For the United States, greater engagement with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities is the least bad policy option.Since the Taliban retook power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the United States has found itself in a vexing dilemma — wanting to condemn and hold accountable the Taliban regime for persecutingwomen and girls, harboring terrorists and failing to govern inclusively, but also wanting Afghanistan to avoid famine and civil war, and achieve some economic and political stability. U.S. policymakers have thus tried to balance principle and pragmatism. To exert pressure on the Taliban, the United States has withheld diplomatic recognition and traditional development aid, frozen Afghan Central Bank assets and maintained sanctions on Taliban leaders. Yet it has also been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance, has not supported armed opposition to the Taliban and has effectively loosened sanctions to enable aid delivery and encourage economic activity.This U.S. policy approach holds internal contradictions. Humanitarian aid is saving lives, while punitive policies simultaneously hamstring the Afghan economy and perpetuate poverty. Such inconsistencies in policy are unsurprising for a superpower with complex interests, and have featured in U.S. foreign policyfor decades. But as the Taliban’s consolidation of power — and the limits of international leverage — become painfully clear, the United States and its partners appear to be moving toward a policy of more engagement with the regime.A shift toward more engagement is the least bad policy option; it affords more opportunities for progress over time, especially on the economy and livelihoods, than does disengagement or isolation. The international community can seek cooperation from the Taliban on issues of mutual interest, while keeping up pressure and withholding recognition until key demands on rights, governance and security are met.Outside actors should remain clear-eyed that expanded engagement — just like isolation — might not succeed in changing the Taliban’s reprehensible social policies. There are no easy or right answers here. Nevertheless, a coherent, longer-term strategy for engagement with the de facto Taliban authorities can help mitigate harm to the Afghan people and enable the United States to better address its security, humanitarian and rights interests in Afghanistan.
What Does ‘Engagement’ Mean, and What Is Driving Calls for More?
The word “engagement” is used frequently and loosely in discussions on Afghanistan, muddying the debate around policy choices. It can be defined as not only official meetings and communication, but also the concrete forms of collaboration that such dialogue facilitates, for instance on humanitarian and development aid, macroeconomic management, security, rights and governance, and regional and climate issues. To this author and as others have stressed, engagement does not mean diplomatic recognition of or fully normalized relations with the Taliban regime, but it does connote a relationship that maintains a two-way channel for communication and negotiation.
Despite the Taliban’s worsening record on human rights, especially those of women and girls, several factors are pushing the United States and its allies toward more engagement with the Taliban: 1) the depth of ongoing humanitarian need and Afghans’ depletion of safety nets; 2) the 2023 fundinggap for humanitarian aid for Afghanistan, and growing interest in resuming development assistance; 3) the Taliban’s steady consolidation of political power; 4) the international community’s failure thus far to pressure the Taliban to reverse its policies of gender persecution; 5) regional states’ increasingly activediplomacy with the Taliban; and 6) the Taliban’s continued willingness to engage with the West, alongside some evidence that they have cooperated on certain issues.
As of August, the 2023 Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan had received only 26.8 percent of the overall $3.2 billion required (an amount that was itself revised down in June from the initial request of $4.6 billion). For the past year, amid other global needs, donors’ generosity has been giving way to an urgency to not create dependency on humanitarian aid, to improve efficiency and to focus more on livelihoods and the underlying economic crisis. Thus far, the Taliban’s human rights violations have been the main obstacle to such a move. Donor capitals have very limited, if any, political space to provide traditional development aid to a pariah regime.
But two years in, there is an increasing sense that Taliban rule is the reality that international actors must deal with — like it or not. Punitive tools, such as sanctions and suspending dialogue in response to egregious policies being announced, have not worked to moderate or reverse restrictions against women and girls. Further, regional states are intensifying their engagement with the Taliban, even signaling that they might break the consensus on nonrecognition that has held thus far. This puts pressure on the West to remain engaged in order to preserve what degree of influence it has. A more dire Afghan economic collapse could intensify existing cross-border threats — a concern deeply felt by the region. But Russia and China are not willing or able to commit the level of resources that the West can bring to bear. Without access to Western financial markets and resources, Afghanistan will likely remain mired in deep poverty, buffeted by climate-related crises and a source of insecurity.
Finally, not lost on policymakers is the perhaps surprising fact that the Taliban are a willing interlocutor. The Taliban are reportedly wary of falling prey to China’s model of foreign investment, and want a relationship with the West. That very desire, even if it exists unevenly among Taliban leadership, suggests that the United States and its allies do have leverage. This leverage is only exercised, however, through engagement. Further, the Taliban are not a monolith; internal differences have been on public display. While Kabul-based officials are not driving decision-making in Kandahar, they and others in the provinces influence policy implementation. Last spring, senior Taliban officials who publicly criticized the emirate’s policies and are known to support girls’ education chose loyalty to the emir over resignation from their posts. But these intra-Taliban debates suggest that at some point moderation of policies might be possible. On security issues, in periodic meetings between U.S. and Taliban officials, by all appearances the two sides are discussing counterterrorism and detainee issues.
This window of opportunity for engagement may not be open forever. Policymakers should seek to avoid going down a path that mirrors North Korea, Iran or Cuba. Decades of punitive policies and withheld engagement have failed to incentivize those regimes to change their behavior, and meanwhile have unintentionally perpetuated the poverty and suffering of these populations.
Arguments for and Against Engagement
All this adds up to an argument for more consistent engagement with the Taliban. The logic is that by pursuing regular dialogue and confidence-building measures on multiple tracks, the United States and its partners can better help the Afghan people and protect their own security interests. This logic holds that some form of relationship with the Taliban might achieve incremental wins on mutual interests, while conversely, isolation (or the status quo of limited, drifting engagement) is unlikely to change Taliban behavior. Moreover, isolation may well strengthen Taliban hardliners — as it appeared to do in the late 1990s — and weaken those who are open to cooperation with the West. It bears acknowledgment that some Afghans inside the country have called for more, not less, U.S. and Western engagement with the Taliban.
There are compelling concerns about the risks of engagement as well. Some voices urge less engagement and more stringent conditions on the Taliban before using any lever of Western influence. They argue that more engagement lends legitimacy to the regime. Political scientist Dipali Mukhopadhyay points out that “[f]oreign aid and engagement often end up insulating the regimes that receive them from the hard domestic work of accommodating political rivals, bargaining over power and resources, and offering rights and concessions to citizens.” Questions around engaging the Taliban have created a rift among civil society and rights activists.
Indeed, a critical question is where human rights fit in a framework that favors greater engagement. More engagement would mean delivering consistent messaging on human rights at various levels of government, keeping rights on the agenda and enabling the United States to track developments more closely. A more distant goal of engagement would be to influence Taliban leaders toward reversal or moderation of policies violating Afghans’ human rights, especially those of women and girls; or to work with those within the movement who already support moderating such policies. It would require months or years to assess the outcomes of this approach.
A recent Foreign Affairs poll asked more than 50 prominent U.S., Afghan and international experts on Afghanistan, “Should the United States normalize relations with the Taliban?” Responses overwhelmingly advised against normalization, but embedded in the answers was the more nuanced debate about ill-defined “engagement.” Many of the experts arguing strenuously against normalization wrote that some level of engagement — in the form of humanitarian aid, targeted development efforts and counterterrorism cooperation — is needed.
Most observers seem to agree on two key principles: 1) that the human and financial costs of supporting armed opposition against the Taliban would be too great and 2) that total isolation is not acceptable, as it risks an even deeper humanitarian crisis and precludes discussions on terrorist threats. There is, in fact, marked consensus on the need for outcome-oriented engagement that includes some degree of conditionality.
The core debate, then, is not whether to engage, but rather how and when. What are the optics of engagement, what policy tools should be used and should engagement be sustained despite the Taliban’s grave violations of human rights?
What Should More Engagement Look Like?
A longer-term strategy for actions to address Afghanistan’s enduring problems is sorely needed. This is why the United Nations (U.N.) secretary-general appointed Special Coordinator Feridun Sinirlioğlu of Turkey to lead an independent assessment that will provide “recommendations for an integrated and coherent approach” vis-à-vis Afghanistan by the international community.
We can expect that the assessment, due out in November, will make the case for greater engagement with the Taliban. U.S. policymakers should be looking for recommendations along these lines:
A multifaceted, international structure or process for regular engagement with the Taliban de facto authorities — one that can build confidence and trust among all sides, and enable measurable progress on certain tracks, while still applying pressure on the Taliban.
Greater clarity around what steps the Taliban need to take in order to fulfill Afghanistan’s international obligations and to obtain what the Taliban want, such as lifting of U.N. sanctions and a seat at the U.N.
In parallel, the United States needs to work out an approach to U.S. bilateral engagement with the Taliban. An effective framework would help the parties move past the policy incoherence that has caused confusion on the Taliban side in terms of what they think the United States wants. It would also enable modest wins in areas of mutual interest, while keeping up pressure on the Taliban on rights and counterterrorism. Elements of such a framework could include:
Numerous tracks for technical-level meetings on a range of issues, such as: macroeconomic management and the international financial system; the humanitarian response; agriculture, water and climate-related impacts; counternarcotics and drug treatment efforts; health and nutrition; border security and counterterrorism.
Raising human rights and governance issues consistently, at national and subnational levels of the Taliban de facto government. This could help U.S. officials identify where openings for progress exist across different sectors — whether on treatment and release of political prisoners, support for women in the private sector, girls’ education or media freedom — or where conditions are deteriorating.
More clarity on what the Taliban must do before the United States is willing to consider recognition, lifting of sanctions or other major steps toward normalization of relations. This kind of dialogue may be months or years away, but U.S. policymakers must think through the details of these steps in advance.
Talking to the Taliban does not preclude broader U.S. work on human rights and political freedoms. The United States should maintain support in whatever forms possible — advocacy, psychosocial support, online learning, documentation and investigation of human rights violations and in international courts — for individuals and organizations working on these issues in Afghanistan, like U.N. Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett. The biggest challenge for the United States and like-minded countries will continue to be helping the Afghan people achieve what most Afghans want for their country, while holding accountable the Taliban government for its repressive behavior.
Ordinary Afghans are not responsible for the perceived faults of a government they did not elect.
On October 3, Pakistan’s interim government announced it was giving “illegal immigrants” 28 days to leave the country. Those who do not do so would be forcefully deported starting on November 1.
This unprecedented measure is directed specifically at the 1.73 million Afghans who have fled to Pakistan and who have not been able to attain formal refugee status.
The announcement was made after the Pakistani government alleged that 14 out of 24 suicide bombings this year had been carried out by individuals holding Afghan citizenship. It has not put forward any evidence to support this claim yet.
The threat of deportation has been condemned by multiple international organisations and governments.
I, and many other Afghans, would attest to the warm hospitality Pakistan has shown Afghan people through the years. Afghans have had significantly better opportunities to study, live and work in Pakistan compared with other countries in the region.
This long history of friendship should not be poisoned by short-sighted and reactionary decisions. The treatment of Afghan refugees has already deteriorated significantly in Pakistan in recent years as they have been persistently blamed for security failures within the country.
Over the past few years, the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, has ramped up its attacks on security personnel and civilians. The Pakistani security apparatus and army have struggled to contain its terrorist activities, and government officials have repeatedly accused the Afghan Taliban of harbouring the group.
