In deference to Turkiye’s request, Pakistan agreed to continue the talks with the Afghan Taliban in Istanbul. A meeting of the Pakistani and Afghan principals (possibly defence ministers) on November 6 is likely to yield a compromise that has bedevilled the dialogue process so far.
Turkiye’s Foreign Office statement gave the encouraging news that “all parties agreed to continuation of ceasefire”, and “put in place a monitoring and verification mechanism that will ensure maintenance of peace and imposing penalty on the violating party”. However, whether the Taliban regime officials agree to provide written assurances on a “monitoring and verification mechanism” remains to be seen.
Earlier, during the meeting between the officials of the two countries, Defence Minister Khwaja Asif’s blunt warning to the Taliban to provide verifiable guarantees on the TTP caused ripples in Afghan circles. Meanwhile, the Taliban’s ‘ignorance’ about the TTP’s presence or activities had no takers. In this day and age, nothing can be hidden, so why claim that there are no TTP guys in Afghanistan or that ISKP cadres are in Pakistan, not in Afghanistan?
The UN, international NGOs, including Amnesty International, report clearly the existence of these terrorist organisations in Afghanistan. Not to forget that the prominent figures of the Taliban leadership are still on the 1267 travel list.
The Istanbul talks brought home three points about the Taliban’s modus operandi towards their interlocutors. First, the decision-making process of the Taliban regime is highly centralised; nothing moves without the consent of Amir Ul Momeneen Mullah Haibtullah Akhund. Therefore, Taliban officials drag out the dialogue to the maximum to tire out their interlocutors. They also believe that yielding to a proposal or demand would give the other side space or reflect poorly on the Taliban.
Empirical evidence of their delaying tactics is the ban on girls’ education, whereby the Taliban officials maintain that they are still formulating a policy about the resumption of girls’ education beyond sixth grade. The question is: are the Taliban working out a rocket manufacturing formula that is taking so much time? The plausible answer is that through such delaying tactics, the Taliban clergy think that the people will forget all about the issue. But they are harshly mistaken; girls’ education will continue to haunt them unless they give in.
Second, the Taliban are stony-faced when confronted by opponents with incontrovertible evidence. For instance, while they are passionate about relaxation in transit trade from Pakistan, their Islamic ethics take a backseat when they happily allow the smuggling of contraband items to Pakistan.
Third, if cornered on the TTP, the Afghan Taliban tell Pakistan that “we fear that bringing pressure on the TTP may push them to join the ISKP”. They also admit that TTP cadres have already joined ISKP. Hence, taking action against the TTP would be detrimental to the Taliban regime. While maintaining this stance, the Taliban officials forget that they are not living on an island and their regime is bound to take action against all terrorist groups, be they ISKP, TTP, ETIM or Al-Qaeda.
The above observations are not a conference-room eyewitness account but a drawing-board sketch of a group of people who are ruling Afghanistan, about whom our ruling elite wore a proud smile when they triumphantly entered Kabul. The Pakistanis were led to believe that the “Taliban have broken the shackles of slavery”, without realising that soon Afghanistan would be ruled by a group with a basic knowledge of religious and conservative characteristics. Therefore, the Taliban regime’s actions do not enjoy endorsement from the Islamic world, especially the ban on girls’ education and women’s right to work, which have been unanimously condemned by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
What should be Pakistan’s course of action in tackling the situation with the Afghan Taliban regime? If Pakistan is banking on controlling the TTP in Afghanistan as a panacea to the current onslaught by the terrorist organisation, there is a need to reexamine the drawing board. That’s where it becomes apparent that the TTP’s back can be broken, mainly in the merged districts of former Fata, with crucial support from the local people, of course.
Once TTP cadres within Pakistan are neutralised, the ones sitting in Afghanistan will automatically become orphans and lose their nuisance value. Also, political ownership of the problem by all and sundry would be crucial for a successful campaign against TTP terrorists. The same applies to Balochistan, where people must be made stakeholders if we intend to render the BLA/BLF irrelevant.
As regards the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan will have to show patience and leadership while tackling the Afghan Taliban diplomatically. Preference should be focused on intelligence-based operations (IBOs) to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure wherever it exists. The government of Pakistan should consider taking measures to make the TTP cadres and their leadership’s lives difficult in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a first step, the government should issue red warrants for the TTP leaders holed up in Afghanistan and raise the issue with the UN Security Council’s 1267 Committee for their arrest and repatriation to Pakistan to face the law.
Second, the TTP’s narrative should be effectively challenged, including their religious locus and the legitimacy of their cause. It is encouraging to note that the TTP does not enjoy legitimacy in Pakistan, especially in the tribal areas. The TTP’s blackmail can be challenged by empowering the local population and adequately resourcing the police.
Third, Pakistan should send a friendly message to the people of Afghanistan, regardless of the government in Kabul. The Afghan people feel comfortable in Pakistan, which is Pakistan’s great strength. By deporting Afghans in droves, the anti-Pakistan lobby in Afghanistan will only be further strengthened, which should be avoided. Fourth, create a conducive environment for people-to-people contacts and business and investment opportunities, especially by encouraging Afghan businesspeople to invest in Pakistan. Afghan businesspeople will be ready to invest billions of dollars in Pakistan, provided their investments are secure.
The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to Iran and the UAE. He is also a former special representative of Pakistan for Afghanistan and currently serves as a senior research fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).
Afghanistan Peace Campaign
