Afghanistan’s Trade Via Alternate Routes Bypasses Pakistan Closures

December 8, 2025
Khaama Press
Ankit Kumar, Assistant Professor (Research) at SICSSL, specializes in modern warfare, geopolitics, and nuclear policy. He has consulted for India’s Ministry of External Affairs and Defense and contributed to leading think tanks and international publications. He is pursuing a PhD on nuclear policy ambiguity with India as a case study.

Afghanistan’s authorities have intensified efforts to diversify trade corridors, gradually reducing dependence on Pakistan following repeated and lengthy border closures that have disrupted bilateral commerce. Major crossings such as Torkham and Chaman – which previously accounted for an estimated 40 percent of Afghanistan’s official trade – experienced extended shutdowns throughout late 2024 and into 2025 amid escalating allegations related to cross-border militancy and security incidents. These closures, often lasting several weeks, have reportedly inflicted monthly losses exceeding USD 200 million on Afghan exporters of perishable fruits, vegetables, and dried nuts. Imports of fuel, wheat, and pharmaceuticals were also delayed, contributing to domestic inflation and periodic shortages. In response, Kabul has increasingly prioritised alternative routes, including India via Iran’s Chabahar Port and new air links, alongside expanded overland connections with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, aiming to build a more resilient, multipolar trade network less vulnerable to sudden disruptions.

The deterioration in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations since 2021 has intensified tensions. Islamabad’s concerns regarding Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) activities inside Afghanistan and Kabul’s objections to Pakistan’s visa restrictions have compounded mistrust. The situation escalated in October 2025 during border clashes that prompted indefinite closures under counter-terrorism justifications. Prior to these developments, annual bilateral trade was estimated between USD 2.5 and 3 billion, with Afghanistan exporting around USD 1.5 billion in agricultural produce while importing fuel and basic commodities through Karachi and Gwadar ports. That figure is now believed to have fallen below USD 1 billion. Afghan agricultural products, such as grapes, have reportedly sold for significantly higher prices in Pakistani markets amid supply volatility, while hundreds of Afghan and Pakistani cargo trucks were left stranded near border points. Analysts suggest that although Pakistan sought to pressure Kabul regarding militant sanctuaries, the interruptions have also reduced Pakistan’s leverage as Afghan traders increasingly rely on costlier yet more predictable alternative routes.

A central component of this shift is the Chabahar International Transport and Transit Corridor, where India has maintained a long-term investment strategy. New Delhi’s USD 500 million contribution to Chabahar, operational since 2018, offers Afghanistan direct access through Iranian ports without requiring Pakistani transit. During Afghan Acting Industry Minister Nooruddin Azizi’s visit to India in November 2025, the sides discussed streamlined visas, lower air-freight tariffs, and expanded cargo flights from Delhi, Amritsar, and Mumbai to Kabul, with the objective of raising bilateral trade toward USD 1 billion. Chabahar has already facilitated the delivery of 1.5 million tonnes of Indian wheat and pulses since 2022. More recently, Afghan pomegranates and raisins have reached Indian markets within days rather than weeks. Although U.S. sanctions complicate Iranian port operations, Chabahar’s reduced docking fees and quicker customs processing have reportedly increased cargo volumes by 30 percent year-on-year.

Northern trade corridors to Central Asia also present expanding opportunities. Trade with Uzbekistan was estimated at USD 1.1 billion in 2024, supported by the Hairatan rail terminal and the Termez bridge, with 2025 targets approaching USD 2 billion across commodities including Uzbek flour, machinery, and Afghan minerals. Turkmenistan’s Torghundi crossing has seen fuel and construction material volumes rise, while Kazakhstan has proposed a USD 3 billion regional transport roadmap focused on road upgrades and dry ports. Afghanistan’s participation in the Ashgabat Agreement since 2018 underpins multimodal rail-and-road connectivity extending toward the Caspian region and aligning with segments of China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the Wakhan Corridor. Taliban officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, have encouraged Afghan traders to prioritise alternative routes, describing Pakistan’s measures as economically restrictive. Supporters of diversification argue that Afghanistan could gain a more central role as a regional transit hub, including potential energy import and export projects such as CASA-1000.

The diversification approach, however, faces significant constraints. Infrastructure limitations – including inadequate road quality, insufficient cold-chain storage, and limited rail connectivity – raise transportation costs by an estimated 20 to 40 percent for time-sensitive exports. Security risks persist on northern routes, while fluctuating Iranian transit regulations and tariffs in Central Asia add additional challenges. Afghanistan’s projected economic growth of around 2.5 percent in 2025 remains closely tied to imports, and customs revenues have reportedly fallen by roughly 25 percent due to border disruptions. Humanitarian concerns persist regarding wheat imports, particularly during drought periods. Nevertheless, analysts argue that forced diversification may create opportunities in value-added processing of Afghan agricultural products, expanded mineral exports to Asian markets, and joint logistics ventures that could gradually narrow the country’s approximately USD 6 billion trade deficit.

These evolving trade patterns also carry broader geopolitical implications. Pakistan risks strategic isolation as Afghanistan deepens economic cooperation with India and Central Asian states, while emerging transit alternatives potentially dilute the influence of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). For Afghanistan, long-term success will depend on sustained infrastructure investment and diplomatic engagement, including efforts to secure sanctions relief for Iranian-linked ports. If diversification strategies continue and logistical barriers are addressed, Afghan officials estimate that non-Pakistani trade could rise to USD 10 billion by 2027. While the current shift has been shaped by prolonged border tensions, policymakers emphasise that a broader network of trade partners may offer Afghanistan greater economic resilience and stability in the years ahead.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Khaama Press.

Afghanistan’s Trade Via Alternate Routes Bypasses Pakistan Closures
read more

Ali Faqirzada is an Afghan refugee. He deserves to stay in America

December 8, 2025

Thu 4 Dec 2025 10.30 EST

On 14 October, Ali Faqirzada – an Afghan refugee, a resident of New Paltz, New York, and a computer science student at Bard College – arrived for an interview at a federal immigration office on Long Island. He was applying for political asylum, a designation for which he was – and remains – a perfect candidate.

In his native country, Faqirzada had assisted the American government and Nato with projects designed to improve the lives of Afghan women and help them get an education. But after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the ministry where he, his mother and sister had worked was bombed by the Taliban, and one of its employees was murdered.

Understandably concerned that they would be tortured and killed like so many Afghans targeted by the Taliban for their cooperation with humanitarian agencies, the Faqirzadas made their way to Mexico, and from there to the US, where they immediately applied for refugee status. Six family members have already been granted asylum after having successfully made the case that repatriation to their Taliban-controlled homeland would probably mean a death sentence.ad

When Ali Faqirzada went for his 14 October interview, it seemed probable that his petition would also be approved. According to Malia Dumont, a military veteran formerly deployed in Afghanistan and now chief of staff and vice-president for strategy and policy at Bard, Ali is a brilliant, generous, community-minded student who has worked in New York state as a hospital security guard, a position of great trust and responsibility.

In a more reasonable, more compassionate country, the immigration official would have walked around the table, shaken Faqirzada’s hand, and thanked him for how much he has done on behalf of his people and our own. In a more recognizably American country, the interviewer would have congratulated Ali on how obviously he is thriving in his adopted land and on the good chance that he will go on to make valuable contributions to our society.

But that is not what happened. That is not how the story went in Donald Trump and Stephen Miller’s America. Immediately following his interview, during which he convinced the authorities that his claim of “credible fear” was justified, Faqirzada was arrested by ICE agents and sent to the Delaney Hall detention facility in Newark, New Jersey, a for-profit prison operated by the GEO Group. He has been there ever since, in a cell with 12 other men, where his access to books, water, and halal food has been severely restricted. According to visitors, he has devoted his energies to maintaining the morale and the welfare of his fellow inmates.

The merits of Ali’s case and the sheer absurdity of the suggestion that the genial, well-liked college student could pose any sort of terrorist threat has prompted an outpouring of popular support.

Among his advocates are Leon Botstein, president of Bard College and himself a refugee from the Nazis, who has stated that wisest course in such situations is to be as vocal – to make as much noise – as possible. Others who have spoken out on Faqirzada’s behalf include the New York governor, Kathy Hochul, Congressman Pat Ryan, a Democrat of New York, the communities of New Paltz and Stone Ridge, New York, and the Episcopal bishop Matthew Heyd, who led a vigil in November outside Delaney Hall.

Their efforts to free Faqirzada have been complicated by a 29 November government ruling that has paused the final approval of all asylum applications. It’s the newest and most drastic addition to a series of recent measures – including the temporary cessation of the US Refugee Admissions Program on 20 January – that have made the process of asylum-seeking steadily more challenging. In addition, there is now a pause on new immigration from Afghanistan and on the issuing of green cards to Afghans already residing in the United States. Decisions on the granting of asylum are made by the Department of Homeland Security and not the judiciary, thus making it easier for the Trump administration to drastically curtail the flow of refugees.

The sweeping new changes targeting Afghans were enacted in the aftermath of the tragic Washington DC shooting of two national guard soldiers, one fatally, by an Afghan national who had worked with the CIA and whose application for asylum had been thoroughly vetted and approved.

Common sense – a trait that the Republican party has claimed as an essential aspect of their political agenda – suggests that a genial, kind-hearted, highly motivated computer science student and hospital security guard should not be held accountable for someone else’s crime. Nor should the entire Afghan community, many members of which have fled great danger at home, be punished for the actions of one man and made to worry about whatever safety and stability they have managed to find in our country. There is great confusion, uncertainty and a dispiriting lack of clarity about what precisely these new measures mean and how to proceed from here.

Many questions remain about Ali Faqirzada’s detention. How long will he continue to be held prisoner at Delaney Hall? How will the new rulings affect his chances of being granted the protections he clearly deserves? But perhaps the most important questions are the ones that we have been asking ourselves since January 2025 and that we will likely ask ourselves for years to come. How did we let this happen – and what can we do about it now?

  • Francine Prose is a former president of PEN American Center and a member of the American Academy of Arts and Letters and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Ali Faqirzada is an Afghan refugee. He deserves to stay in America
read more

Report: 20% of all US aid to Afghanistan was ‘wasted’

December 5, 2025
Responsible Statecraft
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction issued a scathing final analysis

The United States wasted up to $29 billion dollars during its two-decade long effort to transform Afghanistan into a stable and democratic state, according to a major new report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

The wasted funds account for roughly a fifth of the $148 billion that the U.S. spent on reconstructing Afghanistan — a sum greater than what Washington spent to rebuild Europe after World War II, in inflation-adjusted terms. Among the most wasteful projects were a $7.2 billion effort to eliminate opium production in the country as well as a $4.7 billion program that tried and failed to build local state capacity.

