Amid Taliban Repression, Afghan Media Are a Beacon of Hope

August 25, 2023

 Barry Salaam

United States Institute of Peace

Thursday, August 10, 2023

Since regaining power two years ago, the Taliban have largely discarded Afghanistan’s democratic institutions but have taken a somewhat accommodating, albeit contradictory, approach toward independent media. Instead of banning independent media altogether, they have implemented regulatory restrictions and punitive measures to limit free speech and control the media environment. This policy approach seems to be part of an evolving communication strategy that helped enable the group’s rise to power. Despite all the bad news coming out of Afghanistan, resilient, creative journalists and media outlets provide reason for some guarded optimism. The international community should do what it can to support the media sector, which is essential for advocating for citizen rights and providing an information lifeline to Afghans.

Free Media’s Emergence

The rise of independent media in Afghanistan was one of the most remarkable and celebrated achievements of the post-Taliban democratic era. Once an isolated country with no free press or internet access, Afghanistan quickly embraced the information age. Over the course of a few years, the country became an inspiring model of free media in the region, with unprecedented growth in news, entertainment channels, print publications and online platforms. Before the Taliban takeover, 543 local and national media outlets operated across Afghanistan.

The media also promoted pluralism in a highly fragmented society, drove democratic change and helped to empower women. New constitutional rights enabled marginalized ethnic and religious communities to establish for the first time their own outlets and pursue equal rights and opportunities.

In a culturally diverse society often beset by political turbulence and a compromised rule of law, free media emerged as a powerful tool for challenging corrupt officials and advancing government accountability.

The Taliban’s Evolving Communication Strategy

With the media landscape undergoing significant transformation after 2001, the Taliban began adapting its information strategy, as early as 2005. A notable example of its adaptive approach was the incorporation of visual communication tools in propaganda campaigns, including pictures, drawings, videos and online platforms, which the movement had opposed or banned during its first reign from 1996 to 2001.

In addition, several other distinctive elements characterized the Taliban’s evolving communication strategy, enabling the group to outperform its opponents.

Consistency and Resonance

From the outset, the Taliban framed its war as a jihad to expel foreign “invaders” and establish a Shariah-based Islamic system, replacing the U.S.-backed government. This overarching strategic goal remained consistent throughout the insurgency and was central to the Taliban’s master narrative. In addition, their messaging employed cultural, religious and nationalistic codes and frames such as colonialism, occupation, infidels, religious obligation, martyrdom and sovereignty, among others. These terms were used to draw parallels with the historical victories of Afghans in previous holy wars, further enhancing narrative resonance.

Targeted Messaging

Devising targeted approaches, the group tailored messaging to specific audiences with the aim of achieving specific outcomes. For example, they spread intimidating shabnamah (or night letters) to deter locals from aiding the “infidels” and produced videos of heroic attacks to glorify jihad and ramp up recruitment.

Through media manipulation, the Taliban sought to incite outrage by highlighting culturally sensitive issues like home searches, night raids, civilian casualties and the propagation of Western values. They also exploited people’s grievances around the endemic corruption of the state, and their political alienation, to widen the state-society gap while positioning themselves as potential saviors.

Media Weaponization and Savviness

By 2008, the movement had already developed a complex communications strategy. They utilized traditional means like night letters, religious sermons, poetry and print publications and leveraged modern methods including multilingual websites, cell phones and DVDs.

With the rising popularity of digital media post-2009, the Taliban’s sophisticated approach expanded, using platforms like YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and encrypted apps like Telegram and WhatsApp for broader outreach, real-time updates and interaction with the local and foreign media.

With hundreds of aggressive social media accounts, the media-savvy insurgents countered NATO messaging, demonized opponents, threatened critics and projected power.

Through these methods, they pervaded cyberspace and maintained a palpable psychological presence.

Exploiting Weaknesses and Opportunities

Ineffective messaging by the United States and Afghan governments also gave insurgents an advantage. President Hamid Karzai’s calling the Taliban “brothers” and President Ashraf Ghani’s hesitance to call them “enemies” were particularly self-defeating. Washington’s focus on troop withdrawal from 2009 on undermined any appearance of long-term resolve and negated potential gains. These inconsistencies provided rich material for the Taliban to underscore its own resolve.

Premature conciliatory overtures since 2010, including the 2013 opening of a Taliban office in Doha, pushed insurgents into the political limelight. Starting in October 2018, official U.S.-Taliban talks further boosted Taliban legitimacy. Upon securing the landmark withdrawal deal, insurgents astutely entered Afghanistan’s mainstream media and expanded international outreach. The agreement validated the Taliban’s anti-occupation narrative and won them the information war.

Opting For a Controlled Media Environment

The Taliban have strictly controlled non-state media since August 2021. This approach likely stems from the communication strategy and media exploitation skills crucial in their ascent to power.

Early in the insurgency, the Taliban proclaimed that “wars today cannot be won without media,” and to this day, they seem to value the media’s utility as a strategic tool, and a weapon, to promote their narrative and legitimacy.

However, the Taliban’s view of media is solely utilitarian, devoid of respect for democratic values. During the insurgency, they never wavered to threaten, attack or even massacre journalists. Post-takeover, they slashed media freedom using censorship and intimidation.

Yet, the Taliban’s control over independent media is not absolute, a situation potentially shaped by two key considerations. First, pushing for total control might lead to the closure or exile of more independent channels, a scenario the Taliban likely wishes to avoid due to losing their leverage and control. Second, outlets driven into exile have often reemerged with more assertive voices countering the Taliban narrative.

Thus, the Taliban appear to have opted for a relatively accommodating approach, allowing media operations in exchange for enhanced control and self-promotion. Media within the country also understand that to avoid retribution it is necessary to navigate a fine line between objectivity and fair treatment.

This balance presents a conundrum for the Taliban and a potential opportunity for the media to incrementally push for greater freedom. What dynamics may eventually shape a new equilibrium in the media space?

Tightening The Media Noose

Since August 2021, advocacy organizations have reported over 300 incidents against media personnel including violence, imprisonment and surprise raids. Summons, arrests and punitive measures are carried out mainly by the intelligence authorities against local and foreign journalists deemed non-compliant with regulations.

The Taliban have issued multiple decrees, vaguely worded guidelines and verbal instructions drawing ethical and Islamic boundaries for journalists, banning music and entertainment and suppressing news related to citizen protests and resistance forces. These rules also require female journalists to cover their faces and work in segregated spaces.

In a July 2022 decree, Taliban Emir Haibatullah Akhundzada expressly cautioned against criticizing Taliban authorities. Later, in a public tweet, his notorious minister of higher education warned that undermining the emirate, either by speech, pen or action is “punishable by death.”

With no laws governing the free press, authorities across the country have free reign to censor and deal with the media as they see fit. Some provincial officials even demand review and approval of content prior to publication. The suspension of the Republic’s mass media law obstructs legal boundaries, leaving journalists uncertain where to draw the line to avoid reprisals or seek legal protection against persecution.

To control the flow of information, the Taliban heavily scrutinize media content, issue warnings, implement corrective measures and limit access to information deemed harmful to their reign or reputation. They have banned and expelled several popular national and international news services including Hasht-e-Sob daily, Etilat-e-Roz newspapers, Kabul News television, Radio Liberty, BBC and Deutsche Welle.

Media advocacy organizations on the ground report that 40% (200) of media outlets, including 55 TV channels, 109 radio stations, 21 news agencies and 15 newspapers, have been forced to close due to repressive policies and financial struggles. This has led to 60% (4,932) of journalists and media workers losing their jobs. Additionally, 67% (914) of female journalists are out of work, and outlets led by women have dwindled from 54 to 10.

A rapidly contracting economy, aid reduction, cumbersome taxation and the widespread ban on income-generating entertainment shows have compounded the media’s sustainability crisis. Some outlets have reported as much as an 80% drop in their revenues since 2021. Surviving outlets also face a growing capacity deficit due to a lack of experienced journalists and editors, most of whom have left the country.

Emerging Trends and Pushbacks

Still, journalists have resiliently persevered to keep media alive. The continued operation of major national television and radio stations like Tolo, Shamshad, 1TV, Ariana, Killied and Salam Watandar is remarkable. In addition to national outlets, over 30 local televisions and 100 community radio stations operate across Afghanistan. Cable networks that carry foreign news and entertainment channels, including Turkish and Indian, have been largely unaffected by restrictions.

Tolo TV observes World Press Freedom Day with a talk show on Afghan media’s challenges, with active participation from an in-studio audience. (Tolo News)
Tolo TV observes World Press Freedom Day with a talk show on Afghan media’s challenges, with active participation from an in-studio audience. (Tolo News)

Additionally, media remains one of the few select sectors where women are still permitted to work.

Systematic harassment has undeniably led to increased self-censorship and the media cannot dismiss legally binding restrictive edicts. Nonetheless, journalists have time and again ignored potential reprisals and pushed the boundaries by raising critical voices, covering citizen protests and questioning Taliban edicts such as bans on women’s education and work.

Where access to information is denied, media intelligently resort to secondary sources of information, including social media and foreign-based news agencies.

Prominent advocacy organizations like the National Journalists Union, NAI and the Independent Journalists Association are reestablishing their presence. Notably, the Journalists Safety Committee (AJSC) has secured a seat at the Taliban’s media violations commission and has led numerous safety and resiliency training nationwide. AJSC also assisted with the reopening of Voice of Women radio in Badakhshan province in April.

Another exciting trend expected to deter Taliban from further media repression or shutdown is the emergence of digital outlets and advocacy organizations in exile. Many news outlets or reporters forced by Taliban into exile have reemerged with stronger and more critical voices.

