Network for Advocacy and Resources), which started in 2021 to provide legal support to Afghans. “We really view everyone as equally deserving of protection.” Those who were not immediately evacuated on US flights and who couldn’t risk waiting in Afghanistan for the monthslong refugee resettlement process fled to Pakistan or Iran—but they faced long delays there, during which they remained vulnerable to deportations. Many Afghans who were not eligible for special pathways to the US or who hit bureaucratic snags in these or other third countries eventually tried to make it to the US southern border and request asylum. When Trump retook office those waiting abroad saw their cases grind to a halt, and those who did make it found themselves caught in a political storm of their own.

After arriving in New York, Monsef and his family spent a few months at the Roosevelt Hotel in Manhattan, where thousands of new migrants from around the world were being housed. (Starting last spring the Trump administration targeted this shelter in particular, describing the hotel as a base for Salvadoran gang operations and announcing that it would pull millions in emergency management funding that allowed the city to use the building as temporary housing for the new arrivals.) After Roosevelt, Monsef’s family lived for a year and a half at another hotel shelter that was smaller, less crowded, and, in Monsef’s view, more hospitable.

But the shelter system still denied them a sense of agency and stability. They couldn’t cook their own food or even make their own tea; the government meals were bland and unappetizing; it wasn’t clear if the meat was halal. Only when Monsef got approved by a New York state initiative supporting the resettlement of migrants outside the city and moved to a single-family home, he told me, did he feel he had taken the “first step of starting my life in the US.”

In the suburbs Monsef had a backyard where his younger kids could play. The neighbors were friendly, and the family could finally buy groceries and cook their own meals. After an initial struggle, Monsef found a job suited to his training as an engineer; his wife also got part-time employment in food service. His oldest daughter, whose schooling was interrupted by their journey out of Afghanistan, graduated high school but couldn’t find a way into the elite colleges to which she had aspired. She started at community college. The second-oldest, who commuted every day to high school in the city, got into Georgetown.

And yet the family’s future remained unsettled. Throughout 2025 the Trump administration shut down legal pathways to the US and intensified restrictions on Afghan and other migrants. On January 20 Trump suspended the refugee program, pulling over a thousand Afghans already cleared to travel to the US off of flights. Then, in February, Trump’s Department of Homeland Security started terminating Temporary Protected Status and similar safeguards, which are given to people from countries that have suffered natural disasters or conflict, starting with Venezuela and Haiti. In May it terminated TPS for Afghanistan. (The administration has since also announced the end of TPS and a similar program known as Deferred Enforced Departure for people from several other countries, including South Sudan, Honduras, Palestine, and Yemen.)

Monsef’s TPS expired in May 2025, making him more vulnerable to deportation. His family had also applied for asylum, and they could legally stay and work in the country as long as their application was pending. But the process was drawn-out: Monsef’s first court appearance was scheduled for 2028 until his lawyer got it moved up to March of this year.

More restrictions on Afghan migrants followed, with particularly dire consequences for those who still had close family outside the US. In the summer, the president announced travel restrictions for twelve countries, including Afghanistan (although still with narrow exceptions for special visas meant to bring in allied Afghans). Soon after, the State Department started denying final travel documents for family members of Afghan asylees already in the US whose own “derivative” asylum cases had been remotely approved. The International Refugee Assistance Project sued, arguing that the travel ban did not apply to this subset of Afghans, and secured a temporary block. Recently a judge rejected the government’s request to throw out the case.

“These were lawful pathways that were already set up, and what we see time and time again is the Trump administration cutting them off,” Pedro Sepulveda of IRAP told me in an interview. As the case winds its way through an already circuitous legal process—made even more so by repeated government shutdowns in the US—the plaintiffs continue to suffer. Some remain in Afghanistan, fearing for their lives from the Taliban, while a regional conflict with Pakistan escalates. “At the core of this, it’s really about family reunification,” Sepulveda says. “We see a complete abandonment of Afghans, entirely.”

In September, as federal agents were conducting targeted raids around the state, Azizzada could claim a small victory: the government notified some families that their asylum cases had been approved. Among them was Nabila Mirjan, a thirty-year-old single mother I had met at the same 2025 mosque event where I first crossed paths with Monsef. A survivor of gender-based violence who had worked in Afghanistan at organizations for women’s rights, Mirjan spent a year in Iran with her family after fleeing the Taliban before traveling to Brazil and then—with her young son, adult brother, and sister—to the US border. (Three of her brothers and her elderly parents stayed behind in Brazil.) Upon entering the country in San Ysidro her brother was detained for seventy-five days, at which point he was released and told to attend his asylum court hearings and scheduled ICE check-ins. When we met, Mirjan was living at the Roosevelt Hotel with her six-year-old son and her sister, wondering where they would go once the city phased out its migrant shelters, as it had announced it would.

By the time I saw her again at the church iftar event in 2026, she had become a more confident English speaker. She now has a part-time job, and her son is getting used to life in the city, although he still has separation anxiety and cries from time to time because he misses his grandparents and uncles. She too is getting used to the US, but only after adjusting her expectations. When she first decided to come to America, she thought “all my dreams will turn to reality,” she told me. “When I came here, I saw that that is not true. It’s not easy.”

Last November the footing of Afghan asylum seekers already in the US got even more precarious. That month an Afghan man who had worked alongside the C.I.A. and previously been granted asylum in the US fatally shot a National Guard member in Washington, D.C., and injured another. When Monsef heard the news, he called his daughter at Georgetown and told her not to go out in case there was retaliatory violence against Afghans.

News reports suggested that the shooter was struggling with mental illness, but the Trump administration used the killing as a pretense both to impose a spate of new measures against Afghans and to initiate a crackdown for which the foundation had already been laid. Just days before the shooting, the administration had announced that it would be reviewing refugee cases already approved under Biden. Now, however, the Homeland Security agency that considers asylum applications announced that it was halting processing for all the asylum applications in its pipeline. It also suspended green-card and other immigration cases for countries subject to Trump’s travel ban, which had been announced in June 2025 and later expanded. When we spoke in March, the IRAP attorney Laurie Ball Cooper said that this “use of the travel ban domestically” was “unprecedented.” In essence, she continued, it was a “racist deployment of nationality as a restriction on immigration,” a tactic with its source in “the earliest roots of US immigration law.”

In New York City, ICE started calling Afghans waiting for their court dates and demanding they show up for non-routine check-ins, then arresting single men who arrived for their appointments. Among the first cases Azizzada got wind of in the area was that of Mirjan’s twenty-year-old brother, who was taken into custody at a check-in at 26 Federal Plaza on December 2. That evening Mirjan called Azizzada crying. Her brother’s first detention had been hard enough: by the time they reunited that time, she remembers, he had lost his appetite and developed a restless gait.

Two weeks later, with the help of a lawyer that Azizzada’s team helped find, her brother was released again. The family huddled together on a video conference with their siblings and parents in Brazil. “Some of us were crying with joy,” Mirjan told me over Whatsapp, translating her thoughts through an AI app. “My brother couldn’t speak.”

One of the next major threats to recent Afghan arrivals emerged not in New York but in Minnesota. In January 2026, as federal agents descended on the state, lawyers started noticing a disturbing trend: refugees who had already been approved but had not yet received their green cards were being detained. Again IRAP sued on behalf of plaintiffs—including some Afghans—who reported being swept up by masked agents, handcuffed, and aggressively shoved into unmarked vehicles. They were shuffled from building to building without being able to make a call, then put on a plane in shackles and taken out of the state. Some were released days later, on strange streets, far from home.

In February the judge responded to IRAP’s lawsuit by ordering a temporary pause to this practice. Government court filings in the proceedings revealed that the administration had claimed the authority to detain any refugee who was already approved but had not yet applied for their green card or attended the required interviews within a year of arriving in the country. They were clearly planning, civil rights lawyers understood, to take the Minnesota pilot nationwide—so IRAP and other organizations sued again and got a Massachusetts district court to order a stay. “Wide-scale roundup and detention of refugees for the sole reason that they have not yet received their green card? We have not in forty-six years of refugee resettlement seen anything of that kind,” Ball Cooper, who is on the team litigating these two lawsuits, told me.

Trump’s visa adjudication agency lifted its general pause on asylum processing in March. But a hold remained in place on any pending applications from Afghans and others who are on the list of expanded travel-ban countries. “Certainly in terms of policy, we’ve really seen a layering of one restriction on top of the other,” Julia Gelatt, associate director of the US immigration policy program at the Migration Policy Institute, told me in March. “Almost no Afghan can get almost any kind of status right now, either to come to the United States from abroad, or to renew their status in the United States, or to obtain a more secure status.”

The cumulative effect of these policies has been a kind of paralysis. People in the Afghan community worry about which events are safe to attend and whether they can go to the market. Many struggle to manage the anxiety of going about their daily lives. When Monsef leaves home for his office every day, he told me when we spoke in early March, he wonders whether he will return that evening, “or maybe I will go back to some detention center.”

In the past several months, court battles have yielded interim victories. On June 5 a court ruled in a separate case that the federal government’s pause on immigration applications, including from travel-ban countries, was unlawful. The development should, at least for now, mean that Monsef’s family and Mirjan’s siblings might finally see their cases start moving. The government will almost certainly appeal, but because the First Circuit may not side with the administration, the fate of these applications may ultimately fall in the hands of the Supreme Court.

In the meantime, amid the continuing uncertainty and anti-immigrant rhetoric in the US—as well as the eruptions of conflict around the world—small gestures of local communal support and solidarity take on even greater weight. The iftar where I caught up with Monsef and Mirjan this past March took place at St. Ann & The Holy Trinity Episcopal Church in Brooklyn Heights, an institution that was hosting this dinner for Afghan immigrants for the fourth year in a row. When I talked to Mirjan there, she told me that even with a document in hand that says they can stay in the country, she feels unsafe: she knows that paperwork hasn’t protected other refugees or asylum seekers from being detained in recent months. She worries even more for her two siblings whose asylum cases remain pending. In the last year or so, she said, she hasn’t had a “single night of decent sleep.”