The report marks the final update from SIGAR, which will officially close up shop early next year. Over its 17 years of existence, the office used its uniquely focused mandate to ferret out cases of waste and fraud while making recommendations about how to avoid further abuses. According to the report, its efforts led to 171 criminal convictions while saving taxpayers as much as $2.5 billion.

SIGAR was among the most influential critics of America’s nation-building efforts abroad. Its work revealed not just individual instances of waste but also the more fundamental problems that plagued Washington’s reconstruction efforts. “Over two decades, the United States invested billions of dollars and incurred thousands of casualties in a mission that promised to bring stability and democracy to Afghanistan, yet ultimately delivered neither,” the final report says. “The rapid collapse of the Afghan government in August 2021 laid bare the fragility that had been concealed by years of confident assertions of progress.”

The office pointed out “contradictions” in the U.S. approach in Afghanistan, arguing that “the relentless pursuit of reconstruction resulted in perpetual Afghan government dependency, fueled corruption, and in some cases strengthened the very insurgency it sought to undermine.”

It is unclear whether Washington has fully grappled with the critiques put forward by SIGAR over the past 17 years. Congress chose not to create a special inspector general for Ukraine aid, for example, opting instead to coordinate oversight through the office of the Pentagon’s inspector general.

Former SIGAR John Sopko argued that this approach would be insufficient for properly tracking the $187 billion that the U.S. has given Ukraine. “Just look at the amount of money we’re spending,” Sopko told RS in 2023. “When you pour that much money in, even if it’s the most noble cause in the world, you can’t help but waste a lot.”

Report: 20% of all US aid to Afghanistan was ‘wasted’
read more

Who Dares, Kills? Alleged war crimes and cover-ups by Britain’s special forces

December 2, 2025

Rachel Reid

print sharing button

British special forces are being investigated for war crimes allegedly committed between 2010 and 2013 in Afghanistan. A public inquiry is looking into the deaths of Afghans who were killed in suspicious circumstances, mostly involving detention operations that showed hallmarks of summary executions. The killings came to light because of whistle-blowers inside the military, combined with the tenacity of victims and investigative journalists. The scale of the alleged crimes is shocking – lawyers say there were more than 80 suspicious deaths in the time period of the inquiry – but for the families involved, the end may be years away, or may never come. In this themed report, Rachel Reid explores what is known about the killings and the failures of accountability, which resonate darkly with other incidents and with the behaviour of the ‘elite forces’ of other nations. The inquiry and the reporting around it raise questions about the true numbers of victims and the dangers of a culture of exceptionalism among special forces, which morphs easily into one of impunity. 

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below

The SAS occupy a special place in British culture, illustrated by the rule-bending bravado of their motto, “Who Dares Wins.” Yet, in recent years, this reputation has been tarnished by growing accusations of not just rule-bending but potential war crimes, including the suspicious deaths of detainees, mostly during night raids, primarily in Helmand province between 2010 and 2013. Lawyers representing victims’ families say that more than 80 were killed, including children.

The UK military police did try to investigate a number of the killings, but they met resistance from special forces and produced no real accountability for victims’ families. The victims’ lawyers forced a judicial review, which forced the Ministry of Defence to release incriminating documentation, which revealed deep concerns about the incidents inside the military. Investigative reporting by the BBC and others rang raised yet more suspicious deaths and internal military concerns. One former SAS member told the BBC that on some operations, “the troop would go into guest house type buildings and kill everyone there. … It’s not justified, killing people in their sleep.”

According to the laws of armed conflict, detainees cannot be killed, unless in self-defence. To give the appearance of acting within the law, special forces appear to have concocted stories of firefights and even planted weapons on victims. This casual disregard for Afghan lives and for the law is all the more disturbing given what has been learned over the years – including through AAN investigations – about the patchy intelligence that special forces relied upon, which suggests that at least some – or perhaps many of the detainees being killed were not Taliban, but civilians.

This report outlines the patterns of the suspicious deaths, the alleged cover-ups and the failed investigations. It will consider the factors that may have contributed to this bloody period, including wider abuses by special forces, with similar patterns by Australian special forces and reports of extrajudicial killings by United States and Afghan special forces. It will look at the somewhat limited hopes for justice for victims emanating from the public inquiry and beyond.

Edited by Kate Clark and Roxanna Shapour 

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below

20251201 SAS Report FINALDownload

Who Dares, Kills? Alleged war crimes and cover-ups by Britain’s special forces
read more

Claimed by Gunfire: How a single shot stole an Afghan girl’s future

November 23, 2025

Hamid Pakteen • Roxanna Shapour

  print sharing button

In parts of southeastern Afghanistan, a boy seeking to force a girl into marriage may fire gunshots outside her home to claim her publicly as his future wife, often after the girl’s family has refused his proposal. The shots are a signal that the girl now belongs to him – regardless of her wishes or her family’s decision. Once a girl has been claimed in this way, no one else dares to marry her, fearing retaliation. It is rare, though not unheard of, for families to give their daughter in marriage to the boy. In those cases – usually involving community mediation and large payments – the relationship between the families never truly heals and the girl’s family will forever resent their new son-in-law. Most girls who fall victim to this coercive practice remain unmarried for the rest of their lives, living in their father’s home, trapped by someone else’s reckless actions. In this instalment of The Daily Hustle, Hamid Pakteen hears from 47-year-old Bibi Salima about how her cousin’s actions thirty years ago altered her life and shattered her dreams. 

A Kabul street mural by the Afghan artist collective ArtLords reads: “A true Muslim is one whose words and actions do no harm to others (Hadith Sharif). Violence against women goes against the teachings of Islam.” Photo: ArtLords, 2017

 

When I was 17 years old, my cousin – my mother’s nephew – asked for my hand in marriage, but my family refused. My mother said, “She’s still young. She hasn’t reached the legal age yet.”

We are three sisters and I’m the youngest. At the time, my eldest sister was already married and my other sister, who is a couple of years older than me, hadn’t married yet. My mother wanted her to marry first, and according to our customs, that made sense. But my cousin wasn’t having it. He kept asking my mother to let him marry me, every chance he got.

One day, my eldest brother confronted him outside our house. What was supposed to be a quiet chat between two cousins grew into a heated argument when my cousin refused to stop asking for my hand. He told my brother he was determined to marry me, either with the family’s approval or by force. When my brother came inside, he was furious – visibly shaken and red in the face. He told my mother that we should no longer have any relations with her brother’s family. “We shouldn’t go to their house and they should never again come to ours,” he shouted.

The gunshots that changed everything 

From that day on, resentment grew between the two families until one afternoon, my cousin came to our house with a gun. He stood on the street outside our front door and fired shots into the air. He called out my name and then called out to my brother, “Come and save your sister from me now, if you dare.”

That day, none of the men in our family were at home. My mother ran outside to try to calm him down. She begged him not to destroy both families with his actions, but he ignored her pleas. He kept shouting, telling her that she was ruining his life and then he fled.

When my brothers came home and heard about what my cousin had done, they were furious. One of my brothers grabbed the household gun and stormed out of the house. He said he was going to my uncle’s house, a half-hour’s walk from our village, to kill my cousin. But my cousin was nowhere to be found.

My uncle, devastated by what his son had done, rushed to our house. He begged my mother to stop my brother. “Control your son so that he doesn’t do anything that we will all regret,” he pleaded. He said that his son had run away from home and gave his word that he would punish him severely if he found him. He said that he could never forgive his son for doing such a shameful thing, especially to his niece, and then running away like a coward. He apologised over and over again. I think he was truly ashamed and heartbroken. But my brothers were incensed. They said terrible things to my uncle and pushed him out of our home.

Disgrace, repentance and a broken family 

My father was a respected religious scholar, but he wasn’t at home. He was in Kabul, where he was the imam of a mosque. He came back home as soon as he found out – angry and determined to seek satisfaction. He talked it over with my brothers and together they filed a complaint at the district centre. At that time, during the mujahedin regime, there was no official government to speak of, but because everyone respected my father, they took the matter seriously and started an investigation.

The authorities summoned my uncle’s family and demanded that they hand over my cousin. But, knowing what was in store for him, he’d fled to Pakistan, cutting all ties with his family. My uncle, who was well-respected in the community, publicly apologised to my parents and even said, “I’ve disowned him. He’s no longer my son.” He and his sons were detained, but after a few days, when it became obvious they had no idea of my cousin’s whereabouts, they were released.

Afterwards, my uncle came to our house along with his family and several tribal elders to ask for forgiveness according to our custom of nanawatai (sanctuary), which obliges victims to forgive a transgressor who comes to repent. Although my father was still angry, he had no choice but to accept their apology. But he said there would be no contact between the two families ever again. From that day on, our families became strangers. My uncle and his family never visited us again and we never visited them. On rare occasions, my uncle would quietly visit my mother, without my father or brother’s knowledge. But when he passed away, my mother didn’t go to his funeral.

The woman that I never became 

I often think about how a single moment – a single rash act, a single word spoken in anger or a single shot fired to the sky – can alter someone’s life forever. I sometimes look back at my 17-year-old self – a carefree, innocent girl, unaware of the gathering clouds and the storm that was about to destroy her future.

Every girl has dreams of getting married and having a family. And I was no different. I wanted a big wedding, as is our custom, lasting several days and turning the entire village into a festival. I imagined a kind husband who would take me on visits to Kabul and maybe even to Pakistan and Iran. But that life wasn’t meant to be.

I was too young then to understand what all this would mean for my future. I thought that in time, the storm would pass and the families would go back to how things had always been before the shots were fired. But my family knew that things could never be the same and that my life would be one of dependence, isolation and sorrow. Looking back, there were clues in the way people looked at me, in their hushed voices, and in the silence when I walked into a room. But at the time, I was too young and inexperienced to recognise them.

I still didn’t think much about it when my older sister got married. After all, according to our customs, it was her turn and I thought that I’d be next. But reality hit hard as I watched one girl after another in the family get married, but my turn never came and I realised that it never would. At wedding parties, girls would whisper hurtful things: “It’s your turn now, but you can’t marry. You will always stay in your father’s home.” Their words cut into my heart like a knife.

