According to this report, despite minor improvements, 11.6 million people in Afghanistan still face crisis-level food insecurity or worse.
The World Food Program (WFP) has reported a slight improvement in food security in Afghanistan; however, food needs remain very high in the country.
According to this report, despite minor improvements, 11.6 million people in Afghanistan still face crisis-level food insecurity or worse.
The organization attributes this situation to fundamental causes, including unemployment, family debt, low income, the return of migrants from neighboring countries, and fluctuations in food prices.
The World Food Program projects that approximately 3.5 million children under five and 1.15 million pregnant and breastfeeding women will suffer from acute malnutrition.
“With winter approaching, it is expected that more people will need emergency assistance, and the World Food Programme plans to assist more than 6 million people,” said Ziauddin Safi, the communications officer for the World Food Program.
Simultaneously, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that between January and August this year, 14.4 million people in Afghanistan received aid.
The organization noted that sudden crises continue to create new needs and exacerbate infrastructural vulnerabilities.
Sayed Rahman, a Kabul resident, said, “Winter is here, and snow will come. I have young children, and we need help—not just me but also those who have returned from neighboring countries with difficulty and lack basic resources.”
“Winter is coming, and we have neither coal nor wood. There is no assistance, and no one has helped us so far. We request help from our government,” said another Kabul resident, Amin Gul.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Economy says it is intensifying efforts to meet people’s needs. The ministry has requested that the international community enhance cooperation in infrastructure and agricultural development to help Afghanistan gradually achieve food self-sufficiency.
“Relying on existing economic capacities and focusing on national programs, such as transportation infrastructure and energy, supporting local production, and the private sector through trade facilitation and export development, as well as prioritizing job-creation sectors and small businesses to improve the economic situation, are among our priorities,” stated Abdul Rahman Habib, spokesperson for the Ministry of Economy.
Previously, Save the Children announced that it faces a $4.2 million shortfall to provide winter assistance to 18,000 vulnerable families in Afghanistan.
This conference was organized by the Central Bank of Afghanistan.
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, stated on Wednesday at the National Conference on Microfinance Opportunities and Challenges in Kabul that reducing poverty and unemployment, as well as creating job opportunities for citizens, are priorities for the Islamic Emirate.
This conference was organized by the Central Bank of Afghanistan and attended by senior officials from the Islamic Emirate, representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Bank, ambassadors, and a number of investors and businesspeople.
In the meeting, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar said: “Now more than ever, there is an opportunity to support the general public through financing small sectors and to provide them with job opportunities. Thanks to the security established across the country, transparency is in place, and people fulfill their financial obligations on time without anyone’s rights being infringed.”
Noor Ahmad Agha, acting head of the Central Bank, stated: “Da Afghanistan Bank (central bank) believes that micro-financing is an effective tool to improve financial inclusion and can create a significant difference in the country’s social and economic stability.”
Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi also remarked that Afghanistan’s economy over the past twenty years was artificial and that now the Islamic Emirate is working to address economic challenges through the launch of infrastructure projects.
The acting Foreign Minister said: “Unfortunately, in the past twenty years, Afghanistan’s economy was inflated, and an artificial economy was in place. The policies and practices of past years cultivated a dependency among the proud people of Afghanistan.”
Nooruddin Azizi, the acting Minister of Industry and Commerce, another speaker at the event, said: “Meaningful and practical cooperation among all stakeholders in the private sector can bring about economic stability and create job opportunities for all.”
Meanwhile, Roza Otunbayeva, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNAMA, stated that women in Afghanistan have limited opportunities for economic development. Otunbayeva urged the acting government officials to support women in Afghanistan.
Roza Otunbayeva added: “Women constitute more than 40% of existence microfinance beneficiaries. Women have limited opportunities for economic development and hence, we need to keep providing them microfinance assistance so that they can have decent leaving. I request authorities to continue to provide priority to women in the microfinance sector.”
During the meeting, two licenses were issued for institutions that finance companies, and eight additional licenses were granted to companies providing small loans to people.
Baradar: Reducing Poverty, Job Creation ‘Priority’ for Islamic Emirate
Isabelle Moussard Carlsen reported that only 32% of OCHA’s total requested budget has been met from the beginning of the year until November.
Isabelle Moussard Carlsen, head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan told TOLOnews in an exclusive interview that OCHA is striving to deliver aid to those in need during the upcoming winter season in Afghanistan.
Isabelle Moussard Carlsen stated that United Nations agencies and other humanitarian organizations have assisted 14 million people across Afghanistan this year. According to Carlsen, OCHA is developing its 2025 assistance program, focusing on food security, water scarcity, climate change, and natural disaster response.
The head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan said: “First of all, we are still in preliminary numbers for 2025, the humanitarian respond needs plans will be published in December, so we still have a bit of time — couple of weeks — we are working very hard in getting all the information and having all the actors working with us in consulting to make sure that we have the best plan for 2025. And we are also at the same time starting to discuss and advocate with donors to ensure that there will be funding for the humanitarian response in Afghanistan in 2025.”
Moussard also attributed the temporary halting of some aid projects in Afghanistan to administrative obstacles and noted that United Nations agencies make impartial decisions in assisting vulnerable people based on their policies.
On this subject, she added: “It is not OCHA that is stopping because OCHA doesn’t have any projects. OCHA is a coordination body, so the partners that we are working with, have sometimes had to temporary — and its what the report says — suspension of project because they had issues of administrative natures and since we have to respect humanitarian principles, when we can’t respect them, we temporary suspend project till the administrative implements are solved.”
In another part of the interview, Isabelle Moussard Carlsen reported that only 32% of OCHA’s total requested budget has been met from the beginning of the year until November.
She further explained: “Depending on the provinces, the districts, the region, depending on the needs, it will be different types of assistance. And it also depends on the resources. This humanitarian needs and response plan I have talked about, as of October, it’s only be in 31, 32 percent funded, which means that there is a big gap of funding to cover all the needs.”
Although the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Coordination in Afghanistan has noted that the current situation in Afghanistan has improved compared to three years ago, it emphasized that the situation remains fragile and that citizens remain in a vulnerable state.
OCHA Head: Efforts Being Made to Provide Winter Assistance
The day after Donald Trump won the 2024 presidential election, Afghanistan’s Taliban offered its congratulations to the American people for “not handing leadership of their great country to a woman.”
Taliban leaders expressed optimism that Trump’s election would enable a new chapter in the history of U.S-Taliban relations. They noted that it was Trump who suggested a new international order when he inked the February 29, 2020, Doha Agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban. That deal cut out the Afghan government and committed the U.S. to leave Afghanistan by May 2021, closing five military bases and ending economic sanctions on the Taliban. This paved the way for the U.S. evacuation of the country in August 2021 and the return of the Taliban to power.
The Taliban prohibits girls’ education past the sixth grade and recently banned the sound of women’s voices outside their homes.
