Over the past six months, the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan has extended from low-level border skirmishes to talk of “open war.” Pakistan conducted its first-ever air strikes in Kabul in October 2025, targeting Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and, more recently, on 16 March 2026, bombed the city, killing more than 140 civilians. Islamabad, for the first time in a decade, has seen major attacks by militant groups and accuses the Emirate of supporting the TTP’s growth since 2021, accusations that the Emirate has consistently denied. The deep-seated tensions between the two neighbours are also fuelled by longstanding disputes over regional diplomacy, sovereignty and territorial issues. Amid mounting casualties and warnings of looming humanitarian crises, multiple mediation attempts by regional countries and several ceasefires have failed to hold. In this report, AAN’s Fabrizio Foschini, Rachel Reid and Roxanna Shapour examine the state of the conflict, its historical roots and the regional and global response.
The Afghanistan–Pakistan relationship has entered one of its most volatile phases in decades, characterised by escalating cross-border attacks, failed diplomatic efforts and a rapidly worsening humanitarian crisis.
At the core of the crisis lies a complex mixture of immediate security concerns and enduring territorial and structural disputes. Since the establishment of the second Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan has increasingly accused militant groups—particularly Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – of operating from Afghan territory, while the IEA has denied these accusations and has, in turn, accused Pakistan of violating Afghan sovereignty, particularly through airstrikes across the border. The Emirate’s military has responded with attacks on Pakistani border posts as well as low-tech drone strikes inside Pakistan. These tensions are exacerbated by unresolved historical issues, including disagreements over the Durand Line and competing strategic interests that have shaped bilateral relations since 1947.
Despite several attempts at mediation by regional countries, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, successive ceasefires have not held and negotiations have not thus far been fruitful. The escalation of the conflict has resulted in high-casualty incidents in Afghanistan, with the United Nations estimating 289 killed or injured since the end of February. The UN doesn’t track similar statistics on the Pakistani side of the border, though civilian casualties from militant attacks inside Pakistan are at a ten year high. The gravity of the situation has been somewhat overshadowed by the conflict between Iran and the US and Israel, despite its potential ramifications for the region and beyond.
This report provides a brief overview of the latest stage of the conflict, placing recent events within their wider historical and geopolitical context. It outlines the causes of escalation, the involvement of regional and international actors and the humanitarian impacts of ongoing hostilities. It is based on publicly available sources, with an awareness that verification is difficult and misreporting is common.
How it all began: Initial strikes and ceasefire breakdown (October–December 2025)
The most recent Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict began with Pakistan’s first-ever airstrike on Kabul in the early hours of 9 October 2025. In retaliation for a Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which killed 11 Pakistani military personnel, the Pakistan military struck near Kabul’s Abdulhaq Square, reportedly targeting a TTP stronghold. Early reports that they had killed the TTP leader, Noor Wali Mehsud, were denied, with an audio message attributed to Mehsud released soon after (Amu TV, Reuters, Times of India). Airstrikes were also reported in Khost and Paktia provinces on the same night, as well as in Jalalabad city (Daily Urdu).
The Defence Ministry of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) released a statement on 9 October condemning the attacks and warning that if the situation worsened, “the consequences will be attributable to the Pakistani army” (Al Jazeera). A more diplomatic tone was struck by the Emirate’s Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, who was in the Indian capital, New Delhi, for a six-day visit, who said “our issues can be solved by negotiation, not by war” (BBC). Pakistan, for its part, did not comment directly on the reports, but did reiterate that militant groups operating from within Afghan territory posed a threat to its security – an allegation that the Emirate has consistently denied. (Monitoring by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) suggests that the TTP was involved in over 1,000 attacks in Pakistan during 2025.)
Open fighting broke out in the following days, with Emirate forces launching retaliatory attacks on 11 October against Pakistani military posts along the border, prompting counterattacks from Pakistan and reported casualties on both sides (BBC Afghanistan). Emirate forces claimed that 58 Pakistani soldiers and nine IEA soldiers had been killed, as well as around 30 wounded, reported BBC Afghanistan, quoting IEA Spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed.