As we were talking, the volunteers asked for the crowd’s attention, and Monsef got up to make a few remarks. “Events like this,” he read off his phone in English, “remind us that regardless of which religion we practice, we share common values of compassion, kindness and generosity.” On one end of the room sat large aluminum trays of Kabuli pulao, homemade okra, lentils, sabzi, kebabs, and at least two preparations of chicken; volunteers had used the church’s tremendous gothic sanctuary to lay out boxes and tote bags full of kitchen utensils, prayer mats, clothes, hygiene products, and children’s toys. The church is known for candlelit concerts of Bach and Debussy, among other composers, but earlier that evening the first thing I had heard when I ducked out of the rain and into the parish hall was the sound of three young Afghan boys sitting at a grand piano, smashing away cheerfully at the keys.

Tanvi Misra is a writer and investigative journalist who covers immigration and justice issues. 

The Unraveling of Afghan Asylum
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After the Schools Closed: For some Afghan girls, learning happens on the airwaves

One of the first things the Taliban did after returning to power in August 2021 was to ban girls from going to school beyond grade six. Nearly five years later, the ban remains in place. For many, the classroom they had sat in only days before was suddenly out of reach. In this instalment of The Daily Hustle, Freshta, a girl from Ghazni who was about to finish grade nine when the Taliban closed girls’ secondary schools, tells Rohullah Soroush how she refused to let her education come to an end. Unable to afford private tuition or reliable internet, she found an unexpected classroom on the radio. Through educational broadcasts, determination and the support of her family, she has continued to study, even without exams or certificates, while preparing for the day she hopes girls will once again be allowed back into school.

The last time I sat in a real classroom, with a teacher standing by the blackboard and my classmates sitting all around me, I was about to finish grade nine. Then the Taliban came back and the classroom door closed on me.[1] At first, they said it would only be temporary and that girls’ schools would reopen soon, but weeks turned into months, months into years and schools are still closed for girls like me.

Where my story begins

My name is Freshta and I’m 20 years old. I was born in Malestan district of Ghazni province, but my family has lived in Ghazni city since I was seven. My parents thought the provincial capital would give us better access to school and other services than our village could offer. I still live here with my parents and younger sisters and brothers. And it’s also where I started going to school.

We’re not a rich family. We have some land in Malestan, which my father used to farm, growing wheat and potatoes. After we moved to the city, he went back and forth to the village, working the land. The harvest paid for our expenses and he brought some home for the family. My mother used the wheat to make bread and we had potatoes to eat all year. But several years of drought have taken their toll and there is not enough water for my father to keep farming. So he had to take a job in the city and later he opened a small grocery shop in our neighbourhood. My brothers are still in school and too young to work, so my father is the only breadwinner in the family. Because of the wars during their own childhoods, neither of my parents had the chance to go to school. That is why it’s so important for them that all of us children to be educated.

The day classrooms fell silent 

I had just turned 15 and was about to finish grade nine when the Taliban returned to power. Almost immediately, they began putting restrictions on women and girls. One of the first things they did was stop girls going to school beyond grade six. From one day to the next, I could no longer go to school, and everything changed.

I remember the feeling that settled over our house in those early weeks. It was heavy and quiet in a way that is hard to describe. Everyone in the family was worried about the future. But for me, the main concern was that girls’ schools were closed. Every day, I asked my parents whether there was any news about schools reopening.

Here in Afghanistan, Nawruz is not only the start of the new year; it’s also the start of the school year. That year [March 2022], Nawruz didn’t feel the same. There were no celebrations, just waiting to see if girls would be allowed to go to school. We weren’t, and every year since then, Nawruz keeps coming and going without girls’ schools opening their doors.

When one door closes 

My parents looked to see if there was another way for me to keep learning. We knew there were online courses, but they weren’t an option for us. We couldn’t afford the cost of an internet connection. Even if we could, internet service in Ghazni is unreliable. Sometimes it’s so slow that pages won’t load and sometimes it stops working altogether. Trying to follow online lessons is almost impossible because they keep cutting out. So internet courses were out of the question for me.

I also knew that some teachers were secretly holding classes. I talked it over with my parents and with one of my former classmates. We worked out how many teachers we’d need to cover subjects like maths, science, Dari, history and English, but when we added up the cost, we realised there was no way we could afford it. And money wasn’t the only problem. If a teacher came to our house, or if we went to theirs, the neighbours would notice. In Afghanistan, people talk, and gossip spreads quickly. When you’re a girl, the gossip can follow you and it doesn’t have to be true to damage your reputation or your family’s standing in the community.

Finding hope on the airwaves

Then, one day, that same classmate told me she’d found some radio stations that air educational programmes. “We don’t need a classroom or a computer,” she said, “we can just listen to the radio. It’s a different way of learning.” Her words stayed with me and I started looking into what I could learn on the radio.

It seemed easy enough, but not all radio stations have a strong enough signal to reach Ghazni. In the end, I found only two that I could tune into consistently: the BBC’s Dars )Lesson(, a programme which teaches English, and Radio Arman FM, which airs lessons in other subjects. Now, I study English, science and other school subjects on the radio. For maths, physics and chemistry, I listen carefully and follow the lessons using the official school textbooks that my father buys for me.

I learn a lot from the programmes, but it’s not the same as being in a classroom. Nothing can replace having a teacher in front of you and classmates learning beside you.

I also follow a weekly psychology programme on Radio Arman FM. It’s not a school subject, but it helps me understand people and also manage my own anxieties – the ones that come when you don’t know what the future holds.

The way I learn from the BBC’s Dars programme, which airs on Saturdays, is different. There are no textbooks or handouts to go with it. I have to take extra care to make sure my notes are accurate. I listen carefully and write as quickly as I can because I don’t want to miss anything.

I’ve heard that some radio stations offer exams at the end of their courses, but none of the programmes I follow do, at least not in Ghazni. I’ve never heard the BBC’s Dars programme mention any exams. Anyway, I’m not sure it’s even possible to organise exams for girls learning through the radio. So I study without any certificate or official proof of what I’ve learned. I take notes. I review them. I keep going.

Making every second count

One challenge is that the programmes are broadcast at fixed times, but life at home doesn’t always follow a strict timetable. We often have guests visiting us from the village, people who come to the city to see doctors or for other business. As the eldest daughter, I have to help my mother with cooking, cleaning and other chores around the house. When guests arrive, everything else has to wait.

Fortunately, most of the programmes air again later in the week. That makes a huge difference because I don’t have to worry about missing a lesson, I can listen late at night or early in the morning when the house is quiet. I also record the lessons so I can listen again and check my notes to make sure I haven’t missed anything.

A father’s greatest gift 

For a while, things were going well. I listened to the education programmes on my phone. It was just a simple phone with an FM radio and I had to plug in my earphones to get a signal. For the first time since the schools closed, I felt as though I was moving forward again. Then one day, my phone broke. The screen went black. Just like that, the door to learning seemed to close on me once more.

I knew my father couldn’t afford to buy me another phone, so I didn’t even ask, but after a few days, he realised something was wrong.

“What’s going on?” he asked. “Why are you so upset?”

I told him my phone had broken and that I could no longer listen to my lessons. He didn’t say anything. He just reached into his pocket, took out his phone – his only phone, the one he uses every day to keep in touch with relatives, friends and the suppliers for his shop – and handed it to me.

“Here, use mine,” he said.

Waiting for the doors to reopen

Now my father and I share his phone and I’m back on track learning again. Every day I tune in, take notes and keep studying.

I don’t know when the Taliban will let girls back into school and going to university feels like a distant dream. Radio lessons have kept me learning and I’m very grateful for them, but I keep waiting for the day when schools reopen for girls. The radio can never replace the excitement of a real classroom – the sound of a teacher’s voice explaining a lesson, the questions from other students or the sound of chalk on a blackboard. These are the things I miss most.

For now, I keep my mind active. I read geography and history books, revise my school subjects and go over my notes again and again. I want to be ready for when girls are finally allowed back into school. I want to sit the exams for grades 10, 11 and 12. After that, I want to go to university. That is the future I am preparing for.

The classroom door may be closed to me today, but I will keep learning until the day it opens again.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour 

References

References
1 The Taliban announced the reopening of secondary schools on 17 September 2021, but only for boys and male teachers, effectively excluding girls from secondary education (Reuters). The ban was reaffirmed by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on 23 March 2022, when girls who had returned to school expecting classes to resume were sent home hours after schools reopened (ReutersAmnesty International).

 

After the Schools Closed: For some Afghan girls, learning happens on the airwaves
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The Guardian view on EU talks with the Taliban: selling out the rights of girls, women and other Afghans

25 Jun 2026 

Days after Kabul fell to the Taliban in August 2021, the EU’s top diplomat stressed the need to protect women and girls. “Cooperation with any future Afghan government will be conditioned on … respect for the fundamental rights of all Afghans,” Josep Borrell pledged. The regime’s attack on women’s rights began immediately, and has only intensified. The Taliban have barred girls from secondary school and university, legalised child marriage, prevented women from travelling without a male guardian and excluded them from jobs, parks and bathhouses. Women have been literally silenced: their voices are forbidden from being heard in public, even from within their own homes.

A new criminal code introduced last year permits men to beat their wives; even if women are able to prove the use of “obscene force”, a husband may still be sentenced to only 15 days in prison. (In contrast, harming an animal could mean five months in jail.) And restrictions on work, movement and contacts are not merely oppressive. They are often deadly in a country gripped by a humanitarian crisis. UN experts have said that this “widespread, systematic and all-encompassing” assault on women’s rights may amount to “gender apartheid”.

Yet the EU this week hosted Taliban representatives in Brussels for the first time since they returned to power. Officials said that it did not amount to recognition. But it risks “normalisation and implicit legitimisation”, as more than 80 Afghan and other human rights organisations wrote in a joint letter. Zakir Jalaly, a senior Taliban foreign ministry official, described the visit as “an important milestone in relations”.

European Commission spokesman said that the meeting focused on returning irregular migrants “who have committed serious crimes or pose a security threat”. But Euronews reported that the invitation to the Taliban mentioned only the return of “Afghan nationals with no right to stay in the EU”.