The exiled Hasht-e-Sob and Etilat-e-Roz publications are rapidly recovering online audiences. VOA and Radio Azadi may no longer be conveniently accessible on FM networks but they have extended their broadcasts online, as well as on medium and shortwave frequencies, ensuring that they remain relatively accessible.

In addition, a number of prominent journalists have launched new digital, foreign-based outlets including Amu TV, Chashm News, Kabul Now, Farsi Times, Sicht TV and ABN.

On the advocacy side, the Afghanistan Journalists Center, which runs a press freedom tracker, has shifted its base to Belgium, and more entities are emerging across different continents.

Media in exile play a significant role in countering the Taliban’s disinformation campaign and taking the first shot at sensitive news stories, effectively paving the way for further follow-up coverage by local media. There also seems to be information sharing between foreign and local outlets, giving rise to a collaborative, hybrid media approach.

Online platforms continue to play an indispensable role in providing citizens with easier access to information. In addition, digital outlets have allowed audiences to record events and share valuable footage with media for wider public dissemination — a rising trend in citizen journalism.

There are no reliable statistics but de facto authorities have confirmed that at least one-quarter of the population has access to the internet via mobile phones. This corresponds with Meta’s figures that put Facebook users in Afghanistan at roughly seven million.

Pressing Forward

The Taliban’s strategic decision to allow media operations in exchange for enhanced control and self-promotion contrasts sharply with their 1990s rule. This shift provides journalists and the international community a rare chance to advance freedom of expression and push for greater civic space.

To achieve this goal, the international community should provide comprehensive technical and financial support to the media sector, with a particular focus on local media, and those pursuing a hybrid approach.

In addition:

  • It is vital to prioritize the protection and empowerment of female journalists through improved training, resilience building, salary and professional coordination. Local outlets should be incentivized to hire female journalists and produce content related to women’s rights.
  • While pressuring the Taliban to respect free speech, human rights organizations should monitor incidents and advocate for the right of journalists who are mistreated, imprisoned or prosecuted.
  • Local professional unions and associations must be sustained and strengthened in order to defend free speech and advocate for journalists’ rights inside the country.
  • Protecting journalists from intrusive surveillance requires technical support to shield sensitive information and confidential sources. Journalists should also be equipped with encryption tools and VPNs to bypass barriers that restrict access to information.
  • A workable emergency mechanism must be put in place to ensure the identification, sheltering and safe evacuation and resettlement of journalists faced with life-threatening dangers.
  • Thinking ahead on possible internet-related restrictions, it is advisable to engage with tech companies to explore possibilities for continued, seamless public access.

The Taliban are fundamentally opposed to democracy and its underlying values. Noting their relentless rollback of the democratic progress attained over the past two decades, there is little cause for hope in what lies ahead. Nonetheless, it is both pragmatic and wise to protect and enhance what remains of Afghans’ fundamental rights and liberties and push for improved conditions until a more favorable opportunity arises.

Amid Taliban Repression, Afghan Media Are a Beacon of Hope
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Two Years into Taliban Rule, New Shocks Weaken Afghan Economy

August 25, 2023

 BY: William Byrd, Ph.D.

United States Institute of Peace

Thursday, August 10, 2023

The opium ban, falling aid and regime actions against women will exacerbate poverty, worsen hunger and increase outmigration.
The Taliban have done a better job than expected in managing the Afghan economy despite some missteps. But nevertheless, the Afghan economy seems caught in a low-level equilibrium that leaves most Afghans poor, hungry and in need of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, new headwinds threaten to precipitate further economic decline, risking a repeat of the economic free-fall seen in the initial months following the August 2021 Taliban takeover. Much will depend on whether aid declines sharply or gradually, how seriously the opium ban is enforced for a second year during this fall’s planting season, and whether Taliban gender restrictions are tightened, maintained or weakened.

Looking Back at Two Years of Taliban Economic Management

Taliban macroeconomic management has been better than expected, as evidenced by the stable exchange rate, low inflation, effective revenue collection and rising exports. There is no comparison at all with their non-management of the economy during the Taliban’s previous 1996-2001 rule. That regime had no control over the afghani currency and there was hyperinflation; government revenue was negligible; the Afghan economy was largely moribund, especially after the Taliban’s first opium ban in the year 2000; people’s incomes were less than $200 average per-capita; and social indicators such as maternal and child mortality were terrible.

This time around, the Taliban have benefited from learning while facing adversity during their nearly 20 years as an insurgency. For example, they collected significant revenue in competition with the previous government, provided transporters tax receipts to prevent multiple taxation at their various road checkpoints, and issued mining and other permits.

With their unexpectedly rapid takeover, the Taliban inherited functioning government macroeconomic management institutions, namely the Ministry of Finance and the central bank (Da Afghanistan Bank, or DAB). This contrasts sharply with the 1990s, when government institutions had been largely destroyed by years of destructive civil war. Moreover, the Taliban have tried to maintain some capacity in agencies whose work is seen as beneficial for the regime (for example, revenue and budget), while discarding others like justice institutions and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs.

By all indications, the magnitude of corruption has been reduced, particularly in customs where there has been a crackdown on smuggling and bribery, as well as abolition of the separate trade levies previously imposed by the Taliban insurgency. More generally, the stoppage of most aid after August 2021 removed large amounts of money that had been vulnerable to corruption.

Relatedly, they have clamped down on the rampant capital flight that occurred under the Islamic Republic (as much as $5 billion per year or even more), by means of strict enforcement of rules against export of cash as well as tougher regulation of the hawala informal money market. As a result, the Taliban must have built up modest reserves in DAB, and they have held foreign currency auctions to stabilize the afghani.

The Taliban faced enormous macroeconomic problems when they took power. The abrupt cut-off of nearly all aid, amounting to some $8 billion per year (equivalent to around 40 percent of GDP) precipitated a huge economic shock that no country in the world could have managed without severe consequences. The shock was exacerbated by the stoppage of international financial transactions, ongoing collapse of the banking system, existing U.S. and U.N. sanctions against Taliban leaders, and the freezing of Afghanistan’s some $9 billion of foreign exchange reserves. Especially considering the headwinds and problems they faced, Taliban economic management has exceeded expectations.

Afghanistan’s GDP is hard to measure, but it is estimated to have dropped by around 20 percent in the aftermath of August 2021, further increasing hunger and privation in an already very poor country.

After a few months of free-fall, the economy showed signs of stabilizing at a lower level of activity, reflecting in part U.N. cash shipments to pay for humanitarian assistance averaging some $40 million per week that started at the end of 2021, but also Afghan government restrictions against smuggled imports and capital flight, limits on banking transactions to prevent banks from collapsing, tight macroeconomic management, and some adjustment away from the aid- and service-dominated economy.

Most recently there have been some signs of modest economic revival, most notably the 36 percent increase in imports in the first five months of 2023, suggesting that there may be some recovery of demand in the economy. However, the current equilibrium remains fragile, precarious and subject to severe downside risks. Moreover, it is a “famine equilibrium” that leaves most Afghans falling short of their subsistence needs, necessitating large amounts of humanitarian assistance to prevent an actual famine from materializing. U.N. cash shipments, which fund humanitarian programs in the country, reached $1 billion in the first half of 2023, compared to $1.8 billion in all of 2022.

An Authoritarian Regime Making Some Missteps

It must be recognized that the Taliban are focused on regime survival and strengthening, not the welfare of ordinary Afghans. This is not surprising since they came into power through their persistence as an insurgency and their military victory over the previous government — not because of their popularity with the Afghan people. There has been minimal attention to social service delivery or to providing a social safety net for the poor; these areas of governance have been largely ceded to international humanitarian assistance.

Much of what the Taliban have done is understandable as “good practice” for an authoritarian regime. However, the Taliban have made some significant missteps in their management of the economy:

  • The bans on female education and prohibitions against Afghan women working in NGOs and the U.N. will be extremely damaging to Afghanistan’s longer-term economic and social development.
  • They will also accelerate the “brain drain” of educated women and men — that Afghanistan can ill-afford to lose — leaving the country.
  • These restrictions have reduced donors’ appetite to provide continuing humanitarian aid let alone other assistance, probably accelerating declines in aid that were already expected.
  • The Taliban’s effectively implemented opium poppy cultivation ban has resulted in a roughly $1 billion per year loss of income for Afghan rural households.
  • Though effective in the short run, the Taliban’s aggressive revenue collection efforts risk dampening private sector incentives, thereby hindering economic recovery in the future.

Back to Humanitarian Crisis Mode?

The current low-level macroeconomic equilibrium is gravely threatened by two shocks:

  1. Declining humanitarian assistance, which in 2023 is expected to fall by at least $1 billion from last year’s level of $3 billion; and
  2. The Taliban’s successful opium poppy cultivation ban — resulting in something like an 80 percent reduction in acreage, which is depriving rural Afghans of $1 billion in incomes (though trade in opium continues, with associated incomes to large landowners, drug traders, processors and exporters).

These twin economic shocks — likely amounting to a double-digit loss for GDP if the opium ban continues to be enforced — will further worsen poverty and hunger. So, after two winters when humanitarian aid helped prevent the worst-case outcome of widespread famine, Afghanistan looks to be heading into another difficult winter.

As other coping mechanisms for poorer and mid-level households (selling remaining assets, eating less and lower-quality food, eschewing needed health care, in extremis marrying off underage daughters, etc.) become increasingly exhausted, outmigration will remain as the most viable if not the only option for those who can afford its modest costs. In some cases, this will involve entire households, but even more lone males who can seek work in Europe and elsewhere and send back remittances to their families.