My mother tried to comfort me. She was the keeper of all my secrets and the source of my strength. But when I was alone with my thoughts, the sense of gloom and hopelessness overpowered me. I felt trapped, cursed by circumstances that I had no part in. However, with each passing day, my anxiety only grew. Eventually, my family took me to a doctor. When that didn’t help, they took me to one mullah after another. They all prayed for me. A couple of them said that I had been cursed by an evil eye and gave me amulets, and one even said I had been possessed by a jinn. But there was no cure for my suffering.

After my parents died, my brothers, who had families of their own, moved into their own homes. Our family became scattered. Now, everyone’s busy with their own lives and I’m left alone. I live in my father’s house with my eldest brother and his family. Although my brother and my nieces and nephews take care of me and I lack for nothing, I still feel like a burden.

Thirty years without hope

My cousin never came back to our area again. He never visited his family because his father had sworn to kill him and warned him to stay away, but I later learned that he had sent a letter warning people that no one had the right to marry me. People remained fearful that if anyone did marry me, he’d harm them. We heard that he’s living in Pakistan and has a family of his own.

He’s living his life, but his decision to fire a gun outside our house killed my future. In an instant, all my dreams, all my hopes and aspirations, turned to dust.

It’s been nearly 30 years since the day the shots rang outside our house and ruined my life forever. After the Islamic Emirate regained power, it criminalised this despicable act. I wonder if it will make any difference; I haven’t heard of anyone being jailed for it. Whatever happens, the new law came too late for me. I’ve spent my life living through other people’s happiness, watching in the mirror as my hair turned white and wrinkles appeared on my face. These days, I pass the time lost in my own thoughts, without a sense of direction, watching the girls I grew up with – now grandmothers – tend to their own families and grandchildren.

People live on hope. My hope died a long time ago and a life without hope is a slow kind of dying. There is more than one way to kill a person. You can take a gun to a girl’s house and fire shots in the air outside her door.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour

Revisions:

This article was last updated on 23 Nov 2025

Authors:

Hamid Pakteen

More from this author

Roxanna Shapour

More from this author

Claimed by Gunfire: How a single shot stole an Afghan girl’s future
read more

The Islamic Emirate and the (Other) Authoritarians: Afghanistan-Central Asian relations since 2021

November 11, 2025

Letty Phillips

 

Since the Taliban’s return to power, they have invested heavily in building diplomatic relationships with the five states of Central Asia — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Under Republic-era governments, Central Asian governments – avowedly secular in outlook since they became independent nations – frequently sounded warnings over the threat that Islamic extremism posed to their own security and to the security of the wider world. Cracking down on Islamist opposition at home has been a consistent priority for the states of Central Asia. And yet they now appear interested in drawing closer to the Emirate. They have made diplomatic visits and hosted Emirate officials in return, announced numerous regional trade deals and promoted massive regional projects to deliver energy and transportation infrastructure. As AAN guest author Letty Phillips* explores, this suggests that pragmatic economic and regional interests have trumped earlier concerns. 
You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below

The second Emirate might be uninterested in accommodating the demands of Western powers, but it is not isolationist. In fact, establishing relationships with the five Central Asian states has become a key focus of the IEA’s foreign policy. Al-Emarah News, the official mouthpiece of the Emirate, describes this strategy as a “new and distinct era” in Afghanistan’s foreign relations, grounded in cooperation with neighbouring states.

This report examines how these interactions have developed over time and the pragmatism that now defines the relationship between the Emirate and its northern neighbours. Although none of the Central Asian states have formally recognised the Emirate, all have established practical channels for diplomacy, trade, and cooperation. Central Asian states, which were once cautious of the threat of Islamist extremism, are now opting for engagement, driven by concerns over stability, security and regional connectivity.

Drawing on open-source data and official statements, this report analyses the political, security, and economic aspects of these relationships. It reviews the expansion of cross-border trade as well as the progress – and limitations – of large infrastructure projects such as TAPI, CASA-1000 and regional railway links. It also considers illicit and informal trade networks and examines the role that customs revenues play in sustaining the Emirate.

Finally, the report explores how these regional connections contribute to the Emirate’s resilience. It finds that Afghanistan’s engagement with Central Asian states is indicative of a broader trend of cooperation among authoritarian states, in which shared interests in maintaining regime stability and ensuring non-interference outweigh ideological differences. These dynamics, the report argues, are central to understanding the future trajectory of Afghanistan’s foreign relations and internal governance under the current regime. These dynamics, the report argues, are crucial for understanding the future direction of Afghanistan’s foreign relations and its internal governance under the current regime.

Edited by Jelena Bjelica and Rachel Reid

*Letty Phillips is a researcher and analyst who worked in Afghanistan from 2021 to 2024.

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below

20251111 Afg CA trade FINALDownload

 

The Islamic Emirate and the (Other) Authoritarians: Afghanistan-Central Asian relations since 2021
read more

A New Accountability Mechanism for Afghanistan: What the IIM-A can (and cannot) do

November 8, 2025

Ehsan Qaane

print sharing button

The United Nations is creating an Independent Investigative Mechanism for Afghanistan (IIM-A) which will collect evidence of war crimes and other grave violations of international law. The new UN body will investigate, preserve and analyse evidence, creating case-ready files that prosecutors can use in multiple jurisdictions. Its mandate is not time-limited, covering past, ongoing and future international crimes and serious violations committed within Afghanistan’s territory. The move follows years of campaigning by victims’ and human rights groups and comes despite the wariness of countries whose militaries fought in Afghanistan and the current UN liquidity crisis. In this report, Ehsan Qaane explains what the mechanism will do, its potential contribution to accountability in Afghanistan and its limitations and risks.

Delegates attend a session of the United Nations Human Rights Council at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Photo: UN Photo/Jean-Marc Ferré

On 6 October 2025, the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted a resolution to establish the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Afghanistan (IIM-A). For those campaigning for this body, this is a huge win, which has at times looked uncertain amid a challenging global climate for human rights and fluctuating international attention to the ongoing human rights crisis in Afghanistan. This UN body will be tasked with collecting and preserving evidence of serious human rights violations and international crimes. The IIM-A will not act as a court or tribunal, but will function as a professional investigation hub, collecting, storing and analysing evidence and preparing files that can support future prosecutions in national, regional or international courts. It will complement and cooperate with other UN and international bodies, but it is an independent body.
The IIM-A follows similar mechanisms for Syria and Myanmar, each with slight variations in mandate and oversight.[1] These mechanisms are part of a trend towards supporting or incentivising national and international bodies to investigate and prosecute international crimes. Growing numbers of countries have enacted universal jurisdiction laws, allowing them to prosecute crimes wherever they have been committed, based on the principle that some crimes are so egregious they transcend borders. However, most national investigative bodies tend to have very limited resources, including investigators, country specialists and access to evidence. The International Criminal Court is also hampered by limited resources. By creating a kind of ‘one-stop shop’ for evidence, expertise and legal analysis, these UN mechanisms can boost the capacity of prosecutors to carry out investigations.

Given the sheer number of crimes, perpetrators and victims in Afghanistan, the hope is that the IIM-A can make it far easier for prosecutors – either at the ICC or anywhere in the world with jurisdiction – to take on the challenging work of prosecuting war crimes and other grave violations.

This report will examine the mandate of the new mechanism, explain what difference it might make and why civil society fought so hard for it. It will then look at some areas of ambiguity and identify potential pitfalls.

Mandate and scope of the IIM-A

The core purpose of the IIM-A, as set out in paragraph 25 of the Human Rights Council (HRC) resolution, is:

[T]o collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of international crimes and the most serious violations of international law, including those that may also amount to violations and abuses of international human rights law, committed in Afghanistan, including against women and girls, and to prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, in national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law[.] 

The mandate of the IIM-A is very broad, encompassing a wide range of crimes, an open-ended temporal scope, a geographic scope limited to crimes committed in Afghanistan, in addition to a requirement to identify the perpetrators “with a view to ensuring that they are held accountable” (para 26(e)). Each of these areas is briefly explained below. (For the IIM-A’s entire mandate, see paragraphs 25 to 32 of the HRC Resolution 60/9.)

Crimes covered

The IIM-A covers international crimes, which are the most egregious conflict-related crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. Its mandate also covers “the most serious violations of international law, including those that may also amount to violations and abuses of international human rights law” (para 25), which apply in times of war and peace, such as torture, discrimination and other breaches of civil and political rights.[2] When outlining this broad scope, the operative paragraph of the resolution notes international human rights law “including against women and girls,” which clearly indicates that the ongoing persecution of women and girls by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) is of concern.

Temporal scope

Importantly, the mandate is not tied to a specific timeframe, but covers past, ongoing and future crimes and violations. The issue of time limits is politically charged, given the decades and cyclical nature of war and abuse in Afghanistan, as well as the time limitations of other mechanisms. The ICC can only investigate crimes committed after Afghanistan joined the Rome Statute in May 2003 and the prosecutor has placed his emphasis on ongoing crimes, de facto limiting his investigation to the post-2021 situation for now at least (AAN). Similarly, the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur primarily focuses on ongoing violations and abuses (AAN), as does a potential case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), focused on breaches of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) by the IEA after August 2021 (AAN).

This leaves huge numbers of victims with no real avenue to justice. In theory, the IIM-A is authorised to examine the full historical record. However, the colossal number of potential crimes and perpetrators over decades of war and egregious human rights violations in Afghanistan will present a dizzying challenge to the mechanism. Combined with resource constraints, the IIM-A’s case selection policies will be critical (more on this later).

Place of conduct 

The mechanism will have jurisdiction over crimes committed anywhere in Afghanistan, regardless of the specific province or district. This country-wide scope could enable the IIM-A to track patterns across provinces and years, drawing stronger connections between evidence, crimes and perpetrators. It may also allow for a more even-handed coverage of harms suffered by affected individuals and/or communities. However, crimes committed entirely outside the country but linked to the Afghanistan conflict are likely excluded, such as the alleged rendition and torture by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to multiple destinations (AAN).

Perpetrators

The IIM-A is mandated to investigate crimes attributed to both “individuals and entities.”  So far, only the ICC has a mandate to look at individual perpetrators, something that will also be vital for universal jurisdiction cases. This means the IIM-A can focus on individuals with command responsibility within armed groups, as well as current and former Afghan authorities and military forces, in relation to multiple crimes. In the context of the ICC investigation, for example, this might mean identifying other individuals within the IEA who might be responsible for the crime against humanity of gender persecution, beyond the two whom the court has already issued indictments for (AAN piece on those indictments).

