Since taking power in August 2021, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) has introduced increasingly severe restrictions on the rights and freedoms of Afghan women and girls, that have reverberated across families and communities. The new rules have bolstered traditional male roles as women’s ‘gatekeepers’, determining what they can and cannot do. At the same time, these laws have also undermined men’s roles as supporters and facilitators of the ambitions of their female family members – in particular their daughters, but also wives and sisters. Overall, they have taken choices away from families, putting more power over Afghans’ personal lives into the hands of the state and its officials. In this report, Martine van Bijlert and the AAN team explore the effects of the restrictions on women as seen through the eyes of men. They explore how the Emirate’s rules have affected family dynamics and the lives of both men and women – not because it is often considered that men are more articulate or because the harm is more pronounced or important when also felt by men, but because the exclusion of women from public life affects everyone. It can disrupt families, fray communities and undermine both men and women.
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The most invasive of the Emirate’s decrees and directives have aimed at pushing women and girls out of the public sphere and confining them to their homes. Girls were banned from secondary, a decision that has been upheld every year since its implementation. Universities were initially reopened to women, under strict conditions, including gender-segregated classrooms and dress codes. This, however, was short-lived and female students were once again barred from universities, in December 2022. The few fields of study still available to women, such as nursing and midwifery, were suddenly suspended in early December 2024, without explanation. Most female government employees were told to stay at home and, in December 2022, NGOs, the United Nations and foreign embassies were told they could no longer employ women (with some exemptions for health and education). Curbs on women’s mobility have also increased, including the closure of beauty salons and prohibitions on women visiting parks, gyms and historic places, participating in sports and travelling without a male relative.
These restrictions, coupled with anxieties over possibly being harassed by enforcers from the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice when they leave the home, have taken their toll on Afghan women. They have eroded their independence, diminished their well-being and sense of self and upended their lives. Yet, their struggles do not exist in isolation from the rest of society. The restrictions on their lives have not only harmed or affected women and girls, nor are they the only ones who hold opinions about them. The new rules have implications for men’s lives as well and their views on them are critical to the lives of their female relatives – whether they disagree with the restrictions or support them.
Between June and September 2024, we set out to hear from men across Afghanistan about how the new rules and restrictions had affected their families, their own lives, and their relationships with the people around them. In a series of in-depth and surprisingly candid conversations, seventeen men from diverse backgrounds and locations shared their perspectives on these changes. Some of the men agreed with traditions surrounding women’s mobility and appearance, such as hijab and the need to travel with a mahram. Many, although certainly not all, came from families where women traditionally did not work outside the home. Not all their daughters had gone to school. But all of them, in varying degrees and for their own reasons, were distressed by the most invasive restrictions, in particular the ban on girls’ education. The emotional intensity of their responses, as will be seen from the interviews, was arresting.
Edited by Roxanna Shapour and Kate Clark
You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below.
After pausing the roll-out of the vaccination programme twice last year, the Islamic Emirate finally restarted polio vaccination for under-fives in late October 2024. However, it has restricted delivery of the vaccines to mosques and village centres only. No longer will vaccinators be able to go door-to-door. It seems that the pauses and change in delivery may have driven an increase in the number of positive polio cases in Afghanistan: in 2024, 25 positive polio cases were recorded, according to the World Health Organisation, the highest number in four years. The Afghan Ministry of Public Health spokesman denied the cases, saying “no polio case was recorded in the country.” AAN’s Jelena Bjelica and Nur Khan Himmat have been speaking to parents with children under five years of age in some of the 16 provinces that were targeted for polio immunisation in October and November, asking them how effective is the Emirate’s current approach to protecting children from polio.
My brother was visiting and told me that the polio vaccinators had come and that they were immunising the children in front of the mosque. I asked him to help me take my two children. If he hadn’t been there, I wouldn’t have known about the campaign and my children wouldn’t have been vaccinated…
My husband wasn’t in the mosque when they announced it. He was in the fields working. … This is very difficult for me… if my brother hadn’t been there, I wouldn’t have been able to get my children vaccinated. It’s difficult for a woman to take her children to a place where many people are gathered. I myself would’ve been ashamed to have gone…. I prefer door-to-door vaccination. I know that if men are not at home to take the children to be vaccinated, some women will never get their children vaccinated [if it means having to take them to] the mosque.
These are the words of Gul Sima, who has two children under the age of five, in Marja district in Helmand, a province which historically has had a high incidence of polio, an infectious disease that can lead to the permanent paralysis of parts of the body, and primarily affects children.[1] She is one of ten Afghans we spoke to in November and December 2024, as the polio vaccination campaigns resumed following the ten-week-long break, from 13 August to 28 October.[2]
Most of our interviewees, like Gul Sima, come from the southern provinces. Some, but not all, had heard about the vaccination; Gul Sima was not alone in having heard about it only informally, by chance. Some fathers described losing a day’s work to take their children for vaccination – others had to work and leave their children unprotected. Almost all the interviewees had experienced some level of difficulty or inconvenience and said vaccination on the doorstep would have made life easier and vaccination more feasible. Before hearing from these parents, this report opens with an overview of the polio situation in Afghanistan since 2001 and a recap of last year’s breaks in immunisation.
A brief look at polio in Afghanistan since 2001
It has been compulsory for children in Afghanistan to be vaccinated since 1978 when routine immunisation against polio was launched, under the name, the Mass Immunisation Programme. Since then, the number of polio cases in Afghanistan has decreased from the thousands in the 1980s to the hundreds in the 1990s to only handful each year in the 2000s.[3]
The lower number of positive polio cases since 2001 is the result of an increase in immunisation coverage. For example, while only around 25 per cent of children in 2000 received the third (and final) dose of polio vaccine, by 2023 that percentage had risen to around 68 per cent.[4]
However, there were years when the progress came to a standstill, or went backwards. For example, in 2014, the year when most foreign troops left Afghanistan and a presidential election was held, the number of children immunised dropped to 50 per cent. Both events led to a general deterioration of security and consequently less access for vaccinators.