International Policy Dilemmas and Options

What can other countries and international agencies do?

  • First, total aid (currently dominated by humanitarian support) should not fall precipitously but rather decline gradually along a predictable glide-path. This will limit further harm to Afghans and avoid another major macroeconomic shock, even though lower aid will have some adverse effects. Beyond slowing reductions in humanitarian aid, World Bank (including Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund) and Asian Development Bank funds could be deployed to help limit and smooth the decline in total aid.
  • Second, there needs to be a move away from humanitarian business as usual — using increasingly limited resources more effectively and in a cost-effective manner. Examples include reducing the size of administrative overheads and the multiplicity of overheads, making more use of the Afghan private sector to deliver aid, cutting back high-cost programs (for example, the cost per life saved of de-mining tends to be much higher than that of basic health and food assistance).
  • Third and related, there needs to be a shift in the composition of aid away from purely humanitarian support in favor of aid that promotes livelihoods and economic activities. There is some flexibility in what specific programs can be implemented under the “humanitarian” label, and such flexibility should be exploited if some donors are reluctant to provide aid except under that label. This money can be given directly to recipients rather than through the Taliban government or their budget.
  • Fourth and also related, aid needs to be better coordinated; a multilateral organization like the World Bank could help in this regard.
  • Fifth, more international engagement on the economy and private sector is needed. This would not entail financial support to the Afghan government but rather things like various forms of assistance to vetted private businesses, third-party monitoring of financial transactions to assess money-laundering risks, discussions on economic policy and macroeconomic management, and the like.
  • Finally, there are no good options for the international response to the Taliban’s opium ban. Particularly if the ban is maintained and at least somewhat seriously enforced for a second year as seems likely, it will grievously harm the Afghan economy, worsen poverty and hunger, not reduce drug use in other countries, perhaps weaken the Taliban (as happened after their 2000 opium ban), and lead to more outmigration. It is also clear that fully offsetting the adverse economic and humanitarian impacts of the ban, requiring an increase in aid of well over $1 billion given the extra costs and overheads associated with aid delivery, would be impossible. Whatever assistance is provided in response to the opium ban must not be for standalone alternative livelihoods projects. Instead, sound rural development aid is needed, even though it will make only a modest difference at best in the short run
Two Years into Taliban Rule, New Shocks Weaken Afghan Economy
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Two Years Under the Taliban: Is Afghanistan a Terrorist Safe Haven Once Again?

August 25, 2023

BY: Asfandyar Mir, Ph.D.

United States Institute of Peace

Tuesday, August 15, 2023

Two years into Taliban rule, the question of whether Afghanistan would once again become a safe haven for international terrorism remains alive. Longstanding fears were affirmed a little over a year ago, when the U.S. government located al-Qaeda leader Aimen al-Zawahiri in Kabul, Afghanistan, before killing him in a drone strike. The fact that the Taliban would bring Zawahiri back to Kabul, despite repeated assurances to U.S. negotiators both before and after the Doha agreement that they had distanced themselves from al-Qaeda, significantly elevated concerns.

However, the drone strike also allowed the Biden administration to argue that it has a workable counterterrorism strategy to mitigate the remaining threat from Afghanistan. Ever since, policymakers seem to draw comfort from the fact that the Taliban, at the very least, appear to be confronting the Islamic State in Afghanistan — with President Biden even suggesting, in passing, that the Taliban are helping contain terrorist threats from the country.

So, where exactly does the terrorism threat stand on the second anniversary of Taliban rule, and what is the Taliban’s role in incubating and checking various terrorist groups? What explains the Taliban’s choices? And what are the implications of the Taliban’s posture and the threat picture for U.S. counterterrorism policy?

The Threat Picture in Afghanistan

Terrorist groups in Afghanistan fall into two categories: those allied with the Taliban and those opposed to the Taliban. Among the Taliban’s allies are al-Qaeda, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and a number of Central Asian jihadis. The main group of concern that’s opposed to the Taliban is the Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K).

In the first year of Taliban rule, al-Qaeda began to rear its head in Afghanistan. The group started messaging more actively. Its then-leader Zawahiri issued more statements than he had in a long time, with some inciting violence. Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul, Afghanistan, marked the peak of al-Qaeda’s post-takeover activity.

However, since then, al-Qaeda has been relatively subdued, even remaining silent about the killing of its leader as reports surfaced that the group appointed Saif al-Adl to succeed Zawahiri. Last week, in the most significant incitement of violence by the group over the last year, al-Qaeda central leadership issued threats against Sweden and Denmark, calling for the targeting of their embassies across the world. In a recently declassified report, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that al-Qaeda lacks the capability to pose a threat to the United States through 2024.

Compared to al-Qaeda’s central leadership, its South Asia affiliate, AQIS, was more active in messaging and seeking support for jihadist causes, in particular against India. Yet even AQIS hasn’t been complicit in any incidents of violence. There are reports that AQIS, as well as perhaps al-Qaeda central leadership in country, is now being handled by a department responsible for foreign fighters within the Taliban’s intelligence agency, the GDI.

In contrast to al-Qaeda, the TTP — with a presence of thousands of fighters across eastern Afghanistan — vigorously expanded and escalated its operations against Pakistan, killing hundreds of Pakistani security forces personnel and even some civilians. The group appeared to be easily marshalling material resources, from weapons to recruits, from its safe havens in Afghanistan, including some Afghan Taliban fighters.

Among Central Asian jihadis, Tajikistan-focused jihadis that are part of the Jamaat Ansarullah attempted cross-border infiltration and attacks, while the Turkistan Islamic Party also remained in the country.

As for ISIS-K, the group’s overall violence dropped over the last year and it also failed to expand its territorial presence, which was a concern when the Taliban first came to power. The Taliban have been working to neutralize ISIS-K and successfully eliminated some of its leaders this year, potentially including a commander involved in the attack at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul during the evacuation in August 2021.

However, ISIS-K still managed to conduct some high-profile attacks, including killing two Taliban provincial governors, as well as attacks in neighboring Pakistan and Iran. It has also demonstrated signs of integration into a strong transnational network, with reports that the group is receiving funding and guidance from ISIS in Iraq, Syria and Somalia and providing direction to operatives in Maldives. The group appears to regularly transmit funds for plotting activities, with indications of active and foiled plots. While there were reports of disruptions in ISIS-K propaganda, recent releases by the group suggest that its propaganda is back on track.

Taliban Policy Toward International Terrorists

On the face of it, the Taliban insist they are committed to denying the use of their territory by terrorist groups against other countries. However, closer examination reveals that the Taliban’s policy toward militants has three main facets: enablement, restrictions and crackdown.

The Taliban enable various militant groups by providing them continued haven and safety within the country. The Taliban also do not restrict the movement of at least some of these militants inside the country. Moreover, the Taliban provide welfare payments and access to weaponry and ammunition to allied groups, among other forms of material support.

Yet this enablement often comes with certain restrictions. For instance, the Taliban seem to have asked al-Qaeda to not undertake attacks against the United States and its allies, as indicated by both U.S. intelligence assessments and al-Qaeda’s own messaging. Additionally, the Taliban prevent groups within the country from disclosing their locations in their propaganda. This has led to AQIS releasing written materials without accompanying videos. The TTP also denies being based in Afghanistan.

More recently, the Taliban have attempted to discourage their own fighters from joining foreign jihadist groups. The extent to which the Taliban can exert actual control over this complex militant environment remains unclear, but indications suggest that the Taliban have a formal apparatus as part of the GDI to manage foreign fighters within the country.

Against ISIS-K, the Taliban’s crackdown seems to have at least three different verticals: targeting high-value targets such as top ISIS-K leaders; a large-scale counterintelligence campaign within the Taliban’s ranks in search of insiders working for ISIS-K; and punishing segments of populations perceived to be aligned with ISIS-K, such as the Salafi population in the east and north of the country. This campaign seems to be spearheaded by Taliban’s GDI with the involvement of forces from the Ministry of Defense as well.

What explains the terrorism threats and the Taliban’s policy?

Terror groups in Afghanistan appear to remain resolved to long-term campaigns against their respective adversaries. The TTP appears to be moving most aggressively, building up its organization and expanding, whereas others, like al-Qaeda, appear circumspect.

Some, including U.S. intelligence analysis, attribute the cautious approach of al-Qaeda to capacity limitations rooted in organizational weakness. But in Afghanistan’s highly permissive environment, capability buildup for most militants, including al-Qaeda, isn’t a challenge so long as they don’t directly contest the Taliban. A more likely explanation is that Taliban allied terrorist groups are working within the parameters laid down for them by the Taliban. If any group appears to be lower capacity and not rapidly building up organizational strength, most likely that is by choice, perhaps in deference to the Taliban.

When it comes to the Taliban, some analysts suggest that the Taliban have initiated a long and slow process of reining in militants. Others say that the Taliban perhaps lack the capacity to take on some of their allied militants and also fear provoking a backlash. A more plausible explanation is that the Taliban retain their longstanding political desire to be a host to foreign jihadists who are dissidents in their own countries, as well as a supporter of jihadist campaigns internationally — especially in Pakistan. The Taliban chief Hibatullah Akhundzada has spoken about a long, enduring ideological battle in general and with the Western world in particular. He has also spoken negatively about Pakistan’s political system.

At the same time, the Taliban are also attempting to strike a delicate balance between fulfilling their jihadist ambitions as well as obligations to jihadist brethren on one hand and restraining their activities for geopolitical ends on the other. This restraint seems to be intended to avoid jeopardizing their own regime’s survival due to potential actions outside powers can take, including by forging an international consensus and military action against them.