In addition, the inclusion of ‘entities’ means it can also look at the groups themselves (para 26(e)). This could encompass a very long list, from the Taliban as an insurgency and an authority; previous Afghan authorities or entities within authorities (such as intelligence agencies); the Islamic State for Khorasan Province (ISKP); various former mujahedin groups, multiple foreign forces over several decades, from the Soviets to the Republic era. Granting the IIM-A authority to investigate entities may lead to the exploration of corporate accountability, though this is still an emerging concept in international law, and many countries, including those with UJ laws, have yet to codify it.[3]

Overall, this broad multidimensional scope mirrors the longstanding recommendations of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) for a comprehensive investigative mechanism. Fereshta Abbasi, Human Rights Watch’s Afghanistan Researcher, told AAN in October 2025 that it kept “a high moral ground” by not excluding any victims or creating a hierarchy among them. However, it remains to be seen how well the mechanism will deliver this broad scope.

Why the mechanism matters for Afghanistan

The IIM-A can support existing and future accountability pathways for Afghanistan, particularly in the long term, by sharing evidence, analysis and case files with prosecutors in multiple jurisdictions – from the ICC to national courts and universal jurisdiction efforts – as well as in legal proceedings of a non-criminal nature. Each will be considered in turn.

Unlocking more universal jurisdiction cases

The IIM-A could be highly impactful in the context of universal jurisdiction, based on the example of similar UN mechanisms that have already demonstrated their ability to contribute to UJ cases. Most European countries, as well as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Senegal and Argentina have UJ laws, though not all apply universal jurisdiction in practice (see Trial International’s map tracking UJ laws and use).

The Syria International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) has become a clearinghouse for national war crimes units, receiving hundreds of formal requests for assistance from multiple jurisdictions and contributing material to multiple domestic prosecutions. Its 2024 report states that it has supported 215 investigations, including publicly disclosed contributions to justice processes in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States (US), Slovakia and the ICJ.[4]

Afghanistan has already featured in UJ practice in Europe, though the mixed outcomes – particularly weaknesses in evidentiary files – demonstrate why the IIM-A may be helpful. Dutch prosecutors have investigated six Afghan war crimes cases; only two resulted in final convictions for torture as a war crime. The Prosecutor closed two cases at the investigation stage due to inadmissible evidence or the death of one suspect. Judges acquitted two accused individuals due to insufficient evidence to prove their personal responsibility or command liability (AAN).[5] In the United Kingdom, one Afghan individual is currently under investigation for a murder in 2015; details have not been published yet (Trial International, p 108).

The IIM-A can help turn these kinds of uneven results into a steadier pipeline of viable UJ prosecutions by collecting and preserving evidence before it is destroyed.

The International Criminal Court (ICC)

The ICC investigation into Afghanistan could benefit hugely from the IIM-A. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC is currently investigating alleged crimes against the Taliban and ISKP. It has already issued arrest warrants against the Emirate’s Supreme Leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada and its Chief Justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani, for crimes against humanity of gender persecution in Afghanistan. The Prosecutor has said that he hoped more warrants would follow.

The investigation scope is potentially broad, but in practice, it was limited to the Taliban and Islamic State by the OTP due to resource restrictions as well as the “gravity, scale and continuing nature” of their alleged crimes (ICC). The OTP has been criticised for this approach, given wider accusations of selective justice as well as the risk that it creates a hierarchy and unnecessary competition among survivors (AAN).

The IIM-A could share evidence and analytical products in ways that meet the OTP’s evidentiary and analytical requirements and add immediate value to the ICC’s current line of investigation into the Taliban and ISKP.[6] It could also help address the apparent resource constraint that led it to deprioritise other aspects of the Afghanistan investigation by expanding its investigations to include additional perpetrators and examining cases before 2021.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The IIM-A is also expected to cooperate with any future cases heard by the International Court of Justice relating to international human rights law. A case against Afghanistan is expected: in September 2024, four countries, Australia, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands, announced that if the Taliban did not stop violating the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), they would initiate a case against Afghanistan before the ICJ (AAN). Since the ICJ is a state-to-state legal proceeding, any support from the IIM-A to the ICJ’s potential process would go through the state parties to the dispute.

Domestic accountability for military crimes abroad

Countries that deployed troops to Afghanistan under the Republic are expected to investigate and prosecute crimes by their own nationals that took place on Afghan soil. Some countries have already conducted military police investigations or launched public inquiries, but the results remain limited. For example, in Australia, an inquiry into alleged war crimes by the Australian special forces did result in a criminal investigation, but only one former soldier has been charged with the war crime of murder so far (Associated Press).[7] There are concerns that the longer the time between the crime and the investigation, the lower the likelihood of multiple prosecutions (ABC). In the UK, military police investigations have been criticised for their slow start, premature closure, failures to explore all evidentiary avenues and political interference (BBC, Guardian). An independent inquiry currently underway may recommend further investigations, but prospects for justice for the victims of crimes that took place two decades ago seem slim.[8]

The IIM-A can accelerate cases in domestic courts in two ways. First, its existence may encourage states to step up their own investigations into allegations against their forces before the IIM-A gets involved. Second, the IIM-A can contribute to ongoing or future domestic investigations or inquiries by collecting, analysing and sharing evidence. National prosecutorial teams with limited or no access to Afghanistan could benefit from the IIM-A’s greater flexibility to work with civil society documentation efforts, combining the experience and access of CSOs with the IIM-A’s technical capacity.

Transitional justice

The open-ended time frame is important given Afghanistan’s prolonged history of systematic and systemic violence and crime through multiple eras of conflict. While current circumstances in Afghanistan do not allow for the implementation of a transitional justice programme, when this changes, the country will need a foundation of evidence and analysis (see AAN’s report on Afghanistan’s transitional justice process). The IIM-A’s work could make a significant contribution to future transitional justice efforts, particularly by preserving evidence archives. This could be invaluable for eventual national reconciliation and institutional reform. Abbasi told AAN, “When an opportunity for transitional justice arises, the IIM-A’s authentic records will be readily available, enabling Afghanistan to act quickly and not miss another crucial opportunity.” Although much of the IIM-A’s work will not be publicly released (unlike the more public-facing reporting of the UNSR or UNAMA, for example), it could share evidence and information with future Afghan domestic proceedings, assuming certain conditions are met, such as fair-trial standards and witness protection.

How the IIM-A was born: civil society advocacy 

The establishment of the IIM-A comes after years of advocacy by CSOs, gradually gaining support from UN experts and member states. Before the collapse of the Afghan Republic, voices from inside the country were urging an international investigation mechanism. A turning point occurred on 8 May 2021, when a bombing at the Sayed ul-Shuhada girls’ school in Kabul killed 85 mostly Hazara schoolgirls (see victims’ profile on the Hazara Genocide Archive website). The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) publicly condemned the attack in a statement and appealed for an independent UN-led investigation. Shaharzad Akbar, who was the commission’s chair at the time, explained her reasons for this call to AAN in October 2025, stating that she had little faith in the domestic justice system.

The call for a new UN mechanism grew after the collapse of the Republic in August 2021, though it was often thwarted. The HRC held a special session on 24 August 2021, in recognition of the human rights emergency, during which calls for an additional mechanism were repeated but not adopted. Nasir Andisha, who has been Afghanistan’s permanent representative to the HRC, told AAN in September 2025 that the outcome of that special session was not what he expected: “It was very weak and inadequate to the critical human rights situation of Afghanistan.” However, in October 2021, the HRC established the United Nations Special Rapporteur (UNSR) for Afghanistan, with Richard Bennett appointed as the UNSR in 2022. Alongside this mandate, Afghan and international NGOs pushed for an independent investigative mechanism, a call which the UNSR echoed. Repeated open letters signed by dozens of NGOs were sent to the Human Rights Council (see this one, hosted by the International Commission of Jurists).Behind the scenes, the European Union was scoping member states’ interest in moving forward with the mechanism, encountering only pockets of resistance (primarily from former troop-contributing nations, more on this later).

It was in the lead-up to the HRC’s 60th session (Sep–Oct 2025) that the drumbeat for a mechanism reached its peak. On 28 August 2025, a coalition of 107 Afghan and international organisations released yet another open letter urging the Council to “act where it has long failed” (accessible here on Amnesty International’s website). This time, the European Union felt it had the support it required from its members, with EU backing virtually guaranteeing the numbers needed for HRC to endorse the establishment of the IIM-A.

The final resolution was hailed as a significant victory for Afghan victims and a testament to the CSOs’ relentless advocacy. “After decades of pleas for justice, we finally have some hope,” Akbar told AAN. Abbasi told AAN, “One year ago, establishment of a comprehensive investigative mechanism seemed like a dream.”

However, both Akbar and Abbasi acknowledged that the hard job had just started for CSOs. According to Abbasi, the IIM-A’s access to information and witnesses inside Afghanistan is not guaranteed. Thus, the IIM-A will rely on CSOs, which will give renewed energy to their documentation efforts, but this comes at a time when many are struggling for funding. Akbar said that CSOs could continue advocating for funding for the IIM-A and their own funding requirements.

Operational framework: current design and early indicators

The realisation of this mandate and the potential impact outlined above will depend to a large degree on its operational framework. The Human Rights Council resolution provides the foundational elements of the IIM-A, including its independence, primary functions, and its place within the wider ecosystem of justice institutions, but plenty of questions remain.

The IIM-A is an “ongoing” entity within the UN system (para 25). Unlike the UNSR for Afghanistan and UNAMA, whose mandates are annually approved by the Human Rights Council (HRC) or UN Security Council (UNSC), the IIM-A’s mandate continues until the HRC decides to end it. While this does not guarantee long-term funding, it eliminates concerns about renewal, providing a relatively sustainable basis for the mechanism. This is crucial, since not only is the mechanism’s work time-consuming, but it should ideally also provide resources for prosecutors in multiple jurisdictions over a long period for maximum effect (allowing for the movement or discovery of perpetrators over time, for example).

It is an “independent” mechanism, meaning that it operates independently of UN agencies, including the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Secretary-General’s Office (para 25). Nevertheless, it will need to synergise its activities with other agencies (more on this below).

Investigative functions: collecting and preserving evidence, preparing case files

At its core, the IIM-A will function much like a professional team supporting a prosecutorial office, though it is not a police force, prosecutor or court. As an “investigative” mechanism, it is tasked “to collect, preserve and analyse evidence” and information and prepare case files to support criminal or civil law proceedings (para 25). Collecting evidence involves gathering diverse materials, such as witness statements, forensic samples, satellite imagery or digital media, before they are lost or destroyed. It is required to “consolidate” evidence, so that scattered archives from CSOs, UN bodies or individuals are gathered, analysed and stored securely.