In Russia, Russian thinker Alexander Dugin explained the dramatic global impact of Trump’s win. “We have won,” Dugin said. “The world will be never ever like before. Globalists have lost their final combat.” Dugin has made his reputation on his calls for an “anti-American revolution” and a new Russian empire built on “the rejection of [alliances of democratic nations surrounding the Atlantic], strategic control of the United States, and the rejection of the supremacy of economic, liberal market values,” as well as reestablishing traditional family structures with strict gender roles.
Maxim Trudolyubov of the Wilson Center, a nonpartisan foreign affairs think tank, suggested Friday that Putin’s long-term goal of weakening the U.S. has made him more interested in dividing Americans than in any one candidate.
Indeed, rather than backing Trump wholeheartedly, Russian president Vladimir Putin has been undercutting him. He did not comment on Trump’s election until Thursday, when he said that the power of liberal democracies over world affairs is “irrevocably disappearing.” Although Ellen Nakashima, John Hudson, and Josh Dawsey of the Washington Post reported that Trump and Putin had spoken on Thursday, Putin denied such a call as “pure fiction.”
Exacerbating America’s internal divisions and demonstrating dominance over both the U.S. and Trump might explain why after Trump became president-elect, laughing Russian media figures showed viewers nude pictures of Trump’s third wife, Melania, taken during her modeling career.
In an interview, Putin’s presidential aide Nikolay Patrushev said today: “To achieve success in the election, Donald Trump relied on certain forces to which he has corresponding obligations. As a responsible person, he will be obliged to fulfill them.” Meanwhile, U.S. and Ukrainian officials report that Russia has massed 50,000 soldiers, including North Korean soldiers, to reclaim territory in the Kursk region of Russia taken this year by Ukrainian forces.
Trump claims to have talked to about seventy world leaders since his reelection but has declined to go through the usual channels of the State Department. This illustrates his determination to reorganize the federal government around himself rather than its normal operations but leaves him—and the United States—vulnerable to misstatements and misunderstandings.
The domestic effects of Trump’s victory also reveal confusion, both within the Republican Party and within national politics. Voters elected Trump and his running mate, Ohio senator J.D. Vance, but it’s hard to miss that billionaire Elon Musk, who backed Trump’s 2024 campaign financially, seems to be “Trump’s shadow vice-president,” as Nick Robins-Early of The Guardian put it. Sources told CNN’s Kaitlan Collins that Musk has been a constant presence at Mar-a-Lago since the election, sitting in on phone calls with foreign leaders and weighing in on staffing decisions. Yesterday at Mar-a-Lago, Musk met with the chief executive officer of the right-wing media channel Newsmax.
Exactly who is in control of the party is unclear, and in the short term that question is playing out over the Senate’s choice of a successor to minority leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY). In the new Congress, this Republican leader will become Senate majority leader, thereby gaining the power to control the Senate calendar and decide which bills get taken up and which do not.
Trump controls the majority of Republicans in the House, but he did not control Senate Republicans when McConnell led them. Now he wants to put Florida senator Rick Scott into the leadership role, but Republicans aligned with McConnell and the pre-2016 party want John Thune (R-SD) or John Cornyn (R-TX). There are major struggles taking place over the choice. Today Musk posted on social media his support for Scott. Other MAGA leaders fell in line, with media figure Benny Johnson—recently revealed to be on Russia’s payroll—urging his followers to target senators backing Thune or Cornyn.
Rachael Bade and Eugene Daniels of Politico Playbook suggested that this pressure would backfire, especially since many senators dislike Scott for his unsuccessful leadership of the National Republican Senatorial Committee that works to elect Republicans to the Senate.
Trump has also tried to sideline senators by demanding they abandon one of their key constitutional roles: that of advice and consent to a president’s appointment of top administration figures. Although Republicans will command a majority in the Senate, Trump is evidently concerned he cannot get some of his appointees through, so has demanded that Republicans agree to let him make recess appointments without going through the usual process of constitutionally mandated advice and consent.
Trump has also demanded that Republicans stop Democrats from making any judicial appointments in the next months, although Republicans continued to approve his nominees after voters elected President Joe Biden in 2020. Indeed, Judge Aileen Cannon, who let Trump off the hook for his retention of classified documents, was approved after Trump had lost the election.
All this jockeying comes amid the fact that while Trump is claiming a mandate from his election, in fact the vote was anything but a landslide. While votes are still being counted, Trump seems to have won by fewer than two percentage points in a cycle where incumbents across the globe lost. This appears to be the smallest popular vote margin for a winning candidate since Richard Nixon won in 1968.
While voters elected Trump, they also backed Democratic policies. In seven states, voters enshrined abortion rights in their constitutions. Two Republican-dominated states raised their minimum wage to $15 an hour; three enshrined mandated paid leave. In exit polls last week, sixty-five percent of voters said they want abortion to remain legal, and fifty-six percent said they want undocumented immigrants to have a chance to apply for legal status.
The gap between what Trump has promised MAGA supporters and what voters want is creating confusion in national politics. How can Trump deliver the national abortion ban MAGAs want when sixty-five percent of voters want abortion rights? How can he deport all undocumented immigrants, including those who have been here for decades and integrated into their communities, while his own voters say they want undocumented immigrants to have a path to citizenship?
Trump’s people have repeatedly expressed their opinion that Trump was stopped from putting the full MAGA agenda into place because he did not move quickly enough in his first term. They have vowed they will not make that mistake again. But the fast imposition of their extremist policies runs the risk of alienating the more moderate voters who just put them in power.
In September, as the Taliban enforced new rules on women in Afghanistan, they also began to target Afghan men. New laws mandated that men stop wearing western jeans, stop cutting their hair and beards in western ways, and stop looking at women other than their wives or female relatives. Religious morality officers are knocking on the doors of those who haven’t recently attended mosque to remind them they can be tried and sentenced for repeated nonattendance, and government employees are afraid they’ll be fired if they don’t grow their beards. According to Rick Noack of the Washington Post, such restrictions surprised men, who were accustomed to enjoying power in their society. Some have been wondering if they should have spoken up to defend the freedoms of their wives and daughters.
One man who had supported the Taliban said he now feels bullied. “We all are practicing Muslims and know what is mandatory or not. But it’s unacceptable to use force on us,” he said. Speaking on the condition of anonymity because he feared drawing the attention of the regime, another man from Kabul said: “If men had raised their voices, we might also be in a different situation now.”
