State Department Comment on House Foreign Affairs Committee Afghanistan Review

September 10, 2024 ,

U.S. Department of State

OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

SEPTEMBER 9, 2024

The Department appreciates the Committee’s longstanding interest in Afghanistan policy, and we strongly believe in Congress’s independent role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. We remain committed to working with Congress on its oversight requests and advancing the interests of the American people.

Since 2021, we have expended thousands of hours fulfilling congressional requests for documents, briefings, and interviews related to Afghanistan. The Department has provided approximately 20,000 pages of documents to Congress, conducted nine high-level briefings for committees and members of the House of Representatives and Senate, and made available or engaged 15 senior officials for transcribed interviews to House Foreign Affairs Committee staff and members. This includes the Department taking the unprecedented step of providing Congress with a highly-sensitive cable and internal memos related to the Department’s After-Action Review.

Additionally, Secretary Blinken has testified before House and Senate Committees 14 times on Afghanistan, including four times directly before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It was critical to have done so. Americans deserved to hear directly from their leaders on the decisions made to end America’s longest war and the steps taken to fulfill our commitment to the thousands of brave Afghans who stood side-by-side with the United States over the course of two decades.

As the House Foreign Affairs Committee Majority and Minority members complete their review of the 2021 withdrawal from Kabul, the Department wants to especially recognize the dedicated State and Department of Defense professionals who showed extraordinary courage and tenacity as they worked tirelessly on the ground in Afghanistan, in Washington, and at other sites, alongside other critical U.S. Government and civil society partners, to evacuate and assist as many people as possible in the closing days of our presence in Kabul. Our people remain our greatest asset.

We also share our abiding respect and reverence for the 13 servicemembers whose lives were taken by ISIS-K during the withdrawal. These heroes embodied the very best of who we are as a nation and we owe them an immense debt we can never repay. Their selfless sacrifice in the line of duty saved thousands of lives. Our deepest sympathies are with the Gold Star families they left behind.

**

Ending America’s longest war was never going to be easy. But President Biden pledged to do so, and within months of taking office, he made the difficult but necessary decision to end America’s 20 years of war in Afghanistan. He inherited an agreement his predecessor had reached with the Taliban to remove all remaining U.S. forces from Afghanistan by May 1, 2021. As part of that agreement, the previous Administration compelled the Afghan Government to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners, including several top war commanders helping the Taliban achieve their strongest position in 20 years. Meanwhile, the agreement reduced our force presence to 2,500 troops.[1]   And while the Taliban had agreed to cease attacks on our troops, it was contingent that all were withdrawn by the May 31 deadline.

It was, and remains, a flawed agreement that hampered efforts to end the war through negotiations among Afghans. As General McKenzie, the CENTCOM Commander who served both the current and past administration, testified: “The signing of the Doha agreement had a really pernicious effect on the government of Afghanistan and on its military…”[2] 

Due to this agreement, when the Biden Administration entered office it found a revitalized and emboldened Taliban, along with a decimated SIV program and a complete lack of planning for a withdrawal.

The President acted in the best interests of the American people when he decided to bring our troops home and end America’s longest war. This decision ensured another generation of Americans would not have to fight and die in Afghanistan — a full decade after Osama bin Laden had been brought to justice. It strengthened our national security by better positioning us to confront the challenges of the future and put the United States in a stronger place to lead the world.  It freed up critical military, intelligence, diplomatic, and other resources to ensure we are better poised to respond to today’s threats to international peace and stability – whether that be Russia’s brutal and unprovoked assault on Ukraine, China’s increasingly assertive moves in the Indo-Pacific and around the world, or a persistent and global terrorist threat.

**

In the three years since the end of our country’s longest war, important questions have been asked about what could have been done differently. The Department has made every effort to answer these questions transparently – whether they be from Congress, members of the media, the American public, or our own workforce.

As the Department has undertaken this effort, regrettably, others have sought to advance their own interests or agendas that have almost nothing to do with learning important lessons to strengthen American national security. Even more unfortunately, misinformation about the Department’s role and efforts have sought to tarnish the reputation of dedicated non-partisan professionals, many of whom tirelessly worked on Afghanistan policy for years.

The Department has a deep respect for Congress’ legislative mandate and responsibility, and as stated above, cooperated extensively with the Congress to provide the information necessary to do that important work. This is why it remains frustrating that time and time again, Majority members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, along with their Republican counterparts in the House, issued partisan statements, cherry-picked facts, withheld testimonies from the American people, and obfuscated the truth behind conjecture.

Their so-called midterm report on Afghanistan in 2022 did a deep disservice to the American people by further politicizing U.S. policy towards Afghanistan instead of focusing on bipartisan solutions. There is little reason to believe the final report will be anything different than the conclusion of a blatantly partisan exercise.

**

One of the most persistent misunderstandings of the leadup to the withdrawal was that the State Department lacked a strategy, specifically a “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations” plan to close operations in Afghanistan. This is not accurate.[3] 

Noncombatant evacuation operations – often called NEOs – are partnerships between the Department, the U.S. military, and the host government to “assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selected host-nation citizens, and third country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a host foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven and/or the United States,” as described by the United States Military Joint Publication.  The planning for a NEO originates within the State Department before the President approves the action to bring in the military to assist in any needed evacuations. It is a whole-of-government action — planned and decided through a National Security Council process — and statements or suggestions that the Department has the sole authority to activate a NEO are inaccurate.

State Department officials who spoke with the House Foreign Affairs Committee explained during their hours-long interviews that there was extensive planning by the State Department for a possible diplomatic exit from Afghanistan. Planning began in April 2021, with multiple inter-agency and embassy exercises, using a range of scenarios.  The inter-agency developed detailed indicators and warnings to inform a decision to declare a NEO — including the encirclement or siege of Kabul, the closure of HKIA, resumed attacks on American forces, and a declared or demonstrated Taliban intent to take Kabul.

As Brian McKeon, the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources during the Afghanistan withdrawal and evacuation, described, there was continued development of a NEO between the State Department, the Department of Defense, and CENTCOM – with the latter traveling to Kabul in July of 2021 to “further refine the NEO planning.”[4] 

Additionally, the U.S. government intended for the U.S. Embassy to remain open after the end of the war — a decision Congress broadly supported. So, while U.S. military forces would end combat operations, Department personnel planned to operate out of Embassy Kabul to assist Americans and Afghan allies, coordinate diplomatic and development activity and investments, and help protect and advance U.S. national security interests after August 2021. Given those expectations, along with the continued operation of commercial flights out of Kabul until August 15, executing the NEO before that date would have signaled to the people of Afghanistan the U.S. had lost all confidence in the then-Afghan government and precipitated the very collapse we sought to avoid.

The government of Afghanistan controlled all 34 Provincial Capitals until August 6. Between August 6 and the 14, they began to fall rapidly, crossing the indicator and warning trip wires established by the inter-agency. On August 14, State initiated the NEO through an inter-agency agreement. On August 15, President Ghani abandoned his office and fled the country, and the Afghanistan Republic security services and government collapsed. The Taliban then entered Kabul.

Again, while the State Department formally triggers a NEO, the decision to do so is a collective, inter-agency one, coordinated by a National Security Council process that includes multiple Principal and Deputies Committee meetings.  Statements or suggestions that the Department has the sole authority to activate a NEO are false – moreover, principal-level discussions did not conclude a NEO should be initiated prior to the collective interagency decision that was reached on August 14.

Executing a NEO requires substantial military and diplomatic resources, so the State Department, alongside our military colleagues, quickly adapted to the situation on the ground.

Throughout the crisis, there was intense coordination between military and Department personnel. As former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan John Bass described, there was engagement “on a daily, sometimes hourly, basis in terms of the operational coordination of aspects of the NEO” engagement with “the senior military commanders regularly.”[5] 

A NEO is but one tool in the diplomatic toolbox, and one of last resort. And NEO planning was far from the only preparation State took in the weeks and months leading up to August 2021.[6] 

In March, the Department began urging Americans living in Afghanistan to leave the country. At the end of April, the State Department placed Embassy Kabul on ordered departure status.[7]  That same month, State senior leaders and officials traveled to the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan alongside Department of Defense personnel to prepare for the forthcoming absence of the United States military in the region.[8]  In total, between March and August, the Department sent 19 unique messages with warnings to Americans living in Afghanistan to leave, as well as offers of help, including financial assistance to pay for plane tickets.[9]

Despite these efforts, when Kabul fell, approximately 6,000 American citizens remained in Afghanistan — almost all dual nationals who had been living in Afghanistan for years or decades. Almost all were evacuated by August 31 thanks to a relentless effort by the State Department to identify them, contact them, and help bring them to the airport.  This effort included more than 55,000 phone calls and 33,000 emails in a two-week period.  It was unprecedented in scope and scale.

On August 31, several hundred American citizens remained in Afghanistan who could not or would not leave because they could not reach the airport, did not want to leave extended family members behind, or simply chose to remain.  Secretary Blinken vowed to facilitate the departure of any remaining Americans. “We’re continuing our relentless efforts to help any remaining Americans… leave Afghanistan if they so choose,”[10] the Secretary said publicly. Between September 1 and the end of 2021, the State Department made good on that pledge, facilitating the departure of nearly 500 American citizens.

