Some immigrants who have recently returned from Pakistan said that they are facing serious economic challenges and that these aids are not enough for them.
The President of the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS), Matiul Haq Khalis, said that the forced deportation of immigrants from neighboring countries and the earthquake in Herat have increased the level of people’s need for humanitarian aid.
Speaking at a ceremony to receive 5,500 aid packages from the King Salman Charity Foundation, Khalis noted that ARCS is working with international organizations to raise the amount of assistance in the districts and villages because recently returned immigrants face numerous difficulties there.
“After spending 20 to 30 years abroad, when one of them [immigrants] arrives in their district and province, they have no place to stay there and face various problems,” Matiul Haq Khalis said.
Some immigrants who have recently returned from Pakistan said that they are facing serious economic challenges and that these aids are not enough for them.
They asked the Islamic Emirate to also provide them the work opportunities.
“I am happy that I have received the aid, but we should be provided with the employment opportunities,” Wali Khan, a returnee from Pakistan told TOLOnews.
“We returned from Pakistan and rented a house for 6,000 Afghanis, and we have no means to advance our lives,” Khudadad, another returnee from Pakistan, told TOLOnews.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has provided 16 ambulances to the Afghan Red Crescent Society.
Officials of ARCS said that they will send these ambulances to Nuristan, Bamyian and Uruzgan provinces.
We thought we would start the new year by asking AAN writers and friends to recommend books about Afghanistan. The books they reviewed were diverse – fact and fiction, classics and newly-published and written in English, Pashto and German. Two were books that the reviewers felt helped make sense of why the Islamic Republic and its foreign backers failed, both written well before 2021. Three are accounts of journeys, from the 1930s, 2010s and after the 2021 fall of Kabul, all far more than travelogues. The memoirs of a United States airman who listened in to conversations from insurgents far below, gathering intelligence in order to target them, reveals the danger of realising your enemy is human, while a novel brings out the humanity of those living through an earlier phase of the war – the devastating fight over Kabul in the 1990s. We hope you enjoy these reviews as much as we did.
Rosita Forbes, ‘Forbidden Road. Kabul to Samarkand’, 1937
It was one of those finds. I had never heard about the book before, never saw it in a footnote or referred to elsewhere, but then discovered a story from a world long gone.
“The frontier you wish to cross is generally regarded as closed,” is what Rosita Forbes was told at the Soviet embassy in London when she earnestly started planning her trip to Samarkand, “through Afghanistan.” It is the 1930s and her wish to travel had been generated by seeing refugees from Soviet Turkmenistan, fleeing collectivisation, in Mashhad, Iran.
Finally, the journey happens. Forbes, an English travel writer, who had driven an ambulance in the first world war, travels through Afghanistan, a country then in the middle of – underreported – reform. The take of historians is usually that ‘reformer-king’ Amanullah’s abdication in 1929 was followed by half a century of stagnation. But Forbes speaks about then prime minister, His Royal Highness Sardar Hashem Khan, as “Asia’s wisest politician” and describes passing through “amazed villages lectured” by radio broadcasts in “Pushtu” on “agricultural reform, trade, sanitation, and the suppression of unnecessary murder.” She sees an Afghanistan with the potential for change – although the few glimpses into women’s life are sobering.
The road to Samarkand, described in the second half of the book, leads her through Kabul, a city with (you hear echoes of Babur) “a beauty like nothing else on earth.” She travels to the Khyber Pass and Jalalabad, and Herat and Bamyan, with the old bazaar at the feet of the Buddha statues still existing, and Charikar and Duab and finally Mazar-e Sharif, “the mecca of Central Asia.” To get there, she has made ‘a little detour’, mainly by lorry, squeezed in between male passengers and the driver. In a black hat, shawl, overcoat and sunglasses. And lipstick, if one of the ‘76 half-tone illustrations’ in the book does not deceive me.
“We lunched in the middle of [a] Ghazni street under the lovely long walls of her fortress.” road to Mukur, she describes villages with “excellent rest-houses with clean beds, tea, and a pilau for the ordering.” (70 years later, this writer still found pilau there.) “To travel with Afghans is a pleasure,” Forbes writes: “With seventeen Afghans on the post lorry,” mind you, on the way back from Kandahar to Kabul, “we had no food for eight hours, and were half frozen by sleet and wind.” In Kabul, the passengers all said farewell. “It was a good day. I had enjoyed it.” So did I, this very unexpected book.
Rosita Forbes, ‘Forbidden Road. Kabul to Samarkand’, 1937, EP Dutton & Co, New York, 289pp, (second-hand, found online)
Reviewed by Thomas Ruttig, a co-founder of AAN.
Jamaluddin Aram, ‘Nothing good happens in Wazirabad on Wednesday’, 2023
This moving debut by Jamaluddin Aram is an ode to life in the midst of war. His novel tells the story of a neighborhood in Kabul in the early 1990s (Wazirabad, for those who don’t know it, is next to Kabul Airport and was a ‘prize’ greatly fought over) and presents a fascinating cast of characters. There is the Kite-Seller and Bonesetter, the Widow, the Electrician, three militiamen and a young calligrapher called Seema; the men are mostly named by their work or profession, while the women are mostly defined by their familial positions and relations. However, the novel takes us beyond these titles and the stories of the women are detailed and layered – as they provide for their families, questioning and subverting the norms, or skillfully navigating a world where the stakes are set against them, to survive and pursue their hearts’ desires.
This novel is unexpected and refreshing in its language and structure. While written in English, the book incorporates Persian poetry, local proverbs, sayings and elaborate curse words and phrases with ease and grace, immersing us in a particular place and time. The structure is nonlinear, interweaving the stories of all the characters and integrating gossip, rumors, predictions and dreams, giving a surreal quality to the storytelling. The book tells stories of love, hate, faith, doubt and survival with tenderness for a community suffering poverty and living in the shadow of the war but not defined by either.
Jamaluddin Aram, ‘Nothing good happens in Wazirabad on Wednesday’, 2023, Simon & Schuster, 299 pp, ISDN 978-1668009857
Reviewed byShaharzad Akbar, a human rights activist in exile who misses home and loves books.
Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, ‘Connecting Histories in Afghanistan’, 2008
While in Herat recently, I re-read Hanifi’s ‘Connecting Histories’that explores the economy and society of the country in the 19th-century and its relations with colonial British India, through a lens of trade, literacy and state building at a critical and turbulent period of history.
Drawing on official and oral historical sources, Hanifi describes how British hopes of a subservient ‘frontier zone’ that might enhance their economic interests were thwarted by successive Afghan rulers who, while relying on handsome subsidies, gradually expanded their bureaucratic infrastructure in order to retain a monopoly on transnational trade in key commodities that depended in large part on nomadic communities for secure transport. The author documents how control of commerce enabled Abdul Rahman Khan (r 1880–1901) to invest in measures that he deemed essential for a ‘modern’ and independent state, while still making the case for increased subsidies.
The book has particular resonance in the aftermath of the most recent foreign engagement, when a culture of entitlement seemed to prevail among many Afghan politicians and officials whose legitimacy derived largely from financial and material support provided – often unconditionally – by outsiders. Just as in the 19th-century, such assistance was portrayed as a bulwark against an ever-shifting set of perceived threats to both donor nations and their allies in Kabul. By contrast, external aid has, since 2021, been employed as a means to pressure the current administration, whose response is to maximise locally-generated revenue and question the manner in which much ‘humanitarian’ assistance is provided. Hanifi’s book serves as a reminder that tension between Afghan leaders and their foreign backers is nothing new. Since 2021, this tends to be portrayed as primarily a tug-of-war over control of external aid with the administration in Kabul, but may also be about the current leadership’s assertion of a right to determine the longer-term vision for Afghanistan.
Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, ‘Connecting Histories in Afghanistan’, 2008, Columbia University Press, 282 pp, ISDN 0804774110
Reviewed byJolyon Leslie, who has lived and worked in Afghanistan since 1989 and is currently engaged in building conservation in the old city of Herat.
Ian Fritz, ‘What the Taliban told me’, 2023
This is the memoir of a US airman who deployed to Afghanistan after having learned Farsi and Pashto. In 2011, at the age of 22, he began flying hundreds of hours on ‘Whiskey and U-boat gunships’.[1] This was the time of the US military’s ‘capture or kill’ operations and of ‘the surge’ when President Barack Obama pushed US troop numbers up to more than one hundred thousand to break the Taleban insurgency.[2] Fritz’ job was to listen in to Afghans speaking on their walkie-talkies far below – and use that information to kill them.
He offers an entertaining, very personal, worm’s-eye view of the war. He is smart, well-informed and writes with insight about contending with strange languages, cultures and comms systems.
His perch gave him a rare window on the war. Most of us could only really see it from the single angle our particular perspective permitted, but occasionally you get a clear look from a different angle, and it makes your eyes go wide. Fritz shares his double vision with the reader, of the enlisted member of the US armed forces, and the man listening in to the conversations of fellow human beings. That was very hard on him.