Although the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s (IEA) ban on opium cultivation continues largely to hold, the area under poppy did increase in 2024, by almost a fifth, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) annual survey. Even with that increase, however, this year’s cultivation was negligible compared to pre-ban levels. What is more noteworthy is the shifting of the geographic centre of cultivation from Helmand in the south to the northeastern province of Badakhshan. More than half of the country’s total cultivation was grown there in 2024, said UNODC. The Emirate disputed these findings, saying that UNODC report did not take into account its eradication efforts. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica and Fabrizio Foschini have taken a closer look at historical opium cultivation trends in Badakhshan and probe why the IEA’s ban has not worked in this remote province, which borders Tajikistan, Pakistan and China.Last year, there was an absolute decrease – in the order of 95 per cent – in opium cultivation nationally. This year, the new UNDOC’s survey of Afghanistan, released on 6 November 2024, has found a reversal:[1] across 14 of Afghanistan’s provinces, farmers sowed an estimated 12,800 hectares with poppy,[2]an increase of 19 per cent compared to 2023, when an estimated 10,800 hectares were cultivated. This year’s opium poppy cultivation is still a fraction of pre-ban levels: in 2022, Afghans cultivated an estimated 232,000 hectares of land with poppy. The dramatic drop in cultivation during the 2023 season was a direct result of the April 2022 IEA ban, which came into force that autumn. It meant poppy cultivation was virtually eliminated across much of the country (see AAN reporting here and here).[3] This year’s increase in cultivation has also come with a shift in where most poppy is grown, reported UNODC:
The south-western provinces of the country have long been the centre of cultivation up to and including 2023. In 2024, this changed and now 59 per cent of all cultivation took place in the north-east, particularly in Badakhshan.
This is actually an underestimate of Badakhshan’s prominence. The only other province in the northeast to plant more than 100 hectares of opium poppy was Takhar and its contribution was only about two per cent of the regional total.[4] As will be seen below, the IEA believes that UNODC has got its data wrong and that the poppy that was sown in Badakhshan was completely eradicated before the 2024 harvest.
Also of immediate interest in the latest report is data on opium prices. These have now stabilised after steady upward shifts following the Taleban takeover. The long-running pre-ban average was 100 USD per kilo. By August 2023, said UNDOC, they had reached “a twenty-year peak” of 408 USD a kilogramme, surpassing even the price hike following the first IEA ban in 2000/2001. Yet, prices continued to climb. In December 2023, Afghan opiates expert David Mansfield reported they had reached as high as 1,112 USD per kilogramme in the south and 1,088 USD per kilogramme in Nangrahar (see this tweet). Only in early February 2024 did prices start to decline. In June 2024, they were back down to an average of 730 USD, which is still far higher than before the ban, or before the Taleban capture of power.
The extremely high farm-gate prices have produced windfall profits for those who have continued to grow and harvest poppy. The same is true for those who had opium stocks to sell because the IEA did not immediately target traders, although the April 2022 ban also covered trade. In March 2023 (a year after it announced the ban), according to Hasht-e Subh, the IEA issued a 10-month deadline to traders to export opium out of Afghanistan, waiving export taxes. The stated goal of the IEA, they reported, was to end the opium trade in Afghanistan by liquidating all remaining stocks and discouraging future poppy cultivation. However, according to UNODC, trade was continuing in 2023 and Mansfield and Alcis also reported, in April 2024, that:
[O]pium is openly traded in markets across the country even in those areas where there has been no crop since the 2022 harvest; and Afghanistan’s neighbours, including Iran, Tajikistan, and Pakistan, consistently make large seizures of opiates, even arguing that a drug ban is not in place. Evidence shows that the reason that drugs are still being trafficked cross-border is the substantial inventory of opium that remains in Afghanistan.
While traders and richer farmers able to store opium have made huge profits because of the ban on cultivation driving prices up, for land-poor farmers, and the labourers who used to rely on opium for paid work, the ban has been catastrophic. That inequity, between those benefitting from the ban and those hurt by it, could yet give rise to tensions, within or between regions.
All eyes will now be on Badakhshan, the new national leader in opium cultivation, in the coming months, including the Emirate’s. The focus of the rest of this report will be on that province, as we look both at the history of opium there and why many farmers have still been able to continue to grow it, unlike their counterparts elsewhere.
A brief history of opium in Badakhshan
In a major AAN report published in 2016, ‘On the Cultural History of Opium – and how poppy came to Afghanistan’, we quoted researchers like Katja Mielke who suggested that in several parts of Afghanistan, but especially Badakhshan, the “cultivation of opium poppy with the aim to produce raw opium for self-consumption had a long tradition.” It was used, for example, to counter pain, such as from snakebites, and to quell hunger. She and other sources do not say exactly how long ‘long’ may have been, but Jonathan Goodhand, from London University’s School of Oriental and Asian Studies, writes that poppy was introduced to Badakhshan from China and Bukhara via the silk route.[5]
Historically, opium cultivation played a crucial economic role in the province. After the British-Chinese agreement of 1907 had gradually eliminated the century-old trade of Indian opium towards China, Badakhshi traders took the initiative to exploit the large market for opium there, carrying the opium grown in their home province through the Pamirs to Kashgar and Yarkand.[6] However, Badakhshis not only traded in opium, they also grew it. A 1949 UN report mentioned two opium producing areas in the country, “one in western Afghanistan, adjacent to Khorasan province of eastern Iran [which may have been Herat or Farah], and the other in eastern Afghanistan, near Kashmir [probably Badakhshan and Nangrahar].” While the western zone would likely have been oriented towards the Iranian market, where the use of opium as a recreational drug was relatively widespread at that time, the eastern area had certainly developed in order to supply China. Even though that same year, the Chinese borders were closed after the victory of the Communist Revolution, production in Badakhshan continued and exports re-oriented to the rest of the region.
According to Adam Pain’s research on opium cultivation in Badakhshan, “by the 1950s opium poppy was an essential component of the crop repertoire along with wheat and patak (Lathryus sativus) [a legume grown to feed livestock].”[7] The long history of opium cultivation in Badakhshan, along with tradition, brought some to consider its opium to be of the highest quality in Afghanistan (Badakhshi cannabis enjoys similar fame; see AAN reports here and here).
Badakhshan’s opium farmers were, however, to receive a blow in 1958, when the central government made a concerted effort to wipe out opium cultivation, a response to international pressure to do so. However, the country-wide ban, instituted by the king’s prime minister, Daud Khan, was only enforced in Afghanistan’s most northeasterly province. At that time, Badakhshan had 3,000 farmers licensed by the king to grow opium, as Afghanistan in the 1940s and early 1950s was attempting to get an international licence to grow it legally for the pharmaceutical industry. The country’s frequent pleas for the licence at the United Nations had all been denied. Even so, wrote James Bradford, a scholar of drug policies under the Afghan Musahiban dynasty:[8]
The opium ban went into effect on March 21, 1958, stopping all opium cultivation on the nearly 3,000 small opium farmers in the districts around Faizabad, Jurm, and Kishim. All farmers who were licensed by the state were forced to transition to wheat and barley, and unlicensed farmers were being forced to transition as well.