European governments are ramping up deportation efforts in response to domestic political pressures. Last week, the European parliament backed plans to expedite removals of undocumented migrants. Measures could pave the way for ICE-style enforcement and would allow people to be detained for up to two years or sent to offshore centres. As the UN human rights chief, Volker Türk, pointed out when criticising the plans, international law prohibits returning individuals to a place where they would be at risk of serious human rights violations or other irreparable harm.

Internationally, more than 1.5 million Afghans were deported from Iran last year alone, and Pakistan has forcibly returned large numbers. Forced returnees reported threats, arbitrary detention and torture in interviews with UN officials last year.

European concerns about how Taliban rule would affect migration rates, not just Afghan lives, were voiced from the first. But even as the rights and humanitarian crises have deepened, anti-migration sentiment has come to dominate. Afghans, and especially women, are now fighting both Taliban persecution and international indifference. Governments that profess to care for them should be pushing for gender apartheid to be recognised as a crime under international law, funding essential relief efforts in Afghanistan and supporting those who have fled to create safe new lives where they can – not working with the Taliban to send more back, potentially to their deaths.

The Guardian view on EU talks with the Taliban: selling out the rights of girls, women and other Afghans
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Afghan Students in Pakistan: Lost dreams or a life in the shadows?  

Afghans studying in Pakistan had hoped they might avoid the collective expulsions that, since 2023, have upended life for over two million Afghans living there. However, as the scope of deportations has widened, students have found themselves unable to get study visas. Some have already been detained by Pakistani police and deported. Others have managed, for the time being, to evade the authorities or bribe their way out of danger, but live in fear of arrest and deportation. For female students, shut out of universities in their homeland, Pakistan has been an educational lifeline, and the threat of expulsion is catastrophic. To better understand the situation, Rama Mirzada heard from six students who have been deported or are living in fear of deportation.

The alert circulated to try and help three Afghan students detained in May. The three were subsequently deported. Source: Facebook

On 5 May 2026, Afghan students in Pakistan shared an alert calling for the release of three students who were enrolled at the University of Lahore and had been arrested in Islamabad. The call went unheeded: later that month, the three were deported to Afghanistan. They are not alone. Many Afghan students in Pakistan have faced the same fate – or fear it. Although the exact number of Afghan students in Pakistan is unknown, every year, a thousand Afghans are awarded scholarships by the Pakistan government and thousands more go to Pakistan as self-funders, while others are already living in Pakistan. Students on scholarships eventually got their visas, after several months of anxious waiting. It is those who fund themselves who have not been granted visas. They include Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, many of whom were born in the country and have lived nowhere else.

Pakistan has hosted Afghan refugees for decades, and there have also been mass expulsions before, most notably in 2016, when over half a million people were expelled amid an earlier security impasse between the two countries (AAN). However, the current campaign has been far more intense. Relations deteriorated between the neighbouring countries after the Taliban regained power in 2021, as Islamabad accused the group it had supported during the insurgency of supporting Pakistani anti-government armed groups, notably Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP has escalated attacks in Pakistan since 2021 and Islamabad accuses the Emirate of providing it with a safe haven. The Emirate denies these accusations and has, in turn, accused Pakistan of violating Afghan sovereignty, particularly, since autumn 2025, when Pakistan launched airstrikes across the border (AAN).

The mass returns of Afghans began after September 2023, when Pakistan launched its Illegal Foreigners’ Repatriation Plan. More than two million Afghans returned or have been deported from Pakistan since then, according to the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR, since then (data from October 2023 to 4 April 2026). The returns have continued despite warnings from UN officials and human rights organisations that collective expulsions are unlawful when, they say, Afghanistan cannot cope with an existing humanitarian crisis, and certain groups are at particular risk, for example girls unable to get an education beyond grade 6.[1]

In the first phase, the Pakistani authorities targeted undocumented Afghans, followed by those with Afghan Citizen Cards (ACC), which are a form of temporary residence permit. In the third phase, Afghans who were officially recognised as refugees and had a Proof of Registration (PoR) card, some 1.4 million people, were told that their cards would not be renewed after 30 June 2025 and that they too would be deported (Dawn).

The problems for Afghan students began in summer 2025 as they tried to secure visas for the new academic year, which begins in September. They included new students, as well as those who were already enrolled (Hasht-e Subh and Displaced International). Without visas, students midway through a course could not return to Pakistan, or if they were already there, have had to live with the risk of arrest and deportation. A representative of the Afghan Students Union in Pakistan, Anayat Ullah Momand, said that although the government of Pakistan “had not shared any official announcement,” for self-funded Afghan students, “they have stopped the visa process.”

This report is based on interviews with six Afghan students studying in different parts of Pakistan – Islamabad, Lahore and Balochistan province – as well as the representative of Afghan Students Union. Two of the interviewees were on partially funded scholarships and four were entirely self-financed. The students were enrolled in bachelor’s or master’s degree courses in a range of academic fields, including medicine, business administration, international relations, economics and cybersecurity. At the time the interviews were conducted (22-26 April 2026), two had already been deported to Afghanistan. The students’ names have been changed for their protection.

Pursuing education in Pakistan after 2021

Pakistan has been an important educational hub for Afghan students for decades. Earlier generations of Afghans who studied in Pakistan have gone on to work in senior positions inside Afghanistan, in government institutions, the health sector, NGOs and private companies. In particular, thousands of Afghan students have benefited from the Allama Iqbal scholarship for Afghan Students programme, which has run since 2009 (Tribune). Its most recent phase was launched in 2024, for 4,500 students over five years, and covers the costs of graduate and post-graduate students, including tuition fees, living expenses and a book allowance (Higher Education Commission of Pakistan). These students have been able to study at all levels at a wide range of universities in various fields, including medicine, engineering, agriculture, management, political science and computer science. Self-financed Afghan students, on the other hand, bear every expense themselves, including visa costs. Although pursuing higher education in Pakistan has not been without its challenges, it remained a valuable opportunity until tensions between the two countries escalated and Pakistan’s policy toward Afghans began to change. Until 2025, there were few restrictions imposed on Afghans getting study visas.

The hassle of getting a visa 

At the time of the interviews, none of the six had got a study visa and two of the six had already been deported to Afghanistan – one was in the last year of his master’s degree, the other in the third semester of her bachelor’s degree.

The experience of Somaya, who had been studying international relations in Pakistan since 2024, is typical. She had applied for a visa extension in January. It wasn’t given and four days after her visa ran out, on 8 March (ironically, International Women’s Day), she was deported. “As a result,” she told AAN, “I missed my exams. There might have been an option to request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to help facilitate a visa, but the university staff refused to help.”

With so many Afghans desperate to get visas, middlemen have sprung up offering to help, often for hefty fees. Back in Afghanistan, Somaya has lost money twice in an attempt to get a visa so that she could return to Pakistan and sit her exams.

I contacted several individuals to help obtain a visa for me, but most told me it was impossible. Some promised to arrange a visa in exchange for money. In March 2026, one individual took 30,000 PKR [USD 107] from me and disappeared. Then another took 55,000 PKR [USD 197] and provided me with a visa that was fake. Both individuals took my money and vanished, but I couldn’t do anything because I was in Afghanistan and they were in Pakistan. 

Another student, Burhan, had completed a bachelor’s degree in Pakistan after four years of study, in 2025, and was hoping to do a masters, but ran into visa problems:

The study visas were for one year only and mostly ran out during the autumn so we had to re-apply for an extension one or two months before the expiry date. Normally, it took two months or less to get our visas. In June 2025, right after my graduation, my visa expired. I’d applied to extend it two months before it expired and prepared all the documentation. Since I was hopeful I’d get my visa extension, as I had in previous years, I came back to Afghanistan for the summer holidays. I waited for around four months, but didn’t get a visa.

Burhan realised he had to abandon his plans for post-graduate study and cancelled his application for a student visa. In the end, he only got a ‘visit visa’ just to return to get his graduation certificate. For that, the system worked efficiently. “I paid USD 1,000,” he said, “and got the visit visa within 72 hours.”

Abdullah was a postgraduate student, who has been studying in Pakistan since 2019. Every year, he’d applied for a study visa before it expired. 2025 was no different. “I applied one-and-a-half months before the expiry date, but never got the visa. I stayed on in Pakistan without a visa for six months, until March this year.” This is when Abdullah was deported to Afghanistan, more on which below.

Nasrin had been looking forward to starting her studies in Pakistan in October 2025 but her application for a visa was rejected. Fearing she’d miss her classes, she applied for a medical visa, a common workaround for thwarted students. It cost her USD 290. She came to Pakistan in November 2025, began her studies and restarted an application for a study visa:

I got a bona fide letter from my university, which meant I could apply for the study visa, but the letter also needed a stamp from the Ministry of Interior. … The Afghan students’ representative told me the ministry charges each student 10,000 PKR (USD 36) to stamp the letter, though if the number of requests for students’ letters is high, then the middleman (kamishan kar) at the ministry charges less. [But it could be more.] Some students have had to pay 25,000 to 30,000 PKR [USD 89-107] to get the stamp.

As Nasrin explained, being in Pakistan does not make it easier to complete the process, particularly for those with expired visas, given the fear of deportation that looms over Afghans there:

We can’t travel to stamp the letters ourselves because we don’t have a visa and the police might arrest and deport us. There were some students who went to the ministry in person and were deported to Afghanistan. So, there’s a person at the university who collects [the letters] from the students and [gives them to] a person at the ministry, who is also given the money from us [for the stamp].

Many Afghans caught up in the recent wave of deportations were born in Pakistan and have never lived in Afghanistan. Although Pakistan’s Citizenship Act of 1951 generally grants citizenship through birth or descent, Afghans are routinely denied this right. Hadya is one such Afghan. She was born, went to school and started university in Pakistan. She has a Proof of Registration (PoR) card, proof that she is a refugee – although the cards were not renewed after 30 June 2025: “I never even had a visa,” she explained. “I didn’t apply for one because the high court in this province announced that Afghan students could study on their PoR cards, so I can keep studying, even though my family’s PoR cards are expired.” Her status is tenuous. Even if she is able to finish her studies, her right to remain will then evaporate, as it already has for her parents. Until she can graduate, she worries for her family: “It’s a tough time for my family members in Pakistan. When they go out of the house, it’s with the fear of arrest or deportation.”