In February of 2021, the President took a crucial step to ensure America lived up to its enduring commitment to the individuals who stood side-by-side with us in Afghanistan by issuing an executive order directing a review to improve the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program, which was undertaken with great care. Domestic resettlement agencies have traditionally welcomed Afghan SIVs to the United States, but these critical partners had been deliberately left in shambles by the previous Administration and needed massive investments to be reinvigorated.[11] 

As the White House’s summary of Pentagon reviews of U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan details: “The Department of State began seeking transit agreements for Afghans with third countries in June, secured agreements with Qatar and Kuwait in July, and negotiated arrangements with other countries including Germany, Italy, Spain, UAE, Bahrain, Kosovo, and Albania. Setting up this network of transit sites— “lily pads”—would not have been possible without the support of international partners across the Middle East and Europe.”[12] 

In late July, the State Department, along with the Department of Defense and interagency partners, initiated Operation Allies Refuge to begin evacuating SIV applicants in the final stages of processing.[13]  U.S. diplomatic missions in the Middle East and Europe worked successfully and quickly with host government and Department of Defense personnel to establish temporary housing for tens of thousands of evacuees. During the U.S.-facilitated evacuation, vulnerable Afghans went to overseas Defense Department facilities for security screening, vetting, and the administration of public health vaccinations.[14]  Afghan evacuees were then transported by air to eight Department of Defense domestic safe-havens. More than 10,000 State, Defense, and Homeland Security personnel supported this unprecedented humanitarian effort alongside other U.S. Government partners and a cross-section of America.[15] 

Throughout the first half of 2021, the Administration was constantly assessing the likelihood of President Ashraf Ghani’s government’s staying in power and considered multiple scenarios.  Even the most pessimistic assessments did not predict the government forces in Kabul would collapse while U.S. forces remained.  As General Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has previously said, “Nothing I or anyone else saw indicated a collapse of this army and this government in 11 days.”[16]  In an August 14 2021, phone call to Secretary Blinken, President Ghani expressed his intent “to fight to the death” to stave off the Taliban takeover before subsequently fleeing the next day.[17] 

Nonetheless, we planned and exercised a wide range of contingencies.  Because of that planning, we were able to draw down our embassy and move remaining personnel to the airport within 48 hours and the military, which had  pre-positioned in the region, was able to secure the airport and start the evacuation within 72 hours.[18]

The U.S. Government achieved the largest airlift in U.S. history with approximately 120,000 Americans, Afghans, and third-country nationals departing Afghanistan in those final two weeks of August 2021.[19]

Throughout this process, the Department relied heavily on the expertise and guidance of those on the ground and across the globe to assess the fluid environment in Afghanistan. Secretary Blinken has spoken publicly of his respect and appreciation for the selfless work of all these individuals, who stepped up to help others in their time of need, and his commitment to hearing from any State Department employee who wanted to share their Afghanistan-related insights.

Much attention has been paid to the State Department’s highly-valued dissent cable – a way for State Department employees at all levels to directly reach a Secretary of State with dissenting views on U.S. foreign policy. As Secretary Blinken previously stated in public testimony before Congress, the cable did not suggest the Afghan government and security forces were going to collapse prior to our departure. As the Secretary also said publicly, the Department agreed with the concerns raised in the cable, and in fact, a number of the recommendations the cable made were already in motion before it was received. Still, the opinions expressed in the dissent cable were heard at the senior-most levels of State Department leadership. The Secretary personally read and oversaw a response to the dissent cable, and its contents were factored into his thinking.

“With regard to the so-called dissent channel cable, it’s something I’m immensely proud of. It’s a tradition that we have and you’re right, I read every such cable, I respond to it, I factor into it my own thinking and actions, and that cable did not predict the collapse of the government or security forces before our departure. It was very focused and rightly focused on the work we were doing to try to get Afghans at risk out of the country and pressing to speed up that effort,” the Secretary told the Congress.[20] 

The continued distortion of the dissent cable – which remains classified – by Members of Congress to further a political talking point is deeply disappointing, especially after the Department went to extraordinary lengths to allow members of the Foreign Affairs Committee the ability to review the document — the first time since the inception of the dissent channel during the Vietnam War this access had been granted.

**

The State Department remains committed to the thousands of brave Afghans who stood side-by-side with the United States over the course of the past two decades.  As Secretary Blinken has said: our commitment to these individuals is enduring.

When President Biden took office, the State Department inherited an SIV program with a 14-step process based on a statutory framework enacted by Congress involving multiple agencies – and a backlog of more than 17,000 SIV applicants.  There had not been a single SIV applicant interview in Kabul in nine months, going back to March 2020.[21]  The program was basically in a stall as the previous Administration made no senior-level or interagency effort to address the SIV backlog or consider relocation and resettlement options for our Afghan allies and their families as they worked to negotiate a military withdrawal.

Within two weeks of taking office, State re-started the SIV interview process in Kabul.  On February 4, one of President Biden’s first executive orders directed the State to immediately review the program to identify causes of undue delay and find ways to process SIV applications more rapidly. Starting in the Spring, Secretary Blinken surged resources to the program, quadrupling the staff dedicated to processing applications by May 1 and increasing it six-fold by August 1.  The administration went from issuing 100 visas per week in March to more than 1,000 per week in August.

To date, the Administration has worked to resettle 165,000 Afghans who the American people have welcomed to communities across our country.[22] 

Our commitment to helping resettle thousands of Afghan allies has continued well past the withdrawal.

Over the past few years, we’ve worked to resettle tens of thousands of Afghan families within the United States, welcoming them to their new homes and communities and demonstrating the very best of American generosity. Many international partner nations and organizations assist us in this ongoing effort. Since September 1, 2021, the Administration has approved or welcomed to the United States more than 80,000 Afghans under the SIV program. In Fiscal Year 2023 (FY2023) alone we issued more than 18,000 Afghan SIVs, the most in a single year. In this fiscal year (FY2024), we have already surpassed that total.

The Department has also rebuilt the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which was deliberately undermined and partially dismantled by the prior administration. Drawing on best practices from processing Afghan cases in near real-time has helped make this rehabilitation a success story and speaks to the strength and ingenuity of Department and interagency personnel, as well as our refugee resettlement nonprofit partners. So far for this fiscal year, we have interviewed more than 20,000 Afghan refugees in 44 countries, contributing to the admission of one of the highest numbers of refugees through USRAP in a single year in more than three decades.[23]

Ensuring we fulfill our promises to those individuals who stood by our side is one aspect of our continued commitment to the people of Afghanistan. Since August 2021, the United States has provided more than $2.2 billion in funding toward the humanitarian response inside Afghanistan and for Afghans in neighboring countries through established partners with rigorous vetting standards.[24]  The United States is also the single largest humanitarian donor for Afghans in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, providing more than $844 million in humanitarian assistance in FY 2023.[25] 

The Department also stands with the women and girls of Afghanistan and has repeatedly called for their access to education and careers to be restored following edicts by Taliban leaders banning women from universities and working with NGOs. For example, through the establishment of the Afghan Women’s Economic Resilience initiative, a public-private partnership between the Department of State and Boston University, the Department has catalyzed innovative and scalable partnerships between the private sector, civil society, academia, government, and Afghan women leaders to support Afghan women’s education, employment, and entrepreneurship.

The Department remains committed to ensuring that Afghanistan never again becomes a launching pad for terrorism, and we continue to push the Taliban to fulfill all their counterterrorism commitments. We are taking a whole-of-government approach to our Afghanistan counterterrorism efforts, cooperating with partners and allies. We are working vigilantly to prevent the re-emergence of external threats from Afghanistan.

**

There are valid and important criticisms of the two-decade-long war in Afghanistan and how it concluded, which is why the Department has remained focused on evolving and growing from this moment, learning important lessons and making sustainable changes to crisis operations.

In December 2021, the Secretary asked retired Ambassador Dan Smith — a long-serving veteran of the Department — to lead a review of how the Department carried out its duties between January 2020 and August 2021. Ambassador Smith and team interviewed 150 people — including Secretary Blinken — and had access to all contemporaneous records. Studying and learning from Ambassador Smith’s review is a vital component of building a stronger Department that is better prepared to respond to future challenges and to fulfill our mission.

This after-action review[26]  made recommendations on several areas where the Department could have done better by improving processes and systems.  In the interest of maximum transparency, the unclassified sections of this after-action review have been made public.  The Department has already taken more than 40 concrete actions and identified additional steps to guide itself in responding to future crises, including a new, state-of-the-art Operations Center opened in August 2022 with increased surge capacity and modern technology to facilitate information sharing, streamline coordination, and promote a common operating picture.

**

The Department once again expresses its respect for the Congress and its Members who remain dedicated to reviewing the actions taken ahead of and during August 2021. It is our sincere hope the Administration can work hand-in-hand with Congress to make improvements from the lessons learned from the withdrawal. The Department stands ready to work alongside any Member who expresses serious interest in finding legislative and administrative solutions. However, we will not stand by silently as the Department and its workforce are used to further partisan agendas.

State Department Comment on House Foreign Affairs Committee Afghanistan Review
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The Taliban publish vice laws that ban women’s voices and bare faces in public

August 29, 2024 ,
Associated Press
 August 23, 2024

ISLAMABAD (AP) — Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers have issued a ban on women’s voices and bare faces in public under new laws approved by the supreme leader in efforts to combat vice and promote virtue.