Other provinces were growing opium as well, but were not subject to enforcement. Bradford said the Afghan government singled out Badakhshan in order to make a powerful statement, despite its marginal agricultural economy being quite heavily dependent on the narcotic crop:
In choosing Badakhshan, the Afghan government targeted the one area where opium played its most significant role. It was common knowledge at this point that opium was a staple crop in Badakhshan. Previous decades of trade had raised awareness to the superior quality of Badakhshan opium. Symbolism aside, this prohibition was a serious challenge for the state, not only because of the limitations of state power, but particularly because of the unique challenges the province provided.
For Kabul, keen to make a show of force directed at both internal and international audiences, Badakhshan was perfect. Famous as the centre of Afghanistan’s opium production, it was also very remote with limited state penetration and influence – until the ban, that is. Also, the local inhabitants mostly belonged to minority groups without the potential to lobby within or pose a military danger to the state, as Pashtun tribes had done until the 1940s.
Daud chose Badakhshan because it was inhabited by ethnic minorities who presented less of a threat to the stability of the state. … given the general reluctance of Musahiban leaders to provoke the Pashtun tribal base, Daud chose Badakhshan because it was inhabited by ethnic minorities who presented less of a threat to the stability of the state.[9]
The move devastated households’ food security, indicating the crop’s critical role in the province’s economy. Suddenly, tens of thousands of seasonal workers who had relied on opium harvesting, found themselves jobless. The New York Times reported on 16 June 1958 on the plight of Badakhshi residents:
[T]here [in Badakhshan] 100,000 persons, prohibited by law from growing the opium that has sustained them and their ancestors for centuries, are threatened with destitution … unless the loss of revenue from the highly remunerative opium crop can be at least partially offset.
The 1958 ban did not manage to stamp out opium production from Badakhshan completely. In the following years, as the five-year plan devised by the Afghan government with the help of the UN to provide residents with food aid and alternative livelihoods proved slow in materialising, some farmers resumed cultivation.[10]
The more recent history of opium in Badakhshan
Massive, illicit cultivation of opium in Badakhshan started up again in the 1990s, as elsewhere in Afghanistan, in the context of state dissolution and civil war that characterised Afghanistan during that decade. In the 1990s, Badakhshan also became self-sufficient in terms of drug processing, an important development, given that the province is enclosed by three international borders with China, Pakistan and Tajikistan.[11] As the only province that entirely escaped Taleban control during the first Emirate, it was not affected by the Taleban’s 2000 opium ban. That year, cultivation flourished: in 2001, Badakhshan contributed 79 per cent of the area under poppy cultivation nationally, a sharp increase from the three per cent of 2000.[12] In 2003, when opium production rebounded nationally, Badakhshan remained a top producer, second only to Helmand.
In the decades that followed, Badakhshan remained prominent in opium cultivation: it comprised an estimated 15 per cent of the total national area under poppy in 2003, compared to less than 5 per cent during much of the 1990s (see Graph 1 below, showing opium cultivation levels in Badakhshan province between 1994 and 2024).[13] The UNDOC and World Bank’s 2006 report ‘Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for Counter Narcotics Policy’ commented:
Isolated, mountainous Badakhshan, where the Taliban were never able to consolidate their control, was relatively unaffected by the drought, and profited from the Taliban ban that affected the rest of the country. Despite a three-fold fall in farm-gate prices, opium poppy cultivation rose again in 2003/04, only to fall by 50% in 2005. Indeed, the increase in Badakhshan and the reductions in Helmand were so pronounced in 2003 that the district of Keshem in Badakhshan was listed as the district cultivating the largest area of opium poppy in Afghanistan. (page 50)
Graph 1: Opium cultivation levels in Badakhshan province between 1994 and 2024. Source of data UNODC Opium Surveys. Graph by AAN.
Badakhshan was almost poppy-free in 2008 (meaning it was close to cultivating less than 100 hectares of poppy), thanks to a number of factors – low yields brought about by poor weather and insufficient rotation of crops, development agencies’ assistance programmes and increased counter-narcotics law enforcement in the province. Cultivation eventually picked up though, a pattern shared with much of the rest of the country; it reached 8,300 hectares by 2017, just over half of the 2004 historical high of 15,600 hectares.
This year, opium cultivation has almost reached the levels of 2017, but is still only about half of the historic peak of 2004. This then, is the background to the latest attempts by the central government to ban opium and the reasons why Badakhshan is bucking the national trend.
The IEA’s ban and why its application in Badakhshan has been limited
The IEA’s April 2022 ban on poppy cultivation has been implemented to different degrees across the country and that variation has been the main factor in the changing geography of poppy cultivation. In 2023, the amount of land under poppy in Badakhshan was down, but far less than other provinces, a drop of 63 per cent, compared to drops of 99.99 per cent in Helmand, 97 per cent in Balkh and 90 per cent in Nangrahar (UNODC figures here). Most provinces saw further reductions in poppy cultivation in 2024, or tiny increases. The bounce back in Badakhshan in 2024 was unmatched.[14]
The peculiar situation of the province has pushed the persistence of Badakhshan’s poppy cultivation. Its farmers are poor, typically engaging in subsistence agriculture on small and often otherwise unproductive landholdings. When the ban was introduced, there was no high-yielding alternative crop they could grow, and they also lacked stockpiles of opium, which could have acted as a safety net. The sudden abandonment of opium production was utterly unfeasible. That might also have been the case in other provinces, for example, land-poor farmers in parts of Nangrahar. However, in Badakhshan, the local Taleban authorities, many of whom are connected to farmers through family and social ties, appear to have recognised the looming hardship and been encouraged to show a degree of tolerance (although this has obviously not been officially acknowledged). However, the differing local IEA attitude to enforcing the ban in Badakhshan is also based on other reasons.
Elsewhere, enforcement of the poppy ban has been based less on repressive action but rather mainly on persuasion as to the rightness of the ban and an expectation that rules would be obeyed, with messages conveyed from the pulpits of mosques and by the authorities enjoining local elders to uphold the ban.[15] That method depended heavily on the existence of a strong network of long-time supporters and allies of the Taleban. In Kandahar and Helmand, the IEA has also banked on the support and trust of the major local poppy planters, who moreover, benefited greatly from the ban-induced hike in the value of their large opium stockpiles. In Badakhshan, on the other hand, the insurgency had been far weaker and the IEA found itself trying to enforce a ban in a province where its networks inside rural communities were relatively few, and weak (see AAN’s themed report about IEA governance in the northeast)
When the ban was announced, local IEA officials in Badakhshan – former Taleban commanders who had usually not enjoyed mass community support during the insurgency – were still struggling to expand their influence. This was a region that had never previously experienced Taleban rule and which hosted significant remnants of the old anti-Taleban mujahedin networks. The new authorities were suspicious of the old local elites, who are largely of a Jamiat-e Islami background, considering them susceptible to being enticed to join the armed opposition – which is still active in parts of the province. During the first couple of years of IEA rule, some co-option strategies were put in place in order to win locally influential people over to the Emirate’s side. Local Taleban commanders, for example, were generally left in control of their home districts rather than shuffled around the province or even outside it – which is common practice elsewhere in the Emirate – in order to help them consolidate their local power bases. Moreover, veteran ‘tier 1’ Taleban leaders who hail from Badakhshan, like Chief of Staff Fasihuddin Fitrat, despite holding top-ranking positions in the IEA at the central level, have also been depended upon to solve problems and supervise policies and appointments in the province.