In the same vein, the Taliban’s crackdown against ISIS-K is rooted in self-preservation. The Taliban see ISIS-K as an implacable foe and the main opposition group that’s able to make political and religious appeals with the most direct potential to weaken the Taliban internally. Thus, the Taliban seek to forcefully counter it.

Implications for U.S. Policy

Current terrorism activity traceable to Afghanistan — and the Taliban’s aid and support for terrorists — falls short of the worst-case scenario from a U.S. policy standpoint: There hasn’t been a major attack in the United States; al-Qaeda or ISIS-K haven’t opened largescale training camps in the country; and the Taliban’s words and select deeds, like restraining al-Qaeda from attacks, are an improvement on the Taliban posture the last time they were in power.

As for the terrorist groups that are thriving under the Taliban, like the TTP, policymakers have reason to believe that they are not directly America’s problem — at least until they begin to seriously destabilize Pakistan and threaten the security of its nuclear weapons or demonstrate an intent to target the United States. The Taliban’s continued and forceful targeting of ISIS-K is also a favorable outcome. But despite some behind the scenes exchanges between the United States and the Taliban, it doesn’t appear to be a function of any incentive offered by the United States or the international community. The Taliban’s own threat perception motivates them to go after ISIS-K. And their decision to somewhat restrict al-Qaeda seems to be a result of the threat of U.S. targeting and diplomatic pressure — thereby constituting a case of deterrence.

Yet the distance between the Taliban’s stated position of preventing Afghanistan’s territory from being a threat to other countries and their actual policy of supporting several terrorist groups should be concerning. Whether the benefits accrued by terrorist groups that are not America’s immediate problem will begin to spillover or offer opportunities for terrorist groups that are of concern to the United States, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS-K, is unclear and should be a focus of counterterrorism strategists. It is also not clear that the Taliban’s ongoing campaign against ISIS-K will effectively degrade the group, especially when they are resorting to indiscriminate tactics against the country’s Salafi population.

Washington should communicate to the Taliban through a dedicated intelligence channel — as well as through shows of force when necessary — that in case of any attacks on the United States or core U.S. interests by the Taliban’s allied terrorist groups, the protections they have under the Doha agreement will go away and major consequences will follow. The channel should also be used to convey concerns and explore the possibility of exchanges on shared threats.

The United States should maintain the international coalition of withholding full normalization of ties with the Taliban and other terrorism-related sanctions until there is demonstrable proof that terrorist groups are being denied safe haven in Afghanistan. To reinforce the over-the-horizon posture, the United States should beef up counterterrorism-specific intelligence analysis capabilities consisting of analysts, linguists and screeners available to the military while also expanding the Rewards for Justice program to generate leads. The terror landscape in Afghanistan remains highly uncertain and dynamic, requiring significant vigilance.

Two Years Under the Taliban: Is Afghanistan a Terrorist Safe Haven Once Again?
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Don’t shut the door on Afghans. The people deserve connectivity and all its hope and promise

August 25, 2023

Nicola Gordon-Smith

The Guardian
Mon 14 Aug 2023

Western officials like me watched in despair two years ago on this day when the Taliban dramatically seized back control of Afghanistan, 20 years after the US-led invasion, toppling their regime in Kabul.

The Afghan people, especially women and girls, faced the new and grim reality of their lives dictated by ideologues and the deprivation of hard won freedoms during the two decades of west-backed fragile democracy. Documentaries detailing those dramatic days of the August 2021 fall of Kabul to the Taliban will soon be playing on our screens, bringing those shocking events back to the front of our minds.

As a former Australian ambassador to Afghanistan, I, like many colleagues, received calls, texts and emails from Afghans I had known and worked with, desperate for information, advice and help as the Taliban drew closer. Through a US-led effort large numbers of Afghans, especially those who had worked with western authorities, were evacuated from Kabul in a massive airlift.

Many still remain in hiding there including those in desperate wait to join their loved ones here in Australia.

I have not been able to delete the chain of messages from a special co-worker who tried again and again to reach the Kabul airport during the early days of the Taliban takeover. She texted as she negotiated her way through Taliban roadblocks, skirting mobs on the streets, protecting her young children from the threat of violent extremists, including those who launched a suicide bomb attack outside the Kabul airport, tragically taking the lives of 13 members of the US military and over 180 Afghan citizens.

My friend managed to find other people she knew. Sick with fear, they scaled barriers, squeezed through fences, and hid as darkness fell before retreating home to try again. After several days’ of this ordeal, they forded a sewage-filled channel, wading waist deep, to reach western soldiers protecting the airport perimeter. My friend and her colleagues managed to demonstrate their connection to Australia and were able to contact officials who helped them.

Let’s not abandon Afghans under the Taliban

Now, two years on, the international community is still conflicted about how to approach the country and the Taliban administration.

Some have called for rapprochement for the sake of the Afghan people, but significant parts of the western world remain steadfast in supporting isolation of the Taliban’s Afghanistan.

UN secretary general António Guterres has said that now is not the right time to engage with the Taliban. When will be the right time? The Taliban is a terrible regime, but it is important to differentiate between political isolation of the Taliban regime and the potential abandonment of about 40 million Afghan civilians.

Afghan people are already dealing with the day to day realities of Taliban rule. I cannot know what has happened to many of the people, especially the women – professional women, students, young and not so young – who I met in Kabul and in the provinces when I served there. Those people depend on the international community considering their welfare as separate from their current political leadership.

They need support beyond simple humanitarian assistance – they need investment, essential services and support for economic growth, in spite of their challenging conditions.

In order to know what might be possible, including what could be the best way to see Afghan girls back in schools, it will be necessary to have some engagement with the Taliban.

One way the international community can support Afghanistan is to ensure that Afghan civilians feel connected with the rest of the world. Internet access in Afghanistan is extremely limited, with reportedly only a quarter of men and about 6% of women able to access basic internet services. In an increasingly digital world, Afghans need connectivity.

It is the responsibility of the international community to make sure that Afghans, especially women and girls who are now deprived of basic rights and freedoms, are connected through adequate access to the internet. We must not shut the digital door on the Afghan people.

While Australia managed to get many locally employed Afghans and their immediate family out, many family members remain behind. And that is very hard for those people, who are experiencing fear and anxiety being separated from family members, loved ones. The issue of refugees requires regional approaches, and global. It is not simple, there are many aspects of domestic and international policy involved. It’s about people – it matters and it’s very difficult.

If we continue to abandon Afghanistan under the Taliban with the humanitarian crisis and climate change wreaking havoc there, things will get worse.

More people will become more desperate and will feel driven to leave. They’ll move first into the neighbouring countries where they can cross over the border and then they’ll go further, wider. That movement will bring instability and uncertainty, and increased risk.

As the anniversary of those extraordinary August 2021 events approaches the international community should recognise that the people of Afghanistan deserve connectivity and all its hope and promise.

  • Nicola Gordon-Smith is a former Australian diplomat. She served as ambassador to Afghanistan from 2018-2019 and head of the taskforce for Australia’s Afghanistan assisted departure team

Don’t shut the door on Afghans. The people deserve connectivity and all its hope and promise
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How a suicide bombing in Pakistan shows spillover effect from Taliban’s Afghanistan

August 3, 2023

, ,

Heard on All Things Considered

National Public Radio

NPR’s Sacha Pfeiffer talks to security and counter-terrorism Asfandyar Mir about how instability in the Taliban’s Afghanistan has spilled into Pakistan, after a suicide bombing that killed dozens.
 

SACHA PFEIFFER, HOST:

Funeral services were held today in Pakistan, which is reeling from a suicide bombing on Sunday that left 50 dead and hundreds more injured. The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the attack. It targeted a rally for a Pakistani political party called JUI-F.

ASFANDYAR MIR: JUI-F has been an ally to the Taliban.

PFEIFFER: Asfandyar Mir specializes in South Asia and counterterrorism for the United States Institute of Peace. He says the attack was probably motivated by JUI-F’s alignment with the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan.

MIR: There are reports that some members of JUI-F have, in fact, directly supported the Taliban’s campaign against the Islamic State across the borders.

PFEIFFER: I spoke with Mir earlier today, and he said Pakistan’s growing violence and instability are linked to the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

MIR: I think before the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, relative peace and calm had been restored to Pakistan. There was much less insecurity in the country. But we’ve seen a steady rise since the Taliban’s takeover. Anti-Pakistan militants have found haven in Afghanistan, and they have been carrying out cross-border attacks. This attack, however, has been carried out by a group that the Taliban seek to fight – Islamic State Khorasan Province, which has claimed this attack. Look. These groups are trying to carve out space for themselves. So put simply, competition among militants is also contributing to this escalation that we see.

PFEIFFER: And it is a sad, terrible example of how one country being destabilized can destabilize other countries around it.

MIR: Right. That was a concern in the lead-up to the Taliban’s takeover and the U.S. withdrawal from the region. And what we’re seeing is that the first country to be affected by the insecurity that is sort of emanating from Taliban’s Afghanistan is, in fact, Pakistan.

PFEIFFER: There is also an election in Pakistan this fall. Any possible connection between the election and the campaigns and the suicide bombing?

MIR: I think that’s a possibility as well. JUI-F is one of the political parties, the religious political parties that have actively participated in elections. But in general, with the election season now looming in Pakistan, I’d say this attack – there a significant concerns that we might see more violence against political parties, not limited just to JUI-F.

PFEIFFER: How would you describe the overall political environment now in Pakistan? And then do you think that this bombing could have any impact on the political atmosphere?

