After nearly two decades of U.S. presence, the Afghan conflict between the central government and the Taliban reached a deadly stalemate, taking a hundred lives a day from each side between 2018 and 2021. However sad, the international community viewed this impasse as a sign of Afghanistan’s ripeness for peace. Meanwhile, the U.S. shifted its policy from pursuing a military victory to achieving an expeditious political settlement. Yet despite multifaceted and multiparty motivations to finally end this drawn-out conflict, the peace process still failed. Why?
This article’s authors observed the peace process closely from within the Afghan government. The following identifies four interconnected factors that converged to spoil the final attempt to end the long war in Afghanistan, resulting in the Taliban unilaterally taking control of Kabul in August 2021. Additionally, the piece offers three sets of recommendations to the United States and the international community about how the lessons of the past 20 years could inform a workable peace process going forward.
Failure in shaping narratives
Aside from armed struggles over physical territory, the Afghan War was also fought on a parallel battleground: the minds of the people.
Afghanistan’s U.S.-backed government, which existed between December 2001 and August 2021, had the burden to prove two narratives: its ability to provide basic services — physical security at a minimum — to the local population and a capability to advance counterterrorism efforts both at home and beyond the country’s borders.
But the Taliban’s car bombs and suicide brigades continued to speak louder than the government’s infographics proclaiming the competence of its institutions. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan described civilian casualties in May-June 2021 — on the eve of the United States’ announced withdrawal date — as the highest on record for those two months since the mission began recording such data in 2009.
The government itself, seeking sustained global support in the fight against terrorism, reported during every major international meeting that more than 20 terrorist organizations with regional and international reach enjoyed safe havens in Afghanistan under the patronage of the Taliban.
The Taliban, by contrast, defined their existence in terms of the enemy, America, which occupied Afghanistan and established a “puppet” government in Kabul. Over the 20 years of war, the Taliban used sustained offensive attacks and some short-term ceasefires to promote themselves as a cohesive military force. And foreigners interpreted that characterization to mean that if the Taliban committed to something like crushing internationally designated terrorist groups, the Taliban could deliver on it. Whether they actually would remained to be seen.
No narrative promulgated by the last Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, who garnered less than a million votes in a contested election in September 2019, could change a simple reality: the war against the Taliban was widely perceived as lost.
Failure in leadership for peace
During the last decade of America’s presence in Afghanistan, the international community and the local government came to an understanding that the way to end the conflict was through peace negotiations with the Taliban. However, the stakeholders in these talks had conflicting interests.
For Afghan technocrats, peace initially meant a full Taliban surrender. The highest leadership bodies of the government held internal discussions regarding the “reintegration” of the Taliban fighters. During these meetings, the officials offered four types of incentives:
Security in return for disarmament;
Political space to run for office or be appointed to political posts;
Economic incentives to provide jobs; and
Legal incentives to remove the Taliban from international sanctions lists and release their prisoners.
For former mujahideen factions, peace meant a division of power among influential parties. But this process of power-sharing, which would inevitably break down along ethnic lines, would leave no room for the technocrats who now held the presidency. The share of power for Afghanistan’s ethnic Tajiks would go to the Jamiat party; that for the Pashtuns would be given to the Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami; the Wahdat party would claim the Hazaras; and the Junbish party would represent the Uzbeks. Where would the technocrats fit?
Some individuals in the technocrat and mujahideen camps accepted that one way to achieve peace was to hold elections with the participation of the Taliban. However, there were disagreements around the timing of these elections, not to mention the Taliban’s total disinterest in sharing in what they believed to be an illegitimate political system imposed by the United States. President Ghani, in turn, demanded that the transfer of power be based on votes alone, but he showed willingness to hold early elections for the sake of peace. Potential rival candidates argued that no credible election could take place under a party to the conflict. These candidates pushed President Ghani to step aside and let an interim government oversee the elections, which he refused.
In the internal debates regarding peace, three important segments of Afghan society remained outside the process. Youth, women, and civil society organizations, including the media in Afghanistan, did not know what benefits peace would bring them. Apart from symbolic representation in some meetings that were held by the government or the international community, these groups did not meaningfully participate in the wider peace process.
Disagreements over how non-Taliban groups could negotiate with the Taliban were also not resolved. Ghani wanted a two-sided table — the government and the Taliban — in order to portray a united Islamic Republic. But others viewed this format as an unacceptable opportunity for government technocrats to assume leadership roles in the peace negotiations. Therefore, political opponents of the president advocated for multi-party talks in which each side could bargain based on its own interests: the government, the Taliban, political parties, and civil society.
The lack of a shared vision or clear objectives for the peace process among non-Taliban factions ultimately was another factor that contributed to the inability to achieve a settlement.
Parallel structures
In addition to leadership challenges, technical chaos prevailed over the political peace process. The High Peace Council, which later transformed into the High Council of National Reconciliation under Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, was in constant rivalry with the Afghan president and never achieved the power needed to represent the political arm of the peace process. The State Ministry of Peace attempted but failed to project itself as the technical arm of the peace talks. Others rightly viewed “technical matters” as a strategic tool to influence the process.
There were also other governmental agencies that claimed leadership, which instead only added ambiguity to the process. Chief among these agencies was the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC), which maintained a Directorate of Peace and Reconciliation Affairs. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs struggled to preserve its perceived status as the point of contact on peace affairs for foreign countries. Disjointed involvement from too many people and institutions in the peace process meant local Afghans and foreign diplomats had difficulty coordinating their activities with the government.
To make matters worse, rivalries, incompetence, and ideological differences led to the formation of factions within the Afghan state’s negotiations team. When the president was finally able to create a government-led team, it was divided. A former head of the intelligence agency, Masoom Stanikzai, was the lead negotiator. But the Islamist Taliban disregarded Stanikzai because of his former affiliation with parties that were known for their adherence to communist ideologies. Via the Chinese and Uzbekistani governments, the Taliban asked the central government in Kabul to keep Stanikzai out of the peace negotiations. The government responded that the Taliban did not have veto power. Parallel to the official negotiations team, a secret channel of communication between the government and the Taliban opened in Doha, according to Fawzia Koofi, one of the negotiators.
The process was further complicated by foreign interventions. In December 2018, after a year-long effort, high-level representatives from Afghanistan, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia succeeded in bringing the Afghan government and Taliban negotiators to Abu Dhabi. Even though the two Afghan sides did not meet face-to-face during that time, this quadrilateral effort saw some progress until the Americans shifted the venue to Qatar.
Two years later, there was a new team of negotiators from Kabul and a new process was underway in Doha. At this moment, the U.S. administration changed and the newly appointed Secretary of State Antony Blinken asked the sides, via a letter, to appear for peace talks in Turkey. A meeting in Istanbul never materialized, perhaps because the Qataris, with significant influence over the Taliban, opposed it. Each change of plan meant more stakeholders offended, a reshuffling of negotiating teams to adjust their levels of participation, new logistical complexities, discontinuity, and, eventually, failure.
Peace negotiations never took place directly between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Composed of a few members, a governmental contact group repeatedly met with the Taliban in Qatar; but this was the extent of the face-to-face interaction between the two sides. They worked out the principles for the talks but never succeeded in developing an agenda, let alone negotiated over it.
Reducing peace to one element of a foreign deal
The role of the United States was equally important in forestalling peace.
For many years, the overriding stated purpose of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan was to counter terrorism. And so, under the influence of this policy, the Afghan government continuously presented its peace plans as a counterterrorism strategy.
Over time, America’s assessment of the nature of the threat changed, with major terrorist hotspots appearing in other areas of the world. So, America shifted its sights toward withdrawal from Afghanistan, prioritizing the end of its protracted involvement in the region. The agreement U.S. officials signed with the Taliban in 2020 demanded security guarantees for the pull back of U.S. troops and the Taliban’s commitment to counterterrorist actions; but it encouraged the mere start of peace talks among Afghans and only included a ceasefire as a topic for discussion in subsequent intra-Afghan negotiations.
Once the U.S. was determined to depart and the collapse of the Afghan government became conceivable, negotiations with the Taliban were deemed more important than negotiating with the Afghan government. Diplomats and military generals from the U.S., Europe, and regional countries queued up to talk with the Taliban. The insurgent group viewed this string of international visitors as proof of the effectiveness of their violent movement. Now that the whole world was at their door and the United Nations had endorsed the deal they signed with Washington, they sensed it was only a matter of time before they would seize Kabul.
The Taliban, thus, encouraged the U.S. side to pressure the Afghan government into giving in without preconditions. Most notably, under foreign insistence, the Afghan authorities released more than 5,000 dangerous Taliban detainees in 2020, in return for one-fifth that number of their own prisoners. Against their pledge, these violent extremists returned to the battlefield with greater resolve for vengeance, while the Taliban leadership rewarded their time spent behind bars by appointing them as field commanders.
Conclusion and recommendations
The last political peace process failed, but the need for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan did not disappear. In fact, conditions likely to drive armed conflict — such as political exclusion and social oppression — are growing daily under the new regime. Therefore, Afghanistan requires a new political process that aims to not only prevent another civil war but also achieve lasting peace. Afghan leaders need to develop the capability to rally the public and align all Afghan sides of the conflict around a common vision for the future of the country.
The international community, particularly the United States, should undertake three specific sets of actions to foster the conditions for such a political process:
First, the U.S. should change its pragmatic engagement with the Taliban to a more inclusive engagement with all Afghan stakeholders, including civil society organizations, political parties, armed opposition groups, ethnic and religious minorities, women, and youth. While the U.S. has no diplomatic presence in Kabul, American officials can engage Afghan actors in the region around Afghanistan as well as communicate with those inside Afghanistan virtually, through video conference calls. Finally, Washington could better coordinate its efforts with the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, which has a political office that is active on the ground.
Engagement with non-Taliban actors will have a range of repercussions. For leaders who remain inside Afghanistan, contact with the U.S. will come with security risks. Their identities should be protected; but ultimately, they must be allowed to determine for themselves whether the risks are worthwhile. U.S. interactions with the armed opposition to the Taliban can take place without providing material support to such factions. Engaging with America can still benefit armed groups as a means of exerting political pressure on the Taliban. If the U.S. administration shies away from such a policy, Congress should fill this gap.
In fact, Capitol Hill lawmakers ought to play a more active role regardless of the presidential administration’s stance vis-à-vis Afghanistan. American senators and House members should intensify their meetings with Afghans in the U.S. as well as travel to Europe and the region around Afghanistan to meet with leaders in exile. These meetings would broadcast a confident message that America stands with the people of Afghanistan in their struggle to create a peaceful and free country.
Second, the U.S. should use its leverage with the Taliban more strategically to encourage the start of a political process. For instance, the U.S. should work with the U.N. Security Council to turn international sanctions into effective tools of diplomacy rather than use them solely as punishment. Currently, neither imposed sanctions nor limited waivers are tied to specific political or accountability benchmarks and objectives. The unfreezing of Afghanistan’s assets and discussions about recognizing a new government should become conditional on progress in a legitimate political process.
Conditions and benchmarks for launching such a political process may include initiating a series of meetings between Afghan actors and the Taliban, developing a list of popular demands — from opening girls’ schools and reversing restrictive measures against women to creating a broad-based and people-centric government — and finally, delivering on these demands within agreed timeframes.
Identifying stakeholders to meet with the Taliban is complicated but not impossible. One way to group different segments of Afghan society is based on their ideological visions for the country: modernists who constitute much of the new generation of Afghan leaders, conservatives like the jihadist groups, fundamentalists such as the Taliban and their sympathizers, and moderates who have separated from or never joined the other three groups. Representation of all these ideological differences is important because not all civil society organizations, political parties, or women’s groups think alike.
Finally, Washington must revise its approach toward Afghanistan in light of the fact that al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri — who last month was eliminated by a U.S. drone strike — was found to have been sheltered in Kabul. America should, thus, take certain diplomatic steps to mobilize the region and the wider international community to ensure a political process leads to a government that does not harbor terrorists but promotes peace and stability in the world.
Al-Zawahiri’s presence only a few miles from Kabul’s Presidential Palace demonstrated that a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan can be dangerous for the region and beyond. A high-level visit from the U.S. administration or Congress to Central or South Asia in the near-term could potentially ignite momentum among regional countries to mobilize and diplomatically curb future threats that emanate from Afghanistan. The only sustainable means to achieve such an objective is to encourage the formation of a broad-based and people-centric government that is shaped by all Afghans through an inclusive political process. The fact that the Taliban continue to operate as a de facto “acting” government and have yet to announce a new constitution provides a window of opportunity for initiating such a political process.
These short- to medium-term measures by America are achievable. They could exert some pressure on the Taliban and reassure non-Taliban groups that they are not alone in their struggle. They could also mobilize the region to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a regime-run safehouse for terrorists with objectives reaching far beyond its borders. Lastly, these steps, if sustained long enough to jumpstart a potential political process and see it through to completion, could contribute to the restoration of America’s reputation after its catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Aref Dostyar is a Senior Advisor for the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc-Pulte Afghanistan Peace and Development Research Program, and former Consul General of Afghanistan in Los Angeles. He tweets from @ArefDostyar.
Zmarai Farahi is former Head of the Peace Unit at the Office of the National Security Council of Afghanistan. He tweets from @FarahiZmarai. The views expressed in this piece are their own.
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views.
Why the Afghan peace process failed, and what could come next?
For the Biden Administration, supporting the Afghan people without empowering the Taliban is the foreign-policy case study from hell.
Public anniversaries mark the meaning of the past in the political present. In Washington, one year after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, the failure of the United States and its allies is emotive and polarizing. This month, House Republicans issued a report, entitled “A ‘Strategic Failure,’ ” which is unsparing of the Biden Administration’s decision last year to withdraw all remaining American forces from Afghanistan, and of its conduct of the chaotic evacuation that followed. The White House denounced the report as “partisan” and demagogic; the National Security Council circulated a memo defending the Administration’s actions. There will be more of this, particularly if Republicans gain control of one or both chambers of Congress in November’s midterm elections. Democrats have reason, in that case, to fear Benghazi-inspired, election-driving hearings and investigations on Afghanistan, although any Republican drive to hang last year’s failures on Biden will be complicated by the central role played in the dénouement by former President Donald Trump.
The stark politicization of America’s experience in Afghanistan threatens to add one more loop of failure and self-defeat to a sad record. Accountability is vital if it can be achieved impartially and reflectively, yet the urgent question of the moment does not involve the apportionment of blame. Many of the forty million Afghans left behind last summer by evacuating troops and diplomats are being battered by severe crises of hunger and persecution. The policy choices faced by the Biden Administration and its nato allies are morally complex and excruciatingly hard. If they are fogged by partisan politics in Washington, they will be harder still.
Richard Bennett, the U.N.’s special rapporteur on human rights in Afghanistan, joined by other rights experts from across the world, used the anniversary’s occasion to declare, “Nowhere else in the world has there been as wide-spread, systematic and all-encompassing an attack on the rights of women and girls—every aspect of their lives is being restricted under the guise of morality and through the instrumentalization of religion.”
Meanwhile, about half of the population is struggling to eat. “We’re looking at near-universal poverty,” Vicki Aken, the country director of the International Rescue Committee (I.R.C.), an aid-and-development nonprofit, told me from Kabul. When Aken arrived in Afghanistan in 2017, she said, the poverty rate was at about fifty per cent; by the end of 2022, it may reach ninety-seven per cent. “When you go into clinics and you go into hospitals, you see no medicines,” she said. “You see three people to a bed, lines out the door of mothers with malnourished children.”
Governments and nonprofits are navigating an uncomfortable tension between prioritizing human-rights advocacy and working with the Taliban to stabilize the Afghan economy. “We want the pressure” on the Taliban over human rights, Fereshta Abbasi, an Afghan-born researcher at Human Rights Watch in London, told me. “We need to let the Taliban know that we are standing with the Afghan people” and that the regime’s record must change “if they want any recognition.” Simultaneously, she added, “On the humanitarian side, we don’t want the Afghan people to be victims of this crisis and chaos.”
And Taliban repression is worsening, according to researchers, not moderating under outside pressure. “There are definitely differing views between the humanitarian and human-rights communities,” Aken said. “I have immense respect for the human-rights people,” she added, yet “the only solution to this crisis is to find a way to make the economy function.“ That requires coöperating or, at least, engaging with the Taliban.
“One of the things that I find so hard is that there are a lot of Afghan women who stayed behind, women who run their own N.G.O.s, who are attacked by those outside of the country for even hinting that it’s even possible to do that,” Aken continued. About three thousand women work directly for the I.R.C. in Afghanistan. “It’s not easy,” she said. “There does need to be a light shined on human-rights abuses, but, if we don’t stay engaged, the opportunities that remain for women and ethnic minorities might disappear altogether.”
For nato governments, the dilemma comes down to whether to release large sums of money to Afghanistan to stabilize the economy, even if doing so may strengthen the Taliban. The alternative would be to tighten sanctions and expand travel bans, and further isolate the regime’s leaders, even if this accelerates the economy’s free fall, perhaps to the point of widespread famine. This is not an either-or policy question, of course. The often subtle difficulties of prioritizing rights advocacy while engaging with authoritarian regimes to provide humanitarian aid is a familiar one. But the current Afghan case is distinctive—and unmistakably difficult.
The Taliban’s prideful restoration of gender apartheid in secondary and higher education and in many sectors of the economy is an outrage of special dimensions, as Bennett and the other rights experts noted. For the U.S. and other nato countries—champions of a modernization drive in Kabul and other major Afghan cities for two decades—the reversal of the status of women is all but impossible to countenance. “Women and girls have largely been erased from public life,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, in Washington, on July 28th. “It’s especially difficult to accept because we all remember how different it was not so very long ago.”
On July 31st, a U.S. drone killed the Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri at his hideout in downtown Kabul. The Biden Administration, like its predecessors, has identified counterterrorism as a “vital” continuing interest in Afghanistan. That the Afghan capital was Zawahiri’s haven has only deepened doubts in Washington about the Taliban’s reliability. By “hosting and sheltering” Zawahiri in Kabul, Blinken said after the drone strike, the Taliban betrayed “repeated assurances to the world that they would not allow Afghan territory to be used by terrorists.” The Taliban insisted that they didn’t know Zawahiri was present.
Even in the face of this record, development experts continue to urge the Biden Administration to release to the Afghan central bank billions of dollars in foreign-currency reserves. The issue is technically complicated. After the Taliban took Kabul last August, the Biden Administration froze seven billion dollars in reserves held in the U.S. Lawyers representing families of victims of 9/11 then asked a judge to designate those funds as compensation for their clients. (The Taliban, who never lawyered up to defend themselves, have been found liable for the attacks.) Last February, Biden issued an executive order allocating 3.5 billion dollars as potential compensation for the 9/11 families, but reserving the rest for possible future restoration to the Afghan central bank, which is known as Da Afghanistan Bank. One impediment to any future release: the first deputy governor appointed to the bank by the Taliban, Noor Ahmad Agha, has been designated as a terrorist by the U.S.
The Taliban want all of the reserves frozen in the U.S. back, and they have respectable allies. On August 10th, seventy-one economists, including the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, wrote to President Biden and the Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, urging them to immediately allow the Afghan central bank to reclaim all of its reserves. They argued that the funds are “critical to the functioning of the Afghan economy.” The Afghan private-banking system “has nearly ground to a halt,” salaries are not being paid, and businesses and individuals cannot access their savings. Repatriating the reserves would allow the central bank to stabilize the national currency and pay for food and energy imports, the economists wrote. William Byrd, a development economist formerly with the World Bank in Kabul, now at the United States Institute of Peace, argued in reply that the Afghan central bank is in no position to manage billions of dollars productively.
The Biden Administration has handed this foreign-policy case study from hell to two well-regarded mid-level State Department officials: Thomas West, the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan, and Rina Amiri, the special envoy for Afghan women, girls, and human rights. West negotiates directly with Taliban leaders on aid, counterterrorism, and other subjects. He has ruled out releasing the Afghan central-bank funds as a “near-term option.”
Amiri has so far declined to attend bilateral talks with the Taliban, because of the regime’s policies toward the women and girls she is charged to defend—a split on diplomatic tactics that is a microcosm of the larger dilemma. “I support my colleagues engaging the Taliban,” Amiri tweeted recently. “Engagement on issues where there’s traction, such as economic stabilization & the humanitarian response, is necessary.” Yet, in the areas her office oversees, she continued, “robust international engagement . . . hasn’t produced meaningful outcomes for Afghan, women, girls & at-risk populations.”
This summer, the Biden Administration announced a one-hundred-and-fifty-million-dollar contribution to U.N. agencies assisting Afghanistan—slightly more than half of it to address food insecurity, the rest targeting the needs of children and women, via unicef and U.N. Women. It is a significant commitment, but it cannot address the downward spiral caused by the collapse of Afghan banking or the inability of the Afghan central bank to pay for commercial food-and-energy imports.
Byrd is among those promoting a nascent plan to put frozen Afghan reserves into a trust fund that would be housed in Switzerland, perhaps to be overseen by central-banking experts—details to be negotiated with the Taliban. The State Department spokesman Ned Price acknowledged that the U.S. continues to explore “mechanisms” that would allow the 3.5 billion dollars of the reserves designated for possible release by Biden to be used “precisely for the benefit of the Afghan people . . . in a way that doesn’t make them ripe for diversion to terrorist groups or elsewhere.”
Hanging over these negotiations is America’s record of diplomatic failure in the run-up to last summer’s collapse, and during the first Taliban emirate, which reigned from the mid-nineties to late 2001. The Clinton years—when the Taliban controlled Kabul and its ministries—offer perhaps the closest parallel to the present layout. Initially flummoxed by the Taliban’s extremism, and later alarmed by the sanctuary it provided to Al Qaeda, State Department envoys pushed all of the buttons of professional diplomacy—direct engagement with Taliban ministers, multilateral peace talks, economic sanctions, travel bans, and weapons embargoes. The Taliban attended conferences, talked politely, and allowed some international aid to flow into the country, but the movement’s leaders offered no major compromises and stood by passively as Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri carried out deadly strikes against U.S. targets in Africa, in 1998, and Yemen, in 2000, meanwhile secretly plotting 9/11.