The laws were issued Wednesday after they were approved by supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, a government spokesman said. The Taliban had set up a ministry for the “propagation of virtue and the prevention of vice” after seizing power in 2021.

The ministry published its vice and virtue laws on Wednesday that cover aspects of everyday life like public transportation, music, shaving and celebrations.

They are set out in a 114-page, 35-article document seen by The Associated Press and are the first formal declaration of vice and virtue laws in Afghanistan since the takeover.

“Inshallah we assure you that this Islamic law will be of great help in the promotion of virtue and the elimination of vice,” said ministry spokesman Maulvi Abdul Ghafar Farooq on Thursday.

The laws empower the ministry to be at the frontline of regulating personal conduct, administering punishments like warnings or arrest if enforcers allege that Afghans have broken the laws.

Article 13 relates to women. It says it is mandatory for a woman to veil her body at all times in public and that a face covering is essential to avoid temptation and tempting others. Clothing should not be thin, tight or short.

Women should veil themselves in front of all male strangers, including Muslims, and in front of all non-Muslims to avoid being corrupted. A woman’s voice is deemed intimate and so should not be heard singing, reciting, or reading aloud in public. It is forbidden for women to look at men they are not related to by blood or marriage and vice versa.

Article 17 bans the publication of images of living beings, threatening an already fragile Afghan media landscape.

Article 19 bans the playing of music, the transportation of solo female travelers, and the mixing of men and women who are not related to each other. The law also obliges passengers and drivers to perform prayers at designated times.

According to the ministry website, the promotion of virtue includes prayer, aligning the character and behavior of Muslims with Islamic law, encouraging women to wear hijab, and inviting people to comply with the five pillars of Islam. It also says the elimination of vice involves prohibiting people from doing things forbidden by Islamic law.

Last month, a U.N. report said the ministry was contributing to a climate of fear and intimidation among Afghans through edicts and the methods used to enforce them.

It said the ministry’s role was expanding into other areas of public life, including media monitoring and eradicating drug addiction.

“Given the multiple issues outlined in the report, the position expressed by the de facto authorities that this oversight will be increasing and expanding gives cause for significant concern for all Afghans, especially women and girls,” said Fiona Frazer, the head of the human rights service at the U.N. mission in Afghanistan.

The Taliban rejected the U.N. report.

This story was first published on Aug. 22, 2024. It was updated on Aug. 23, 2024 to make clear that the Taliban vice and virtue laws say that women should veil themselves in front of all male strangers, including Muslims, and in front of all non-Muslims.

The Taliban publish vice laws that ban women’s voices and bare faces in public
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War Crimes in the First Two Decades of the Afghan Conflict: Republishing the UN Mapping Report

August 15, 2024 ,
 Kate Clark

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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In 2004, a major report mapping the war crimes and human rights violations committed in Afghanistan between 1978 and 2001 was published by the United Nations before being swiftly taken down under political pressure, allegedly from then president Hamed Karzai, some of his ministers and foreign backers and from within the UN. What became known as ‘the UN Mapping Report’, authored by Patricia Gossman and Barnett Rubin, was subsequently made available to the public on a website. As the link is now broken, the AAN is posting this important report on the Resources section of our website. AAN’s Kate Clark has been looking at why the UN Mapping Report remains so interesting and important but also how its aim, to help Afghans and others face up to the crimes committed during the war, is still unfulfilled. 

 

You can preview and download the UN Mapping Report here.

The UN Mapping Report brought together all the published sources on the war crimes of the first two decades of the Afghan war. It is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in Afghanistan. Together with the Afghanistan Justice Project’s ‘Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 1978-2001’, published in 2005, which incorporated fresh eye-witness and survivor testimony into its account, these two reports meticulously documented patterns of war crimes up to the formation of the interim government in December 2001.[1] Crucially, they also provide the political context for the crimes, giving indispensable background to the emergence of the various political and military forces which continue to dominate Afghan life.

That some form of accountability was yearned for and expected in the first years of the Islamic Republic was made clear in a nationwide consultation by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), the results of which were published in a 2005 report, ‘A Call for Justice – A National Consultation on Past Human Rights Violations in Afghanistan’. 70 per cent of those interviewed said they or members of their family had suffered war crimes or human rights violations. Patricia Gossman and Sari Kouvo summed up the findings in their 2013 special report for AAN, ‘Tell Us How This Ends: Transitional Justice and Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan’:

There was considerable support for either criminal accountability or for removing suspected perpetrators from power. How this was to be achieved was not included in the survey. There was also a wide recognition that sustainable peace required national reconciliation. Although the term was not fully defined, participants described it as including overcoming conflict at the local level. Reconciliation was not equated with forgiveness.

How the UN Mapping Report came about

The genesis for the mapping report had come during the final year of the first Islamic Emirate as a response to human rights groups’ dismay at the United Nations’ failure to investigate two massacres that followed successive captures of Mazar-e Sharif in the late 1990s, of Taleban prisoners of war by General Malek in 1997, and of largely Hazara civilians by the Taleban in 1998.[2] In mid-2001, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) launched an attempt to ‘map’ human rights violations in Afghanistan over the course of the war. Later that year – after the 9/11 attacks and the United States’ toppling of the first Islamic Emirate – two researchers travelled to the region to assess what was required for the mapping exercise. At the time, news of a third mass killing was emerging, again of Taleban prisoners of war and again after Mazar-e Sharif had changed hands; the men who asphyxiated in shipping containers had this time been under the control of General Abdul Rashid Dostum’s forces.

The Secretary General’s new Special Representative in Kabul, Lakhdar Brahimi, opposed taking action over that third massacre, reported Gossman and Kouvo, and also opposed a callmade in October 2002 by Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Asma Jahangir for a commission of inquiry “to undertake an initial mapping-out and stocktaking of grave human rights violations of the past, which could well constitute a catalogue of crimes against humanity.” [3] In the end, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) commissioned only a limited mapping exercise that drew on already published material. Gossman and Rubin’s cataloguing of the major patterns of violations over the course of the war, from the 1978 coup d’état to the formation of the interim government in December 2001, became known as the UN Mapping Report.

How the UN Mapping Report was received

The mapping report was due to be published alongside the AIHRC’s ‘A Call for Justice’ in 2005. However, reported Gossman and Kouvo:

In the weeks before the scheduled release of the two reports, UN officials pressed the High Commissioner [for Human Rights], Louise Arbour, not to make the … report public. UNAMA officials argued that a public release would endanger UN staff, and complicate negotiations surrounding the planned demobilization of several powerful militias. They also argued that as a ‘shaming exercise’, the report raised expectations that neither the UN nor the Afghan government could meet: namely, that something would be done about the individuals named in the report. 

Journalist and author Ahmad Rashid, who was in Kabul for the launch, described in an AAN report how deep and broad the pressure on OHCHR not to publish had been:

The Mapping Report … clearly implicated Afghan communists, present day warlords still holding power in Afghanistan, Taleban and a host of others as being responsible for war crimes. But when the report was about to be published – [UN High Commissioner for Human Rights] Louise Arbour already had arrived in Kabul -, almost all major players – the Americans, the Afghan government, many Europeans, the UN mission for Afghanistan – insisted that the Mapping Report be suppressed and not be made public.

They did not want to rock the boat of the fragile Karzai government that had been cobbled together of unlikely partners – Karzai and his circle of Afghan returnees from exile who had started as reformers and most mujahedin leaders (except Hekmatyar, Khales and Nabi Muhammadi) who were dead against all reforms that would threaten their key positions in the institutions, the security forces and the (licit and illicit) economy. These ‘Jihadi leaders’ were about to see their names printed in the report and threatened all kind of action to avoid this happening.

However, the UN Mapping Report slipped through the net. It was published briefly on the OHCHR website, “most likely,” reported Gossman and Kouvo, “by accident.” Despite being swiftly taken down, it had already been picked up by Human Rights Watch and other human rights organisations and as it had officially been published could legitimately be disseminated by others.[4] Moreover, as Rubin said, it was based on already public material so it could hardly be ‘suppressed’.

The pressure not to discuss or take action on war crimes never went away. Indeed, a worse fate was to befall the far more comprehensive mapping report compiled subsequently by the AIHRC.

The AIHRC mapping report

Following AIHRC’s publication of ‘A Call for Justice’, together with the United Nations and Afghan government, it drafted an action plan focussing on transitional justice. The plan was formally adopted and publicly launched by Karzai in December 2006.[5] However, said Gossman and Kouvo, the government “implemented little and finally shelved it for all intents and purposes.” The major action that did come out of the plan was the AIHRC’s own mapping report. This was an ambitious, multi-year-long project which gathered fresh material about the war crimes of 1978-2001 from witnesses and survivors from all of Afghanistan’s provinces. That report was never published. AIHRC chairwoman Sima Samar said she could not publish without Karzai’s support. He never gave it. Ahead of the 2014 election, when AAN asked the two frontrunners if they would publish the AIHRC mapping report should they become president, Ashraf Ghani said he would, Dr Abdullah appeared not specifically to have heard of it.

The consequences of ignoring the past

The inability of the post-2001 Afghan state to accept any form of truth-telling and the fearfulness of most of its international backers of any move to face up to the crimes and hurts of the past ultimately weakened the Republic. The argument in those early years was that stability was more important than justice, and peace had to come before accountability. That meant the foundations of the Republic were built on shaky ground that would eventually prove unstable.