This comparatively secluded provincial political life contributed, at least for a time, to sheltering Badakhshan from the full enforcement of the opium ban and – together with the pressing economic needs of the residents of this poor mountain province – has allowed for a continuation of poppy cultivation in the province. Remarkably though, poppy growing in Badakhshan increased as a percentage share of the land area nationally under cultivation between 2023 and 2024 at precisely the time when the central government was bringing governance of the province more into line with the rest of the country.
Eradication in 2024
At the end of 2023, a reshuffle of the provincial authorities brought outsiders to govern Badakhshan for the first time. This coincided with the realisation or acknowledgement that, unlike the rest of the country, Badakhshis were still sowing and harvesting poppy. That posed a challenge to the IEA’s credibility and risked undermining adherence to the ban elsewhere. It spurred the government into pushing for greater eradication efforts in spring 2024. The newly-appointed provincial governor, Muhammad Ayub Khaled and his entourage, all men from Kandahar, found the local Taleban district authorities unwilling or unable to cooperate with the eradication campaign: in May 2024, Taleban troops from Kunduz and other nearby areas were brought in and tensions with the local farmers arose, leading to violence.
Farmers protesting in the districts of Argu and Darayem were met with violence, with some shot and killed in early May 2024 (see reports by Pajhwok and CIR), while a few days later, an IED attack (claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province, ISKP) killed three members of the IEA security forces sent to support an eradication mission (read AP reporting here). Eventually, the IEA’s unofficial plenipotentiary for Badakhshan, Fasihuddin Fitrat, arranged mediation and managed to defuse the situation. Eradication carried on in full swing for a few weeks and then continued sporadically throughout the rest of the spring and early summer; the protesting farmers obtained a minor but significant concession, that only local Taleban troops were to engage in it.
Faced with the need to cancel the impression that Badakhshan was being allowed to get off lightly from the ban on narcotics, it is no wonder that, contrary to UNODC reporting, the Emirate has been adamant that the 2024 eradication campaign in the province was carried out thoroughly and successfully. For example, in a response to the UNODC survey, the Ministry of Interior insisted that:
According to your report, the highest cultivation is in Badakhshan province. However, our regional reports indicate that the cultivation is concentrated in the districts of Argu, Khash, Jorm, Darayem, and Shahr-e-Bazarg, where the fields have been completely eradicated. The issue of eradication has been a major concern across all provinces where opium poppy is being cultivated.
Unfortunately, the UNODC office did not mention the eradication of opium poppy fields in its 2024 report. As you are aware, security forces in all provinces have taken serious actions against opium cultivation, compelling farmers not to grow poppy on their fields.
Our regional information indicates that approximately 16,000 hectares of opium poppy have been eradicated since the end of 2023 until now. Of these, around 6,000 hectares were measured using GPS technology. All GPS data has been shared with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). However, after reviewing the GPS data, it was noted that some GPS points were recorded multiple times on the same date due to GPS devices being left on, which resulted in inaccurate data collection. In some instances, barren land and other crops were mistakenly classified as poppy fields. While there may be discrepancies in the GPS data, this does not invalidate all the figures.
If opium poppy eradication efforts in Badakhshan province had been conducted with the technical cooperation of UNODC, it is likely that accurate GPS data for more than 7,000 hectares would have been recorded. The lack of cooperation from the UNODC office has negatively impacted these eradication efforts.
…
In Badakhshan, all opium poppy fields have been eradicated and your data should accurately reflect the situation, considering that the eradication process is ongoing, and images may have been taken before this was completed.
The IEA claim that the eradicated area equalled the totality of poppy cultivation in Badakhshan contrasts, however, not only with UNODC but also satellite imagery provided by Alcis and reports by locals. According to villagers from the main poppy-growing districts of Badakhshan of Argu and Darayem interviewed by AAN, eradication in 2024 was not full-scale, but rather ended up targeting mostly easy-access areas such as the outskirts of cities and stretches along the main roads, or those areas where farmers and landlords had no connections inside the provincial government to resort to who could help to save at least part of their crop. Locals also alleged the involvement of local officials involved in counter-narcotics operations in influencing which poppy fields were selected for destruction, keeping the eradication teams away from their own turf and even directing teams against their rivals – something also seen under the Islamic Republic.
The current sowing season – autumn 2024, and spring 2025
After last season’s eradication campaign, carried out on the crop that was harvested in late June/early July 2024, all eyes were on Badakhshan to see whether farmers would again defy the law. In this province, there are two main times of poppy cultivation. Autumn sowing (tirmai) usually happens in October, with the poppy seeds then staying in the ground under the snow through winter. Farmers will wait for a couple of good autumn rains before sowing, but if it does not rain, they can afford to wait even until mid-November to sow. This type of sowing is usually practised in higher-elevation areas. The second type of sowing, bahari, takes place as the name implies in late winter/spring and is more common in lower-lying and warmer areas where the snow melts earlier and poppies grow more quickly, allowing for an earlier spring sowing compared to higher area. Bahari also brings lesser yields; the main harvest centres around tirmai sowing.
According to locals interviewed, tirmai sowing is certainly now taking place in a majority of Badakhshan districts. The increased risks of opium cultivation, as shown by the eradication efforts in 2024, have not outweighed the incentives provided by high prices and a growing interest in Badakhshan’s produce shown by opium traders from other Afghan provinces. Also, the acquiescence of many local Taleban officers and the farmers’ ability to stand their ground, although at the cost of violence, in front of the eradication campaign, or at least to reach compromises through the mediation of powerful figures at the central IEA level, might have played a role in their decision to sow again.
Moreover, locals complain of the lack of alternative crops and government funding for them, despite promises they say were made at the time of the eradication campaign and more recent attempts to promote the cultivation of the cash crop, hing (asafoetida),a spice used in the Indian subcontinent.[16] Hing is actually not a good alternative to poppy in the short run because, like orchard crops, it takes several years to produce a return – unlike poppy which is an annual.[17] Interviewees said the lack of an alternative was why, in the higher areas of Argu, Darayem, Khash and Yaftal, farmers had already sown poppy. AAN also heard from locals that no action had been taken against the sowing so far: local Taleban officials have relatives or associates in the villages sowing poppy, we were told, and will not stop them. Also, as reported by locals, a number of farmers hit by past eradication have struck deals with district or provincial authorities in order to ensure next year’s crop will not be destroyed – in exchange for part of the profits.