Pakistan, however, dismissed the Emirate’s claims, though it acknowledged that 23 of its soldiers were killed in clashes (Al Jazeera). It responded by closing major border crossings, including Torkham and Chaman, disrupting trade, movement of people and humanitarian aid (AP).
Despite a brief ceasefire of 48 hours that began on 15 October (Al Jazeera) and ended on 17 October when fighting resumed with Pakistan’s airstrikes on three locations in Paktika province (Amu TV), the five-day clashes from 10 to 17 October resulted in 47 civilians being killed and 456 injured in Afghanistan, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Spin Boldak in Kandahar province recorded the highest number of casualties, with additional civilian casualties reported in Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, Kandahar and Helmand provinces (UNAMA).
On 19 October 2025, negotiations in Doha, mediated by Qatar and Turkey, resulted in an immediate ceasefire and an agreement to establish “mechanisms to consolidate lasting peace and stability between the two countries” (Al Jazeera, Reuters).
This led to tense talks between the two countries from 25 to 30 October in Istanbul. Pakistani officials – includingDefence Minister, Khawaja Asif and Information Minister, Attaullah Tarar – accused Afghan negotiators of backtracking and warned that progress would be difficult (AP, Dawn). Meanwhile, Amu TV cited an unidentified Emirate official as saying that Pakistan had made “unreasonable demands” and had refused to address Afghan concerns, including alleged airspace violations and allowing extremist groups to stage attacks inside Afghanistan from Pakistani territory. The joint statement issued on 30 October stated that both sides agreed to continue the ceasefire and a new round of talks on 6 November.
However, on 6 November, as the peace talks began, the two sides exchanged fire at the Spin Boldak/Chaman border crossing (Reuters, Al Jazeera). On 8 November, the Emirate’s Deputy Interior Minister and member of the negotiating team, Rahmatullah Najib, attributed the breakdown of the talks to Pakistan’s demand that Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada issue a fatwa (religious decree) declaring all ongoing warfare in Pakistan as “illegitimate.” Najib said at a press conference that since Afghanistan had no right to approve war in Pakistani territory, “we also don’t have the right to declare these wars illegitimate, because they don’t belong to us … Then why should we issue such fatwa” (Amu TV). He added that the authority for such a fatwa lies with the Taliban-affiliated Dar al-Ifta (religious decree body) and that the Emirate “cannot dictate or influence the content of such religious rulings” (RTA).
The ceasefire ultimately collapsed on 11 November in the wake of a suicide bombing outside a courthouse in Islamabad, which Pakistani officials said killed 12 and injured 27, making it the first major attack in the capital for a decade (New York Times). Pakistani Defence Minister Asif declared on X: “We are in a state of war,” blaming Afghanistan, adding that “bringing this war to Islamabad is a message from Kabul.”
However, in a 15 November interview with the Pakistani daily The Express Tribune, Asif proposed that a way to mend the relationship between the two neighbours could be through a “written pledge,” which might be supported by friendly states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, China and Qatar. In subsequent remarks, however, Asif adopted a more pessimistic tone about talks with Emirate officials, stating that: “today, we are completely writing them off and we have no good hope from them” (Dawn).
Another round of talks was held on 3 December in Saudi Arabia, but these too failed to yield a breakthrough, although both sides agreed to maintain a ceasefire (Reuters). Sporadic clashes persisted throughout December 2025, including cross-border fighting on 5 December, which caused civilian casualties near Spin Boldak (BBC).
Renewed fighting and escalation (January–March 2026)
In January and most of February, the conflict remained sporadic. In Pakistan, an attack on 12 January 2026 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which killed six police officers (Dawn), was followed by a suicide bombing at the Shia Khadija Tul Kubra Mosque in Islamabad during Friday prayers on 6 February (BBC), further straining already tense relations between the two neighbours. A UN Security Council statement that condemned the attack in the strongest terms said that the mosque attack, which was claimed by “ISIL (Da’esh),” had killed 32 and injured 92 Pakistani nationals.