Transitional justice, what to do about the perpetrators of war crimes, as Barnett Rubin has put it, “some reckoning with the past,” did come up at the December 2001 Bonn conference at which Rubin participated as an advisor to Brahimi.[6] It was discussed, Rubin said, but rejected from inclusion in the Bonn agreement, which set out a road map for what would become the Islamic Republic. As Rubin has stressed, the Bonn agreement was not a peace settlement. The parties did not “painstakingly negotiate over a period of years how to structure a government that would resolve the conflicts that had torn the society apart, create new armed forces and a new police service, and confront the painful legacy of the past to lay the groundwork for national reconciliation.” Rather, one side was still being “pulverised by US bombs” while representatives of four anti-Taleban groups thrashed out the Bonn agreement, along with UN, US and other interested parties.

In retrospect, the moment of de facto regime change had already taken place: when the US decided to arm the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taleban commanders to fight the Islamic Emirate while it bombed Taleban frontlines, it had established who gain the victory and who would capture the Afghan state. Once in power, some of those featuring in the AJP report, the UN and (presumably) the AIHRC mapping reports were able to stop any attempt at national reconciliation or a facing up to the past. Their efforts included, in 2008, MPs voting for a blanket amnesty for “[a]ll political factions and hostile parties who were involved in one way or another in hostilities before the establishing of the Interim Administration.”[7]

The silencing of the discussion of war crimes, at least those committed by the groups and individuals who ended up with power in 2001, has had repercussions. This author has argued that – as it was framed – favouring peace over justice and stability over accountability led to a lack of peace, justice, stability and accountability. Ignoring the past fostered impunity, encouraging continuing and future abuses by the state and pro-government individuals and groups, which meant there were never nationally representative, accountable security forces or government. Ultimately, as well, it helped spark the insurgency.[8]

Despite everything that has happened since 2001, the mapping of the war crimes of those first two decades remains important, given how the crimes of those years have still not been dealt with and how the patterns of violation in Afghanistan seem to keep repeating themselves.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour

References

References
↑1 Both reports include material from late 2001 on US bombing and its treatment of detainees, including forced disappearances and its use of secret detention facilities in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
↑2 These massacres are documented in both the AJP and UN mapping reports.
↑3 Brahimi argued that the time was not yet right for an investigation. As reported by the BBC, he said an enquiry should happen eventually, but the fledgling Afghan government did not have the capacity to deal with one at that time. “There is no judicial system,” he said, “that we can really expect to face up to a situation like this” and the priority had to be with the living not the dead, given the Afghan authorities were unable to protect potential witnesses.
↑4 For many years, it was hosted on a website called flagrancy net, but that link is now broken.
↑5 The Action Plan, wrote Gossman and Kouvo includes:

five measures in graduated sequence to be completed over three years: (1) according dignity to victims, including through commemoration and building memorials; (2) vetting human rights abusers from positions of power and encouraging institutional reform; (3) truth seeking through documentation and other mechanisms; (4) reconciliation; and (5) establishing a task force to make recommendations for an accountability mechanism.
↑6 See Rubin’s ‘Transitional Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan’ published in ‘International Affairs’, vol 79, no 3, May, 2003, pp 567-581. His text is based on a lecture he gave in memory of Anthony Hyman at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London on 3 February 2003.
↑7  For the text of the law, see Kouvo’s ‘After two years in legal limbo: A first glance at the approved ‘Amnesty law’ and for a discussion, Gossman and Kouvo’s report, pp28-31.
↑8 See Stephen Carter and Kate Clark, ‘No Shortcut to Stability: Justice, Politics and Insurgency in Afghanistan’, December 2010, Chatham House, and ‘Talking to the Taliban: A British perspective’, 3 July 2013, AAN.

 

War Crimes in the First Two Decades of the Afghan Conflict: Republishing the UN Mapping Report
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Islamic Emirate Rejects Central Asia Concerns Over Drug Trafficking

February 10, 2024
By Naweed Samadi
Tolo News
10 Feb 2024

Zabihullah Mujahid rejected the claims of drug trafficking out of Afghanistan, and called on the world to cooperate in the area.

The spokesman of the Islamic Emirate said that since the return of the Islamic Emirate, a serious fight against narcotics has been carried out in Afghanistan, and the concerns voiced by countries are baseless.

Zabihullah Mujahid rejected the claims of drug trafficking out of Afghanistan and called on the world to cooperate in the area.

“Islamic Emirate is serious about smuggling. Our fight has had three aspects, first, we ban poppy cultivation of drugs. The farmers should be helped and, the countries which have been affected by drugs and the money they used in this regard should be given to the Afghans,” he added.

Meanwhile, some Central Asia media outlets have recently reported that Tajikistan wants to manage its borders with the financial cooperation of Japan to reduce the threat of drug trafficking from Afghanistan.

Quoting the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Tajikistan, The Times of Asia reported that the Japanese government, through its Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), is also funding the Border Management Project, an initiative to support the Tajik Government in controlling its national border with Afghanistan.

“The project aims to both secure the length of the Tajik-Afghan border and facilitate cross-border trade, the report reads.

Meanwhile, several military analysts believe that some superpower countries are making efforts to destabilize Afghanistan.

“The borders of our neighboring countries are safe from drugs. Japan is of the same opinion with America, that’s why it wants to transfer the war of the Arabic world to Central Asia, especially to Afghanistan.,” said Kamran Aman, a military analyst.

“In the half of a century the eastern and western superpowers have fought for special goals in the geography of Afghanistan, which led to the increasing terrorism and cultivation and smuggling of drugs,” said Akhtar Rashikh, a military analyst.

Before this, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov, at the joint meeting of the Council and the 16th plenary session of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly in Moscow expressed concerns about the increase of terrorist group activities, drug smuggling, and the smuggling of weapons in Afghanistan, claims which were rejected by the Islamic Emirate.

Islamic Emirate Rejects Central Asia Concerns Over Drug Trafficking
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UN Security Council Resolution on Afghanistan: Just another ‘much ado about nothing’?

January 1, 2024 ,

AAN Team

Afghanistan Analysts Network

31 Dec 2024print sharing button

The United Nations Security Council has passed a resolution on the Independent Assessment on Afghanistan, which former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Feridun Sinirlioğlu had put together. UNSC Resolution 2721 only passed after a month and a half of Security Council meetings, mainly held behind closed doors, and two weeks of intensive negotiations on its language. The result is a resolution which failed to fully endorse the Sinirlioğlu report. AAN’s team here summarises the developments around the Independent Assessment, from how it came to be proposed, to its contents, to the Resolution passed on 29 December, the last working day of the Council in 2023. 

The Security Council adopts resolution 2721 (2023) on the independent assessment on Afghanistan. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation). Photo by UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe, 29 December 2023.

The Independent Assessment on Afghanistan, mandated by the UN Security Council on 16 March 2023 (see UNSC Resolution 2679), was given to UNSC members on 9 November. Since then, it has been the subject of much discussion among Security Council members, Afghans and other interested parties and Afghanistan has loomed large on the Council’s agenda, both formally and informally.[1] On 11 December, the co-penholders, Japan and the UAE, circulated a first draft of a resolution concerning the Assessment to Council members. The members then met to discuss the draft on 12 December and later provided written comments. A second draft was shared on 18 December, and after an additional round of comments and edits, a third draft was shared with council members’ under silence ‘on 26 December.[2]

The following day, China, France and Russia broke the silence, with Malta, Switzerland and the United States providing additional comments. The penholders then put a fourth and final draft ‘in blue’ on 28 December (here). This was the resolution that was put to a vote on 29 December.

This report is structured around four questions. The first deals with the events that preceded the Assessment and how the Security Council embarked upon this course of action. The second and third summarises the Assessment, while the fourth sums up what the Resolution says.

Why did the UN Security Council ask for an assessment? 

In the two years following the dramatic collapse of the Islamic Republic, the question of ‘what to do’ about Afghanistan has been of great concern to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Three of its permanent members – the United States, United Kingdom and France had given military and financial backing to the Republic and, for greater or lesser periods of time, had fought the Taleban, who took power on 15 August 2021.

Afghanistan has been high on the Security Council’s agenda as it concerns the Council’s specific powers, especially Chapter VI (articles 33-38) on the specific settlement of disputes and Chapter VII (articles 39-51) on actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.[3]

On the day after the takeover, 16 August 2021, Afghanistan was the priority item on the agenda for the 8834th meeting of the Security Council (see here); UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appealed to the Security Council and the ‘international community’ to “stand together, work together, act together and use all tools at their disposal to suppress the global terrorist threat in Afghanistan and to guarantee that basic human rights will be respected.” Since then, the Security Council has continued to single out these two primary concerns, what it casts as the ‘global terrorist threat’ and ‘respect for basic human rights’.

The 2021 annual report on Chapter VI related practices of the UNSC also touched on the situation in Afghanistan, encouraging all parties to:

[S]eek an inclusive, negotiated political settlement, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, that responded to the desire of Afghans to sustain and build upon the country’s gains over the past 20 years in adherence to the rule of law, and underlined that all parties must respect their obligations (see page 434 here).