Managing everyday life without a visa

Some Afghan students stay in Pakistan to continue their studies while they keep trying to renew their visa or try to keep studying without documentation. This makes daily life difficult. They live in fear of being stopped and questioned by the police. The Pakistan authorities can deactivate students’ SIM cards, and restrict access to bank accounts and hospitals by insisting that a person’s ID and visa status are checked. The combined impact of these practical restrictions, combined with the risk of arrest, makes it difficult for students to step out of university grounds.

Khaled was due to start his last year of university in 2025 when, in Afghanistan for the holidays, he ran into problems renewing his visa. So, he and his friends returned to Pakistan illegally. “We waited for our visas for an extra month,” he said, “but since we still hadn’t got them, we decided we had no choice but to travel to Pakistan, via Spin Boldak, without a visa. For each of us, we paid 65,000 PKR [USD 233] to cross the border.” They did manage to get into Pakistan, but continuing their studies has not been easy, said Khaled, and they have had to deploy various ‘workarounds’ in the hope of avoiding arrest.

I’ve got bank accounts and SIM cards from Pakistani friends. Sometimes, we manage to go out by using a road where there is no checkpoint. But even if we get round the checkpoints, we’re on edge because of the fear of arrest. Some hospitals also ask for a visa, so we try to get basic treatments from the clinic inside the university. Every weekend, me and my friends plan to go out, but we never do because of the fear of deportation. Most of the time, we order food and clothes online.

Nasrin said she had, sometimes, to go without food during Ramadan because she didn’t want to take the risk of going shopping.

There were times when I had nothing to eat in my room and couldn’t go out because the police had a checkpoint in front of my dormitory. When I was on my period, I couldn’t go out to purchase my needs. I faced so many challenges getting to Pakistan for my education, I didn’t want to waste this opportunity and so I’m very cautious. … My primary need is food. Although the food inside the dormitory is quite expensive and not good quality compared to outside, I choose to buy it here to avoid being arrested. 

Still, she said, she lives in fear of the police.

Some people say: The police won’t disturb Afghan women, but I can’t trust them. Even if they don’t deport me, they’d ask me to give them money. Often the police release Afghan students after getting money from them. 

Nasrin says that many Pakistanis seem to blame Afghans for Pakistan’s weak economy and insecurity. Because of this, she began to conceal her identity: “I try to hide that I’m Afghan, I tell people that we’re Iranian. Other than my university classmates, nobody knows that I’m from Afghanistan because I fear being detained and deported.”

Hadya also said she’s struggling on many fronts, including accessing good healthcare:

It’s difficult to manage everyday life here. … It’s impossible for us to visit the public hospital because they ask for documents, although the private hospitals don’t require it. We can’t travel from one city to another because the police will deport us. Since mid-2025, our lives have become so difficult in Pakistan.

Burhan said that he and his friends stopped going out when he was in Pakistan in order to avoid the police. “We’re like prisoners.” He relied on friends who had visas to get him things like a SIM card. He said he and his friends had to pay bribes to the police many times to avoid being arrested, including the last time he arrived in Pakistan, in November 2025.

Right after I came out of the airport, the police stopped me at a checkpoint and asked to see my police registration stamp, which would have been impossible for a passenger to get right at the airport. They made me wait for two hours and threatened me, saying they would take me to Hajji Camp and deport me. Finally, they took 8,000 PKR [USD 28] and let me g. 

He and his friends now move around using side roads, or, he said, “go out with Pakistani friends to prevent being arrested or stopped by the police.” However, a week after his brush with the police at the airport, he and his Afghan friends were picked up by the police as they got out of a taxi on their way to get food. Although he had a visit visa and a police registration stamp and his friends had student visas, the police detained them:

The police put us into their vehicle and started abusing the Afghans among us, saying we’re all terrorists. They took us at nine at night and put us in the truck bed of their vehicle, then carried on patrolling the area. We remained in their car until three in the morning. The police were deliberately driving in a way that would hurt us in the truck bed, and forced us to pay them. Finally, one of them opened the conversation and asked each of us to pay them 50,000 PKR [USD 179] and they’d release us. But the head of our union found our location, intervened and got us freed us after we paid them 15,000 PKR [USD 53]. 

Abdullah was initially able to stay under the radar for a while in Pakistan because he was good at languages and had some connections in the police and Pakistani friends.

My visa expired in September 2025, but I stayed on in Pakistan without a visa for six months, until March 2026. Since my Urdu and English are good, whenever the police were speaking to me at checkpoints, they didn’t realise I was an Afghan. Some of the Pakistani police were also our friends because they’d graduated from the university where I’m studying. Also, because Afghan students can’t set up a bank account at Pakistani banks, I was getting SIM cards and a bank account from my Pakistani friends.

However, as will be seen, his luck eventually ran out.

Students deported

For many students, there is a limit to how long they can avoid (or bribe) the police. For Abdullah, the blow came when his friends were preparing for a graduation ceremony.

In March, nine of us students went out to have dinner. Afterwards, we went to a barbers because the next day there was a graduation ceremony at the Embassy of Afghanistan for Afghan students. The police arrested five of us. After bringing us to the police station, they initially agreed to release us in exchange for 70,000 PKR [USD 251] from each person, but then one of the police officials said: No. They transferred us to Hajji Camp [in Islamabad] and we spent a day there. The next day they transferred us to the border and deported us to Afghanistan via Torkham. All my belongings are still in Pakistan. My friends even brought my belongings to the camp, but the police didn’t allow me to take them. 

Somaya told AAN she was arrested just four days after her visa expired, in March 2026. Her parents were visiting Pakistan so that her mother could get surgery and she had gone to meet them.

After I was arrested, they took me to Hajji Camp. I tried to contact my parents so they wouldn’t worry, but the police seized my phone. I remained there for two days during Ramadan. We didn’t have the right to call our families nor leave the room. 

She described harsh conditions at the camp.

There were almost 60 people in one room. The windows were completely closed and the rest rooms were really dirty. It was Ramadan and they didn’t feed the children. For iftari [the evening meal when the Ramadan fast is broken], they were giving us only a few spoons of white rice in a plastic bag. They were throwing the food to us as if they were feeding animals. It was cruel. 

Because Somaya was alone and could not contact her family, they feared the worst.[2] Her mother tried to find her:

My mother followed the deportation route and came to Chaman after me. She stayed in Chaman for three days and waited for my deportation. After we returned to Afghanistan, my mother was hospitalised as she was already sick and spending the time in Chaman was not good for her health. 

Female students in Pakistan

Because of the Emirate’s ban on women going to university, those who had the financial means and family support began seeking alternative ways to continue their education, ranging from enrolling in online universities to traveling abroad to study. Despite an initial wave of support from many countries, refugee and migrant policy has hardened in Europe and North America. That includes putting restrictions on study visas or even, in the UK, stopping them completely for Afghans (AAN). Until 2025, Pakistan had been one of the few places where Afghan women could pursue higher education. For Somaya, being deported was the final blow in her efforts to complete her studies.

Before the ban on education by the Taliban, I was in the third semester of midwifery training. I then travelled to Pakistan to continue my education despite family and economic problems. Again and again, I’ve been blocked in the middle of my educational journey. The effect on me has been terrible.

Studying in Pakistan had set her family back hundreds of dollars for visas and university fees, but had felt worth the effort:

I was just about surviving with the living expenses, for example, the dorm fee was only 25,000 PKR [USD 89] for the Pakistani students, but for us, it was 95,000 PKR [USD 341]. It was really difficult for me to manage because the economic situation in Afghanistan is bad and it was hard for my family to support me. But I was happy to get the opportunity to study in Pakistan because I was denied this right in my own country.

When she was deported, she even lost the valuables that she had kept in her room. Being deported, she said, has left her feeling hopeless: “All my efforts to get an education have been wiped out. I’ve lost my education. I don’t know whether I will ever be able to continue it.”

Nasrin said the fear of deportation is affecting her academic performance: “All the problems mean we cannot go out of the university. It’s worst during exams when I should be relaxed and able to focus on my studies instead of facing all these difficulties.”

Hadya, the student who studies on her PoR card, said that if her family is deported, they will not allow her to stay on in Pakistan without them, so she’ll be forced to leave too: “My family is staying in Pakistan for my education. They won’t allow me to stay in a dormitory or continue my education [if they’re not here]. They’re conservative.” Like Nasrin, the insecurity felt by her and her family overshadows everything: “After the deportations increased in my area, I couldn’t focus on my studies. I could hardly think about the future of my education and whether I could finish or not. I was just worried about being sent to Afghanistan because women have no rights to study or work there.

Appeals to the Pakistani authorities go unheard

Complaints about visa problems and the detention or deportation of Afghan students tend not to get very far. Afghan Students Union Representative in Pakistan Anayat Ullah Momand has a visa for his final year of medical studies thanks to a scholarship and so is in a position to try and help others. He said he has received hundreds of requests for help from students who have been denied visas, but the authorities “have not taken any action for Afghan students.”

Khaled reported that despite the student union sharing its concerns with Pakistan’s Higher Education Commission (HEC), the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan Embassy, none had accepted responsibility: “The Ministry of Interior said that senior government officials banned them from issuing visas, HEC said the Ministry of Interior isn’t approving visas and the embassy said it was all was out of their hands and they could not do anything.” Burhan also said that he and his student union had tried to help other students:

The union never got a satisfactory response. I and several other students personally met the Pakistani official responsible for Afghan students and other officials at HEC, several times. They promised that our visas would be issued in a few weeks, but we never got our visas. We also visited Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior several times. The behaviour of the officials at the ministry wasn’t good towards us. Sometimes they used bad language against us. Once, they ejected me from the ministry when I’d asked them to resolve our problems. They just kept telling us to wait. 