The core of the narrative is how Fritz’ comms monitoring got him seeing his ‘targets’ as humans and the war itself differently. It made him suicidal. He did quit in time to save himself, but had a hard time getting the people around him to even understand what the problem was. He describes how the same thing happened to most other specialists in his role. Fritz went on to become a medical doctor.
I had expected more about the Taleban in this book, given its title, but it really only offers glimpses of them: he condemns them, but likes them. Fritz only deals with the politics of the war on a very abstract level, focusing on the stupidity and wrongness of it.
Ian Fritz, ‘What the Taliban told me’, 2023, Simon & Schuster, 304 pp, ISDN 978-1668010693
Reviewed byRoger Helms, who has been involved in Afghanistan since the 1980s when he worked on cross-border aid projects from Pakistan. He features in AAN largely as our map-maker.
Lillias Hamilton, ‘A Vizier’s Daughter: A Tale of Hazara War’, 1900
Hamilton, a prolific journalist as well as family doctor to the Afghan king, Abdul Rahman Khan (r 1880–1901) wrote what reads now like historical novel, in 1900. That was only a few years after the events which give it its setting, the brutal suppression by the ‘Iron Amir’ of the Hazara uprisings of 1888-1893. The author gives a fictionalised account of real events, saying she wrote about what had been seen and heard by people that she spoke to. They included Gul Begum, the heroine of her story.
Gul Begum is the daughter of an arbab, a Hazara landowner, who was a minister – vizier – in the self-governing Hazarajat before the war. Beautiful and wise, her father was really proud of her. When Hazaras lost their lands and property after defeat in the fight against Abdul Rahman Khan, Gul Begum was among the women and children taken captive and sold as slaves, while her father disappeared. In a complicated but compelling story, she tries to escape a forced marriage to a colonel in the amir’s army. Whether or not she escapes her fate, the reader will need to find out.
I found the book realistic and exciting, and with everything narrated simply and fluently, in a way that any reader could easily understand. Hamilton was an outsider, a British woman at a foreign court, but also an insider, family doctor to the royal family. Her account feels authentic.
Lillias Hamilton, ‘A Vizier’s Daughter: A Tale of Hazara War’, 1900, Gale and The British Library, 430 pp ISBN 978-1535800402
Reviewed byRohullah Suroush, a researcher with AAN.
Barnett R Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System’, second edition 2002
Of the books about Afghanistan that I have read over the years, and they are quite a few, there is above all one which gave me a major piece in the puzzle of why everything turned out the way it did in that agonised country – Rubin’s ‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System’.The main focus of the book is how the Afghan political elites, including the state, as well as civil society and later the armed opposition groups during the Soviet occupation, became increasingly dependent on foreign assistance from competing international powers. It was a development which began in earnest during the reign of Abdul Rahman Khan (r 1880-1901) and which ultimately led to the collapse of the state and the fragmentation of Afghan political and social society in the beginning of the 1990s. Although it is not covered in the book, the same conditions came to characterise Afghan political life in the coming decades and was an important cause to the downfall of the Islamic Republic in August 2021.
Barnett R Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System’, 1995 (second edition 2002), Yale University Press, 420 pp, ISDN 0300095198
Reviewed byAnders Fänge, a Board Member of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), SCA Country Director for 17 years during different periods between 1983 and 2011 and UNAMA Field Director 2001-03.
Whitney Azoy, ‘Buzkashi: Game and Power in Afghanistan’, 1982
Books published on Afghanistan that adhere to at least a minimum academic standard are not known as enjoyable reads. That is not their purpose; they should instead have rigorous analytical standards and be of value in helping you to understand Afghanistan, either as a whole system or one of its smaller components. Reading these books does often feel like a chore. But on occasion — a rare occasion — there is a book that offers both high quality analysis and is an enjoyable read. Whitney Azoy’s 1982 classic about buzkashi is one of those few.
Whitney Azoy first came to Afghanistan at the beginning of the 1970s as a US State Department Foreign Service Officer. He later resigned from the State Department and enrolled in an anthropology PhD programme. He returned to Afghanistan for fieldwork and departed in 1978, as did most foreigners. The result of his fieldwork was a PhD dissertation on the horse-riding sport of buzkashi, a project that was later published in 1982 as a book. In 2012, a 3rd edition by Waveland Press was published that included two new chapters and 30 more years of buzkashi in Afghanistan.
Buzkashi, a sport with deep Turkic cultural roots and historically popular in northern Afghanistan, and often described as horseback polo with a dead goat (or calf), is usually considered at most to be an entertaining game to play or watch once the temperatures drop. However, the game as a metaphor for politics and power competition in Afghanistan is a rich one. There is so much in this sport that can, once analysed, offer insight into how Afghanistan works. It is a metaphor, not strict engineering schematics, so it does take some literary license to make the metaphor work. Azoy goes beyond that simple comparison and observes everything around buzkashi as part of the broader game – from powerful local elites to the lowliest of social outcasts who are present on the sidelines. The importance of buzkashi was not lost on the national government, and they eventually introduced it in Kabul in a sanitised and controlled version for public consumption.
The book has, throughout the text, engaging characters and vivid scenes of people angling for position – both on and off the field. It is as valuable a read now as it was when it was first published. I consider it mandatory reading when considering a short list of introductory texts to Afghanistan.
Whitney Azoy, ‘Buzkashi: Game and Power in Afghanistan’, 1982, University of Pennsylvania Press, 152pp, ISDN 978-0812278217
Reviewed byChristian Bleuer, a researcher with two decades of experience in Central Asia. He is currently updating his Afghanistan Analyst Bibliography (2019); to be published by AAN in 2024.
Muhammad Ismail Yun, ‘What was Not Said in the Palace’ (in Pashto), 2017
This book was written by Kabul University professor and owner of Zhwandun TV station. Muhammad Ismail Yun. He also worked as the Head of Cultural Affairs in the Security Council for about two and a half years during the second Hamed Karzai presidency, sitting in the Arg, Afghanistan’s Presidential Palace.
Before that, Yun worked as an elected first clerk (munshi) in the Emergency Loya Jirga and member of the secretariat (dar al-insha) in the Constitutional Loya Jirga and as a campaigner for Karzai in the 2009 presidential election. He had established good relations with Karzai during his jobs in the Jirgas and been able to have many meetings with the president. He said he accepted Karzai’s offer of a job at the Security Council on the understanding that he would not only be a government employee, but the voice of the nation.
Yun provides short biographies and character sketches of all those who were in the palace during his time there, what he observed and heard, including in special meetings with the president, whom he said he met more than ten times.
He mostly speaks about the demands of the various powerbrokers. As a staunch Pashtun nationalist, it is not surprising that Yun mainly highlights those coming from the Northern Alliance – Shura-ye Nizar – whom he says were able to get Karzai to accept their demands and work for their interests. He also describes how it was individuals working in the palace, rather than the rule of law which prevailed, and how the neighbouring countries were also able to put pressure on Karzai, obliging him, he said, to accept their proposals concerning the internal affairs of Afghanistan. An example he gives of something which actually took place in Karzai’s first term, before Yun got his palace job, was what Yun calls the ‘unnecessary pampering of minorities’, when the districts of Panjshir and Daikundi were promoted to the rank of provinces in 2004.[3] He says that after making scores of arguments to Karzai against this promotion, the president told him: “I was very much forced to – Iran forced me a lot.” Yun believes that, as there was no parliament at the time, these decisions were unlawful.
“I understood from my first meeting with him,” Yun says of Karzai, “that anyone could spend time with him. His social behaviour was very good, but his political behaviour was full of ‘dealings’, and he obeyed force.”
People outside the palace, writes Yun, kept asking: What’s going in the palace? While people inside the palace were asking each other: What’s the gossip (sar-e chowk)? The real situation, he contends, was unknown not only to the people outside, but also even to those working in the palace. Yun claims to have been the voice of the nation when speaking to those in power, a sane voice in a place of chaos and an observer of that chaos and of what ‘really went on’ behind the scenes. The detail he gives, the accusations he makes and the stories he tells are all interesting. He was also, of course, an individual with interests as well.
Muhammad Ismail Yun, ‘De Arg Nawayalai, 2017, De Afghanistan Mili Tahrik [the National Movement of Afghanistan]
Reviewed byAli Mohammad Sabawoon, a researcher with AAN.
Matthieu Aikins, The Naked don’t Fear the Water’, 2022
I find it difficult to read books about Afghanistan, partly because so few compare with my experience of the country and its people. Most are still written by non-Afghans with an outsider’s view, some of them downright orientalist. Of course, I belong to this group of outsiders, although I have lived and worked in the country for many years, so feel entitled to criticise. So, it’s rare that books come along that pique my interest, but Matthieu Aikins’ book, “The Naked don’t Fear the Water”, did pique my twin interests – Afghanistan and refugee studies. It is also written by someone I met during my time in Afghanistan and respect deeply.