Only in a few districts, where eradication was carried out more massively and many farmers lost the capital they had invested or barely regained what they had spent, does local behaviour appear more cautious. In poorer and less connected areas, such as the upper reaches of Jorm district, farmers hit by eradication simply do not have the relevant connections at the provincial or national level, or the money to bribe themselves out of trouble when and if eradication starts. Hence, according to locals interviewed, many have refrained from sowing the tirmai crop.
However, even this successful intimidation could turn sour: rugged and secluded valleys in this area, such as the Khastak Valley, have regularly offered shelter to anti-government groups. Already selected as a redoubt by the Taleban during the insurgency, the area has lately come to host ISKP sympathisers. Left without choices, the local villagers could turn to these armed opposition groups to protect their poppy crops from the central government, again, something also seen under the Republic.
The resilience of the drug economy
Badakhshan might represent an exception across an Afghanistan, where poppy cultivation is still at historical lows, but in the context of the rather integrated Afghan opium economy, the fact that poppy growing continues there is a matter of interest for all Afghan opium traders and the markets in neighbouring countries. Although Badakhshan, first and foremost, remains the key supplier for the illicit drugs markets and the traders in Tajikistan for trafficking onwards through the former Soviet republics,[18] in the past two years, informed locals told AAN, the major drug traffickers from Helmand and Kandahar have entered the Badakhshan market and struck deals with local producers (read also this report by the International Crisis Group). Farmers from southern Afghanistan might have complied with the narcotics ban, out of old alliances and respect for the IEA, but traders from there have been earnestly exploring ways to secure continued supply to their clients, without fully depleting their stockpiles. Thanks to their better connections inside the IEA, the ‘Kandaharis’ (as all Southerners are labelled in the north) have fewer problems circumventing police controls and transporting drugs across the country. According to locals interviewed, the Kandaharis initially tried to access Badakhshi producers directly and cut off local traffickers, for example, by having them arrested. However, after some violence was traded between the two groups, the Kandaharis gave up the idea of completely swaying the Badakhshi market and included the local traffickers, who have their own separate smuggling routes and contacts for taking opiates to Tajikistan – as intermediaries in the deals. Moreover, the higher prices of opium allow for an additional tier of middlemen to fit in without hurting profits.
As a province, Badakhshan is particularly vulnerable to the loss of income associated with the poppy ban. Its economy, always fragile and previously dependent on seasonal labour migration to other parts of the country and to Iran – both options now reduced by Afghanistan’s contracted economy and border closure – would be seriously harmed by a full implementation of the ban there. However, the ban has had consequences everywhere, as we explored when we heard from poor farmers in Helmand in the spring. Persistent high prices and lack of economic alternatives make it increasingly difficult for the IEA to achieve a full, nationwide implementation of the ban – in fact, other poor and peripheral provinces such as Badghis also seem ready to resume poppy cultivation (see footnote 13). That means the major political fallout likely to proceed from the ban on cultivation remaining fully in force might not be limited to provinces where the IEA traditionally faced opposition, such as Badakhshan. Where it leads, other provinces might follow: so far, opium farmers with large landholdings from Kandahar and Helmand have been benefiting from stockpiles, but once these are depleted, the IEA risks alienating many even from that area, which always constituted its major support base in the country.
Edited by Kate Clark
References
References
↑1
‘Afghanistan Drug Insight Volume 1 – Opium Poppy Cultivation 2024’ is the first of three in the annual series of UNODC reports on opium cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption in Afghanistan and it is a rather short report that shows data collected by UNODC through remote sensing techniques and rural village surveys, as well as through global data collection on drugs (the UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform).
↑2
The 14 provinces were Kunar, Laghman, Badakhshan, Takhar, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Badghis, Farah and Ghor. For an estimated hectarage for each province, see the table on pages 10 and 11 of the UNODC survey. Poppy-free provinces are provinces with less than 100 hectares in cultivation. The national total includes opium poppy found in poppy-free provinces.
↑3
Alcis, a company that also monitors illicit crops in Afghanistan, has provided slightly diverging estimates. However, as it is currently revising its data for Badakhshan based on a more refined method, we have not included its estimates in this report. For the latest Alcis estimates for Badakhshan, see here.
↑4
For UNODC, the northeast comprises four provinces: Badakhshan, which had 7,408 hectares of land under poppy in 2024; Takhar, with 165 hectares after being poppy-free in 2023; and Baghlan and Kunduz, both classed as poppy-free, ie planted with less than 100 hectares of poppy.
↑5
Katja Mielke ‘Opium as an economic engine: Drug economy without alternatives?’ in Wegweiser zur Geschichte: Afghanistan, Potsdam: MGFA, 2007, 207; Jonathan Goodhand, ‘From holy war to opium war? A case study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan’, Central Asian Survey, 2000, 19(2), 270.
↑6
Fabrizio Foschini, ‘Heretics or Addicts: The Ismailis of Afghan Badakhshan caught in the middle of the opium trade’ in ‘Uyun al-Akhbar. Islam, Collected Essays, Bologna, 2010, 241-263.
↑7
Adam Pain. ‘Between necessity and compulsion: opium poppy cultivation and the exigencies of survival in Badakhshan, Afghanistan’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2023, 51:4, 902-921, DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2023.2216145
↑8
James Bradford, ‘Drug Control in Afghanistan: Culture, Politics and Power During the 1958 Prohibition of Opium in Badakhshan’, Iranian Studies, 2014, p14, 19. doi:10.1080/00210862.2013.862456. The article explores the process leading to the Afghan government’s decision to implement a prohibition and eradication of opium in the northeastern province of Badakhshan – why Daud chose Badakhshan, the impact of the opium ban on the people of Badakhshan and the future of opium production and trade, as well as the evolution of drug control in Afghanistan under the Musahiban dynasty. See also his PhD dissertation, available here.
↑9
James Bradford, ‘Drug Control in Afghanistan’, 19.
↑10
James Bradford, ‘Drug Control in Afghanistan’, 18. Ultimately, the economic marginalisation suffered by Badakhshan in the 1960s and 70s was a primary factor behind the development there of a political movement, Sazman-e Enqelabi-ye Zahmatkashan-e Afghanistan (the Revolutionary Organisation of Afghanistan’s Toilers (usually known as Setam-e Melli or “National Oppression”) which criticised Pashtun hegemony and advocated an economic and political emancipation of the northern minorities.
UNODC reported opium cultivation in Badghis as also up, by 241 per cent to 1,255 hectares, and Helmand, up by 434 per cent to 757 hectares. However, these amounts are both dwarfed by Badakhshan’s 7,408 hectares.
↑15
As AAN reported in March 2024 about opium cultivation in Helmand:
An interviewee in Greshk district said that, last November, during the poppy sowing, the IEA had arrested some people and imprisoned them for between one and three months. He thought this was intended to frighten other farmers into not growing poppy.