The Defence Minister, Khawaja Asif, said that the attacker had made several trips to Afghanistan before the incident, which was proof of an Indian-Afghan “collusion” (BBC). This was echoed by Pakistani Minister of State for Interior, Talal Chaudhry, who also told a news conference that the attacker had made several trips to Afghanistan before the attack (New York Times).
A 16 February attack against a security checkpoint in Bajaur district, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, killed eleven soldiers and one child. Pakistan responded by summoning Afghan diplomats and warning that it would take action against militant bases if necessary (Anadolu Agency, Express Tribune).
Pakistan launched a series of airstrikes on 21 February in several districts of Nangrahar and Paktika provinces, which the UN said killed at least 13 civilians and injured seven, including children (UNAMA). The Emirate warned of retaliation (Amu TV). Finally, Pakistan announced at a military briefing the start of Operation Ghazab lil-Haq (Righteous Fury) on 26 February, with the first wave of airstrikes hitting Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost and Nangarhar (Dawn). Pakistan’s Defence Minister, Khawaja Mohammad Asif, declared on the same day: “Our patience has now run out. Now it is open war between us” (Guardian).
Fighting intensified in the first week of March 2026, with Pakistan conducting strikes inside Afghanistan, including on the former US military base, Bagram, which Kabul said its air defences had thwarted (Guardian). Pakistani media, however, carried satellite images of what they said showed evidence of a successful strike on Bagram, located in Parwan province, about 40 kilometres north of Kabul International Airport (Geo News). Also in early March, the Emirate claimed it has used drones to hit Pakistani military targets in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, which Pakistan denied, but the Emirate’s ability to get its low-tech drones as far as the capital represents a new irritant for Pakistan (Al Jazeera).
One of the deadliest attacks came on 16 March 2026, when a Pakistani airstrike in Kabul targeted the Omid Drug Rehabilitation Facility and former NATO base, Camp Phoenix (UN News). As is often the case in such incidents, casualty figures remain contested, reflecting the difficulty in verifying figures in the early days after an incident. BBC Afghanistan quoted the Emirate’s Deputy Spokesman, Hamdullah Fitrat, as saying that “at least 400 people were killed and 250 wounded,” while Al Jazeera cited the United Nations as saying that it has recorded 143 deaths. Pakistan claimed that the target was an ammunition depot and a drone storage facility. Emirate officials dismissed this, describing the attack as a “crime against humanity” (BBC). In a statement published on 27 March, Human Rights Watch described the attack as “an unlawful attack and a possible war crime.” It noted that there was “no evidence that the Omid center was being used for military purposes,” rendering the strike unlawfully indiscriminate.
Following the 16 March strike, both sides continued exchanging fire. Afghan forces reportedly targeted Pakistani military positions, while Pakistan expanded its campaign with further strikes and reportedly intercepted drones near the border.
Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts to bring the two countries to the negotiation table continue, with countries in the region, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, pushing for de-escalation. These efforts led to a temporary ceasefire timed to coincide with Eid al-Fitr, the three-day holiday marking the end of the month of Ramadan, which fell on 20-22 March (AP).
The ceasefire, however, proved to be short-lived and fighting resumed along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border in eastern Afghanistan on 25 March, when Pakistani forces fired into Kunar province, killing at least two civilians and injuring several others (AP). The rapid collapse of this ceasefire, as well as earlier ones, highlights the volatile nature of the situation. With the unrelenting volley of attacks and counterattacks and no clear indication that either side is willing to de-escalate, the conflict continues to intensify in real time.
Humanitarian consequences
Amid these clashes, casualties have mounted, displacement has increased, with price rises and blocked humanitarian supply routes leading to growing food insecurity.
Civilians have been killed and injured on both sides, although higher numbers have been recorded in Afghanistan, mainly as a result of Pakistani airstrikes.