Burhan said that, before 2025, they had given bribes to speed up the visa process, but that this stopped working:

Previously, we were paying 30,000 to 40,000 PKR [USD 107-143] as a bribe to the Ministry of Interior so that they would approve our visas, but even that failed to work. I paid twice to get a visa before the complete ban on student visas. If we paid the money, normally our visa was approved within 25 days, but if we didn’t pay, our visas were approved after three to four months. We had to pay up or we might miss our classes. … We paid the money to a middleman who had links at the ministry. In the first year, the price to approve our visas wasn’t that expensive, but later, they were demanding up to 70,000 PKR [USD 251] per student.

Somaya said that before she was deported, some friends had tried to get the university to intervene“but the university staff behaved harshly with them.” She said she doesn’t think that officials want to help, no matter who makes representations to them.

The government of Pakistan is 100 per cent aware of the challenges Afghan students face in Pakistan because we shared our problems with our university and several times, we provided all the documentation for the Pakistani authorities. When they deported me, I told them it was only four days since my visa had expired and that I’d applied for a new visa but that their government hadn’t issued it. They told me it had nothing to do with them, nor did they care about it.

Abdullah and his classmates had petitioned officials from the Ministry of Interior, but this had no impact. He says the problem is deeper than a bureaucratic visa issue: “The situation has changed a lot for Afghan students over the past eight months. The police don’t accept any documents, including university cards or other documents. When I was in the camp, I met Afghans who were arrested even despite having visas.” Abdullah speculated that the troubles faced by Afghan students related more to Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Based on my information, Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior has no authority anymore to issue visas for Afghans. Students, including myself, have received phone calls from an ‘unknown individual’ who told us to meet at a café and there he asked us questions about ourselves. We didn’t know that person, nor did he tell us who he was. The employees at the Ministry of Interior also told us they had no authority over issuing visas, so I think there is a possibility that Pakistan’s ISI [intelligence agency] is controlling visas. 

Hadya’s family is so determined to protect the ability of her and her sisters to finish their education in Pakistan, they have taken legal action.

Since my other sisters are also studying here, my father filed a case at the high court to allow us live here until we all graduate. We’ve not received a response yet, but we’ve a letter that prevents the police from deporting us until the court announces its decision. The lawyer we hired told us it was nearly impossible to get a stay order [temporary court directive to prevent harmful or unlawful acts]. It’s just a hope. 

She also thinks the Pakistani government is indifferent to their suffering.

The government is well aware of the problems that Afghan students face in Pakistan and they know that girls aren’t allowed to pursue their education in Afghanistan. But the Pakistani government doesn’t care about Afghans, whether you are happy or unhappy, they’ll deport you.

Conclusion

For many young Afghans, being denied the opportunity to study in Pakistan has been devastating. For young women in particular, the prospect of being deported to Afghanistan slams the door shut on their prospects to secure higher education. For Somaya, deportation has been a life-changing blow: “I’m so worried about my future now and fear that I’ll remain uneducated.” Khaled placed the blame squarely with politicians on both sides. “The two countries,” he said, “brought education into their political concerns.”

As long as relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan remain poor, Afghan students will lose out. Some may manage to cling on to their studies in Pakistan without a visa, but only by living in the shadows of their university grounds. For now, the scholarship route is the only viable option. Last year, more than 20,000 Afghans applied for the Allama Iqbal scholarship, competing for just 1,500 places (Ariana). Now that these scholarships are, for now at least, a golden ticket to getting a visa, one can only imagine the flood of applications in 2026, assuming, that is, that Pakistan keeps this last door open.

Edited by Rachel Reid and Kate Clark

References

References
1 See a statement by the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, Türk: States must halt involuntary returns to Afghanistan, OHCHR, 22 May 2026; see also a statement by eight UN experts and the UN’s Working Group on discrimination against women and girls: UN experts sound alarm on looming deportations of Afghans from Pakistan, 29 August 2025.
2 Amnesty International has raised concerns that some of the deportation centres deny Afghans basic legal rights, such as communicating with their families or speaking to a lawyer.

 

Afghan Students in Pakistan: Lost dreams or a life in the shadows?  
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The toll on Afghanistan of five years of Taliban rule

By Besmillah Taban

The toll on Afghanistan of five years of Taliban rule
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‘We can’t give up on Afghans’: Lyse Doucet on the remarkable ‘people’s history’ that won her the Women’s prize

The Guardian
12 June 2026

The BBC’s chief international correspondent was awarded the prestigious nonfiction prize for The Finest Hotel in Kabul – which she hopes will bring more attention to the Taliban’s draconian treatment of women

More than three decades later, it became the subject of her first book, The Finest Hotel in Kabul, which has now won the Women’s prize for nonfiction. But while the prize recognises a remarkable work of reportage and history, the BBC’s chief international correspondent is more interested in what it might do for the country that inspired it.

The Finest Hotel in Kabul – A People’s History of Afghanistan by Lyse Doucet
 Photograph: PR

“Afghanistan has largely slipped from the headlines,” Doucet says. “Perhaps this win will bring some attention to the country. None of us should be ready to accept a situation in which we live in a world where there is a country where girls cannot be educated after they’re 16, where women cannot go to university, where women are barred from so many jobs. This is something we should all be angry about.”

Afghanistan was not ever thus. After nearly four decades reporting from the country, primarily for the BBC, Doucet, 67, has watched it pass through almost every political experiment of the modern era: Soviet-backed communism, civil war, Taliban rule, western-backed democracy, and now the Taliban again.

“I was conscious that Afghanistan has a very difficult and violent history,” Doucet says. “I needed to find something that would draw people in rather than push them away. I didn’t want people to close the book and say: ‘It’s too dark. It’s too bloody.’ So a hotel was a device to tell the story in a way people could recognise.”

The Intercontinental Hotel – known simply as the Intercon – offered the perfect lens to tell a people’s history of the country. Built by the British in the late 1960s, it was once a symbol of a different Afghanistan. In the 1960s and 70s, Kabul was known as the “Paris of the east”, a vibrant hub of fashion, jazz, miniskirts and apres-ski resorts. Afghan pop star Ahmad Zahir – known as the “Elvis of Afghanistan” – performed at the hotel; Gloria Gaynor was a guest. Foreign travellers passed through on the hippy trail.

As the following decades saw immense political upheaval, the Intercon remained open. “Politics, like hotel guests, checked in and out,” Doucet writes. “As Afghanistan lurched through decades of trial and terror, laced with bright but brief beginnings, the Intercon was an unbreakable constant.”

Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul.
‘Politics, like hotel guests, checked in and out’ … Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. Photograph: Theodore Liasi/Alamy

The hotel staff who remained through those changes are at the heart of her story: Hazrat, the housekeeper who worked there from the hotel’s opening; Abida, the hotel’s first female chef; Amanullah, the engineer; and Malalai, one of the first female waiters.

“I have to pay tribute to the Afghans who helped me and spoke to me for the book, because in Afghanistan even sharing stories can have risks,” Doucet says.

Doucet began her career in journalism as a freelance reporter in west Africa for the BBC. She went on to cover conflicts across the world, eventually becoming chief international correspondent in 2012. Her book opens with the fall of Kabul in August 2021, and the disastrous American withdrawal, which remains one of the defining moments of Doucet’s career. She recalls watching the evacuation from the airport: military transport planes, helicopters and Afghans carrying only one bag as they fled.

“There was this fear at the end. People kept talking about Vietnam – that image of the people clinging to the last helicopter rising from the roof of the embassy in Saigon,” she says. “In fact, it was a hundred times worse – Afghans racing to the airport, clinging to the underbelly of planes. It’s been a really traumatising experience.”

Since returning to power, the Taliban have systematically erased women from public life through a series of draconian measures. Girls have been entirely banned from secondary education and university, women have been forced out of many workplaces and banned from public spaces, and strict adherence to the burqa is required. Last month, an official decree was passed effectively legally recognising child marriage. And just this week, a rare protest that erupted in the western city of Herat against arrests of women accused of violating hijab rules ended with two people killed, including a child.

A member of Taliban security stands guard outside a mosque in Shahrak-e-Almahdi, Jebrail district of Herat province yesterday.
A member of Taliban security stands guard outside a mosque in Shahrak-e-Almahdi, Jebrail district of Herat province yesterday. Photograph: Mohsen Karimi/AFP/Getty Images

“Five years in and it is getting worse. It is a stain on our world,” Doucet says. “But the courage of Afghan women is extraordinary.”

Doucet is also frustrated that the barriers facing Afghan women go beyond those inside the country. “There are Afghan women getting scholarships, but there are no visas now to allow Afghan women to come and study in Britain and in many other places,” she says. “They are meeting obstacles everywhere. We live very privileged lives here, and it’s not our privilege to give up on Afghans.

“People who were somebody in Afghanistan – activists, world-class journalists – find themselves having to start again from scratch,” she continues. “It’s something none of us would want to do.”

Doucet believes, though, that the world must be careful not to dismiss the achievements of the post-2001 period. “People often say: what did 20 years of international engagement achieve? Was it all for nothing? I always say it wasn’t for nothing. There were many mistakes, but that period helped create the most educated, the most connected generation in Afghan history,” she says. “When you see girls saying: ‘I want to get online, can you help me get a scholarship, can you help me get some kind of education?’ … They know their rights now.”

This month, for the first time, the EU is preparing talks with Taliban representatives in Brussels, despite concerns that engagement risks legitimising a bloody and despotic regime. Doucet is cautious about prescribing a solution.

“I’m a BBC journalist,” Doucet says. “My job is to explain, not advocate. But [some] mediators would say that it’s better to negotiate than isolate. The only change is going to have to come from within the Taliban.”

For now, there is little sign of change in the country. But Doucet is reluctant to surrender the quality Afghans themselves prize above all others.

“Afghans always used to say: the last to die is hope,” she says. “Afghanistan has possibly lived through every political system the world has tried – the thread through Afghan history is that nothing lasts forever.”

‘We can’t give up on Afghans’: Lyse Doucet on the remarkable ‘people’s history’ that won her the Women’s prize
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The Decline of Ashar: How collective labour is fading in rural Afghanistan

For generations, the tradition of ashar – voluntary, unpaid communal labour – was one of the strongest expressions of solidarity in rural Afghan society. Whether harvesting a neighbour’s wheat, building a home or cleaning an irrigation canal, ashar bound together families, villages and tribes through reciprocal obligation. This tradition has sharply declined across much of southeastern Afghanistan in recent years, weakened by the monetisation of labour, mechanisation, migration and the slow unravelling of the social bonds that once made collective work both necessary and expected. In this report, AAN’s Sharif Akram examines what ashar used to mean to rural communities, why it is disappearing and what its decline says about broader changes in society in the Afghan countryside.