It is important to put these developments in context. Pakistan played a key role in creating and bringing to power the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s. During the 20-year US occupation of Afghanistan, the Pakistani establishment gave refuge to the group. The TTP is a byproduct of this relationship. The leaders of the TTP all trained and developed bonds with the leaders of the Taliban during their time in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
But the TTP was formed in Pakistan and has operated for most of its existence from within the country. Even if one were to accept the claim that today the Afghan Taliban allows the TTP’s leadership to operate from eastern Afghanistan, let us remember that the Afghan people did not choose the Taliban to rule them and they should not be punished for its decisions.
Let us also recall that the elected Pakistani government was among the first to congratulate the Taliban on taking over Kabul and then-Prime Minister Imran Khan even called it “breaking the chains of slavery”.
It is important to note that the Afghan Taliban has made concrete progress in fighting terrorist groups, which has been acknowledged by the United States, China, Russia and countries in Afghanistan’s immediate neighbourhood. It has systematically attacked cells of the Islamic State-Khorasan Province, which claimed a deadly suicide bombing in July in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
Its government in Kabul has also made an effort to address Pakistan’s security concerns regarding the TTP. In 2022, the Taliban hosted negotiations between Pakistan and the TTP that resulted in a ceasefire lasting five months. When the Pakistani military carried out air raids in April last year on Afghan territory, violating Afghanistan’s sovereignty and killing civilians, the Taliban government had a rather mellow reaction, issuing a statement condemning the attacks as “cruelty”, a response that was quite unpopular among Afghans.
Then in August, the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, issued a decree forbidding cross-border attacks. In late September, Taliban government forces detained about 200 TTP fighters on Afghan territory.
Against the backdrop of all these events, it is unfortunate that the Pakistani government decided to ignore the potential for meaningful security cooperation and take a populist and inhumane decision to expel Afghans.
Pakistan is a nation born during the biggest migration of people in modern history. Its people know what seeking safe haven means. They also know the trauma of collective punishment.
Today as Pakistanis are standing up to denounce Israel’s collective punishment of Palestinians, they should not close their eyes and stay silent about the decision to expel an Afghan population almost as large as that of Gaza.
I call upon our friends in Pakistan to appeal to their government and demand that they respect the Afghan refugees’ basic rights to dignity and safety.
African American poet Maya Angelou once said: “No one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark.” Pakistanis should not let those who need kindness the most become the victims of ill-conceived foreign policies. If carried out, this cruel act of deportation would negatively affect relations between both countries for years to come.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
Obaidullah Baheer is a lecturer of Transitional Justice at the American University in Afghanistan. He holds a postgraduate degree in International Relations from the University of New South Wales, Australia. His research was titled “A Study of the Ideational and Structural Factors Hindering Negotiations with the Taliban”.
Pakistan must not collectively punish Afghan refugees
How to support your family when you have just lost your job during hard economic times? That was the question one journalist asked himself after his newspaper laid him off during the calamitous contraction of the economy in 2021 when the amount of international money coming into Afghanistan suddenly diminished. The journalist’s response surprised even himself – he started a business in an area he knew nothing about – clothing. He has used modern technology to help create a business that supports himself and dozens of others. AAN’s Sayed Asadullah Sadat has spoken to the former journalist about how he came to set up his online business selling beautiful traditional Afghan clothes via Facebook.
Some of the beaded work and embroidery on sale by the business. Photo: Ismail Sadeqi/Facebook, 2023.I used to work as a reporter for a local newspaper covering social and economic stories, but after the Republic fell, the paper I worked for downsized because there was not enough money coming in from advertisers, and I lost my job. I had a bit of savings and we thought that if we tightened our belts and economised, the savings would tide us over until I found another job. But everyone was in the same boat as me; hundreds of journalists on the unemployment line were competing for the same jobs, which were few and far between.As I watched my savings dwindle, the weeks turned to months, and I finally had to admit that I wasn’t going to get another job in my profession. I had to find a way to support my family, pay for the household, my children’s schooling and my parent’s medical bills. I started looking round for other jobs until one day, a little over a year ago, my wife told me that one of our relatives, who was a seamstress, was looking around for someone to help her market her products.
The next day, I called our relative and we went to her house to discuss the idea with her. She told us she was getting a lot of orders for traditional handmade clothes and thought this was a growing market and worth exploring. She told me that traditional clothes had fallen out of favour during the Republic because affordable imported clothes were readily available, but now they were making a comeback.
Keeping Afghanistan’s cultural heritage alive
The idea of reviving traditional Afghan clothes appealed to me. The idealist in me thought about how the business would keep a part of our cultural heritage from disappearing. I thought about the times when I covered handicraft markets as a journalist. These used to be regularly organised by the government or NGOs who had projects supporting widows or female heads of household. I had interviewed artisans from all over the country about the particulars of the clothes from their region. Back then, they would tell me about how long it took to create each piece, how difficult it was to sell their work at a profit and how, when the projects ended, they would be left with their unsold stock, struggling to find customers. So we agreed to focus on traditional Afghan clothes, such as gand-e Afghani (traditional Afghan wedding dress), and other handmade Afghan accessories we could make in my business partner’s small home-based workshop.
Traditional Afghan wedding dress. Photo: Ismail Sadeqi/Facebook, 2023.
We spent a couple of weeks talking about how we should proceed. We didn’t have enough money to open a shop. From my work as a journalist, I knew that young Afghans are heavy social media users and that e-commerce is a growing sector in the economy, and setting up a Facebook page was free. So, we decided to focus on online sales.
This is how I came to open an online shop selling traditional Afghan clothes.
Growing an online business in Afghanistan
It was hard going at first. We didn’t have much money to invest in a business and I knew nothing about clothes – sewing or selling. But I was desperate to find a way to support my family and my business partner, the tailor, had a good reputation for making top-quality clothes. We used some of my savings, about 50,000 Afs (USD 550), to make some samples and I started exhibiting our work through photos that I posted and promoted on Facebook.
The orders came in slowly – only a few from people who knew my business partner’s work, and there were times when I almost gave up on the whole thing. But my wife kept urging me to stay the course and I’m so happy I listened to her. Our reputation for quality workmanship grew and more orders started coming in. Nowadays, customers from all over Afghanistan place orders with us using our Facebook page. We’ve even had a few orders from overseas, but sending things abroad from Afghanistan is difficult. It’s a market we’d like to grow, but with all the banking restrictions, doing trade outside Afghanistan seems like an impossible dream.
It’s hard to believe that the business is only over a year old. In this short time, we have grown a solid customer base and have had to hire more people to keep up with incoming orders. We’ve gone from our humble start to employing 23 people, including 16 women who work from home as seamstresses and artisans who do the beadwork and leatherwork. Our product line has grown to include a variety of Afghan clothes and accessories, which are both machine-made and handmade and feature traditional embroidery techniques such as gulbatun (silk thread), zartar (golden thread) and the chirmadozi (double-knotted). We’ve also expanded into leather works such as sandals and purses. Our most popular items include Kuchi-style clothes, Afghan shawls and hand-beaded purses.
We even have a designer who works with our customers to design bespoke pieces for them. We don’t have enough working capital to have a stock of raw materials on hand, so after the customer agrees to the design, we buy the fabric and other materials from the market and deliver them to the home of one of the seamstresses/artisans who will then create the pieces. Once the item is finished, we deliver it to the customer by courier and they pay us cash on delivery.
But as successful as online sales are, people still have a hard time trusting a business that is not bricks and mortar. So eight months ago, after we got our business licence from the Emirate, we rented a small storefront and opened a showroom. Having an address has helped give us more legitimacy and has increased customer confidence. Thank God we are making good money. There is even a bit of a profit, about 20,000 Afs (USD 230) a month, after expenses. I’m putting the money away for a rainy day, or maybe we could use it to expand the business. But the most gratifying thing is that in addition to my own and my partner’s families, our business supports the families of the 23 people who work for us. They each provide for eight or ten family members.
Creating jobs for women
Handicraft work in Afghanistan is mostly done by women, who often have expertise in sewing, weaving, beadwork, embroidery and other traditional crafts, which means it can be an important source of income for them, especially in these hard economic times. I’m happy that I’ve been able to provide women with jobs. These days, many women are staying at home and struggling to find jobs. Now, some of them are working. I’ve bought sewing machines for them with my own money so that they can work at home. They can do housework and they can also sew. This way, they can support their families financially. These days, many women are training as seamstresses and artisans, hoping to make a living. Word has gotten around that I hire women who sew well and I get tons of calls every day from women looking for work.
Planning for the future
But as the economy continues to struggle, I fear that a time will come when my business will also struggle. As people have less and less disposable income, paying for the necessities of life, like food and rent, will take priority over luxuries like clothes. I’m hoping the government will lend a helping hand to domestic producers and keep cheap imported products from flooding the market. The Emirate could subsidise the textile industry so that the fabric and other things we use could be produced in Afghanistan. Not only would this make the raw material we need cheaper, but it would also create jobs and bring money into the economy.
If women could work outside the home and if the government supported me with subsidies, I could open a big factory so that all the women could work under the same roof. We could invest in professional industrial machines and hire more people, including women. These things would make our work easier, faster and more profitable. We wouldn’t have to pay couriers to go to and from people’s homes all day to deliver raw materials and pick up finished products, which is time-consuming and expensive. It slows down our work and makes collaboration and coordination difficult.
Online sales have tremendous potential. They do away with geographic limits and make it possible for businesses to trade worldwide, like the fashion websites they have in China. I know that a business in Afghanistan can’t trade globally right now, but I hope that Afghanistan can someday rejoin the world economy. When that day comes, I plan to be the first Afghan online clothing store that sells clothes from Afghanistan to customers all over the world.
Edited by Roxanna Shapour
The Daily Hustle: Selling traditional Afghan clothes on Facebook
The 20-year presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan ended on August 31, 2021, with the withdrawal of the last US soldier in Afghanistan.
22 years ago, an international coalition led by Washington on October 7, 2001, attacked Afghanistan.
America stated that the aim of the attack was to fight and overthrow the organizers of the 9/11 attacks on their country.
On September 11, 2001, nearly a month before the United States invasion of Afghanistan, the Al Qaeda network crashed hijacked passenger planes into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon, killing around 3,000 people and bringing the United States into Afghanistan.
“America’s aggression against Afghanistan was against all international law, they waged an unjust war on the Afghan nation and a long war was inconclusive,” said Najibullah Jame, a political analyst.
“Their ultimate goal was to be able to contain global regional competitors in the region, particularly Russia and China, to a great extent,” said Jawid Momand, a political analyst.
“The United States invaded Afghanistan without any justified reason, without listening to the people of Afghanistan and the government, and unfortunately the invasion lasted for 20 years,” said Zabiullah Mujahid, the spokesman of the Islamic Emirate.
Some political analysts said that the US presence in Afghanistan was one of the mistakes that the former Soviet Union had made and that the two countries caused significant losses to the Afghan people for political gain.
“NATO and Russia both made the same mistake and it was not a mistake but a persecution for the people of Afghanistan who during 45 years of negative competition have done so,” said Said Qaribullah Sadat, political analyst.
Finally, the 20-year presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan ended on August 31, 2021, with the withdrawal of the last US soldier in Afghanistan.
The battle cost the US $2 trillion, and 2,460 US troops were killed and more than 21,000 others were wounded.