The 2022 UNSC annual report on Chapter VII concerns named Afghanistan as one of the countries which it saw threats to international peace and security as continuing to emanate from and expressed particular concern over:

[T]he cultivation, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs and acknowledged that illicit proceeds of the drug trafficking in Afghanistan were a source of financing for terrorist groups and non-state actors that threatened regional and international security. (page 4)

[T]he Council reiterated the need to ensure that the sanctions regime pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) contributed effectively to ongoing efforts to bring about sustainable and inclusive peace, stability and security in Afghanistan, and noted the importance of the sanctions review when and if appropriate, while taking into account the situation on the ground, in a manner that was consistent with the overall objective of promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan (pages 24 and 25).

Afghanistan continued to figure prominently on the UNSC agenda in 2022. Of the 127 UNSC consultations in 2022, seven were about Afghanistan and the country was referenced 11 times in the list of highlights of UNSC activities that year (see here). It was discussed, among other places, at a country-specific high-level meeting on 26 January and also at an informal, confidential gathering under the Arria-formula on 24 October. (see here).

However, differences in how the member states of the UNSC wanted to deal with Afghanistan emerged in 2023 in discussions surrounding the extension of the United Nation’s Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) mandate in March. The lack of a consensus became evident. Initially, the co-authors of two March resolutions on Afghanistan — Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – envisioned an extension of the UNAMA mandate without any changes for nine months and an independent assessment regarding Afghanistan by October 2023. The United States, in particular, strongly opposed extending UNAMA’s mandate for only nine months, saying that shortening the mandate for four months would “negatively affect both UNAMA and the Secretary-General’s plan to convene Afghanistan special envoys” (see AAN reporting here).

The result was two resolutions, both passed on 16 March 2023. One extended UNAMA’s mandate until 17 March 2024. The second, Resolution 2679 (2023), requested the UN Secretary-General, in his role as the UN’s chief administrative officer, to provide the Security Council with “an integrated, independent assessment” no later than 17 November 2023 (see AAN reporting here), following consultations with “all relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, including relevant authorities, Afghan women and civil society, as well as the region and the wider international community.” The Assessment should:

[P]rovide forward-looking recommendations for an integrated and coherent approach among relevant political, humanitarian, and development actors, within and outside of the United Nations system, in order to address the current challenges faced by Afghanistan, including, but not limited to, humanitarian, human rights and especially the rights of women and girls, religious and ethnic minorities, security and terrorism, narcotics, development, economic and social challenges, dialogue, governance and the rule of law; and advance the objective of a secure, stable, prosperous and inclusive Afghanistan in line with the elements set out by the Security Council in previous resolutions”

The mandate was broad and somewhat vague, covering the actions not only of the UN but also other ‘relevant political, humanitarian, and development actors’, in other words, everyone concerned with Afghanistan.

About a month later, Guterres appointed senior Turkish diplomat Feridun Sinirlioğlu as the Special Coordinator for the independent assessment (announcement on 25 April here). The appointment preceded a long-awaited meeting of special envoys on Afghanistan, held in Qatar’s capital Doha, on 1-2 May 2023. The meeting, said Guterres, was “about developing a common international approach, not about recognition of the de facto Taliban authorities,” and that it was important to “understand each other’s concerns and limitations” (see readout of the press conference here). Participants in this meeting, Guterres said, agreed on “the need for a strategy of engagement that allows for the stabilisation of Afghanistan but also allows for addressing important concerns” (see also AAN analysis here).

What key issues does the independent assessment identify? 

The Independent Assessment on Afghanistan was not published on the UN website until 6 December 2023 (here), but was leaked and widely distributed soon after it was circulated to UNSC members (see for example, the independent, women-led non-profit news website Pass Blue here).

The Assessment says it has one “overarching goal” – to “advance the objective of a secure, stable, prosperous and inclusive Afghanistan in line with elements set out by the Security Council in previous resolutions.” It does not, however, identify what those elements are.[4] Widespread consultations with Afghans and others, it says, have underlined that “international engagement is not working.” It does not “serve the humanitarian, economic, political or social needs of the Afghan people,” nor does it address the concerns and priorities of “international stakeholders, including the neighbouring countries.”

Following what the Assessment coyly refers to as “the political transition in August 2021” (ie the military defeat of the Islamic Republic, which donor countries and the UN itself had done so much to support, and the re-establishment of the IEA, which many of those countries had previously been fighting), it says that many Afghans, nations and UN bodies had been concerned about IEA governance and the protection of rights, especially of women and girls. They are also concerned about “potential threats” to regional stability. From the IEA’s point of view, the Assessment says, it controls Afghanistan’s territory and governs the country, but has “appealed unsuccessfully for political and economic normalisation.” This situation “has led to an impasse, leaving much of the international community’s relations with Afghanistan in a state of uncertainty, with serious repercussions for the Afghan people.”

It concludes that it is necessary to find a ‘political pathway, basing this premise on current problems with aid (more on which below) and the fact that Afghanistan has the potential to both “enrich the region” as a hub for “trade, connectivity and people-to-people contacts” and destabilise it as a potential source of “transnational terrorism,” illegal narcotics and migrants” and because Afghans and others do not want to see renewed conflict. It says the pathway should allow all sides to discuss and deliberate their interests fairly.

The end state of those discussions, the Assessment says, is the “definition of a future where the State of Afghanistan is fully reintegrated into the international system without passing through a further cycle of violence while respecting all legal obligations.” It offers proposals “for a way forward and an engagement architecture to guide and bring more coherence to political, humanitarian and development activities” and that it presents “a substantive roadmap” that will “enable more effective negotiation and implementation of the priorities of Afghan and international stakeholders.”

This is a grand vision, but even at the earliest stage of the document where these quotes are from – page 2 of 19 – questions are raised and not answered, for example, given that the various Afghan and international stakeholders have contradictory priorities, how can Sinirlioğlu confidently assert that they will be implemented?

The Assessment then identifies five “key issues and priorities”. The first is human rights, especially what it calls the “basic rights of women and girls,” including to education, work and representation in public and political life. It also mentions “other patterns of unequal treatment and discrimination” towards citizens of “a number of ethnic or religious minority groups” (without specifying which – here or anywhere else), reports of extrajudicial killings by the IEA, especially of former officials and members of the security forces, the shrinking of civil space, including the harassment of civil society and the media, and restricted access to justice.

A second, shorter section outlines concerns about “counterterrorism, counternarcotics and regional security”. Security has improved since August 2021, it says – not surprisingly, given the (unmentioned in this document) the complete victory of the Taleban over the Republic. It acknowledges Emirate moves against the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), again not surprising as it is the IEA’s most dangerous armed opponent. It then points to the Emirate’s “limited responsiveness” to international calls to contain or control “terrorist groups and individuals inside Afghanistan, including members of Al Qaeda,” who, it says, have shown a “persistent presence.” These groups include significant numbers of Tehrik-e Taleban Pakistan (TTP) fighters who “appear to have free movement and shelter in Afghanistan and are carrying out an intensifying campaign of violence inside Pakistan.” This section also acknowledges the IEA’s “significant progress” on counter-narcotics (although as AAN has reported, so far, that has focused on cultivation, while trade has largely continued) and says “many stakeholders” want to help with “alternative crops and livelihoods”.

The Assessment then moves on to a third key issue/priority – economic, humanitarian and development issues. Those consulted by Sinirlioğlu and his team “across the spectrum” urged, the Assessment says, for “any international engagement strategy” to give attention to the combined humanitarian, development, and economic challenges facing Afghanistan.” Neighbouring countries, it says, see their interests served by Afghanistan having a robust and healthy economy. Afghans want urgent relief, it said, but also “but also an ability to fully invest in and pursue their own economic futures and livelihood opportunities freely.”

The Assessment describes the collapse of the economy in August 2021 as a consequence of the abrupt halt to aid and the freezing of Afghan access to the international banking system and (for the new IEA government) offshore foreign exchange reserves. Although the economy has, it says, for now stabilised, albeit at a low level, it warns that aid, already insufficient, is expected to fall, and that the banking system is still not functioning properly. It devotes one bullet point to shortcomings in IEA policy, which have contributed to “chilling” the economy: “Failure to institute measures of fiscal transparency, abrogation of the judicial system and basic legal guarantees, and lack of equal economic participation among all sectors of society have all contributed to continued low confidence among international donors and investors.” It also cites the IEA’s “exclusionary policies” towards women and some former technocrats.

The Assessment recognises that the nature of the aid – off-budget, with little development funding and no technical assistance – “limits the degree to which [it] can respond to basic needs in a sustainable and cost-effective way” and that delivery via an “overlapping network” of UN agencies and NGOs is costly and lacks necessary scale and coordination. It hones in on the particular damage of restricting technical assistance in agriculture, water management, demining and public health and denying Afghanistan access to funds aimed at helping the poorest countries adapt in the face of the climate crisis.

The last bullet point in this section feels significant. Stakeholders, the Assessment says, suggested ways to improve the effectiveness of aid or ensure economic recovery, but it warns: “[T]he triggers that have led to the current situation are as much political as economic, and economic recovery will depend significantly on a political decision, by donors in particular, to promote the development of the economy for the benefit of the Afghan people.” It lays Afghanistan’s problems with development and the economy squarely at the door of donors, alone.