Likewise, in the years preceding both 2011 and 2020, when a hike in cases, to 80 and 56 respectively, was recorded (see Graph 1 below), gaps in vaccination were caused by intensified fighting, a general lack of oversight of polio vaccination in the country as well as localised bans on door-to-door vaccination by the then Taleban insurgents.[5] In 2020, there were no vaccination campaigns from March to June due to the Covid pandemic, while a year earlier, the more stringently imposed Taleban ban on house-to-house vaccination, announced in May 2018, led to no vaccination campaigns the following year from April to July.
Graph 1: Data extrapolated from the World Health Organisation’s reports. Graph by AAN.
In general, since 2001, the poliovirus has most often been detected in the southern region and, to a lesser extent, in other parts of country.[6] In the south, the polio endemic is generally concentrated in Kandahar and Helmand and neighbouring provinces.[7] In 2011, for example, out of 80 cases, 62 were recorded in southern Afghanistan. Likewise, in 2020, out of 56 cases, 38 were recorded in the southern region (16 from Helmand, 14 from Kandahar, 4 from Uruzgan, 3 from Zabul and 1 from Nimroz province). In 2024, too, out of 25 positive cases, 21 were recorded in the southern provinces — 14 cases in Kandahar and seven in Helmand.[8]
The latest gap in the immunisation campaign
Usually, every month, a polio immunisation campaign takes place somewhere in Afghanistan, either at the national or sub-national level (targeting specific regions). Each lasts between three and five days. Additionally, smaller targeted campaigns – called ‘campaign responses’ – are also carried out regularly. The monthly campaigns target millions of children under five across all the districts of Afghanistan.[9] The two tables below show an annual overview for 2023 and 2024 of the type of polio campaigns carried out, the number of children vaccinated in each monthly campaign and the number of positive polio cases registered in each month. The two gaps in vaccination can be seen in the 2024 data.
Overview of 2023, broken down by month, of the types of polio campaign carried out, the number of children vaccinated in each campaign and the number of positive polio cases registered. Data collated from the WHO monthly and annual snapshots. Table by AAN.Overview of 2024, broken down by month, of the types of polio campaign carried out, the number of children vaccinated in each campaign and the number of positive polio cases registered. Data collated from the WHO monthly snapshots. Table by AAN.
There was a huge break. I’ve [also] been hearing from news since around last two months that the door-to-door vaccination was banned by the Emirate. I was really unhappy, and I was thinking that we won’t have polio drops for our children at all and that the Emirate will ban it for good. Thank God, it’s been resumed.
– Sayed Muhammad, father of three (all under five years of age) from Kajaki district in Helmand
Between 13 August and 28 October 2024, no Afghan child under five was immunised against polio after the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), in the words of a health official speaking to The Guardian in mid-September, “temporarily suspended” the campaign. The official said immunisation had been suspended because of “issues with the modality of implementation,” listing them as security concerns and the involvement of women in administering vaccines. Radio Free Europe in their mid-September report quoted a polio worker in the eastern province of Nangrahar, who said the polio-immunisation campaign in the region was suspended because local Taleban officials were “demanding tax from aid organizations.”
As little was said about the suspension by the authorities publicly, the reasons for it remain uncertain. However, it was evident when vaccination resumed that door-to-door vaccinations had been banned, so presumably it was concern over this method of delivery that had made the authorities hesitate over letting the campaigns go ahead. They were now allowing vaccinations but parents would have to take their children to a temporary polio vaccination centre, such as a mosque.
The way vaccines are delivered has long been a point of contention for the Taleban. During the insurgency, they banned door-to-door vaccinations in areas under their control because of the fear that the vaccinators might be spies (see the AAN reports in footnote 8 for more on this). The health official who spoke to The Guardian said this was still a fear: “‘One of the reasons for banning door-to-door campaigns was security. The south, especially Kandahar, is where the Taliban leaders live, and they are concerned the campaigns could reveal their locations to foreign threats.’”
However, where concerns were expressed by officials they centred rather on public morality, with a local health worker telling The Guardian of the government’s dislike of female vaccinators going door-to-door. This has been hinted at in other statements, for example, as reported by BBC Pashto on 23 September. The BBC quoted the head of the polio vaccination campaign in the Ministry of Public Health, Dr Abdul Qudus Baryalai, as saying door-to-door campaigns had been banned by Supreme Leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada after it was requested by Kandahar’s Ulema Council and representatives of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan provinces, at the “demand of the people of the region.” Baryalai said the Ulema Council’s concern, shared with Mullah Hibatullah, was that “when volunteers knock on their doors, men may not be home.” As will be seen below, this was not what we heard from parents interviewed for this report.
The ban is making health experts anxious because of the inherent benefits to children of door-to-door immunisation campaigns. Vaccinators going from house to house can reach new-borns, children who are sleeping or sick and visiting children. They can reach the children of parents who cannot leave the house: as will be seen, this is often the case for women who cannot leave home unaccompanied by a man, but parents might also be disabled or sick and unable to take their children, or not have transport, so cannot easily get to a far-away vaccination centre. Fathers might be away, or working. Moreover, facing a vaccinator on the doorstep makes it easier for parents to say ‘yes’ to getting their children protected, in contrast to having to actively choose to take them to a centre.
What do parents say?
We wanted to hear from parents about their experiences of polio immunisation since the late summer/early autumn pause and the country-wide ban on door-to-door delivery.[10] We conducted two rounds of interviews with ten parents, in total, who came from 5 of the 16 provinces where vaccination campaigns took place in October and December. We interviewed seven parents who had children under five – two from Kandahar, two from Helmand and one from each Uruzgan, Zabul and Kunduz provinces – just after the IEA resumed the polio vaccination on 28 October 2024.[11] Additionally, after the completion of the second polio vaccination campaign that started on 25 November 2024,[12] we interviewed three additional parents – one each from Kunduz, Kabul, and Zabul provinces. We also reinterviewed a parent from Kandahar who had missed immunising his children during the October campaign. The short questionnaire was a mix of open and close-ended questions.[13]
All our interviewees eventually got their children vaccinated – eight during the October campaign and two during the November campaign. Most had not heard about the campaign before it began. Some found out about it by chance, including Nur Muhammad, the father of two under-fives from Aino Mina in Kandahar province of the October campaign.