Some of the biggest impediments to prosecuting international crimes are the erosion or destruction of evidence over time, making the IIM-A’s preservation function critical. It can maintain the integrity and ‘chain of custody’ of evidence by minimising access and the potential for tampering with each piece of evidence through secure storage, forensic protocols, and digital safeguards. Analysis might require experts to verify sources, identify patterns, connect acts to perpetrators or provide contextual and legal analysis.[9]

Civil society will be crucial to the IIM-A’s work, particularly if the IIM-A is not permitted to visit Afghanistan (more on that later). Most NGOs do not typically collect ‘evidence’ to the standards required by courts, but the IIM-A can act as a filter and sorting house for their documentation.

Complementarity

The IIM-A is intended to be a bridge mechanism that works “in complementarity with, and without risk of prejudice to, competent and robust existing national and international processes” (para 26(h)). AAN understands that this language is there to satisfy the concerns of states that had military forces in Afghanistan and are wary of external investigations. A source told AAN in October 2025 that “The purpose is almost certainly to guide the IIM-A to avoid investigation of the same cases” under existing investigations. The legal concept of ‘complementarity’ recognises the primacy of national investigations, which would mean that, for example, as long as investigations or inquiries are ongoing in Australia and the United Kingdom into potential war crimes by their forces in Afghanistan, the IIM-A would have to be cautious about doing anything that might “prejudice” those processes.

In contrast, the ICC is likely to be more welcoming towards the IIM-A. In 2023, the Prosecutor, Karim Khan, announced a new strategic focus on cooperation and complementarity, shifting the OTP from being the “apex” of the Rome Statute to a “hub” within a network of accountability efforts, with a view to greater cooperation with other accountability mechanisms and national authorities.[10] The OTP may still want to protect certain lines of inquiry from duplicative efforts that might “prejudice” its work, but given the scale of the task it has, it is not hard to see how the IIM-A and the ICC can have a constructive engagement.

The history of how complementarity is used at the ICC, however, also shows how states can abuse the principle to avoid accountability. The ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes if a state with primary jurisdiction is “unwilling or unable” to investigate (article 17 of the Rome Statute). Ideally, the threat of an ICC investigation can spur a state into a meaningful investigation. However, states can defer an investigation by claiming that they are investigating, even if that is more of a façade of superficial or inadequate investigations, much as the Afghan government did under the Republic when it sought to block the ICC’s investigation, even though its own ability and willingness to investigate war crimes were extremely doubtful.

A lack of clarity over these boundaries could create disputes between the IIM-A and states or other bodies over case selection, without further elaboration, as well as highlighting the need for a dispute-resolution mechanism in the event of disagreement about complementarity.

The IIM-A and the Special Rapporteur

The resolution goes some way to specify how the mechanism will work with the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan under paragraph 26(b). It directs the IIM-A to “Build on the work and findings” of the UNSR and make use of relevant information, “with consent of information providers as appropriate.” (This will likely include obtaining additional consent from victims, which will be challenging, even with goodwill.) Once the IIM-A becomes operational, the ‘collection and preservation’ part of the UNSR’s mandate, which was added to his initial mandate in 2022, will transfer to the IIM-A. This appears to be a logical use of resources — the UNSR was never adequately resourced to conduct large-scale, criminal-grade evidence collection and preservation. However, the core work of the UNSR’s initial mandate – to “seek, receive, examine and act on information from all relevant stakeholders pertaining to the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” – will continue after the IIM-A is operational. This means that the UNSR can focus on public reporting on the human rights situation and on engaging with civil society, while the IIM-A operates discreetly in support of criminal accountability.

The resolution calls upon the entire United Nations system to fully cooperate and respond promptly to the IIM-A’s requests (para 31). UNAMA, in particular, has gathered extensive information and potential evidence on human rights violations and international crimes over many years. However, the extent to which such information has been preserved – with a clear chain of custody or the required consent – is less clear.

The resolution also calls for the cooperation of states, civil society, business enterprises and other stakeholders to provide any information and documentation they hold or may later obtain (para 30). As noted, the work of CSOs will be particularly important, especially if the IIM-A’s field engagement is hindered due to the de facto authorities’ lack of cooperation. CSOs are able to operate (discretely) inside Afghanistan and possess a rich archive of materials, including victim testimonies and datasets.   Victim-ce

ntred, gender-responsive and multidimensional approach

The mandate requires the IIM-A to adopt procedures that are survivor-centred and gender-responsive (para 26(d)). Afghan women and girls have suffered disproportionately under the IEA rule, as demonstrated by the arrest warrants for Taliban leaders for gender persecution as a crime against humanity. This will likely mean that the mechanism will ensure they have the relevant staff and procedures to ensure that crimes like sexual and gender-based violence are prioritised and that the experiences of women, girls and minorities inform its investigations.

The IIM-A is also tasked with adopting procedures which are “multidimensional.” Although this is not defined, it could imply that the IIM-A should approach its work through multiple, interrelated lenses, including the historical, political, economic and social dimensions, as well as intersectional grounds.

Budget and staffing

There are two funding sources for the IIM-A: initial support from the UN to establish a start-up team and a Trust Fund for voluntary (state) contributions that will provide long-term support. The estimated 2026 budget is approximately USD 2.5 million, increasing to USD 3.5 million in 2027 and 2028, with an anticipated increase to around USD 9 million from 2029 onwards (Oral Statement by the UN Office of Programme Planning, Finance and Budget). None of this will be guaranteed, however, until December 2025, when it is subject to budgetary review and approval at the UN (the Fifth Committee, UN press statement).

The budget is significantly lower than the Syrian mechanism’s budget, which was around USD 25 million in 2024 (Justiceinfo.Net), while the annual budget for the Myanmar mechanism is around USD 15 million (Reuters). The oral statement suggests this may reflect, at least in part, the cost-efficiency of sharing data processing, cybersecurity, and other systems between the existing mechanisms and OHCHR. However, a staff of 43 is envisaged for the IIM-A, to be appointed over three years, while the Syrian mechanism was allocated a team of 100 (IIIM 2023 Results Report, p14). It presumably also reflects a backdrop of a significant reduction in resources for the UN, with the Secretary-General warning in October 2025 that the UN could “race to bankruptcy” (UN News).

Risks, limitations and mitigation factors

The mandate reads well on paper, but delivery will be shaped by real-world constraints, including limited access inside Afghanistan, political pushback on cooperation, lean staffing and restricted funding. Experience from the ICC’s Afghanistan engagement, as well as the IIIM and IIMM, suggests that these factors will define what the IIM-A can achieve. The most relevant risks and limitations are set out below.

Managing scope and expectations

The IIM-A’s expansive scope is a strength, but broad mandates can collide with finite resources, cooperation limits and political headwinds, producing disappointed constituencies when some victim groups are left behind. This has been seen in the ICC’s Afghanistan engagement – first because of how slowly things have moved, and second, in the narrowing of investigative focus, as discussed. The IIM-A’s remit is even wider than the ICC’s, covering pre-2003 conduct and serious violations of the International Human Rights Law (IHRL) that may not amount to international crimes, magnifying the risk of over-promising relative to staffing, funding and longevity.

The case selection procedure for the IIM-A has not yet been defined, except for a direct reference to crimes against women and girls in the operative paragraph of the resolution and it will likely be developed and published when it is operational. It has been directed to take a “gender-responsive and victim-centred approach,” which should allow for some degree of proactive case selection to meet clear victim/survivor demands.[11] Some Afghan victim/survivor communities advocate for a ‘representative coverage’ model, which would include at least one feasible, high gravity case from different periods and parties, to provide some equity for victim/survivor communities (the author participated in relevant discussions).

Resourcingandphased capacity development

As discussed, the IIM-A rollout will happen amid a UN liquidity crunch, which may already have influenced the proposed budget for the IIM-A, which starts at a fairly low level. Beyond core UN contributions, which are limited, the mechanism will rely on a voluntary Trust Fund, which could leave it vulnerable to unpredictable donor cycles and political conditionalities. In recent years, funding for human rights accountability work has generally decreased and for Afghanistan in particular (OHCHR’s 2025 annual report and AAN’s report on assistance cuts in Afghanistan). Donors may attempt to fund specific types of cases, excluding those they do not wish to support, which risks politicising the mechanism.[12]

Universal jurisdiction is highly state-dependent

UJ cases rise or fall on the will and capacity of states to prosecute, which in turn depends on a wide range of factors, including their legal frameworks, access to evidence and witnesses, the ability to identify perpetrators and, in many cases, the requirement for perpetrators to be present in the jurisdiction of the state. In addition, the advocacy and involvement of diaspora communities, as well as other civil society and donors, can all be influential.

The impacts of the Syrian (IIIM) and Myanmar (IIMM) mechanisms are quite different, though there are multiple reasons for this. The IIIM has received 500 information sharing requests, mainly from European states, while the IIMM has received only one, from Argentina. However, unlike the Syrian mechanism, the IIMM also cooperates with the ICC, so universal jurisdiction is not its primary focus.[13]For the Syrian mechanism, there is a greater presence (or potential presence) of perpetrators and victims in relevant jurisdictions, which relates to migratory flows as well as citizens travelling to take part in hostilities abroad (mostly to join sanctioned terrorist groups) and returning to their home country.[14]

The presence of the accused is not always necessary, however. A number of states, including Argentina and Germany, allow prosecutors to investigate and issue arrest warrants even when the suspect is abroad (though neither country will hold trials in absentia).[15] In France, not only can warrants be issued in absentia, but trials can also be held without the perpetrator present: three senior Syrian officials were tried in absentia and found guilty of war crimes in 2024 (Reuters). France also issued an arrest warrant for Bashar al-Assad in 2024, once he was no longer a head of state (an earlier warrant while he was still in office was ruled invalid, see this Reuters report).

However, prosecutors with limited resources may also want to know that there is at least the possibility of a perpetrator’s presence to justify their application of resources. In 2023, for example, the German Federal Prosecutor declined to open a universal jurisdiction case against Myanmar, which was filed by the NGO Fortify Rights and complainants from Myanmar, because the accused was not present in Germany or expected to be present (also noting the IIMM’s case building work). The decision that was criticised by Fortify Rights, which argued that the movement of persons of interest can be dynamic and unpredictable. More cynical observers might suggest that such pragmatism could be overridden only when high-profile arrest warrants align with foreign policy or business interests (Western states were criticised for many years for turning a blind eye to corporate oil and gas dealings with the Myanmar junta, for example, see this Guardian article).