22 Years On, Remembering US-Led Coalition Attack on Afghanistan
Over the course of 20 years, the United States made strategic mistakes in its war with the Taliban that helped fuel the insurgency and likely precluded an earlier end to the war. The U.S. government became fixated on a purely military solution, to the neglect of a political solution. This overwhelming focus on dealing the Taliban a decisive defeat was reinforced by the perceived political risks of negotiating a peace agreement with an organization that was seen solely through the lens of the war on terror. The United States should learn from its experience in Afghanistan and the opportunities it missed to reach a better and faster outcome to the war. Policymakers should apply these lessons to other conflicts — starting with the war in Ukraine.
Lesson 1: Seek opportunities for peace when military leverage is greatest.
The United States’ moment of greatest leverage with the Taliban was in late 2001, when the regime was militarily defeated and ousted from power. From 2001 through 2004, dozens of senior Taliban offered various forms of surrender and reconciliation in exchange for amnesty. The United States rejected these, excluded the Taliban from the new political order, and barred Afghan interim leader and later President Hamid Karzai from talking with the Taliban. We will never know whether greater openness to such offers might have averted two decades of war.
Later, as the Taliban insurgency emerged and grew, the United States increased its military presence, which peaked in 2011 with roughly 100,000 U.S. and 30,000 NATO troops in the country. Despite Taliban willingness to talk, U.S. leaders were highly skeptical about the prospects for a negotiated settlement. Military commanders sought to capitalize on the troop surge to strengthen the U.S. position in advance of any talks, and overestimated President Obama’s willingness to maintain the larger military presence. Some officials also feared that negotiations would undermine the war effort by forcing the military to enter into a cease-fire or reduce violence against the Taliban.
The Taliban made steady gains as the foreign troop presence declined over the next decade. By the time the United States came to the negotiating table in 2018, in desperation to end the “forever war,” it did so from a position of weakness. The tragedy is that, in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, the United States acquiesced to Taliban demands that it never would have considered earlier in the war but might have been able to resist or counter when it was stronger. The deal secured for the United States only the safe withdrawal of its troops, which in turn fatally undermined the Afghan Republic government in its negotiations with the Taliban — and later precipitated the collapse of Afghan security forces and the government that the United States had supported for 20 years.
Lesson 2: Be careful not to neglect peace efforts, particularly when overconfidence in the war effort might dampen support for negotiations.
The United States never seriously invested in a peace process to end the war in Afghanistan until it was too late. Up until 2018, the United States consistently sought to achieve a complete victory against the Taliban on the battlefield, either through its own military operations or those of Afghan forces. The overwhelming U.S. focus on winning militarily — rather than exploring a political settlement — illustrates retired Army colonel and scholar Christopher Kolenda’s argument that the U.S. government “has no organized way of thinking about war termination other than seeking decisive military victory.”
Despite years of warning signs that the Afghan government was losing the battle for legitimacy and that its security forces would not be able to sustain the fight against the Taliban without significant ongoing support, U.S. leaders continued to pursue a strategy that hinged on those trends reversing themselves. They believed — wrongly — that time was on their side. Defense Department reports to Congress overestimated Afghan forces’ strength and legitimacy relative to the Taliban’s. Part of the problem was that defense officials were using bad data and changing metrics for Afghan army and police capabilities that overestimated their actual strength and cohesion. In turn, overconfidence in the war effort limited policymakers’ appetite for pursuing peace. Why prepare for and invest in a political track to end the war if U.S. and Afghan forces were expected to turn the corner in the next six to 12 months?
Lesson 3: Pursuing peace can entail greater political and bureaucratic risks than continuing war.
Even as the United States doubled down on counterinsurgency efforts at the start of Obama’s presidency in 2009, a handful of senior officials in the White House, State Department and Pentagon quietly agreed that the United States needed a Plan B. In an interview, a former senior White House official told me that in early 2010, these officials created a small “Conflict Resolution Cell.” The cell helped pave the way for secret U.S.-Taliban talks, which began later that year. Those talks proceeded episodically over the next several years, but largely remained “talks about talks” and focused on prisoner releases. They were stymied by diplomatic snafus, the eroding U.S. relationship with President Karzai, and the Taliban’s refusal to include the Afghan government in talks (a U.S. demand).
But backchannel talks were also hamstrung by serious political and bureaucratic obstacles within the U.S. government. A former senior State Department official told me that “there was never a willingness to take political risks that would have been necessary to advance the peace process.” For example, prisoner releases faced an array of barriers: disagreements between the State Department and Defense Department, congressional certification required for releases from Guantanamo prison, and cabinet-level secretaries’ aversion to associate themselves with a politically risky prisoner exchange or with the talks themselves.
So, at the peak of the United States’ military leverage, the Obama administration never resourced peace efforts in a significant way (e.g., as in the Balkans in the 1990s), nor aligned both Defense and State Department efforts behind a peace process. There was no single U.S. official on the ground in Afghanistan who was responsible for coordinating military and political tracks, much less one who was empowered to do so.
Lesson 4: Do not demonize the enemy. When opportunities for peace negotiations arise, it will be harder to garner political and public support for talks.
For most of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, talking with the Taliban was taboo. U.S. presidents saw negotiations — and the prospect of any concessions to the Taliban — as politically toxic, even as many policymakers acknowledged that there was no military solution to the war. The taboo was rooted in the maxim that the United States does not negotiate with terrorists, the Taliban’s brutal treatment of women, and post-9/11 rhetoric that made littledistinction between the Taliban and al-Qaida despite the two organizations’ different origins and goals and the fact that no Afghans were part of the 9/11 attacks.
The problem with a black-and-white, dehumanized portrait of the Taliban was that it sharply constrained U.S. policy options and blunted inclinations to better understand the movement. As early as 2001, simplistic perceptions of the Taliban — combined with the trauma of 9/11 and political pressures for vengeance — cut off pathways for negotiations. These factors led the Bush administration to rebuff Taliban attempts at reconciliation. A decade later, the same factors undercut the Obama administration’s backchannel talks and made even modest confidence-building measures a political lightning rod with Congress and the public.
Lessons for Other Conflicts
The U.S. experience in Afghanistan suggests that the pursuit of military leverage should be paired (perhaps quietly) with diplomatic and other tools of national power. And it shows how the failure to do so can prolong a conflict in ways that do not serve the interests of the United States and its partners, and may lead to a less-favorable negotiated settlement down the road. It also demonstrates that accurate intelligence about battlefield trends and military capabilities, and political will to admit that U.S. leverage is declining, are crucial for weighing when to pursue a peace process. Further, without White House attention and resources, U.S. efforts on peace negotiations may well founder and fail.
As the topic of negotiations becomes ever more taboo in the Ukraine war, there are echoes of Afghanistan. U.S. policymakers should seek to maintain space for discussion — including within U.S. agencies — of various scenarios, outcomes and the potential for a political process. The work of thinking through the conditions that would be conducive to negotiations, redlinesto hold and what outcomes could prevent a relapse in hostilities can be done now. Critics might say such efforts signal weakness and risk emboldening Russia. But if the United States fails to identify or shape potential opportunities for a just peace in Ukraine, U.S. leaders may not be prepared to seize those chances when they arise.
In the current period, Ahmad Massoud, the leader of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF), finds himself residing in France. During his stay, he has engaged with numerous leaders from French political parties and the Afghan community living in the country. He also took part in the unveiling ceremony of a book published under his name. Massoud stands out as one of the rare opposition figures against the Taliban, advocating for armed resistance, emphasizing that the Taliban comprehend only the language of weapons. Additionally, he participated in an interview with France Inter radio, addressing several queries posed by the radio station. To thoroughly assess the content of this interview, it is essential to delve into the following points.
At the commencement of the interview, Ahmad Massoud declared, “We, the opposition against the Taliban, stand alone, and I am here to amplify the voice of the Afghan people to the world.” He further stated, “When Kabul fell, the French Embassy suggested I relocate to France, yet I declined, choosing instead to stand alongside the people, refusing to abandon them.” Massoud’s statement underscores his solidarity with the populace, his relocation to Panjshir post the fall of Kabul, and his initiation of resistance against the Taliban. Nevertheless, his portrayal of standing with the people while donning battle attire and leading the Panjshir war against the Taliban requires scrutiny.
Despite fervently denouncing the Taliban from Panjshir, Massoud fled the battleground before the Taliban seized the province, leaving the vulnerable citizens, who had placed their hopes solely on him, to grapple with innumerable challenges. His passionate anti-Taliban rhetoric and claims of resisting until his last breath earned him considerable acclaim, transforming him into a legend when others fled. Regrettably, this approach only exacerbated the suffering of the defenseless and innocent people, subjecting them to torture and persecution instead of offering assistance. Over the past two years, the leadership of the front committed the same error repeatedly, organizing armed demonstrations that left numerous young people in Panjshir Province and the Andarab district as victims.
When questioned about the situation in Panjshir Province, Massoud asserted, “Our forces occupy certain mountains and valleys. The Taliban aspire to control our strongholds but are unable to do so. They are confined to the large valleys, while we operate in other areas.” However, these statements do not align with the actual circumstances. Following the demise of Commander Malek and Commander Khanjar, alongside dozens of their companions in the heights of Dara district in September 2022, the NRF lost its presence in Panjshir, both on the roads and in the heights. Over the past year, the Taliban dedicated substantial efforts to establish dominance at Panjshir’s highest points, hindering the armed opposition’s activities. They constructed roads to various elevated locations in the valley. The leaders and commanders of the resistance front, present in Panjshir until 2022, fled to neighboring countries, ceasing to pose any threat to the Taliban. Consequently, no military action against the Taliban has occurred in Panjshir over the past year. It raises the question: are the military officials of the Resistance Front misleading Massoud, or is he deliberately asserting the opposite?
Massoud emphasized, “I did not seek foreign forces’ intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, nor do I advocate for it now. At that time, I opposed the establishment of foreign military bases as well.” Readers must contemplate the following: given Massoud’s current age of 34, he was merely 12 years old in 2001. How could a 12-year-old child decide whether American troops should enter Afghanistan, especially considering his father’s leadership in the anti-Taliban resistance? At that juncture, what role did he play in the anti-Taliban front, granting him the authority to permit or prohibit foreign involvement? Ahmad Massoud’s narrative of the past remains perplexing and subjective, leaving room for deeper examination and analysis.
Ahmad Massoud fervently calls upon the global community to impose sanctions on the Taliban, extend political support to their opponents, and seek a reasonable resolution to the crisis in Afghanistan. He also urges regional nations to increase their involvement in crafting a political solution. Both Western nations and neighboring countries perceive their interests as intertwined with engaging the Taliban. In the realm of realpolitik, ethical considerations often take a backseat. Human rights and women’s rights issues within a country are overlooked in favor of safeguarding governments’ interests. Thomas West, the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan, explicitly stated that women’s and human rights issues are internal matters for Afghanistan, not concerns of the international community.
It is naive to assume that the Taliban solely attained power through sheer military might. Various pieces of evidence suggest that this group is part of a plan devised by some Western countries to extricate themselves from the Afghan quagmire. Diplomatic visits, even by security officials, from certain Western nations to Kabul have likely revealed crucial insights to analysts studying the situation.
The eminent British philosopher Bertrand Russell posited that great world leaders emerge at pivotal moments in history. He stressed that the success of political or military leaders, besides their individual talent and efforts, is contingent upon the prevailing circumstances and contexts. Ahmad Shah Massoud, the former Afghan guerrilla commander, gained prominence due to global and regional dynamics supporting him, in addition to his exceptional personal abilities. Aspiring to replicate Massoud’s achievements in vastly different circumstances is unrealistic and disregards essential facts. Ignoring the surrounding situations and global dynamics only leads to wasted efforts. A wise leader navigates within the realm of possibilities.