Eventually, in 1999, Clinton authorized C.I.A. covert action against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The C.I.A. funded and equipped anti-Taliban insurgents, such as those led by the legendary guerrilla commander Ahmed Shah Massoud. Today, some Afghan opponents of the Taliban and their allies in Washington advocate a rerun of covert-action strategies. But neither the Biden Administration nor other nato governments appear to have any appetite for fostering more violence in Afghanistan. In a Foreign Affairsessay this month, Ali Maisam Nazary, the head of foreign relations for the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, a movement led by Massoud’s son, acknowledged that its anti-Taliban insurgents of 2022 have yet to receive “a drop of help from any country.”
For their part, the Taliban declared a public holiday to mark the anniversary of Kabul’s fall. On Twitter and in a round of media interviews, Abdul Qahar Balkhi, a Taliban foreign-ministry spokesman, promoted the emirate’s achievements one year on, including the resumption of commercial flights to and from Kabul, economic projects, and the accommodation of about a thousand foreign journalists who have travelled to report in the country since last summer. He also cited the Taliban’s engagement with diplomatic missions and argued that an international consensus had taken hold that there is “no alternative to [the] current government.”
It is certainly true that the Taliban have made themselves an intractable fact of life in international affairs. Five successive White Houses have failed to defeat the movement militarily or to influence its leaders to change their ideology. Yet the hardest and least politically rewarding problems in foreign policy are sometimes the most important ones.
For its own failings and those of its predecessors, the Biden Administration has a moral obligation to the Afghan population suffering today under Taliban rule. The U.S. and its nato allies also have an interest in preventing a further Afghan economic collapse that could trigger more mass migration toward Europe or foster more violent extremism. Blessed are the peacemaking, rights-promoting mid-level special envoys, but this is a crisis for Presidents and Prime Ministers. Where are they? ♦
One year after the United States withdrew its military from Afghanistan, relations between the two countries are stuck in a holding pattern. The United States remains the single largest humanitarian donor to the people of Afghanistan, with over $774 million USD distributed since the Taliban takeover, but the United States maintains no diplomatic presence in the country — nor does it send official diplomatic envoys.1
U.S. sanctions have not altered the Taliban’s calculus on human rights or ties with al-Qaeda. The Taliban has proved intransigent and unrealistic in its relations not only with Washington but with neighboring countries like Pakistan. Its senior leaders lack a coherent vision for the country and its emir remains reclusive.2
Future U.S. policymakers might be tempted to disengage diplomatically and economically from Afghanistan and instead rely primarily on “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism.3 The most likely consequence of this approach would be a more isolated and unstable Afghanistan, which in turn could foster an even more permissive environment for transnational terrorists. Consistent diplomacy tied to long-term U.S. security objectives is likely to produce incremental results at best, but is still preferable to diplomatic disengagement or military intervention.
This brief provides a concise background and analysis of the most pressing issues affecting U.S. interests in Afghanistan. It draws on open source data; interviews with government officials — including from the de facto Taliban government; and interviews with private analysts that were conducted remotely or in person — in the United States, Pakistan, and Qatar.
Broad policy recommendations
• The United States should work closely with regional countries, including Pakistan, India, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to ensure they are prepared to handle security challenges as they emerge. If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is revived, opportunities may emerge to engage Iran on Afghanistan. These should include routine dialogue, intelligence sharing, and capacity building, such as policing and border security. Washington should engage separately with India and Pakistan to bolster humanitarian aid and limited commerce to Afghanistan.
• The United States should reiterate mutual responsibilities under the 2020 agreement it signed with the Taliban in Doha, but recognize that it lacks effective enforcement mechanisms and therefore is better understood as an aspirational framework.
• Formal recognition of the de facto Taliban government should be withheld until it demonstrates a clear commitment to its counterterrorism responsibilities and respect for basic human rights, including for women. But Washington should place diplomats in Afghanistan either through the creation of an in-country Afghanistan affairs unit, whether based in the prior U.S. Embassy or inside a friendly third country’s diplomatic mission, or by sending temporary delegations to Kabul, as our allies have. This should be coupled with multilateral steps to remove the leadership’s travel privileges. It is important that U.S. officials interact with Taliban cabinet members in Kabul and other Taliban stakeholders based in Kandahar.4 Direct outreach by U.S. military officials and the intelligence community may have utility but it is not a replacement for a coherent civilian-led diplomatic strategy.
• Sanctions intended to target the Taliban as a non-state actor now extend far beyond their original scope, since they became the de facto government of Afghanistan. If not yet determined, the U.S. government should communicate what steps the Taliban must take to be de-listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group.
Introduction
Much of the responsibility for Afghanistan’s diplomatic and economic isolation lies with the country’s new Taliban government. Afghan women, ethnic and religious minorities, former government officials, journalists, and anyone who dares to criticize the Taliban have suffered over the last year. The U.N. has estimated there are hundreds of al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan, in at least 15 provinces.5 However, the U.S. National Security Council released a memo claiming that less than a dozen core al-Qaeda members remain in Afghanistan today.6 The intelligence services of various countries have warned that the Taliban maintains a relationship with al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri was in a safe house held by the Taliban’s Interior Minister when a U.S. drone strike killed him.
U.S. interests in Afghanistan are rooted in managing the threats of terrorism and regional instability. During the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, many analysts erroneously, and even disingenuously, assumed that U.S. objectives were synonymous with the interests of the Afghan people. This led to inaccurate analysis at best. At worst, it resulted in empty promises by U.S. officials to the people of Afghanistan and unrealistic expectations by Afghan leaders. The analysis presented here accepts that short-term U.S. interests in Afghanistan are not currently, and never have been, perfectly aligned with the diverse interests of the Afghan people. However, the well-being, human development, prosperity, and human rights of Afghan men and women are a necessary precursor to long-term security and stability.
The Taliban have managed to maintain territorial control and a relative monopoly on violence despite pockets of anti-Taliban resistance and continued terrorism attacks by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (IS-K). The Taliban’s offer of blanket amnesty to former government officials and security forces is undermined by frequent reports of collective punishment, arbitrary detentions, and targeted killings.7 IS-K continues to terrorize Afghans and in particular targets the predominantly Shi’a Hazara ethnic minority. The human and civil rights of Afghan women have been severely restricted with the imposition of severe limitations on freedom of movement, removal from the workforce with few exceptions, and the continued ban on secondary schooling for girls.8
The United States and broader international community must develop an Afghanistan policy that is sustainable in the face of Taliban intransigence and ready to capitalize on fleeting moments of Taliban pragmatism.
Afghanistan is also facing a gradual economic collapse. The country’s growth was propped up for 20 years by a war economy that supported industries such as construction and fuel transport, but hurt traditional agriculture. Historically unprecedented levels of aid and international attention were connected to the U.S.-led war effort and immediately declined when the Taliban assumed power. Afghanistan’s growth was not commensurate with its real economic potential. Relying on the altruism of a fickle international donor community will set Afghanistan on the same course as other long-ignored countries with humanitarian catastrophes.
The Taliban government has the most agency to take tangible steps to reduce the suffering of Afghans. The international community is unlikely to bring significant influence to Taliban decision making in the short-term. The United States and broader international community must develop an Afghanistan policy that is sustainable in the face of Taliban intransigence and ready to capitalize on fleeting moments of Taliban pragmatism. Ultimately, Washington must prioritize broad relations with Afghanistan as a country rather than adopting a short-sighted focus on the political reality of the Taliban alone. The consequences of inaction will include putting thousands of Afghan lives at risk while undermining the security of both the region and the United States.
This brief asseses the risks of economic collapse, civil war, and transnational terrorist threats, followed by an updated policy framework to address these risks through diplomacy.
Risk of economic collapse and prolonged humanitarian disaster
Afghanistan’s economy was in desperate straits prior to the Taliban takeover and the subsequent departure of aid agencies. Afghanistan’s landlocked location, fraught relations with its neighbors, poor infrastructure, and high rates of illiteracy and innumeracy have for decades hindered its economic growth. Foreign grants accounted for 75 percent of public spending9 prior to the U.S. withdrawal, while urban poverty rose to 47.6 percent by 2019-20, compared to 41.6 in 2016-17, with poverty exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.10
The economy deteriorated further after the Taliban takeover. The United States immediately froze the country’s central bank (Da Afghanistan Bank or “DAB”) reserves, halted shipments of cash and temporarily ended humanitarian aid. Sanctions that the United States and U.N. had previously applied to the Taliban and Haqqani Network, as non-state actors, were now applied to them as the de facto government. Most qualified technocrats fled the country and were replaced by inexperienced Taliban loyalists. The Taliban government cabinet includes members of the Haqqani Network and at least 15 individuals sanctioned by the U.N.11
Rapid inflation followed the Taliban takeover. By January 2022 the price of wheat flour and diesel had increased by 52.7 percent and 40.3 percent since the last week of June 2021, just prior to the August collapse of the Afghan government.12 The price of bread, which is a staple for many Afghans, increased by 12.8 percent during the same period.13 As of the first week of August 2022, the price of wheat and diesel has increased by approximately 5 percent and 35 percent since January 2022.14 With drought, aid and investment flight, Taliban mismanagement, and economic isolation, Afghanistan risks becoming a failed state with universal poverty rates.
Taliban focused sanctions, comprehensive effect
The U.S. government was initially slow to act following the Taliban takeover, despite calls from Congress and the international aid community to prevent a humanitarian disaster.15 Since a designated terrorist group gaining countrol of an entire country is unprecedented, it was initially unclear if existing U.S. sanctions on the Taliban would apply to the new government or the entire jurisdiction of Afghanistan.16 On December 22, 2021, The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published FAQ 951, which clarified that, “[i]n contrast to sanctions programs administered and enforced by OFAC with regard to North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Syria, and the Crimea region of Ukraine, there are no comprehensive sanctions on Afghanistan.”17 Nevertheless, the chilling effect of U.S. sanctions and a Taliban-led government have in effect subjected the country to comprehensive sanctions.18 Few countries or private sector entities have enough political19 or economic interest in Afghanistan’s economy to outweigh potential risks. This distinguishes Afghanistan from most other U.S. sanctions targets, which still receive foreign investment from other countries.
Limited sanctions relief
Since late September, OFAC has issued seven General Licenses (GLs) permitting personal remittances, various types of humanitarian aid and non-commercial development activities, and some commercial transactions (see Appendix A).20 For example, General License No. 19 permits certain transactions and activities involving the Taliban so long as they are “ordinarily incident and necessary” to carry out specified humanitarian and development projects which includes the “payment of taxes, fees, or import duties, or the purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services.” These general licenses are self-executing — i.e., individuals or entities that wish to conduct activities pursuant to them do not require additional clearance from OFAC. But this provides little comfort to NGOs attempting to interpret the vague and ambiguous language of the GLs.
Sanctions have also added complexity to crucial cross-border trade between landlocked Afghanistan and its neighbors. The Afghanistan Pakistan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry reported that Afghan businesses are finding it difficult to sell exports to Pakistan, historically Afghanistan’s second largest trading partner after India, due to sanctions that prevent the banking system from engaging in transactions with Afghan entities.21 Pakistan’s place on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) gray list makes its banking sector particularly risk averse concerning transactions with Taliban-led Afghanistan. OFAC initially addressed this by reiterating that no sanctions prohibit the export or reexport of goods to Afghanistan or flow of money so long as they do not involve sanctioned individuals or entities. Although commercial transactions were not technically subject to sanctions, when the Taliban assumed governing authority, commercial transactions were effectively restricted because any payments to the Taliban would have triggered the sanctions.22 Furthermore, the issuance of GLs permitting the payment of taxes and other fees related to humanitarian and development projects to the Taliban government implied that similar payments related to non-humanitarian or commercial activities were subject to sanctions.
Policymakers must recognize that Afghanistan is effectively subjected to comprehensive sanctions, even if this is not legally the case.
OFAC responded to this conundrum by issuing GL No. 20 on February 25, 2022. In practical terms, GL No. 20 does for commercial business what GL No. 19 did for humanitarian aid and development, opening up commercial transactions and cross-border trade in Afghanistan by allowing for the kinds of incidental payments23 that are necessary to conduct business.24 However, neither of these GLs have fully overcome the chilling effect of powerful U.S. sanctions that instill more fear in law-abiding individuals and entities than those that flout them. Some humanitarian groups are accustomed to working in sanctioned jurisdictions, maintain close working relationships with the U.S. Treasury Department, and are motivated by a values-based mission that is willing to take on the sanctions risk. This is not necessarily true for private business and it is unclear that GL 20 has significantly alleviated the concerns of regional banks, let alone international financial institutions. Suhail Shaheen, head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha, claimed during an interview with the author that, while GL 20 produced a “positive” effect on the economy, many Afghan businessmen are still unable to utilize the international banking system for money transfers in and out of Afghanistan.25 Statements by analysts familiar with the regional banking sector suggest that most banks are too risk averse to take on transactions involving Afghanistan.26
Policymakers must recognize that Afghanistan is effectively subjected to comprehensive sanctions, even if this is not legally the case. The effects of U.S. sanctions are felt far beyond their stated intent, as shown by the fact that Afghanistan, unlike Iran or Venezuela, offers little commercial incentive for investors and businesses to assume risk. In order to alleviate the stress on Afghanistan’s economy, the United States should devise a roadmap commensurate with specific and realistic Taliban actions that will allow it to rescind broad sanctions on the Taliban as an entity, while maintaining sanctions on individual members of the Taliban leadership, including the enforcement of previously lifted restrictions like the privilege of travel abroad. The primary victims of U.S. sanctions on the Taliban today are ordinary Afghans. As mentioned above, there is little evidence that sanctions have influenced the Taliban’s behavior as an insurgency or government, or motivated them to break ties with al-Qaeda.
To punish the Afghan people for a foreseeable consequence of the U.S. decision to negotiate with the Taliban is nothing short of cruel.
The United States chose to negotiate with the Taliban and start the Doha process to extricate itself from Afghanistan. Achieving a political settlement to the war was an aspirational byproduct of this process which, if it had been successful, would likely have resulted in a new government inclusive of sanctioned senior Taliban figures. Even this best-case scenario would have required the United States to consider rescinding most sanctions on the Taliban. The collapse of the previous government was not an unforeseen possibility.27 India’s former ambassador to Afghanistan, Gautam Mukhopadhaya, argued early on that talks with the Taliban would provide Western governments the excuse that Afghans were offered an opportunity for peace but, “they squabbled amongst themselves and tore it up.”28 To punish the Afghan people for a foreseeable consequence of the U.S. decision to negotiate with the Taliban is nothing short of cruel. Most importantly, sanctions on the Taliban as an entity do little to enhance U.S. security and may even undermine it. But their removal at this point will require significant actions by the Taliban to reassure the world they will not finance terrorism.
Liquidity crisis
The GLs issued by OFAC have facilitated some movement in humanitarian aid but are insufficient to address either U.S. sanctions or the broader liquidity crisis. Without liquidity the private sector cannot pay for imports and Afghan consumers cannot pay for basic necessities. With its foreign exchange reserves frozen, Afghanistan’s central bank is unable to maintain a balance of payments or regulate the national currency.29 No amount of aid can compensate for the loss of this function, and direct humanitarian aid is both inefficient and unsustainable over the long term. One prominent development economist with an area focus on Afghanistan concluded that “it makes little sense for the donor community to facilitate high-cost food imports via the World Food Programme while hindering commercial imports.”30
As of January, some have indicated that cash injections of U.S. dollars into Afghanistan’s economy have gradually increased toward rates close to the Federal Reserve’s cash shipments into the country pre-August 15.31 However, Afghanistan’s economy finds itself in a kind of “liquidity trap,” whereby most money is hoarded or immediately exported rather than circulated within the economy.32 In February, the U.N. Development Programme in Afghanistan reported that it was unable to convert U.S. dollars deposited in the private Afghanistan International Bank into afghanis and therefore cannot withdraw cash to implement its programs on the ground.33 Moving money into Afghanistan is now more costly than ever, with one prominent global payments and foreign exchange company charging approximately 10 percent to move cash into Kabul and an additional 4 percent to reach Afghanistan’s provinces.34
On February 11, 2022, President Biden signed Executive Order 14064, titled “Protecting Certain Property of Da Afghanistan Bank for the Benefit of the People of Afghanistan.”35 The executive order split in half the approximately $7 billion USD of Afghanistan’s central bank foreign exchange reserves held in the United States. It set aside $3.5 billion in a consolidated account with the stated intention of facilitating access to those assets for the “benefit of the Afghan people.”36 It also left more than $3.5 billion of those funds to remain the subject of ongoing litigation by 9/11 plaintiffs in cases where the Taliban is a named co-defendant. Since this litigation is ongoing, President Biden’s hands were effectively tied; denying those litigants their day in court would have potentially constituted a violation of their constitutional rights.37 In February 2022, U.S. Special Representative Thomas West indicated U.S. willingness to recapitalize Afghanistan’s banking sector with $3.5 billion of the foreign exchange reserves set aside for the benefit of the Afghan people.38 This process was first hindered by serious concerns over the Taliban’s willingness and ability to combat the financing of terrorism and money laundering. It was further delayed by the Taliban’s decision to prohibit girls from attending school. The presence of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul has raised serious and legitimate concerns over whether the Taliban can be trusted with billions in foreign exchange reserves.39 One option would be to create a trust fund in a third country for limited disbursements; in late July, Reuters reported talks about this alternative were underway between the United States and Switzerland.40
Providing sanctions relief and returning at least part of the foreign exchange reserves to Afghanistan’s central bank, or an intermediary institution, should be a U.S. policy objective because it will help prevent Afghanistan from becoming a failed state. But it requires the Taliban-led government to take certain actions, including verifiable counterterrorism assurances, demonstrating a real commitment to preventing money laundering, and basic respect for human rights. The Taliban have increased their revenues by reducing corruption at customs checkpoints, but this is not enough to run their government effectively or save the economy.41 Afghanistan’s economy would remain in crisis even with broad sanctions relief and a return of the frozen foreign exchange reserves.
Refugee crisis
The United States should encourage regional countries to streamline the process of granting some form of status to Afghan refugees which would allow the refugees to live dignified lives.
Economic hardship and fears over a Taliban-led government have led to a new surge in refugee outflows from Afghanistan. There are 2,070,956 Afghans registered as refugees in neighboring countries, according to the UNHCR, with 182,590 having left since the beginning of 2021.42 Of this figure, 62 percent are located in Pakistan and 37.7 percent in Iran. This places significant stress on regional host countries already facing high inflation and economic stagnation. The refugees have no path to fully legal status in either Pakistan or Iran, leaving them unable to work or build a future, and sometimes prompting them to return to Afghanistan out of desperation. A significant number of Afghan refugees entering Iran hope to reach Europe, which involves undertaking extremely dangerous journeys. Despite the significant risk of being deported from Europe and returned to Afghanistan, thousands make the journey out of desperation. The United States should encourage regional countries to streamline the process of granting some form of status to Afghan refugees which would allow the refugees to live dignified lives. Washington can begin by improving its own process by which those who served alongside U.S. forces as interpreters apply for special immigrant visas.
Risks of transnational terrorism and civil war
Most assessments of the effect of a U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan predicted a period of protracted civil war, during which the Taliban would have a military advantage, but few imagined such a rapid collapse of the Afghan government and security forces. In the weeks following the dissolution of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANDSF) some former Afghan commandos continued fighting in the Panjshir valley — a historical stronghold of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance that was never brought under the control of the first Taliban emirate. Nevertheless, by mid-September the Taliban took control of Panjshir, forcing resistance groups to reorganize outside Afghanistan.
The two most prominent resistance groups are the National Resistance Front (NRF) and Afghanistan Freedom Front.43 Other groups include the Afghanistan Islamist National and Liberation Movement and Unknown Soldiers of Hazaristan. The Taliban has faced recurrences of armed resistance in the Panjshir Valley, but these groups lack the supplies and numbers to hold territory.44 U.N., Western government, and NGO assessments of the threat these groups present to the Taliban’s hold on power are sometimes exaggerated, especially when compared to past assessments of the ANDSF when they were in a far weaker position.45 Resistance groups unable to procure basic supplies are highly unlikely to present a challenge to the Taliban’s monopoly on power.
IS-K may present the greatest threat to the Taliban. It does not have the capacity to hold territory, but by committing assassinations and acts of terrorism it threatens one of the Taliban’s core claims to legitimacy — i.e., the ability to provide security. But IS-K is also a phenomenon feared equally by the Taliban, regional countries, Europe, and the United States. Special Envoy Thomas West has said that in his assessment the Taliban are genuinely committed to fighting IS-K, but may lack the capacity.46 Preventing its spread is more important than any perceived benefit that could be gained by allowing IS-K to harass the Taliban. But a more cooperative relationship also requires the Taliban to create the necessary conditions. Taliban leaders have continued to downplay the threat of IS-K and ignore its real causes. Suhail Shaheen, head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha, claimed during an interview with the author that IS-K attacks were orchestrated by outside opponents of the Taliban but also largely inconsequential; intelligence assessments indicate the threat is homegrown even if its funding model remains opaque. U.S. officials said they indicated to the Taliban that they might be willing to share actionable intelligence about threats — in part to encourage less draconian choices — but the Taliban showed little interest.47
The U.N. Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concluded that the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda “remains close and is underscored by the presence, both in Afghanistan and the region, of al-Qaeda core leadership and affiliated groups” and that “core al-Qaeda leadership under Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri is reported to remain in Afghanistan: more specifically, the eastern region from Zabul Province north towards Kunar and along the border with Pakistan.”48 We now know that al-Zawahiri certainly reached Kabul under the protection of the Taliban’s senior leadership.
Al-Qaeda remains degraded and will likely face some limitations in movement and activities from the Taliban. The Taliban have also allowed the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to take refuge in Afghanistan as the group engages in attacks on Pakistan’s security forces.49 But policymakers should be careful not to assume that pragmatism will overcome ideology and personal connections in the case of the Taliban’s continued support for al-Qaeda or the TTP.