Where does this leave Afghanistan?  On the one hand, Afghanistan is of importance to the ICC, which is expected to welcome the IIM-A. In addition, Afghanistan is relevant to many European states, with large Afghan diasporas and a longstanding political and military engagement. Dutch prosecutors, echoing Dutch judges’ earlier decisions, told AAN in 2019 that a key driver of their Afghan docket was ensuring the Netherlands did not become a haven for war criminals (AAN). On the other hand, several factors may temper expectations related to Afghanistan.

First, under-resourced war crimes units in several jurisdictions may remain focused on Syria and Iraq; even with assistance from the IIM-A, Afghan files may sit lower on priority lists. Secondly, the ‘presence or expected presence’ determination may affect the prosecutor’s case selection. Many former Taliban commanders and IEA officials are subject to travel bans or do not travel to jurisdictions where they might be arrested. Similar considerations may come into play with regard to ISKP commanders. However, in both cases, mid or lower-ranking commanders can defect and travel, even under the status quo, while the longevity of the regime itself is hard to predict. As things stand, this could leave former Republic officials more vulnerable to investigation, given that many are already in countries with universal jurisdiction. This, however, is a relatively under-documented area, with political sensitivities for some in the Afghan diaspora, given the scale of past and ongoing violations by other perpetrators.

Thirdly, the growing political normalisation with the IEA, which in some European states is linked to questions of migration and returns, may dampen the appetite to pursue Taliban cases. Over time, some EU countries, such as Germany, have increased their de facto engagement with the IEA, apparently driven by a need for IEA cooperation to receive Afghan deportees (InfoMigrants). Other countries, like Norway, have chosen a path of engagement with the IEA despite the gravity of their rights violations. For example, in 2022, a senior IEA delegation visited Oslo, including Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Anas Haqqani, a senior member of the Haqqani Network (BBC).[16] While they were in Oslo, Afghan CSOs requested the Norwegian authorities to arrest them (NewsinEnglish.no).

Domestic inquiries and cooperation challenges

As discussed, there would almost certainly be resistance from former troop-contributing nations to the IIM-A opening investigations into potential war crimes that touch on their forces. States with potential exposure could narrow cooperation or seek to ring-fence sensitive files. The recent ICC experience with the United States is the most extreme example of a state’s backlash. The US imposed visa bans and financial sanctions on ICC officials over Afghanistan (2019 and 2020) and Israel (since 2025). Reports suggest that the US might even sanction the ICC as an institution (Financial Times). While US foreign policy under Donald Trump is far from the global norm, there are growing numbers of populist leaders as well as hostility to what is sometimes called ‘lawfare’ by conservative governments (including in the UK, see this article by the NGO Action on Armed Violence).

AAN obtained credible information that Poland, which eventually joined the EU consensus on the resolution, previously opposed the notion of proposing an IIM for Afghanistan during EU internal discussions over the last four years (the EU drafted and proposed resolution 60/9, which resulted in the adoption of the IIM-A). It is believed this was driven by concerns about allegations against the Polish military forces (in 2011, seven Polish soldiers were acquitted of war crimes in an incident in 2007, see this BBC report).

AAN also obtained information about the UK’s attempt to restrict the IIM-A’s scope during the informal discussions in September 2025. The UK apparently tried, but failed, to modify the wording so that the IIM-A would “be complementary with” existing national and international processes, while the wording in the draft was “working in complementarity with” those processes. A source suggested that the UK wanted to preclude the IIM-A from investigating crimes that a state has already investigated. (As noted, in December 2022, the UK established an Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistanto investigate potential war crimes in Afghanistan by its special forces.)

Access and witness protection

The resolution equips the IIM-A to conduct field engagement (para 26(c)). The IEA has not reacted to the IIM-A’s creation, though it is highly unlikely they would permit investigations into their own culpability. They might conceivably permit investigations into historical abuses against their own forces, such as the notorious massacre at Dasht-e Leili, though it would be equally hard to imagine the IIM-A travelling to Afghanistan to investigate only incidents by one perpetrator without compromising their own independence.[17] Thus, it seems quite possible that the IIM-A will not have an on-the-ground presence. Recent practice points the same way. They banned the UNSR from visiting after critical reports following his visits in 2022 and 2023 (Reuters). They also publicly announced that they would not cooperate with the ICC (Al Jazeera).

The IEA’s control over territory, institutions and records means that site inspections, facility visits and routine subpoenas are unrealistic. As a result, crucial information archives inside Afghanistan, including court and prison ledgers, hospital registers, school and payroll records, procurement files and telecom records, may be unreachable, altered or destroyed, degrading their value as evidence over time. Very little forensic work has been done and what there is may not be admissible. Remote investigation tools, satellite imagery, secure digital intake and proxy interviewing across borders can be helpful, but they also come with trade-offs. Without on-the-ground corroboration, authenticity and chain of custody challenges increase; translation and cultural context errors also rise.

Consequently, working with diaspora witnesses and with CSOs working on human rights issues will be vital to the IIM-A. That said, in terms of witness protection and protection for human rights defenders, even Afghans in exile also face security threats to their extended families and associates. How the IIM-A navigates this will be of utmost importance.

Conclusion

The IIM-A marks a decisive upgrade from monitoring to case building for Afghanistan, raising hopes for greater criminal accountability in the years to come. It is the first UN body mandated to collect, preserve and analyse evidence to courtroom standards across all parties, all periods and in relation to International Criminal Law, International Humanitarian Law and the most serious International Human Rights Law violations. Other UN mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur and UNAMA, remain central for public reporting and advocacy and offer a good complement to the mechanism. Properly used, the IIM-A could encourage universal jurisdiction proceedings, enhance the capacity and potentially the scope of the ICC investigation, support a potential ICJ case and preserve evidence for future Afghan transitional justice.

The reality, however, will also be shaped by practical limitations. The same features that make the mechanism powerful – its broad scope, ongoing mandate and open-ended timeline – also carry risks familiar from Afghan civil society’s experience with the ICC. It could raise expectations that collide with finite resources, political headwinds, limited cooperation and access constraints. The IIM-A’s start-up budgets are lean and phased, cooperation may be uneven and field engagement inside Afghanistan may be limited or denied.

The decisions made by the IIM-A regarding its strategic lines of inquiry and case selection will be decisive for both the mechanism’s impact and its ability to be truly victim-centred. It will be a fine balancing act to reconcile the broad scope, limited capacity and significant expectations.

Responsibility does not rest with the IIM-A alone. Its operations and independence will depend upon predictable, preferably unearmarked funding and state cooperation. Much will also depend on the resources and interest of national war crimes units to proactively pursue UJ cases where the evidence leads. UN entities could play a significant role by enabling access to important files and aligning their future procedures, such as ensuring broader consent from their information providers, enabling them to share their documentation with the IIM-A.

Measured against Afghanistan’s decades of impunity, the IIM-A is far from a cure-all and it will not deliver justice quickly or evenly. Its contribution can be to help stop further loss of evidence, improve the quality and readiness of files for courts, encourage more prosecutors to take action and keep justice options open until judicial and political opportunities arise.

Edited by Rachel Reid and Roxanna Shapour

 

References

References
↑1 Another UN mechanism, the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD), operated from 2017 to 2023, primarily to support investigations by the Iraqi authorities. For background see this article on JusticeInfo.Net.
↑2 Legal instruments include the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols and the Rome Statute (1998) which established the International Criminal Court and four core international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. International human rights law is enshrined in a series of instruments such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976). See this UN list: The Core International Human Rights Instruments and their monitoring bodies.
↑3 Some countries including France and Sweden can hold entities accountable, see for example the groundbreaking 2022 Lafarge/Syria case (ECCHR) and Lundin Energy / South Sudan case (JusticeInfo.Net).
↑4 This was exemplified by Germany’s landmark Koblenz case (Anwar R.), which convicted for the first time a senior Assad government official for crimes against humanity in Syria (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights).
↑5 The two convictions were against former KhAD (Khedamat-e Ettela’at-e Dawlati) officials. A third case, against another former KhAD officer, ended in acquittal, because the evidence was insufficient to prove personal responsibility or command liability. A fourth led to an initial conviction for war crimes linked to Pul-e-Charkhi prison; the Court of Appeal acquitted him in 2024 on a legal technicality, which was under appeal until he died in 2025 (AAN). There was another investigation into an individual implicated in the 1979 Kerala massacre but prosecutors closed the case in 2017 for lack of admissible proof (AAN).
↑6 The IIM-A’s gender responsive procedures also align with the OTP’s Policy on Gender-Based Crimes, including the crime against humanity of gender persecution.
↑7 In Australia, the government created the Office of the Special Investigator (OSI) in January 2021 to investigate criminal matters arising from the Inspector-General ADF (Brereton) Inquiry, which found “credible information” of unlawful killings and other violations by Special Forces (2005–2016). In 2023, former SAS soldier Oliver Schulz was charged with the war crime of murder of an Afghan civilian in 2012; his case is awaiting trial, pending the release of information by the Australian military.
↑8 The Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan is not a court, but may recommend further military police investigations.
↑9 The IIIM says it received increasing requests for analytical products that help prosecutors establish elements of a crime, such as an entity’s organisational structure, see IIIM 2024 report, page 14.
↑10 See, ICC Office of the Prosecutor launches public consultation on Policy on Complementarity and Cooperation, 6 October 2023. The policy reflects a desire to work more cooperatively with national authorities working on universal jurisdiction, partly influenced by Khan’s own background working with a UN pre-prosecutorial mechanism, UNITAD (Just Security). There are also, however, concerns that “excessive deference to national systems could potentially leave victims without viable avenues for justice,” as expressed by the International Federation for Human Rights.
↑11 The IIM-A selection policies operate on the basis of requests, but also proactively, using three strategic lines of inquiry: detention; crimes associated with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and unlawful attacks against civilians and civilian objects. A cross-cutting theme is an attempt to “address biases” and include underrepresented persons and groups (IIIM Bulletin No 9, August 2023, p4). Its proactive work gives it some leeway to provide a more “victim/survivor-centred approach,” including under-represented crimes against children and gender-based violence, including sexual violence, as well as a focus on missing person. The IIMM says it prioritises cases on the basis of the nature, gravity and scale of each crime; the impact on victims; the strength of available evidence; the prospect of an investigation meeting international criminal standards; the likelihood of a court or tribunal taking jurisdiction over the crime, and the possibility of building a case against the alleged perpetrator. Incidents that include sexual and gender-based crimes and crimes against and affecting children are prioritized (IIMM FAQs).
↑12 This concern was raised in relation to the ICC following its opening of an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, when some states voluntarily funded the ICC. This was seen as influencing the ICC’s prioritisation and case selection policy, which ultimately prejudices its independence (Amnesty International, Al Jazeera). In response to such critiques, in 2022, the OTP announced that states can only fund OTP as a whole, allowing it to allocate funds according to its priorities.
↑13 The importance of the IIMM was noted by the ICC prosecutor when announced his request in 2024 for an arrest warrant for the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Defence Services.
↑14 A 2023 analysis by The Syria Justice and Accountability Centre of more than 250 UJ cases relating to Syria found that “states are predominantly prosecuting their own citizens for crimes committed in the Syrian conflict.” While former Syrian officials were also prosecuted, these were mostly “low and midranked individuals” who had come to Europe.
↑15 See for example, the arrest warrants against Jamil Hassan, a Syrian Air Force Intelligence officer, in 2018 (ECCHR).
↑16 Muttaqi joined the Taliban in 1994 and served in various positions, including the Minister of Education (2000 and 2001) at a time when girls were largely banned from education, a practice which could amount to gender persecution. After 2001, he remained in a senior leadership role within the Taliban (his IEA biography is here: https://mfa.gov.af/en/page/30133). Haqqani was found guilty of terrorist crimes and convicted to death (later to imprisonment) by Afghan courts, but released in exchange with US and Australian hostages in 2019, before completion of his sentence (BBC).
↑17 For more on Dasht-e Leili and other mass grave sites, see Assessments and Documentation in Afghanistan by Physicians for Human Rights, which conducted several forensic investigations.