Furthermore, if the Taliban opposition lacks strength and control over specific territories, it becomes challenging for the world to heed their requests. Countries are reluctant to antagonize the heavily armed Taliban, who dominate Afghanistan entirely, boast hundreds of thousands of seasoned fighters, and pose unnecessary threats in the volatile region. Moreover, these nations believe that engaging with the Taliban can safeguard their regional interests. If anti-Taliban forces managed to secure a portion of Afghanistan’s geography, the world might be more receptive to their concerns. Superficial meetings with parliamentarians or party leaders yield negligible results.
The Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan constitutes a full-scale catastrophe, necessitating collective efforts to bring it to an end. However, indulging in wishful thinking and illusions won’t resolve this dire situation. Mere slogans and bravado do not cure our woes. Over the years, we have witnessed leaders who, at the first sign of adversity, abandoned their slogans and chose flight. A leader’s empty rhetoric confuses followers, preventing them from perceiving reality. A genuine leader refrains from misleading their people, presenting a clear and pragmatic perspective to guide them through challenging times.
Ahmad Massoud and the Arduous Path of Fighting Against the Taliban
Climate change is bringing about more devastation, forcing more Afghans to flee. Deportations from neighbouring countries will not stop them.
This summer, I visited my village in Jaghori district in Ghazni province for the first time since 2017. I had never been so at ease while travelling from Kabul to my birthplace.
Just a few years ago, undertaking this 260km trip meant risking one’s life. In 2009, for example, on my way to the village with some relatives, our car got caught in the crossfire of a battle between Afghan forces and the Taliban. We narrowly survived.
This time around, I travelled without witnessing any explosions or fighting or being stopped and searched at a checkpoint.
When I arrived, I was struck by how much my village had changed. I hardly recognised the place. It looked almost deserted. My relatives and friends had all left. The house I grew up in was occupied by strangers – internally displaced people from another province. The streets were empty; I saw just a few lonely children roaming around.
The village of my childhood looked completely different. It was full of people and full of life, with crowds of children running in the streets and playing. Our favourite place was the local stream, which was surrounded by greenery and attracted all kinds of birds and small animals.
There was a small dam, deep enough for us children to swim and play in. Women would come to the stream to chat and catch up on gossip while filling up their jugs with water to carry home. During prayer times, the men would also show up to do their ablutions.
Water from the stream irrigated the nearby fields. Villagers grew wheat, potatoes, beans and other vegetables; they also kept orchards of apricot, apple and plum trees.
Eager to remember those good times, I rushed to the stream, but what I found was devastating. Prolonged droughts had reduced it to a trickle. The green, lively valley of my childhood was no more; in its place lay a dry, silent strip of parched land. The fields lay mostly barren, as there was not enough water to irrigate them; I could see just a few orchards here and there still being kept.
The once bustling community of 170 people now has no more than 40 left, most of them internally displaced people – too poor to make it to urban centres or abroad.
I found a few of the original residents – old people, whose children and grandchildren had left for the country in search of a better life or had moved to bigger cities like Kabul and Herat.
I felt nostalgia for the good old days, but also an uneasy premonition for what the future holds for my country. I realised that the depopulation and desolation I saw in my village are the reality in many places across rural Afghanistan.
Decades of conflict have pushed almost a quarter of the Afghan population of 40 million to flee abroad. The return of security to the country after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021 has certainly made a difference in the lives of many Afghans and given us hope for better times. It has enabled humanitarian access to all provinces, including the areas which had been out of reach for decades.
But this has not resulted in refugees rushing to come back to the country. According to the UNHCR, some 1.3 million out of 4.5 million IDPs have returned to their home areas since August 2021 and some 6,000 registered refugees came back voluntarily to the country last year.
The growing hostility against Afghans in neighbouring Iran and Pakistan, which host the majority of refugees from my country, has not resulted in a large movement of people returning home, either.
The recent announcement of a crackdown on “illegal immigrants” by Pakistan’s Interior Minister Sarfraz Bugti is likely to put more pressure on Afghan refugees. But many of them, especially those who lived in Pakistan for years, have no homes in Afghanistan to return to and would find it hard to survive in a country, where unemployment is rife.
If the Pakistani authorities act on their threats and deport Afghans, it is unlikely many of them would stay in Afghanistan. They would most likely attempt to leave again.
In response to the announced crackdown, the Taliban’s spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid wrote on X: “The behavior of Pakistan against Afghan refugees is unacceptable. The Pakistani side should reconsider its plan. Afghan refugees are not involved in Pakistan’s security problems.”
This indicates that the Taliban government also realises that the country cannot provide for a large number of returnees. Two years have passed since the war ended, but Afghanistan is still struggling to recover.
Worse still, another menace is on the horizon, which is as dangerous as a conflict but cannot be resolved with arms. Climate change has stricken Afghanistan, prolonging droughts and shrinking the already limited water reserves of the country.
Between 1950 and 2010, temperatures in Afghanistan rose 1.8 degrees Celsius on average – about twice as much as the rest of the world. Rainfall across the country has fallen by as much as 40 percent.
In 2018, as the war between the international coalition and the Taliban was still going on, droughts displaced some 370,000 Afghans – as many as the conflict did.
Dry spells have decimated the rural areas, destroying harvests and depopulating villages like my birthplace in Jaghori district. There is little hope for these areas.
As the effects of climate change worsen in the coming years, the depopulation of Afghanistan will likely continue. People from rural areas will flock to the big cities, fleeing hunger and increasing exponentially the population of the urban poor. Those Afghans who have the means will continue to try to leave the country in search of better economic opportunities. Sadly, more unique places that used to be filled with life – like my village – will be lost.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
Hujjatullah Zia is a journalist and senior writer in Daily Outlook Afghanistan Newspaper
Diversion of aid in Afghanistan is in the news again, this time with allegations by the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John Sopko, that the Islamic Emirate or its officials are diverting humanitarian aid. Language in a draft US appropriations bill would prohibit any US assistance going “directly or indirectly” to the Taleban, something which Sopko has warned could have “serious” consequences for aid organisations. The Emirate has denied the allegations. Guest author Ashley Jackson* has been looking into the Taleban’s actual influence over aid, hearing from aid workers on the ground about their experiences and delving into the role of both donors and the Emirate in its delivery. She asks if aid diversion is any worse – or better – than the historical ‘norm’ in Afghanistan and suggests that, whatever its level, there is a need for a candid dialogue that would lead to practical and ethical steps to ensure aid reaches those most in need.You can preview the report online and download it by clicking the link below.
[A]id taken, stolen or damaged by any governmental or local authority, armed group or any other similar actor. Such act is to be considered diverted aid even if the aid is re-distributed to other people in need other than the intended beneficiary group.
This report explores the dynamics that drive aid diversion, arguing that it cannot be understood in isolation from the political, economic and historical factors and patterns. It distinguishes between aid diversion, which is not always malicious or self-serving, and broader corruption, defined as the abuse of power for personal gain. It also notes that indirect benefits to a government that may arise when aid frees up resources for other tasks (for example, aid supporting basic services could allow more spending on the military), or by supporting the macro-economy) is also not aid diversion. However, it is part of the debate on the amount and nature of aid given to Afghanistan under the Islamic Emirate. These three categories – diversion, corruption and indirect benefit – are often confused or conflated in the current debate over aid to Afghanistan.
Aid diversion is a serious issue that could result in a further reduction of aid to Afghans. Therefore, this report aims to provide some context for assessing donors’ concerns because, while accusations of widespread diversion of aid are increasingly common, detailed evidence is harder to come by.
The report investigates aid diversion in Afghanistan, specifically examining:
How aid diversion is defined, and how it is distinct from both corruption and the indirect benefits that aid brings to any government, including the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA);
The historical context of aid diversion in Afghanistan, beginning with the eras of the anti-Soviet jihad and subsequent civil war of the 1980s and early 1990s, through the first Islamic Emirate and the Islamic Republic, including the Taleban’s manipulation of aid during the insurgency;
The dynamics of the aid industry since Taleban returned to power in August 2021, including the scope and patterns of aid diversion under the IEA; and
The responses of aid workers and donors to IEA attempts to control or divert aid.
Finally, it concludes by exploring what might be done differently to mitigate any harm to Afghans in need of assistance.
Edited by Kate Clark and Roxanna Shapour
* Ashley Jackson is co-director of the Centre on Armed Groups and author of ‘Negotiating Survival: Civilian-Insurgent Relations under the Taliban’, Hurst & Co, 2021.
You can preview the report online and download it by clicking the link below.
The number of Afghan refugees moving along the Balkan Route has remained very high this summer. In particular, a great proportion in their earlier 20s and often under-age Afghans seem to be taking the long trip to central, western and northern Europe. From Turkey, they usually cross Greece and Bulgaria in order to reach Serbia. Once there, most Afghans opt for the ‘Western Balkan route’ leading through Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia and finally Italy – where routes for further possible destinations split once again. Among these countries, Croatia became, in January 2023, the European Union’s foremost external border facing the Balkan Route, while non-EU Serbia, remains a midway staging point for migrants, beyond the EU borders yet conveniently close to their final destinations. During a recent visit to Croatia and Serbia, and through long-term observation from the vantage point of Trieste, the Italian city close to Croatia and Slovenia where one of the western branches of the Balkan Route leads, AAN’s Fabrizio Foschini has sought to understand what is happening to Afghans transiting through these two, very diverse yet closely connected, countries. In Savamala, traces of past frequentation by migrants, such as cheap hostels and restaurants, are still visible in the neighbourhood, which is now the site of major building projects. Photo: Fabrizio Foschini, 25 July 2023. A country in the EU: Croatia
Almost ten years ago, a young Afghan told me the story of how he had been unwittingly tricked by Croatia’s membership of the EU. After an odyssey of several months across Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary – he was one of those low-budget DIY travellers who, without even a GPS, counted only on their skills to make it to their destination – he had managed to cross the Serbian-Croatian border undetected. Coming out of a plum tree orchard where he had spent the night, and still wet from having waded a creek to get there the previous evening, he walked into a Croatian hamlet and inquired from the first person he met his basic whereabouts: “Which country am I in? Is it in the European Union?” “Yes!” was the somewhat upbeat reply “This is Croatia, we’re in the EU!”It took my friend, who had hurried to the nearest police station and duly applied for asylum, hoping his roaming was over, some days to understand that the people he had met were highly enthusiastic because Croatia had in fact just joined the EU a few days previously, in that fateful July of 2013. It took him some more time to realise that the country had no proper reception system yet and offered no viable chances to asylum seekers, at least not to Afghans.[1] He eventually decided – and managed – to leave Croatia and told me his tale when he was freshly arrived in Trieste, where he would apply for – and eventually obtain – asylum.
Croatia’s position in refugees’ mental geography of the so-called Balkan Route has become clearer since those early days, and more sharply defined: had my friend hit the border four or five years, later he would not have thought of grabbing the chance to seek asylum there. Croatia is now largely seen by migrants as an obstacle to overcome during their hoped-for movement westwards and its security forces and government’s attitude as uncompromisingly hostile.