We didn’t hear any announcement and the vaccinator didn’t come to our house either. A few months previously, they’d come to our house and vaccinated our children. It isn’t difficult for us to take our children to the mosque or any other centre where vaccination is taking place. We’re an extended family and thank God, we have four cars between us. But if we aren’t aware of the campaign taking place, that’s a problem.
We interviewed him a second time, after the November campaign. Again, he had not heard about it, but this time, he found out by chance and in time.
They aren’t putting a lot of effort to make us aware of the campaigns. We were lucky – one of my friends called me on the fourth day of the campaign and asked if we’d got our children vaccinated. He knew they’d missed out in October. As soon as I heard, I took my children to the hospital in our area and got them vaccinated.
Similarly, Aziz Khan, the father of two under five-years from Kabul province also got to hear about the second vaccination campaign in November 2024 in a haphazard way:
I got vaccinated my children last week. I couldn’t get them vaccinated in the [October] campaign because we didn’t know it was happening. There wasn’t even an announcement in the mosque. I did hear about the latest campaign. I told my brother to find out where it was and take my children to be vaccinated. He searched for the vaccinators and when he found them, they asked him if they could use our house as a polio immunisation centre. They said people hardly ever give them their houses to use as a centre even for only an hour. My brother gave his permission. This way, we got vaccinated our children, as well.
Rahmatullah, the father of three children under-fives from Dasht-e Archi district in Kunduz, told us he did know about the November campaign – it was announced every day in his local mosque. However, he decided his children would miss out on their November vaccinations because he was working and he’d got them vaccinated during in October (three doses of polio vaccine are necessary, so this decision may be detrimental to his children). “I didn’t take my children for vaccination,” he said, “because I’d recently found a job of digging a well. I go early to a village about three kilometres away from our house. I couldn’t lose that work.”
Similar dilemmas faced Muhammad Omar from Shah Joy district, Zabul province, in November: he was busy ploughing his land when that campaign took place. However, the father of three under-fives also objected to where the November vaccinations were taking place:
I got my children vaccinated around 40 days ago [in October]. I didn’t get them vaccinated in the recent campaign [November]. Last time, it was good. It was in the mosque and my wife took our children there. This time, our mosque’s mullah and some elders had decided the mosque shouldn’t be used as a centre for vaccination and selected two other places instead. [O]ne of the centres was very far away. I was working on my land and I’d rented a tractor for ploughing, I was busy with sowing the wheat. My wife didn’t take our children to the centre because she’s a woman. We traditionally don’t allow our women to go out, especially to far-off places.
The second centre was near to our house … maybe five minutes from us, but we didn’t take our children there because it was the house of a man with whom I have differences [a kind of enmity]. I told my wife not to take the children to his house for immunisation.
Another parent, Bibi Aisha, who has four children, three under five, from Arghestan district in Kandahar, told us her husband had to take a day off work so they could take their children for vaccination:
My husband’s working in a pomegranate orchard. He goes there at 6 ‘o clock in the morning, every day. On that day, he didn’t go to his work because he had to go with me to get our three children vaccinated. They’re all under five years old. My husband would never allow me to go on my own to the mosque for vaccination because there are many men in the mosque. He tells me not to take the children for vaccination unless he’s with me. He’s telling me that the children won’t die, but please don’t go alone to the mosque. It’s our tradition. Women don’t go anywhere without being accompanied by a man.
Public information campaigns and clear announcements that campaigns were starting locally appear to have been only haphazardly undertaken. That further reduced the ability of parents to take up opportunities to get their children vaccinated. With door-to-door vaccinations, announcing the start of a campaign is useful, but if parents have to take their children to a centre, it is vital. Several of our parents were critical of the absence of public information. A few had a more positive experience, for example,Sayed Muhammad, father of three under-fives from Kajaki district in Helmand:
I heard about [the October campaign] on the radio and also from the vaccinators over the loudspeakers in our village. We took our children to the mosque and they were immunised there. The mosque isn’t very near to our house. I used to live in our village in the past, but two years ago, I built a new house near my fields, I prefer to live near to my agriculture land…
However, he recalled with regret the convenience of the old door-to-door campaigns:
[The current way of doing things] is very difficult for me. If I’m not at home, my wife can’t take our children for vaccination. My wife is sick. She can’t take the children to the mosque. I prefer door-to-door vaccination. It used to be very easy for us. I don’t think anybody prefers mosque-to-mosque vaccination.
Hassan Khan, father of three (two under five) from Shah Joy district in Zabul province heard about the campaign when it was announced in the mosque.
I wasn’t at home, but my elder son had heard the announcement and took his two infant brothers to the mosque for vaccination. My brother is actually a vaccinator, himself, and was out in another village, vaccinating children. Yet, his two children weren’t immunised against polio because his wife didn’t want to take them to the mosque. Some women don’t go to the mosque for vaccination – they are either not allowed by their husbands or they themselves feel shy. I’ve heard of other children as well in our village that have remained without being vaccination.
Dost Muhammad, father of six (three under five) from Dasht-e Archi, Kunduz, said a campaigner had come to his mosque early in the morning and told all the men to bring their children to the mosque to be vaccinated, which he had done. Mullah Obaidullah Jan, father of eight, with three children under five from Chahar Chino district in Uruzgan, said he had himself announced to the people in his mosque that vaccination would be taking place. However, he said his elder children had had to bring their younger siblings because he was busy welcoming people to the mosque.