Fashioning a sustainable long-term Afghanistan policy
Regionalizing counterterrorism
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and its Global War on Terror (GWOT) placed an invisible thumb on the scale of regional security calculations. In particular, the Afghanistan policies of India, Iran, and Pakistan became reactive to U.S. actions in the country. This discouraged regional countries from developing sustainable approaches to Afghanistan and enabled counterproductive state behavior by subsidizing overall regional security with U.S. boots on the ground. Pakistan and Iran took advantage of this by supporting the Taliban’s insurgency without concern that it would topple the Afghan government. India reaped the benefits of a friendly U.S.-backed government in Kabul without much skin in the game, although this was partly due to NATO’s admonition that a larger Indian footprint would rile Islamabad.
India felt excluded by the United States and other NATO countries, which preferred to cultivate a closer relationship with Pakistan when it came to Afghanistan.50 Pakistan’s tendency to publicly place the onus of internal instability on India is just one example of a counterproductive state narrative that was quickly deconstructed after the U.S. military withdrew. One Pakistani analyst observed, “[w]hile externalizing the extremist trends in Pakistan is not without merit, the multi-decade sustenance of extremist groups, ideology, and organizational network — combined with the incredible power of social media as a force multiplier for extreme political and social ideas and narratives — means that the bulk of the burden of extremism in Pakistan in 2021 is domestic, and not foreign.”51
Policymakers should be careful not to assume that pragmatism will overcome ideology and personal connections in the case of the Taliban’s continued support for al-Qaeda or the TTP.
Prevailing U.S. narratives about the role of regional countries in Afghanistan’s conflict were also counterproductive. The United States encouraged India to invest in Afghanistan, but dismissed its concerns over Washington’s commitment to the country’s stability. Pakistan was viewed as a double-dealing partner of necessity rather than an independent country with its own unique set of security concerns. This was due in part to Pakistan’s own short-sighted decisions to support some militants and not others. But strategic coordination between Washington and Islamabad was rarely achieved even when their priorities overlapped. Pakistan’s military establishment became an easy scapegoat for U.S. policymakers due to its shortsightedness and outsized influence over Pakistan’s foreign policy. But this dismisses the significant losses Pakistan’s military endured at the hands of militant groups and the fact that Washington was content to take advantage of the expediency of routing U.S. demands through Pakistan’s generals rather than its civilian politicians. A more assertive civilian government in Pakistan may or may not have been a more cooperative partner in GWOT.
Washington should learn from these mistakes. It should take advantage of having removed U.S. troops from harm’s way by encouraging regional countries to take a greater lead in dealing with the challenges of Afghanistan and counterterrorism. It can start by working closely with regional countries, including Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and, to the extent possible, Iran, to ensure they are prepared to handle security challenges as they emerge. This cooperation should include routine dialogue, intelligence sharing, bilaterals, and capacity building, particularly policing and border security. Just as it was a mistake to create the Afghan military in the image of the U.S. military, encouraging regional countries to recreate a U.S.-style GWOT would be a mistake of similar magnitude. This is not only because regional countries have different domestic and technological constraints, but also a recognition that the tactics of GWOT were often ineffective or unsustainable. However, there is a risk of regional countries replicating these tactics in unproductive ways. On April 16, 2022, Pakistan conducted strikes in Khost and Kunar, Afghanistan’s eastern provinces, which killed 47 people, including civilians and children.52Pakistan carried out the strikes in response to escalating TTP attacks on its security forces, but it is unclear that Pakistan managed to kill a single TTP leader.
Critics of over-the-horizon counterterrorism typically point to the impracticality of conducting traditional air and drone strikes without maintaining U.S. boots on the ground to facilitate logistics and intelligence gathering. Most of this criticism implicitly assigns value to recreating conditions as close as possible to the status quo of the last decade of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and the region. This skepticism is valid but misses the bigger picture in that U.S. policymakers must place counterterrorism strategy and tactics into context by closely examining civilian casualties, resilience of terrorist groups and their ability to replace leadership, cost and sustainability of high tempo drone strikes, effect on other U.S. policy priorities, and the overall terrorism risk relative to other threats. Much of the practices that came to define GWOT would not stand up against such a balancing test. Regional countries face greater domestic constraints and lack the budget and technological capacity to conduct counterterrorism campaigns à la GWOT.
Instead, U.S. policymakers should revisit approaches to counterterrorism in tandem with regional partners to build a more sustainable toolkit. This could involve going back to the basics by investing in a covert intelligence gathering architecture enhanced by current cyber capabilities. It may also involve bolstering the capacity of regional countries. This capacity-building should not necessarily focus on traditional military units, special operations, or intelligence agencies. Building local police capacity and enhancing the ability of partner countries to track and control terrorist movements may prove more effective in the long-run. As one analyst advises, “[r]ather than jumping straight to the discussion of drone basing, the United States should offer something of value to these countries: border security training and equipment.”53 Perhaps most importantly, Washington should take steps to increase confidence building, intelligence sharing, and cooperation with and among regional countries, like China, Pakistan, India, and to the extent possible, Iran and Russia on the limited goal of preventing transnational terrorists from using Afghanistan to conduct attacks abroad. As one Rand report recently concluded, “Afghanistan has proved more a burden than an asset and is better conceived of as a common challenge than a source of great power discord.”54 The next generation of terrorist attacks will be more effectively prevented by proactive communication between partners than reactive firepower.
Robust diplomacy
The United States should take steps to move towards the resumption of a limited diplomatic mission for the benefit of the Afghan people, its own security, and the security of its allies. This could begin with diplomatic envoys visiting Afghanistan, then transition to the establishment of a more permanent physical presence on the ground. The current status quo of meeting the Taliban at international forums only enhances the group’s legitimacy; the United States and its partners should consider a push to suspend the waivers that allow Taliban leaders to travel abroad, or simply refuse to meet them outside Afghanistan. It is also crucial that U.S. diplomats meet with various Taliban cabinet members in Kabul and stakeholders in Kandahar. Direct outreach by U.S. military officials and the intelligence community may have utility, but it is not a replacement for a coherent civilian-led diplomatic strategy.
Some of the United States’ closest allies during the war in Afghanistan have sent senior diplomats to meet with Taliban officials in Kabul even in the absence of a physical diplomatic mission in the country. These include Hugo Shorter, the U.K.’s intérim chargé d’affaires; Jasper Wieck, Germany’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan;55 Markus Potzel, then Germany’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; and Emiel de Bont, the Dutch Special Envoy for Afghanistan.
The United States and its partners should consider a push to suspend the waivers that allow Taliban leaders to travel abroad, or simply refuse to meet them outside Afghanistan.
Various countries in Asia and the Middle East have maintained permanent diplomatic missions in Afghanistan.56 The E.U. also announced plans to establish a diplomatic presence in the country, without recognizing the Taliban government.57 A similar action by the United States is not without precedent. In 1977, at the height of the Cold War, the United States opened an Interests Section in its former embassy building in Havana.58 It was staffed by U.S. diplomats accredited to the Embassy of Switzerland and remained operational until the U.S. embassy reopened in 2015. Until 2019, the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem also served as the primary diplomatic link with the Palestinian people and leadership.59 It now houses the State Department’s Palestinian Affairs Unit, which serves a similar purpose.
A U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan will facilitate consular services, including for the approximately 78,000 Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants left in Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrew, and advance U.S. national security.60 The very presence of U.S. diplomats in the country will raise the stakes for any failure on the part of the Taliban to live up to its commitments under the U.S.-Taliban agreement signed in February 2020. It will also enhance our ability to react to fluid changes on the ground and demonstrate to our partners and foes that we are still engaged in the region.
More often U.S. interest sections are administered by the embassies of friendly countries, such as the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran. Alternatively, they are located in friendly third countries: the Venezuelan Affairs Unit, for example, is housed in the U.S. embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. The expedited establishment of a formal interests section or Afghan affairs unit in a regional country could advance U.S. interests and fulfill our promise to continue supporting the people of Afghanistan.61
Afghanistan presents a unique set of security challenges for U.S. diplomats. Because terrorist groups like IS-K are capable of staging mass casualty terrorist attacks inside Kabul, the security of U.S. diplomats is a real concern. The Taliban regime has expressed openness to a U.S. diplomatic mission in the country but significant security challenges remain. A more sustainable first step may be to find ways to send small delegations for brief periods.
Economic engagement
Afghanistan’s economy will inevitably contract; this is a necessary step in shifting towards a more sustainable model of growth. But as one expert observed: “the [Afghan] population needs a glide path to a diminishing level of support, rather than the abrupt cutoff that hit the economy with a shock wave.”62 Humanitarian aid cannot provide this “glide path” without a functioning economy.
Keeping Taliban-led Afghanistan financially isolated may appear attractive to U.S. policymakers concerned about the group’s positions on human rights and terrorism, but this approach is unlikely to alter the Taliban’s core beliefs and behavior; on the other hand it is guaranteed to turn Afghanistan into a failed state, with all the negative consequences for the region and the United States. The future of the Taliban is uncertain and Afghanistan’s modern history suggests that regime turnover is the rule — not the exception. But destroying Afghanistan’s economy and undermining its institutions to promote regime change may make the country ungovernable by any authority for the foreseeable future.
European partners are unlikely to take the lead in addressing Afghanistan’s worsening economic situation if doing so contradicts U.S. policy. As one European official expressed to the author, the U.S. lack of consistent coordination on Afghanistan since the Trump administration and extending into the August withdrawal only solidified the tendency of these countries to be risk averse.63 Washington must continue to lead in order to avoid a complete breakdown of Afghanistan’s economy.
The United States should continue to communicate to the Taliban what actions it must take for sanctions to be lifted. At a minimum, OFAC should continue to clarify the scope of GLs by providing comprehensive FAQ guidance. Public and private sector entities should be encouraged to apply for specific licenses. Currently remittances sent to Afghans are only permitted for non-commercial uses. Regulating remittances by a specified value rather than the non-commercial status of the use will allow Afghans in the diaspora to help support small businesses while still providing protections against the financing of terrorism. Lastly, letters offering assurances to specific entities about sanctions-exempt transactions should be edited and redacted before they are published to protect the privacy of the original entity, while offering clarity to others engaged in similar types of permitted transactions.
Engagement with the Afghan people
The United States should continue to engage in proactive diplomacy with the people of Afghanistan, regardless of the state of its relations with the Taliban-led government. This can be achieved by restarting the Fulbright Program, exploring the funding and sponsorship of third country and remote learning programs for Afghan girls and women, and remaining engaged with Afghan civil society inside and outside Afghanistan.
Because Afghan women are particularly vulnerable, the United States must base its demands for girls to attend school and women to work outside the home on upholding human and civil rights, rather than on making mere concessions in exchange for legitimacy or greater engagement. No amount of aid or financial integration will allow Afghanistan to develop if half its population remains shuttered in their homes. Nevertheless, clear inducements must be provided to expedite the protection of human and civil rights for women. It is also crucial that the Biden administration increase efforts to assist the evacuation of former interpreters and other Afghans who closely assisted the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.
Utility of the U.S.-Taliban agreement
Both the United States and the Taliban have arguably violated aspects of the U.S.-Taliban agreement. The Taliban continue to reference the U.S.-Taliban agreement in their public and private statements and appear to view it as in effect, even as they violate its terms. The agreement was inherently unbalanced as it was negotiated because the primary objective of both parties was the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The revelation that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, was living in a home owned by the Taliban’s interior minister is assuredly a violation of the Taliban’s duty to “send a clear message that those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies have no place in Afghanistan…” This is particularly true given that al-Zawahiri recently released videos threatening the United States. However, since the agreement is currently the only framework the two countries have for conducting diplomacy, scrapping it based on violations would risk ending whatever degree to which the Taliban have adhered to the agreement. Instead, it should be used as an aspirational framework that can guide future dialogue. Ultimately, strategic patience in diplomacy rather than war is required to develop a relationship with a modicum of trust.
Because Afghan women are particularly vulnerable, the United States must base its demands for girls to attend school and women to work outside the home on upholding human and civil rights, rather than on making mere concessions in exchange for legitimacy or greater engagement.
Conclusion
The United States was the single most important actor in Afghanistan for 20 years, which disincentivized sustainable development and fostered dysfunction in Afghanistan’s government. During this period Afghanistan occupied a disproportionate amount of U.S. government attention relative to other foreign policy priorities. The withdrawal of U.S. troops reduced the importance of each country to the other. But it would be a mistake reminiscent of the 1990s for Washington to disengage from Afghanistan or the region entirely. Instead, the United States must engage in gradual and consistent diplomacy with the Taliban and the Afghan people. Change will be incremental and there will be many setbacks, but there is no viable alternative.
U.S. policymakers should anticipate Taliban intransigence, accept the limits of outside influence, craft policies to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a failed state, and promote its long-term stability. Neither China nor Russia, nor any regional powers, have demonstrated a desire to fill the role played by the pre-withdrawal United States; policymakers should avoid viewing Afghanistan through the lens of great power competition or regional rivalries. Rather, there is a limited window in which the overall interests of most countries are aligned in Afghanistan.
It is crucial that U.S. policymakers seek a middle ground between a harshly punitive approach (and potential military intervention) or disengagement reminiscent of the 1990s. This will require the government to find creative ways of confronting terrorism rather than pouring resources into a forward-deployed GWOT.64 The United States should take steps commensurate with Taliban actions to issue GLs and ultimately rescind broad sanctions that were never intended to be used against the Taliban as a de facto government. This will require communicating clearly to the Taliban’s leadership precisely what actions will lead to a reassessment of U.S. sanctions policy. Ambiguity will not work with the Taliban, nor will holding out dialogue as a reward for concessions, rather than a starting point.
Formal recognition should be predicated on the Taliban upholding its commitments to counterterrorism and basic human rights, including for women. But U.S. diplomats must still use the framework of the U.S.-Taliban agreement to engage with the government that exists, which is likely to be the Taliban for the foreseeable future. This requires U.S. diplomats to travel to Afghanistan and ideally establish a semi-permanent diplomatic presence that can serve the Afghan people. Relying on diplomatic engagement in third countries separates U.S. decision makers from the Taliban’s senior leadership and unnecessarily grants the Taliban the privilege of international travel.
The United States and its allies have an interest in preventing Afghanistan from becoming a failed state. Fighting al-Qaeda will be easier with some semblance of a relationship with the Taliban than none at all. Disengagement will do little to undermine the Taliban or dismantle terrorist groups but much to hurt Afghanistan and the Afghan people. With U.S. troops out of Afghanistan policy makers finally have an opportunity to consider long-term interests rather than short-term necessities.
Appendix A: Current U.S. and U.N. exemptions to sanctions
*See FAQs 928-931; 949-955; 957-963; 991-997; and 1032 for scenario specific guidance.
“[…] all transactions involving the Taliban or the Haqqani Network […] ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan or other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan by the following entities and their employees, grantees, contractors, or other persons acting on their behalf are authorized:” [Emphasis added]
USGOVNGOsUNInternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB Group)Red Cross and Red CrescentIslamic Development Bank
“[…] all transactions involving the Taliban or the Haqqani Network […] ordinarily incident and necessary to the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, or software updates for medical devices to Afghanistan, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to Afghanistan, are authorized.” [Emphasis added]
“[…] all transactions involving the Taliban or the Haqqani Network […] that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the transfer of noncommercial, personal remittances to Afghanistan, including through Afghan depository institutions, are authorized.” [Emphasis added]
“Noncommercial, personal remittances do not include charitable donations of funds to or for the benefit of an entity or funds transfers for use in supporting or operating a business, including a family-owned business.” [Emphasis added]
“[…] all transactions and activities involving the Taliban or the Haqqani Network […] that are for the conduct of the official business of the United States Government by employees, grantees, or contractors thereof are authorized.” [Emphasis added]
“[…] all transactions and activities involving the Taliban or the Haqqani Network […] that are for the conduct of the official business of the following entities by employees, grantees, or contractors thereof are authorized:” [Emphasis added]UNInternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB Group)Red Cross and Red CrescentIslamic Development Bank
“[…] all transactions and activities involving the Taliban or the Haqqani Network […] that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the activities described in paragraph (b) by nongovernmental organizations are authorized.” [Emphasis added]
“Activities to support humanitarian projects to meet basic human needs in Afghanistan, including drought and flood relief; food, nutrition, and medicine distribution; the provision of health services; assistance for vulnerable or displaced populations, including individuals with disabilities, the elderly, and survivors of sexual- and gender-based violence; and environmental programs;” [Emphasis added]“Activities to support the following in Afghanistan: rule of law, citizen participation, government accountability and transparency, human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to information, and civil society development projects;” [Emphasis added]“Activities to support education in Afghanistan, including combating illiteracy, increasing access to education, international exchanges, and assisting education reform projects;” [Emphasis added]“Activities to support non-commercial development projects directly benefiting the Afghan people, including related to health, food security, and water and sanitation; and” [Emphasis added]“Activities to support environmental and natural resource protection in Afghanistan, including the preservation and protection of threatened or endangered species, responsible and transparent management of natural resources, and the remediation of pollution or other environmental damage.” [Emphasis added]
“This general license does not authorize:”
“Financial transfers to any blocked person described in paragraph (a), other than for the purpose of effecting the payment of taxes, fees, or import duties, or the purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services;” [Emphasis added]“Any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of any blocked person described in paragraph (a);”“Any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the GTSR, the FTOSR, or any other part of 31 CFR chapter V, or E.O. 13224, as amended.”
(a)…all transactions involving Afghanistan or governing institutions in Afghanistan prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), or Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, are authorized.”
“This general license does not authorize:”
“Financial transfers to the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, any entity in which the Taliban or the Haqqani Network owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, or any blocked individual who is in a leadership role of a governing institution in Afghanistan, other than for the purpose of effecting the payment of taxes, fees, or import duties, or the purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services, provided that such payments do not relate to luxury items or services;” [Emphasis added]“Transfers of luxury items or services to any blocked person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this general license; (3) Any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of any blocked person; or (4) Any transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the GTSR, the FTOSR, or E.O. 13224, as amended, other than the blocked persons described in paragraph (b)(1) of this general license, unless separately authorized.”
About the Author
Adam Weinstein is a Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute. Before joining Quincy, Adam worked for KPMG’s international trade practice and assisted multinational clients in navigating Asia’s changing trade landscape. Prior to that, he worked as senior law and policy analyst at the National Iranian American Council, where he focused on thesecuritization of U.S. immigration policy and its effect on communities. Adam is an attorney by trade and received his J.D. from Temple University Beasley School of Law with a concentration in international law. During law school, he contributed to a brief that was presented to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He has presented papers at the 2016 International Society of Public Law Conference and 2019 Constitutional Resilience in South Asia Workshop sponsored by Oxford University and Melbourne Law School. He served as a U.S. Marine and deployed to Afghanistan in 2012.
Strategic Patience: Sustainable Engagement with a Changed Afghanistan
The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan last year — followed by economic sanctions and other restrictions from the international community — precipitated a dire humanitarian crisis. Afghan women and children, particularly girls, have been hit the hardest. After two decades of hard-won gains, Afghan women have seen their rights evaporate before their eyes and young girls’ dreams for their futures have been squashed. Meanwhile, the country’s economic crisis has left nearly the entire population in hunger, with limited access to health care and other basic needs.
Mercy Corps’ Yasmin Faruki, Save the Children U.S.’s Allyson Neville, World Vision’s Ashley Igwe, Care USA’s Dhabie Brown and Norwegian Refugee Council’s Becky Roby look at what’s driving the humanitarian and economic crises, how it’s impacting access to food and health care, how it is uniquely impacting women and girls and what the United States can do to help. Recent reports and statements on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan from their organizations and others can be found here.
The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for Afghanistan is the largest ever in history for a single country at $4.4 billion. What are the key factors driving humanitarian needs?
Faruki: Today’s humanitarian crisis is primarily an economic one. The crisis is driven by three factors. First, the country is suffering from a lack of access to cash, or liquidity. The credentials revocation of Afghanistan’s Central Bank, known as Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), halted basic banking transactions and subsequently limited the flow of cash within the country. This flow of cash was crucial to daily market activities for Afghan families, who are now unable to earn incomes and buy basic goods. Second, foreign donors’ decision to suspend development assistance, which supported a majority of Afghanistan’s public sector budget, cut off salary payments for essential government workers in sectors like health and education. Finally, skyrocketing levels of inflation, including more than a 50% increase in the cost of goods since last July, have diminished Afghan families’ ability to purchase food and basic items, despite their widespread supply on the open market.
In addition, Afghanistan continues to battle COVID-19, among other infectious diseases, and recurring natural disasters, including a recent drought and 5.9 magnitude earthquake in June that left over 300,000 Afghans in need of humanitarian assistance. While humanitarian assistance has helped stave off even deeper levels of starvation, more support is needed. Ultimately, no level of humanitarian funding will be able to substitute the role of a functioning economy.
Many of your organizations have recently released reports. What’s one thing that either surprised you or that people should know about the situation in Afghanistan right now?
Neville: This is a children’s emergency. Because of the economic crisis, 97% of households are now unable to meet basic needs, including food and medical care. According to an assessment by Save the Children, an overwhelming majority of children report eating less. Some children describe only eating one meal a day — sometimes consisting of bread and tea only — or only one full meal a week.
The situation for girls is especially concerning. Girls are nearly twice as likely to go to bed hungry on a frequent basis, indicating that they are probably missing out to benefit their male siblings and peers, and more than twice as likely to be out of school compared to boys. They are also facing increased risks of child marriage. More than one in four girls were reported by their caregivers to show signs of depression and anxiety on a daily basis. There isn’t a single area in which the lives and wellbeing of children have not been negatively impacted by the ongoing crisis.
Igwe: Child protection systems in Afghanistan have weakened, and pressure on families from the economic crisis is exposing children to significant risk — child marriage, child trafficking, child labor, psychosocial distress from conflict and displacement and violence, abuse or exploitation closer to home.
A 14-year-old boy we spoke to dropped out of school to help provide for his family of seven. He told us, “Going to school helps me build my future, but how can I survive without eating something? Going to school means missing half of the work I do now, and that means half of my current income, which is never enough for our family.”