Afghan rural society has long been characterised by strong social bonds at multiple levels: the extended family, village, qawm (a close-knit group of interrelated families bound by shared patrilineal descent, larger than the extended family but smaller than the tribe) and tribe. People depended on one another not only in times of crisis but also in routine daily tasks. The paternal grandfather, brothers, uncles and male cousins – the tarburna (patrilineal male relatives) – formed the innermost circle of social obligation. Beyond that came the village. While a tribe may be a broad and dispersed category, the qawm functioned as the primary unit of solidarity and mutual obligation, sometimes spanning several villages, with a strong say in individual and family decisions. Members were present at funerals and disputes and equally at weddings, harvests and communal feasts.

While the customs that held these communities together were numerous, this report focuses on one – ashar, the tradition of collective voluntary labour, in which villagers contributed their time and effort, without payment, towards tasks that benefited either a single household or the community as a whole. Ashar was, in many ways, the material expression of qawmi solidarity – the understanding that communities, bound by proximity, kinship or shared resources, had obligations towards one another and that this went beyond their own household. It is associated with Pashtunwali (the customary code of honour and ethics for Pashtuns), but is not exclusive to it. Ashar is also, overwhelmingly, a practice whereby men contribute their time and labour to each other’s households or to the community.

The report examines ashar as it used to exist in rural Pashtun communities until quite recently, traces its decline and analyses what that decline means for the broader social fabric. It is based on in-depth interviews with 18 individuals across Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Ghazni and Wardak provinces, conducted during October and November 2025. Respondents were all men, but of all ages from young to old; they included tribal elders and village leaders who had witnessed the transition from collective to individualised modes of work.[1]

The term for ashar varies by region. In Khost, the word pagra is used, possibly derived from pa gada (together). In other southeastern provinces, ashar is the common term. In some Persian-speaking parts of southeastern Afghanistan, it is sometimes called wandi. Throughout this report, ashar is used, rather than local variations, except in direct quotes. In many of the quotes, interviewees use ‘people’ to refer to ‘men’; we have kept this in the translations.

What is ashar?

Ashar, derived from the Arabic word hashr, meaning gathering or assembling, is a form of collective, voluntary labour that members of an extended family, village, tribe or even a district carry out for each other or for a common cause. It operates on the simple principle of reciprocal obligation: when a family or community needs labour for a task too large for one household to manage, villagers are called upon to help. A household who helps others today can also expect the same support when their turn comes. This creates a cycle of mutual dependency that reinforces social bonds across households and villages.

Interviewees consistently distinguished between two forms of ashar. The first was household-level ashar, for the benefit of a single family. The most common occasions were agricultural: harvesting wheat, threshing grain, ploughing fields or transplanting rice. Families that lacked sufficient labour – widows, the elderly or households whose men had migrated – were typical beneficiaries, but the practice was not limited to the needy. In Khost, a 70-year-old respondent recalled that “pagra was also done for the village khans and maliks (the big landowners). Usually, the khan or malik had a lot of land. Villagers would bring out several pairs of oxen and turn the khan’s land and the khan would only provide them with food.” But when poorer families ran out of grain, the khan would reciprocate. Life, as the respondent put it, “went on well in this way, with mutual cooperation.”

Beyond agriculture, household ashar extended to building and repairing mud houses, gathering firewood from the mountains and preparing for weddings and funerals. In Khost, ‘wedding firewood ashar’ was common: young men would gather wood. As one interviewee from the province described it, “‘[Someone would] say: So-and-so is getting married, let’s do a firewood pagra for him. And we’d bring more than enough firewood.’” Women also participated in certain forms of ashar. Interviewees in Khost recalled calling village women to spread mud on the roofs of houses that were being built. In mountainous areas, women from neighbouring households helped one another carry firewood, with the favour returned the next day.

Calling men to household ashar was informal. The person in need would tell friends and neighbours the evening before or announce in the mosque or village hujra (a community guesthouse where male villagers gathered) that he needed help with a particular task. Participants arrived early, already dressed and ready for work. The only obligation on the host was to provide food – typically the most valued food such as shirwa (homemade ghee) and dandakai, a popular meal made of rice, dried yoghurt and meat in Loya Paktia.

The second form was collective or village-level ashar. The cleaning and repair of jui (irrigation canals) before the planting season and the construction of mosques, village meeting places, roads, small bridges and ponds were all done through collective ashar. Each household was expected to contribute one or two men; participants brought their own tools and food and the work was organised by village elders, the malik or the mirab (water master). When tasks extended beyond one village – maintaining a shared kariz (underground irrigation channel), for instance – the labour was distributed proportionally, usually by the number of households or the degree of benefit enjoyed by each village. Ashar is, moreover, an overwhelmingly male activity: the labour mobilised through ashar is almost entirely male and the social institutions that organise it are led by men. Women have their own parallel forms of ashar, helping other women with tasks such as gathering firewood or household labour, but these operate in separate networks. Due to cultural constraints, this research was conducted with men only, so insights into women’s ashar are almost existent.

This distinction matters because the two forms have declined at different rates. Collective ashar has proved more resilient for a straightforward reason: communal infrastructure, such as canals and dams, affects everyone’s livelihood directly. If the canal is not cleaned, nobody can irrigate. The incentive to opt out is therefore weaker. Individual ashar benefits only one household at a time, making it easier for others to decline.

The spirit of ashar

Ashar was not merely a labour arrangement. It carried a strong social dimension and was, in many forms, as much a social occasion as a working day. Interviewees across all provinces recalled that participants worked with genuine enthusiasm and sincerity, treating the task as their own. One elder from Khost put it this way: “It’s not like nowadays, where workers don’t do their best and only pass time in order to get paid. In ashar, everyone was working sincerely and with all his abilities, like working on his own task.” A village elder from Paktia said he had worked “for another villager in the harvest season even for three consecutive days,” which meant leaving his own fields unattended. This was not unusual; it was expected.

In Khost, agricultural ashar – rice transplanting and harvesting in particular – was accompanied by dhol (drums) and later by music played through tape players. A respondent in his forties recalled the range of occasions that once existed:

Before, there was hardly any need to look for an excuse [to carry out] pagra (ashar). There was pagra at harvest time, pagra when turning the soil, pagra when planting rice, pagra when making mud bricks for rooms, pagra when bringing firewood, pagra when storing wheat grain, chaff and fodder. The young men would gather; there was work, but there was also enjoyment.

Ashar in this sense was not just a way of getting work done. It structured the social year, giving young men regular occasions to gather, work together and eat together. A village elder from Khost said: “When work is done collectively, it is full of blessings and far more effective than paid labour. We have tested it many times: both the quality and the speed of collective work are far better.” An elder from Paktika linked it directly to social cohesion: “When the young men go to each other’s houses, eat with each other and work with each other, it strengthens the bonds and keeps them together and united.”

Participation in ashar was not legally enforced, but it carried strong social expectations, backed by one of the most potent sanctions in Pashtun society – the desire, even necessity, of avoiding payghor, or shame. To be subject to payghor, a concept deeply embedded in Pashtunwali, is to be publicly shamed for failing to meet a social obligation – an intensely painful experience in a society where honour and reputation are paramount. In the context of ashar, refusing to participate without valid reason brought not only payghor, but also risked exclusion from future communal support. According to one respondent from Khost, “in the past, if someone did not participate in pagra, it would be considered payghor and they’d feel ashamed.” Those who could not attend due to a genuine obligation would seek permission from the person calling the ashar; only then was their absence tolerated.

For village-level work, the consequences were sharp. One interviewee from Paktika explained it:

If you didn’t share in others’ work, you’d remain alone in your own tasks, with no one coming to help you. If you didn’t participate in someone’s funeral ceremony, then no one would come to the funeral of your relatives. And no one can handle something like that alone.

A respondent from Wardak described a more formal punishment: “If someone failed to attend community ashars, he’d be made to pay nagha [compensation] – providing food to all the ashar participants or something else that the village had decided upon.”

Ashar was, in this sense, also a governance mechanism. It provided one of the bases through which communities enforced conformity with local customs and nerkh (customary law). A Paktika elder put it plainly:

In the past, families and individuals [acting] alone were very weak and no one could survive on their own. Therefore, everyone was bound to abide by the norms and by nerkh. No one could move away from the customs and traditions in a village because, if they did, no one would help them in their ceremonies and agricultural work. This was something no one could afford.

A tribal elder from Paktia summed it up: “It was like an obligation – not in the sense that it was absolute, but the way society was woven made it obligatory for everyone to be part of it, or face isolation – and no one could afford that.”

The decline of ashar

Ashar has not disappeared entirely, but across much of southeastern Afghanistan it has sharply declined. Collective ashar – canal cleaning, mosque repair, road maintenance – survives in a diminished form, particularly in remote areas. But household-level ashar has, in many places, been replaced almost entirely by paid labour. A Khost respondent described the shift, including in forestry work:[2]

Speaking of individual pagra, most occasions for it no longer exist. No one does pagra for bringing firewood, because the mountains and forests are not like they used to be. Ploughing with oxen and harvesting with sickles is no longer done. Tractors do all this work now.

Even where collective ashar persists, it has weakened. The same respondent noted the paradox:

Previously, even though there weren’t so many tools and resources, the village roads, canals and dams were maintained very well. But now, despite so many resources, there are shortcomings. The canals and dams are not as clean as before. Even village roads are in a bad condition and nobody cares much.

A young man from Ghazni made a similar observation:

In our village, there used to be only five cars and two tractors. In the neighbouring village, there were three cars and three tractors. And in the winter season, we’d go out and repair the tracks right up to the asphalted road. However, in the last five years, people don’t gather despite the fact that now the number of cars has risen to fifteen and tractors to seven in our village and a similar number in the neighbouring village. And we use the damaged, muddy tracks. It’s like people have lost their ability to work together and solve a common problem.