All our interviewees said that in their localities, the vaccinators, both past and present, were male. Aziz Khan, the father of two under-fives from Kabul province, was the only one with a different experience: in Kabul city, he said, “the mobilisers were female, but vaccinators were male.” Yet, the programme to deploy women to deliver the vaccine among other duties has expanded since a 2020 pilot project in three provinces. These are the ‘female vaccination mobilisers’, women from the local community who, despite not having the medical training to administer intravenous vaccines, can administer polio drops, be the first-line advocates for polio eradication and deliver health education more generally to other women. In 2024, the programme covered 20 out of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, with more than 600 workers; these reports by WHO’s Global Polio Eradication Initiative and UNICEF mention female vaccination mobilisers in Nangrahar, Helmand and Khost.
The theory behind the project is that women can more easily reach women: one mobiliser in Khost, Rezia, said to UNICEF that changing people’s minds is the first and biggest step toward getting more children vaccinated, and women are critical players: “I’m respected in the community. … I’m a mother, a grandmother – women listen to me. I can persuade the older women, and they want their daughters to have services they didn’t have. It trickles down.” UNICEF quoted the female vaccination mobilisers as saying that having mothers’ questions answered straightforwardly, by a trusted neighbour, has contributed significantly to changing attitudes toward vaccination in the districts where they work.
Regardless of who delivers the vaccinations, all our interviewees said they preferred door-to-door campaigns because they are convenient, save time and do not require additional logistics. That included the mullah from Uruzgan who said he preferred them because his elder children had had to bring the smaller ones to the mosque. In areas where women generally cannot go alone to the mosque or other centre and need a man to be at home to take the children, the end of door-to-door campaigns will, inevitably, mean fewer children vaccinated, as Nur Muhammad, father of two under-fives from Aino Mina in Kandahar province summed up:
We do indeed prefer door-to-door vaccination. If we’re aware of the campaign then [taking the children to a centre] isn’t a problem for us personally. But for families who only have one man in the family and he’s working, it’s difficult for women to take their children to the mosque or to a polio centre. Many people don’t allow their women to take the children out of the home – and that includes us.
What do the experts say?
It not only parents who prefer the door-to-door campaigns. Experts told AAN the two vaccination gaps in 2024 had caused some damage, but far worse had been the harm done by the ban on door-to-door campaigns. A former UNICEF communication manager told AAN that, in previous years, door-to-door campaigns had been able to reach almost 100 per cent of under-fives. “The mosque-to-mosque modality isn’t successful because people don’t bring their children to the mosque. The reason is tradition – women will not bring their children to the mosque if the men are not at home [to accompany them].” The contrast with the current delivery method, he said, was stark: “The teams could barely reach 60 per cent of children through the mosque-to-mosque approach in previous years. A successful campaign is when you vaccinate at least 95 per cent of children.”
This same conclusion was reached by a vaccinator in Nad Ali district in Helmand province who told AAN that in the November 2024 campaign, his team reached only between 700 and 750 children out of the 1,200 they would normally reach via the door-to-door campaign (less than two-thirds). He said people were not bringing their children to the mosque or village centre because the men might be busy at work and women could not go outside unaccompanied.[14]
The denial of the positive polio cases by the IEA Ministry of Public Health has added to the problem. It seems to be a bizarre exercise in semantics: the ministry’s claim that there is no record of positive polio cases in Afghanistan is based on the fact that, currently, samples are sent for examination to a laboratory in Pakistan. It seems that the ministry is spinning the narrative by denying the positive cases as a ploy to try to get funds to set up a laboratory in Afghanistan, according to several AAN sources, who wish to remain unnamed. However, that denial does not help parents protect their children from the spread of the poliovirus.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are the last two remaining countries in the world where polio is endemic, despite a great deal of resources and attention. Their eradication efforts are interlinked and the two countries are dependent on each other’s success in eliminating polio – or held back by the other’s failings. Pakistan has also seen an increase in positive cases last year; 72 cases had been recorded in 2024, an enormous increase from only 6 in 2023, according to WHO data. The epidemiological evidence suggests that the role of population movement is one of the key factors for poliovirus transmission across Afghanistan. The number of positive polio cases in Pakistan plays an important role in the virus spread through population movement across the border. This is why the intermittent breaks in vaccination, the ad-hoc shifts in approach, as well as unnecessary politicising of the issue, for example, the question of the laboratory location, does not help protect children. However, these particular problems have only existed since 2001 in Afghanistan.
In the past, access to children might always be limited by fighting and lack of security. Today, it is the government’s attitude towards women that is limiting the outreach of vaccinators, together with cultural restraints on women’s autonomy and movement. While the vaccination campaigns will, hopefully, be regular throughout 2025, unless door-to-door campaigns are resumed, it seems inevitable that many Afghan children will be left unprotected from the poliovirus.
Edited by Kate Clark and Rachel Reed
References
↑1
Polio, short for poliomyelitis, is an infectious disease that is caused and transmitted by a virus called the poliovirus. Poliovirus only infects humans. It is very contagious and spreads through person-to-person contact. The virus is most often spread by the faecal-oral route, that is, if food or water is contaminated with faecal matter, it enters through the mouth and multiplies in the intestine. Infected individuals shed poliovirus into the environment for several weeks, where it can spread rapidly through a community, especially in areas of poor sanitation. One of the severe symptoms of polio in childhood is paralysis and the disease is therefore also known as ‘infantile paralysis’.
↑2
This was the second break in vaccination in 2024. The first, twelve-week-long break lasted from 1 February to 29 April.
↑3
For a more detailed historical analysis on the number of polio cases, see AAN’s report ‘One Land, Two Rules (5): The polio vaccination gap’ from 2019. The publicly available historical data on positive paralytic polio cases in Afghanistan shows that the number of cases dropped from almost 2,000 in the mid-1980s to a handful in the early 2000s; see the ‘Our World in Data’ by Oxford University.
↑4
See this World Health Organisation’s immunisation dashboard for an overview of the coverage as a percentage.
↑5
The Taleban attitude towards polio vaccinators varied over time and geography, as described in the AAN report in Footnote 3.