A devastated father admitted to selling his 7-year-old daughter in marriage to a creditor: “I did not have any alternative, so I agreed to sell my daughter for 200,000 Afs ($2,250) so that I can pay off the debts and feed my children for a while.”
There has been significant press coverage on increased hunger and malnutrition, and challenges in accessing health care. Can you describe what you are seeing in your programs, and how families are being impacted?
Igwe: After August 15, 2021, people who had been in inaccessible areas began seeking health care, and the health system was unable to cope with the additional load. It takes households an average of 90 minutes to reach the nearest health-care center, with some families traveling up to four hours. We are especially concerned about the effect this has on mothers and infants. Access to midwife care can reduce newborn mortality and stillbirth rates by over 80 percent, and pre-term labor and birth by 24%. However, we are finding that less than a third of births are attended by a skilled professional.
Further, malnutrition is rampant. So many children are dying, and even those who survive aren’t able to thrive. Malnourished mothers who are pregnant or breastfeeding are unable to give their babies the essential nutrients they require, which can cause long-lasting harm to brain development and make their children more susceptible to infections and illnesses.
Brown: Nearly the entire population of Afghanistan (95%) is not getting enough to eat, but what’s startling is that the hunger crisis is generally not due to a lack of food — it’s manmade. The markets are full, but people can’t afford to buy what they need. International economic restrictions and the suspension of foreign assistance to Afghanistan have had dire consequences on families. Inflation has driven the price of basic goods like food and fuel out of reach and family incomes have been devastated from job and salary losses. Drought and lack of access to agricultural inputs means we also expect domestic food production to decrease soon, adding another layer to this crisis. Humanitarian assistance has helped prevent catastrophe so far, but it can’t solve the economic and development crisis at the root of this suffering.
Can you say a little more about how women and girls are being uniquely impacted by the crisis?
Brown: CARE recently surveyed 345 Afghan women across nine provinces to better understand the gendered impacts of food insecurity. Women who previously worked outside of the home told us that job and wage loss, intimidation and restrictions on their mobility mean they can no longer earn an income and contribute to their households. Many have also been forced to adopt negative coping mechanisms — such as selling their jewelry, rugs and other personal assets; taking unfavorable loans; or resorting to harmful cooking practices like burning plastic instead of expensive oil — to make sure there is food on table. Unfortunately, Afghanistan’s crippling liquidity crisis has also precipitated a spike in early marriages. One of our young staffers who helped conduct the study wanted U.S. policymakers to know that the key to a brighter future for Afghan women like her is the ability to work, go to school and travel freely so they can support their families and communities.
Igwe: Women must now be accompanied by men (muharam) when they leave their homes. Consequently, women without muharam — like widows and single mothers — have lost their jobs and are struggling to find ways to survive. Moreover, girls can no longer be educated past sixth grade. Afghanistan has fewer female teachers and fewer girls in school than at any point over the last two decades. Soon, fewer and fewer female educators will exist to teach the next generation of girls. Many girls feel that they have no future in Afghanistan.
As families struggle to provide, young girls are given in marriage so their dowry can be used to care for the children who remain at home. We spoke to a 12-year-old girl. To cancel her family’s debt, she is promised to a man with grandchildren her age. She told us, “Getting a divorce is the only dream I have in my life.”
What actions can U.S. policymakers take to address the current crisis?
Roby: Going forward, there should be proactive engagement with financial institutions to encourage them to facilitate the financial transactions of aid agencies and the private sector operating in Afghanistan. U.N. member states should provide legal guidance and incentives to address the chilling effect of sanctions on private sector actors. This should include efforts to encourage financial institutions — including banks, payment platforms and other systems, such as SWIFT — to engage with Afghanistan.
The United States, along with other influential U.N. member states, can also take steps to secure mechanisms for providing technical assistance to DAB. This includes building DAB’s capacity and independence as a necessary step toward restoring the commercial banking sector and reconnecting the Afghan economy to the global economy. Such assistance is essential in maintaining macroeconomic stability and restoring confidence in the banking system. Furthermore, steps should be taken to resume the printing and circulation of Afghani banknotes. A functioning banking sector and economy are essential to prevent a perpetual cycle of humanitarian need.
Neville: In addition to the actions above, the United States should continue to demonstrate leadership in funding the humanitarian response. The United States has been incredibly generous, but humanitarian needs — globally and in Afghanistan — are at record-high levels. Support must expand to meet these needs. Additionally, there must be a plan to replenish development funding, including resources that were repurposed for humanitarian assistance. The United States and others must ensure that funding resumes for key sectors that had long been supported by development assistance. A humanitarian-only response is insufficient, and the lack of development funding also undermines the economy. One step would be to end the pause in teacher salary payments through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. Finally, work must be done to encourage the Taliban to ensure women can access and participate in the humanitarian response, girls of all ages can attend school and there is non-interference in humanitarian activities.
Dhabie Brown is a senior humanitarian policy advocate at CARE USA.
Yasmin Faruki is a senior policy advisor at Mercy Corps.
Ashley Igwe is a humanitarian and emergency affairs policy advisor at World Vision.
Allyson Neville is a senior advisor at Save the Children U.S.
Becky Roby is an advocacy manager at Norwegian Refugee Council.
A Year into Taliban Rule, Afghans Face Spiraling Economic, Humanitarian Crises
It is almost a year since the departure of the last foreign forces from Afghanistan, the collapse of the Republic and its armed forces and the Taleban’s capture of power. It is almost a year, as well, that the Taleban have been ruling Afghanistan. AAN has reported on every step of the way, on the collapse itself, how the United States both underestimated and bolstered the Taleban, and how the Taleban defeated a Republic hollowed out by corruption and vain hopes. We have looked at the makeup of the new Taleban administration, at its morality police, and its clamping down on the rights and freedoms of women and girls, journalists and musicians and the wider population. We have traced Afghanistan’s calamitous economic collapse and the struggles of its people to feed their families, and how aid is being delivered. In this dossier published ahead of the second Emirate’s first year anniversary, we bring together our reports to tell the story of this momentous year for Afghanistan.
The dossier is split into five chapters:Chapter 1: US withdrawal, Republican Collapse, Taleban Victory
Chapter 2: The Transition to a new political order
Chapter 3: Human Rights
Chapter 4: Economic collapse and the struggle to find food
Chapter 5: Aid after the Taleban takeover
Chapter 1: US withdrawal, Republican Collapse, Taleban Victory
President Biden’s 14 April 2021 announcement of the full, rapid and unconditional withdrawal of international military forces from Afghanistan by 11 September gave the Taleban a timetable to launch their assaults on government-held areas. They pushed against Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) which had been hollowed out by corruption, churn in senior leadership and demoralisation, as soldiers and police realised that neither the US nor Kabul had their backs. In a matter of months, district after district and then provincial capitals fell until finally, the Taleban captured Kabul on 15 August. The Taleban’s rise to power: As the US prepared for peace, the Taleban prepared for warargues that America’s strategy of recent years has been one factor – although not the only one – facilitating the Taleban takeover.
One week after the fall of Kabul, Kate Clark looked at the flaws in US Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad’s strategy, driven as it was by the United States’ desire to withdraw its troops. He and President Trump had already given away the US’s main bargaining chip when they signed the US-Taleban Doha Agreement on 29 February 2020. They had agreed to an almost unconditional withdrawal in return for the haziest of commitments to ‘intra-Afghan talks’, an effective gamble that the Taleban actually wanted to negotiate an end to the conflict with Kabul, rather than try for military victory.
As it turned out, the Taleban were planning their final push to take Afghanistan, while the Afghan elite were blind to the wolf at the door. Even as the US was packing up to leave and the Taleban were preparing to fight for power, Afghanistan’s elites continued to fight over posts and milk the state. The government failed to prepare for a post-US Afghanistan or even believe the US would ever actually leave.
In the final days of the Republic, Afghanistan’s last president Ashraf Ghani had few allies and was isolated. His micro-managing, inability to delegate, quick temper and fear of rivals had left the administration drained of talent, flexibility and decisiveness. Inaction, such as the failure to properly resource those organising to resist, had further sabotaged the Republic’s defence. He appeared out of touch with reality; as the Taleban marched towards Kabul, the Palace continued business as usual. On 12 August, three days before he was to flee Afghanistan, Ghani was busy meeting the country’s Olympics team and attending international youth day celebrations. His secret flight out of Afghanistan as the Taleban entered Kabul, without informing even the defence minister, and leaving no transitional arrangements in place, will be a lasting ignominy.
In the end, the fall of the Republic was more rapid than anyone had imagined and came well before the 11 September 2021 deadline set by President Biden. By fastening America’s departure from Afghanistan to the twentieth anniversary of the al-Qaeda’s 2001 attacks on the United States – the event that brought the American military to Afghanistan – President Biden ensured that the day will be celebrated by the Taleban and the various violent jihadist groups around the world as the second defeat of a superpower by Afghan mujahedin and remembered by history as the start of the Taleban’s second Emirate.
The beginning of the end
In the weeks following President Biden’s announcement, a thunderstruck Afghanistan struggled to come to terms with the implications of its looming abandonment. In his reportPreparing for a Post Departure Afghanistan, Ali Yawar Adili looked at how the Ghani government tried to put a brave face on the situation, even as it failed to gain consensus within its own ranks on what to do. Western diplomats and Afghans with means ‘rushed to the door’, while former factional commanders and leaders talked of mobilising a ‘second resistance’ outside the government’s formal military structures – a repeat of what they had done 20 years earlier as the anti-Taleban Northern Alliance. The announcement of unconditional troop withdrawal transformed the Taleban’s approach to the intra-Afghan talks, fatally weakening any chance of a negotiated end to the war.
It was not long before the Taleban started their push to capture territory in earnest. They kept to their agreement with the US not to attack the departing international forces, but no longer saw any benefit to be gained by restraint against Afghan forces. Following the 2020 US-Taleban agreement, they had already intensified their attacks on their fellow Afghans, but now the gloves were off. In A Quarter of Afghanistan’s Districts Fall to the Taleban amid Calls for a ‘Second Resistance’, Kate Clark and Obaid Ali charted the fall of some 127 district centres out of a total of 421 to the Taleban between 1 May to 29 June. The maps below by Roger Helms illustrate the Taleban’s mounting territorial gains, showing how the balance of power shifted steadily and then ineluctably in the insurgents’ favour.
Changes in district control as of 29 June 2021.
That shift of power was felt at first particularly in the north, which after bloody battles and ultimate defeat in a few key districts, saw a collapse of the ANSF and the civilian authorities at breakneck speed. More than 60 districts in nine provinces (Faryab, Jawzjan, Sar-e Pul, Balkh, Samangan, Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan) had been overrun or ceded to the Taleban by 29 June, most of them in the last ten days of the month.
Changes in district centre control in northwestern Afghanistan from 1 May to 29 June.
When the Taleban were last in power in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it had been the north where they faced their most resistance, so beginning their push for power in this region now looked like a pre-emptive strike to prevent any new northern opposition from organising. As much as Taleban strength of canniness led to their trouncing the ANSF, equally significant was corruption in government, especially in the all-crucial security ministries and forces; questionable senior level appointment-making and persistent scarcities in supplies and salary payments also helped precipitate the collapse. Running out of ammunition or food had demoralised troops, already reeling from the US decision to withdraw.
By mid-July, the insurgents had gained control of almost 200 district centres, or just under half of the total.
Kate Clark’s Menace, Negotiation, Attack: The Taleban take more District Centres across Afghanistan looked at the Taleban’s strategy of focusing on border crossings and other money-making locations while avoiding a move on provincial capitals and eastern areas which border Pakistan. Many of the first districts to fall had been dismissed as ‘low-hanging fruit’, places where the government and ANSF had only controlled the district centre, often precariously so, but by mid-July, Taleban gains had gone well beyond the capture of those centres. As districts toppled like dominoes, ANSF morale plummeted further, as did the confidence of civilians in the government. The Taleban’s narrative that it was heading to victory proved more powerful than the government’s insistence that it was in control and could protect the people.
Changes in district centre control as of 14 July 2021, including principal roads and border crossings.
The Taleban’s push to sue for power exacted a heavy toll on civilians in Afghanistan. Kate Clark took a deep dive into UNAMA’s mid-year report on civilian casualties, published on 26 July. New UNAMA Civilian Casualties report: The human cost of the Taleban push to take territoryexamined numbers of civilians killed and injured in the first six months of 2021 which were back up to the record highs of 2014 to 2018. UNAMA also reported on the deliberate destruction and looting of civilian homes, schools and clinics in newly-captured territory, the vast majority by or with the complicity of Taleban fighters.
As Afghanistan entered the second half of 2021, fears over the harm done by this bitter conflict were legion, of further loss of life and the destruction of homes, of having to flee through areas planted with IEDs, of being subject to abuse or ‘revenge’ attacks by armed men and of the denial of dignity and respect. The cut-off point for data for the UNAMA report had been 30 June. By the time it was published, on 26 July, the conflict had raged on, more districts had fallen to the Taleban and the toll on the civilian population had mounted. We calculated that at least 226 of Afghanistan’s 421 district centres, or more than half, had by then fallen to the Taleban.
Changes in district centre control as of 24 July 2021.
As well as looking at the national picture, AAN wanted to publish several case studies of how particular districts or provinces fell – the local politics, local economics, the deals done, the role of elders and how government forces had fared.
The first to be published was on Laghman province, which sits on the main highway between Kabul and the Torkham border crossing with Pakistan; focusing on it was consistent with the Taleban’s strategy of seeking to deny the government access to domestic revenues. At that time, in early August, Laghman, long-contested, had seen four of its six districts fall to the Taleban between late May and mid-July. Yet the government still had a precarious hold on the provincial capital Mehtarlam. Ali Mohammad Sabawoon’s Taleban Victory or Government Failure? A security update on Laghman province took a close look at how political rivalries, the competing demands of local elites and a failure to establish a united front with strong command-and-control had contributed to the Taleban’s success in this strategically important province. He looked at how three district centres and multiple security outposts had fallen to the Taleban without bloodshed, following mediation by local tribal elders and the surrender of government forces. The government arrested the civilian and military leaders implicated in these surrenders, but it was not enough to stem the political turmoil that had seen the province cycle through three governors in under a year.
In The Domino Effect in Paktia and the Fall of Zurmat: A case study of the Taleban surrounding Afghan cities,Thomas Ruttig and Sayed Asadullah documented the successive collapse of 11 of Paktia’s 14 districts to the Taleban in six days, in late June/early July, culminating in the fall of the politically significant Zurmat district on 2 July 2021. They reconstructed how these districts, protected by a 1,000-strong government force, had fallen so rapidly to just 200 to 300 Taleban fighters on motorbikes. Strategy and morale, it seemed, had trumped numbers. They explored the Taleban strategy, government weakness, the shifting loyalties of local people, the role of tribal elders and the history of violence in Zurmat – all contributing to the Taleban capturing Zurmat, which put the insurgents at the gates of the provincial capital, Gardez.
On 6 August 2021, the Taleban gained control of their first provincial capital, Zaranj in Nimruz province. As Taleban fighters entered the city, government security forces melted away, many to Iran through the nearby border. They left the provincial capital free for the taking. Fabrizio Foschini’s The Fall of Nimruz: A symbolic or economic game-changer?argued that after an unexpected and highly successful sweep of rural districts in Nimruz, the Taleban had encountered significant resistance when they turned their sights on major cities, such as Kandahar, Herat, Ghazni and Lashkargah. In order to boost the morale of their fighters, who had grown accustomed to routing the ANSF, Taleban military leaders changed tack; while keeping up the pressure on those cities, they also started targeting relatively undefended provincial capitals like Zaranj.
At first glance, this province in Afghanistan’s remote southwest might look inconsequential, but Nimruz is a leading import-export hub, ranking fourth for customs revenues, after Nangrahar, Herat and Balkh. It is also a gateway for the smuggling of illicit drugs and Afghans seeking to go to Iran and beyond. Capturing Nimruz was a morale boost to Taleban fighters, who went on to take four other provincial capitals in quick succession – Sheberghan in Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, Kunduz and Taloqan in Takhar.
Changes in district centre control as of 8 August 2021.
From before the fall of Kabul, the AAN team had been interviewing Afghans on how their district or city had fallen and what changes they had seen in their lives.Afghanistan’s Conflict in 2021 (1): The Taleban’s sweeping offensive as told by people on the groundwas the result: a compilation of story fragments gathered by AAN researchers and compiled by Martine van Bijlert. These accounts reveal how variable takeovers had been – in the level of violence, the duration of the fighting or standoff, the pace of events, whether the ANSF had resisted, fled or surrendered, and the extent of suffering among civilians. Interviewees gave vivid descriptions of fierce fighting, particularly early on and around the cities, and of desperate attempts by individual ANSF units to hold on to their positions. Small pockets of besieged security forces left to fend for themselves often held off Taleban attacks for weeks. Such accounts explain the anger and confusion when people talk about the incompetency of the Kabul leadership, the absence of leadership and the lack of support. People described military units as being often unable, no longer willing or sometimes not even authorised to fight back against the Taleban onslaught.Things moved at breakneck speed after the fall of Zaranj. By the morning of 15 August, just nine days later, 19 more provincial capitals had fallen into Taleban hands and six of the seven zonal army corps had either surrendered or dissolved and the Taleban were on the outskirts of the capital. That morning, on what would turn out to be the final day of the Republic, we published Martine van Bijlert’s Is This How It Ends? With the Taleban closing in on Kabul, President Ghani faces tough decisions. It summed up what had driven the rapid fall of Afghanistan’s district and provincial capitals to the Taleban and described the government’s now tenuous prospects. Many, most notably the government itself and the US, which was still operating on the assumption that the Taleban would only begin their offensive on the capital in earnest after all the foreign troops had left on 31 August, were caught off-guard. Foreign governments were clamouring to evacuate their staff and nationals and the Afghan public was coming to terms with the fact that the Americans were leaving with scarcely any thought for what was left behind. A few hours later, Ghani fled Afghanistan in a helicopter for Uzbekistan, and eventually the United Arab Emirates, and the Taleban entered Kabul as conquerors. Kabul police and security forces melted away and, in the end, the Taleban entered Kabul without resistance. By nightfall, they had taken control of the Presidential Palace.
Changes in district and provincial center control as of 13 August.
The fall of the Republic did not come out of the blue. If the government and the US had been unprepared, the Taleban were not. They seemed to have been planning what they would do when international forces left for months, making deals and issuing threats and using networks they had built over the years. In many ways, those final months were an acceleration of the existing state of affairs in large parts of the country: an ongoing war with deaths, revenge killings, aerial bombardments and an ever-encroaching Taleban.
During the Taleban offensive, they were winning the information war with a mass of social media accounts distributing a deluge of carefully curated images and videos of their fighters running through towns or taking control of government buildings and the Taleban flag raised in various locations or, two days before the fall of Kabul, footage of a slightly dazed Ismael Khan, former governor of Herat and mujahedin strongman, was distributed on social media after being detained by Taleban forces as he attempted to cross the border into Iran. In the last days of Kabul under the Republic, cries of ‘Allah-u Akbar!’ had been shouted out across the night-time city, a symbol of opposition to the incoming Taleban. Yet, the Palace had continued to live in its own surreal bubble, including now pointless donor-driven ceremonies and meetings and even a bizarre visit by Ghani to the ancient Bala Hissar fortress in Kabul. Terrified Afghans had been arriving to what they thought would be the safety of the capital in their numbers, and a humanitarian crisis was starting to unfold. Ghani’s now infamous 14 August video message to the nation made vague commitments to remobilise the forces, conduct wide consultations, and work to end further violence, but the subtext was clear – the fight was over.
How Afghanistan fell to the Taleban, 2021.
Chapter 2: The transition to a new political order
The end, when it came, brought to the foreground the apprehensions of an anxious nation wondering what this turn of events would mean to their lives. Some Afghans headed to the airport seeking to flee and find refuge outside Afghanistan. Many more stayed home to wait for the start of a new chapter in Afghanistan’s history to unfold and the streets were largely left empty. Martine van Bijlert contemplated the emergence of the Taleban as Afghanistan’s new leaders in Afghanistan Has a New Government: The country wonders what the new normal will look like.
On reaching the Arg, the Taleban had reportedly declared that they had no interest in a shared interim government and were simply going to rule by themselves. And so it was that on Monday 16 August 2021, the Taleban started their transition from a warring group that used, among other things, terror to achieve its goals to a government that would be held to account and faced a plurality of opinions, politics and lifestyles. How would they negotiate the demands of a generation of Afghans unaccustomed to Taleban rule and, in particular, the demands of Afghan women for their share in public life? The real litmus test, van Bijlert wrote, was girls’ education. Would Afghan girls be allowed to attend school and university and, if so, under what conditions?
Taleban’s spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed held his first press conference with an announcement, among other things, of a general security guarantee (often referred to as an amnesty) for those who had worked with the Republic. He said there would be no reprisals. As we saw in Martine van Bijlert’s The Taleban leadership converges on Kabul as remnants of the republic reposition themselves, there was a great deal of uncertainty about the Taleban’s emerging strategy and the shifting alliances of Afghanistan’s old political elite: Would Taleban leaders engage with the various powerbrokers, such as former president Hamid Karzai and former chief executive Abdullah Abdullah, who had not fled and who were trying to mediate on behalf of the remnants of the Republic?
Outside Kabul, there were reports of skirmishes and protests, and also pockets of resistance by those still holding out against Taleban rule. In Panjshir, First Vice-President Amrullah Saleh and Ahmad Massud, the son of Ahmad Shah Massud, were said to be organising a resistance.
Meanwhile, the scramble to leave the country escalated, with Taleban fighters manning checkpoints outside the airport, often violently. The evacuations focused mainly on foreign nationals and employees, leaving many Afghans desperate to get to safe harbours rushing to the airport and risking life and limb to secure a much-coveted seat on one of the evacuation flights.