This non-fiction book tells the story of a journey made in 2016 by Matt with his Afghan translator, driver, ‘fixer’ and friend, Omar, to reach Europe in search of a better future: the aim was to experience first-hand and chronicle the dangerous journey many refugees and migrants take to escape poverty, economic uncertainty and conflict.
It is written in the sort of beautiful and compelling prose that I have never been able to master. It is an important book that has come at an important time – when the discussion of forced migration is once again dominating politics, and when the humanity of the refugee is too easily lost or forgotten. If you read it carefully, it also tells us how differently some countries welcome ‘outsiders’ – like Matt – who was welcomed by Afghans and Pakistanis with open arms and friendship, in stark contrast to the way most Western countries approach refugees, which is increasingly hostile and suspicious.
For the journey – described by one reviewer as “a modern version of Homer’s ‘Odyssey’”[4] – Matt had to “leave behind the passports that allowed me to move so easily through this world of borders.” There are many such reflections along the way, reminders of the enormous privilege that comes with a ‘respectable’ passport that enables easy border-crossing. Hopefully, readers will keep these differences in mind – and not simply be swept up by the incredible journey. The majority of refugees, lack such a privilege; Omar fittingly observes that his only possession is luck.
Matt tells us early on that he is making the treacherous and risky journey in part to give something back for all that Omar made possible for him in Afghanistan since they first met when both were about 24 years old: “I was confident that we would leave Afghanistan together, no matter what. Our trip would close a circle, for there had been a reciprocity in our motion, it seemed to me, since the day we met.” Matt does sometimes wonders if it was this reciprocity – or brotherhood – that drove him to make the journey, or whether, perhaps, it was the great story. The truth perhaps is a bit of both, friendship and story become blurred. After all, the book is written by Matt, not co–written with Omar, and while it tells Omar’s story, it is from Matt’s perspective, and in many ways, it is really Matt’s story.
When I recently reread the first 50 pages of this book, I was struck by two things. Firstly, this story is underpinned by male privilege – it is unlikely that a woman could have had quite such an experience or written such a story. At the least, the story would have been drastically different. Mostly though, Matt is aware of his various privileges, reflecting, for example, on how he can pass as an Afghan while also holding Canadian and US passports: “My ancestors came from Japan and Europe, but I look uncannily Afghan: almond eyes, black hair, wiry beard, describing the reaction of an early tea house acquaintance: “He’s a foreigner! But why does he look so Afghan?” Elsewhere, he experiences racism because of that appearance, so the privileges it brings is highly contextual: “With my dark hair and Asian eyes, I had crossed a color line somewhere over the Atlantic. In Europe, I was no longer included with the whites. I got called a Paki in England; in France, I was arabe. But as I travelled into central Asia, it was like walking toward a mirror; in norther Afghanistan, with its mix of Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks, I’d found my phenotype. People saw their face in mine.”
Matt was able to slip in and out of these two apparent identities, passing as Afghan when it suited, and calling on his Canadian-American identity when it suited, such as entering Afghanistan with the two litres of alcohol allotted to foreigners, in an exchange with the border police: “‘Brother, are you telling me you’re not Afghan?’ ‘No sir,’ I’d say, scrambling around the let with my passport before the cop could snatch the bottles. ‘Look at my name, I’m not even Muslim – sorry’.” Most refugees, including Omar, don’t have this privilege, to take on different identities, although Omar did try – and fail – to pass as a non-Afghan on his refugee journey.
The second surprise for me when re-reading the book for this review also came early on, when Matt tells his story of throwing a big party in Kabul, with alcohol and drugs flowing freely. I wondered why this had to be included in a story about displacement. Was it there to show the decadent lives of many Westerners in Kabul (not all, possibly not even a majority of us) and to remind the reader why the Taleban might feel that the West had corrupted Afghans? Did he mention this, along with other earlier stories of first going to Afghanistan, travelling on local transport and staying in small hotels and guesthouses, hanging out with some questionable characters, smoking hashish and occasional opium, as honest truth-telling of his own coming of age as journalist, or unnecessary bravado? These are the parts I stumbled over – perhaps, because I wondered how much of an Indiana Jones or Lawrence of Arabia mentality there was in the many Western men who worked in Afghanistan, especially as I had not pegged Matt as one of them. There is always a danger in such great stories, even when written with great sensitivity and finesse, that they appeal to readers on a different level than intended – to those in search of a good adventure story.
In the end, Afghanistan and Omar gave Matt what he had wanted since graduating from college in 2006 – great stories: “I wanted to be a writer and thought I’d find in the world the material I lacked within myself.” And while Matt has delivered an insightful and empathetic story about Afghanistan, Afghans and displacement, and the global dilemma of how to humanely address forced displacement, I could not help but wonder how the story would have been told differently if Omar had not been the protagonist in Matt’s story, but the author of his own story. What would Omar have told us about the experience of the failed Western state–building project in Afghanistan that squashed his hopes of a better future, how he felt about working for the Western military and Western journalists, ‘fixing’ their stories and fame? How did Omar experience the trip – and what was he thinking when Matt got annoyed at him being homesick and lovesick and wondered to himself: “What kind of protagonist was he?”
I enjoyed the book, despite the occasional discomfort at some passages, but also wondered if I would have liked it more had it been co–authored or written from Omar’s perspective. Does it take a Western author to draw attention to the plight of refugees? There are, after, all excellent first-person narratives written by refugees, such as Behrouz Boochani’s acclaimed autobiographical book ‘No Friend But the Mountains: Writing from Manus Prison’,[5] and I think we need more of these books, especially from Afghans, where the authors are the protagonists of their own story, not someone else’s. I can’t wait to review such a book next time.
Matthieu Aikins, ‘The Naked Don’t Fear the Water: An Underground Journey with Afghan Refugees’, 2022, Fitzcarraldo Editions, 384 pp, ISDN 978-1913097851
Reviewed bySusanne Schmeidl, a critical peace scholar-practitioner. She has worked for nearly three decades in academia and the non-profit sector, much of it in Afghanistan.
Christoph Reuter, ‘We Were Happy Here: Afghanistan after the Victory of the Taleban – A Road Trip’, 2023
“We met Taleban who offered, with a flirtatious smile, to carry our luggage,” but also “local commanders who held us for hours, time and again, just because they could.”
This book by veteran German journalist and occasional AAN author Christoph Reuter provides a deep look into a period in Taleban-ruled Afghanistan that might well be already over – the immediate aftermath of the re-establishment of their Emirate. Chaos reigned in many places, allowing access to areas that had been off-limits for reporters – and most Afghans – for at least a decade. Given the subsequent consolidation of the Kandahar-centred Taleban leadership’s power and increasing control of Afghan and international journalists, Reuter’s freedom to move, his ability to make a ‘road trip’, as the book’s subtitle calls it, might already be a historical anomaly.
“Suddenly, we were able to travel everywhere,” the author says and takes us to 18 of the (now) 33 provinces of Afghanistan: to Nuristan where former government employees try to survive as hunters, to Zaranj in Nimruz province where desperate Afghans try to break through the border to Iran and to Daykundi where an accusation of ‘Taleban land-grabbing’ turns out to be the work of a Hazara landlord. Reuter also takes the reader to Ghormach in Badghis province where a farmer ploughs a field that has seen no rain and is not even his own, and for a walk through Kabul’s terror victim cemeteries. The road trip is completed by glimpses of Kabul in the dramatic time just before and then after the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Reuter had been in Kabul just before the collapse, not anticipating – like everyone – that it would come so soon.
Reuter also takes us back to the pre-August 2021 Kabul bubble, with parties where German diplomats and aid officials shared thoughts on ‘how it really looks in the country,’ a reality which they did not share in their official reporting. The Afghan government’s narrative of difficult but incremental ‘progress’ had to prevail – until it was too late. Reuter laments that, in German, there is “no plural for ‘self-delusion’.” It is a great line.
The book, however, is much more than pure reportage, let alone travelogue. A chorus of Afghan voices permeates the book, from Baridad, the farmer, to Afghan parliamentarian Raihana Azad, from the Taleb who apologised for his boss’s rudeness, to Muhammad Yassin, an aircraft mechanic who was sitting on an evacuation plane in August 2021 about to leave Kabul airport. Reuter had sneaked onto what was a private evacuation flight, only to be forced off it at gunpoint by the US military. It was Yassin, the Afghan about to go into exile, who provided the quote for the book’s title: “We were happy here.”
Reuter slips in a good amount of – sometimes dead-pan – analysis. He draws from two decades of Afghanistan exposure, from not just flying in from time to time, but from spending years in the country. For some of them, he was the only German journalist permanently based in Afghanistan. He carried out pioneering investigations, including an early report into one of the many US ‘wedding bombings’, in 2002 in Uruzgan province, the result of a local US ally covering up his men’s looting of a village.