↑16
It is an interesting historical fact that hing was mentioned as alternative crop to opium poppy in the 1958 New York Times article about Badakhshan quoted earlier in the text.
↑17
Asafoetida is deep-rooted plant from the carrot (umbelliferous) family, which produces a pungent spice widely used especially in Pakistani and Indian cooking. A wild plant, it is now increasingly cultivated, but unlike poppy, which is an annual, it needs several years to mature and produce an income. Harvesting involves tapping the roots to extract the gum, which usually kills the plant. Typically grown on rain-fed or waste ground, hing is also not an alternative to poppy in terms of land use.
↑18
Neither the seized amounts nor the frequency of seizures on the Tajik-Afghan border in the last two years indicate that any change has happened in the legal regime on drugs in either country, according to the Paris Pact Initiative data.
Opium Cultivation in Badakhshan: The new national leader, according to UNDOC
The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) announced that the United States has spent over $14 billion in the past three years on relocating and resettling Afghans in the U.S.
The Washington Times reported on Sunday, November 10, that this $14 billion was allocated to evacuation flights and resettlement programs for Afghan refugees in the United States.
According to the report, since the Taliban regained control on August 2021, the U.S. has not only spent billions on evacuation and resettlement but also sent over $3 billion to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
John Sopko, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, told the newspaper that “the United States remains the largest donor to the Afghan people.”
Sopko noted that while Afghanistan continues to need humanitarian aid, what he described as “harassment of aid groups” has led to the shutdown of over 80 humanitarian operations in the country.
The U.S. continues to play a major role in supporting Afghan refugees and providing humanitarian assistance, even as challenges persist within Afghanistan under Taliban control.
Ongoing obstacles in delivering aid to Afghanistan highlight the complex relationship between the U.S. and the Taliban, raising concerns over the sustainability of humanitarian efforts in the region.
US spends over $14 billion on Afghan evacuation and resettlement: SIGAR
The Mine Clearance Organization recently announced that over 65 square kilometers of land in Afghanistan is contaminated with improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
The organization has called on the global community to increase political and financial support for clearing these devices from Afghanistan’s lands.
According to the Mine Clearance Organization, more than 65 square kilometers across 26 provinces in Afghanistan are currently affected by IEDs.
This announcement was made on Monday, November 11, through a report highlighting a 10% decrease in the number of anti-personnel mines cleared in contaminated areas.
The report states, “Sixty countries and various regions worldwide are contaminated by mines. The HALO Trust operates in one-third of these countries, including four heavily contaminated ones: Afghanistan with 2,235 de-miners, Cambodia with 1,191 staff, Iraq with 83 staff, and Ukraine with 1,376 staff.”
Afghanistan is among the countries with the highest contamination levels from landmines and unexploded ordnance left over from past conflicts. These explosive remnants are the second leading cause of civilian casualties in Afghanistan.
The urgency for mine clearance in Afghanistan cannot be overstated, given the severe impact on civilian safety and the hindrance to development in affected areas.
Increased international support is essential for accelerating demining efforts, saving lives, and fostering a safer environment for communities in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, addressing the mine contamination issue is critical not only for Afghanistan’s security but also for the stability and rebuilding efforts in the broader region.
Mine Clearance Organization warns of IED contamination in Afghanistan
Under this program, health, education, and cash assistance for heating homes in winter will be provided to 18,000 families.
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has announced the formation of a task force to assess drought conditions in Afghanistan.
During a meeting with the acting director of the National Disaster Management Authority, the UN delegation stated that if signs of drought are identified by this team, $10 million will be allocated to manage the situation.
This task force includes the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Organization for Migration, UNICEF, and the Red Cross Federation.
“OCHA has set up a team which, if it encounters or confirms signs of drought in Afghanistan, will spend $10 million to provide improved seeds for farmers and livestock in Afghanistan,” said Janan Saiq, spokesperson for the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA).
Meanwhile, Save the Children has announced a shortfall of $4.2 million to implement its winter assistance program in Afghanistan.
Under this program, health, education, and cash assistance for heating homes in winter will be provided to 18,000 families.
Sayed Farooq, a Kabul resident, said, “I earn 80 to 100 afghani a day. How can I live with eight family members? If I buy flour, I can’t afford oil; if I buy oil, what about flour? Should I pay rent or buy food?”
“We earn 100 afghani a day. If we buy food, it’s not enough, and if we spend on other needs, food runs short. We ask the government to support us,” said Another Kabul resident, Mohammad Agha.
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Economy announced that the country has been affected by recent droughts and floods and needs global cooperation to address these issues.
“We seek cooperation in public welfare and infrastructure sectors as we need roads, bridges, and schools to be built, and we need to prevent the destruction of agricultural lands,” said Abdul Rahman Habib, spokesperson for the Ministry of Economy.
Previously, the World Food Program and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization reported an increase in food insecurity in 22 countries, including Afghanistan. According to the joint report, conflicts, climate crises, and economic pressures will put millions of people in critical conditions in the coming months.
Special Team Formed to Assess Drought in Afghanistan: OCHA
Shaheen emphasized that the interim government is ready for positive engagement with all countries, including the United States.
The head of the Islamic Emirate’s political office in Qatar, Suhail Shaheen, told a Japanese media outlet that Afghanistan’s interim government is hopeful for strengthened ties between Kabul and Washington.
Shaheen referred to the Doha Agreement, describing Donald Trump as a pragmatic figure who, he expects, would realistically address current challenges. He told the Japanese media, “It seems Mr. Trump is more pragmatic, and I think we need to be realistic in solution of issues.”
Shaheen emphasized that the interim government is ready for positive engagement with all countries, including the United States. “We are open to positive engagement with the world and also the United States,” he said.
Before the US presidential election, the Islamic Emirate urged the incoming president to adopt a realistic policy toward Afghanistan.
Political analyst Mohammad Aslam Danishmal told TOLOnews, “Trump is not very interested in continuing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, and he is more inclined to focus on countering China in the region.”
Sayed Akbar Sial Wardak, another political analyst, said: “The remaining provisions and annexes of the Doha Agreement, signed between the two parties, could be implemented through dialogue with the Islamic Emirate if Trump takes office.”
Previously, the White House had stated that if Afghanistan’s interim government seeks sanctions relief and international legitimacy, it must fulfill its commitments.
Shaheen: Trump Seems ‘More Pragmatic,’ Relations Should Be ‘Realistic’
The Radio Television Digital News Association decision to pull back the award follows a Washington Post report on warnings the filmmakers of “Retrograde” received about endangering Afghans.
A scene in Afghanistan from the 2022 documentary “Retrograde.” (National Geographic Documentary Films/Everett Collection)
The Radio Television Digital News Association on Friday rescinded its 2023 Edward R. Murrow Award to an acclaimed Afghanistan war documentary that has been criticized for allegedly endangering some of the Afghans who appear in the film.