Two weeks after the Taleban takeover, the US announced that the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan was complete. The Taleban declared a “historic victory,” celebrated the defeat of America and the re-emergence of Afghanistan as a “free and sovereign” nation, while the Afghan public wondered what their country would look like and how it would be ruled. In The Moment in Between: After the Americans, before the new regime, Martine van Bijlert looked at how the Taleban continued to project an image of a government girding itself up to rule. Already, there were signs of power struggles between different Taleban leaders, Ghilzai and Durrani, eastern and southern networks, and hardliners and those looking for more flexibility. The Taleban were also grappling with a pressing problem – how to disarm the thousands of Taleban fighters who, in the absence of as yet codified rules and procedures, were policing the population of Kabul and other cities and towns, deciding themselves what was inappropriate behaviour, hairstyle and dress.
There were reports that they had beaten up, arrested and shot men and boys for flying the Republic’s flag and more worrying reports of reprisals against the proponents of the fallen Republic. In addition, on 26 August, ISKP (the Islamic State Khorasan Province) had killed at least 170 Afghans and 13 US troops in a suicide attack at Kabul airport. The violence was not over.
At year’s end, Kate Clark looked at the historical parallels and differences in the fall of the Republic and the coming to power of the Taleban’s second Emirate with earlier regime changes in Afghanistan’s conflict in 2021 (2): Republic collapse and Taleban victory in the long-view of history. It was an attempt to assess the strength of the new Taleban polity and the dangers it faced as it sought to secure its rule over Afghanistan. So much of what marked 2021 out – the swift toppling of the old regime, the hubris of the victors, their disdain for former opponents, or even murderous intent, and a refusal to hear dissenting voices – had been seen before and with disastrous consequences.
The Taleban face a very different Afghanistan than when they were last in power. Afghans are more urban, more educated and more connected through social media and mobile phones to each other and to the world. A majority of children, boys and girls, have grown up going to school, and far more women have enjoyed paid work and a public voice. Now, the Taleban were no longer an insurgent movement, Clark concluded, they might find that the business of ruling Afghanistan, of providing public services and keeping public discontent at bay, is far trickier than when they were last in power.
The Second Islamic Emirate
As Afghans grappled with what the start of this new chapter meant for them, the Taleban pressed forward with solidifying their rule and re-establishing their Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They announced a caretaker government on 7 September, less than a month after they took control of Afghanistan. The 33-member cabinet was all-male, almost all-Pashtun, almost all clerical and all-Taleban.
Our report, The Focus of the Taleban’s New Government: Internal cohesion, external dominance, looked at the makeup of the new cabinet and what it signalled to other Afghans and to the outside world. Martine van Bijlert argued that the appointment of a ‘victors’ cabinet’ is not unusual after a change of regime. The 2001 cabinet was also heavy with the members of the armed factions that had opposed the Taleban, but there was a far greater ethnic diversity and two women. The Taleban cabinet, by contrast, is homogenous and dominated by southern Pashtuns. It has shown how the movement’s priorities coalesced around internal cohesion, monopolisation of power, the silencing of open dissent and dividing up the ‘spoils of war’, in terms of government posts, among themselves. The Taleban had seen no reason to compromise with anyone but their own.
Martine van Bijlert continued to look at the subsequent two rounds of appointments in The Taleban’s Caretaker Cabinet and other Senior Appointments. These appointments had solved only the immediate question of who would head the ministries and other state institutions that would help restart government. But there were still outstanding questions: How might the lack of experience by most of the new appointees in their respective portfolios affect the ability of the Taleban to govern a state whose economy and state institutions had collapsed? And how did the new government intend to fund itself, given almost all foreign aid stopped when the Taleban took the country by force?
As when they were first in power, in 1996-2001, ‘promoting virtue and preventing vice’ has emerged as a top priority for the new Taleban administration. Many Afghans feared the return of the Taleban’s ‘religious police’ and the notorious brutalities of the 1990s’ Amr bil-Maruf (virtue and vice) ministry. AAN guest author Sabawoon Samim compared Amr bil-Maruf in the two Taleban administrations, twenty years apart, in his report Policing Public Morality: Debates on promoting virtue and preventing vice in the Taleban’s second Emirate and argued that two decades on, Taleban views on the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice had evolved, but so had Afghan society. While all Taleban appear to believe it is a state’s duty to actively police public morality, Samim traced the emergence of a new generation of Taleban leaders, some of whom are less conservative, and asked whether they might take a softer approach.
Chapter 3: Human rights
Since the takeover, reports of human rights violations by the Islamic Emirate have been legion, but human rights abuses in Afghanistan did not begin on 15 August 2021. A little more than a week into the Taleban’s new regime, the UN Human Rights Council held a Special Session to discuss the human rights situation in Afghanistan – past and present.
Rachel Reid and Ehsan Qaane provided background to the UN session in UN Human Rights Council to talk about Afghanistan: Why so little appetite for action?, which the Ghani government, no doubt wary of additional accountability mechanisms that might implicate its own forces, had finally agreed to in early August 2021. Well before the Taleban takeover, pressure had been increasing for a stronger response by the UN to an escalation of human rights and conflict-related abuses in Afghanistan, especially since the massacre of schoolgirls at the Sayed ul-Shuhada school on 8 May 2021 in west Kabul. However, the resolution the council considered had been drafted by Pakistan, the Taleban’s main international backer. Far from creating a Fact-Finding Mission or Commission of Inquiry that would have had robust, long-term powers to monitor and investigate grave human rights violations, the resolution merely proposed that the High Commissioner report back to the Human Rights Council in nine months’ time, in March 2022. In the end, the Human Rights Council passed the resolution with just one revision: it asked the High Commissioner to give them an oral report in September, rather than wait for March 2022, giving rise to the question: Why, in the middle of a human rights crisis, did the United Nation’s leading human rights body signal to the world that the Taleban’s seizure of power should be met by nothing more than ‘business as usual’?
Kate Clark had taken a first look at civilian casualties in the Taleban’s military push for victory and accusations of Taleban revenge attacks in her already mentioned review of the takeover, ‘Afghanistan’s conflict in 2021 (2). UNAMA’s first major report on human rights in Afghanistan since the Taleban came to power on 15 August 2021 covered these and many more abuses, including arbitrary detention and the loss of the rights of women and girls. In Arbitrary Power and a Loss of Fundamental Freedoms: A look at UNAMA’s first major human rights report since the Taleban takeover, Kate Clark reviewed that report and found a recurring theme – the arbitrary way the new administration often works and the unpredictability of its laws, punishments and procedures. Her report examined what has facilitated these violations of Afghans’ rights: the clamping down on human rights defenders and the media, the suppression of free speech and peaceful protest and changes in state institutions, which all help to make the deployment of arbitrary and unaccountable state power so much easier.
Attacks on Hazaras/Shia Muslims
West Kabul, like many other places where Hazaras/Shia Muslims are in the majority, has been the target of some of the deadliest attacks in Afghanistan, especially since 2016. Attacks which, moreover, aim to kill the softest of targets – children, women in labour and with their newborns, sportspeople and worshippers. While the former government promised to step up measures to protect this community, including a much-touted security plan for west Kabul, it failed to deliver. Immediately after the Taleban took power in August 2021, the neighbourhood experienced a short-lived respite from attacks, but has since become the scene of a new cycle of assassinations and bombings.
In January 2022, Ali Yawar Adili looked at the post-Republic attacks in Dasht-e Barchi and argued that the failures of successive governments to protect ethnic Hazaras and other Shia-Muslims have left them exposed to violence, bloodshed and fear. His report A Community Under Attack: How successive governments failed west Kabul and the Hazaras who live there provides an overview of the widespread and systematic attacks against the community. In the face of ongoing attacks, the beleaguered residents of west Kabul have little hope that the country’s new rulers will take any more steps to protect them than the old ones did.
The rights of women and girls
Our last special report before 15 August 2021 felt, in retrospect, very important. We wanted to find out what women living in rural areas thought about war and peace. Given they are probably the most under-represented voices in the country and that women’s rights activists living in the cities were often dismissed and accused of misrepresenting their rural sisters who were assumed to be generally content with more conservative mores.
Through in-depth interviews with a wide range of women in rural Afghanistan, we gained rare insight into their views and experiences, fears about war and hopes for peace. Our special report Between Hope and Fear: Rural Afghan women talk about peace and war by Martine van Bijlert is an intimate snapshot of the pressures they were navigating, heartbreaking losses and, for most, the daily grind of living through a war while still, stubbornly, holding onto hopes for a peaceful future. In the end, our conversations revealed that the priorities of rural women were not that different from those put forward by the more well-connected women activists. They challenged the idea that women in rural areas are satisfied by what is often portrayed as ‘normal’ by the Taleban and other Afghan conservatives.
Since the Taleban took power, Afghan women have been stripped of many of their rights. Women workers have, largely, been sent home from government offices. They are hindered from travelling and suffer an enforced a strict dress code. Oder girls have been banned from school. Public protest dwindled in the face of the new authorities’ crackdown on those they viewed as dissidents and rebels. Women’s rights activists have proven the bravest of all, but the Taleban’s response has been harsh – detaining and, reportedly, beating women protesters who had taken to the streets to demand their rights. In the face of opposition, including even some reservations within their own ranks, the Emirate has appeared determined to disappear women from public life.
In May 2022, the Taleban announced a new order imposing what they called ‘sharia hijab’ with faces to be covered and women to only leave their homes if there is a real need; it tasked their male relatives with policing them. In We need to breathe too”: Women across Afghanistan navigate the Taleban’s hijab ruling, Kate Clark and Sayeda Rahimi heard from women across Afghanistan about what the ruling meant for them and how they and their families had responded. The authors argued that dress codes might seem less consequential than other curbs on women’s freedoms, but the order was symbolic of the Emirate’s desire to turn Afghan women into entirely invisible, private citizens again.
Girls’ education
Taleban policy towards women and girls, and especially towards girls’ schools, has always been one of the prisms through which the movement has been studied – and judged – since they first came to power in the mid-nineties. One of the first things the Taleban did after they took control of Afghanistan was to close girls’ high schools. All eyes, then, were on Nawruz, the spring equinox and the start of the new school year in most provinces, with the question of whether the Taleban would allow all the nation’s schools to reopen, as they had promised.
In a series of reports in the months leading up to Nawruz, the AAN team looked at Taleban practice and policy on schooling, especially for girls. The first piece drew on research from our ‘Living under the new Taleban government’ series. Kate Clark provided a clearer picture of where Afghan children were managing to go to school, and where they are not in Who Gets to Go to School? (1): What people told us about education since the Taleban took over.
The second report in the series, Who Gets to Go to School? (2) The Taleban and education through time traced the evolution of Taleban thinking on education historically to answer the question of why the Taleban are so uneasy about girls going to school when as mullahs, they should know the value Islam places on education and literacy. Authors Kate Clark and Reza Kazemi argued that many Taleban, coming from the rural south where women generally live in purdah, feel it is wrong for girls, especially those of marriageable age, to be outside the home. Yet, their discomfort stands at odds with the attitudes of many, if not most of their compatriots. There has been a sea-change in Afghan attitudes towards school education over the last 40 years: where there have been schools, Afghan parents, in very high numbers, have been choosing to send their children, including their older girls, to get an education. Going to school has become a normal part of most Afghan children’s lives since 2001.
In the third part in this series, Who Gets to Go to School? (3): Are Taleban attitudes starting to change from within?, guest author Sabawoon Samim looked at views of girls’ education within the Taleban movement, uncovering a relatively new trend, that some Taleban are now seeking out school and even university education for their sons and their daughters. He looked at how and why a significant membership of a group that banned girls’ education when it was last in power has changed their attitude towards schooling.
On the first day of the new school year, 23 March, the Ministry of Education’s preparations to open all schools were abruptly overturned by a last-minute decision from Kandahar to keep the ban on girls’ secondary schools in place. Months of promises that they would reopen left girls, parents and teachers alike distressed. The decision had profound ramifications for aid flows to Afghanistan, for the prospects of international recognition which the Taleban aspire to, and has led international interlocuters to rethink their policies on engaging with the Emirate.
Initially, the Taleban’s justification was confused, with various officials giving different reasons for the closure, from lack of teachers to inappropriate school uniforms. Eventually, a formal announcement cited the need for a “comprehensive plan, in accordance with sharia and Afghan culture.” In The Ban on Older Girls’ Education: Taleban conservatives ascendant and a leadership in disarray, guest author Ashley Jackson pieced together what had happened behind the scenes that led to this policy reversal. From interviews with local sources, including within and those close to the Taleban, aid workers, donors and diplomats, she found that Taleban power politics lay at the heart of the u-turn.
Girls’ education remains a sensitive issue with political repercussions. It is a key demand of the Western nations that are still not only Afghanistan’s main donors, but also key players in deciding to waive or maintain sanctions, both in Washington DC and at the UN Security Council. A far more important constituency, however, are the many Afghan parents who want their children, boys and girls of all ages, to be educated.
Freedom of speech/expression, civic rights
In Music Censorship in 2021: The silencing of a nation and its cultural identity, Fabrizio Foschini traces the threats and intimidation faced by musicians since the Taleban takeover. He explores how Afghan music had flourished over the previous two decades, and how it has contributed to the burgeoning of a national identity which recognises and enjoys Afghanistan’s diverse cultural traditions. Music in Afghanistan, he argued, has a unique potential for countering communal and ethnic rifts, rifts that the Taleban themselves denounce and claim to oppose.
The Taleban takeover of Afghanistan also delivered a devastating blow to one of the Republic’s few outstanding achievements – relatively good freedom of expression and a vibrant media sector. Since the fall of the Republic, nearly half of Afghanistan’s media outlets have closed and thousands of Afghan journalists and media workers have either left the country, lost their jobs, or are in hiding, with local media outlets and female journalists bearing the brunt of the downturn.
In Regime Change, Economic Decline and No Legal Protection: What has happened to the Afghan media?, Eshan Qaane attributed the media sector’s sudden and catastrophic decline to three principal reasons: the sudden shortage of financial resources, severe Taleban restrictions on press freedom, and a fear of violence. Access to information is now severely constrained in Afghanistan, and violence against journalists continues, with the Taleban identified as the main perpetrator. There are reports of journalists being told, formally and informally, what and how to report and women TV presenters are now compelled to cover their faces on air. In some cases, those who disobeyed have been summoned, interrogated, threatened, tortured and detained.
Chapter 4: Economic collapse and the struggle to find food
Even as the Taleban celebrated their unprecedented victory on 15 August 2021, Afghanistan had been transformed. It was suddenly poorer, more isolated and extremely economically fragile. The Taleban capture of power by military force had ruptured Afghanistan’s relationship with its donors, touching off a chain of events that triggered the collapse of an economy heavily reliant on foreign aid and already weakened by conflict, pandemic and drought.
Three weeks after the Taleban victory, Hannah Duncan and Kate Clark looked at the dynamics that had pushed the Afghan economy off a cliff – the turning off of the foreign aid tap, the empty treasury and frozen foreign reserves, the collapse of the banking system, the UN and US sanctions that had applied to the Taleban now applying to the whole country, and the flight of the country’s skilled workforce. In Afghanistan’s looming economic catastrophe: What next for the Taleban and the donors?, they argued that mitigating economic disaster would require revising existing sanctions regimes and continuing aid, but cautioned that negotiations between actors who have been hostile for years – the Taleban and the donor governments – would mean navigating a legal, practical and ethical minefield.
The collapse of the Republic had caught the country’s erstwhile backers unprepared and scrambling to devise new policies for engagement with the new Afghanistan. The victorious Taleban have demonstrated that they are in no mood to accept the concessions demanded by donors in exchange for funding, especially over the rights of women and girls.
Kate Clark continued her examination of the economic repercussions of the Taleban taking over a state dependent on funding from foreign donors hostile to them in Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg: Afghanistan’s economic distress post-15 August. The report mapped out the decline of Afghanistan’s economy and the Taleban’s own economic fortunes since 15 August and looked at how, in the end, politics would decide whether the Taleban and Afghanistan’s donors could find ways – or not – to support Afghanistan’s ever-increasing poor.
Even what should have been a boon if no other existed, the end of the fighting, was wiped out by the grievous consequences of economic ruin: collapsing livestock prices, households selling their possessions, families taking children out of school to work or marrying very young daughters to men who would usually be considered unsuitable (too old, already married, or ‘strangers’) and parents of malnourished children unable to find a hospital or clinic still open. Typically, as is always the case, it has been women and girls who suffer disproportionately. When poverty strikes, they are often the last in the household to eat.
In the summer of 2021 AAN had started a new research project for ‘Living under the Taleban’ that looked into how life had changed in districts that were newly coming under Taleban control. The message from our interviewees was loud and clear: the new regime had brought many changes and much uncertainty, there was great disorientation, occasional nervous hope, but most of all, people were deeply worried about the economic collapse and the coming winter.
What was perhaps most striking from the conversations was the near complete lack of options, even for those who had been doing relatively well at some point in the past. The interviews presented a bleak blend of resilience, determination and depletion. People hoped to protect their children from harm and safeguard their future. They had aspirations for new ventures. They continued to look after others who were even worse off than themselves. And many of them were exhausted and stunned by the continuous onslaught of crisis and tragedy, every time disaster compounding disaster.
The series’ second report, Living in a Collapsed Economy (2): Even the people who still have money are struggling, mapped what the economic collapse has meant for the relatively fortunate – those who were wealthy to start with or had a diverse set of income streams, as well as those who still had a stable salary. We heard from a landlord and a relatively successful factory owner in Kabul, an NGO employee in Zabul, an extended family in Khost with a brother in Dubai, a former government employee in Badakhshan and the only ‘doctor’ in a remote area of Daikundi. It turned out that even these people were struggling. They too faced serious obstacles and setbacks and, in most cases, had to cut down on their expenses drastically. Most of them said they were no longer able to help others like they used to. Martine van Bijlert argued that the picture pointed to an unravelling of a critical part of Afghanistan’s social safety net – support provided by the relatively wealthy to others in need, within their families, neighbourhoods and communities – at a time when the country needed it most.
The series’ third instalment, Living in a Collapsed Economy (3): Surviving poverty, food insecurity and the harsh winter, provided a detailed and layered picture of the many ways Afghanistan’s economic collapse is affecting families and businesses. Martine van Bijlert and the AAN team returned to the people we had interviewed at the beginning of winter to find out how they had managed during the harsh winter months. For many, not much had changed, except that their situations had slowly worsened. Yet, despite the dispiriting hardship, most interviewees showed a remarkable determination to keep going and take care of their families and, often, their wider communities.
Van Bijlert wrote that the international focus on food aid for Afghanistan threatened to treat Afghans as a faceless and initiative-less mass, waiting to be helped. In reality, most households were doing everything they could to find marginal income and take care of each other. The problem was that the options are so very limited. Although most of our interviewees had received some form of food aid, which was much appreciated and provided a brief respite, the greater improvement in people’s lives would come only from access to income. The report underscored, once again, that Afghanistan needs more than humanitarian aid to restart its economy.
The change of regime was a moment of rupture, its aftermath the latest in a long series of upheavals that have marked the lives of most Afghans over the age of 55. For those living in rural areas, unpredictability stems not only from regime change and violent conflict, but also from drought, flooding and other natural disasters. Guest author, Adam Pain’s report, Living With Radical Uncertainty in Rural Afghanistan: The work of survival, helped deepen our understanding of how rural households attempt to survive and prosper in this ever-changing environment. He drew on lessons from a research project that traced the livelihood trajectories of rural households from 2002 to 2016. Given that rural households can rely neither on the state nor the market, he found they invested in village and household relationships. He asked whether this would be enough to get people through the latest economic shock. He also suggested a rethinking of the hitherto unsuccessful market-driven agricultural policy models for an Afghanistan that offers no long-term future opportunity for its rural households and no possibility of decent work in the urban areas domestically or regionally.
The state of the Agriculture sector
War, political upheavals and regime change are only part of the complicated dynamics that mar Afghanistan’s rural economy, but drought and regional politics also play a significant part in the fortunes of Afghan farmers.
In Crops not Watered, Fruit Rotting: Kandahar’s agriculture hit by war, drought and closed customs gates Ali Mohammad Sabawoon heard from farmers and others about the woes affecting the province, famous for its fruit production. While the end of the conflict should have meant better times for the farmers of Kandahar, as elsewhere in Afghanistan. Yet drought looked to be looming again and exporting produce has remained difficult and unreliable, with much of the fruit crop that was – or should be – destined for Pakistan and other markets further afield going to waste because of the frequent and unpredictable closure of crossings into Pakistan.
We also looked at two illicit crops, opium and cannabis, which are hugely important for the national and household economy. In March 2020, the Taleban banned the cultivation of cannabis and the production and trafficking of cannabis resin, known as hashish, in areas under their control. What now for the Taleban and Narcotics? A case study on cannabis looked at whether and how the ban was implemented using field research conducted by Fazal Muzhary before the Taleban captured power nationally. The report provided a useful context for considering future Taleban policy on this important sector of the illicit economy.
Then, seven and a half months after they took power in Afghanistan, at the beginning of the opium harvest, and at a time when Afghans across the country were suffering under the strain of economic collapse, the Taleban officially banned opium.
In The New Taleban’s Opium Ban: The same political strategy 20 years on?, Jelena Bjelica looked at the far-reaching and grievous consequences if the ban was implemented. Illegal opiates are among the few real export earners in a country where imports during the Republic had dwarfed licit exports, six to one. The illicit drug economy’s gross value in 2021, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), was estimated at between 9 and 14 per cent of the country’s GDP. Bjelica’s report probed the Taleban’s possible motives for banning opium and the similarities between this ban and the one the Taleban implemented in July 2000 when they were last in power. She argued that this ban, if implemented, would cause harm to many Afghans dependent on the illicit drugs industry, put even greater pressure on farmers and labourers already struggling to survive economically, and further dehumanise drug users put under compulsory and brutal treatments. Whether it even brings much goodwill from Afghanistan’s donors, she said, seemed doubtful; their concerns about Afghanistan’s opium cultivation are, for now, eclipsed by the Taleban’s ban on older girls going to school, their restrictive policies on women’s rights across the board and attacks on media freedom and the right to dissent.