Interviewees identified several interrelated factors behind this decline. These are best understood not as isolated causes but as mutually reinforcing changes. Among them, the most frequently cited factor was the shift from a subsistence to a monetised economy. In the past, rural households operated largely outside the cash economy. Labour was exchanged for labour and ashar was the only way to mobilise the hands needed for large tasks. As cash became more widely available and daily wage labour emerged, this changed. An elder from Paktia explained:

In the past, there was very little money and very few things were bought with cash. People were content with the life they had and didn’t desire too many things, which meant they were not money minded. But now, everyone is trying to earn as much money as possible. So, when one can find a paid labourer for 300 afghani a day, why would he work voluntarily?

Paid labour did not merely provide an alternative to ashar; it actively undermined it. The same neighbours who would previously have worked for one another now offer their services for a daily wage. One Paktia interviewee described this: “Ten years ago, I was helped by villagers through ashar, but now when I ask them, they say they need to do this or that, but when I offer them a daily wage, they leave their work and work for me – in return for payment.”

In Ghazni, one man in his 50s recalled a time when being paid by a fellow villager would have been considered shameful: “It was like a shame to work for a villager and then get paid. There were some year-round labourers who’d work in exchange not for money but for wheat. But for occasional work, it was a shame to be paid.” That this is no longer the case marks a significant change in the moral economy of rural life.

A Khost respondent described the shift from both sides: “Now perhaps neither side wants it – instead of calling people to pagra, a family considers it better to pay money and get the work done. On the other hand, people also think that instead of participating in pagra, it’s better to do some work and earn a living.” When both the person who needs labour and the one who might provide it prefer to use cash, ashar becomes redundant. An interviewee from Ghazni illustrated the problem: on one occasion, he had arranged with two villagers to help him with his harvest, but two days later, both told him they had been selected for a musisa (NGO) project where they would get 500 afghanis [USD 9] per day, “so,” he said, “they couldn’t come and work with me.”

Mechanisation and changing livelihoods

A second factor is mechanisation, which has eliminated many of the tasks which had once made ashar essential. Harvesting used to require dozens of hands. Now, it can be done by one or two men using a machine. Ploughing, once performed with shared teams of oxen, is done by tractor. Firewood is bought from urban markets. “In the past,” one interviewee from Ghazni said, “harvest would be done by hand. Now it’s done by tractor, which consumes fuel [which is not free, and has to be paid for], and many people bought [tractors] in order to make a profit from them.”

The scarcity of tools and equipment also created bonds of interdependence. A Khost respondent described this: “Previously, many families couldn’t afford two oxen. So, one family would buy one ox, another would buy another, and at ploughing time, their partnership was formed by bringing both oxen together.” When each family can afford their own tractor, a respondent from Paktia said, that bond dissolves:

The work that once took a hundred people to do is now done by a single machine. And a machine is purchased and has maintenance costs and people buy it to make a profit. So, it’s not logical to gather a hundred people to work for free for days on end instead of a machine that does the same work by itself, all in one day – and makes a return of a few thousand afghanis.

A third factor leading to a decline in ashar is the diversification of livelihoods, which has left men with less time for communal work and, in some cases, has dissolved the reciprocal logic that used to sustain it. Government and private-sector jobs and commitments (such as university and school) leave little room for all-day voluntary labour. As one Khost respondent said: “In the past, our people had no other occupation; there was only farming. Almost everyone was engaged in agriculture, so they were compelled to help one another. Now, alongside farming, there are government and private jobs and people are also increasingly busy with small businesses.” A young man from Wardak, a university student in Kabul, explained the problem in practical terms:

Now everyone is busy. There’s no time for ashar. I only go to the village once every two weeks and that too on a Friday. This is the story of most of our young [men]. And on Friday, there’s a lot more to do than participate in someone’s ashar.

The shift away from ashar also reflects a deeper structural change – the declining centrality of agriculture itself. As market goods have replaced household production, even in small villages, most essentials are now purchased rather than grown. Many young men have left for the cities or abroad in search of paid employment and the proportion of households sustaining themselves solely by farming has dropped sharply. That has eroded the economic foundation of reciprocal labour. When most families were farming, exchanging labour made practical sense; each household needed something from the others. Such logic no longer works in a diversified cash-based economy. Another young respondent made a broader point about the breakdown of reciprocity:

In the past, people were all doing the same things and there was very little to do outside the village. And they all lived in the village. Now, people aren’t doing the same as one another and they’re not able to help other people. I’m a shopkeeper. No one can help me with ashar because that’s not their profession. I’m not a farmer and I can’t help others with farming. The reciprocal nature of things is no longer there.

Migration, war and the erosion of authority

Decades of conflict have driven massive displacement and migration, both to Pakistan and within Afghanistan, especially to the cities. Culturally, it has exposed rural Afghans to different ways of life, where collective labour plays no role. A Khost respondent said:

In the past, people mostly depended on farming, but over time, and especially when they moved to other areas, they saw different types of business. This changed their old way of thinking and many launched different businesses as well as farming. And what’s more important, they found out that the same things they were doing for free could be transformed into a form of business.”

The wars that began in 1979 also damaged the structures of authority on which collective ashar depended. At the village level, ashar was coordinated by the elders, maliks and mirabs, whose authority rested on customary legitimacy within the qawm system. After the Soviet invasion, as Roussel and Caley documented, “[T]he leaders of the uprising, more often than not of religious background, rapidly, and sometimes abruptly, replaced the leaders of their qawm, the traditional notables who had survived the government purges, thereby creating a new social category: the militia chiefs.”[3] Commanders were focussed on military mobilisation, not on ashar, and the elders who had once called for ashar found their standing diminished. One interviewee described this transition: “The khan of a village was a person who held great authority. He’d call for ashar and everyone would be present. Later, the khans lost their influence and each person became wealthy, each a ‘heavyweight’[4] unto themselves.”

During the Republic era, even though the maliks lost influence and commanders and insurgents gained it, the Taliban in areas under their control did use their authority to impose a form of collective work, though not, according to interviewees, in the spirit of maintaining social solidarity, but to solve practical problems. A respondent from Wardak described this:

When the Taliban were in our area [before 2021], in the winter, they’d announce in the mosque that the tracks had to be cleared of snow or repaired. All the villagers would participate out of fear. The Taliban did this because their mobility would be limited on muddy or snowy paths and they’d use the villagers to clear them. But since the Taliban are gone [as insurgents and become a government], the villagers have cleaned and repaired the routes just once in four years.

Population growth has compounded these pressures, as a resident of Khost explained:

The land that a few decades ago was farmed by one or two members of a family is now shared among ten or twenty, while the land remains the same size! There’s now more than enough men and wasael [technological tools] to make households self-sufficient.

Smaller plots require less labour, reducing the need to call upon neighbours. At the same time, fragmented holdings have reduced the agricultural surplus that once allowed wealthier families to reciprocate ashar by distributing grain in lean times.

The role of international aid

One striking argument that emerged during the interviews was that international aid has played a role in weakening collective ashar. Aid organisations periodically provided financial support for maintaining infrastructure – dams, canals, headworks – something that had previously needed communal labour. A younger Khost respondent was direct about this:

In my opinion, international aid organisations weakened the spirit of collective ashar among the people. This aid caused harm rather than benefit, because [by paying locals for refurbishment work] it took away the spirit of voluntary labour from the people, but the assistance didn’t continue. So now, people wait in hope that someone will appear again and provide assistance in exchange for work.

A shift in mentality

Underlying all of these factors is a broader shift in attitudes, described by a Khost man in his 40s:

At one time, people’s mentality was such that they led highly social lives and participated with others in grief, in joy and in voluntary cooperation. Now, the mentality is that, instead of being highly social, one should become self-sufficient and meet one’s own needs without others’ help. At one time it was considered manly to cooperate with others or ask for their cooperation. But now it’s considered manly to meet one’s needs without others’ assistance.

This inversion is significant. In the past, a man who refused ashar would face payghor. Today, as the same respondent noted, “People take pride in saying, ‘I don’t participate and I meet my own needs myself.’” The sanction that once enforced collective behaviour has not merely weakened; what was shameful is now a source of pride.

A resident of Paktia in his fifties also described another aspect of this change in attitude:

When you tell people to come and help as ashar, they say they have this or that work to do. This doesn’t mean that in the past people didn’t have work. The issue is that in the past, they valued [ashar] to the extent that they’d leave their own work and help, because they knew they’d need that villager’s help in the future. But now, no one sacrifices their work for others.

A Khost respondent was lyrical about his sense of loss:

It’s true that in the past, resources were scarce and life was full of hardships, but the love and pleasure that was in that life doesn’t exist today, with all its abundance of resources. Because now, everyone is trying to rely on themselves only.

New forms of collective action: from labour to fundraising

While traditional ashar has declined, it has not vanished without trace. In some areas, a new form of collective action has emerged, particularly among younger Afghans who run businesses and are living in cities or abroad. Rather than contributing their labour, they contribute money. In some cases, a young man from the area posts on social media calling on friends and fellow villagers – often those working in the Gulf countries or Afghan cities – to donate funds for a shared problem. One respondent from Paktika described one example of how this worked:

The road that connected five villages to the district centre was very damaged. No one was there to repair it, including the government. One day, a very active young man from Zangikhel posted on Facebook and asked his friends who were from the same district and also had businesses in Saudi and Dubai to donate money so that the route could be repaired. 300,000 afghanis [roughly USD 5,000] was donated. Then one person took responsibility for speaking to a construction firm and the road was rebuilt.

A respondent from Wardak described a similar initiative: “In our area, the district school building was very old and wasn’t big enough to host the number of pupils enrolled. So, the young men decided to collect donations from the wealthy people of the area. They collected a good sum and repaired the school.”

These initiatives represent a significant type of community self-help, but the form is fundamentally different. In traditional ashar, men gave their time and physical labour and this was itself the social bond: they worked side by side, ate together and reinforced their relationships through the act of working. In the new form, the contribution is financial. It can be made from thousands of kilometres away, by someone who has not set foot in the village for months or even years. The work itself is contracted out to a construction firm or to paid labourers. The communal meal, the drums, the shared effort do not exist at all.