An update from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), covering 6 to 17 March, said 76 people had been killed and 213 injured, more than half of whom were women and children, in less than three weeks between 26 February and 17 March. It also drew attention to displacement, noting that in addition to large numbers displaced, more than 318 shelters destroyed or badly damaged, with displaced families in need of water, health services and food assistance. The UN’s Refugee Agency, the UNHCR, had previously warned on 5 March that the border conflict had displaced an estimated 115,000 people in Afghanistan and around 3,000 in Pakistan. This compounds the critical situation of Afghan returnees, with over one million forcibly returned by Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2025, according to UNHCR (for more on this see this AAN report).
OCHA also pointed to the impacts on food security, especially in Afghanistan, noting a 20 to 40 per cent price rise for key staples such as rice and vegetable oil since December. Humanitarian supply routes have been disrupted, with cargo trapped in Pakistani ports due to the border closure, as well as the Iran transit route being blocked amid its ongoing conflict. The World Food Programme warned on 3 March that around 160,000 people have been affected by the suspension of emergency food distributions.
Not surprisingly, UN officials have warned of dire humanitarian consequences and urged a diplomatic resolution. The Secretary-General, António Guterres, said on 27 February that he was “deeply concerned by the escalation… and the impact that violence is having on civilian populations,” and called for an immediate ceasefire (UN News). Senior UN officials have urged ceasefires, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, who called on 6 March for fighting to end, saying “Civilians on both sides of the border are now having to flee from airstrikes, heavy artillery fire, mortar shelling and gunfire.” In a statement issued on 24 March, United Nations experts urged Pakistan and Afghanistan to agree to a renewed ceasefire, warning of rising civilian harm.
Ceasefire calls have also come from Islamic leaders, including Ali Mohiuddin al-Qaradaghi, head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, who encouraged Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to mediate talks (Ariana News, Amu TV). The head of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also called for a resolution, with Khalil Ibrahim Okur, Deputy Director General for Humanitarian Affairs at the OIC, stating: “Afghanistan and Pakistan are brotherly countries, and we hope the issue will be resolved through diplomatic channels” (Ilkha).
Origins of the dispute: The contested border and the Pashtunistan issue (1947–1970s)
Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been fraught since Pakistan came into being through partition from India in 1947. Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, disputing the right of the newborn independent state to rule over the Pashtun-majority Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West Frontier Province – and later Balochistan. Afghanistan argued that these areas had been occupied by the British and were never formally ceded by Afghan rulers. Instead, it maintained that the people in these areas should be given the opportunity to choose whether to join Pakistan, Afghanistan or become independent through a referendum. Kabul asked Islamabad to negotiate a different border. Pakistan rejected any such negotiations and the so-called ‘Pashtunistan’ issue gained little traction with the international diplomatic community, where, in the context of the Cold War, Afghanistan remained relatively isolated.
Relations between the two countries never quite recovered from this initial shock. Afghanistan still refuses to accept the current demarcation line as an official international border (the so-called Durand Line, named after the British diplomat who negotiated it with the Afghan ruler in the 1890s). Over the decades, the Pashtunistan issue would remain a major focal point of Afghan political and intellectual debate (though often eclipsed during the most intense years of war in Afghanistan from the late 1970s).
A notable supporter of Pashtunistan was Prime Minister Daud Khan (1953-63), who pursued a proactive stance on the issue. Kabul supported Pashtun dissidents in Pakistan and lodged official protests when they were arrested. Pakistan reacted by blocking imports from Afghanistan, while respective embassies and consulates were often shut or ransacked by mobs. The two countries came close to military confrontation on several occasions, including an undeclared conflict in 1960-61 when Afghanistan provided military support to Pashtuns on the other side of the Durand Line opposed to Pakistani security forces. The confrontation escalated into direct military involvement by both countries and led to the severing of diplomatic ties and a full blockade of commercial routes. Tensions were only defused in 1963, when the Afghan King Zaher Shah replaced Daud with a less aggressive prime minister.
The Afghan crises and Pakistani interference (1970s–2021)
The presence of a hostile Afghanistan on its northwestern border has long been a major concern for Pakistan, constantly focused on its enmity with India; the latter, on the other hand, generally maintained good relations with Kabul. Afghanistan never intervened in the wars between Pakistan and India (in 1948, 1965 and 1971, nor in a series of more recent minor conflicts, such as those in 1999 and 2025). However, the need to avert that possibility has remained at the core of Pakistan’s strategic security doctrines and has largely informed its policies towards Afghanistan.