A fourth key area, Inclusive Governance and Rule of Law, deals with what the Assessment describes as the call by many Afghan stakeholders, member states, multilateral institutions, the Security Council, neighbouring countries and near-neighbours that the IEA establish “an inclusive system of governance.” A “balanced, broad-based, inclusive, accountable and responsible government” is both a “reflection of fundamental rights” and “a key ingredient for peace, stability and harmony within the country and in the region.” It says that in this “diverse, multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian, multi-linguistic and multi-cultural society,” the inclusion of all communities in governance structures is “central to the social and political stability.” Many Afghans, it says, “expressed perceptions of exclusion and discriminatory practices on the basis of ethnicity, language and gender” under the IEA. Many spoke of their disenfranchisement from the “full ability to participate in political life” and the “marked decline in the space for political engagement”, to raise concerns and affect policy-making.

This, it says, was especially the case for Afghan women.

It says the IEA interprets such calls as a demand for power-sharing and “specifically for a return to government of some former political leaders”. The IEA also denies the charge that it is exclusive, insisting its government is ethnically diverse and that it has retained much of the Republic’s civil service.

The Assessment acknowledges that the IEA has established some limited means for consultation and complaint and that “many Afghan civil society actors” have continued to “build bridges and create spaces for dialogue among themselves and with the [de facto authorities] on an informal basis.” It believes these could be “built upon and be complemented by national dialogue.” Re-establishing “a justice and rule of law system that protects equal participation and fulfilment of rights,” it says, “would advance inclusive governance, while also contributing to economic growth and stability”. Notably, no mention is made of elections.

The fifth key indicator deals with Political Representation and Implications for Regional and International Priorities. In this short section, the Assessment acknowledges the IEA’s call for recognition, bilaterally and at the UN, and its assertion that it meets the requirements for occupying Afghanistan’s seat at the UN General Assembly (a decision on this was postponed for the third year in December 2023, see AAN report here). The Assessment acknowledges that this lack of recognition disadvantages Afghans and has limited the means to deal with regional concerns, including on trade, connectivity and transboundary resource management. However, “International stakeholders,” the Assessment says, remain “aligned behind the position expressed at the Secretary-General convened meeting of Special Envoys on Afghanistan in May 2023, which supported engagement with Afghanistan and the development of a common international approach, but that acknowledged the DFA [de factor authorities] should not be recognized at this stage”.

Already, in this laying out of the key issues, assumptions have come into play: that donors are overwhelmingly responsible for the economic woes of Afghanistan, or that the IEA will change what it fundamentally believes to be correct, for example, why would the Emirate want to ‘re-establish’ something it believes it has already instituted, the establishment of a justice system based on holy law that fulfils the rights of both God and people?

What are the Assessment’s recommendations?

The Assessment makes four broad recommendations and offers an analysis of the justification for those recommendations as well as suggestions regarding their implementation.

The first set of recommendations proposes a series of measures aimed at addressing the basic needs of Afghan people and strengthening trust through structured engagement. These include:

  • Expanding international assistance, including technical assistance, to improve the capacities of relevant Afghan institutions to deliver services to Afghan people more effectively.
  • Supporting food security and agricultural livelihoods, including the IEA’s ongoing counternarcotics campaign, environmental security and water management, the health sector, and demining, prioritising the most vulnerable groups and women and girls.
  • Finalising some near-finished infrastructure projects that were started before August 2021.
  • Establishing economic dialogue and financial reforms to reduce the effects of existing sanctions on the banking sector and supporting efforts to rehabilitate Afghanistan’s central bank, but only after the Emirate demonstrates transparent and accountable fiscal governance.

The Assessment point out that while “economic dialogue may positively impact blockages to private investment and banking transactions,” the “chilling” economic effects will likely ease only after significant policy changes, including removing restrictions on women and girls. The Assessment envisages that progress on economic issues would promote the Switzerland-based Fund for the Afghan People to disperse funds, which would stabilise the currency and offer a “gradual transition from current cash shipment-based assistance.”

  • Enabling partial restoration of regular transit, trade, and other means of connectivity between Afghans and the world, including airport safety and capacity, which would pave the way for more flights at Kabul International Airport.
  • Restoring regular administrative processes inside the country and abroad to issue passports and visas.
  • Encouraging and assisting activities that help Afghans realise their political, economic, cultural and social rights, including support for media, civil society, and victim-centred approaches to justice and reconciliation.

Recommendations to provide women and girls “educational opportunities, including for online learning, employment, micro-finance, preventing gender-based violence and providing psycho-social support” seem to fall well short of pursuing avenues that would see Afghan women benefit from the full spectrum of their rights as guaranteed by international law. This section also includes assistance to “women and girls and vulnerable Afghan groups and individuals who have sought protection and refuge outside Afghanistan” and dialogue with the IEA on its human rights obligations.

The second set of recommendations addresses what the Assessment calls security-related concerns of “International stakeholders and UN bodies” about “the use of Afghan soil to threaten or attack any other country, the planning and financing of terrorist acts, and the production, sale and trafficking of illegal narcotics.” The Assessment stresses the need for coordination and cooperation between the IEA and international stakeholders to address these concerns and enumerate priority areas as:

  • Supporting bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, which it says will require significant capacity and resources.
  • Cooperating with international counter-narcotics efforts to maintain the current pace of the IEA’s plan to eradicate illegal narcotics.
  • Strengthening international borders, including border controls and issuance of identity papers and travel documents.
  • Expanding international cooperation and assistance in areas that advance regional and global priorities, including in response to climate change, transboundary water issues (presumably on the Helmand Water Treaty, see AAN report here), counter-narcotics and global health security.
  • Reviewing and updating relevant provisions of the UN 1988 Sanctions list to “facilitate better compliance … and make the sanctions regime more relevant to current realities.”
  • Gradually resuming diplomatic engagement inside Afghanistan, which would pave the way for more sustained dialogue with all Afghan stakeholders, without specifying who these might be, as well as the delivery of international aid, including development assistance.

The third set of recommendation lays out a roadmap for political engagement intended to fully reintegrate Afghanistan into the international community in line with its international commitments and obligations. This section sets out to explain how the Assessment’s stated objective: “An end state of Afghanistan’s full reintegration into the international system” can be achieved using a “more coherent political engagement process…. pursued through a performance-based roadmap.” The outline of which is explained broadly as: “(A) international obligations of the State of Afghanistan with suggested benchmarks to indicate progress in meeting them, and (B) a call for an intra-Afghan political process that will build toward inclusive constitution-making. Progress in both of these components will build toward (C) an end state of the international community’s normalisation of relations with the State of Afghanistan.”

The final and fourth set of recommendations suggests a set of mechanisms designed to coordinate and oversee the recommendations made in the report. The Assessment stresses that significant resources and coordination platforms are needed to implement its recommendations effectively. To this end, it recommends three interlinked mechanisms:

  • UN-Convened Large Group Format: This group currently exists and was first convened by the UN Secretary-General in May 2023 in the Special Envoys format. The Assessment recommends another meeting of the large group format to discuss and advance its recommendations.
  • International Contact Group: This smaller group, selected from members of the large group format, would coordinate action and approaches “take a more frontal role” in political engagement with Afghan stakeholders.
  • UN Special Envoy: The Special Envoy would have a complementary mandate to UNAMA and focus on “diplomacy between Afghanistan and international stakeholders as well as on advancing intra-Afghan dialogue.” She/he would represent the UN in the above-mentioned groups and lead coordination efforts.

What is in the Resolution about the Assessment and where do we go from here?

Resolution 2721 was adopted on 29 December by 13 votes in favour, with China and Russia abstaining (see here). The Resolution sets forth six points as a common approach of the Council members on Afghanistan, with some reservations from China and Russia (more on which below).

It says that the Security Council:

1. Stresses the critical importance of a continued presence of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes across Afghanistan, and reiterates its full support to the mandate and the work of UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

2. Takes positive note of the independent assessment on Afghanistan (S/2023/856);

3. Encourages member states and all other relevant stakeholders to consider the independent assessment and implementation of its recommendations, especially increasing international engagement in a more coherent, coordinated and structured manner, affirms that the objective of this process should be a clear end state of an Afghanistan at peace with itself and its neighbors, fully reintegrated into the international community and meeting international obligations, and recognizes the need to ensure the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of Afghan women in the process throughout;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with members of the Security Council, relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, including relevant authorities, Afghan women and civil society, as well as the region and the wider international community, to appoint a Special Envoy for Afghanistan, in a timely manner, provided with robust expertise on human rights and gender, to promote implementation of the recommendations of the independent assessment, without prejudice to the mandate of UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and their vital work in Afghanistan;

5. Welcomes the Secretary-General’s intention to convene the next meeting of the group of Special Envoys and Special Representatives on Afghanistan initiated in May 2023 in a timely manner, and encourages the meeting to discuss the recommendations of the independent assessment;

6. Requests that the Secretary-General brief the Security Council on the outcome of these consultations and discussions within 60 days.

According to the independent think tank, The Security Council Report,[5] it appears that negotiations concerning the Resolution were complex and contentious (see here). This was evident also from the discussion at the Security Council following the vote on 29 December (see here). On one side of the rift were the UK and US, both very supportive of the Assessment and apparently also of the initial draft of the Resolution. China and Russia, on the opposite end, were primarily concerned about the lack of IEA buy-in for the process suggested in the Resolution. In remarks delivered on 20 December, US Ambassador to the UN Robert Wood said:

[W]e welcome the UN’s Independent Assessment on Afghanistan. We agree with the report’s recommendations on appointing a UN Special Envoy in establishing an international contact group. The UN Special Envoy and the contact group will be important for the development of a roadmap that ensures Afghanistan meets its international obligations. They will also complement UNAMA’s work to accomplish its mission of promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Following the vote, Deputy Political Counsellor of US Mission to the UN Lisa Browne said:

The United States strongly supports this resolution’s call for a UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan. A Special Envoy will be well positioned to coordinate international engagement on Afghanistan, including with relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, to achieve the objectives laid out in this resolution. The resolution’s request to set up a Special Envoy for Afghanistan, emphasizing that such a post would help coordinate work to achieve progress in the country.