In Kunduz, Reuter and photographer Marcel Mettelsiefen visited each family of the 90 people who had been killed in the German bombing of two fuel tankers highjacked by Taleban in 2009. The tankers had got stuck in a sandy riverbed during a dark Ramadan night and the insurgents had called the inhabitants of a nearby village to syphon off the fuel and get the tanker afloat again (they failed). Meanwhile, a German commander – fed disinformation by a sole source (an NDS employee who augmented his earnings with a German salary) that all the people assembled there were ‘Taleban’ – ordered an airstrike. Reuter called it “the gravest order to kill the Bundeswehr [German armed forces] issued in its history.” His investigations – recalled in this book – brought the incidents back to light, the horror fresh again, after all these years.
Some parts of the book were published as reportages in English on Spiegel magazine’s website (see here; here and here). The book deserves to be translated in its entirety.
Christoph Reuter: ‘Wir waren glücklich hier: Afghanistan nach dem Sieg der Taliban – Ein Roadtrip’, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2023, 336 pp. ISBN 978-3-421-07005-0
Reviewed byThomas Ruttig, a co-founder of AAN.
Edited by Kate Clark
References
References
↑1
The Airforce-speak for variants of the C-130 military transport plane.
↑2
The surge in troops began in December 2009, peaked in summer 2011 and numbers returned to 70,000 in by summer 2012: see a timeline from the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations. For more on the ‘capture or kill’ operations see this AAN report by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, ‘A Knock on the Door: 22 Months of ISAF Press Releases’, published on 12 October 2021.
↑3
These decisions were, however, immensely popular with local people who felt they had been neglected by successive central governments. People in Daikundi, for example, one of the poorest and most isolated areas of Afghanistan, believed that splitting from Uruzgan and gaining a status as a province would bring them more attention, services and funding.
The mosque is located alongside the Kabul-Kandahar highway, and it cost them 3.5 million Afs.
The deputy prime minister for Economic Affairs, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, said that work on more than 500 small and big development projects is being continued across Afghanistan.
Speaking at a gathering held to begin work on a new mosque in Daman district of Kandahar province, Mullah Baradar said that work on Wakhan avenue is underway, which will connect Afghanistan to China.
“We assure our compatriots that we support them in every area and we stand beside them,” he said.
The mosque is located alongside the Kabul-Kandahar highway, and it cost them 3.5 million Afs.
Mullah Baradar said that Qush Tepa canal and Badakhshan’s Wakhan’s connectivity with China will help the country’s economy to improve.
“A path will be constructed, through which we will conduct our transit of trade goods with China, witb both exports and imports, and we will give you good news soon in this regard,” Mullah Baradar said.
Speaking at the same gathering, the acting Minister of Public Work, Mohammad Esa Sani, said that based on the decree of the Islamic Emirate’s leader, at least 75 mosques will be constructed along all highways across the country.
“Based on the decree of the Amirul Momineen (Islamic Emirate’s leader), at least 75 mosques will be built across the country,” he said.
The residents of Kandahar also praised the implementation of the projects, saying that the projects helped the economy of the province.
“Any kind of facilities is in the interest of Afghanistan and the nation,” said Sebghatullah Arghand, a resident of Kandahar.
According to TOLOnews’s findings, the start of construction of the 2nd phase of the Qush Tepa canal, the reconstruction of the Salang highway and contracts worth billions of dollars are considered to be the main economic projects for 2023.
Work on 500 Projects Continues Across Afghanistan: Deputy PM
Mujahid said the officials of Pakistan’s caretaker government pledged to not put pressure on Afghan refugees.
The Islamic Emirate’s spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid, said that the deportation of Afghan refugees by Pakistan has recently dropped compared to the initial days when Pakistan began expelling undocumented Afghans from its soil in early November last year.
According to Mujahid, nearly 2,000 families are crossing to Afghanistan on a daily basis, which he said shows a significant reduction.
“During the initial days and weeks, the number of deportees was high. It was even up to 15,000 to 20,000 families on a daily basis. They came through various gates, where control was difficult. This process becomes easier later,” he said.
Mujahid said the officials of Pakistan’s caretaker government pledged to not put pressure on Afghan refugees.
“The promises that they have made so far were to not apply pressure anymore… we have also not seen any new pressure,” Mujahid said.
Meanwhile, some Afghan refugees in Pakistan expressed optimism that the Pakistani government has eased pressure on the Afghan nationals recently.
“The process of forceful deportation of the refugees has been reduced. The treatment of Pakistan toward the documented and undocumented refugees has been eased,” said Atiqullah, an Afghan refugee in Pakistan.
“There should be a joint meeting for facilities to be provided to the people, so that the people [refugees] can live in prosperity,” said Mir Ahmad Rauf, head of an Afghan refugee council in Pakistan.
In December Mujahid said that since October, 2023, more than 800,000 Afghan immigrants had returned to the country.
Pakistan’s Deportations of Afghans Has Decreased: Mujahid
A pseudonym for an Afghan peace and women’s activist
Al Jazeera
Published On 1 Jan 2024
The biggest challenge of teaching girls and women in Afghanistan is not the security risk or the bad internet connection, but the creeping hopelessness.
I have sent the link and I am waiting for my students to join the Zoom session. I am teaching them English. I receive a notification that my students are in the waiting room. I put a big smile, I let them in, and greet them in English.
I know that they can’t see my smile because I don’t turn on my camera for security reasons, but I know they hear it in my voice. I know that I have to do everything and anything to keep up the spirits of my students. And I have to do it for myself as well.
Since 2021, we have had to struggle against two enemies: the Taliban ban on secondary and higher education for girls and women and the desperation and hopelessness that are slowly overcoming us.
According to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), some 2.5 million girls and young women are out of school due to the ban. Before the universities were closed for us, one in three young women were enrolled; some 100,000 were denied their dreams of pursuing the degrees they wanted. Not only that, even when students have found opportunities to study abroad, the Taliban has denied them the right to do so.
Islamic scholars have repeatedly said and emphasised that there is no basis in our religion for this ban. Even economically, it does not make sense. The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that preventing girls from attaining secondary education costs the Afghan economy some $500m per year.
The Taliban government has refused to change its decision despite the repeated appeals of international organisations and agencies. Afghan women and girls, for their part, have refused to give up.
The need and desire for education has been so great that soon after the bans were imposed, a few teachers got together and organised classes online. At first, it was a small group with just a few students. I joined them about a year and a half ago.
We teach English as well as all high school subjects and a few additional courses, like computer skills. News of our courses spread by word of mouth and more and more students joined. By 2023, we had grown to 400 students from across Afghanistan.
I consider myself lucky to have this opportunity – to be able to help a little my family financially and help other young women and girls who want to study and learn.
I had received training at a teacher training centre before 2021. I did the course without having the intention to be a teacher one day; my dear father had suggested that I do it and I followed his advice.
At the centre, they taught us how to approach education through different methods and how to interact with students to help them learn better. But a lot of what we learned could only be applied in a normal situation where the teacher and students are in a classroom together, not online struggling with a frustratingly bad internet connection.
So when I began teaching online, it was a challenge. I struggled and often thought about quitting, but the desire of my students to learn kept me going and I found a way to make it work.
“Whenever I thought I couldn’t do it, you showed me somehow that I could. You are the best role model in my life,” one student wrote to me recently. Such messages really warm up my heart and motivate me to keep going.
But there are other times when I also get difficult questions that I struggle to answer.
“Teacher, if I had been allowed to go to school, now after two years, I would have graduated from school. But it would have been useless because I am not allowed to go to university. Or if I were to graduate from university, again it would be useless because I would not be allowed to work. So why should I study now?” another student asked me recently.
It was a heartbreaking question. I wonder how many girls and young women across the country are asking themselves this question.
Due to the prison-like conditions that Afghan women and girls live in, many suffer from mental health problems. According to statistics from medical facilities, there has been a sharp increase in Afghan women taking or trying to take their own lives.
Many don’t have hope for the future and I can see it in my students. I am often compelled to assume the role of a counselor and sit and listen to stories of suffering and depression. Some of my students have shared that they are mocked or blamed for what has happened to them – working hard and dreaming big, only for everything to come crashing down.
Hearing and knowing what my students are going through makes it all the more challenging to teach. But I know I cannot give up and must keep going for their sake. I constantly try to keep them motivated, keep their spirits high, and encourage them to love learning and exploring.
I share inspirational stories and biographies of great people from across the world. I ask them to write lists of their dreams and goals, to share their plans for their future and everything that keeps them hopeful and motivated. I try to help younger students discover their talents; I ask them to write stories and poems or to paint. We try to break out of prison through learning and creativity.
The other teachers and I are doing our best to keep the hope of Afghan girls and young women alive. But we need support. It would make a huge difference for our students if the United Nations and international organisations could help us set up a mechanism to formalise the education we provide and grant valid documents certifying degrees attained. This would help motivate young women and girls and lessen the troubling feeling that they are wasting their lives.