When Daud Khan seized power in a coup against his cousin Zaher Shah, in 1973, Pakistan became directly involved in the political turmoil in its neighbouring country by hosting and supporting Afghan dissidents, namely militant groups expounding a version of political Islam inspired by both the Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistani ideologue Abu Ala Maududi. After a failed insurrection against the Afghan government in 1975, these militants regrouped in Pakistan and went on to play a more significant political and military role in 1978-79, after a group of Afghan communists wrested power from Daud and eventually Soviet troops entered the country to support the newly established government.
Pakistani military commands and intelligence services played a pivotal role in supporting the mujahedin’s fight against the Soviets. After the Soviet withdrawal, they sought to help those factions they considered more aligned with their interests seize power in Kabul. In this quest for influence and leverage on a future Afghan government, Pakistan’s security establishment later spurred the country to support the first Taliban Emirate’s ascent to power in the mid-1990s.
After the 2001 US intervention and the toppling of the Taliban, Pakistan ostensibly joined the US campaign aimed at suppressing Islamic militancy in the border region but proved unable or unwilling to prevent the Afghan Taliban from taking shelter on its territory and using it to organise an insurgency against the new republican institutions in Afghanistan.
Pakistani support for the Taliban insurgency was a major bone of contention between Kabul and Islamabad during the two decades of the Islamic Republic, with occasional frustration also voiced by some international supporters of Afghanistan’s republican government. Meanwhile, having all but ceased to function during the civil war of the 1990s, the Afghan state lacked leverage with Pakistan and its once aggressive posture on the Pashtunistan issue had considerably weakened. Against the backdrop of heightened religious militancy spurred by decades of foreign armed interventions and financing of Islamist groups, the ethno-nationalist narrative behind the Pashtunistan issue seemed far less relevant. The ethnic solidarity among Pashtuns across the Durand Line instead played a role in the mobilisation for jihad against the Afghan government and its international backers between 2001 and 2021.
However, decades of violence and jihadi militancy in the frontier region were starting to take a toll on Pakistani society. From around 2007, the Pakistani Taliban, the TTP, emerged as an umbrella organisation for groups operating in western Pakistan. While supporting the Taliban insurgency was part of its original aims, its focus on the Pakistani state and its security forces grew in importance over the years. The repression-insurrection spiral in the FATA and other Pashtun-inhabited areas of Pakistan escalated over time. After major Pakistani military operations in 2014, local Pashtuns started to flee to the Afghan side of the border and, as the territory controlled by their Afghan brethren expanded, the TTP militants followed suit. For Pakistan, long accused of supporting the Afghan Taliban, the growing presence of the TTP in Afghanistan meant it now faced a similar threat from a militant group with a secure base across the border. Pakistani officials increasingly claimed that Kabul was using the TTP militants to destabilise Pakistan. While the extent of the Afghan government’s involvement, or even Kabul’s ability to effectively patronise TTP militants, remains unclear, the presence of TTP militants in Afghanistan became a major point of contention between the two countries.
The second Islamic Emirate and its relations with neighbours
The re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in August 2021 has not erased the underlying causes of tensions between the two countries. Despite prioritising a fundamentalist religious agenda and professing a lack of interest in matters relating to ethnicity, the IEA has not moved significantly away from the position of previous Afghan governments with respect to its border with Pakistan, although its wider regional relations have shifted.
The IEA has not changed Afghanistan’s longstanding position regarding the Durand Line, still actively opposing Pakistan’s fencing of the border (Reuters). Emirate Defence Minister, Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid, said in an interview with ToloNews in March that the Durand Line issue cannot be resolved, that the Emirate could not recognise it, but that it should be left “for the future” (transcription in English here by the Kabul Times).
Pakistan is more likely to cite the TTP, whose activities and presence on both sides of the border were boosted by the fall of the Republic and the withdrawal of NATO troops, with critics pointing to the Emirate’s more tolerant stance with regard to militant groups. The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), which reported regularly on the TTP’s growing strength, told AP that this was partly driven by militant groups getting hold of U.S. military equipment left in Afghanistan after the American withdrawal in 2021.