The UK position was similar. Following the vote, its ambassador, Barbara Woodward, said the UNSC:

[S]hould seize the momentum of the independent assessment with the hope of changing Afghanistan’s current negative trajectory.… [W]e encourage all parties, including Afghan and international stakeholders, to take forward the independent assessment’s recommendations, working towards an Afghanistan that is at peace with its people, its neighbours, and the international community.

China and Russia built their argument around the Islamic Emirate’s response to the Assessment (seen by AAN), which was provided to Council members. The IEA defended its record on women’s rights, security, the economy and narcotics and rejected any suggestion of intra-Afghan dialogue or the creation of the oversight mechanisms referred to in the report, particularly the Special Envoy. It blasted the “malicious and illegal sanctions” regime, “grudge-motivated pressures” on it and interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. The IEA did welcome “recommendations of the assessment that support the strengthening of national economy of Afghanistan, opens the pathway to the recognition of the current government and encourages regional connectivity and transit via Afghanistan.”

Following the vote, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Geng Shuang said:

It is obvious that currently Council members remain divided on the follow-up implementation of the assessment report, and the Afghan authorities, on the other hand still have reservations on some recommendations…. China and the Russian Federation expressed these concerns in the consultation and constructively proposed amendments to the draft of relevant issues, which however were not taken on board. It is deeply regrettable, and we have to abstain in the vote just now.… It is our hope that going forward, the Secretary-General will cautiously deal with the appointment of the Special Envoy, continue to strengthen communication and interaction with the Afghan authorities, and strive to find appropriate solutions.

Russia’s Deputy Permanent Representative, Anna Evstigneeva was even more plain:

Russia abstained on a draft resolution on the independent assessment report on Afghanistan.… [W]e assume that the Secretary-General will consult the de facto authorities when appointing a Special Envoy and will also take into account the views of all members of the Security Council. That is a principled condition that we have insisted on from the outset. We would like to make it clear that we will not support Secretary-General’s decision unless it has the approval of the de facto authorities.

China and Russia, according to The Security Council Report, also raised questions regarding the composition of the “smaller contact group” and suggested deleting the paragraph about the Special Envoy altogether. However, the penholders have not gone as far, and their suggestion was left out of the final ‘in blue’ draft. The think tank reported that:

[C]hina and Russia apparently suggested deleting the paragraph that requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Envoy for Afghanistan and removing text noting that the next meeting of Special Envoys and Special Representatives should discuss the proposed establishment of the “smaller contact group,” In the next draft of the Resolution, the penholders apparently removed the text on the “smaller contact group” and added language requesting that the Secretary-General consult with relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders (including the Taliban, Afghan women, and civil society); Council members; the region; and the international community before appointing a Special Envoy. 

It also seems that UNSC members could only agree “to take a positive note of the independent assessment” and “encourage member states and all other relevant stakeholders to consider and implement its recommendations.” China and Russia were reportedly behind the latter formulation. Altogether, any language that stipulated endorsement of the Assessment and its recommendations was a point of debate among Council members. The Security Council Report said:

Although the first draft of the Resolution endorsed the independent assessment and its recommendations, it appears that later drafts instead welcomed them, following a proposal from Malta and the US. It seems that China and Russia argued that the draft should either take note of the independent assessment or welcome the efforts of Sinirlioğlu and his team. In an apparent compromise, the draft in blue takes positive note of the independent assessment.

Text affirming that one objective of this process was to see Afghanistan fully reintegrated into the international community and meeting its international obligations was subsequently added to the Resolution, The Security Council Report said. However, the Resolution was stripped of any conditionality, ie any language that suggested that IEA compliance with the obligations under international law was a precondition to Afghanistan’s full reintegration into the international community. According to The Security Council Report, a group of European members of the Security Council, including France, Malta, and Switzerland had sought to bolster language relating to Afghan women and the ‘women, peace and security agenda’. The think tank said:

Several members, including France, Malta, and Switzerland apparently proposed language emphasising that the Taliban’s compliance with their obligations under international law, particularly those relating to human rights, is central to the roadmap for political engagement outlined in the independent assessment report. 

Text reaffirming the indispensable role of women in Afghan society was added to the Resolution following a proposal from Switzerland, as was language noting that the Special Envoy for Afghanistan should have robust expertise on human rights and gender.

The independent assessment has generated a dynamic discussion about Afghanistan, which has been on the global side-line for some time, but so far, responses to its recommendations among Afghanistan’s stakeholders appear to fall short and be far from adequate. The move to have an independent assessment was driven by a desire to establish a consensus on how the Security Council deals with Taleban-ruled Afghanistan. No such shared approach, however, appears to have emerged. The Resolution does authorise the appointment of a Special Envoy, but “in consultation with members of the Security Council, relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, including relevant authorities, Afghan women and civil society, as well as the region and the wider international community”. There is no mention in the Resolution of an intra-Afghan dialogue envisioned by Sinirlioğlu’s report as the key mandate of the Special Envoy. Instead, the Special Envoy, as per the text of the Resolution, is seen as a gender and human rights expert who should “promote implementation of the recommendations of the independent assessment, without prejudice to the mandate of UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and their vital work in Afghanistan”. This also limits the space where a future Special Envoy would work and have a say. It is also noticeable that the idea of a smaller contact group has been dropped entirely. The Resolution only confirms that the negotiations between various international and local actors will continue without a feasible conclusion any time soon. China and Russia’s firm position that they will not approve any choice that the IEA has not approved, seems to indicate that the appointment of the Special Envoy will not happen any time soon.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour, Jelena Bjelica and Kate Clark

References

References
↑1 The following meetings were among those held: 

10 November A first discussion of the report by Security Council members during an informal lunch organised by the outgoing co-penholders on Afghanistan, Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

28 November Closed-door Security Council meeting (see here).

30 November Meeting of the high-level diplomatic grouping, the Group of Friends of Afghanistan, co-organised by Canada, UK and Qatar (see hereand here).

11 December Closed-door, ‘Arria-formula’ Security Council meeting on “women’s perspectives on Afghanistan” (see here), organised by Switzerland and co-sponsored by Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)

20 December Briefing of the Security Council by Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Roza Otunbayev (see the video here). Statements were also given by the Representative of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva and Director of the Coordination Division, Ramesh Rajasingham, a “representative of Afghan civil society” (unnamed in UN reporting ahead of the event) and the chair of the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee, the Ecuadorean Ambassador to the UN José Javier De La Gasca. This meeting was followed by closed consultations.
↑2 According to UNSC procedures, draft resolutions go through a negotiation process before they are put ‘under a silence’ – normally lasting 24 hours – to allow for final comments from Council members. When the Security Council approaches the final stage of negotiating a draft resolution, the text is printed ‘in blue’. See The UN Security Council Handbook.
↑3 The Security Council, as one of the six main organs of the United Nations, is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security (here). The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression; it calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. It can also impose sanctions or even authorise the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. It can set forth principles for a peace agreement; undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases; dispatch a mission;appoint special envoys or; request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute. Its powers are laid out in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the UN Charter. The UNSC deliberations on Afghanistan are based on powers listed in Chapter VI (articles 33-38) on the specific settlement of disputes and Chapter VII (articles 39-51) on actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Based on these powers, the Security Council authorises UNAMA’s mandate and obliges the mission to provide quarterly reports on the situation in Afghanistan.
↑4 The list of Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan is long (read them here). There have been eight since the IEA takeover, dozens during the Republic and after the al-Qaida attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, and 11 before that.
↑5 The Security Council Report (SCR) is an independent think tank that works towards the promotion of transparency in UNSC decision-making. See the organisation’s website here.

UN Security Council Resolution on Afghanistan: Just another ‘much ado about nothing’?
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Afghanistan media guide

January 30, 2023
BBC News
27 Jan 2023
Afghan men watch television in a restaurant in Kabul in August 2022
Afghanistan media outlets have come under severe pressure since the Taliban takeover

Afghan media have faced difficulties since the Taliban took power in Kabul on 15 August 2021.

Outlets have endured severe restrictions, an economic crisis and waning Western support.

There is growing self-censorship and editorial appeasement of the Taliban. Freedom of expression has largely disappeared.

Music is no longer broadcast and women rarely appear in the media. Female TV presenters must wear a face covering.

ore than 300 media outlets have closed and many journalists and media activists have left the country.

There were 9.2 million internet users by July 2022, comprising 22% of the population (Worldinternetstats.com).