MIR: So Pakistan has been reeling from multiple crises this past year. There’s been a major economic problem. Pakistan has been teetering on the cusp of a financial default. It barely averted that by signing an agreement with the IMF. There have been political challenges. There’s a lot of political polarization. And then, of course, this terrorism problem, which has been surging. So, you know, this attack increases the stakes of all of these crises because there is a concern that all these crises could come to fuse with one another and metastasize into something much bigger, more troubling, both for the country and its people, as well as for the broader region and the world.

PFEIFFER: Asfandyar Mir is with the United States Institute of Peace. Thank you very much.

MIR: Thanks for having me on.

How a suicide bombing in Pakistan shows spillover effect from Taliban’s Afghanistan
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Taleban Perceptions of Aid: Conspiracy, corruption and miscommunication

July 30, 2023

Sabawoon Samim • Ashley Jackson

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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Despite publicly claiming to welcome international aid, the Taleban government has exercised a growing influence over humanitarian operations within Afghanistan at both national and local levels. This includes bans on women working for NGOs and the United Nations and, more recently, an order to hand over all internationally funded education projects to the Ministry of Education. These more high-profile national orders have been issued alongside hurdles and increasing suspicion at the local level, from demands for beneficiary lists to the detention of aid workers. In this report, Sabawoon Samim* and Ashley Jackson** look at the factors driving these restrictions on aid delivery and the dynamics that shape Taleban attitudes toward aid and aid workers.

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking the link below.

After assuming power in August 2021, the Taleban government was initially eager to reassure the United Nations and NGOs that they could continue aid operations. First impressions were of greater access, not surprising given that the establishment of the Islamic Emirate also represented, largely, an end to hostilities and greater security for aid workers. Nearly two years on, the Islamic Emirate has introduced restrictions on a number of issues affecting how aid is provided and by whom.

These restrictions ranged from limitations on female participation in aid work to demands for information about aid workers and aid recipients. This peaked with the bans on Afghan women working for NGOs in December 2022 and the UN in April 2023. At the same time, aid workers have reported increasing attempts by local officials to influence who receives aid, who is hired to work on aid projects and how aid projects are carried out.

The Taleban’s attitude toward aid is complicated. On the one hand, aid operations are vital to delivering certain services such as health and education and they employ many Afghans. Foreign aid has been integral to keeping the economy afloat, with UN shipments of cash supporting the aid effort, injecting liquidity into the economy, stabilising the currency and keeping inflation in check. On the other hand, many government officials are deeply suspicious of aid actors and the motives of most donors, who have so far refused to recognise their government. While the government wants aid, it also wants to influence how it is spent and programmed.

This report delves into Taleban views of aid and the factors driving their suspicion and hostility, starting with exploring the roots of Taleban suspicion and distrust of aid and subsequently heads to their concerns of corruption within aid actors. The report then assesses the consequences of this suspicion and how and why the Taleban want to regulate aid, explains the existing misunderstanding between the Emirate and aid workers and looks back at the missed opportunities early on after the takeover to influence Taleban attitudes more positively toward aid.

* Sabawoon Samim is a Kabul-based researcher whose work focuses on the Taleban, local governance and rural society.

**Ashley Jackson is co-director of the Centre on Armed Groups and author of ‘Negotiating Survival: Civilian-Insurgent Relations under the Taliban’, Hurst & Co, 2021.

Edited by Kate Clark 

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking the link below.

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Taleban Perceptions of Aid: Conspiracy, corruption and miscommunication
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Taliban again denies TTP presence in Afghanistan

July 24, 2023
BY 
Long War Journal
July 21, 2023

The Taliban continues to claim that there are no foreign terror groups operating inside Afghanistan, despite plenty of evidence to the contrary. The latest denial came this week when the Taliban was pressed about the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan (TTP), which shelters inside of Afghanistan while it wages a deadly insurgency inside Pakistan.

In response to Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif recent accusation that the Afghan “is not abiding by the Doha Agreement” and “terrorists who shed the blood of Pakistanis can find refuge on Afghan soil,” Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that Afghanistan “is not used against Pakistan and Pakistan is a brother and Muslim country.”

Asif referred to the defunct Doha Agreement, in which the U.S. agreed to leave Afghanistan in exchange for nebulous and unenforceable promises from the Taliban. Under the agreement, the Taliban said it would “prevent any group or individual, including Al Qaeda, from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.” [See LWJ report, Analysis: Taliban leader declares victory after U.S. agrees to withdrawal deal.]

Mujahid responded by saying that the Taliban “signed the Doha agreement with America,” implying that Pakistan was exempted, and perhaps is not a U.S. ally.

The Taliban, of course, has lied about not allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for foreign terror groups. That was made fact on July 31, 2022, when the U.S. killed Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri in a safe house in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. Zawahiri was sheltered by a subordinate of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s Interior Minister and one of the group’s two deputy emirs.

The Taliban has lied about Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan for the past two decades, claiming the group’s members left after the U.S. invasion in 2001. The Taliban has maintained this lie even as both Al Qaeda and the Taliban has admitted that top leaders of the group have been killed in the country since then.

In the past, the Taliban has also attempted to assure the U.S. that Al Qaeda leaders based in the country were no threat to the U.S. As the 9/11 Commission found, the Taliban told an American diplomat in April 1998 that it didn’t know where Osama bin Laden was and, in any event, he wasn’t a threat to the United States. Four months later, on Aug. 7, 1998, Al Qaeda operatives drove two truck bombs into the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. [See LWJ report, The Taliban promises China it won’t allow terrorists to use Afghanistan as launching pad.]

The TTP’s presence in Afghanistan is undeniable. Thousands of TTP fighters maneuver in southern and eastern Afghanistan, and the group played a key role in the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. In a 2020 video released by the TTP that celebrated its second emir, Hakeemullah Mehsud, the TTP admitted that both he and his predecessor, Baitullah Mehsud, fought alongside the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan. The video stated that TTP’s men fought alongside the Afghan Taliban in Khost, Paktika, Paktia, Nangarhar, and Helmand.

In the mid-2000s, there were numerous reports of bodies of slain Pakistani Taliban fighters being brought back from Afghanistan to be buried. Faqir Mohammad, the former deputy emir of the TTP, was captured in Afghanistan in 2013 and freed after Afghanistan fell to the Taliban in Aug. 2021. The U.S. military struck a TTP training camp in eastern Afghanistan in 2018. After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban invited the TTP and the Pakistani government to Kabul to broker a ceasefire.

The ties between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban are also undeniable. The TTP’s emir has sworn allegiance to the leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Noor Wali Mehsud, the emir of the TTP, has said that his group “is a branch of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”

The latest report on Afghanistan by the United Nations Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which was released on June 9, noted that Afghan Taliban is directly sheltering, supporting, and training the TTP with the help of Al Qaeda. TTP fighters are training at a camp in Kunar province run by Al Qaeda. The UN estimated that more than 4,000 TTP fighters, commanders and leaders are sheltering in Afghanistan.

The Afghan Taliban continues to lie about TTP’s presence in an effort to obscure its relations with foreign terror groups, even if there is evidence to the contrary in plain sight.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD’s Long War Journal.

Taliban again denies TTP presence in Afghanistan
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The Daily Hustle: Women take to street peddling to feed their families

July 24, 2023

Sayed Asadullah Sadat • Roxanna Shapour

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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After the Taleban came to power in August 2021, the flow of international funds into the country that helped prop up the economy declined precipitously, and a significant number of people lost their jobs. Women, facing new legal restrictions on work from the Islamic Emirate, have been hit disproportionately hard by unemployment. With few options available to them, an increasing number of women, especially widows and single heads of household, have taken to selling goods from handcarts in an effort to earn a living. AAN’s Sayed Asadullah Sadat has heard from three female street vendors. Their arresting accounts of how the lack of paid work or forced unemployment, driven by the Emirate’s mounting restrictions on women working outside the home, have pushed them into joining the ranks of their male counterparts as street pedlars in Kabul.

When the Taleban took power, they told the tens of thousands of women who worked for the government to stay at home.[1] The Emirate continued to pay these women. 26-year-old Nilofar was one of those to lose her government job. She said that the Emirate eventually stopped paying her salary. Faced with the responsibility of supporting her family of 10 – her two children, disabled husband and his father and four sisters, she took to street peddling to support the family.

Things took a turn for the worse for our family when my husband, who was in the military, lost both his legs and damaged his spine on the battlefield. Money-wise, we had to tighten our belts, but back then, I was working for the government and my salary was enough to keep us going. After the Taleban came to power, I lost my job. They kept paying my salary for a while, but eventually stopped paying me.

I used some of my savings to buy a karachi [handcart]. I sold soda, cigarettes and cold water, but my husband’s injuries required medical attention, so I had to sell the handcart to pay for his treatment. After that, I started selling ice cream. The company gave me the handcart and I get a percentage of what I sell – 2 afghanis [about two and a half US cents] for every small ice cream cone, which sells for 10 afghanis [12 US cents] and 5 afghanis [about five and a half US cents] for the large ones, which go for 20 afghanis [24 US cents]. It comes out at 100 to 200 afghanis [1.17 to 2.33 US dollars] a day. That is enough to pay for our basic needs, including rent and utilities.

Life is hard for a woman in this country and for women street peddlers, it’s doubly hard. We have to endure street harassment which is an unfortunate pastime of some Afghan men. They say and do disgusting things without a second thought.