This means that, while the new form may solve practical problems, it does not replicate the social function that traditional ashar performed. It does not keep communities physically together; it does not create regular occasions for bonding, dispute resolution and norm enforcement that made ashar a mechanism of self-governance, as well as a labour practice. On the contrary, monetary contributions vary enormously with economic status, easily becoming a competition in generosity displayed, that feeds into family prestige and local prominence, drawing yet another dividing line between the wealthy, who can donate conspicuously, and the poor, who cannot. Several interviewees also raised concerns about the misappropriation of donated funds for personal gain, a problem that could not arise when the contribution was labour, rather than money.

The consequences of the decline of ashar

The losses described in this report go beyond the disappearance of a labour arrangement. Because the practice was embedded in a wider system of social obligations, its erosion has weakened the mechanisms through which rural communities maintained their internal cohesion, enforced norms and protected their most vulnerable members.

The most visible consequence is the loosening of the social bonds that held villages together. Ashar was one of the main ways by which people maintained good social relations, resolved tensions informally and enforced conformity with nerkh. When participation in communal life was the price of communal support, individuals had strong incentives to stay within accepted norms. With paid alternatives now available, that leverage has weakened. “These days,” said one interviewee from Paktia, “if someone doesn’t participate in ashar, he’s not concerned that tomorrow, his fellow villagers won’t help him because he can hire people for money. He doesn’t need his fellow villagers.” A respondent from Wardak, in his fifties, drew a sharp contrast with the past:

In the past, occasions like ashar kept people together. While some injustices existed, it was never to the extent of nowadays. In the past, when someone in a village was dealing with a problem or couldn’t do a task alone, the entire village was with him and would consider his problem as their own. Now, when someone is dying because of a problem, no one knows and no one helps because people have become scattered and don’t care about each other. This is why God’s blessings [barakat] have gone from our lives.

Many interviewees described this erosion in very concrete terms. One elder from Paktia said:

Life was very good at that time. In the entire village, if even one man was present and the rest were out of the village, that one man would take care of all the families and their needs. Nowadays, people can’t leave their own home for a day because nobody else cares what might happen to it.

Another interviewee, also from Paktia, described how a single tractor could serve an entire village:

In the entire village, if someone had one tractor, that would mean the whole village could benefit from it. Now, everyone has their own and when a few people don’t have one and want a fellow villager to lend them his, he says they need to pay for it or even refuses them altogether. That kind of behaviour was never expected in the past.

A third interviewee recalled a night when a villager knocked on his door because his wife was sick and four neighbours with cars had refused to drive them to the clinic. “I took her, along with him,” he said. A tribal elder from Paktia’s Ahmad Abad district described a broader change:

Rural areas and villages have become like the cities. People who once were living like one family now take pride in not interfering with one another. In the past, if a child did something wrong, every elder in the village had the right to correct him, or even beat him and the parents of that child would be happy that the villagers had corrected their son. But now, when you tell someone not to do this or that they did something wrong, his family protests and says this is not your business.

An elder from Ghazni described the cultural consequences:

In our village, young men are imitating the fashions of infidels and no one dares tell them not to. In our time, no one dared to come to the mosque not wearing a khwalai and patkai [cap and turban], but now very few people wear it. When you ask them why, they say: Are you feeding me [ie do I owe you anything]? Everyone is their own boss these days.

The elders interviewed typically couched this change mostly in cultural terms. They resented their loss of authority to discipline others’ children or enforce how others dress and behave. However, the trend they describe bears a broader connection to the decline of practices of mutual help such as ashar, which arguably originally came into existence because of communities’ interdependence and not because of patriarchal and gerontocratic control over society.

The erosion of collective life is also visible in the changing role of the hujra, which was once the centre of village social organisation – the space where decisions were made, disputes mediated, guests hosted and ashar organised. An elder from Khost said: “In the past, there might have been one or a few hujras in the village, but everyone treated them as their own. Now, every family has its own hujra and has acquired the means to host guests.” The shared hujra both depended on and reinforced collective life. Its replacement by individually owned guest rooms mirrors the replacement of ashar by paid labour: both represent the privatisation and fragmentation of what was once communal. But the shift is not only in practice, but  also in aspiration. In today’s economy, every household wants to achieve the status symbols that only the wealthy could once attain – their own guest room and their own hired labour. Communal arrangements that once softened inequality now feel like signs of poverty rather than sources of solidarity. And it is the less affluent who lose most: they cannot fully achieve the new expectations. Yet the old safety nets that once supported them are gone.

Even participation in social events has changed. In Khost, a respondent described how grave-digging, once a task young men competed to perform, had declined to the point where “villagers have become worried that if this continues, there might come a time when no one would go to dig the graves.” The solution was to impose a rule: one person per household must attend. That a task once performed enthusiastically now requires compulsion illustrates the scale of the change. The same respondent described participation in communal life as having become “somewhat contractual,” for example, “People attend weddings only to avoid causing offence, not out of genuine solidarity.”

The consequences of neglecting collective maintenance can be severe. An elder described how floods had destroyed crops in two villages because a canal had not been cleaned for a decade, something another interviewee from Wardak described:

The main reason was that the canal [rod] was full of mud and dirt and no one had cleaned it in the last ten years. Such things were done, in our time, twice a year and therefore, when it rained, there’d be no problem. But in the past ten years, despite a lot of advanced technology, such as excavators and money, no one bothered to clean them out and the result was that the crops of the two villages were destroyed.

The decline has not affected all households equally. Wealthier families can hire labourers and buy machinery; for them, the loss of collective labour is manageable. For poorer households, the consequences are severe. In the past, ashar functioned as an informal safety net regardless of a family’s wealth; the village contributed labour for their harvest, construction or ceremonies. One interviewee described the new reality:

When you ask someone for ashar, he says, “I’m doing it on a daily wage basis, not as ashar.” And even in daily wage work, people don’t work properly and just want to stretch the task out so they can charge for two days. For a poor farmer, it’s difficult to pay such an amount of money.

An elder from Paktia explained that in the past, “men had no money and there were few men. And even if a household had more [men], they’d migrate for work, so no family could do their work alone.” A farmer from Khost described the costs of not being able to rely on ashar: “I grow beans on my land and from sowing until the harvest is done, I hire three men on a daily wage to help me for seven days. They take a good amount of money from me. Now, the costs are very high. I remember in the past, no one hired anyone and that money was saved as profit.” The disappearance of this safety net has made the poor poorer and the rich richer.

Tribal structures and village principles have weakened accordingly. One Khost elder observed, “Some young men even take pride in not being bound by these things.” A younger respondent similarly said that, “Now, anyone can build a house on their own, plant an orchard on their own and carry out farming and animal husbandry on their own.” This self-sufficiency might, in material terms, be thought of as ‘progress’, but interviewees consistently described it as a loss. The same young man added, “Today’s young men prefer to do everything by themselves. But they don’t understand that the pleasure that was in the old traditions and in cooperating with one another – it no longer exists.” Self-sufficiency, as one Khost elder noted, comes at a cost: “This situation has filled life with stress and confusion.”

Conclusion

The decline of ashar is not a simple story of modernisation replacing tradition. It is the result of several interacting pressures that reinforce one another, progressively dismantling the conditions that once made collective labour both necessary and natural.

What is lost is more than a labour practice. Ashar was a mechanism of social cohesion, an informal safety net, a tool of local governance, backed by the powerful sanction of payghor, and a source of communal identity. Its decline has weakened bonds between households, undermined the enforcement of nerkh, disproportionately harmed the poorest families and accelerated a rise in individualism that many communities view with ambivalence.

Yet the picture is not entirely bleak. Collective ashar survives in many areas, sustained by the simple logic that if the canal is not cleaned, nobody eats. In Khost, harvest ashar has found an unexpected afterlife among school students, who call on classmates for help and turn the work into a social outing. New forms of collective action have also emerged, with young Afghans abroad or in cities raising funds through social media for village infrastructure. These adaptations suggest that the impulse towards solidarity has not been entirely extinguished, even though the new forms do not replicate the social bonds that traditional ashar created.

It would also be too simple to read this decline purely as a tale of lost virtue. Some scholars have cautioned against romanticising rural Afghan solidarity, noting that “the cooperation and solidarity among rural Afghans assumed to be a community because they happen to live in the same place are at best limited.”[5] Ashar may have always been more fragile than nostalgia suggests and its decline may partly reflect the removal of the local power dynamics that compelled cooperation, rather than the loss of goodwill. What interviewees describe as a golden age was also, by their own account, a world of scarcity and constrained choices.

The decline of ashar offers a window into the broader transformation of Afghan rural society – the replacement of reciprocal bonds with transactional relationships, the growing stratification of village life and the tension between material progress and social fragmentation.

Edited by Fabrizio Foschini, Rachel Reid and Kate Clark


References

References
1 Because of the difficulty of a man interviewing women in the southeast, all the interviewees for this report were male.
2 The interviewee refers here to the significant depletion of Khost forests due to the felling of trees for fuel during the decades of conflict. The availability of alternative fuels, which are easier to access, though more expensive, has probably contributed to the abandonment of collective forestry work, but the weakening of local community control was not necessarily good for the state of Afghan woodlands, with unsustainable logging practices still carried out by individual traders or companies.
3 See Frederic Roussel and Marie-Pierre Caley, ‘Les Manteqas: Le Puzzle Souterrain de l’Afghanistan’, unpublished paper, 1994, cited in ACTED, ‘Review of the Implementation of the AGORA Methodology in Afghanistan under SRDP IV,’ Paris, ACTED, 2023, p3.
4 The interviewee literally said that everyone considered themselves a man, the seven kilogrammes unit of weight, used, for example, for measuring wheat and flour. He means that everyone has come to think of themselves as sufficient unto themselves, that everyone claimed authority and no one accepted the authority of the khan.
5 See David J Katz, Community-Based Development in Rural Afghanistan: First, Assume a Community, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace, April 2017, p1.

 

The Decline of Ashar: How collective labour is fading in rural Afghanistan
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