Maybe it is not so paradoxical that Afghan migrants’ increasingly poor perception of Croatia has developed in the same years that saw the completion of Croatia’s accession to full EU membership. In January 2023, it made the last two big steps forward, with the adoption of the EU’s common currency, the euro, and entry into the Schengen Agreement, a treaty which led to the creation of the Schengen Area in which internal border checks have largely been abolished. Bulgaria and Romania are members of the EU, but not Schengen, while Greece, a Schengen member, has a sea border with the rest of the Union, something which facilitatesits control of migrants’ movement. That leaves Croatia, together with Hungary to the north, the main external border for those approaching the EU from the southeast. EU strategies and concerns about what it deems ‘the migrant crisis’, therefore inform Croatia’s policies and behaviour towards migrants more than the internal political debate about them. This is also because, so far, despite the migrants having a highly visible presence, very few have stopped and settled in Croatia.
However, an increase in the number of asylum requests filed in Croatia during the first months of 2023 pointed to possible imminent changes in the country’s position and role in migration along the Balkan Route, and inspired this research and report. Let us then first have a look at some numbers.
Asylum seekers in Croatia: inflow and outflow
In the first six months of 2023, the most important entry to the EU for Afghans remained what is known as the Western Balkan route. [2] It was along this route that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, listed the highest numbers of detections of illegal border crossings by Afghan nationals – 6,392 – far more than the 2,437 detections along the Eastern Mediterranean route (from Turkey into Greece or Bulgaria or from Turkey by sea to the Greek islands or to Italy).[3] The Frontex numbers look to be an undercount given the increasing trend in migration in recent years. Moreover, in 2022, in Croatia alone, the Ministry of Interior reported far more: 14,877 illegal border crossings and 1,390 asylum requests provided by the Ministry of Interior.
Actual figures for Afghans travelling along the Western Balkan route must be even higher, given there are also undetected border crossings by Afghans. For example, in 2022, Hungary effected more than 25,300 pushbacks of Afghan nationals to Serbia, according to its police statistics (quoted by the Asylum Information Database – AIDA). A majority of Afghans, moreover, unlike Syrians who typically try to cross north into Hungary (the most direct route to their destinations in northern Europe), opt to keep moving west, from Serbia through Bosnia and then Croatia, on the western branch of the Balkan Route which leads towards Italy. This will be the specific focus of this report. [4]
The constant flow of Afghans arriving at Italy’s north-eastern border further provides a glimpse of the overall numbers moving through Croatia. In 2022, the number of migrants crossing from Slovenia into Italy, traced by the Border Police of Trieste, or who spontaneously presented themselves to the authorities there, amounted to around 13,000. This figure coincides roughly with the number of migrants in transit assessed by a group of solidarity organisations active in the city, which also estimated that over half were Afghans, (see their recent report). In particular, according to them, in the third quarter of 2022, Afghans made up 75 per cent of the total number of migrants transiting through Trieste. In the case of non-accompanied minors arriving in Trieste, Afghans accounted for 85 percent of the total during 2022.
In Croatia itself, these two trends, the increase in the numbers of overall arrivals and of Afghans, were also monitored. In 2022, 12,872 asylum requests (of all nationalities) were made, against a mere 3,039 of 2021 (see AIDA’s annual country report about Croatia). Then in 2023, the first partial data showed an enormous jump in asylum requests: by 20 March, as many as 6,280 individuals had applied for asylum in Croatia, an 800 percent increase compared to the same period in 2022. By 30 June, according to the Ministry of Interior’s statistics Croatia had received 24,367 asylum requests, among them, the majority (5,925) filed by Afghan nationals.
It was difficult not to link the new pace of asylum requests with the changed political and economic situation of 2023 – Croatia joining the Schengen agreement and adopting the euro. The game-changer of being inside Schengen, for example, was mentioned by an unnamed police official to the Croatian daily, Vecernji List:
Previously they went to Slovenia, a Schengen member and sought asylum there because then they could no longer be returned to a country outside of Schengen. Now that Croatia in is Schengen, they don’t need to wait to arrive in Slovenia, so they’re asking for asylum here.
Was it possible that a Croatia now in Schengen could become more attractive as a destination for migrants, and that those who had just transited through it, could become more interested in trying to stay, given the country’s fast-expanding economy and its hunger for cheap seasonal labour in tourist sector? Moreover, this year, Croatia fell into line with most other EU countries with respect to the waiting time imposed on asylum seekers before they can legally seek a job; it was brought down from nine months to just three.
A second look at the situation however quickly dispelled this theory. Firstly, the assumption that all asylum requests would lead to those seeking asylum remaining in Croatia is misleading. A number of factors point to relatively few new asylum seekers stopping in the country for good. They include the fact that the increase in asylum requests in Croatia was paralleled by migrants transiting through to Trieste. Also, the numbers of recorded illegal entries into Croatia and Slovenia (the next country along the route westwards to Italy) during the first six months of 2023 were roughly equivalent – 26,871 and 25,431 respectively (see for example figures given in this report by Ansa). This points to the outflow of migrants from Croatia into Slovenia keeping pace with the number of new arrivals, including those who applied for asylum. In 2021, researchers at the University of Zagreb had assessed that almost 90 per cent of those applying for asylum in Croatia left the country after a short time, leaving their requests pending. The current estimate is that around 85 per cent do so.
Further elements reinforce the likelihood that few of the new asylum seekers stop in Croatia for good. As already mentioned, so far, Afghans constitute by large the most numerous group of asylum seekers in Croatia this year. Yet it is realistic to infer that, in the case of Afghans even more than that of other national groups, the great majority leave the country and move westwards. According to information shared by a Zagreb-based independent organisation offering legal assistance and advocacy for asylum seekers the Centre for Peace Studies (Centar za mirovne studije, CMS), asylum requests made by Afghans in Croatia are usually rejected, even after appeal (in both the 2nd and 3rdinstances). Despite an increased focus on Afghans on the part of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and its partner organisations in Croatia, such as CMS, this is not yet reflected by changes in the asylum policy at the national level. Only a negligible number of Afghans, mostly individuals who worked with NATO forces and could prove direct collaboration with Croatians, managed to settle in Croatia after being evacuated in 2021. Few Afghans would choose to stop in a country showing such reticence in granting asylum, especially when they are so close to more attractive destinations deeper inside the EU.
Croatian police behaviour towards Afghans likely plays another key role in keeping them on the move. The country’s borders with Bosnia and Serbia, are heavily patrolled, along with transit routes in the interior of the country; according to the Croatian Prime minister 6,700 police guard and patrol the border. The Croatian police often engage in so-called ‘pushbacks’ – that is, the immediate and illegal expulsion of individuals who may have applied for asylum, if given the opportunity.
Migrants intercepted by the police not only close to the border, but even at greater distances from it, are routinely brought back and forced to re-enter Bosnia on foot, without a formal transfer to Bosnian authorities, and usually through deserted tracts of the border far away from their original crossing point.
CMS estimated around 25,000 pushbacks to Bosnia in the years 2019-21 (smaller numbers of pushbacks towards Serbia have also taken place). The overall number of pushbacks may have slightly diminished in 2022 –the Danish Refugee Council counted 3,461 pushbacks to Bosnia; however, Afghan nationals constituted the main victims of this practice, with 919 such cases. In the first six months of 2023, the volume of pushbacks involving Afghans has continued unabated, with 475 recorded.
Instances of police abuse against migrants have been consistently reported and denounced by NGO workers and the media, in Croatia and elsewhere over the past few years and have recently been detailed in a major report by Human Rights Watch. Leaving aside the issue of ‘chain-pushbacks’, which involve more than one country, in this case Slovenia and Italy (more on this later), such abuses range from the blanket denial of access to asylum to arbitrary detention, theft and damage of personal property, physical violence and degrading treatment. As documented in a CMS report, police officers who take part in such operations most often have their faces covered to avoid identification and likewise cover up the pushback as instances of prevention of illegal border crossings.
Despite a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that held Croatia responsible for the death of a six-year-old Afghan girl, Madina Hosseini, who was run over by a train after being pushed back by the police to Serbia in 2017, the Croatian police continue with its abusive practices. They have evidently become engrained in the operational routine of Croatian police forces tasked by their and other European governments, which support Croatian border control economically and operationally through Frontex, with checking unauthorised migration. The actions of the Croatian police should be considered an integral part of the deterrence measures put in place to ‘protect’ the whole of the European Union, not just their own country: the push-backs are just one of a range of measures – bureaucratic hurdles, low recognition rates and threats of deportations – variously deployed by different EU countries.
The mother and the sister of Madina Hosseini, the young Afghan girl run over by a train after being pushed back from Croatia, at her graveside in the Serbian border town of Šid. Photo: Jelena Bjelica, 28 December 2017.
Even when Afghans are not subjected to pushbacks, NGO workers reported that this nationality is are often treated worse than other migrant groups such as the (far fewer) Syrians, so that the idea that they are not welcome in Croatia is quickly and firmly impressed upon the transiting migrants. A number of conversations with Afghan refugees travelling through Croatia corroborated this point.
Talking to Afghans outside of Porin Hotel
The main reception centre in Croatia is in the former Hotel Porin, on the southern outskirts of Zagreb. The centre opened in 2011 with a capacity of 600. Although meant for single men, it currently hosts a mixed population which include several families.[5]The authorities might have considered its location, away from the city centre, convenient. It has proved uncomfortable for those living there. There is a foul-smelling major waste disposal nearby, a huge and largely abandoned freight train exchange station and untended expanses of grass. The area swarmed with ravenous mosquitoes even more than the average Zagreb suburbs in the wet and stormy summer of 2023.
The entrance gate of the Hotel Porin, the main reception centre for asylum seekers in Croatia, in the southern outskirts of Zagreb. Photo: Fabrizio Foschini, 21 July 2023.
The camp is closed to all but government personnel and the Red Cross. Médecins Sans Frontières used to have access but has recently suspended its operations there. However, Afghan migrants are regularly to be found moving around the old hotel’s fenced precincts, squatting in the greenery that surrounds it, exchanging information or walking back from the city after a failed departure. At lunch time, in particular, many Afghans who have not been able to secure accommodation in the complex try to obtain some food from their acquaintances inside.
For someone who used to speak to migrants on the Balkan Route a few years back, and to those arriving in Trieste, the first contact with Afghans in 2023 Croatia was telling. The first person, a particularly sombre-looking young man from Maidan Wardak, apologised profusely in Dari for requesting to see my ID. He would not talk to me unless he could reassure himself beyond any doubt that I was not linked to either the Croatian security forces or Frontex.
I‘ve just been let out of police detention, you know. I spent last night in the hold-up. I’d arrived here yesterday morning, the police identified me and sent me to the camp [Porin]. I left the camp shortly after and went to the train station to catch a train and continue my journey. However, before the train started, the police checked it, carriage by carriage, and there was no place to hide. They were very angry at me for leaving the camp, and even more so for having taken the train. They said, “You have no right to board trains or buses here, you can only move around the way you came – walking.” They brought me to the police station and kept me there for the night. As soon as I’d fall asleep, somebody would make a noise or shake me to force me to stay awake. Then they let me go, but told me: “Go on or we’ll deport you back to where you came from.” The Croatian police don’t care about us applying for asylum. They only want to fingerprint us because the more fingerprints they take, the more money they receive from the EU.