↑6
In the eastern region, the epidemic is part of what is called the ‘northern corridor transmission zone’, extending from Nangrahar, Kunar and Nuristan into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including what were formerly the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas in Pakistan (FATA). The one case in Kapisa since 2001 would probably be placed at the westernmost end of this corridor. There have been fewer positive polio cases further north, for example, in Kunduz and Balkh provinces. Herat province in the west of the country had also seen a few positive polio cases, as has Farah, which neighbours both Herat and Helmand.
There are also special immunisation campaigns targeting older children (from 5 to 12 years of age), an example of which can be found in this 2023 WHO annual polio vaccination newsletter.
↑10
In the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand the door-to-door campaign have been banned for some time.
↑11
16 of 34 Afghanistan’s provinces were targeted for the immunisation campaign that started on 28 October 2024: Helmand, Kandahar, Urozgan, Zabul, Nimruz, Farah, Kabul, Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, Khost, Paktika, Nangrahar, Laghman, Kunar and Nuristan.
↑12
The second campaign after the ban was carried in ten provinces: Kabul, Nangrahar, Laghman, Kunar, Nuristan, Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Uruzgan and Kunduz.
↑13
The polio questionnaire:
When did you vaccinate your children last? (Yesterday, Last week, Several months ago)
How did you hear about the polio campaign in your village?
Was there any break in the vaccination campaigns in your village? For how long?
In the past, did the vaccinators come to your house or you took your child/children to the mosque/centre?
How far is the mosque/centre where vaccination takes place from your house?
How difficult was this for you, to take your children for vaccination?
Which one do you prefer: door-to-door vaccine or mosque-to-mosque?
Are the vaccinators male or female? What were they in the past?
↑14
A polio volunteer in Kabul told AAN that mullahs did not allow them to carry out vaccinations in the mosque in one area of Kabul. He said the mullah is the son of a community elder who is against polio vaccination and had banned the use of the mosque as a polio centre.
Polio Cases on the Increase in Afghanistan: How is the Emirate handling immunisation?
Top Taliban officials met Iran’s foreign minister Sunday to discuss tensions along their shared border, the treatment of Afghan refugees in Iran and water rights.
It was the first visit by an Iranian foreign minister to the Afghan capital since 2017.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran was committed to the return of some 3.5 million Afghan refugees and had no intention of interfering in its neighbor’s domestic politics, according to a statement from the Afghan government’s deputy spokesperson Hamdullah Fitrat.
He also called for the full implementation of the Helmand River water treaty, which envisions shared water resources, the statement said.
Acting Prime Minister Hassan Akhund asked Iran to treat Afghan refugees with respect and said it was not feasible to manage a large-scale repatriation within a short period. He also said incidents such as the execution of Afghans in Iran provoked public sentiment.
Araghchi also met Afghanistan’s foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoob.
Earlier Sunday, Iran’s official IRNA news agency quoted Araghchi as saying he hoped for more economic ties and improved relations with Afghanistan, citing some “ups and downs.”
Iran doesn’t formally recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which seized power in 2021 as U.S. and NATO forces withdrew from the country following two decades of war.
But Tehran maintains political and economic ties with Kabul and has allowed the Taliban to manage Afghanistan’s Embassy in Iran’s capital.
Iran’s foreign minister meets Taliban in 1st visit to Kabul in 8 years
Washington, DC – When Ruqia Balkhi arrived in the United States in September 2023, she was greeted by a federally funded resettlement agency that helped her launch a new life.
Balkhi, a 55-year-old engineer, was one of the thousands of Afghans who worked alongside the US military during its two-decade-long intervention in her home country.
But after the fall of the US-backed government in 2021, it became unsafe for her to stay in Afghanistan under Taliban leadership.
So she left for the US. During her first 90 days in the country, Balkhi received temporary housing, language lessons, basic goods, mental health support and guidance on enrolling her 15-year-old son in a local school in Virginia.
However, when her husband, Mohammed Aref Mangal, arrived under the same visa programme in January, those services had been abruptly halted. President Donald Trump had just been inaugurated, and the US had tightened restrictions on federal funding and immigration.
“It was completely opposite for my husband,” Balkhi said of the circumstances he faced.
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Advocates say her family’s story illustrates how Trump’s broad executive orders might have repercussions even for areas of bipartisan support.
Veteran organisations have largely supported efforts to bring Afghan citizens to safety in the US, particularly if they worked with US forces or the US-backed government.
But in the first days of Trump’s second term, the government paused the US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), leaving some already approved Afghan applicants stranded abroad.
Another executive order halted foreign aid. That, in turn, has caused interruptions to the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) programme for Afghans who worked with the US military, like Balkhi and her husband.
Balkhi explained that her husband was luckier than most, given that he had a family already established in the US. But she expressed anguish for those entering the country without the same support system she received.
“Without help from the resettlement agency, I don’t think we would have been able to survive,” she told Al Jazeera in Dari, speaking through a translator provided by the Lutheran Social Services of the National Capital Area.
Some critics see the issue as a test of just how durable Trump’s hardline policies will be when their full impact becomes clear.
“My request from the new government is that they not forget their commitments to Afghan allies and Afghan immigrants,” Balkhi said.
Trump’s campaign promises made no secret of his desire to overhaul the US immigration system, to fend off what he decried as a migrant “invasion”.
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But his criticism of the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 had sparked hope among those advocating for services for Afghans involved with the US military.
“President Trump campaigned on a bunch of stuff related to Afghanistan, particularly how bad the withdrawal was,” Shawn VanDiver, the founder of #AfghanEvac, an organisation that supports Afghan resettlement.
“So I just don’t believe that he would do that and then not try to help our allies. I’m just hoping this is a mistake.”
In his latest bid for re-election, Trump repeatedly expressed sympathy for those caught up in the August 2021 troop withdrawal, during which a suicide bombing claimed the lives of 13 US service members and 170 Afghans.
Trump also blasted former US President Joe Biden for overseeing the incident, which he called the “Afghanistan calamity”. The day before his inauguration, on January 19, Trump pointedly visited the grave of three soldiers who died during the withdrawal effort.
VanDiver said Trump’s actions from here forward will be critical. If his administration changes course on Afghan resettlement, VanDiver sees that as a hopeful sign.