The unprecedented decision to strip the prestigious journalism award from National Geographic for director Matthew Heineman’s “Retrograde” follows revelations in a Washington Post article earlier this year that filmmakers showed the faces of Afghan contractors who cleared mines for U.S. soldiers despite being warned by at least five active-duty and former U.S. military service members not to do so.
One of the Afghans, whose face is shown in close-up, was captured by the Taliban shortly after the film’s December 2022 release and died from wounds inflicted by torturers while he was being held, according to an interpreter and two others who spoke to The Post on the condition of anonymity to describe the sequence of events without imperiling themselves and their own families in Afghanistan.
Heineman and producer Caitlin McNally told The Post at the time that they had “no recollection” of warnings and that it would be “deeply wrong” to blame the film for the man’s death. After being contacted by The Post with questions about the film, National Geographic and its owner, Disney, removed “Retrograde” from streaming services.
National Geographic did not respond to a request for comment. Heineman and McNally referred a request for comment to Theodore Boutrous Jr., a First Amendment attorney who represents them and who has also represented journalism organizations, including The Post.
“The RTDNA says that it ‘conducted its own review … into the filmmaking process’ but you have to be deeply skeptical about the nature and thoroughness of that review, given that no one ever even contacted the filmmakers who produced ‘Retrograde’ in a manner fully consistent with long-standing journalistic values,” Boutrous said in an email Sunday. “The RTDNA’s action is inexplicable and irresponsible.”
Sheryl Worsley, chair of the RTDNA board of directors, disputed the assertion that Heineman was not contacted, saying in an email to The Post on Sunday that an “RTDNA staff person reached out to Mr. Heineman via email on June 10, 2024, as part of the review process. No response from Mr. Heineman as a result of this outreach was ever received.” The Post has reviewed the June email.
Worsley also said via email Sunday that “RTDNA did connect with National Geographic and other individuals associated with the filmmaking process during their review.” The email did not specify which individuals.
On its website, the news association says its board of directors “received background information” about “Retrograde” following publication of The Post’s article in May, but it does not go into detail. “This decision was not made lightly and occurred only after an RTDNA-led review into the procedures and practices associated with the filmmaking process,” Worsley said in an initial statement emailed Friday to the Post.
The RTDNA board did not explain its reasoning for taking back the honor, which was awarded to National Geographic in October 2023 in the network feature-length documentary category.
The Murrow awards require adherence to RTDNA’s code of ethics, which includes a section on “accountability for consequences.”
“Responsible reporting means considering the consequences of both the news gathering — even if the information is never made public — and of the material’s potential dissemination,” the ethics code states. “Certain stakeholders deserve special consideration; these include children, victims, vulnerable adults and others inexperienced with American media.”
RTDNA’s staff knows of no other instance of the organization rescinding an award on the basis of issues related to the reporting since it began handing them out in 1971, according to an email to The Post. In 2020, the New York Times voluntarily returned an award it had received for the narrative podcast series “Caliphate” after discovering discrepancies in its own reporting. The association also once rescinded an award on a technicality after learning the work had been submitted in the wrong category.
In April, National Geographic removed the documentary from all of its platforms, including the Hulu streaming service, after The Post sought comment on whether the documentary endangered its subjects. A spokesman for National Geographic, which produced the film under a joint agreement with Disney, said in a written statement that the company was acting in “an abundance of caution.”
According to The Post’s reporting, at least five people — three active-duty U.S. military personnel and two former Green Berets — warned the filmmakers before “Retrograde’s” December 2022 cable and streaming debuts that they could be putting Afghans who were hired to work with the U.S. military in danger by showing their faces in the documentary. At that time, there had already been hundreds of documented Taliban revenge killings of Afghans who worked for the U.S. military and their family members. Those issuing warnings considered the Afghans shown in the film to be in greater danger because of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 — about eight months after filming began in Helmand Province.
As many as eight Afghan contractors whose faces were shown in the film are still in the region and remain in peril, according to the 1208 Foundation, a charitable organization that specializes in evacuating Afghans who cleared mines for U.S. forces.
While The Post was preparing to publish a story on warnings received by the filmmakers, two congressmen — Jared Moskowitz (D-Florida), and retired Green Beret and Afghanistan war veteran Michael Waltz (R-Florida) — called the documentary “a de facto target list” in a letter to the State Department that asked for expedited handling of visas for the men depicted in the film.
In a statement, the film’s director and producer said: “The U.S. government’s precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan and the vengeful actions of the Taliban upon taking power — armed with detailed information identifying Afghans who worked with the U.S. government — led to the deaths of countless partners left behind. That is the tragic story that warrants attention. But any attempt to blame ‘Retrograde’ because the film showed faces of individuals in war zones — as has long been standard in ethical conflict reporting — would be deeply wrong.”
Military officials signed off on “Retrograde” before its release per its agreement with Heineman’s company, a fact that the director has pointed to in defending the decision to show the faces of the Afghans. According to The Post’s reporting, military officials interpreted the contract to say that they only had the right to ask for changes involving the depiction of U.S. forces. Still, they felt compelled to warn the filmmakers anyway.
“Concern about Afghan partners and faces being blurred was raised,” said Charlie Crail, the 10th Special Forces Group media officer assigned to the project. Crail recalled telling the filmmakers: “You guys need to do your due diligence before you release this movie to make sure as many of these guys are out [of Afghanistan] as possible.”
Clips of “Retrograde” — which went on to win three Emmys, for cinematography, editing and current affairs documentary, and the Murrow journalism award and was shortlisted for an Oscar — began circulating on TikTok in Afghanistan shortly after its National Geographic Channel and Hulu debuts. A spokesperson for the National Academy of Television Arts & Sciences — which awards the Emmys — said in a statement that the academy has “had no cause” to revoke the awards. Specifically addressing the current affairs category, the spokesperson said “Retrograde” “was consistent with” rules and policies in place as of the applicable competition year.”
One Afghan mine-clearer in “Retrograde,” whom the Green Berets had given the nickname “Justin Bieber,” was captured by the Taliban within weeks of the clips appearing on TikTok and died in April 2023 after undergoing surgeries to repair wounds he received while being tortured, according to an interpreter who spoke to him and agreed to be interviewed by The Post on the condition of anonymity to protect family members in the region.
The Post’s story about “Retrograde” prompted discussion in entertainment industry circles about the responsibilities of filmmakers in war zones.
“In making this film, did it not occur to anyone that it might be putting people in Afghanistan in danger?” Blair Foster, a producer of the Oscar-winning documentary “Taxi to the Dark Side,” told Variety. “Everyone is pointing the finger at each other. The military is pointing to Heineman, Heineman is pointing to the military. Frankly, I think everyone is culpable.”
Hope Hodge Seck and Alice Crites contributed to this report.
Murrow Award rescinded for acclaimed ‘Retrograde’ documentary
Afghanistan Peace Campaign