Things in life often don’t go according to plan. I never planned to be a teacher, especially not one in hiding. But here I am teaching online, defying an unjust ban, trying to help my fellow Afghan girls and women, and fighting despair. It is a job I never wanted, but I love doing it.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
I teach in secret, defying the Taliban ban and fighting despair
The United Nations Security Council has passed a resolution on the Independent Assessment on Afghanistan, which former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Feridun Sinirlioğlu had put together. UNSC Resolution 2721 only passed after a month and a half of Security Council meetings, mainly held behind closed doors, and two weeks of intensive negotiations on its language. The result is a resolution which failed to fully endorse the Sinirlioğlu report. AAN’s team here summarises the developments around the Independent Assessment, from how it came to be proposed, to its contents, to the Resolution passed on 29 December, the last working day of the Council in 2023.
The Security Council adopts resolution 2721 (2023) on the independent assessment on Afghanistan. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation). Photo by UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe, 29 December 2023.
The Independent Assessment on Afghanistan, mandated by the UN Security Council on 16 March 2023 (see UNSC Resolution 2679), was given to UNSC members on 9 November. Since then, it has been the subject of much discussion among Security Council members, Afghans and other interested parties and Afghanistan has loomed large on the Council’s agenda, both formally and informally.[1] On 11 December, the co-penholders, Japan and the UAE, circulated a first draft of a resolution concerning the Assessment to Council members. The members then met to discuss the draft on 12 December and later provided written comments. A second draft was shared on 18 December, and after an additional round of comments and edits, a third draft was shared with council members’ under silence ‘on 26 December.[2]
The following day, China, France and Russia broke the silence, with Malta, Switzerland and the United States providing additional comments. The penholders then put a fourth and final draft ‘in blue’ on 28 December (here). This was the resolution that was put to a vote on 29 December.
This report is structured around four questions. The first deals with the events that preceded the Assessment and how the Security Council embarked upon this course of action. The second and third summarises the Assessment, while the fourth sums up what the Resolution says.
Why did the UN Security Council ask for an assessment?
In the two years following the dramatic collapse of the Islamic Republic, the question of ‘what to do’ about Afghanistan has been of great concern to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Three of its permanent members – the United States, United Kingdom and France had given military and financial backing to the Republic and, for greater or lesser periods of time, had fought the Taleban, who took power on 15 August 2021.
Afghanistan has been high on the Security Council’s agenda as it concerns the Council’s specific powers, especially Chapter VI (articles 33-38) on the specific settlement of disputes and Chapter VII (articles 39-51) on actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.[3]
On the day after the takeover, 16 August 2021, Afghanistan was the priority item on the agenda for the 8834th meeting of the Security Council (see here); UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appealed to the Security Council and the ‘international community’ to “stand together, work together, act together and use all tools at their disposal to suppress the global terrorist threat in Afghanistan and to guarantee that basic human rights will be respected.” Since then, the Security Council has continued to single out these two primary concerns, what it casts as the ‘global terrorist threat’ and ‘respect for basic human rights’.
The 2021 annual report on Chapter VI related practices of the UNSC also touched on the situation in Afghanistan, encouraging all parties to:
[S]eek an inclusive, negotiated political settlement, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, that responded to the desire of Afghans to sustain and build upon the country’s gains over the past 20 years in adherence to the rule of law, and underlined that all parties must respect their obligations (see page 434 here).
The 2022 UNSC annual report on Chapter VII concerns named Afghanistan as one of the countries which it saw threats to international peace and security as continuing to emanate from and expressed particular concern over:
[T]he cultivation, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs and acknowledged that illicit proceeds of the drug trafficking in Afghanistan were a source of financing for terrorist groups and non-state actors that threatened regional and international security. (page 4)
[T]he Council reiterated the need to ensure that the sanctions regime pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) contributed effectively to ongoing efforts to bring about sustainable and inclusive peace, stability and security in Afghanistan, and noted the importance of the sanctions review when and if appropriate, while taking into account the situation on the ground, in a manner that was consistent with the overall objective of promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan (pages 24 and 25).
Afghanistan continued to figure prominently on the UNSC agenda in 2022. Of the 127 UNSC consultations in 2022, seven were about Afghanistan and the country was referenced 11 times in the list of highlights of UNSC activities that year (see here). It was discussed, among other places, at a country-specific high-level meeting on 26 January and also at an informal, confidential gathering under the Arria-formula on 24 October. (see here).
However, differences in how the member states of the UNSC wanted to deal with Afghanistan emerged in 2023 in discussions surrounding the extension of the United Nation’s Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) mandate in March. The lack of a consensus became evident. Initially, the co-authors of two March resolutions on Afghanistan — Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – envisioned an extension of the UNAMA mandate without any changes for nine months and an independent assessment regarding Afghanistan by October 2023. The United States, in particular, strongly opposed extending UNAMA’s mandate for only nine months, saying that shortening the mandate for four months would “negatively affect both UNAMA and the Secretary-General’s plan to convene Afghanistan special envoys” (see AAN reporting here).
The result was two resolutions, both passed on 16 March 2023. One extended UNAMA’s mandate until 17 March 2024. The second, Resolution 2679 (2023), requested the UN Secretary-General, in his role as the UN’s chief administrative officer, to provide the Security Council with “an integrated, independent assessment” no later than 17 November 2023 (see AAN reporting here), following consultations with “all relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, including relevant authorities, Afghan women and civil society, as well as the region and the wider international community.” The Assessment should:
[P]rovide forward-looking recommendations for an integrated and coherent approach among relevant political, humanitarian, and development actors, within and outside of the United Nations system, in order to address the current challenges faced by Afghanistan, including, but not limited to, humanitarian, human rights and especially the rights of women and girls, religious and ethnic minorities, security and terrorism, narcotics, development, economic and social challenges, dialogue, governance and the rule of law; and advance the objective of a secure, stable, prosperous and inclusive Afghanistan in line with the elements set out by the Security Council in previous resolutions”
The mandate was broad and somewhat vague, covering the actions not only of the UN but also other ‘relevant political, humanitarian, and development actors’, in other words, everyone concerned with Afghanistan.
About a month later, Guterres appointed senior Turkish diplomat Feridun Sinirlioğlu as the Special Coordinator for the independent assessment (announcement on 25 April here). The appointment preceded a long-awaited meeting of special envoys on Afghanistan, held in Qatar’s capital Doha, on 1-2 May 2023. The meeting, said Guterres, was “about developing a common international approach, not about recognition of the de facto Taliban authorities,” and that it was important to “understand each other’s concerns and limitations” (see readout of the press conference here). Participants in this meeting, Guterres said, agreed on “the need for a strategy of engagement that allows for the stabilisation of Afghanistan but also allows for addressing important concerns” (see also AAN analysis here).
What key issues does the independent assessment identify?
The Independent Assessment on Afghanistan was not published on the UN website until 6 December 2023 (here), but was leaked and widely distributed soon after it was circulated to UNSC members (see for example, the independent, women-led non-profit news website Pass Blue here).
The Assessment says it has one “overarching goal” – to “advance the objective of a secure, stable, prosperous and inclusive Afghanistan in line with elements set out by the Security Council in previous resolutions.” It does not, however, identify what those elements are.[4] Widespread consultations with Afghans and others, it says, have underlined that “international engagement is not working.” It does not “serve the humanitarian, economic, political or social needs of the Afghan people,” nor does it address the concerns and priorities of “international stakeholders, including the neighbouring countries.”
Following what the Assessment coyly refers to as “the political transition in August 2021” (ie the military defeat of the Islamic Republic, which donor countries and the UN itself had done so much to support, and the re-establishment of the IEA, which many of those countries had previously been fighting), it says that many Afghans, nations and UN bodies had been concerned about IEA governance and the protection of rights, especially of women and girls. They are also concerned about “potential threats” to regional stability. From the IEA’s point of view, the Assessment says, it controls Afghanistan’s territory and governs the country, but has “appealed unsuccessfully for political and economic normalisation.” This situation “has led to an impasse, leaving much of the international community’s relations with Afghanistan in a state of uncertainty, with serious repercussions for the Afghan people.”
It concludes that it is necessary to find a ‘political pathway, basing this premise on current problems with aid (more on which below) and the fact that Afghanistan has the potential to both “enrich the region” as a hub for “trade, connectivity and people-to-people contacts” and destabilise it as a potential source of “transnational terrorism,” illegal narcotics and migrants” and because Afghans and others do not want to see renewed conflict. It says the pathway should allow all sides to discuss and deliberate their interests fairly.
The end state of those discussions, the Assessment says, is the “definition of a future where the State of Afghanistan is fully reintegrated into the international system without passing through a further cycle of violence while respecting all legal obligations.” It offers proposals “for a way forward and an engagement architecture to guide and bring more coherence to political, humanitarian and development activities” and that it presents “a substantive roadmap” that will “enable more effective negotiation and implementation of the priorities of Afghan and international stakeholders.”