“But if they don’t change anything, well, then you can be left to conclude that maybe they did mean to do it.”
While Trump’s orders have not directly stopped processing under SIV, they have snarled a pipeline for those seeking relief under the programme, which requires federal funding to operate.
Earlier this month, 10 national organisations that rely on federal support to provide “reception and placement services” received an order to stop work immediately — and incur no further costs.
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The State Department’s freeze on foreign aid has also gutted services for those waiting abroad in places like Qatar and Albania, including medical care, food and legal support, VanDiver explained.
Most significantly, Trump’s orders have cut funding for relocation flights run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Most SIV recipients relied on that transportation reach the US.
“The shutdown of these services isn’t just an inconvenience,” VanDiver said, pointing to the delicate living situations of many Afghans seeking safety. “It could be a death sentence for some of the most vulnerable evacuees.”
Refugee suspension
The SIV programme is not the only one hampered by Trump’s new orders, though.
Refugee resettlement has likewise ground to a halt. Under the previous US administration, Afghans facing persecution from the Taliban could apply for relocation under special refugee categories.
The P1 category was reserved for Afghans referred by the US embassy, while P2 was available for those who worked with the US military, US government-affiliated programmes or nonprofits based in the US. A third category also allowed for family unification, for those with relatives already in the US.
Those pathways have all been closed amid the wider suspension of the US refugee programme.
Kim Staffieri, the executive director of the Association of Wartime Allies, said individuals seeking refuge through those programmes should receive the same urgent attention as SIV recipients.
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“There are a lot of people that helped us, who worked for the same goals over there that are very much in danger, but they just don’t qualify for the SIV because it’s got such tight requirements on,” Staffieri said.
She added that she expected Trump’s administration to have given more consideration to Afghan refugees, given the bipartisan support for them.
“We expected some challenges. What we didn’t expect were these broad, sweeping strokes of pausing and suspending necessary programmes,” she told Al Jazeera.
“It feels like either they didn’t have knowledge or they didn’t take time to really think what the downstream effects would be in their entirety.”
Veteran support
Polls have repeatedly shown wide support for resettling Afghans who supported US forces during the war in Afghanistan.
In September 2021, for instance, a poll from NPR and the research firm Ipsos suggested that two-thirds of US respondents backed the relocations, far outpacing support for other groups seeking refuge.
That high level of approval has continued in the years since. An October 2023 poll from the With Honor advocacy group found that 80 percent of respondents signalled continuing support for Afghan resettlement.
US military veterans have been at the forefront of the relocation effort. That demographic, while diverse, typically skews conservative. About 61 percent supported Trump in the 2024 election, according to the Pew Research Center.
Andrew Sullivan, the chief of advocacy and government affairs of No One Left Behind, an SIV advocacy group, described the support as “a matter of national honour and of national security”.
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“It is certainly a veterans issue. And so it’s been a bipartisan issue,” said Sullivan.
A veteran of the Afghanistan war himself, Sullivan worked closely alongside an Afghan interpreter when he was an army infantry officer. That interpreter — whom Sullivan identified only by a first name, Ahmadi — has since relocated to the US through the SIV programme.
Sullivan said he was optimistic Trump would eventually create “carve-outs” for Afghans, pointing to the large number of veterans from the Afghanistan conflict in the Republican’s administration.
One of those veterans, former Congressman Mike Waltz, has since become Trump’s White House national security adviser. Waltz previously put pressure on former President Biden to “bring home our Afghan allies”.
Sullivan explained he has repeatedly engaged with Waltz on the issue, and he left feeling hopeful.
“He understands on that personal, visceral level, how much these folks mean to [veterans],” Sullivan said. “So I know he gets it.”
‘A screeching halt’
Other advocates, however, are less hopeful. James Powers, a grassroots organiser from Ohio who focuses on veterans issues, pointed to immigration hardliner Stephen Miller’s role in the new administration.
Miller had served in Trump’s first administration when SIV processing had slowed to a trickle.
“It only makes sense that [the programme] would come to a screeching halt as soon as he got back into power to influence the current president,” Powers said.
Advocates also worried that the years of work to grow the current system were at risk.
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Just last year, Congress passed a law with bipartisan support that created a special office to coordinate and streamline SIV relocations.
Over the last four years, the Biden administration also expanded the processing of both SIVs and other Afghan refugee categories. Biden’s government issued 33,341 SIVs in fiscal year 2024, about triple the number issued in 2022, the first full fiscal year following the withdrawal.
Afghan refugee admissions also increased from 1,618 in fiscal year 2022 to 14,708 in 2024.
All told, over 200,000 Afghans have been relocated to the US since the withdrawal, including tens of thousands flown on evacuation flights in the immediate aftermath.
“They’ve got to do a better job,” Powers said of the Trump administration. “There are fair experts on both sides of the aisle, on all ideological spectrums, that will tell them there are better ways.”
Source: Al Jazeera
Trump at odds with US military veterans over snarled Afghan relocations
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Pakistan has expressed concern over the expulsion of Afghan nationals from Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The organization is aware of the Pakistani government’s directive that all Afghans holding the ACC card must leave these cities and immediately return to Afghanistan.
In a statement released on Saturday, February 1, the UNHCR confirmed that under the new instructions from the Pakistani government, Afghan nationals with POR cards are also required to relocate from Islamabad and Rawalpindi. This comes despite the fact that their residence permits in Pakistan are valid until June 30 of this year.
The UNHCR further stated that Afghans who have been accepted for resettlement in third countries must also adhere to this relocation order. These individuals are required to move out of Islamabad and Rawalpindi by March 31, 2025, according to the decision made by the Pakistani authorities.
The decision to expel Afghan refugees has raised significant concerns, particularly about the safety and security of those affected. Many of the displaced individuals have limited resources and are already vulnerable due to their refugee status. The UNHCR’s call for attention underscores the need for more international support to ensure their rights and welfare are protected during this difficult transition.