The Emirate is clearly reluctant to act against the TTP and other jihadi groups, which Defence Minister Mujahid was quite frank about in the interview with ToloNews noted above. When asked about Pakistan’s demands for the TTP (and Afghan refugees in Pakistan) to be dealt with, he said (Kabul Times translation):
They wanted to create issues that would force us to stand against our own people or tribes (qabayil) in such a way that the war currently happening in Pakistan would be transferred to Afghanistan, or that we would take actions against migrants and tribal people so that instead of fighting Pakistan they would fight us.
The resolute position of the Emirate has added to Pakistan’s frustration, as it has realised that the leverage and goodwill it believed it could count on in its relationship with the isolated regime in Kabul might not be enough to compel the IEA to act against the TTP.
Moreover, since its return to power, the IEA has deliberately diversified its trade – once reliant on Pakistan for exports, Iran has emerged as the main destination for Afghan goods since 2024-25, while India has become Afghanistan’s biggest export partner. The Emirate has also sought to reestablish closer diplomatic ties with India; something that cannot fail to antagonise Islamabad given its historical hostilities with Pakistan, which flared up during a four-day conflict between the two neighbours in May 2025 (BBC).
Relations with Afghanistan have long fed Indo-Pakistan tensions. Before 2021, India largely viewed the Taliban insurgency as a Pakistani proxy, but as Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have deteriorated, India has shifted towards rapprochement with the IEA (Asia Times, Chatham House). The Pakistani airstrikes in Kabul in October 2025 coincided with an unprecedented week-long visit to India by Muttaqi, which would lead to the reopening of the Indian embassy in Kabul shortly afterwards (BBC, Time). In March 2026, India and Pakistan exchanged sharp words during a UN Security Council debate on Afghanistan, with India condemning Pakistani airstrikes on Afghanistan and Pakistan accusing India of complicity with non-state groups operating in Afghanistan (Dawn, The Hindu, see also this AAN report featuring the tense exchange between the Pakistani and Indian representatives at the 16 March quarterly beefing of the UNSC on Afghanistan).
Mediation efforts have been led by Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, including talks in Qatar, Istanbul and Riyadh. Gulf states, in particular Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have a longstanding engagement with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Qatari mediation has been prominent over the past decade, including the US-Taliban talks that led to the 2020 Doha Agreement (AAN). Saudi Arabia’s role was historically security-focused, with an eye on Afghanistan’s western neighbour, Iran, but has shifted towards humanitarian efforts since 2021, playing an instrumental role in the Afghanistan Humanitarian Trust Fund, which the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) inaugurated in 2022. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia agreed a defence pact with Pakistan in September 2025, another sign of the increasingly multipolar nature of the region, which India would have noted (BBC, Chatham House). However, the instability triggered by the Israel-US war with Iran can only reduce the bandwidth of Gulf countries for mediation efforts between Afghanistan and Pakistan, despite the evident spill-over effects.
China, which has bilateral relations with both Pakistan and Afghanistan, plays a quieter role but has also been urging restraint and dialogue (International Crisis Group, BBC). The Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, reportedly held side meetings during the talks in Riyadh held in December 2025 (Afghanistan International). In mid-March 2026, Wang told his Afghan counterpart Muttaqi in a phone call that disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan should be resolved through dialogue and consultation, not force (Reuters). For China, good relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are vital to its economic expansion, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with Afghanistan brought into China’s Belt and Road framework in 2025 (ThinkChina).