According to CMS in Zagreb, Afghans crossing into Croatia face three possible legal outcomes, if caught by the police and identified as migrants. Some migrants receive access to asylum applications and are subsequently sent to Porin or another reception centre – from where most eventually resume their trip westwards. A second possibility is that the person receives a ‘return decision’, a seven-day warrant ordering them to leave Croatia. 30,000 such decisions were issued in 2022, in particular to migrants from Burundi (who used to be able to travel to Serbia without visas) but also to many Afghans. Reportedly, this practice is continuing without a clear pattern and leaves migrants facing an uncertain fate. The return decision in fact can result in their being allowed to continue traveling, or their being held and then pushed back to Bosnia. A third option – an expulsion decision – has also become more frequent this year (more details in this analysis by Balkaninsight), especially after a ministerial summit of the western Balkan countries and the EU in Rome in April 2023. Migrants may be issued an expulsion decision, which results in Bosnia formally readmitting them. They are delivered to the Bosnian police. This is reported to have happened even after a person asked for asylum in Croatia.[6]
Whichever they get – authorised to ask for asylum, given a seven-day warrant to leave the country or a formal expulsion decision – it is difficult for migrants to make sense of any of it. At least when it comes to Afghan nationals, there were many complaints about the paucity of translation services – and communication in general – on the part of the police. The complaint of a young man from Takhar province, formerly a member of the Afghan National Army (ANA), was echoed by nearly all his compatriots: “There’s never an interpreter with them [the police], the paperwork is all in Croatian and many policemen don’t even bother to try to speak English with you.”
Most Afghans AAN spoke to were convinced they had not applied for asylum in Croatia, although they had given their fingerprints to the European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (Eurodac). According to the Dublin Regulation, once a person is identified by the Croatian police, their asylum request is up to Croatia to process, because it was their EU country of entry, even if they do not afterwards complete their application there.[7] They are also be liable to be sent back to Croatia, if they travelled on to another EU member state. The readmission of Dublin cases to Croatia is a relatively frequent instance, and actually one on the rise since Croatia’s accession to Schengen, especially by countries with big volumes of Afghan asylum seekers, such as Switzerland. The phenomenon led a group of Croatian NGOs to travel to Bern in mid-June to meet the Swiss Secretary of State for Migration to advocate for a stop to the practice. They cited the lack of sufficient capacity in their country’s reception system for accommodating refugees (read about the delegation in the Swiss press). Being sent back, of course, does not necessarily prevent migrants from trying to travel west again and apply for asylum elsewhere.
The Porin hotel was fully booked during the days AAN was in Zagreb. Afghans hanging around the hotel said that some newcomers had been made to sleep in the hallways and others could simply not be accommodated inside and slept rough in abandoned wagons in the nearby railway area. When the author visited in late July, the rough sleeping was especially grim, as Zagreb was hit by a quite unprecedented hurricane. It caused extensive damage and several deaths in the city. The Croatian capital was ravaged by bouts of heavy rains and wind for the full following week.
One of the Afghans who was sleep rough outside Porin was a young boy from Dand-e Ghuri in Baghlan province. Hardly looking as old as the 16 years he claimed, he had been sent by the Croatian police to what he termed “a camp for minors” (likely the reception centre in Kutina) upon arrival. He left it after just one day, however, and proceeded to Zagreb, but could not find a place inside Porin. While waiting for some sympathetic compatriot to bring him food from inside the hotel, he related what had led him to leave in haste the arguably better reception he would have received at the camp for minors:
I left my country two years ago, shortly before the fall of the Republic. I wasted a lot of time in Turkey because I had no money to pay for the next leg of the trip. I worked as a shepherd near Istanbul, and also in the city, but it was never enough. My family sold everything in order to have me out of Afghanistan. They sold the last sack of rice, even some of the little land they owned. My little sister is at home. My whole family is only waiting for me to get to some place where I can start to help them. It’s two years I’ve been gone and not a single time have I been able to send some shirini [literally “sweets”, presents or sums of money given as gifts to relatives, friends or associates] to my father. There’s no money left at home. How could there be? We are sharecroppers: one quarter of our harvest the Taleban take as taxes, one quarter goes to the landlord, one quarter is just for our own consumption to eat and stay alive, and with the sale of the remaining quarter you have to meet all the other expenses of the family. … The time I spent in Turkey, the way I used to slave for a small sum of money there made me reflect a lot. Now I need to get somewhere fast, somewhere I can get an education, find a good job, start a different life.
As for where this more favourable final destination could be, in the minds of those traveling, there are a few recurrent ideas. While some mention France and potentially further, possibly to the UK, or Switzerland, most seem to be directed to Germany. However, the majority of those interviewed by AAN declared they aimed first to get to Italy, and so were trying to catch a train or bus to Rijeka, Croatia’s Adriatic seaport, only 50 kilometres away as the crow flies from its ‘twin’ city in Italy, Trieste.
Migrants cannot fly, however, or even, apparently, be allowed to take a bus or train, but must only walk. Two former members of the ANA from Mazar-e Sharif related what had happened to them the day before:
Yesterday, we went to the main station to catch a train, but the police were on the platform and sent us back to the camp [Porin]. They called a taxi and forced us to take it and followed us in their car. The taxi driver had first said the ride would cost 30 euros and we gave it to him, but then he started saying that it was 30 for each of us and got angry at our refusal to pay the additional money, so he stopped the cab after just a couple of blocks and the police came and threw our backpacks out of the car and we had to walk back to the camp. The policemen told us we could continue our trip, but not by any form of transport. They even threatened us: Go quick, move on or we’ll deport you back to Afghanistan.
Taxi drivers are a key component in what Afghans call ‘the Game’, played along this section of the route, both as transporters of migrants for short distances, but also, often, as police informers.
From Serbia onwards, the role of traffickers is much less direct and their presence ‘on the ground’ negligible. Of course, there are those traveling under more high-profile and costly arrangements, such as direct transport by vehicle, which according to one police investigation can cost up to 5,000 euros from Bosnia to Italy or up to 8,000 euros if somebody wants to get further west, for example to Spain. However, most migrants, especially single young men, are left to themselves after they leave Serbia and cross the border into Bosnia. The traffickers keep in touch over the phone and provide guidance by sending GPS positions which they must reach, stage by stage.
A short distance from the gates of Porin, the author met a group of Afghans squatting in the tall grass, listening attentively to a twenty-year old from Bagram talking in Pashto with smugglers on his phone. He was telling them about the difficulty of boarding public transport and the poor conditions of his and his companions’ feet after the tiresome trekking they had been forced to do in the previous days and afterwards recounted to the author his recent journey.
I arrived two days ago. I slept outside Porin, I cannot enter [the complex] or eat there as I gave no fingerprints to the police – I actually have not met any so far. I came all the way with a friend from my district. We paid 3,000 USD to travel from Turkey to Serbia. During that part of the trip, we always had a rahbalad [guide] with us and when we were detained for some days in Bulgaria, somebody from our smuggler network waited until we were out and guided us into Serbia. From Serbia onwards, we were alone. Now it works through “locations” only. The smugglers give you a series of locations via GPS and you follow them: a station, a road, a border crossing. From Belgrade, they brought us to a river border and told us to jump into the water to get into Bosnia. On the other side we took a taxi. It cost 50 euros for each of the passengers to be brought close to Bihac. Then we went to a camp called Lipa and after around a week, we crossed into Croatia. On the way, there were people coming back to the camp whose phones had been broken or stolen by the Croatian police. We crossed a forest which had no paths. Luckily we met no police, although we could hear the drones buzzing over our heads. Then we walked until Zagreb. Now we are waiting for the new location from our contact. … Altogether, for the trip Bosnia to Italy (with locations) you pay 700 USD if the trafficker is a rafiq [a friend or associate], otherwise 800 USD.
The chances are that somebody among the migrants gets a discount if he becomes a jelawro (‘lead-the-way’), informally taking charge of a small group and keeping in touch with the smuggler network to enhance the group’s possibilities of successfully arriving at the next stage (and the smugglers’ of getting paid in full). Recently, there have been press reports about an increase in the number of traffickers arrested by the Croatian police. According to CMS, many of these arrests have been made among migrants who had reached Rijeka or other places far from the border with Bosnia. This could point towards their real role, as jelawros, rather than real members of a smuggling network.
Besides providing a barrier on behalf of the EU at the border with non-EU Bosnia (it became a candidate country only in December 2022), Croatian police efforts seem directed at keeping pressure on migrants to move on once they are inside Croatia. Over the past few years, for example, the route from Zagreb to Rijeka (by train or bus), from Rijeka (by train) to the inland town of Buzet on the Istrian peninsula (the westernmost area of Croatia which bulges out into the Adriatic Sea), and from there on foot across Slovenian territory (at its narrowest point – around 15 km) and into Italy, had become well-established. Police crackdowns on migrants in Rijeka have recently caused part of the flow to shift towards Pula, a seaport at the tip of the Istrian peninsula: which would be a counterintuitive detour for those trying to get to Italy. The aim of this ‘keeping migrants on the move’ is probably to make sure one single route does not become too prominent and crowded, with the risk of it developing into a public scandal or something which could tarnish the image of the country advertised as a tourist paradise.
Crossing Croatia is not as gruelling as crossing Bulgaria with its higher levels of abuse and violence or an impassable obstacle such as Hungary. Still, it comes like a cold shower for migrants convinced that they have finally overcome the harshest part of their trip, that they are finally on the doorstep of western Europe and that with that, will come better standards of reception and human rights, as one man said:
In Serbia and Bosnia, the people are good and the police don’t bother us migrants.In Croatia, we’re treated like animals. Elsewhere, the violence, the hostile behaviour is on the border and once you’ve made it away from there, you’re fine, people aren’t hostile and the police don’t bother you. So, once you’ve arrived here in Zagreb from the forests on the Bosnian border, you think you’ve come out of the jangal [the jungle, here used also in a figurative sense] and reached ‘the city’. But then, you realise that the behaviour of the police here in the capital is the same as on the border. Actually, the police here mistreat you as you would expect someone to do in the jungle, while out there in ‘the jungle’ [referring here to the refugee camps of the Bosnian Una-Sana canton, located in forested areas] people were treating us in a more civilised way.
The Zagreb government’s hostile attitude is compounded by the migrants’ own lack of interest in remaining in Croatia; hence, they seldom reach out to the very committed organisations which offer legal aid and other forms of support. The positive perception of police and Bosnian and Serbian people’s attitudes noted by the two ex-soldiers from Mazar and many other migrants AAN spoke to reflected their personal experience, that is, of a relatively swift and smooth crossing. However, the full picture is not so rosy nor so simple in Serbia and Bosnia, which have been at the centre of the ‘migrant crisis’ for years, as the author discovered when he took a closer look at the situation of Afghan migrants still in Serbia.
Talking and walking in Belgrade
For many migrants, having experienced a first taste of the EU in Greece or Bulgaria, Serbia may look like a comparatively relaxed stage of the trip. Access to asylum-seeking is available, but not everywhere: according to members of a Serbian NGO providing legal and psychosocial support to migrants, Klikaktiv, the police do not easily provide the possibility to register outside Belgrade and even in the capital, this opportunity is not available at all times. Despite improvements in the reception capacity of the 17 camps active across Serbia, for which the EU is the major funder, not many possibilities are offered to those who apply for asylum besides accommodation. The wait to legally seek employment amounts to nine months and, before a positive decision has been made, according to migrants solidarity organisations in Belgrade, no language or professional courses are available. At any given moment, there are around 3,000 migrants hosted in the reception centres, but very few opt to remain in Serbia. Most move quickly on to Bosnia and Croatia.