The large-scale return of Afghans from Pakistan, especially under such circumstances, may further strain Afghanistan’s already fragile infrastructure and resources. As more people are forced to return to Afghanistan, international organizations and governments must step up their support to ensure that these returnees have access to basic services, shelter, and opportunities to rebuild their lives.
UNHCR expresses concern over deportation of Afghan refugees from Islamabad and Rawalpindi
Iskandar Momeni, Iran’s Minister of the Interior, announced on Saturday, February 1, that since the beginning of March last year, 1.1 million Afghan refugees have been sent back to Afghanistan from Iran.
Momeni made these remarks during a special interview with Iran’s state television, IRIB News. He highlighted that, as of now, there are six million foreign nationals living in Iran. He also pointed out that two million of these individuals are residing in Iran illegally, even for short-term stays.
Minister Momeni reminded that there are limited job opportunities available for both refugees and local citizens. Furthermore, international assistance to address the needs of the migrant population is still lacking.
Although Afghan migrants have historically been present in Iran, the number of migrants has increased significantly since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan. Factors such as lack of job opportunities, poverty, insecurity, and ethnic discrimination under Taliban rule have forced many Afghan citizens to flee their homeland.
The large number of Afghan refugees in Iran is placing immense pressure on the country’s resources. With limited opportunities for both refugees and local populations, Iran faces a challenging situation. The need for international cooperation to support both the migrants and host communities is becoming more urgent.
Given the ongoing political instability in Afghanistan, long-term solutions to the refugee crisis are necessary. International organizations and governments must work together to create sustainable plans that support refugees while addressing the root causes of displacement, such as conflict and lack of opportunity in Afghanistan.
Iran’s Interior Minister says over one million Afghan refugees deported
In its 66th report, SIGAR describes ISIS as a threat to Afghanistan and claims that the interim Afghan government tolerates Al-Qaeda.
The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), in its quarterly report, has addressed security, governance, international relations, the humanitarian crisis, education, and Afghanistan’s economy.
In its 66th report, SIGAR describes ISIS as a threat to Afghanistan and claims that the interim Afghan government tolerates Al-Qaeda. The report details that ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) has increased its attacks by 40% compared to last year, posing a threat not only to Afghanistan but also to Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Russia.
A section of the report states: “While the Taliban have moved against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) and other anti-Taliban groups, they remain tolerant of terror groups such as al Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). A UN sanctions monitoring team reported in July 2024 that Afghanistan continues to be perceived as permissive or friendly territory by terrorist groups, which also aspire to project threats globally.”
John Sopko, the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, also pointed out that although no country has officially recognized the interim Afghan government, they continue to engage with its officials.
Another section of the report discusses Afghanistan’s human rights case at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
According to the ICJ process, the interim Afghan government will be given an opportunity to resolve the issue, failing which, political pressure will be exerted on countries considering normalizing relations with the Islamic Emirate.
The report states: “According to court proceedings, the Taliban will be given a chance to resolve the issue, and if they fail to do so, the ICJ will proceed with the case. The ICJ lacks an enforcement mechanism, but analysts have pointed out that a judgment against the Taliban would put political pressure on states who are considering normalizing relations with the regime.”
The Islamic Emirate has rejected SIGAR’s claims, insisting that no foreign groups operate in Afghanistan and dismissing SIGAR’s portrayal of ISIS as an exaggerated and politically motivated campaign.
Hamdullah Fitrat, the deputy spokesperson of the Islamic Emirate, stated: “Labeling ISIS as a major threat to Afghanistan and indirectly amplifying its significance is part of a campaign that no one should promote. There are no rogue groups in Afghanistan, and we reject this report.”
Aziz Maraj, a political analyst, said: “If the officials of the Islamic Emirate wish to establish and expand relations with the international community, they must adhere to all global principles, regulations, and charters.”
Additionally, SIGAR highlighted the ban on female education in medical institutions, citing a UN Women report that warns maternal mortality rates in Afghanistan could increase by 50% by 2026 due to this restriction.
In a statement, the organization said that the US State Department has instructed them to immediately halt all activities related to US financial aid.
Following the 85-day suspension of US foreign aid, the Norwegian People’s Aid organization has now announced the cessation of its activities in 12 countries, including Afghanistan.
In a statement, the organization said that the US State Department has instructed them to immediately halt all activities related to US financial aid.
“The leaders of the Islamic Emirate should invest in larger projects, just as they have started work on some initiatives so that the people of Afghanistan can find employment in them,” said Ismail Zadran, an economic analyst.
Previously, the Ministry of Economy had also announced the suspension of operations of 50 aid organizations in Afghanistan.
The ministry emphasized that organizations operating in vital sectors are crucial and stressed that essential activities related to security, preventing human casualties, poverty reduction, and addressing environmental challenges should not be politicized.
Abdul Rahman Habib, spokesperson for the Ministry of Economy, said: “Due to the prolonged imposed wars, a significant amount of landmines and unexploded ordnance pose a serious threat to our people in various parts of the country. The suspension of certain essential activities by some foreign organizations in this area, due to changes in US policy, has led to a loss of trust in the principles and objectives of humanitarian aid and respect for human dignity under the United Nations framework worldwide.”
Unemployment and poverty have forced some Afghan citizens, particularly Kabul residents, to wait on the streets of the capital for daily wage work.
Javid, a 55-year-old man, waits daily on a Kabul street in the hope of finding a job. Supporting a family of nine, he said that over the past month, he has only found work twice.
“There is no work. You see these people—they are extremely needy. Many of them don’t even have lunch, let alone knowing how they will get through the night,” said Javid, a resident of Kabul.
Meanwhile, following the suspension of US foreign aid, the United States Agency for International Development’s website has gone offline without providing any details.
These developments come as a US senator has once again urged the country’s president to halt the weekly transfer of $40 million in aid to the Islamic Emirate.
Norwegian People’s Aid Suspends Operations in Afghanistan
The watchdog for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan said the Taliban have no legal right to billions of dollars in funding set aside for the country because they are not recognized as its government and are under sanctions.