Chapter 5: Aid after the Taleban takeover
With Afghanistan’s economy in freefall and a humanitarian catastrophe growing, donor nations came together at a virtual pledging summit, co-hosted by the United Kingdom, Germany, Qatar and the United Nations. The aim was to raise lifesaving humanitarian support for an unprecedented 22.1 million Afghans in need, as compared to 17.7 million in 2021. In A Pledging Conference for Afghanistan… But what about beyond the humanitarian? Roxanna Shapour and Kate Clark took a close look at the Humanitarian Response Plan – the UN’s largest appeal ever for a single country.
Donors were presumed to be on board with the Humanitarian Response Plan precisely because it was humanitarian, and therefore officially apolitical. Ultimately, however, the Taleban’s decision, made just before the conference began, to keep older girls out of school, derailed the funding drive and pledges came in at USD 2.4 billion, well short of the United Nations’ USD 4.4 billion target, although still sizeable.
A major focus of the international humanitarian response to Afghanistan’s economic collapse has been a ramped-up distribution of food aid, as large parts of the population no longer have the income to buy enough food for their families. Food Aid in a Collapsed Economy: Relief, tensions and allegations was the fourth instalment of our economic research based on interviews conducted across Afghanistan.
In this report, Martine van Bijlert and the AAN team looked at the reach, scope and implications of food aid distribution at the community and household levels and found that around half of the families we interviewed had, by mid-February, received some form of food assistance at least once. This was a testament to the determination and hard work of countless NGO employees, community members, government civil servants and UN staff, often under extremely difficult circumstances.
While our interviewees were grateful for the much-needed help and hoped it would continue, they also expressed recurring concerns that those who needed aid the most might not be receiving it. They described favouritism and interference in the selection of beneficiaries and, to a lesser extent, corruption and capture.
Most people reported that they and their communities were stretched far beyond their usual coping mechanisms. Many had depleted what reserves or options to borrow or sell they might have had. Food aid allowed them to feed their families, something at least, even if only for a short time, but Afghans desperately need their economy to restart, the government and its salaries to become dependable, and conditions for small businesses to improve.
However, while the Taleban continue to snub calls from Western capitals to respect human rights, including the rights of Afghan girls and women, and while they fear that funding will help strengthen the regime, donor countries have found it difficult to know what to do for the best to help Afghans.
In Donors’ Dilemma: How to provide aid to a country whose government you do not recognise, Roxanna Shapour looked at engagement between the donors and the Taleban, what the future of aid to Afghanistan might look like, how donors might reconcile their demands with the Taleban’s increasing restrictions on civic life, and what mechanisms exist that might allow for non-humanitarian assistance. She argued that what might at face value appear to be mixed messages from donors actually reveal real quandaries and complexities. While donors feel the need to respond to Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crises, they also want respect for human rights and security guarantees. The Taleban, for their part, are ambitious for international legitimacy, but have shown no inclination to concede anything to donors or, indeed, the demands of their own people.
Against this precarious backdrop, Western donors and diplomats have been left trying to answer tough policy questions and take difficult funding decisions. The strategy decided upon has been to funnel development and what has become known as ‘humanitarian plus’ aid largely via the World Bank’s multilateral trust fund to UN agencies and then to NGOs. The aim is to help Afghans and not help the Emirate, but the dangers are many – that the Taleban are inevitably strengthened as this policy frees up their own resources, that it creates parallel structures to government and is wasteful, with money going to headquarters costs and more expensive foreign and Afghan salaries.
Climate change
The change of regime has also affected the struggle to get money to help Afghanistan survive climate change. The Paris Climate Agreement recognises that the climate crisis has been caused by developed countries and requires them to compensate poor countries for the effects of climate change. Afghanistan, one of the lowest emitters of greenhouse gases but among the top ten countries most vulnerable to climate change, is suffering out of all proportion to the contribution they have made to damaging the planet’s atmosphere and climate.
In two reports, Global Warming and Afghanistan: Drought, hunger and thirst expected to worsen and The Climate Change Crisis in Afghanistan: The catastrophe worsens – what hope for action?, guest author Mohammad Assem Mayarlooked at how the climate catastrophe is already upon Afghanistan, evident in the increased frequency of droughts which cause hunger and distress and which are likely to become more frequent. He considered what the Republic did – or did not do – to reduce the harmful effects of global warming and finally discussed how climate change could be tackled under Taleban rule, now that Afghanistan is poorer, more isolated and cut off from global climate crisis funds aimed at helping poorer countries.
Out-Migration
Finally, AAN also looked at some of those trying to leave, focussing on the Afghans in Turkey. It has long been a destination itself and an important point along the transit route to Europe for Afghan migrants attempting to enter the European Union through its sea and land borders to Greece and Bulgaria. An increasing number of Afghans fleeing persecution or trying to find better economic opportunities have arrived in Turkey.
In the first instalment of a two-part report, Refugees or Ghosts? Afghans in Turkey face growing uncertainty Fabrizio Foschini looked at the worsening political and economic environment there, and at the bureaucratic hurdles that mean most Afghans in Turkey are undocumented. With its own unprecedented economic crisis, the climate has become increasingly hostile for Afghans.
Then, in Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: No good options for Afghans travelling to and from Turkey, Foschini explored how and where Afghans are living in Istanbul, their role in Turkey’s economy and how they are perceived in Turkish society. Through the voices of those interviewed, he looked at the difficulties of travelling to Turkey and when trying to move on, given that both Turkish security forces and those of neighbouring European Union countries have tightened their control of borders.
Conclusion
Like everyone else trying to report on what has been a momentous year for Afghanistan, AAN has had to struggle and persevere in trying to reflect the experiences of Afghans across the country, make sense of everything that has happened, and think about what this means for the future of the country and its people. We remain committed to producing analysis that is independent, of high quality and research-based and, as the second year of the Taleban’s second Emirate begins, of being bi-taraf but not bi-tafawut – impartial, but never indifferent.
AAN Dossier XXXI was compiled by Roxanna Shapour and edited by Kate Clark
All maps by Roger Helms
REVISIONS:
This article was last updated on 13 Aug 2022
Transition to a New Political Order: AAN dossier takes stock of Afghanistan’s momentous year
During their long and ultimately successful insurgency, the Taleban, like their foreign enemies, were faced with choices over battlefield tactics, between military effectiveness and trying to win over, or at least not alienate, local people. As insurgents, the Taleban were up against well-drilled foreign forces with advanced weaponry and a monopoly on air power, but little local knowledge. This situation drove the Taleban to turn to IEDs, one major type of which, the pressure-plate IED (PPIEDs, or victim-detonated IEDs), had been banned in 1998 by then Taleban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, who called them inhuman and unIslamic. This report by guest author Sabawoon Samim* (with input from Kate Clark) looks into the Taleban’s use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), even after the ban ordered by Mullah Omar. Highly effective against the enemy, they were probably also the leading killer of civilians of any weapon by any party during the conflict. Yet, like the foreign forces, which eventually realised that civilian casualties were hurting their war effort, the Taleban political leadership also pondered the use of IEDs and attempted, albeit half-heartedly, to stop their use.
An explosives specialist conducts mine clearance operations after detecting a piece of metal in Afghanistan. Photo: UNMAS/Cengiz Yar,
As the Taleban slowly re-mobilised following their 2001 defeat, they faced a very different enemy from the Northern Alliance – although those who had fought against the Soviet army in the 1980s would have had that earlier experience of fighting a superpower’s army to draw upon. The fight against the Northern Alliance had involved, for both sides, frontlines, artillery, limited access to air power and amassing fighters to assault or defend, as well as efforts to entice the enemy to switch sides and civilians to switch support. By contrast, as insurgents, the Taleban faced well-armed, well-drilled professional military forces with a monopoly on airstrikes. The question, then, was how to fight successfully against the foreign backers of the new Afghan government.
The Taleban’s battle against the well-equipped and well-trained international forces was initially through small-scale guerrilla attacks against government and international targets, using road mines, deploying small squads to capture police and army check posts, trying to persuade locals to join the ‘jihad’ and, gradually, pushing to capture villages. However, as the international military deployment grew after the mid-2000s, particularly because of the formidable air power facing them, the Taleban’s small numbers and small local operations proved insufficient to take and defend territory (see, for example, this article by Theo Farrell). In those early years, the Taleban took up several controversial tactics, including within their own ranks. These included beheadings (dropped early on), suicide bombings (adopted and used continuously during the insurgency and valorised even after the Taleban captured power) and IEDs.
Beheadings of those considered the enemy were adopted as a gruesome way to kill someone and thereby spread fear (see, for example, this Islamic Affairs Analyst’s paper). They were particularly associated with Mullah Dadullah who, along with Mullah Omar, was the first Taleb to publically call for armed jihad against the new government and the foreign forces in early 2003. Dadullah brought his Emirate-era reputation as a brutal but effective frontline commander and, in the early years of the insurgency, was seen as part of the group that had adopted ‘al-Qaeda tactics’, which included beheadings (see this AAN report). The inspiration may have come from Iraq, from where ‘kill videos’ featuring beheadings travelled to Afghanistan in the form of DVDs, encouraging the Taleban, some reports said, to make their own (see, the Islamic Affairs Analyst paper cited above).However, the tactic did not spread much beyond Dadullah, largely disappearing after his death, although there were also later, fairly isolated incidents of beheadings.[1] According to some media reports, the Taleban leader Mullah Omar ordered a ban on this practice in 2008, a year after Dadullah’s death. There were also reports that the Taleban leadership was unhappy not only with his use of beheadings but also another – for Afghanistan – novel tactic, suicide bombings.[2]
The first known suicide bombing in Afghanistan was carried out by two Arab members of al-Qaeda in September 2001 in a lethal attack on the Northern Alliance military leader Ahmad Shah Massud. In 2002, a failed suicide bomb in Kabul was thought to be connected to al-Qaeda rather than Afghans, as was a successful suicide bombing of coalition forces in 2003, which killed three German soldiers. In January 2004, a suicide attack targeted a British forces vehicle in Kabul, which a man claiming to be a Taleban spokesman asserted was perpetrated by a 28-year-old Palestinian (See this RFEl report). Meanwhile, for the first time, in January 2004, an Afghan suicide bomber is known to have blown himself up in an attack targeting a vehicle of the international coalition.[3]
Initially, the idea of suicide bombings caused disquiet and revulsion among many Taleban because of the explicit Quranic order not to kill oneself. Against this, some Muslims have countered that self-sacrifice in the cause of armed jihad is not just permissible, but the best way one can end life. This thinking became the orthodoxy among the Taleban, with suicide bombers established as an everyday ‘weapon’ during the insurgency, and would-be bombers making ‘martyrdom videos’ following training and before ‘deployment’. They have remained a feature of the army of the Emirate even though they are now in power; see, for example, reporting in The New York Times and as Taleban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahed said on 6 January 2022, “Our mujahidin who are martyrdom brigades will also be part of the army, but they will be special forces.” (as quoted by The London Times).
A brief history of IEDs in Afghanistan
Another type of weapon, the anti-personnel landmine, however, which was used daily during the insurgency and had a longer history than suicide bombings or beheadings, is the subject of this report. These had been used by all parties, governments, armed groups and foreign forces fighting in Afghanistan pre-2001, although after that, the international forces and the Afghan National Army did not use them. They were a familiar weapon to the Taleban and indeed every Afghan. Everyone was fully aware of the costs and consequences of these weapons: according to an estimate by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, as of 1999, landmines had disabled more than 400,000 people in Afghanistan, and until 1993, had killed or injured 20 to 24 people every day. According to Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority officials, landmines are still killing and injuring 120 Afghans every month. (see this Pajhwok report). However, what made anti-personnel landmines potentially controversial, and at least questionable for the insurgents, was not the cost they extracted from civilians, but the fact that Taleban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar had banned them during the first Emirate.
This happened on 6 October 1998, when the Emirate issued a statement signed by Mullah Omar “strongly supporting” the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty of 1997, with “a total ban on the production, trade, stockpiling and use of landmines.” It said they had made a “commitment to the suffering people of Afghanistan and the international community that the IEA [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] would never make any use of any type of landmines.” Omar called them “un-Islamic” and “inhuman.”
The Ottawa Treaty (article 2.1) bans anti-personnel mines that are “designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” In other words, the type of mines banned are those which are victim-activated and cannot discriminate between combatants and civilians, making them an inherent violation of a key principle of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that obliges all parties to a conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians and to protect the latter.[4] Remote-controlled mines (RCIEDs), which are ‘command-detonated’, are not banned because they can be targeted. The treaty also does not ban anti-vehicle mines, often known as anti-tank mines, designed to destroy or disable vehicles. These contain more explosives than anti-personnel mines and typically require more pressure or weight to detonate. If they have sensitive fuses and function like anti-personnel mines, their use is also banned by the treaty (more information in this Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor article). Omar’s words, however, appear to have banned all types of anti-personnel mines, whether victim-detonated or remote-operated.
For Mullah Omar, who was a veteran of the anti-Soviet war, decreeing anti-personnel mines to be illegal may have been driven by his lived experience of the harm they had done to both civilians and comrades during that war. However, the fact that the Taleban were at that time the de facto government of most of the country and on the offensive might also have encouraged his ruling. Anti-personnel mines were of limited use in the war against the Northern Alliance, given that the Taleban were on the front foot. They were much more useful for the retreating Northern Alliance. Denouncing them as illegal paid tribute to the many civilians who had historically suffered from landmines, put the Emirate on the moral high ground vis-a-vis President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Islamic State, and brought the Emirate in line with most countries internationally: banning them looked good and demonstrated that the Taleban were an accountable and responsible government, all with little military cost.
Mines had been used by the Soviet army during its nine-year occupation and then by the mujahedin who, according to Laster Grau, first recycled the Soviet mines and then began to manufacture their own explosive devices. Many years later, when the insurgency began, the Taleban also used remnant mines from the Soviet era. After 2006-07, when the insurgency was becoming more widespread, the Taleban began manufacturing more complex and destructive forms of IEDs.[5]
Internal debate gives way to IEDs as a weapon of choice – and to soaring civilian casualties
21 interviews, all conducted during the insurgency between March and June 2021, with a mix of Taleb and local civilian interviewees, point to a debate within the Taleban on the use of pressure-plate IEDs.[6] There was a discussion on whether to use this weapon, given ethical concerns about the harm it poses to civilians. Some considered landmines illegal, such as this Islamic scholar affiliated with the Taleban from the Giro district of Ghazni province who said in an interview in March 2021:
The use of things such as mines that are harmful to ordinary people is prohibited in sharia. If someone [civilian] is killed by a mine, and the mine is placed by the order of the Amir, they must give his family diyat (blood money).
Others came up with sharia-based justifications for their use of what Mullah Omar had declared to be an illegal device, driven by its military effectiveness, as a Taleban IED specialist from Helmand province explained in March 2021:
If it was called haram then [in 1998], it was because there were no invaders, no tanks, no drones, but now there is everything. And we need to kick them out and bring in an Islamic system. It’s therefore permitted in sharia because, without using such tactics, it will be impossible to bring an Islamic order to the country and kick out the infidels.
Whatever the ethics of the matter, IEDs became the Taleban’s weapon of choice and were used on a large scale until the very end of the insurgency. In 2010, the Taleban carried out 7,000 IED attacks in a single year.[7] Their use peaked in 2011, when the group’s IED attacks increased, according to a US Army report, to 1,600 in just two months of that year. Civilian casualties soared. Since UNAMA began systematically documenting civilian casualties in 2008, as published in its Annual Reports on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, IEDs were usually the main killer of civilians (in all the years between 2008 and 2013 and in 2021), or the second most deadly (from 2014 to 2016 and 2019 to 2020) or the third (2017 and 2018). Although all types of IEDs caused civilian casualties, pressure-plate IEDs accounted for the majority of these casualties because of their explosive force, indiscriminate detonation and widespread use (see the table below). According to one Taleban fighter interviewed for this report, in March 2021, the group had plenty of IED ‘engineers’ by then: “We have on average five to six IED makers in our local groups – each of which are 20 to 30 fighters strong.”
Source: UNAMA Protection of Civilian Casualties Reports from 2008 to 2021 (see here).
In the initial years of the insurgency, the Taleban mostly relied on remote and wire-command IEDs. However, since these needed human operators – who were easily detected by NATO – over time, the Taleban shifted to pressure-plate IEDs. They were less risky for the Taleban’s own forces, but much more dangerous for civilians as they explode automatically when any person steps on them, or if less sensitive, when any vehicle drives over them.
For the Taleban, IEDs, especially pressure-plate IEDs, made military sense. They put their fighters in less danger than confronting either foreign or Afghan government forces directly and were an effective weapon in an asymmetric conflict against better-armed forces who had a monopoly on air power. In 2009, 2010 and 2011, IEDs caused about half of all United States troop casualties (45.5 per cent, 51.5 per cent and 43.8 per cent respectively), according to Brookings, leading NATO to launch a counter-IED campaign. NATO troops, the Inter-Press Service news agency reported, spent over 18 billion dollars on this. Despite its efforts, the Taleban’s IED campaign was a significant factor in their resilience and ultimate capture of power.
IEDs and the need not to alienate local support
The initial reason for the Taleban using IEDs was to counterbalance the international and Afghan government forces’ better weaponry and, especially their monopoly on air power, to secure footholds of territory. As long as the tactic proved successful on the battlefield, the Taleban’s use of landmines, widespread and indiscriminate, continued. Eventually, however, other considerations began to emerge.
As the insurgency gained momentum in the early 2010s, the Taleban, at least on a leadership level, became concerned that the insurgency was unwinnable without local support. “Even though the population is often unable to stand up to the Taleban,” as an AAN report in 2011 argued, “in this war, winning the support of local people is seen as crucial – for all sides.” (See page 18 of AAN report on the Taleban Layha or code of conduct.) While the leadership was aware that civilian lives could not be saved entirely (as is always the case in war even when all parties follow IHL), for pragmatic reasons, ie keeping local support, they wanted to reduce civilian harm.
The Taleban never recognised the IHL definition of a civilian as a non-combatant, insisting, for example, that government officials and buildings, clearly civilian under IHL principles, were legitimate targets. Rather, they spoke about the need to protect the ‘common people’. Even so, this protection was not across the board. In their suicide attacks in Kabul, for example, insurgents deliberately attacked purely civilian targets that were not even connected to the government, such as hotels and restaurants. They also attacked government and military targets without regard for passers-by and other civilians inevitably killed and injured. They appeared to regard those living in areas under their control, or potential control, whom they regarded as the ‘common people’ – potential supporters – as worthy of some protection, whereas others, including some urban populations, appeared to be considered low status and entirely unworthy of protection.
Even so, their revised Layha or code of conduct issued in 2010 was marked by a change of tone. It ordered: “…all mujahedin [Taleban] with all their power must be careful with regard to the lives of the common people and their property…” (See page 21 of AAN’s report on the Layha). As to “the general ‘hearts and minds’ policy of the Taleban,” the AAN report continued, it “is summed up in article 78”:
Mujahedin are obliged to adopt Islamic behaviour and good conduct with the people and try to win over the hearts of the common Muslims and, as mujahedin, be such representatives of the Islamic Emirate that all compatriots shall welcome and give the hand of cooperation and help.”
The report argued that a major focus of the Layha was to “restrict the worst brutalities of Taleban fighters: not all methods of warfare would be acceptable.” This was also suggested in another analysis of the Layha which concluded that it was intended, among other reasons, to ensure that “jihadist operations do not negatively impact the Taleban’s public support.”[8] Following the announcement of their spring operation in 2011, Mullah Omar again declared to his fighters that “strict attention must be paid to the protection and safety of civilians during the spring operations by working out a meticulous military plan.[9]
Pressure had been coming from the communities in the Taleban’s rural strongholds from which they recruited fighters, where they felt they enjoyed a large measure of public support and sought refuge and shelter, and where their IEDs were causing the greatest harm. The deaths and injuries to civilians caused by Taleban IEDs were tarnishing the Taleban’s image locally and precipitating criticism in their heartland. The casualties were also sparking widespread condemnation in both the local and international media, human rights groups, UNAMA and presumably behind the scenes, also, the International Committee of the Red Cross. Partly in response to this pressure, the Taleban leadership began to engage in dialogue with a range of political and diplomatic figures, including UNAMA, who were keen to get Taleban policy on IHL, including the group’s use of the indiscriminate pressure-plate IEDs, changed.
UN reporting on civilian casualties was seen, wrote Jackson and Amiri in a 2019 USIP report on Taleban policy-making, as particularly problematic for the Taleban:
On August 15, 2010, the Taliban released a public statement in response to UN civilian casualties reporting. They proposed a joint commission to investigate civilian casualties, comprising members of the “Islamic Conference, UN’s human rights organizations as well as representatives from ISAF forces and Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” The UN publicly responded that it would be willing to engage in dialogue with the Taliban if it were “premised on a demonstration of genuine willingness to reduce civilian casualties.” This exchange eventually led to the creation of a private channel of dialogue between the Taliban and the United Nations.
In June 2013, the Taleban announced the establishment of a commission for civilian complaints casualties, sitting within the military commission, to investigate incidents caused by all sides in the conflict. It actively supplied UNAMA with information and complaints.
The Taleban, stung by UNAMA’s annual ranking of their fighters as causing the most deaths and injuries to civilians in the conflict, were certainly engaging in a propaganda battle, accusing UNAMA of partisanship, and putting the ‘real blame’ on foreign forces. But were they actually also engaged in trying to reduce their own civilian casualties?
In October 2012, the Taleban issued an open letter to UNAMA about civilian casualties in which they denied that their fighters used ‘live mines’, a reference to pressure-plate IEDs. The Taleban stated that their fighters, “never place live landmines in any part of the country, but each mine is controlled by a remote and detonated on military targets only.” (see the text of the letter in this article – original link not working) The question always was whether such denials represented anything more than words, ie was there any shift in battlefield tactics to try to protect civilians?
Internal debates on pressure-plate IEDs
It seems that at a senior level, the political leadership was convinced of the need to take practical steps to protect civilians in order not to alienate local people – the political leadership here meaning the supreme leader, chief of justice, heads of civilian commissions, and at a lower level, provincial governors and other civilian officials. However, this only happened when the movement was in a relatively better military position, in 2012. That year, according to Antonio Giustozzi: “the Rahbari [leadership] Shura ordered a suspension of the mine campaign to prevent losing political capital among the communities.”[10] What exactly happened, though, is confusing.