This is a grand vision, but even at the earliest stage of the document where these quotes are from – page 2 of 19 – questions are raised and not answered, for example, given that the various Afghan and international stakeholders have contradictory priorities, how can Sinirlioğlu confidently assert that they will be implemented?
The Assessment then identifies five “key issues and priorities”. The first is human rights, especially what it calls the “basic rights of women and girls,” including to education, work and representation in public and political life. It also mentions “other patterns of unequal treatment and discrimination” towards citizens of “a number of ethnic or religious minority groups” (without specifying which – here or anywhere else), reports of extrajudicial killings by the IEA, especially of former officials and members of the security forces, the shrinking of civil space, including the harassment of civil society and the media, and restricted access to justice.
A second, shorter section outlines concerns about “counterterrorism, counternarcotics and regional security”. Security has improved since August 2021, it says – not surprisingly, given the (unmentioned in this document) the complete victory of the Taleban over the Republic. It acknowledges Emirate moves against the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), again not surprising as it is the IEA’s most dangerous armed opponent. It then points to the Emirate’s “limited responsiveness” to international calls to contain or control “terrorist groups and individuals inside Afghanistan, including members of Al Qaeda,” who, it says, have shown a “persistent presence.” These groups include significant numbers of Tehrik-e Taleban Pakistan (TTP) fighters who “appear to have free movement and shelter in Afghanistan and are carrying out an intensifying campaign of violence inside Pakistan.” This section also acknowledges the IEA’s “significant progress” on counter-narcotics (although as AAN has reported, so far, that has focused on cultivation, while trade has largely continued) and says “many stakeholders” want to help with “alternative crops and livelihoods”.
The Assessment then moves on to a third key issue/priority – economic, humanitarian and development issues. Those consulted by Sinirlioğlu and his team “across the spectrum” urged, the Assessment says, for “any international engagement strategy” to give attention to the combined humanitarian, development, and economic challenges facing Afghanistan.” Neighbouring countries, it says, see their interests served by Afghanistan having a robust and healthy economy. Afghans want urgent relief, it said, but also “but also an ability to fully invest in and pursue their own economic futures and livelihood opportunities freely.”
The Assessment describes the collapse of the economy in August 2021 as a consequence of the abrupt halt to aid and the freezing of Afghan access to the international banking system and (for the new IEA government) offshore foreign exchange reserves. Although the economy has, it says, for now stabilised, albeit at a low level, it warns that aid, already insufficient, is expected to fall, and that the banking system is still not functioning properly. It devotes one bullet point to shortcomings in IEA policy, which have contributed to “chilling” the economy: “Failure to institute measures of fiscal transparency, abrogation of the judicial system and basic legal guarantees, and lack of equal economic participation among all sectors of society have all contributed to continued low confidence among international donors and investors.” It also cites the IEA’s “exclusionary policies” towards women and some former technocrats.
The Assessment recognises that the nature of the aid – off-budget, with little development funding and no technical assistance – “limits the degree to which [it] can respond to basic needs in a sustainable and cost-effective way” and that delivery via an “overlapping network” of UN agencies and NGOs is costly and lacks necessary scale and coordination. It hones in on the particular damage of restricting technical assistance in agriculture, water management, demining and public health and denying Afghanistan access to funds aimed at helping the poorest countries adapt in the face of the climate crisis.
The last bullet point in this section feels significant. Stakeholders, the Assessment says, suggested ways to improve the effectiveness of aid or ensure economic recovery, but it warns: “[T]he triggers that have led to the current situation are as much political as economic, and economic recovery will depend significantly on a political decision, by donors in particular, to promote the development of the economy for the benefit of the Afghan people.” It lays Afghanistan’s problems with development and the economy squarely at the door of donors, alone.
A fourthkey area, Inclusive Governance and Rule of Law, deals with what the Assessment describes as the call by many Afghan stakeholders, member states, multilateral institutions, the Security Council, neighbouring countries and near-neighbours that the IEA establish “an inclusive system of governance.” A “balanced, broad-based, inclusive, accountable and responsible government” is both a “reflection of fundamental rights” and “a key ingredient for peace, stability and harmony within the country and in the region.” It says that in this “diverse, multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian, multi-linguistic and multi-cultural society,” the inclusion of all communities in governance structures is “central to the social and political stability.” Many Afghans, it says, “expressed perceptions of exclusion and discriminatory practices on the basis of ethnicity, language and gender” under the IEA. Many spoke of their disenfranchisement from the “full ability to participate in political life” and the “marked decline in the space for political engagement”, to raise concerns and affect policy-making.
This, it says, was especially the case for Afghan women.
It says the IEA interprets such calls as a demand for power-sharing and “specifically for a return to government of some former political leaders”. The IEA also denies the charge that it is exclusive, insisting its government is ethnically diverse and that it has retained much of the Republic’s civil service.
The Assessment acknowledges that the IEA has established some limited means for consultation and complaint and that “many Afghan civil society actors” have continued to “build bridges and create spaces for dialogue among themselves and with the [de facto authorities] on an informal basis.” It believes these could be “built upon and be complemented by national dialogue.” Re-establishing “a justice and rule of law system that protects equal participation and fulfilment of rights,” it says, “would advance inclusive governance, while also contributing to economic growth and stability”. Notably, no mention is made of elections.
The fifth key indicator deals with Political Representation and Implications for Regional and International Priorities. In this short section, the Assessment acknowledges the IEA’s call for recognition, bilaterally and at the UN, and its assertion that it meets the requirements for occupying Afghanistan’s seat at the UN General Assembly (a decision on this was postponed for the third year in December 2023, see AAN report here). The Assessment acknowledges that this lack of recognition disadvantages Afghans and has limited the means to deal with regional concerns, including on trade, connectivity and transboundary resource management. However, “International stakeholders,” the Assessment says, remain “aligned behind the position expressed at the Secretary-General convened meeting of Special Envoys on Afghanistan in May 2023, which supported engagement with Afghanistan and the development of a common international approach, but that acknowledged the DFA [de factor authorities] should not be recognized at this stage”.
Already, in this laying out of the key issues, assumptions have come into play: that donors are overwhelmingly responsible for the economic woes of Afghanistan, or that the IEA will change what it fundamentally believes to be correct, for example, why would the Emirate want to ‘re-establish’ something it believes it has already instituted, the establishment of a justice system based on holy law that fulfils the rights of both God and people?
What are the Assessment’s recommendations?
The Assessment makes four broad recommendations and offers an analysis of the justification for those recommendations as well as suggestions regarding their implementation.
The first set of recommendations proposes a series of measures aimed at addressing the basic needs of Afghan people and strengthening trust through structured engagement.These include:
Expanding international assistance, including technical assistance, to improve the capacities of relevant Afghan institutions to deliver services to Afghan people more effectively.
Supporting food security and agricultural livelihoods, including the IEA’s ongoing counternarcotics campaign, environmental security and water management, the health sector, and demining, prioritising the most vulnerable groups and women and girls.
Finalising some near-finished infrastructure projects that were started before August 2021.
Establishing economic dialogue and financial reforms to reduce the effects of existing sanctions on the banking sector and supporting efforts to rehabilitate Afghanistan’s central bank, but only after the Emirate demonstrates transparent and accountable fiscal governance.
The Assessment point out that while “economic dialogue may positively impact blockages to private investment and banking transactions,” the “chilling” economic effects will likely ease only after significant policy changes, including removing restrictions on women and girls. The Assessment envisages that progress on economic issues would promote the Switzerland-based Fund for the Afghan People to disperse funds, which would stabilise the currency and offer a “gradual transition from current cash shipment-based assistance.”
Enabling partial restoration of regular transit, trade, and other means of connectivity between Afghans and the world, including airport safety and capacity, which would pave the way for more flights at Kabul International Airport.
Restoring regular administrative processes inside the country and abroad to issue passports and visas.
Encouraging and assisting activities that help Afghans realise their political, economic, cultural and social rights, including support for media, civil society, and victim-centred approaches to justice and reconciliation.
Recommendations to provide women and girls “educational opportunities, including for online learning, employment, micro-finance, preventing gender-based violence and providing psycho-social support” seem to fall well short of pursuing avenues that would see Afghan women benefit from the full spectrum of their rights as guaranteed by international law. This section also includes assistance to “women and girls and vulnerable Afghan groups and individuals who have sought protection and refuge outside Afghanistan” and dialogue with the IEA on its human rights obligations.
The second set of recommendations addresses what the Assessment calls security-related concerns of “International stakeholders and UN bodies” about “the use of Afghan soil to threaten or attack any other country, the planning and financing of terrorist acts, and the production, sale and trafficking of illegal narcotics.” The Assessment stresses the need for coordination and cooperation between the IEA and international stakeholders to address these concerns and enumerate priority areas as:
Supporting bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, which it says will require significant capacity and resources.