 

A New Accountability Mechanism for Afghanistan: What the IIM-A can (and cannot) do
read more

Five Ways Pakistan Is Trying To ‘Hide’ Its Own Blunders In Afghanistan

November 5, 2025

Sarral Sharma

NDTV (India) Opinion,

Updated:
Nov 04, 2025 15:53 pm IST
Pakistan is working to shift the global narrative in its favour amid ongoing tensions with Afghanistan and uncertainty regarding peace negotiations with the interim Taliban government. To achieve this, Islamabad is portraying itself as a victim of cross-border terrorism, calling the Taliban uncooperative, seeking external support from Western and friendly Islamic nations on the issue, justifying aggressive military actions in Afghanistan, and blaming India for the rift with the Taliban. All these factors also contribute to Pakistan’s attempts to hide its “strategic depth” policy failure in Afghanistan and coerce the Taliban leadership to fall in line or face consequences. Riding high on renewed ties with the United States and a growing diplomatic role in the Middle East, Pakistan believes it can reshape the perception about Afghanistan. While this tactic may work in the short term, Islamabad risks alienating the Taliban in the long run.

Pak Plays Victim

First, Pakistan is presenting itself internationally as the victim of cross-terrorism allegedly originating from Afghan territory. Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Taliban-led interim government of harbouring the Tehrik‑i‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups that attack Pakistani armed forces. In the most recent round of talks in Istanbul (with mediation from Turkey and Qatar), Pakistan initially declared: “The dialogue…ended without any workable solution” and accused the Afghan side of being “indifferent to Pakistan’s losses”. However, the recent negotiations were extended due to third-party mediation efforts and finally concluded on October 30, with plans to hold the next round on November 6 in Istanbul. By emphasising its own sufferings and sacrifices, Pakistan is now portraying itself as a responsible, peace-seeking neighbour whose diplomatic overtures have been rejected due to the Taliban’s intransigence. This victim narrative gives Islamabad moral cover in international forums.

A ‘Peace Warrior’

Second, by pointing the finger at the Taliban and declaring its own peaceful credentials, Pakistan can claim the role of the peace warrior. The Pakistani side has claimed that the country had “always desired, advocated and immensely sacrificed for peace and prosperity for the people of Afghanistan” and warned that “Pakistan’s patience has run its course”. Whereas Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, warned the Afghan Taliban to choose between “peace and chaos”, and stated in January 2024, “when it comes to the safety and security of every single Pakistani, the whole of Afghanistan can be damned”. In doing so, Pakistan presents itself as both a willing negotiator and a powerful military force that reserves the right to act. This matters because the international community generally favours diplomatic negotiations over military solutions. Therefore, Pakistan’s argument that it engaged with the Taliban in Doha and Istanbul, but that the latter allegedly backtracked on commitments, gives Islamabad a diplomatic advantage and allows it to shift the blame away from itself and onto Kabul for bilateral tensions.

Look At What It Says To The World

Third, the failure of negotiations helps Pakistan mobilise external support from the West and some Islamic countries to pressure the Taliban. Islamabad has long argued with Washington that Kabul cannot be stable unless Pakistan’s security concerns (especially the TTP) are addressed. With the Taliban’s limited role in controlling militancy in Pakistan, which it considers the latter’s “internal problem”, Islamabad may use the uncertainty around peace talks as an example of the Taliban’s unreliability and solicit financial aid, intelligence, and military cooperation, or diplomatic backing from Western capitals on the issue. Notably, Pakistan remains a close counterterrorism partner of the United States and has strengthened bilateral security cooperation under the Donald Trump administration. With renewed support from Washington and ongoing tensions between the US and Afghanistan over the issue of the Bagram airbase control, Islamabad sees an opportunity to bolster its external support and portray the Taliban as a threat to regional and global security.

Justifying Its Aggression

Fourth, the diplomatic impasse gives Pakistan a convenient justification for an aggressive military strategy against Afghanistan under the pretext of counterterrorism operations against TTP and its affiliates. For example, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif threatened Afghanistan that Pakistan did not need “even a fraction of its full arsenal to completely obliterate the Taliban regime” if provoked further. The temporary breakdown of diplomacy between the two countries may lead to Pakistan using force and carrying out more and deeper strikes inside Afghanistan, such as in Kabul or Kandahar. In Pakistan, there are growing calls for ‘open war’ or redrawing the Durand Line by forcefully capturing some territories in eastern Afghanistan. Other options include increasing airstrikes on so-called militant hideouts, decapitation of top TTP leaders, and even attempts at regime change or a reshuffle in the current Taliban administration in Kabul. These options are possible as Pakistan is working to shape a global narrative that, if the ceasefire fails and peace talks with the Taliban break down, it reserves the right to take escalatory actions against Afghanistan.

Blaming India, As Usual

Fifth, Pakistan is also using the deadlock with the Taliban to further its propaganda that India is supposedly interfering via Afghanistan by supporting certain militant outfits. In its recent narrative, Islamabad is increasingly blaming India for influencing the Taliban regime to allegedly destabilise Pakistan’s western region. While Islamabad has failed to provide any evidence proving India’s involvement, this narrative serves the purpose of Pakistan’s military establishment: shifting attention away from its own counterterrorism policy failures, pressuring the Taliban, and placing India in the role of a destabiliser in the region. Pakistan is unsettled after the recent multi-day visit of the Acting Foreign Minister of the interim Taliban government, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to India. Muttaqi lauded India as a “close friend” that provides humanitarian aid, and announced Afghanistan’s desire for “mutual respect, trade, and people-to-people relations” with India.

Additionally, New Delhi recently agreed to upgrade its “technical” mission in Kabul to a full embassy. For Pakistan, the burgeoning India-Afghanistan relationship under the Taliban regime in Kabul is a clear failure of its decades-old “strategic depth” policy. To express its disapproval and frustration, Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kabul, allegedly targeting key TTP leaders, during Muttaqi’s visit to India. This shows Pakistan will not accept growing diplomatic ties between Kabul and New Delhi and may intensify pressure on the Taliban through military strikes and narrative warfare against India. Nevertheless, these tactics will not solve Pakistan’s core issues with the Taliban administration, improve the internal security situation, or address deep ethnic divisions within the country.

By combining these reasons, Pakistan may extract short-term gains from ongoing tensions with the Taliban. The third-party mediation from Qatar and Turkey provides Pakistan with an additional advantage to pressure the Taliban and shape the global narrative and outcomes of the talks in its favor. Here, Pakistan’s aim is to change the Taliban’s behaviour in its favor, limit Kabul’s ties with New Delhi, and use regional instability as a time-tested tool to garner international attention.

However, this approach also poses certain risks to Pakistan. By leaning heavily on military operations and coercive diplomacy, Pakistan may further alienate the Afghan Taliban, reduce its influence, and increase the probability of a broader armed confrontation. The Taliban may turn away from Pakistan and cultivate new partnerships within the region and outside. Unlike the first Taliban regime in the late 1990s, Taliban 2.0 does not want to accept Pakistan’s policy directives and expects respectful treatment from its neighbour. On the other hand, Pakistan is not ready to accept the Taliban’s independent policy lines, especially Afghanistan’s growing ties with India, and would continue to push for a malleable leadership in Kabul. Even after four years, Islamabad has still not officially recognised the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. This has generated serious mistrust in Kabul regarding Islamabad’s intentions and is one of the key reasons for tensions between the two sides.

‘Disappointment’ Is The Word

Since August 2021, Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan has shifted from one of triumph to one of disappointment. As the Taliban refuse to accept blatant subordination from Islamabad, Pakistan has decided to use coercive diplomacy, military measures, and the cross-border terrorism issue to create a narrative in its favour, which will allow it to justify its hard actions against Afghanistan in the future. This strategy may benefit Pakistan in the short term, as the Taliban’s international reputation is already struggling with credibility issues. However, Pakistan faces the following risks: losing influence over the Taliban in the long term, intensifying anger among Afghans, especially refugees and those impacted by Pakistani military actions, rising local militancy, and possibly consolidating the disgruntled members of the Pashtun community on both sides of the border.

Therefore, what remains to be seen is whether Pakistan’s aggressive policy on Afghanistan would ultimately pressure the Taliban and bring long-term peace to the two countries, or whether the regional instability would again help garner international attention and material support for Islamabad. One thing is clear: under Munir’s leadership, Pakistan’s military establishment is likely to use rising tensions on both its eastern and western borders as justification to further consolidate its power and deflect any calls for public accountability for its recurring counterterrorism failures and destabilising regional policy.

(Sarral Sharma is a Doctoral Candidate at JNU and a former Consultant at the National Security Council Secretariat)

Five Ways Pakistan Is Trying To ‘Hide’ Its Own Blunders In Afghanistan
read more

What options on the Pak-Afghan table?