The Taleban make it difficult for me to work. In the early days, they wouldn’t let me work. They kept telling me that I couldn’t do this work without a mahram. Eventually, a nice Taleb agreed to come to my home and see the situation for himself. He saw the house full of women, my elderly father-in-law and my bedridden husband for himself and helped me get official permission to sell my ice cream. He cautioned me to observe the hijab and stay in one place, but I have to move around. People are poorer these days, they don’t have enough money for luxuries like ice cream and I have to keep moving to crowded locations in search of customers. It’s a game of cat and mouse, evading the Talebs so I can sell my ice cream. Some of them are nice and when I explain my situation, they let me be, but there are those who have no sympathy for my situation at all, they make me move on and leave the area.

So this is how I spend my days, peddling ice cream from Kart-e Parwan to Shahr-e Naw and Wazir Akbar Khan and sometimes all the way to the airport. At the end of the day, I go back to the ice cream company, turn over that day’s earnings and they give me my share every day. I leave the karachi at the company and they fill it overnight with ice cream for me to sell the next day.

I take my meagre earnings and rush home. I pick up some bread along the way. Sometimes when I have the money, I get some vegetables or yoghurt, but I’m worried about the winter when people don’t buy ice cream.

Another Kabuli, 35-year-old Leilma, supports her two daughters and infant son by selling socks and masks in the west of the city. She said she had lost her stock several times after the Taleban confiscated her karachi because she was selling on a main road without a permit from the municipality.

I used to work for a private company as a cook. My husband worked too. We didn’t have an extravagant life, but we had enough money to live a good life and our children were in school. But after the Taleban took over, the economy went bad, and both my husband and I lost our jobs. Last year, after looking for a job in Afghanistan for over a year, my husband went to Iran in search of work. He was caught by the police in Iran and spent some time in jail. Finally, with the help of some friends, he was released. He has a job now, but everything is so expensive in Iran and he can’t send us much money. So it’s up to me to support the family.

I looked for work too, but there were no jobs for women. Finally, I decided to buy a karachi with the money I had left. I bought socks and masks from the Mandawi [Kabul’s central open-air market]. Now, I spend all day hawking my socks and masks. I make 2 afghanis [about two and a half US cents] in profit for every mask I sell and 5 afghanis [about five and a half US cents] for a pair of socks. People aren’t buying masks so much anymore, so I don’t make much money. Most days, I go home without enough money to even buy bread for my children.

My infant son is now malnourished. I heard some organisations give people food and treat malnourished children, but we haven’t received anything and I don’t know where to go to get help. We don’t have a man at home to follow up on these things and find the offices and I don’t have time to do it myself. I can’t miss time from work because every hour I’m not on the street is money lost.

Every day is like an obstacle course. I have to keep on the move because the municipality has rules about street peddlers staying in one place. The Taleban are always bothering me and telling me to move on. Sometimes, they confiscate my karachi and I have to go to the police station to get it back. When I do get it back, my stock is missing and I have to find the money to buy more things to sell. They made me sign a paper several times promising I would not sell on the main roads, but I don’t have a choice; there is no footfall and no customers on the side streets.

48-year-old Maryam has been her family’s sole breadwinner since her husband was killed by a suicide attacker several years ago. Her older daughters used to help her, but she finally decided to leave them at home to protect them from attention from the Taleban and street harassment.

I used to have a proper job working for an international organisation, but after the Republic fell, I lost it and couldn’t find another one. Now, they say women can’t work in offices anymore. I’m a widow with six daughters and a son. It’s up to me to feed my family. There is no one else to provide for us. So, I borrowed money from a relative, bought a karachi and started selling vegetables and greens on the street. At first, my eldest daughters would come along to help me, but they attracted too much attention and we were constantly harassed by men on the street. I finally decided to leave them at home and go it alone. I’m older and I don’t get harassed as much.

Most people are friendly and respectful, but there are always those few bad apples who say off-colour or hurtful things. What can I say? It’s the lot of women on the streets of Kabul. We hear a thousand and one unpleasant things every day. We have to tolerate it; there is no other way. Sadly, this is our culture. When you’re down, people look down on you.

Some Taleban treat me well, but most think women should not be working outside the house and definitely not as street peddlers where all the men can see us. They stop and tell me that I’m not allowed to operate a karachi on the street among non-mahrams [men who are not close relatives]. But I try to meet all obstacles head-on and find a way to get past them. What else can I do? I have to feed my family.

Life is getting more difficult every day. I wish the Taleban would let women work for the government or foreign organisations. Many women don’t have a husband to provide for them and have to find ways to provide for their children. If I could get a job, I could make as much as 5,000 afghanis a month [58 USD] – a living wage. I’m ready to do any kind of work, cooking, cleaning, anything really. I wish I had enough money to start a small business at home and put my girls to work. But I have borrowed money from everyone I know and no one will lend me any more money because they don’t think I can pay them back.

I earn about 150 to 200 afghanis [1.75 to 2.30 USD] a day; if I work every day, it’s enough to meet our expenses. But sometimes, when business is bad or when I’m prevented from selling by the Taleban, I don’t make enough money and we have trouble making ends meet. If I get sick, that’s one day’s earnings gone. Some days, I can’t afford to buy much stock from the vegetable market because the prices have shot up overnight. Still, I have to keep trying. I have no other choice. I’m two months behind on rent and the landlord has been hassling me. The rent is 3,000 afghanis [35 USD] and I don’t know how I’m going to find the money to pay him. I stay up nights worrying that we will end up without a roof over our heads.

At the end of the day, I take a look at what’s left on my cart. Some things will keep for another day, but people buy only fresh produce, so I take the wilted greens and rotten vegetables home and we eat them ourselves. It eats into my profits, but it keeps food on the table and keeps my losses to a minimum.

During the Republic, my husband and I had so much hope for our daughters. They were all in school and we helped them with their homework. We thought they would grow up educated, get office jobs and support us in our old age. Now that future seems like an impossible dream. I don’t know what to do. Where should I raise my voice to ask for help? There is no one to hear us.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour

References

References
↑1 Shortly after the Taleban takeover women in the civil service were told to stay home until further notice. Over the ensuing months more rules and decrees were introduced preventing women from working in December 2022 for NGOs and eventually in April 2023 for the UN. Some working in foreign embassies have also been hit by this ban. Most recently, in July 2023, the Emirate ordered all beauty parlors to shut down, closing off one of the last all-female income sources for women in Afghanistan.

REVISIONS:

This article was last updated on 23 Jul 2023

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From Land-grabbing to Haircuts: The decrees and edicts of the Taleban supreme leader 

July 16, 2023

Kate Clark

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The decrees, edicts and instructions of Taleban supreme leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, from 2016, when he became leader, to May 2023, have been published. They make fascinating reading, tracing some of what the leadership felt was important to ban, make obligatory, organise or administer during the insurgency and since recapturing power. Some themes are repeated – land and land-grabbing, administrative corruption and treatment of prisoners, including using torture without a court order. Several orders enjoin Taleban fighters to good behaviour, such as not letting hair grow below the shoulders, not using profanities and avoiding cronyism and ethnocentrism. Alongside AAN’s English translation of the decrees, which can be found in the Resources section of our website, Kate Clark has been delving into their substance to see what they tell us about the Taleban’s leader and the Islamic Emirate.

65 decrees, edicts and instructions from Mullah Hibatullah have been published in the Official Gazette (announcement here). The original orders in Dari and Pashto, as well as an unofficial English translation by AAN are available in the Resources section of the AAN website. A list of the orders (brief title and number) can also be found here.

A forthcoming report on Taleban publications will examine, a book by their Chief Justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani, “Al-Emarat al-Islamiya wa Nidhamuha” (The Islamic Emirate and its System of Governance), which may be the fullest and most authoritative account yet of the Taleban’s vision of governance.

Ruling by decree is nothing new. The Islamic Republic’s presidents, Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, and before them, the first Taleban amir, Mullah Omar, also issued decrees and edicts which had the force of law. According to the 2004 Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the National Assembly, with its two houses, was the highest legislative organ in the country (the cabinet could also suggest laws to MPs). The president could issue decrees of two types: administrative (regulatory) and legislative only in emergencies and which were supposed to be temporary and needed parliamentary approval (if MPs voted a decree down, it would be rescinded). The cabinet could also issue regulations, and ministries could issue policy documents, such as action plans and other administrative documents, without the need for approval by the cabinet or parliament.”

The Islamic Emirate’s legislative process is far less clear and there is far less literature on its nature and organisation. Existing literature suggests that among the Emirate’s key attributes are that “all branches of government are subject to the authority of the emir” and that “basic rights are defined/limited by Sharia as interpreted by the emir/leadership” (see this USIP report).

Hibatullah is the highest authority in the Emirate, and his orders are the law. Under the Emirate, there is no parliament and legislative, executive and judicial powers are the exclusive purview of the amir. The 2004 constitution has apparently been suspended (according to UNAMA, quoting the acting Deputy Minister of Justice on 22 September 2022 in which he said it was unnecessary (see TOLO News, “Officials: Afghanistan Does Not Need a Constitution”, quoted in UNAMA’s May 2023 report “Corporal Punishment and the Death Penalty in Afghanistan” p10). Islamic judges and muftis, including the Emirate’s fatwa-issuing institution, the Dar al-Ifta, are also powerful and their rulings are enforceable. Relevant departments have the authority to draw up legislation. It is reviewed by the Ministry of Justice and a special commission before being sent to Hibatullah for sign-off (see decree (9) on page 67 of AAN’s unofficial translation dated 24 October 2022, which sets out the process and principles for enacting legislative documents).