Russia, which maintains diplomatic and economic relations with both the IEA and Pakistan, has frequently called for a diplomatic resolution to their conflict (Reuters, Al Jazeera). On 6 March, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke to the IEA Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amir Khan Muttaqi, emphasising “the need for settling the differences between Kabul and Islamabad by political and diplomatic means” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
From escalation to entrenchment: A conflict at risk of spiralling
The impact and broader ramifications of this cross-border conflict are already severe and could worsen. Military operations, previously confined to narrow strips along the border, have now expanded to larger areas in both countries. Pakistan has been targeting Kabul and blaming the Emirate for attacks in its own capital, as well as (less threatening) Emirate drones reaching Islamabad. The intensity of the confrontation comes at a time when the international community’s attention, commitment and capacity to operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan have greatly decreased due to the diplomatic impasse with the IEA and the distractions and shifts in priorities caused by other international crises.
Understanding the strategic goals of both Pakistan and Afghanistan can be hard given the taciturn nature of the IEA and Pakistan’s deeper state. Pakistan may simply be trying to curtail the TTP, given the intensity of attack levels in recent years, but there have been hints that their goal could be more ambitious and more dangerous. An unnamed security official told the Express Tribune in early March that “If there is actionable intelligence, no target will be off the table.” While a journalist from the same newspaper, Fahd Hussein, suggested that “regime change in Kabul should be the ultimate aim” (see his February 2026 post on X). While these statements may be propagandistic bluster, analysts have raised concerns. Political scientist Ayesha Siddiqa warned in The Print that “there is much talk of the necessity of an Islamabad-driven regime change in Kabul,” though she noted that this might require the “herculean task” of ground troops.
Similarly, analyst Timor Shahran, writing in Madras Courier, argues that “Pakistani’s strategy is aimed at degrading the depots, constraining resupply and diminishing the Taliban’s capacity to sustain a prolonged fight,” adding that a “second phase may involve targeting Taliban leadership directly, including the Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada.” He cites“unconfirmed reports” that “Taliban figures with historical ties to Pakistani intelligence have privately signalled to Islamabad and Washington that a post-Akhunzada Taliban would be more flexible,” but also cautions: “Afghanistan has defeated larger powers before—not through superior firepower, but by exhausting occupiers who underestimated the country’s internal complexity.”
In a move that highlights how multiple, overlapping crises in the region are shaping global priorities, Pakistan made an offer on 24 March to host talks between Iran and the United States (Al Jazeera, AP), although “Pakistan has been working the phones” as a mediator between the US and Iran, NY Times wrote, since early March. For Pakistan, which imports more than 85 per cent of its crude oil from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through the Strait of Hormuz, the energy crisis coupled with the risk of a sectarian spillover represents what one commentator in Dawn called a “polycrisis.” If Pakistan were to emerge as a global mediator, it would amount to “a major upgrade in Islamabad’s strategic standing,” a senior resident fellow at Washington’s Middle East Policy Council, Kamran Bokhari, told Reuters, adding that “Pakistan appears to be re-emerging as a major American ally in West Asia.”
At the same time, the leadership of the Emirate is not seasoned in participating in peace talks that lead to de-escalation. The hardliners at the centre may feel more ideological kinship with the TTP than their erstwhile friends in Pakistan, or not want to risk them turning on the Emirate, as the Defence Minister has indicated. The Emirate prides itself on its ability to outlast a superior force, though analyst Amira Jadoon, writing in War on the Rocks, warns that its “rationality is bounded by ideological solidarity, battlefield ties, and tribal obligation,” with a tendency to overlook “Pakistan’s enabling role” in that narrative. She concludes that the most likely scenario in the near term would be an “entrenched low‑grade confrontation along the Durand Line: recurring cross-border strikes, ground engagements, and retaliatory operations that normalize militarized rivalry without resolving the core dispute.”
In this light, the continuation of the conflict may be more the result of a convergence of interests rather than a failure of diplomacy. Pakistan may view a sustained conflict as a means of containing threats without risking a full-scale war, while the Emirate might tolerate an ongoing, controlled confrontation, rather than risk upsetting its jihadi brethren. Pakistani air aggression, combined with its harsh treatment of Afghan refugees, may win the Emirate more domestic legitimacy and strengthen its resistance to external demands. Forecasting, however, may be foolhardy, given the combination of old grievances, inscrutable, unpredictable or ideological leaders, economic instability and a volatile global arena.
Edited by Jelena Bjelica
Afghanistan Peace Campaign