November 5, 2025

By Asif Durrani

The News International (Pakistan)
November 05, 2025

In deference to Turkiye’s request, Pakistan agreed to continue the talks with the Afghan Taliban in Istanbul. A meeting of the Pakistani and Afghan principals (possibly defence ministers) on November 6 is likely to yield a compromise that has bedevilled the dialogue process so far.

Turkiye’s Foreign Office statement gave the encouraging news that “all parties agreed to continuation of ceasefire”, and “put in place a monitoring and verification mechanism that will ensure maintenance of peace and imposing penalty on the violating party”. However, whether the Taliban regime officials agree to provide written assurances on a “monitoring and verification mechanism” remains to be seen.

Advertisement

Earlier, during the meeting between the officials of the two countries, Defence Minister Khwaja Asif’s blunt warning to the Taliban to provide verifiable guarantees on the TTP caused ripples in Afghan circles. Meanwhile, the Taliban’s ‘ignorance’ about the TTP’s presence or activities had no takers. In this day and age, nothing can be hidden, so why claim that there are no TTP guys in Afghanistan or that ISKP cadres are in Pakistan, not in Afghanistan?

The UN, international NGOs, including Amnesty International, report clearly the existence of these terrorist organisations in Afghanistan. Not to forget that the prominent figures of the Taliban leadership are still on the 1267 travel list.

The Istanbul talks brought home three points about the Taliban’s modus operandi towards their interlocutors. First, the decision-making process of the Taliban regime is highly centralised; nothing moves without the consent of Amir Ul Momeneen Mullah Haibtullah Akhund. Therefore, Taliban officials drag out the dialogue to the maximum to tire out their interlocutors. They also believe that yielding to a proposal or demand would give the other side space or reflect poorly on the Taliban.

Empirical evidence of their delaying tactics is the ban on girls’ education, whereby the Taliban officials maintain that they are still formulating a policy about the resumption of girls’ education beyond sixth grade. The question is: are the Taliban working out a rocket manufacturing formula that is taking so much time? The plausible answer is that through such delaying tactics, the Taliban clergy think that the people will forget all about the issue. But they are harshly mistaken; girls’ education will continue to haunt them unless they give in.

Second, the Taliban are stony-faced when confronted by opponents with incontrovertible evidence. For instance, while they are passionate about relaxation in transit trade from Pakistan, their Islamic ethics take a backseat when they happily allow the smuggling of contraband items to Pakistan.

Third, if cornered on the TTP, the Afghan Taliban tell Pakistan that “we fear that bringing pressure on the TTP may push them to join the ISKP”. They also admit that TTP cadres have already joined ISKP. Hence, taking action against the TTP would be detrimental to the Taliban regime. While maintaining this stance, the Taliban officials forget that they are not living on an island and their regime is bound to take action against all terrorist groups, be they ISKP, TTP, ETIM or Al-Qaeda.

The above observations are not a conference-room eyewitness account but a drawing-board sketch of a group of people who are ruling Afghanistan, about whom our ruling elite wore a proud smile when they triumphantly entered Kabul. The Pakistanis were led to believe that the “Taliban have broken the shackles of slavery”, without realising that soon Afghanistan would be ruled by a group with a basic knowledge of religious and conservative characteristics. Therefore, the Taliban regime’s actions do not enjoy endorsement from the Islamic world, especially the ban on girls’ education and women’s right to work, which have been unanimously condemned by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

What should be Pakistan’s course of action in tackling the situation with the Afghan Taliban regime? If Pakistan is banking on controlling the TTP in Afghanistan as a panacea to the current onslaught by the terrorist organisation, there is a need to reexamine the drawing board. That’s where it becomes apparent that the TTP’s back can be broken, mainly in the merged districts of former Fata, with crucial support from the local people, of course.

Once TTP cadres within Pakistan are neutralised, the ones sitting in Afghanistan will automatically become orphans and lose their nuisance value. Also, political ownership of the problem by all and sundry would be crucial for a successful campaign against TTP terrorists. The same applies to Balochistan, where people must be made stakeholders if we intend to render the BLA/BLF irrelevant.

As regards the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan will have to show patience and leadership while tackling the Afghan Taliban diplomatically. Preference should be focused on intelligence-based operations (IBOs) to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure wherever it exists. The government of Pakistan should consider taking measures to make the TTP cadres and their leadership’s lives difficult in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a first step, the government should issue red warrants for the TTP leaders holed up in Afghanistan and raise the issue with the UN Security Council’s 1267 Committee for their arrest and repatriation to Pakistan to face the law.

Second, the TTP’s narrative should be effectively challenged, including their religious locus and the legitimacy of their cause. It is encouraging to note that the TTP does not enjoy legitimacy in Pakistan, especially in the tribal areas. The TTP’s blackmail can be challenged by empowering the local population and adequately resourcing the police.

Third, Pakistan should send a friendly message to the people of Afghanistan, regardless of the government in Kabul. The Afghan people feel comfortable in Pakistan, which is Pakistan’s great strength. By deporting Afghans in droves, the anti-Pakistan lobby in Afghanistan will only be further strengthened, which should be avoided. Fourth, create a conducive environment for people-to-people contacts and business and investment opportunities, especially by encouraging Afghan businesspeople to invest in Pakistan. Afghan businesspeople will be ready to invest billions of dollars in Pakistan, provided their investments are secure.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to Iran and the UAE. He is also a former special representative of Pakistan for Afghanistan and currently serves as a senior research fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).

What options on the Pak-Afghan table?
read more

Disco, Djinns and 5-Star Service in Afghanistan

November 2, 2025
By Amy Waldman

The New York Times

Nov. 2, 2025

THE FINEST HOTEL IN KABUL: A People’s History of Afghanistan, by Lyse Doucet

After an intense 20-year relationship, America and the West have largely ghosted Afghanistan. As the Taliban regime has implemented gender apartheid, as Afghans have endured hunger and earthquakes and internet blackouts, we’ve averted our gaze from the suffering.

To her credit, Lyse Doucet, the BBC’s chief international correspondent, who has been reporting from the country since 1988, hasn’t wavered in her attachment. In “The Finest Hotel in Kabul,” she’s made an uneven but ultimately compelling attempt to provide a “people’s history” of the country through the story of one building, the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul.

The Inter-Con, as it continued to be known long after the chain that lent its name severed ties, was originally a five-star accommodation built by the British in the late 1960s on a hill at the edge of the city. From the start it was meant for foreigners and the Afghan elite; ordinary Kabulis rarely passed through its doors, except to work. In the opening chapters, Doucet details its glamorous early years while telling the story of the employees who made it run, and, she says, found a second home there.

Doucet does have an eye for the black comedy of successive regimes assuming control of both country and hotel. In 1973, the hotel staff takes down the king’s portraits after he is deposed, then in the succeeding three decades do the same for a series of presidents and commanders, all of them exiled or executed. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, a dozen mujahedeen squeeze, with their rifles and rocket launchers, into the hotel’s unfamiliar revolving door, only to smash it in frustration.

For a good chunk of the book, I questioned Doucet’s choice to tell the country’s story through this particular place. As a foreign correspondent I spent time at the Inter-Con, though nowhere near as much as Doucet. The mix of warlords, government officials, spies and diplomats there was always intriguing, but I never considered it representative.

As Doucet herself writes, “The Hotel Intercontinental Kabul felt like a different country.” It’s not until the mujahedeen take power in 1992 that she lets slip that Afghan traditional dress had not previously been encouraged in the hotel, and that even the few local musicians who performed for guests usually covered their baggy tunics in sequins. Could there be any clearer sign that, despite its loyal employees, this was not a “people’s” place?

But at some point, the book rises — or falls — into the more representative history Doucet aims for. Violence and loss are so ubiquitous in Afghanistan’s recent history that no one and no fortress, not even the “finest hotel,” can avoid them. The Inter-Con comes into its morbid own as a vehicle for Afghanistan’s story. And a somewhat plodding, occasionally frothy book becomes both riveting and sad.

During the height of the fighting in 1993, an Inter-Con housekeeper named Hazrat finds he is unable to cross the city to reach the hotel. He ekes out a living making matchboxes at home with his family, Doucet writes, for “a city mostly lit by hurricane lamps and candlewicks.” A rocket strikes the house, killing his niece. When the family sets out for a safer area, another rocket kills his brother.

The cover of “The Finest Hotel in Kabul,” by Lyse Doucet.

The hotel gets a new life during the two-decade American presence that comes with the U.S. invasion in 2001, but its identity as a Westernized hub makes it a target: It’s attacked not once but twice, in 2011 and again in 2018. Employees see guests and friends murdered. Some come to believe the hotel is haunted by djinns.

Doucet’s long focus pays off. In the early ’70s, Hazrat, the housekeeper, is an optimistic 20-year-old bartending at a discothèque for extra cash. Nearly a half-century later, in 2018, he’s pushing 70 and hiding for more than 10 hours in a tiny, dark cleaners’ closet while the hotel is under siege.

“In just one night, more of the hotel had been destroyed than in all the war-torn decades gone by,” Doucet writes of that attack. “The ruin didn’t stop at marble, wood and steel. The hotel’s people were broken.”

It’s those people who haunted me after I closed the book. They are at the mercy of the power hungry. They may believe their fate is in God’s hands. Yet their sheer determination to survive, to feed and house their families and keep them safe, and to improve their children’s chances, never flags. If their absence of flaws doesn’t ring completely true, Doucet’s choice to highlight their ordinary heroism in this deeply felt account is understandable.

After the second attack, the hotel faces a new precarity. In 2021, Hazrat is let go in a large staff cut. Soon after, the government falls, and the Americans withdraw in chaos. The Taliban, back in power, greet the hotel, the second time around, like an old friend. A sign (“Intercontinental for Everyone”) appears at the bottom of the hill.

“Everyone” does not include women, who are ordered out of government jobs. Malalai, the hotel’s first female waiter and her family’s sole earner, is sent home. In a stroke of good fortune, she’s later brought back, not to work in the restaurant but in security — body-searching the rare woman who comes up the hill.

Amy Waldman is the author of the novels “A Door in the Earth,” which is set in Afghanistan, and “The Submission.” She is also a former South Asia bureau chief for The Times.

THE FINEST HOTEL IN KABUL: A People’s History of Afghanistan | By Lyse Doucet | Allen Lane | 423 pp. | $29

Disco, Djinns and 5-Star Service in Afghanistan
read more

Recent Posts