Serbia’s role is mainly one of transit, and in recent years, of an increasingly swift transit. According to the annual report by the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 124,127 migrants were registered and hosted in reception centres during 2022. On average, they stayed in the country for 16 days, a considerable decrease from the 30 days of 2021 or the 36 of 2020. Reportedly, over 73,000 migrants had already transited through Serbia’s camps in the first six months of 2023. Afghans were the most represented nationality to pass through the Serbian reception centres in 2022, amounting to over 36 per cent of the total.
It is often vulnerable cases, families or people with medical conditions who access reception centres out of their own free will. They may need to stop for a short while in order to recover, while other migrants try to continue on their path almost immediately. Outside the official camps, there is indeed another migrant population in Serbia, estimated at between 3-4,000 and constantly flowing into and out of the country and thereby renewing itself. This is centred on smugglers’ rented safehouses and the many squats located on the northern border with Hungary. At the western border with Bosnia, there is also a constant flow, but far less ‘housing’ because it is easier and quicker to cross.
The crossing into Bosnia is also the route generally favoured by Afghans, many of whom therefore end up stopping in Serbia for only a couple of days. According to both migrants and NGO workers interviewed by AAN, crossing into Bosnia is now relatively easy. From Belgrade, migrants move to minor border crossings near quiet towns in western Serbia such as Loznica. Migrants described wading or swimming across rivers – though crossing the Drina, which largely marks the border between the two countries, would require along most of its course advanced swimming skills – read here about migrants stranded mid-river. Different interviewees related also crossing rivers by bridges, either secretly, through a system of ropes hung under the bridge, or quite openly – just walking across. At some minor border crossings, such as Ljubovija, migrants can be taken across the river into Bosnia directly by car: according to the Serbian NGO, Klikaktiv, it is relatively common to see cavalcades of vehicles with non-local plates crossing this and other nearby ‘sleepy’ border towns. Some migrants may be picked up by cars on the Bosnian side. These ‘all-inclusive’ migrants who pay more and travel fast, stay with smugglers throughout, and are often brought directly to the Croatian frontier and even beyond.[8] The average migrant, however resorts to public transport once on the Bosnian side.
Map by Roger Helms for AAN
On both sides of the frontier, the police often opt to close their eyes to migrants’ crossing, or can be bribed by smugglers if necessary. The lax attitude of the police in Serbia has often been commented positively on by migrants and looks to be a constant from AAN’s previous visit to the country’s migrant squats in 2016 (read this and the other reports from the series). However, things might be changing in this respect, as episodes of violent repression of migrants at border crossings have recently been documented and seem to be on the rise. Klikaktiv has also reported police pressure on migrants trying to use public transport to reach Belgrade from the south.
The shift in Serbian police attitudes is not happening only at the borders: a short walk in downtown Belgrade in the same places researched in 2016 at the height of the ‘first Balkan Route crisis’, showed that a lot had changed in the city as well. The area of the once dilapidated central train station in the Savamala neighbourhood, that has since been relocated, has been transformed into a new upscale Belgrade Waterfront project, radically changing the city skyline and profile of the neighbourhood. This means also that migrants’ presence in the area, previously a ‘natural’ hub for those transiting, is nowadays less tolerated.
Around the remains of the old train station in Savamala (read here a report on BBC Serbian about its past glory, and last days), the absence of refugees is made more conspicuous by the signs of their previous presence: PCO shops, where people could phone home or contact smugglers, and kebabs once lining the main avenue are now shut, together with the cheap hostels that would accommodate families or migrants coming to Serbia in a more high-profile way.[9] Tents and shacks have disappeared and illegal squats inside the abandoned wagons near the old train station have been removed. Serbian police are known to raid such urban squats in order to destroy them and deport their occupants to the camps inŠid near the Croatian border or in Preševo near the border with North Macedonia (read this report by Klikaktiv).
By mid-2023, only a few migrants were visible around Belgrade’s former main railway station in the Savamala neighbourhood. In the past, it was a busy hub. Photo: Fabrizio Foschini, 25 July 2023.
The nearby park, universally known by migrants as ‘Afghan Park’ since at least 2015, where smugglers used to hold court (read this instalment of the previous AAN series on Afghan migrants in Serbia) now looks to be only frequented by migrants part-time. With the coming of spring and then summer, it started to fill again with newcomer migrants arriving from the Bulgarian or Macedonian border, but they do not spend all their time there and are frequently rounded up and forcibly relocated by the police to camps far away from the city.
Arriving at Afghan Park one morning shortly after 11am, the author could witness from afar such an operation. Two dozen migrants, seemingly Afghans, had been made to sit on the grass while a dozen police agents counted and identified them in order to have them board a big police bus, already waiting by the side of the road. Some civilians stayed there throughout the process, possibly NGO workers who had come with their own translator to make sure the migrants were advised and accounted for and that none ended being pushed out of Serbia.
Moving a couple of lanes above the park, in front of a line of shops selling hiking gear, a few migrants were apparently waiting for the police operation to be over before moving out of cover. Three were Afghans from the southeast, speaking Pashto over the phone and a bit uneasy about speaking Dari to a stranger. They hurried to declare that they were already accommodated in a camp at the outskirts of the city and had only come to town to do some shopping.
Walking down another lane leading back to the park, there was another group of Afghans who had apparently left it in the wake of the police arrival. They were mostly Pashto speakers as well, with at least two very young boys among them. Although arguably keen to put more distance between them and the police bus on the other side of the road, they did not look over-concerned by it (the vehicle was also shielding them from the agents inside the park). However, the conversation with them was cut abruptly short by an old lady from a balcony above, who started protesting loudly that it was not permitted to talk to migrants (arguably taking the author for a local). She kept urging the migrants to go back and immediately report to the police in the park, as it was not allowed for them to stay in the city. Indeed, the Afghans did not look at ease stopping anywhere in the area and kept hurrying onwards, so the interview had to be continued while walking several hundred metres. It was a full reversal of how easy it was to spot and engage in conversation with migrants in Belgrade only a few years back. The information they provided was necessarily sketchy, but its interpretation made somewhat easier by the circumstances.
They had not been stopped by the Serbian police and had kept clear of the camps. Although they claimed they were sleeping in various city parks, they seemed to be following a clear leader – a tall, bearded guy walking a few dozen metres ahead of them – and had shopping bags full of food with them. They said they would stop to rest for a couple of days before hitting ‘the game’ towards Bosnia. When asked if they were ‘khod-andaz’ (migrants who self-organise their trip) or were with smugglers, they seemed to find the idea funny and replied “We’re with smugglers, of course.” They added that the police in the park did not see them and they did not wish to be seen, else the police might bring them back to the camps “two hours away [located in the south of Serbia.” They complained that the Serbian police were making some problems for migrants, that people were forced to go to the camps and that the police sometimes sent some of their number back to Bulgaria.
On returning to the park, I found it deserted. The migrants had boarded the police bus, which seemed now ready to start. The whole process had taken around one and a half hours. A few more Afghans, altogether not more than half a dozen, were squatting or sleeping in the more secluded parts of the park esplanade in front of the old train station, now a restored monument, not creating even a visible trouble to passers-by. Ironically, above their heads, a big travel agency placard atop an unfinished building promised that with it: “Every day, you could go to Turkey”.
Discussions with NGO workers and researchers at Belgrade University confirmed the impression that, regardless of the still significant numbers of migrants passing through Belgrade, they are much less visible in the city. The causes for this are the authorities’ changed attitude, as well also the nature of the operations run by the smuggling networks in Serbia. Migrants constitute a minor source of concern for the Serbian government, provided they do not become too visible in central areas of the city. To disincentivise their presence, besides raids and forced relocation to camps out of the city, the authorities have discontinued the provision of services to migrants in the area. The main hub offering assistance to migrants in the city centre was Miksalište. It had been transformed over the years from a volunteer organisation to a state-run info point (read this paper on its history and the transformations of migrants reception in Belgrade), forced to relocate in 2016 due to the demolitions planned for the Belgrade Waterfront and was shut down for good on 31 December 2022.
The withdrawal of the state left a free hand once again to the smugglers, not only to arrange for the migrants to cross frontiers in a swift way, but to organise every other aspect of their stay in Serbia. Today, migrants who do not seek reception in the government camps are fully dependent on the smugglers for transport, accommodation, food and communications – hence the lack of need for PCO shops and food stalls. This of course, has its backlashes. Migrants who cannot pay smugglers can face serious abuses and are often exploited for labour or sex. Many such migrants have to work for the smugglers in assisting the accommodation or transport of other migrants and are kept in isolation and are very difficult to access, whether by NGOs keen to help, or the security forces. The situation is of particular concern for vulnerable categories, such as unaccompanied minors – Klikaktiv assessed that in the first six months of 2023, there were three times as many of these crossing Serbia compared to the same period last year.
Recently there have also been numerous instances of violence between smugglers, believed to be caused by competition between rival groups. The string of violence started in July last year, with a shooting between two rival groups of Afghan smugglers in a squat near the northern border with Hungary, which ended in one member killed and also caused serious injuries to an Iranian girl who was caught in the crossfire. The episode made some impression on the Serbian media back then, but this year, despite several similar incidents – at least five, including one recorded in March on the border with Bosnia which resulted in the death of an Afghan – they have not attracted much public interest nor police reaction. The fact that they happened in liminal places, such as migrants’ squats or in remote border towns and did not involve Serbian nationals, has so far kept the profile of such crimes low in the eyes of the state and public. Klikaktiv, however, denouncing the threat posed by smugglers to migrants and NGO workers, indeed all citizens, lamented the lack of political will to deal with the problem on the part of the authorities (see their most recent report).
Where does the Balkan Route end?
During the 1990s, when the civil wars that resulted in ethnic cleansing and mass displacement across the territories of former Yugoslavia, the use of the old terms ‘Balkanisation’ and ‘Balkanise’ as pejoratives denoting fragmentation, chaos, insecurity and unlawfulness was revamped.[10] A joke about the Balkans’ physical borders, told by people writing about the region at that time, suggested the impossibility of even ascertaining where ‘the Balkans’ started or ended, as no country coming out of the dissolution of Yugoslavia would accept being called part of the ‘Balkans’, and would cast the label with its now stained connotation onto its neighbour.
Nowadays, it could prove equally hard to define where the Balkan Route starts or ends, judging by the behaviour of the EU states. Is the situation faced by Afghan migrants at the supposed end of the route radically different? Legal provisions may be different, but the reality is not.
A long chain of push-backs of thousands of migrants, including many who intended to apply for asylum, from the Italian border near Trieste to Slovenia, and from there to Croatia and Bosnia, was ongoing between 2019 and 2021. The ‘chain push-backs’ were exposed only through the work of independent organisations and lawyers who investigated complaints made by some deported asylum seekers. The sensation the news made and a court sentence back then put a stop to such practices, but recently, authorities at the regional and national level have been openly advocating for their resumption.
Meanwhile, Trieste’s train station, just inside Italy, and the square in front of it are crowded with hundreds of migrants, half of them transiting through the city on their way to further destinations, the other half waiting to access a reception programme after having applied for asylum in Italy. Waiting times for a place to sleep in the city can now last more than fifty days (read here about conditions in Trieste). A reception system made of small flats scattered across the city, that once worked very effectively, has been hampered by cuts to funding and the preference given to the creation of big hubs that relocate high numbers of migrants away from the cities. The identification of the venues for such hubs has, however, become a bone of contention between the administrations and their constituencies, as communities stand up and reject them, while political parties squabble over responsibilities (read reports in Italian and English). Transfers to reception programmes in other parts of Italy have been blocked since November 2022 because of the priority given to arrivals by sea over those who travel by land They have only just recently, sporadically, resumed in the face of the crisis.