Like his predecessors, the numbering of Hibatullah’s orders is inconsistent, for example, in his first year as leader, he issued four orders, numbered 82, 85, 86 and 87, with 83 and 84 missing. One of the orders from 2022 also refers to an earlier unpublished set of instructions by name, date and volume number: it had forbidden officials from holding “needless and lavish” wedding ceremonies when they married for a second, third or fourth time. The 2022 order instructed the Taleban’s ‘morality police’, Amr bil Maruf, to identify those disobeying instructions and report them to the leadership.[1]

Karzai and Ghani both issued decrees that were never published. It was unclear whether this was because they were too sensitive or too trivial or just because the system was not standardised. Maybe this is also the case for Hibatullah.[1] Whether or not this is a complete list, there is much in the 65 published orders[2] that is of interest: they point to what was important at the time to the leadership.

The orders span the last seven years, with the first issued in 2016, when Hibatullah took over as Taleban supreme leader following the killing of his predecessor, Mullah Akhtar Mansur, in an American drone attack (Hibatullah’s second order accepts and endorses all of Mansur’s orders). 19 orders were issued during the insurgency (four in 2016, six in 2017, none in 2018, seven in 2019 and two in 2020), and the bulk since the Taleban and Hibatullah captured power in August 2021.

The insurgency-era decrees are mostly to do with keeping control of fighters and commanders and ironing out arbitrary or potentially problematic behaviour. Some cover conduct in war – how to treat prisoners, not growing long hair and not using profanities in communications – this is “inappropriate” and gives the enemy “an excuse for insulting the mujahedin [as the Taleban call themselves].” Also important is curbing behaviour in the field which would harm higher-order priorities, for example, accepting government soldiers who have switched sides, even if they bring no weapons with them, and not persecuting defectors; the leadership wanted to encourage defections and government soldiers and officials needed to have confidence that amnesties would be honoured to come over.

Other insurgency-era orders are to do with quasi-state functions, sometimes with an apparent eye to trying to prevent administrative corruption in the ranks, for example the ban on seizing land, the order to hand over Emirate property to one’s successor upon redeployment, not publishing books without the leadership’s permission and the proper use of seals. One of the decrees, about how to certify a person is missing so that a widow can re-marry (the decree only refers to dead male spouses), looks to be a response to a need for legal clarity in an organisation which saw so many of its members killed.

After the Taleban’s capture of power and its transformation, once again, into Afghanistan’s rulers, many more of Hibatullah’s orders have been to do with administration and ensuring order within the state: which ministries should report to which of the acting Prime Minister’s deputies, relocating departments and courts, defining the duties of various government bodies, defining the stages legislative documents go through and ordering the Supreme Court to send its decisions to the leadership. A good number look to be trying to head off administrative corruption, while many deal with the security services, including purging the ranks of “undesirable and corrupt people.”

However, it is noticeable that the 46 orders issued since the Taleban’s return to power are not aimed at redesigning the administration of the Afghan state. The ideology and aims of the Emirate certainly represent a very clear break from the past. The Emirate’s leaders, from the amir down to many in civil service middle management, are also new to their posts, along with almost all the security forces and judiciary personnel. Yet, the Emirate has largely kept the administrative and financial systems and institutions of the Republic intact, and Hibatullah’s orders are not those of a leader seeking to overturn them. Rather, the changes they institute are largely marginal to the state’s bureaucracy, financial system and administrative systems, aimed not at nullifying them, but, as the Taleban presumably see it, improving what they have inherited.

Some themes running through the orders

Hibatullah appears particularly concerned with two areas of governance, both as leader of an insurgent movement and later ruler of a state – firstly, the courts and secondly, the fighters who would become the Emirate’s security services – with some overlap, for example, the treatment of prisoners of war and the role of military courts.

This attention is hardly surprising. The Taleban’s founding legend, from 1994 Kandahar, is that its formation was prompted by the need to deliver justice and free the people from tyranny. During the insurgency, Taleban courts, whether fixed or mobile, have been the key service the movement has delivered, including during the insurgency in areas under its control or influence (education, health and other services continued to be delivered by the Islamic Republic, as AAN’s 2018-2021 series on service delivery in insurgency-influenced districts detailed). As to the orders’ focus on fighters/the security services, from 1994 until 2021, the movement’s primary activity was fighting. Much of the leadership’s attention has naturally been devoted to organising and controlling its large body of armed men. Some themes emerging in the orders are looked at in more detail below.

Land grabbing and other corrupt administrative practices/abuses of power

Land is the subject of six out of the 65 orders – roughly ten per cent of the total – and features both before and after the takeover: state land can be leased to the public (2017) and; private land must not be seized by the ‘mujahedin’ or anyone else (2019). After the takeover, the first two published orders concerned land. In the first five weeks after the Taleban captured the Afghan capital, Hibatullah ordered the end to what he said had been “the norm” under the “puppet administration” – the usurpation of state land. He also ordered provincial governors “to rigorously prevent the grabbing of Emarati [state] land and hand over usurpers to face Sharia law.”

A month later, in October 2021, he again banned land-grabbing, this time for land whose ownership was not clear. Only the supreme amir, the order decreed, “Based on necessity and expediency, can give [such land] to a member (of the Muslim community) as property.” The decree drew a parallel with what it said was the amir’s right to “withdraw from the public coffer [bait ul-maal]” and presumably give money to someone, again because of expediency. This is something also banned for others, elsewhere in this body of orders. In March 2023, the ban on officials selling land, or transferring land to individuals or corporations, was repeated unless there was a specific decree from the amir.[3]

Land has always been and will remain a source of controversy and conflict in Afghanistan. Throughout the war, since 1978, it has been seized by successive administrations and victorious commanders, creating layers of claims and counterclaims. Even before the Saur Coup, rulers in Kabul ceded land, typically to particular ethnic groups and tribes for political reasons, making ownership an even more historic source of lingering conflict.[4]That land has emerged again as an issue requiring the amir’s attention is entirely unsurprising.

Another issue that has appeared both in insurgency-era orders and since the re-establishment of the Emirate concerns state property: officials who are redeployed should not take “office accessories and state equipment,” including vehicles, with them but hand the property over to their successor (2019). In 2022, that ban was repeated twice, and in the second became even stronger and more explicit – a part of a long decree outlining the formation, duties and powers of the Security and Screening Commission, whose main task was to purge the ranks of the security forces, the text said:

Any individual involved in looting or removing without authorisation from the leadership, equipment, military or non-military vehicles, ammunition or gear belonging to the Islamic Emirate will be hunted down and the property of bait ul-maal (public coffer) will be recovered. If felt necessary, they should be expelled from the defence and security organisations and introduced to the military court.

The amir is explicitly excluded both from the ban on taking from the public coffer and the ban on transferring ownership of land. In these areas, Hibatullah has taken on monopoly powers.[5] It is easy to see how new cycles of conflict could be set up by his giving away land, if the transfers are seen as biased or unfair. As to taking from the public coffer, if at scale, this would undermine the public finance system, given that budgeting and ensuring spending does not exceed revenues is so crucial to the steady running of government and stewardship of the economy.

There are also a slew of orders attempting to prevent different types of administrative corruption that have been issued since the Taleban recaptured power and its officials came to control so many resources. They include: a ban on double salaries (2022), that revenues must be collected transparently and then, “to avoid irregularities and chaos,” must be handed over to the Ministry of Finance, with no independent spending of them (2022), the establishment of a National Procurement Commission (October 2022), and various spending limits for ministries and departments set, above which the Commission has to approve procurements (also October 2022) and – because corrupt procurement was still a problem? – a ban on state officials and employees and private companies in which officials and employees have shares or management responsibilities tendering bids for goods, services or gaining contracts for building materials or mines (2023).

A particularly strong decree, quoting a Hadith threatening hell for perpetrators, was issued in 2022, forbidding ‘cronyism’ in public recruitments; officials should not award jobs to their relatives or friends, it said. The message was repeated in a later order that year in a long decree concerning the behaviour and attitudes of the ‘mujahedin’. They are ordered to act only for God, to be pious, fair, kind and just, to eschew arrogance, to “strictly avoid ethnocentrism, regionalism, language-centrism and cronyism and refrain from cheating the public coffer (repeated twice in the same order), to pray in the mosque and support the families of the martyrs. The order appeared aimed at closing the gap between how the movement views its ideal self and the reality on the ground.

Other orders look less concerned with preventing corruption and more to do with ensuring financial matters are regular and systematised: for example, aligning the financial affairs of state bodies when it comes to salaries, e’asha(lunch and other free food provided to staff) and other expenses within the financial system of the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance (2022) and aligning salaries in the three branches of the security services (Ministries of Interior, Defence and the General Directorate of Intelligence) (2022). In the same year, the amir also ordered the Commission of Economy to activate all idle state-owned sources of revenue generation and inform the leadership about them.

Justice: courts, prisoners, punishment and torture

15 orders, or just under a quarter of the total, deal with justice, including the courts, lawyers, prisoners and legislation. Before the takeover, the main focus was on the treatment of prisoners of war, with some orders repeated after the takeover, but concerning prisoners in general.

Hibatullah’s first published order, in June 2016, referred to what he said were recent instances of “captured prisoners of war being arbitrarily subjected to tazir [discretionary][6] or inappropriate punishment and, in some cases, even killing without the knowledge of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s General Directorate of Courts.” No one has the right to punish a prisoner, the order insisted, nor exempt them from punishment, with the exception of the amir or his deputy. Furthermore, filming the scene of a killing was banned, and if an execution was ordered, it must be by firing.