In its latest report issued Friday, the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or SIGAR, also said President Donald Trump’s administration and Congress may want to examine returning nearly $4 billion earmarked for Afghanistan to the “custody and control” of the U.S. government.
In 2022, the U.S. transferred $3.5 billion in Afghan central bank assets previously frozen in America to the Swiss-based Fund for the Afghan People. The fund has grown to nearly $4 billion since then, according to the inspector general.
Although no payments benefiting Afghans have been made, the fund is aimed at protecting and stabilizing the economy on their behalf.
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“The Taliban want these funds even though they have no legal right to them since they are not recognized by the United States as the government of Afghanistan, are on the U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist list, and are under U.S. and U.N. sanctions,” the report said.
Responding to the report Saturday, the Afghan Economy Ministry said more than $9 billion of Afghanistan’s foreign exchange reserves had been frozen and warned that any U.S. action regarding the allocation, use or transfer of these reserves was unacceptable.
It urged the international community to return the money to the central bank to ensure the country’s stability.
The ministry also said that U.S. expenditure had made no significant impact on the Afghan economy.
The SIGAR report follows Trump’s decision to freeze foreign aid for 90 days pending reviews to determine whether projects align with his policy goals.
Another $1.2 billion remains available in the pipeline for possible disbursement, the report said.
U.S. humanitarian assistance may have “staved off famine” in the face of economic collapse, but it has not dissuaded the Taliban from taking Americans hostage, dismantling the rights of women and girls, censoring the media, allowing the country to become a “terrorist safe haven,” and targeting former Afghan government officials, added the watchdog.
The U.S. remains the largest donor to Afghanistan, but the report said a lot of the money is taxed or diverted.
“The further the cash gets away from the source, the less transparency there is,” Chris Borgeson, the deputy inspector general for audits and inspections at the watchdog, told The Associated Press last August.
The General Directorate of State-Owned Corporations said an international hotel brand, Serena, had signed an agreement in 2003 with the Tourism Promotion Services Company for Afghanistan. This contract was terminated by the Emirates Hotel Company last December. The hotel had continued its operations as usual since then.
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“To further standardize its services, the Emirates Hotels Company has signed an agreement with an international company that has extensive experience in the hospitality industry,” said the directorate on its official X account. “This international company will now manage and operate the Kabul Hotel’s services in a professional and standardized manner.”
The name of the international company was not mentioned.
The Taliban have no legal right to multibillion dollar Afghan fund, says US watchdog
Some economic experts believe that the US should not politicize its aid to Afghanistan.
US Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) has introduced a bill to prevent the Islamic Emirate from accessing American funds through the United Nations.
According to this bill, US aid sent via the UN will be subject to the US State Department’s guarantee that Washington’s cash assistance will not be included in UN humanitarian shipments to Afghanistan.
Senator Shelley Moore Capito stated: “the bill prohibits US contributions to the UN for assistance to Afghanistan until the State Department provides certification to Congress that: (1) no US funds are included in UN cash shipments into Afghanistan; and (2) no Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organization or Foreign Terrorist Organization will receive any funds via such contributions.”
“The Islamic Emirate must engage not only based on religious principles but also in accordance with global and regional norms in political and economic sectors. Otherwise, the humanitarian crisis will worsen further,” said Silab Samandar, an economic analyst.
Despite ongoing concerns about reduced aid and economic challenges, the Ministry of Economy asserts that the country’s economic situation is under control and that Afghanistan will not face serious problems if aid is cut off.
Abdul Latif Nazari, the deputy minister of economy, stated: “The approval of a new bill by a US senator to exert more pressure on the Afghan people cannot slow our economic progress. The country’s economic situation remains stable, exports and imports continue without issue, and national revenues are transparently deposited into the state treasury.”
Some economic experts believe that the US should not politicize its aid to Afghanistan.
“In all countries, when a crisis arises and people face economic hardship, it is the responsibility of other nations to provide assistance. However, this aid should not be politicized. If humanitarian aid reaches ordinary people and some attempt to portray it as political, they are, in fact, violating human rights,” said Abdul Nasir Reshtya, an economic analyst.
Previously, US President Donald Trump stated that the US provides billions of dollars in annual aid to Afghanistan and that these funds should be given on condition that US equipment now held by the Islamic Emirate be given back to the US.
US Senator Introduces Bill to Restrict Aid to Afghanistan Through UN
The United Nations says aid workers are still in a “race against time” to remove rubble and rebuild after the devastating earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan last month, killing at least 2,200 people and cutting off remote areas.
The 6.0-magnitude quake on Aug. 31 was shallow, destroying or causing extensive damage to low-rise buildings in the mountainous region. It hit late at night, and homes — mostly made of mud, wood, or rocks — collapsed instantly, becoming death traps.
Satellite data shows that about 40,500 truckloads of debris still needs to be cleared from affected areas in several provinces, the United Nations Development Program said Wednesday. Entire communities have been upended and families are sleeping in the open, it added.
The quake’s epicenter was in remote and rugged Kunar province, challenging rescue and relief efforts by the Taliban government and humanitarian groups. Authorities deployed helicopters or airdropped army commandos to evacuate survivors. Aid workers walked for hours on foot to reach isolated communities.
“This is a race against time,” said Devanand Ramiah, from the UNDP’s Crisis Bureau. “Debris removal and reconstruction operations must start safely and swiftly.”
People’s main demands were the reconstruction of houses and water supplies, according to a spokesman for a Taliban government committee tasked with helping survivors, Zia ur Rahman Speenghar.
People were getting assistance in cash, food, tents, beds, and other necessities, Speenghar said Thursday. Three new roads were under construction in the Dewagal Valley, and roads would be built to areas where there previously were none.
“Various countries and organizations have offered assistance in the construction of houses but that takes time. After the second round of assistance, work will begin on the third round, which is considering what kind of houses can be built here,” the spokesman said.
Afghanistan is facing a “perfect storm” of crises, including natural disasters like the recent earthquake, said Roza Otunbayeva, who leads the U.N. mission to the country.
Afghanistan Peace Campaign