Sone of the following outlets have moved their broadcasting operations outside Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover:

Media guides by BBC Monitoring

Press

Radio

  • Arman FM – Afghanistan’s first private radio station, on FM in Kabul and other cities
  • Arakozia FM – private, operated by Moby Group
  • Radio Afghanistan – run by state broadcaster National Radio-TV Afghanistan (NRTA); also operates Kabul Radio FM 93 in the capital and 32 provincial stations
  • Salam Watandar – non-profit production house, has 47 partner stations
  • Kilid Group (TKG) – US/EU-funded public media group comprising 11 local radios

Television

  • National Television Afghanistan – run by state broadcaster (RTA), via terrestrial relays and satellite
  • Tolo TV – leading private network, operated by Moby Group; via provincial relays and satellite
  • TOLOnews – Moby Group’s news network, via satellite; website in English
  • Lemar TV – private, Pashto-language sister station of Tolo TV
  • Ariana TV – private, broadcasts terrestrially in many provinces and via satellite to Asia, Europe and North America
  • Shamshad TV – private, available terrestrially in major cities
  • 1 TV Kabul – private, since September 2021, it has been broadcasting from Germany

News agencies

Afghanistan media guide
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UN RELEASES REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE TALIBAN TAKEOVER

July 20, 2022

UNAMA

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

20 Jul 2022

UN RELEASES REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE TALIBAN TAKEOVER

KABUL  – The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) today released a report (Human rights in Afghanistan: 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022) outlining the human rights situation in Afghanistan over the 10 months since the Taliban takeover.

The report summarises UNAMA’s findings with regards to the protection of civilians, extrajudicial killings, torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan, fundamental freedoms and the situation in places of detention. The report also contains recommendations to both the de facto authorities and the international community.

Despite an overall, significant reduction in armed violence, between mid-August 2021 and mid-June 2022, UNAMA recorded 2106 civilian casualties (700 killed, 1406 wounded). The majority of civilian casualties were attributed to targeted attacks by the armed group self-identified “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province” against ethnic and religious minority communities in places where they go to school, worship and go about their daily lives.

“It is beyond time for all Afghans to be able to live in peace and rebuild their lives after 20 years of armed conflict. Our monitoring reveals that despite the improved security situation since 15 August, the people of Afghanistan, in particular women and girls, are deprived of the full enjoyment of their human rights,” said Markus Potzel, Acting Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan.

While the de facto authorities have taken some steps seemingly aimed at the protection and promotion of human rights, such as the amnesty for former government officials and security force members, the 3 December decree on women’s rights and a code of conduct relating to prisoners, they also bear responsibility for a broad range of human rights violations.

The erosion of women’s rights has been one of the most notable aspects of the de facto administration to date. Since 15 August, women and girls have progressively had their rights to fully participate in education, the workplace and other aspects of public and daily life restricted and in many cases completely taken away. The decision not to allow girls to return to secondary school means that a generation of girls will not complete their full 12 years of basic education. At the same time, access to justice for victims of gender-based violence has been limited by the dissolution of dedicated reporting pathways, justice mechanisms and shelters.

“The education and participation of women and girls in public life is fundamental to any modern society. The relegation of women and girls to the home denies Afghanistan the benefit of the significant contributions they have to offer. Education for all is not only a basic human right, it is the key to progress and development of a nation,” said the UN envoy.

On 17 August 2021, the de facto authorities announced an amnesty for former government officials and Afghan National Security and Defense Force members. This amnesty does not, however, appear to have been consistently upheld, with UNAMA recording at least 160 extrajudicial killings of former government and security officials by members of the de facto authorities between 15 August 2021 and 15 June 2022.

UNAMA is concerned about the impunity with which members of the de facto authorities appear to have carried out human rights violations. UNAMA’s report details extrajudicial killings of individuals accused of affiliation with armed groups, as well as cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments and extrajudicial killings of individuals accused of “moral” crimes and the excessive use of force by law enforcement officials. Human rights violations must be investigated by the de facto authorities, perpetrators held accountable, and ultimately, incidents should be prevented from reoccurring in the future.

UNAMA’s report highlights specific concerns with respect to two bodies within the de facto authorities – the de facto Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (Amr bil Maruf) and the de facto General Directorate of Intelligence (Istikhbarat). Many of the directives issued by the de facto Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice limit the human rights and freedoms of Afghans, in particular women and girls. Although such directives are said to be recommendatory in nature, at times members of the de facto authorities have taken a harsh stance on their implementation, including carrying out physical punishments for alleged infringements of their directives.

Officials of de facto Istikhbarat have been identified for their particularly severe treatment of people deprived of their liberty. UNAMA’s report details instances where the de facto Istikhbarat was involved in perpetrating human rights violations against individuals in their custody, including extrajudicial killings, torture and ill-treatment, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions.

In the 10 months since they took control of Afghanistan, the de facto authorities have made clear their position on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of opinion. They have limited dissent by cracking down on protests and curbing media freedoms, including by arbitrarily arresting journalists, protestors and civil society activists and issuing restrictions on media outlets.

“The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of opinion are not only fundamental freedoms, they are necessary for the development and progression of a nation. They allow meaningful debate to flourish, also benefiting those who govern by allowing them to better understand the issues and problems facing the population,” said Fiona Frazer, UNAMA Chief of Human Rights.

With regards to places of detention: encouragingly, the de facto authorities do appear to be seeking to fulfil their obligations in relation to the treatment of detainees, with the Taliban leader having issued guidance on this issue in January 2022. Progress is hindered by financial constraints, resulting at times, in inadequate food, medical care and hygiene supplies for detainees and the cessation of vocational education and training programs for prisoners that were previously funded by the international community.

This is compounded by detainees remaining in extended pre-trial detention in some cases, due to the functioning of the justice system.

The human rights situation has been exacerbated by a nationwide economic, financial and humanitarian crisis of unprecedented scale. At least 59% of the population is now in need of humanitarian assistance – an increase of 6 million people compared with the beginning of 2021. UNAMA’s report calls on the international community to continue its support for the people of Afghanistan by ensuring that urgent humanitarian and basic needs are met. Further, the international community has an obligation to ensure that sanctions, while they remain in place, do not have a negative impact on human rights.

The findings and recommendations contained in the report reflect many of the concerns raised by UNAMA with a number of de facto entities over the past 10 months. UNAMA has appreciated the level of engagement to date and remains committed to supporting the de facto authorities in protecting and promoting the human rights of all Afghan women, men, girls and boys.

“As reflected by the United Nations Security Council in the extension of UNAMA’s mandate, Afghanistan as a state remains party to a number of instruments concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms. With this in mind, I urge the de facto authorities to do their utmost to address the concerns outlined in our report and meet their international obligations to protect and promote the human rights of all Afghans,” said Markus Potzel, Acting Secretary General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan.

Key findings for the period 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022:

Over the reporting period, UNAMA documented:

  • 2106 civilian casualties (700 killed, 1406 wounded) predominantly caused by improvised explosive device (IED) attacks attributed to ISIL-KP and unexploded ordnance (UXO).
  • 160 extrajudicial killings, 178 arbitrary arrests and detentions, 23 instances of incommunicado detention and 56 instances of torture and ill-treatment of former ANDSF and government officials carried out by the de facto authorities.
  • 59 extrajudicial killings, 22 arbitrary arrests and detentions and 7 incidents of torture and ill-treatment by the de facto authorities of individuals accused of affiliation with self-identified “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province”.
  • 18 extrajudicial killings, 54 instances of torture and ill-treatment and 113 instances of arbitrary arrest and detention and 23 cases of incommunicado detention of individuals accused of affiliation with self-identified “National Resistance Front”.
  • 217 instances of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishments carried out by the de facto authorities since 15 August 2021
  • 118 instances of excessive use of force by the de facto authorities between 15 August 2021 and 15 June 2022.
  • Human rights violations affecting 173 journalists and media workers, 163 of which were attributed to the de facto authorities. Among these were 122 instances of arbitrary arrest and detention, 58 instances of ill-treatment, 33 instances of threats and intimidation and 12 instances of incommunicado detention.[1] Six journalists were also killed during the period (five by self-identified Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province, one by unknown perpetrators).
  • Human rights violations affecting 65 human rights defenders, 64 of which were attributed to the de facto authorities. Among these were 47 arbitrary arrests, 17 cases of incommunicado detention, 10 cases of ill-treatment and 17 cases of threats and intimidation.

[1] Since one individual may have suffered more than one violation (e.g., one person may have been arbitrarily arrested, held incommunicado, tortured and/or threatened), the number of violations is higher than the number of individuals affected.

Read the full report

 

UN RELEASES REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE TALIBAN TAKEOVER
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RAND: American Policy Toward the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

June 3, 2022

Engage, Isolate, or Oppose

by James Dobbins, Andrew Radin, Laurel E. Miller

Format File Size Notes
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With the American military withdrawal, the Taliban’s seizure of control, and a developing humanitarian crisis, the United States faces a question of what policy it should pursue toward the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. To inform U.S. policymakers, the authors of this Perspective identify the remaining American interests in Afghanistan — principally counterterrorism and humanitarian relief — and propose a framework to evaluate three different U.S. overall policy approaches: to engage with the Taliban, to isolate the regime, or to oppose the Taliban by seeking to remove them from power. The authors identify the conditions under which these policies may be most appropriate and how they would best serve U.S. interests. They conclude that engagement offers the only prospect of advancing American interests in the country. They caution, however, that isolation is the more usual U.S. response to an unwelcome change in regime. With its embassy closed and a comprehensive sanctions regime in place, this will become the default U.S. policy toward Afghanistan in the absence of contrary decisions.

Download full report: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1540-1.html

RAND: American Policy Toward the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
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