Giustozzi reported that the Military Commission did not accept the suspension, so only village-level fronts and governor groups obeyed the order. Furthermore, he said that about six months after the ban, the Taleban in the south began to receive Iranian-made remote-control mines, which could be targeted effectively, and this prompted the Rahbari Shura to lift the suspension. However, a senior Taleban source described to the author how the need for a ban on pressure-plate IEDs had been raised that year by several senior leaders and that the remaining leadership approved it. “There was a ban,” the source said, but it was not issued as “a direct order from Mullah Omar.” He said Omar’s then deputy and successor, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur, who took over effectively in April 2013, but officially only from July 2015 after Omar’s death was belatedly announced, had been “among those leaders strongly lobbying to stop using pressure-plate IEDs.” Members of the military commission, though, the source said, were “not in a position to accept an outright ban and proposed instead that pressure-plate mines should continue to be used but that they should be laid more carefully.” Another senior official involved in the discussion gave a similar explanation:
Some mashran [leaders] were against the [use of] pressure-plates and were determined to place a ban on them. After discussing the issue with us [the military commission], however, we told them our reasons why we couldn’t just stop using them completely. We suggested that only in exceptional circumstances, after completely ensuring that civilians wouldn’t be hurt, would we use them. We didn’t reach a conclusion. They insisted on the ban and continued [publicising] it, and we went on with using pressure-plates in very limited circumstances.
Interviews with Taleban fighters suggest an order banning pressure-plate IEDs was disseminated, or at least known about. One fighter from the Nad Ali district of Helmand province, for example, interviewed said: “Pressure-plate mines were banned by our leaders a long time ago. In April 2021, our Amir ul-Muminen told us not to use these types of mines because they cause civilian casualties.” Another Taleban commander from Ghazni province explained how they had used landmines in Ghazni province:
We were told [by senior commanders] that we could only use pressure-plate IEDs in a few exceptional situations. If a road or area was completely free of civilians and we and the enemy [Afghan security forces] were the only ones concerned, then we were allowed to use them. Last year [1400/2021], we used heavy pressure-plate IEDs in Arzu [an area in Ghazni city] to fight because civilians were totally evacuated from there. We also used them on the Qarbagh road after we’d damaged some parts of the road to ensure that civilians couldn’t pass on it. Apart from these exceptions, pressure-plate IEDs weren’t allowed. Our friends used wire command mines more, connecting a five-hundred-metre-long wire and detonating the mine through it.
On the ground, however, any drive to completely cease their use was neither consistent nor sustained. The battlefield priorities of the military wing weighed too heavily on the leadership.
Actual battlefield tactics were shaped by local commanders rather than the political leadership. Even though the political leadership may have wanted to assert control, ensure discipline and move on with a more population-centric strategy, it was also aware that the rank and file would not tolerate too much pressure. Fighters were excessively sensitive when it came to being told what to do on the battlefield, as a Helmandi commander told the author in early April 2021: “If they are ordering such things [the ban on pressure-plate IEDs], then they themselves should fight. We cannot fight on those terms. They aren’t aware of our situation on the battlefield.” The military commission and senior commanders did have more influence on the battlefield, but they were often not convinced of the need to ban pressure-plate IEDs either.
Given the effectiveness of this type of weapon against the enemy and the limited alternatives available, it is perhaps not surprising that Taleban fighters remained hostile to any ban. Meanwhile, the political wing continued to brief that there was a ban and the use of pressure-plate IEDs had ceased. Except for a few exceptions, they attempted to explain away their use by saying they had been laid by local rogue commanders or that they would investigate.
It may have been sensitivity over pressure-plate IEDs, as well as continuing claims of an official ban that led to most attacks using this weapon going unclaimed. In 2016, for instance, the Taleban only claimed responsibility for 49 pressure-plate incidents out of a total of 560 incidents documented by UNAMA. In 2017, they claimed responsibility for only 22 out of 482 UNAMA-documented incidents. It was an indication that the group’s media arm thought it better to remain silent.
Many Taleban commanders also denied accusations that their IEDs caused any harm to civilians or at least insisted that if they did, they were not responsible. They asserted that the claims were disinformation pushed by Kabul and the media, as a commander from Maidan Wardak province explained:
It’s all government propaganda. Our mines do not kill or injure civilians; civilians are not our targets. It is the fatwa [order] of our Amir ul-Muminen that it is not a problem to target whoever is in front of infidels and is sheltering [the ANSF].
The idea that the civilians themselves were responsible if they happened to be harmed by IEDs because they were ‘sheltering’ enemy combatants looks like an attempt to deflect blame. Yet it might have been this sort of thinking that allowed local Taleban fighters to assure their superiors – and themselves – that their IEDs only ‘occasionally’ killed or injured civilians. Mullah Omar, however, appeared to have been aware of this issue, saying in his 2011 Eid message:
If civilian casualties are caused in IED strikes, martyrdom attacks and other operations but the Mujahedin of the area repudiate these allegations while all testimonials and evidence point otherwise then all the suspects should be forwarded to the legal offices.
He went on: “If the same officials persist in their neglectfulness in relation to civilian casualties then more Islamic penalties should be handed out, in addition to his termination from post” (see this AAN report).
Enacting the ban – or not
On the battlefield – the Afghan countryside – the Taleban’s use of pressure-plate IEDs continued. Indeed, according to UNAMA’s 2012 annual report, when the ban was supposedly established, the use of landmines actually increased slightly as that year wore on. Most of the IEDs that were known about, UNAMA said, were victim-activated, with pressure-plate IEDs being the most common. It quoted ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) data that there was no statistically significant difference in the type of IEDs used between 2011 and 2012. “Approximately 70 percent of IEDs remain victim-activated,” it said. Moreover, victim-activated IEDs were most widely used in the southern provinces, where, UNAMA said, “they constitute the vast majority of IEDs used.” In the year of the reported ban, Taleban IEDs caused 2,531 civilian casualties – 868 deaths and 1,663 people injured.
UNAMA was sceptical about Taleban intentions. Certainly, they were speaking more about protecting civilians: 25 of the Taleban’s 53 public statements issued in 2012, UNAMA said, concerned civilian casualties or human rights protection. The Taleban had made a public commitment to protect civilians, denied using pressure-plate IEDs and sometimes asserted that they had taken specific measures to protect civilians in certain attacks. The 2012 Protection of Civilians annual report said:
UNAMA observed a shift in the Taliban’s public messages regarding attacks against Government officials with a greater emphasis on targeting of military objects and promoting ‘insider attacks’. This apparent shift may reflect a heightened awareness by Taliban leadership of a need to both show and address public concern for protection of Afghan civilians and support for a wider political objective related to the peace process and winning Afghan “hearts and minds.”
However, UNAMA added: “While Taliban statements calling on its members to protect civilians are welcome, the situation on the ground has not changed. The Taliban increased their direct targeting of civilians through targeted killings and continued to indiscriminately use IEDs including illegal pressure-plate victim-activated IEDs.”
The following year, however, the number of civilians killed and injured by pressure-plate IEDs did fall, and quite considerably. UNAMA reported that this weapon killed and injured 39 per cent fewer civilians in 2013 than in 2012 (although that still meant a total of 557 civilian casualties, 245 deaths and 312 injured). Those watching the war did wonder if the Taleban had finally implemented an effective ban, for example, AAN’s Kate Clark:
[In 2013], there were some small signs of improvement in Taleban tactics: the number of civilians killed in suicide and complex attacks while still high – 15 per cent of all civilian casualties, ie 255 deaths and 982 injuries – were 18 per cent less than in 2012, even as the number of attacks remained similar. A sign perhaps of better targeting? Taleban orders also led to a decrease in the use of pressure-plate IEDs which are completely indiscriminate, being detonated as easily by a child stepping on them as an armoured vehicle driving across. This move follows a great deal of criticism, not least from UNAMA.
Unfortunately, said UNAMA, casualties from the now more often used remote-controlled IEDs had risen, often because the operator had not taken enough care to protect civilians. In any case, the following year, 2014, the numbers killed and injured by pressure-plate IEDs recovered: UNAMA reported a 39 per cent increase compared to 2013.
After the ISAF withdrawal
Interviewees have suggested that after the withdrawal of ISAF in 2014, rank-and-file Taleban fighters and commanders themselves took some steps to reduce civilian harm. Some local Taleban commanders began increasingly informing local people where they had planted IEDs, and in many cases, they blocked civilian access to mined roads. In Ghazni province, for example, local Taleban were announcing in local mosques that they had lined a road with IEDs and ordering people not to use that road. One Taleban fighter said:
Whenever we plant mines on highways, we block the road. We tell the people in nearby villages; we announce in the mosques and on loudspeakers that the road is blocked. Whoever goes on it and gets killed, it is their fault, because they are informed of mines.
Similarly, after the Taleban mined sections of the Kabul-Kandahar highway, a resident of Maidan Wardak province, interviewed in late March 2021, said they informed the surrounding population: “For the past two years, the Taleban ordered local villagers not to go on the road because we [the Taleban] planted IEDs there. They were telling people to use alternative routes.” A resident of Zurmat district in Paktia Province made similar comments:
The Taleban once blocked our road with IEDs. They told people living nearby not to go on the road and wrote ‘Mainuna di’ [there are IEDs] on the walls. They also put noticeable stones on many parts of the road for anyone who had not heard about the closure. The Taleban also told some people who had farmland nearby to stop people using It [the road].
A commander from Zurmat district, now holding a job in the provincial police, said once the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) became their primary enemy,[11] Taleban thinking changed:
In the time of the Americans, after we were told they were coming for operations, we’d encircle more than a dozen of villages with fishari mines [pressure-plate IEDs] and weren’t telling locals [about them] because of jasusan [informers]. They often targeted ordinary people and even our own comrades, but once the Americans were gone, we were good enough at fighting the Afghan army, and also to decrease the harm to locals, we didn’t use mines in the villages.
Another Taleban interviewee said which mine they used depended on the enemy: “We were told by our [senior] commander that we can use them [pressure-plate IEDs] when Americans and [Afghan] Special Forces w coming for operations. We only used those mines [pressure-plates] after our spies told us that there was an American and commando operation.” In normal situations, he said, they mostly used remote and wire-commanded IEDs, along with mobile-call-activate IEDs. He said he did not, personally, know of any formal bans on pressure-plate IEDs.
In some cases, as our interviews revealed, Taleban fighters hid their use of pressure-plate IEDs from the leadership because of their sensitivity. For example, a Taleban source told the author that a commander had laid pressure-plate IEDs on both sides of the Paktika-Ghazni highway from 2018 onwards, without informing the leadership. The Taleban source said that in April 2021, a visiting Taleban delegation travelled along the road and heard about the use of pressure-plate IEDs. They warned him that planting such devices again could end his career in the Taleban.
Some of the variations in use were geographic. In the Nad Ali district of Helmand province, for instance, the vast majority of IEDs used, according to interviewees, were pressure-plate IEDs per the order of the district’s senior commander. (In 2017, according to UNAMA, half of the civilian fatalities from pressure-plate IEDs were in the southern three provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan.[12]) In other provinces of Afghanistan, such as Paktia and Ghazni, either their use was ceased, or local commanders took measures to save civilians from harm. It may be that in these areas, local communities were stronger and more organised vis-à-vis the insurgents and could mobilise to demand better protection.[13]
Also possibly contributing to a change of tactics at this point in the conflict more generally was that, after the ISAF withdrawal and the decision by President Barak Obama not to target the Taleban, the insurgents went on the offensive, trying to capture more and more territory. When the ANSF began to re-take territory, Taleban tactics changed accordingly. In 2015, there was a decline in the civilian casualties caused by IEDs generally, but again an increase in those caused by pressure-plate IEDs, reported UNAMA, a further 35 per cent increase compared to the previous year (1,051 civilian casualties, 459 deaths and 592 injured).
The increase in civilian casualties from pressure-plate IEDs stems from the growing use of these devices by Anti-Government Elements as a defensive weapon to slow or prevent advancement of Afghan security forces before, during and after ground engagements. UNAMA documented multiple incidents of pressure-plate IED detonations in civilian agricultural areas, footpaths, public roads and other public areas frequented by civilians. These IEDs killed and maimed civilians as they went about their daily lives, traveling between villages and grazing livestock.
The final years of the Republic
UNAMA statistics show that 2012 was the peak year for civilian fatalities from IEDs, and after that, they declined until 2019 and 2020. In those two years, IEDs were the second most effective tactic used by the Taleban against the Afghan National Army (ANA) after direct fires (see page 19 of this 2020 US Department of Defence report to Congress). 2021 would have been the worst year for IED use and civilian casualties by a long way if the war had continued at the same intensity until December.
In those last years of the insurgency, IEDs again became a highly effective weapon against government forces, extremely intimidating for the ANA and resulted in some major defeats. Since the reinforcement of ANA bases in areas of conflict was mostly carried out by road, given the lack of sufficient air power, Taleban IEDs managed to cut off most of the reinforcement routes by lining roads with enormous IEDs. An ANA commander in Maidan Wardak province told AAN in early April 2021:
The Taleban’s mines block our reinforcement routes. Many of our bases and even district centres fall to them due to this blockage of reinforcements because with that you can’t fight for too long. Last week, a base fell to the Taleban in the Sheikhabad area after they blocked the road by planting mines. Reinforcements and ammunition did not reach [the base], and after one week under siege, they left the base with everything inside and retreated to our base in the night.
An ANA commander from Zabul described to the author in April 2021 interview what it was like facing IEDs:
Mines are the hidden enemy. You wouldn’t know[what has just happened], but you see the limbs of your friends in the air. In the war with the Taleban, mine detection and protecting your life from them is the most difficult task we deal with. It causes us to slow down our operation and at the same time, they [the Taleban] often attack us. Our mine detectors are also targeted by the Taleban snipers during detection operations, and that is a huge loss for us. I can say that if the Taleban didn’t use mines, they could be defeated in the war.
How to weigh up the Taleban’s use of pressure-plate IEDs?
The leadership did recognise that particular brutal or ‘unnecessary’ violence could alienate the population. Civilian interviewees, asked years later about the Taleban of the early insurgency, described a movement that became less brutal. They cited the insurgents stopping beheading people as a terror tactic, reducing the number of extra-judicial killings in their areas, and that they now placed IEDs more carefully. A resident of Sayedabad district in Wardak province, interviewed in March 2021, for example, referred to such changes in tactics and attitudes towards civilians and said the Taleban “were very brutal in their first years, but now they have become [more] human.” The leadership also sometimes removed or disarmed commanders if they had been particularly harsh, presumably because they caused a backlash. For example, in 2018, a notoriously ruthless commander in the Yahyakhel district of Paktika province was replaced because his extremely hard attitude toward people in his home district had prompted criticism of the movement as a whole. He was only moved sideways, appointed as the supervisor of the Taleban ‘hideouts’, the houses for injured fighters, madrasas and so on, in Peshawar, Pakistan.
Taleban leadership concerns over civilian harm from IEDs stemmed from the damage they were doing to the Taleban’s overall war effort and the movement’s reputation. Those concerns mirrored similar worries felt by the senior US military leadership over their forces killing and injuring large numbers of Afghan civilians in air strikes, search operations and escalation of force situations when, for example, civilians driving ‘too fast’ towards checkpoints were killed too swiftly. General Stanley McChrystal, commander of ISAF and US forces in Afghanistan, 2009-10, and his successors began to prioritise reducing civilian harm seriously. The number of civilians killed and injured by foreign forces fell dramatically as they put in place new rules of engagement, better investigation and reporting and pre-deployment training (see AAN reporting from 2012 and this 2016 report from Open Society Foundations).
There were many differences in Taleban efforts to reduce their use of pressure-plate IEDs. The Taleban senior leadership were aware of the need to keep rural communities onside and to present the Emirate as competent and fair, a government-in-waiting, both to international audiences and other Afghans. Yet, they were either unable to control Taleban fighters and commanders on the ground or greatly influence the military commission. Another contrast is the US impetus to reduce civilian harm which had come from the US military leadership. On the Taleban side, it had come from political figures, not those in charge of the war effort. US and other foreign soldiers did complain that the changed rules of engagement which gave far greater priority to the protection of civilians, inevitably led to greater risk to their lives. Nonetheless, they, largely obeyed orders. Moreover, unlike foreign armies, there was no single clear command about pressure-plate IEDs for the Taleban to obey; instead a continuing difference of opinion prevailed at the highest levels. A direct order from Mullah Omar would have carried more weight with the rank-and-file and their commanders, but it did not come. Perhaps he was not in a position to order it at a time when the debates over it erupted, given his deteriorating health around this time.
Taleban insurgents were always more sceptical of any restrictions on their room for manoeuvre and were far more autonomous. Fighting Taleban weighed military advantage and the risk to themselves of not using pressure-plate IEDs with the harm to their civilian compatriots and the need to keep civilians onside as part of the war effort. For the most part, they were not persuaded and continued to deploy pressure-plate IEDs, as they felt they were needed. As AAN reported:
It is also worth recalling that the number of civilians killed and injured by US forces remained high and increased every time the US decided to push for military advantage in the conflict and/or widened their rules on targeting (eg carrying out offensive as well as defensive air strikes) or ‘relaxed’ measures to protect civilians. In 2018, for example, the US air force released 70 per cent more weapons in air operations than in 2017 (7,362 compared to 4,36; itself a significant increase on the 1,337 weapons released in 2016), but caused more than double the number of civilian casualties. UNAMA says this followed additional deployments to Afghanistan at the end of 2017 and “a relaxation in the rules of engagement for United States forces in Afghanistan, which removed certain ‘proximity’ requirements for airstrikes.” It suggested, as well, that the US military was taking a more ‘robust’ line against insurgents using civilian homes as cover. If the rules brought in by McCrystal and his successors had been adhered to, the US air force would not have killed and injured so many Afghan civilians. Like the Taleban, then, there was always a weighing of concerns; battlefield contingencies could cancel out worries of the harm civilian deaths would do to the war effort.
Always, as well, whatever protections the Taleban might have given to civilian populations in their heartlands fell away when it came to the cities. Suicide bombers targeting urban centres rarely appeared to try to spare civilians. The justification, as seen when speaking to Taleban in private discussion, was that they viewed the capital’s population, for example, as default supporters of the US and its allies’ war against them. “Those living under the control of an apostate regime,” a Taleban-affiliated scholar from Ghazni told the author, “who don’t denounce its anti-Islamic policies and don’t support jihad also share [responsibility for] what the Americans and the government is doing.”
Edited by Kate Clark and Rachel Reid
[1] For example, there were 12 reported beheadings documented by UNAMA in 2014, 9 of which were attributed to the Taleban. See “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2014,” page 56.
[2] See Thomas Ruttig’s 2012 report, “The Mulla Dadullah Front: A search for clues,” in which he notes concerns within the Taleban that the methods used by Dadullah (and his brother who took over his mantle) were ‘un-Islamic’, with many first-generation Taleban rejecting Dadullah’s methods.
[4] The first rule in the International Committee of the Red Cross’s database of customary International Humanitarian Law concerns this:
The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.
[5] Some anecdotal reports suggest that Taleban were assisted by al-Qaeda and other foreign groups providing training in IED-making, for example, this Taleban fighter interviewed by Newsweek:
The Arabs taught us how to make an IED by mixing nitrate fertilizer and diesel fuel, and how to pack plastic explosives and to connect them to detonators and remote-control devices like mobile phones. We learned how to do this blindfolded so we could safely plant IEDs in the dark.
See also “The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004–2012,” Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, page 845, and “The Battle for Afghanistan, Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” Anand Gopal, 2010, New America Foundation, page34.
[6] Out of the 21 interviews, seven were with Taleban fighters – three from Ghazni, four from Helmand, two from Maidan Wardak and two from Paktia – and nine with residents, a journalist and two former government soldiers from the same provinces. Three interviews were conducted via mobile phone and the rest face-to-face.
[8] Thomas H. Johnson & Matthew C. DuPee (2012) Analysing the new Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha): an assessment of changing perspectives and strategies of the Afghan Taliban, Central Asian Survey, 31:1, 77-91, DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2012.647844 (see here).
[9] Statement of Taleban’s Leadership regarding the Inception of the Spring Operations, 30 April 2011, paragraph 4 (link is no longer working, but the statement was seen by the author).
[10] Giustozzi, Antonio, The Taliban at War: 2001-2018, Hurst & Company London, 2019, page 143.
[11] After 2014, the US alone among the foreign forces had a potential combat mission and their involvement in offensive operations, largely air or special forces on the ground, waxed and waned until their final departure in 2021.
Editor’s note: In August, The National Interest organized a symposium on Afghanistan one year after the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban takeover of Kabul. We asked a variety of experts the following question: How should the Biden administration approach Afghanistan and the Taliban government? The following article is one of their responses:
The U.S. decision to withdraw from Afghanistan extricated the United States from a worsening, unsustainable quagmire with no end in sight. It liberated U.S. intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets, special operations forces, and other highly valuable resources for employment in places crucial to U.S. geostrategic objectives, such as Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific. However, the speed with which the Afghan government and its forces melted down under the Taliban onslaught—reflecting years of profound misgovernance and waste of international support, as well as the venality and self-interested parochialism of the fractious Afghan political elite—meant that the Taliban felt few constraints on its rule. And the Taliban’s rule has so far been that of a revolutionary regime consumed by zealotry and the prevention of defections, mismanaging both Afghanistan and its external relations.
The Counterterrorism Picture
The counterterrorism picture in Afghanistan has worsened. That the Taliban—or at least its key factions, including powerful Acting Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani—was willing to host Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri is merely the tip, albeit the most egregious part, of the iceberg.
Foreign fighters have been flowing into Afghanistan from the Middle East, Pakistan, and Central Asia. With the excuse that Afghanistan’s borders are porous and it lacks the capacity to stop the inflows unless the West helps provide border surveillance equipment, the Taliban has also been unwilling to stop the influx of foreign fighters. Doing so would alienate crucial jihadi sponsors in the Middle East and Pakistan on whose support the Taliban depends—amidst a tanking Afghan economy—to pay its own existing fighters. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), sometimes referred to as the Pakistani Taliban, has used its safe havens in Afghanistan to further increase its attacks against Pakistan, a trend well-preceding the Taliban takeover.