Cooperating with international counter-narcotics efforts to maintain the current pace of the IEA’s plan to eradicate illegal narcotics.
Strengthening international borders, including border controls and issuance of identity papers and travel documents.
Expanding international cooperation and assistance in areas that advance regional and global priorities, including in response to climate change, transboundary water issues (presumably on the Helmand Water Treaty, see AAN report here), counter-narcotics and global health security.
Reviewing and updating relevant provisions of the UN 1988 Sanctions list to “facilitate better compliance … and make the sanctions regime more relevant to current realities.”
Gradually resuming diplomatic engagement inside Afghanistan, which would pave the way for more sustained dialogue with all Afghan stakeholders, without specifying who these might be, as well as the delivery of international aid, including development assistance.
The third set of recommendation lays out a roadmap for political engagement intended to fully reintegrate Afghanistan into the international community in line with its international commitments and obligations. This section sets out to explain how the Assessment’s stated objective: “An end state of Afghanistan’s full reintegration into the international system” can be achieved using a “more coherent political engagement process…. pursued through a performance-based roadmap.” The outline of which is explained broadly as: “(A) international obligations of the State of Afghanistan with suggested benchmarks to indicate progress in meeting them, and (B) a call for an intra-Afghan political process that will build toward inclusive constitution-making. Progress in both of these components will build toward (C) an end state of the international community’s normalisation of relations with the State of Afghanistan.”
The final and fourth set of recommendations suggests a set of mechanisms designed to coordinate and oversee the recommendations made in the report. The Assessment stresses that significant resources and coordination platforms are needed to implement its recommendations effectively. To this end, it recommends three interlinked mechanisms:
UN-Convened Large Group Format: This group currently exists and was first convened by the UN Secretary-General in May 2023 in the Special Envoys format. The Assessment recommends another meeting of the large group format to discuss and advance its recommendations.
International Contact Group: This smaller group, selected from members of the large group format, would coordinate action and approaches “take a more frontal role” in political engagement with Afghan stakeholders.
UN Special Envoy: The Special Envoy would have a complementary mandate to UNAMA and focus on “diplomacy between Afghanistan and international stakeholders as well as on advancing intra-Afghan dialogue.” She/he would represent the UN in the above-mentioned groups and lead coordination efforts.
What is in the Resolution about the Assessment and where do we go from here?
Resolution 2721 was adopted on 29 December by 13 votes in favour, with China and Russia abstaining (see here). The Resolution sets forth six points as a common approach of the Council members on Afghanistan, with some reservations from China and Russia (more on which below).
It says that the Security Council:
1. Stresses the critical importance of a continued presence of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes across Afghanistan, and reiterates its full support to the mandate and the work of UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;
2. Takes positive note of the independent assessment on Afghanistan (S/2023/856);
3. Encourages member states and all other relevant stakeholders to consider the independent assessment and implementation of its recommendations, especially increasing international engagement in a more coherent, coordinated and structured manner, affirms that the objective of this process should be a clear end state of an Afghanistan at peace with itself and its neighbors, fully reintegrated into the international community and meeting international obligations, and recognizes the need to ensure the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of Afghan women in the process throughout;
4. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with members of the Security Council, relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, including relevant authorities, Afghan women and civil society, as well as the region and the wider international community, to appoint a Special Envoy for Afghanistan, in a timely manner, provided with robust expertise on human rights and gender, to promote implementation of the recommendations of the independent assessment, without prejudice to the mandate of UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and their vital work in Afghanistan;
5. Welcomes the Secretary-General’s intention to convene the next meeting of the group of Special Envoys and Special Representatives on Afghanistan initiated in May 2023 in a timely manner, and encourages the meeting to discuss the recommendations of the independent assessment;
6. Requests that the Secretary-General brief the Security Council on the outcome of these consultations and discussions within 60 days.
According to the independent think tank, The Security Council Report,[5] it appears that negotiations concerning the Resolution were complex and contentious (see here). This was evident also from the discussion at the Security Council following the vote on 29 December (see here). On one side of the rift were the UK and US, both very supportive of the Assessment and apparently also of the initial draft of the Resolution. China and Russia, on the opposite end, were primarily concerned about the lack of IEA buy-in for the process suggested in the Resolution. In remarks delivered on 20 December, US Ambassador to the UN Robert Wood said:
[W]e welcome the UN’s Independent Assessment on Afghanistan. We agree with the report’s recommendations on appointing a UN Special Envoy in establishing an international contact group. The UN Special Envoy and the contact group will be important for the development of a roadmap that ensures Afghanistan meets its international obligations. They will also complement UNAMA’s work to accomplish its mission of promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Following the vote, Deputy Political Counsellor of US Mission to the UN Lisa Browne said:
The United States strongly supports this resolution’s call for a UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan. A Special Envoy will be well positioned to coordinate international engagement on Afghanistan, including with relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, to achieve the objectives laid out in this resolution. The resolution’s request to set up a Special Envoy for Afghanistan, emphasizing that such a post would help coordinate work to achieve progress in the country.
[S]hould seize the momentum of the independent assessment with the hope of changing Afghanistan’s current negative trajectory.… [W]e encourage all parties, including Afghan and international stakeholders, to take forward the independent assessment’s recommendations, working towards an Afghanistan that is at peace with its people, its neighbours, and the international community.
China and Russia built their argument around the Islamic Emirate’s response to the Assessment (seen by AAN), which was provided to Council members. The IEA defended its record on women’s rights, security, the economy and narcotics and rejected any suggestion of intra-Afghan dialogue or the creation of the oversight mechanisms referred to in the report, particularly the Special Envoy. It blasted the “malicious and illegal sanctions” regime, “grudge-motivated pressures” on it and interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. The IEA did welcome “recommendations of the assessment that support the strengthening of national economy of Afghanistan, opens the pathway to the recognition of the current government and encourages regional connectivity and transit via Afghanistan.”
It is obvious that currently Council members remain divided on the follow-up implementation of the assessment report, and the Afghan authorities, on the other hand still have reservations on some recommendations…. China and the Russian Federation expressed these concerns in the consultation and constructively proposed amendments to the draft of relevant issues, which however were not taken on board. It is deeply regrettable, and we have to abstain in the vote just now.… It is our hope that going forward, the Secretary-General will cautiously deal with the appointment of the Special Envoy, continue to strengthen communication and interaction with the Afghan authorities, and strive to find appropriate solutions.
Russia abstained on a draft resolution on the independent assessment report on Afghanistan.… [W]e assume that the Secretary-General will consult the de facto authorities when appointing a Special Envoy and will also take into account the views of all members of the Security Council. That is a principled condition that we have insisted on from the outset. We would like to make it clear that we will not support Secretary-General’s decision unless it has the approval of the de facto authorities.
China and Russia, according to The Security Council Report, also raised questions regarding the composition of the “smaller contact group” and suggested deleting the paragraph about the Special Envoy altogether. However, the penholders have not gone as far, and their suggestion was left out of the final ‘in blue’ draft. The think tank reported that:
[C]hina and Russia apparently suggested deleting the paragraph that requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Envoy for Afghanistan and removing text noting that the next meeting of Special Envoys and Special Representatives should discuss the proposed establishment of the “smaller contact group,” In the next draft of the Resolution, the penholders apparently removed the text on the “smaller contact group” and added language requesting that the Secretary-General consult with relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders (including the Taliban, Afghan women, and civil society); Council members; the region; and the international community before appointing a Special Envoy.
It also seems that UNSC members could only agree “to take a positive note of the independent assessment” and “encourage member states and all other relevant stakeholders to consider and implement its recommendations.” China and Russia were reportedly behind the latter formulation. Altogether, any language that stipulated endorsement of the Assessment and its recommendations was a point of debate among Council members. The Security Council Report said:
Although the first draft of the Resolution endorsed the independent assessment and its recommendations, it appears that later drafts instead welcomed them, following a proposal from Malta and the US. It seems that China and Russia argued that the draft should either take note of the independent assessment or welcome the efforts of Sinirlioğlu and his team. In an apparent compromise, the draft in blue takes positive note of the independent assessment.
Text affirming that one objective of this process was to see Afghanistan fully reintegrated into the international community and meeting its international obligations was subsequently added to the Resolution, The Security Council Report said. However, the Resolution was stripped of any conditionality, ie any language that suggested that IEA compliance with the obligations under international law was a precondition to Afghanistan’s full reintegration into the international community.According to The Security Council Report,a group of European members of the Security Council, including France, Malta, and Switzerland had sought to bolster language relating to Afghan women and the ‘women, peace and security agenda’. The think tank said:
Several members, including France, Malta, and Switzerland apparently proposed language emphasising that the Taliban’s compliance with their obligations under international law, particularly those relating to human rights, is central to the roadmap for political engagement outlined in the independent assessment report.
Text reaffirming the indispensable role of women in Afghan society was added to the Resolution following a proposal from Switzerland, as was language noting that the Special Envoy for Afghanistan should have robust expertise on human rights and gender.