Italy is not a lone example of controversial and ineffective policies. Austria has reinstated border controls with Italy and even fenced part of its border with Slovenia in 2015 at the height of the ‘Balkan Route Crisis’. It has maintained these controversial measures, which are a de facto breach of Schengen, even in the face of diplomatic tensions, and despite the fact that most of its migrants currently arrive from Hungary (across a border which Austria also controls). At the other end of the Alps, France likewise reinstated border controls in 2015 and proceeds routinely to effect “entry refusals” against migrants coming from the Italian side of the border, even when they are traced well inside its territory (read about it in this AIDA report).
As for the Balkans, speaking in strictly geographical terms, they remain the battleground of choice for the externalisation of migration control strategies implemented by various EU countries or groups of countries (see this recent paper on the role of, for example, the Salzburg Forum, which brings together several Central European states in a security partnership). Such externalisation of migrant control strategies is often done in a controversial or chaotic manner, despite the refugee crisis having been one of the EU’s long-term concerns for over a decade now. The current trend sees an extension of the externalisation of such practices to non-EU countries in the region, such as Serbia and Bosnia (read this paper on the subject).
It is unclear whether a more comprehensive set of EU policies aimed at dealing with the migration crisis on its south-eastern borders will appear any time soon. It seems likely that, for the time being, the conditions met by Afghans crossing Serbia and Croatia will remain far from ideal. Serbia, with no obvious chance for a quick accession to the EU, will likely retain a somewhat permissive environment for transiting migrants. However, if the partnerships with the EU in border security and reception system were to be expanded, there might be a change in that equation. This would also depend on the levels of economic aid and/or political concessions that the EU is willing to make to get Serbia to act to block migrants moving westwards. On one hand, additional incentives could be created for migrants to apply for asylum in Serbia and have their cases processed there; this would include language and vocational courses and the possibility of being relocated to an EU country at a later date. On the other, Serbia could also become a country to which the EU could return unwanted migrants and failed asylum seekers, thanks to its position exactly outside of the EU and that it is not bound by the EU’s legal framework. Such a development is already being reported for Bosnia, whose policy and attitudes towards migrants is even more linked to EU policies and funding (read about an agreement allowing Bosnia to repatriate Pakistani migrants).
As for Croatia, for the time being the possibility that it could itself become a target destination for Afghan asylum-seekers must be excluded, despite its entry into the Schengen area and the burgeoning touristic sector which could offer jobs. These potential attractions are countered by the unwelcoming attitude of the security and political forces, low wages, language difficulties and, even more so, the lack of a diaspora community to link up with. Until a thorough rethinking of EU migration policies comes into being or the Union’s external frontiers are pushed somewhere else, the hostile reception given to migrants in Croatia is unlikely to change. Moreover, Croatia’s long and tortuous border risks it being relegated to its role in the 16th to 18th centuries in the Hapsburg Empire, of being a Militärgrenze, a military frontier, where normality and the rule of law are sacrificed in order to protect the tranquillity of what lies behind – in exchange for dubious economic or political benefits.
Afghan migrants, trying to move from Turkey towards central and western Europe, are faced with a series of countries displaying varying policies and attitudes, from outright hostility and violence to laissez-faire and opportunism. Such inconsistency en route continues well beyond the Balkans for the many among the transit population aiming at destinations further afield, such as France, Germany or the UK. Theirs is not an experience of moving from the wild ‘jangal‘ to the lawful ‘city’ – the Dari and Pashto word used by migrants, paytakht, ‘at the throne’s feet’, conjures even more the idea of law and order connected to it. Rather, the experience of those travelling through the West Balkan route amounts to a rough introduction of what they will encounter deeper into the European Union, a set of migration laws and policies which are unclear and uneven from one country to another.
Edited by Jelena Bjelica and Kate Clark
References
References
↑1
A reception system for asylum seekers of sorts in Croatia did exist in 2013, but it had only recently been expanded and become more effective. Croatia has received nearly 47,000 asylum requests since 2004, when the first laws about asylum were passed, of which more 40,000 were filed in the last seven years, after the announced ‘closure of the Balkan Route’, ie, the humanitarian corridor of September 2015 to March 2016, following Germany’s Angela Merkel’s announcement that Syrians fleeing the civil war could be welcomed. Only a tiny fraction of the asylum requests, 1,015, have received a positive answer, according to information given by the Centre for Peace Studies in Zagreb, 19 July 2023.
↑2
Frontex data about the Western Balkan route refers to border crossings between EU and non-EU countries, between Bulgaria and Hungary and Serbia, Croatia with Bosnia and Greece with North Macedonia and Albania. It does not include Croatia’s detection of irregular migrants deeper inside its territory – see an example of Frontex’s methodology here.
↑3
In the last few years, an alternative sea route has emerged from Turkey directly to the southern shores of Italy. More expensive than the land route to Italy, it is sought by those, including many families, who cannot contemplate the hardships of the land route. It is nevertheless no less dangerous, as the shipwreck off Cutro in February 2023, which cost almost one hundred lives tragically proved. Half of them were Afghans, but there were also Pakistanis, Syrians, Iranians, Palestinians, Somalis and others, reported AP.
↑4
As further background readings on Afghan migration to Europe, see two AAN dossiers presenting several reports on Afghan migrants here and here.
↑5
Besides Porin, there exists a reception centre for vulnerable cases in Kutina, some seventy kilometres southeast of the capital, which has been recently renovated and can host up to 140 people; and two transit centres in Trilj and Tovarnik, close respectively to the borders with Bosnia and Serbia, where migrants caught crossing the border can be detained until moved elsewhere or readmitted to the neighbouring countries. Minors, among them many Afghans, are reportedly often hosted in structures meant for problematic minors, despite the objections raised against this practice by the NGO community in Croatia.
↑6
A similar bilateral agreement permitted Slovenia to readmit a number of migrants to Croatia in past years. This practice has been diminishing since 2022, when Croatia started refuse further readmissions (see this report on Slovenia by AIDA).
↑7
The Dublin Regulation is actually a series of treaties among EU countries aimed at combating so-called ‘asylum-shopping’ by migrants, that is, the attempt to reach deeper into central and northern Europe for what they consider more favourable destinations. The argument is that asylum-shopping creates undesirable volumes of illegal movement across the Union. However, by ordering that asylum seekers must be transferred back to the countries of first entry (and fingerprinting), the agreements have arguably increased such movements, as the so-called “Dubliners”, usually after long and frustrating waits, relocate in order to avoid being deported to places they do not want to be, usually moving to third EU countries to try their chances there. A more common criticism of the Dublin Regulation is that, if implemented systematically, it would lay all the burden of the reception of asylum seekers and the processing of their cases on the southern and eastern countries of the EU.
↑8
At official border crossings where document checks are regularly carried out, some migrants can also try to use forged documents to cross. However, only a small number of migrants can afford to buy such documents and their purchase and use are more often linked to attempts to travel via airports and seaports.
↑9
Between 2017 and 2018, for example, Iran was temporarily granted a visa-free status by the Serbian government (read this report about its revocation). Back then, many Iranian nationals would travel to Belgrade only in order to proceed further to the EU and seek asylum there. As they were often traveling with their families many would rent cheap rooms rather than join the illegal squats.
↑10
These terms with its pejorative meaning have been in use in English (and corresponding terms in German, French and Italian, among other languages) since the 1920s in reference to the Balkan Wars of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Fabrizio Foschini
Keep on Moving on the Balkan Route: No quarter for Afghan asylum seekers in Croatia and Serbia
Two years after the Taliban took over Afghanistan, the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice has banned all women from visiting the country’s premier national park. “Going sightseeing is not a must for women,” the head of the ministry explained. Band-e-Amir, a UNESCO World Heritage site about 155 miles west of Kabul, is known for blue lakes and sweeping cliffs. It was last in the news for being the first park in Afghanistan to employ female rangers. The announcement of the ban came on Women’s Equality Day.
At this point, there is only so much the West can do to help Afghanistan’s women.
Yet they need as much help as they can get. After two decades in the wilderness, the Taliban claimed after seizing Kabul that women would be allowed to study, work and “be very active in our society.” All lies.
Last month, about 100 young Afghan women who earned scholarships from an Emirati billionaire to attend the University of Dubai were blocked from leaving the country as they tried to board a charter plane. With daily humiliations big and small, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan continues to be a disaster for the women left behind. The Taliban regime forces half the population to live in prisonlike conditions, a waste of human potential.
With U.S. troops offering protection, 3.6 million girls were enrolled in primary and secondary schools and about 90,000 received higher education. Now, women are flogged by men for such crimes as “escaping from home.”
An Aug. 30 report by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom says the majority of the 100 religious edicts issued by the de facto government since August 2021 directly enforce severe restrictions on women and girls. Millions are also starving. The International Rescue Committee says women and girls account for almost 80 percent of the Afghans in need of humanitarian assistance.
“Child marriage and attendant maternal mortality have increased,” according to an Aug. 17 Human Rights Watch report, “and gender-based violence, particularly in the home, continues to skyrocket.”
In July, the Taliban ordered the closure of every beauty salon in Afghanistan. With gyms, parks and classrooms no longer accessible, salons were among the final sanctuaries. Visiting beauticians offered a rare taste of freedom. When some women protested, security forces dispersed them with fire hoses.
With the regime determined to stamp out any ember of joy for women, it’s no surprise there’s a suicide epidemic. Afghanistan has become one of the few countries in the world where more women than men die by suicide. The Guardian told a heartbreaking story on Aug. 28 about an 18-year-old who tried to take her own life after her dreams of becoming a doctor were dashed and her family sold her into a forced marriage with a cousin who is addicted to heroin. According to the Guardian, “Some see suicide as the only remaining form of defiance possible.”
Anyone who advocated withdrawal from Afghanistan, including both President Donald Trump and President Biden, deserves a share of the blame for these foreseeable consequences. Because of the U.S. government’s decision to abandon Afghanistan to extremists, Washington has limited leverage to undo the Taliban’s edicts. The U.S. government can refuse to recognize the Taliban so long as Afghanistan’s rulers commit such wide-scale human rights abuses. The State Department can designate Afghanistan as a country of particular concern. Congress can make it easier for Afghans in the United States on humanitarian parole to apply for permanent legal status after undergoing appropriate vetting.
Afghanistan is a party to, and clearly in violation of, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, as well as the convention on the rights of the child. The convention is difficult to enforce, but the U.S. government should declare that the Taliban’s treatment of women constitutes an ongoing crime.
The U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, said in a June report that the Taliban might be responsible for “gender apartheid.” This term should stick. Notably, South Africa’s representative to the U.N.’s Human Rights Council urged the international community to treat gender apartheid “much like it did in support of South Africa’s struggle against racial apartheid.”
The United States might have surrendered most of its leverage. But that does not mean the United States should fail to use all it has left.
Afghanistan women suffer 2 years after Taliban takeover
Afghanistan Peace Campaign
In Savamala, traces of past frequentation by migrants, such as cheap hostels and restaurants, are still visible in the neighbourhood, which is now the site of major building projects. Photo: Fabrizio Foschini, 25 July 2023. A country in the EU: Croatia