Moreover, visibly pulling back from the jihadi brotherhood—whether by not allowing foreign fighters or by publicly breaking with Al Qaeda, something the Taliban has never been willing to do—would cause factionalization within the movement.
The Taliban leadership’s single and dominant preoccupation, to which all decisionmaking has been subordinated, has been preserving unity and avoiding defections. All the more so because the Taliban’s principal on-the-ground rival, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISIS-K), remains potent and would receive some Taliban defectors. The Taliban has been battling ISIS-K and has succeeded in decimating its rural presence at various times, but it has not been able to wipe out its urban cells.
The key question is whether the Taliban will be willing and able to live up to its promise not to allow terrorist attacks to be carried out from Afghanistan.
The Political, Social, and Economic Picture
Despite its promises of moderation, the Taliban has been ruling with tightening authoritarianism. Women have particularly suffered, with girls not allowed to attend secondary schools in most of the country, restrictions on women’s presence at workplaces, a head-to-toe covering again mandated, and a requirement that a male guardian accompanies women during travel. Moreover, freedom of expression and media have been severely curtailed, and journalists and protestors have been brutalized. The Ministry of Interior has been operating as a thuggish force to repress any voice of dissent against the Taliban-only exclusionary regime. And despite early declarations, the resurrected Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice has been intrusive and aggressive in imposing and enforcing all kinds of social mores, such as beard length.
The Afghan economy, declining since 2014, has tanked. Western sanctions have meant that liquidity has been critically lacking. Economic output has substantially fallen, affecting everything from the financial sector and rural households’ coping mechanisms. Even though the Taliban regime has been able to improve revenue collection, poverty, affecting more than one-third of the population before the Taliban takeover, has risen dramatically. Western donors have been generous with humanitarian aid that is to bypass the Taliban regime through non-governmental organizations and go to the Afghan people, but famine looms on the horizon this winter. Without sustained financial liquidity and the regularized capacity of the economy to function, humanitarian aid merely suppresses one peak of economic crisis before another emerges.
Multiple cleavages and axes of division and alignment pervade the Taliban. Among them is the division between Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada and the so-called sheikhs around him in Kandahar and several other key poles of power, such as the more internationally-oriented Mullah Baradar, Acting Minister of Defense Mullah Yaqub, and Sirajuddin Haqqani. Although chosen for his religious credentials and ostensible weakness as someone seen as unable to threaten other powerful Taliban commanders, Haibatullah has been able to rule with an iron fist, impervious to input from others within the Taliban and the outside. He has focused on the doctrinaire re-creation of the 1990s system of rule in Afghanistan, rejecting the validity of man-made laws, taking it upon himself to establish in Afghanistan a vision of sharia that harkens back to centuries ago and whose purpose is to prepare people for the afterlife. Thus, the more internationally-oriented segments of the Taliban, like Baradar, or those who care about ruling for decades, not just a few years (such as Yaqub and Sirajuddin), have not been able to sway the regime on reopening girls’ schools or other matters.
The National Resistance Front of Tajik and other opposition figures from the former Afghan regime remains feeble, unable to draw tribal support, and is performing far worse than many expected. The Taliban has effectively shut down even its low-level tactical efforts. The broader Afghan opposition is as divided and fractious as ever and hopelessly fantasizes about the possibility of a new U.S. on-the-ground military intervention, such as if a terrorist attack from Afghanistan takes place.
Just like the West, Russia, China, Iran, and Central Asian countries have been frustrated with the Taliban both on terrorism issues, such as foreign fighters and Al Qaeda, and social issues, principally restrictions on women’s education and minorities. (The loss of human rights, civil liberties, and political accountability does not bother these non-Western authoritarian countries.) Even Pakistan, the steadfast and decades-old sponsor of the Taliban, particularly the Haqqanis, has not achieved satisfaction on issues related to the TTP. No country has recognized the Taliban regime, but Russia, China, Iran, and others operate embassies in Kabul and verbally cozy up to the Taliban regime. However, they subordinate their frustrations with the Taliban to global power competition, eager to see the United States out of their backyard.
Looking Forward
The immediate fallout from the Taliban’s sheltering of Zawahiri will likely be a U.S. pullback from engagement. The United States has adopted a very sensible and pragmatic policy of limited, cautious engagement, seeking to influence the Taliban’s stance on counterterrorism cooperation and social issues.
Appropriately, the United States has also attempted to figure out how to enable some liquidity inflows into Afghanistan while staying in legal compliance with sanctions and various U.S. lawsuits related to the September 11 attacks, such as by working through international financial institutions to deliver cash to an independent Afghanistan central bank. In what was inevitably going to be a complex, one step forward, two steps back effort, the United States has received little from engagement, and it is now likely to give the Taliban a much colder shoulder. The international community is also most likely to once again deny Taliban leaders the ability to travel, as urged by a group of former U.S. diplomats. But even this important signal will not alter the Taliban’s policies as long as the internal power balance between Haibatullah and others remains as is.
But isolating the Taliban, however emotionally satisfying, will not make the Taliban change its behavior either. Moreover, the likely terrible humanitarian situation this winter will necessitate some engagement.
The possibility of Taliban policy shifts can emerge if the power distribution within the Taliban changes, with the restorationists centered around Haibatullah losing power. This could happen as a result of Haibatullah’s death or an internal power reshuffle. Baradar, Siraj, and Yaqub are in line as some of the most likely successors, and they would eventually likely be far more pragmatic and responsive on social issues than Haibatullah and the sheikhs around him. However, Sirajuddin Haqqani has lost much of his already very limited credibility with the international community as a responsible interlocutor on counterterrorism issues. Will the Taliban come to understand that it will struggle to survive if it does not at least quietly provide counterterrorism intelligence and thus comes to face extensive international isolation? Or will it bank on the international community remaining too fragmented in its response?
Alternatively, the Taliban regime could simply implode and fragment into factions fighting each other in a civil war. The counterterrorism picture would likely be worse in such a civil war scenario due to even greater opacity and more limited actionable options. And the likely winner of years of bloodshed would merely be some constellation of the Taliban’s factions.
Zeal, Dogma, and Folly: How the Taliban Bungled Afghanistan
I worked for Afghanistan’s government. Now I recognise we, too, bear responsibility for the country’s struggles.
On the morning of August 15, 2021, I boarded a 9am flight from Kabul to Istanbul, thinking I would be back at work in a few days’ time at the Afghan state-owned national utility company I called the office.
When we landed in Istanbul late afternoon, the beeps and dings of cellphone notifications from people’s devices were soon replaced by gasps and cries. Within seconds, I saw grown men and women fall to the airport floor in tears. While we were in the air, Afghanistan’s elected leadership had fled and the Taliban had arrived in Kabul. I would eventually see images of Taliban fighters walking on the grounds of my old offices in the presidential palace.
Everything I had spent the past seven years working towards unravelled in the time we were in the air. In the weeks and months prior, my colleagues and I were negotiating long-term power-purchase agreements and investments in Afghanistan’s energy sector. We were discussing 10 and 25-year plans. We were developing strategies to turn Afghanistan into a regional hub for connectivity. I believed in a vision of a sustainable, self-reliant country if only the latest war would end.
The war did end, but instead of connecting Asia with the world, Afghanistan — which sits at the heart of the continent — is now isolated. Its people are without money, jobs and increasingly food, a year after the Taliban came back to power. When I returned in March to a very different Kabul from the city that I had left last August, it was as a humanitarian worker no longer focused on long-term strategies but on programmes aimed at ensuring basic survival.
A country that has seen so many political upheavals over the last five decades is in a more dire situation than it has ever been. Still, the cessation of active warfare allowed me to travel to some of the most remote areas of the country that were difficult to access under the democratic governments before the return of the Taliban.
From the earthquake zones deep in the mountains of Paktika province to Sangin district in Helmand province, I drove through riverbeds and dirt trails. After the earthquake in June, when I travelled to affected areas, we lost network coverage halfway there, with no cellphone or electricity tower in sight.
I thought back to my days in the energy sector, and how I would get upset with our commercial team when they would list Paktika as having zero revenues. There was no grid, I would argue, so why did we even need to list it in our collection reports?
Now I saw things differently. Billions of dollars of foreign aid had poured into the country, and national strategies for development had been created year after year, some of which I had directly worked on. Yet, regions like Paktika have seen little progress and remain disconnected from the rest of Afghanistan, let alone the world.
Governments have come and gone, regimes have changed, and the lives of much of Afghanistan’s population remain the same, stuck in cycles of basic survival with little to no access to any public services vital to uplift their human and economic conditions.
I sat with women in makeshift tents in Barmal, Paktika, after their mud homes were destroyed in the earthquake. They asked me what I was holding in my hand. How do you explain what a smartphone is to people who have never had electricity?
In Kamaa, a district of Nangarhar province, I spoke with a woman who said the only way she can feed her children is by picking food from the garbage: If she can get enough of the hair and dirt off, she brings it home. This was in a district only 40 minutes from the provincial capital, Jalalabad. Kamaa was largely spared from the violence of the last 20 years, but this woman came from a community that suffered from endemic poverty.
This is not to say that there hasn’t been progress in Afghanistan. Incredible gains have been made, particularly in the areas of public services, education, economic growth, and most critically, women’s participation across all sectors. Many of these advances are now under threat and must be protected.
However, my recent visits have revealed to me that while the Taliban introduce policies that cause trepidation, previous authorities and the international community also bear responsibility for the multiple crises Afghanistan faces. Whether it was from shortsighted Western technocratic models or the violence targeting infrastructure and development, we must come to grips with the idea that we have collectively failed the Afghan people repeatedly over the past several decades.
Only then will we realise that the way to move forward is through acknowledging the needs of ordinary Afghan citizens. The status quo cannot continue: Every single Afghan deserves to have access to basic services and an opportunity to build a life on their terms.
Samira Sayed-Rahman is a Canadian-born Afghan humanitarian worker.
She has been working in Afghanistan for the last 7 years, spanning strategic communications firms, the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and currently with an international humanitarian organisation.
Afghanistan’s crisis started well before August 2021
A year ago, the Taliban captured Kabul, capping the dramatic fall of Afghanistan’s fragile U.S.-backed government. America’s longest war ended in ignominy and tragedy. The Islamist militants that had been chased from power in 2001 were back in command and the legacy of two decades of U.S.-led state-building and counterinsurgency that had drained more than $1 trillion from U.S. taxpayers and cost the lives of more than 3,500 U.S. and allied soldiers — and tens of thousands more Afghan troops and civilians — hung excruciatingly in the balance.
Hours after the world watched the chaotic scenes at Kabul airport as thousands of Afghans desperately tried to flee the victorious Taliban advance, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, a U.S. government ombudsman, issued a report on 20 years of U.S. efforts in the country. It was grim reading: “If the goal was to rebuild and leave behind a country that can sustain itself and pose little threat to U.S. national security interests, the overall picture is bleak,” the report noted.
Billions of dollars in American and foreign aid may have been siphoned into boondoggles for corrupt Afghan officials and opportunistic U.S. military contractors. While the threat of extremist al-Qaeda militants operating on Afghan land was largely rooted out, ordinary Afghan civilians saw their country’s security situation grow more precarious amid constant terrorist bombings and attacks. A branch of the Islamic State found fertile soil in Afghanistan’s rugged terrain. And years of American efforts to shore up a fledgling Afghan government and train its new army did little to prevent its sudden and total collapse.
As a result, a generation’s worth of fitful progress in advancing women’s education was derailed, with the Taliban reneging on earlier assurances that they would allow all schoolgirls to return to classes. Surging poverty has led to impoverished families selling their daughters as child brides. Tens of thousands of Afghans who assisted U.S. and international forces remain stuck in the country, vulnerable to a regime that sees them as having collaborated with foreign occupiers.
In Washington, there’s plenty of lamentation over what went wrong. Some former military officials believe the United States was out of its depth culturally and could never graft its political system onto Afghanistan’s tribal landscape. Others pin more direct blame on former president Donald Trump, who signed a peace deal with the Taliban that critics argue doomed the U.S.-backed government in Kabul, and President Biden, who executed the full withdrawal even as Afghan provinces fell like dominoes to the Taliban.
“Our foundational mistake was our lack of commitment,” wrote David Petraeus, former commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, for the Atlantic. “In essence, we never adopted a sufficient, consistent, overarching approach that we stuck with from administration to administration, or even within individual administrations.”
That’s a difficult view to accept given the extent and length of the U.S.’s commitment to Afghanistan. As my colleagues reported in 2019, many U.S. officials tasked with carrying out counterinsurgency and reconstruction in Afghanistan privately knew the mission was failing, but in public spun a different message.
“For a long time, Washington’s elites saw Afghanistan as the ‘good war,’ morally justified and sanctioned by the United Nations,” wrote Fareed Zakaria for The Washington Post’s opinion page. “People were invested in believing that it was working, and many blinded themselves to evidence that it wasn’t.”
Now that the Washington establishment has been robbed of its delusions, Afghanistan has faded from view. Biden has repeatedly insisted the legacy campaigns of the post-9/11 era in Afghanistan and Iraq were obscuring the more important challenges facing U.S. strategists, who are now fully occupied by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the looming challenge posed by China.
“I have been struck that much of Washington has appeared keen to essentially put Afghanistan in the rearview mirror and try to move on,” Michael Kugelman, an expert on South Asia at the Wilson Center, told Reuters.
Many Afghans, meanwhile, are only looking ahead with despair. The evaporation of international aid to the country, compounded by U.S. sanctions that froze some $7 billion of Afghan foreign reserves, sent Afghanistan’s economy into a tailspin. The country’s banking system is paralyzed and food prices have soared. The majority of the Afghan population is in need of humanitarian assistance. More than half the population is going hungry and more than a million children are severely malnourished. The United Nations estimated that as much as 97 percent of the country may fall below the poverty line by the second half of the year.
“Regardless of the Taliban’s status or credibility with outside governments, international economic restrictions are still driving the country’s catastrophe and hurting the Afghan people,” John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch, said in an Aug. 4statement.
In rural areas of the county devastated by years of war, the Taliban takeover seemed to offer a future of peace. But, as my colleague Susannah George recently reported from Helmand province, long a hotbed of insurgency, the country’s economic woes have darkened the mood. She encountered a mechanic in the town of Marja who had to rebuild his shop three times and now has seen a considerable drop in business.
“Every time I started from scratch,” he told her, “and each time I had less money, so the shop has gotten smaller and smaller.”
“I am worried and upset all the time. Everyone in this country is upset,” Hussain said. “We have no idea what will happen next, or what our future will look like. When I see the hundreds of messages on Facebook, so many people trying to leave the country, it makes me think I should take my family and go.”
Professor in Conflict and Humanitarian Studies at Qatar Foundation’s Hamad Bin Khalifa University and an Honorary Professor of the University of York
Al Jazeera
Published On 15 Aug 2022
The Taliban’s first year back in power was one of crisis, but they also scored victories that deserve to be acknowledged.
When asked in a recent interview to assess the Taliban’s first year back in power, Afghanistan’s former President Hamid Karzai (2002-2014) delivered a fair summary: the Taliban have brought an “…end to widespread fighting and conflict”, he said but the Afghan people cannot “find themselves” in the government and the “economic situation is disastrous”.
Indeed, in the eyes of many Afghans, the year since the Taliban seized Kabul with little to no resistance has been shaped by a bewildering mix of half-realised hopes, unexpected blessings, many disappointments and devastating economic, social and political crises.
According to the West, however, Afghanistan’s first year back under Taliban rule was marked by just three main events: the chaotic evacuation of Western nationals from Kabul airport; the decree by the Taliban leader to stop girls’ secondary education; and the drone killing of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri – in a clear violation of Afghanistan’s sovereignty – in a Kabul safe house allegedly owned by the Haqqani network and the Taliban’s interim minister of interior, who is responsible for law and order in the country.
So what exactly were the many gains and undeniable losses and failures of the Taliban during their first year back in power?
US and the Taliban
Given the emphasis the 2020 Doha Agreement – which paved the way for the withdrawal of US-led foreign forces – places on the Taliban’s guarantees that it will not allow transnational armed groups to operate on Afghan soil, many observers concluded that the assassination, which exposed enduring ties between al-Qaeda and the new Afghan leadership, would lead to a total collapse of trust between the US and the Taliban and perhaps even trigger a new military confrontation.
However, the situation is much more complex in reality. To start with, the relationship between the two parties was never built on trust, but on a set of pragmatic interests which both are determined not to abandon even if pursuing them requires turning a blind eye to potential violations of the Doha Agreement.
For this reason, following the assassination, the Taliban refrained from threats and actions that could lead to the total collapse of relations and tried to reassure its constituents merely with relatively measured condemnations. Likewise, the US has been careful not to allow the discovery of al-Zawahiri in Kabul to drastically change its policies towards the Taliban.
Despite appearances, both parties are keen to protect their alignment around the strategic objective of preventing Afghanistan from becoming a failed state that could provide a haven to “terror” organisations such as the ISIL (ISIS) group and a base for the distribution of narcotics to the rest of the world.
A nation hostage
Despite efforts by the Taliban and the US to maintain a delicate relationship, however, in the past year Afghanistan experienced severe economic devastation, largely due to the ongoing efforts by Washington – and the rest of the Western alliance – to prevent the group from further consolidating power through economic pressure.
First came the sudden decline in international aid. Billions of dollars that were used to finance the war effort and to support a wide range of developmental projects, including funding a thriving civil society, in the past two decades have suddenly dried up, causing a sharp rise in unemployment, particularly in the public sector. Almost simultaneously, the country was isolated from the international financial system, which crippled local banking. Adding insult to injury, the US froze almost $9bn in Afghan foreign exchange reserves held abroad and started to float the possibility of using some of that money to compensate the families of 9/11 victims.
Although a serious threat of famine was averted last winter thanks to the Taliban’s willingness to cooperate with the international community – which provided the Afghan people with $1bn in humanitarian aid – the country still came to the brink of universal poverty soon after the change of government, with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) warning that as much as 97 percent of the Afghan population could sink into poverty before the end of 2022. Incomes dropped so starkly since the Taliban takeover that the World Bank said in April that about 37 percent of Afghan households did not have enough money to cover food while 33 percent could afford food but nothing more. Moreover, given Afghanistan’s dependency on imported food and skyrocketing global food prices due to the war in Ukraine, a deadly famine is still on the cards for Afghanistan.
As a result, while most of this economic devastation was beyond the control of the Taliban, many in Afghanistan – just like those in the West – are struggling to see any positives in the group’s year-one report card.
And yet, the group took some steps – and implemented some policies – that if they did not significantly improve the living conditions of most Afghans, at least helped avert bigger catastrophes.
Acknowledging Taliban achievements
Indeed, the country could not have absorbed the combined effects of the above-mentioned economic shocks if it was not for some of the Taliban’s achievements.
First and foremost, the security situation in Afghanistan has significantly improved since the Taliban’s takeover. After NATO forces left, the Taliban officially ended their armed struggle, declared a general amnesty for all political and military opposition and announced a nationwide decommissioning of weapons. As a result, civilians started to feel safe once again and mobility increased significantly across the country.
By bringing the country under the control of a single authority for the first time in more than 40 years, the Taliban also curbed the influence of local warlords who have been acting above the law and terrorising locals. Kabul and other cities were cleared of the concrete barrier walls that had made certain parts off limits for citizens and caused huge traffic jams. Body searches at the entrances to public buildings were downgraded. All this increased the confidence of Afghans and restored a degree of normality. Of course, these positive developments were not felt by huge segments of the Afghan population, namely women and members of the Hazara minority who continue to find themselves on the receiving end of ISIL (ISIS) attacks.
Second, at the regional level, except for some tensions with Pakistan, the Taliban have managed to maintain good relationships with all of Afghanistan’s neighbours. Despite UN sanctions, for example, China maintains diplomatic and economic relations with the Taliban and has plans to not only provide humanitarian assistance but invest in the country. Uzbekistan also has friendly relations with the new Afghan government and has opened its border to trade. None of the countries in the region is interested in supporting a proxy war in Afghanistan today.
Third, the Taliban managed to protect Afghanistan’s public sector institutions and infrastructure, including its security apparatus. Most public institutions maintained their employees and continued to provide a reasonable level of services. By far the most important institution the Taliban managed to protect was the Central Bank. Under the Taliban, the bank’s acting governor was given a good degree of independence and was allowed to work closely with national and international advisers to protect Afghanistan’s currency. As a result, the local currency was quick to recover much of its value against many international and regional currencies and newly printed bank notes were quickly brought from Poland to circulate in the local market. The Taliban government also managed to recruit almost 100,000 young men to the national army and up to 180,000 to the national police in the past year. Admittedly, many were former Taliban fighters, although not all were.
Fourth, in just a year, the Taliban, having lost international budget support, were able to put forward a national budget dependent only on national income. By tackling the culture of corruption that held the country back over the last 20 years, the Taliban were able to increase state revenue to the unprecedented level of $100 million per month despite the economic difficulties facing the country and the low tax base that this has resulted in.
While these achievements undoubtedly deserve some acknowledgement, it cannot be denied that they have all been overshadowed by the Taliban’s confused and regressive social policies. For example, while girls are still allowed to go to secondary school in several provinces, in most localities their access to education has been restricted to please a minority view within the movement. This combined with the crackdown on liberties, including press freedom, cultural expression (music and dance) and political activism has resulted in many Afghans feeling detached from the Taliban government and becoming wary of its rule. Counterproductive social policies also placed the country on a path to international isolation despite its officials’ occasional ability to participate in regional and international bilateral visits and conferences.
All in all, the Taliban’s year one report card is far from perfect. Nevertheless, the group also had some significant victories against difficult odds in their first year in power that deserve to be acknowledged.
Afghanistan Peace Campaign
An explosives specialist conducts mine clearance operations after detecting a piece of metal in Afghanistan. Photo: UNMAS/Cengiz Yar,