In 2017, the ban on filming executions was repeated, along with a ban on filming the beating of enemy soldiers and implementing hudud and qisas punishments,[7] and all executions had to be approved by all three tiers of the justice system (primary, appeal and supreme) and the leadership.

Similar orders were given in November 2019 – quoting the Quran and Hadith, to treat captives well – and in November 2020, that “only a Sharia court has the prerogative to decide on the guilt of a suspect and punish criminals.” That order goes on to instruct all officials and mujahedin to pay the utmost attention to two points:

1. No one has the right to beat with sticks, [use] whips [dura] or cables or torture [a person] in any other way without a court order. When mujahedin take someone into custody, be they a political or criminal prisoner, they have no right to punish [that person] without a court order;

2. No one has the right to take photographs of the scene of a punishment or to film it. 

Violators will be “considered criminals,” the decree goes on to say and will be punished for “disobeying Sharia norms and decrees, disturbing public order and defaming the Islamic Emirate.” In 2019, Hibatullah again ordered officials to refrain from torturing, because torture, like tazir punishments, could only be carried out with a court order. Also, suspects must not be kept under investigation for more than a month, unless, again, officials obtain a court order. Without court orders, it says, torture or punishment is “not justice, but oppression [zulm]. Preventing zulm is an obligation [wajeb], while allowing it to happen is forbidden [haram].”

For human rights advocates, this and some of the later orders are significant because, under International Humanitarian Law, torture is always illegal – regardless of whether a court or anyone else has authorised it. Others have deployed torture in Afghanistan in recent years, the United States military and CIA and the Republic’s intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in particular, but they either denied it was happening, insisted what they did was not really torture or implied it was necessary, even though it was illegal. Only the Emirate has been so frank about torturing detainees.[8]

After the takeover, in March 2022, all these commands were repeated: avoid torture and punishment of detainees – both are the “sole prerogative of the courts,” while keeping detainees under investigation was now not permitted beyond ten days, again, unless with a court order.

The frequent repetition of the same commands strongly suggests there has been a continuing problem with torture and arbitrary punishment. The latter has been tracked by UNAMA in its human rights reporting, most recently in a report published on 7 May 2023, which collated evidence both of non-court authorities, eg provincial and district governors, implementing punishments after a formal decision, and non-judicial officials, such as Amr bil Maruf, police and intelligence officials, carrying out punishments ad hoc. (See UNAMA, “UNAMA Brief on Corporal Punishment and the Death Penalty in Afghanistan” and AAN’s analysis.)

Since the takeover, the amir has placed an emphasis on the organisation of the justice system, especially the place of the military courts, setting limits on their jurisdiction (2021), ordering the establishment of an implementation force, merging military courts within the structure of the Supreme Court (2022) and finally, dissolving the Ministry of Defence’s military courts (2022).

Other orders have moved all specialisations in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and issuing fatwas from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Higher Education (2022), with Justice also losing the Law Department, this time to the Supreme Court (2022). The time taken for laws to be drafted has been set (2022), as has the time given to law courts to consider cases (2023), while new procedures were established for licensing law firms (2022).

The Emirate’s fighters/security services 

Many of the 65 orders focus on controlling the ‘mujahedin’ and, after the takeover, organising them into security services and purging their ranks. The last published order before the Taleban’s capture of power was a decree liquidating ‘general fronts’, issued in January 2021. Like the mujahedin factions before them, the Taleban recruited and organised themselves organically in a multi-level military hierarchy of district and provincial commanders, ultimately all falling under the movement’s Military Commission. A ‘mahaz’, usually translated – somewhat confusingly as ‘front’ – is a grouping of groups of fighters, totalling anywhere between 200 and 1000 men, led ultimately by a single commander. This was highly useful and effective for organising an insurgency, but was always risky for the leadership as it created the potential for rival centres of power to emerge if a commander’s influence extended too widely. This decree sought to limit fronts to their commander’s own province. It banned recruitment from other provinces and said that any group loyal to a commander, but active in another province should come under the orders of that province’s governor. “General fronts,” it said, were “forbidden in the structure of the Islamic Emirate.[9]

After the takeover, several orders were issued to do with ‘cleansing’ the ranks and ensuring those who fail vetting cannot join other services. The US military did not destroy biometric data gathered from members of the Republic’s Afghan security forces and NDS, which meant the Emirate had a database to work from (see reporting, for example, by Human Rights Watch, on 30 March 2022). In 2021, a new body, the Military Commission, was set up with the task of purging the Emirate’s security forces of “undesirable and corrupt people.” This was followed in 2022 by an order to the security services to register ‘mujahedin’ with biometrics taken and positions and salaries specified. Later that year, a very long and detailed decree set out the duties of another new body, the Security and Screening Commission, also with a mandate to purge.

Conclusion

The orders published in the Official Gazette give us insights into what was important to the leadership at particular moments. Where problems have not been resolved, orders have been repeated, for example, the multiple bans on various types of land-grabbing, officials taking state property when they are redeployed, arbitrary punishment and unauthorised torture.

The body of orders also gives insight into the thinking and principles behind the orders. References to consultations with the ulema and reference to Hanafi jurisprudence feature prominently in the texts. Citations backing up the orders include some verses from the Quran and Hadiths and named collections of fatwas and exegeses of the Quran (tafsir).

There are also insights into what appears to interest or annoy Hibatullah personally. Only ask for a fatwa – a religious decision on a particular matter – officials were told in 2022, if the issue you are concerned about has not already been decided in your ministry’s rules and regulations. Was the leader being pestered for decisions?

Another order, issued just before the start of the new university year in 2022, delved into the minutiae of the religious education curricula of university students, even referring to spelling mistakes in the draft. The length and detail suggest this subject is particularly close to the Taleban’s supreme leader’s heart.

All orders can be read in the Resources section of the AAN website, both the PDF original, issued by the Ministry of Justice and an unofficial English translation by AAN.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour and Jelena Bjelica

References

References
↑1 The Department for Invitation and Guidance on Promoting Virtue and Preventing Vice (Dawat wa Ershad Amr bil-Maruf wa Nahi al-Munkar) is typically shortened by Afghans to ‘Amr bil-Maruf’ or, in English, ‘Vice and Virtue’. The same names are also used for its enforcers, also known in English as the Taleban’s ‘morality’ or ‘religious police’.

After the Taleban gained power in August 2023, the department became a ministry and was renamed the Ministry for Invitation and Guidance on Promoting Virtue and Preventing Vice and Hearing of Complaints. For more, on this body, see AAN’s report: Sabawoon Samim, “Policing Public Morality: Debates on promoting virtue and preventing vice in the Taleban’s second Emirate”, 15 June 2022.
↑2 There are a few important orders that we know about that have not been published, for example, the insurgency-era set of instructions banning the cultivation of cannabis (4/8/1441 (29 March 2020) No: 86/5), AAN wrote about the ban and published a translated text of the instructions as an annex to our report, “What now for the Taleban and Narcotics? A case study on cannabis”.
↑3  The other decree concerning land ordered the transfer of the Land Department from the Ministry of Urban Development to the Ministry Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock in 2022.
↑4  For more on this, see Liz Alden Wiley’s 2013 paper for AREU, “Land, People, and the State in Afghanistan: 2002 – 2012”, which reviewed the formal treatment of land rights in Afghanistan over the post-Bonn decade (2002–2012). For a recent case study of the historical dispute between Kuchi nomad landlords and settled, largely Hazara farmers and how this was renewed by shifts in power after the Taleban takeover, see Fabrizio Foschini’s 2022 paper for AAN, “Conflict Management or Retribution? How the Taleban deal with land disputes between Kuchis and local communities”.
↑5 In its November 2020 report “The Nature of the Afghan State: Republic vs. Emirate” USIP describes the key attributes of the Emirate as: sovereignty is manifested through implementation of Sharia; leader is chosen by a select Islamic shura, or council;  all branches of government are subject to the authority of the emir; and basic rights are defined/limited by Sharia as interpreted by the emir/leadership. Put another way: “The emir has near absolute executive, legislative and judicial authority, and while hypothetically having the same rights and responsibilities as other Afghan citizens [cites The Taliban’s draft Constitution of 1998, article 59] there are no provisions for accountability. Individual rights and freedoms are also subject to the limits of Sharia as determined by the emir and selected ulema.”
↑6  Islamic law has a standard three-way categorisation of offences and punishments (used by the Republic as well as the Emirate).

Hudud offences have punishments viewed as fixed by the Qur’an or Hadith and are perceived as offences against God; they include zina (sex outside marriage), accusing someone falsely of zina, drinking alcohol and some types of theft.

Qisas is a form of retributive justice between the victim, or their family, and the perpetrator. It allows for equal retaliation in cases of intentional bodily harm, up to and including murder. These crimes may also be forgiven by the victim or their family, or resolved between families with blood money or by giving a bride to the victim or a member of their family in what is called a bad marriage (this type of marriage was banned by Mullah Omar during the Taleban’s first emirate and in December 2021 (decree number 83, vol 1) by Hibatullah.

All other offences are given tazir punishments, which are at the discretion of a judge or ruler.

Different offences within all three categories may receive corporal, capital or other types of punishment.
↑7  For an explanation of hudud and qisas, see the previous footnote.
↑8 See AAN dossier “Detentions in Afghanistan – Bagram, Transfer and Torture.”
↑9 For more on the role and nature of fronts in the insurgency, see AAN guest author Rahmatullah Amiri’s second report in a two-part series from 2016 on how Helmand province was then falling to the Taleban, “Helmand (2): The chain of chiefdoms unravels”.

 

From Land-grabbing to Haircuts: The decrees and edicts of the Taleban supreme leader 
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