The independent assessment has generated a dynamic discussion about Afghanistan, which has been on the global side-line for some time, but so far, responses to its recommendations among Afghanistan’s stakeholders appear to fall short and be far from adequate. The move to have an independent assessment was driven by a desire to establish a consensus on how the Security Council deals with Taleban-ruled Afghanistan. No such shared approach, however, appears to have emerged. The Resolution does authorise the appointment of a Special Envoy, but “in consultation with members of the Security Council, relevant Afghan political actors and stakeholders, including relevant authorities, Afghan women and civil society, as well as the region and the wider international community”. There is no mention in the Resolution of an intra-Afghan dialogue envisioned by Sinirlioğlu’s report as the key mandate of the Special Envoy. Instead, the Special Envoy, as per the text of the Resolution, is seen as a gender and human rights expert who should “promote implementation of the recommendations of the independent assessment, without prejudice to the mandate of UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and their vital work in Afghanistan”. This also limits the space where a future Special Envoy would work and have a say. It is also noticeable that the idea of a smaller contact group has been dropped entirely. The Resolution only confirms that the negotiations between various international and local actors will continue without a feasible conclusion any time soon. China and Russia’s firm position that they will not approve any choice that the IEA has not approved, seems to indicate that the appointment of the Special Envoy will not happen any time soon.
Edited by Roxanna Shapour, Jelena Bjelica and Kate Clark
References
References
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The following meetings were among those held:
10 November A first discussion of the report by Security Council members during an informal lunch organised by the outgoing co-penholders on Afghanistan, Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
28 November Closed-door Security Council meeting (see here).
30 November Meeting of the high-level diplomatic grouping, the Group of Friends of Afghanistan, co-organised by Canada, UK and Qatar (see hereand here).
11 December Closed-door, ‘Arria-formula’ Security Council meeting on “women’s perspectives on Afghanistan” (see here), organised by Switzerland and co-sponsored by Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
20 December Briefing of the Security Council by Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Roza Otunbayev (see the video here). Statements were also given by the Representative of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva and Director of the Coordination Division, Ramesh Rajasingham, a “representative of Afghan civil society” (unnamed in UN reporting ahead of the event) and the chair of the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee, the Ecuadorean Ambassador to the UN José Javier De La Gasca. This meeting was followed by closed consultations.
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According to UNSC procedures, draft resolutions go through a negotiation process before they are put ‘under a silence’ – normally lasting 24 hours – to allow for final comments from Council members. When the Security Council approaches the final stage of negotiating a draft resolution, the text is printed ‘in blue’. See The UN Security Council Handbook.
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The Security Council, as one of the six main organs of the United Nations, is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security (here). The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression; it calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. It can also impose sanctions or even authorise the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. It can set forth principles for a peace agreement; undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases; dispatch a mission;appoint special envoys or; request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute. Its powers are laid out in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the UN Charter. The UNSC deliberations on Afghanistan are based on powers listed in Chapter VI (articles 33-38) on the specific settlement of disputes and Chapter VII (articles 39-51) on actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Based on these powers, the Security Council authorises UNAMA’s mandate and obliges the mission to provide quarterly reports on the situation in Afghanistan.
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The list of Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan is long (read them here). There have been eight since the IEA takeover, dozens during the Republic and after the al-Qaida attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, and 11 before that.
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The Security Council Report (SCR) is an independent think tank that works towards the promotion of transparency in UNSC decision-making. See the organisation’s website here.
UN Security Council Resolution on Afghanistan: Just another ‘much ado about nothing’?
HONG KONG — In August 2021, when U.S.-led forces were withdrawing from Afghanistan and evacuation flights were being overwhelmed by people desperate to leave with them, Mahbouba Seraj decided to stay.
Seraj, 75, an Afghan-American women’s rights activist and founder of the nonprofit Afghan Women’s Network, had been in Afghanistan since 2003, when she moved back with a mission to help the country’s women and girls. More than 25 years earlier, Seraj — the niece of the country’s former king — had been forced into exile by Afghanistan’s Communist government, settling in the United States.
But in 2021, that government was being toppled, leaving the Taliban poised to take over once again and Afghan women facing an uncertain future.
“I knew that they are going to be needing some kind of support, at least something from the past that remained, so that will give them the feeling that, okay, things have not gone to hell completely,” Seraj told NBC News in an interview in Hong Kong in November.
Since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the fighters and clerics espousing an extremely conservative version of Islam have arrested women’s rights activists, ended education for women after sixth grade, barred women from gyms and parks, ordered the closure of beauty salons, and prohibited women from working at nongovernmental organizations.
They have also shut down most shelters for victims of domestic abuse, with Seraj’s among the few remaining.
The Taliban government has been largely ostracized internationally, but with its control firmly established, the United Nations Security Council is considering how to engage with it politically and perhaps reintegrate it into the global system. Some, including Seraj, see this as an opportunity to pressure the Taliban into restoring some rights to women in exchange for diplomatic recognition.
Afghanistan’s Taliban government on August 15, marked the second anniversary of their return to power, with supporters celebrating as critics denounced ever-tightening restrictions on women’s rights.
Others, such as Nobel Peace laureate Malala Yousafzai, say the Taliban cannot be trusted or given any kind of legitimacy and governments should continue to shun them.
An independent assessment of potential engagement that was submitted to the Security Council in November said the basic rights of women and girls “are not only fundamental obligations of a state, but also critical to build state capacity for long-term development and economic growth and peace and security,” according to Reuters.
In its response to the assessment, Reuters reported, the Taliban said it was obligated to consider Afghanistan’s “religious values and national interests” and that no one would be allowed to interfere in the country’s internal affairs.
The Taliban also defended their record on women, saying they respected women’s rights in line with their interpretation of Islamic law.
Seraj argues that the best way forward with the Taliban “is to talk, and come up with some kind of an agreement.”
“Every single day that it goes on with the Taliban not being recognized, it’s not that the Taliban are being pushed in a corner, it’s the people of Afghanistan that are being denied their rights everywhere — in the United Nations, in the world, in the conferences and the meetings,” she said.
Though the Taliban are struggling to transition from waging war to running a country, Seraj said, trying to install a new, more palatable government would only bring more chaos.
“If we keep on changing government, after government, after government, we cannot afford that,” she said.
That doesn’t mean consigning Afghanistan’s 20 million women to second-class citizenship, Seraj said, arguing that the world cannot move to accept the Taliban unless they engage in parallel, step-by-step reforms.
“They have to recognize [women’s rights] first for the world to recognize them, but it has to happen,” she said. “So in order for that to happen, they have to have a talk.”
There is no time to waste, she added.
The head of a major aid organization said Thursday, May 25, that the Taliban have agreed to consider allowing Afghan women to resume work at the agency in the southern province of Kandahar, the religious and political center for the country’s rulers.
“The boys [who] are growing up in this era, you will not be able to tell them that they have to respect a woman later,” Seraj said. “They won’t. Even right now they are not.”
Boys, too, are facing an education crisis under Taliban rule, Human Rights Watch said in a report on Dec. 6. With women barred from teaching boys, the group found, they are often replaced by unqualified male teachers or not replaced at all.
Afghanistan’s problems have been compounded this fall by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Afghans from neighboring Pakistan, which said in October it would arrest and deport any foreign nationals living in the country without documentation. Though the Pakistani government says it is not targeting any particular nationality, most of those affected are from Afghanistan.
The crackdown has created a humanitarian crisis as Afghans who fled Soviet occupation in the 1980s or Taliban rule after that stream into a country that some have never lived in and that is struggling to take them in.
“They’re not kicking out people who have been there [in Pakistan] for five years and six years, they’re kicking out people that were there for 40 years,” Seraj said.
The International Organization for Migration, a U.N. agency, said in late November that about 375,000 Afghans had left Pakistan in the last two months, many of them forced to leave behind their savings and possessions.
Many of those returning, including women and children, “could lose their lives in a harsh winter if left without adequate shelter,” the U.N. refugee agency said in December.
An additional 345,000 Afghan refugees have been deported from neighboring Iran since late September, the Afghan news channel TOLOnews reported in December, citing the Iranian Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation.
Afghanistan is also still dealing with the aftermath of a series of 6.3-magnitude earthquakes that hit the northwestern province of Herat in early October. U.N. officials said the vast majority of the people killed were women and children, most of whom were at home while their male relatives were working outside.
Though the Taliban regime has not been formally recognized by any foreign government, in September neighboring China became the first country to name a new ambassador to Afghanistan, and in December the Taliban said they had appointed an ambassador to China, their first to any country.
The Taliban are also joining Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road infrastructure initiative.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry said Dec. 5 that while Afghanistan “should not be excluded from the international community,” the Taliban government must engage in political reform before it can receive diplomatic recognition.
“We believe that diplomatic recognition of the Afghan government will come naturally as the concerns of various parties are effectively addressed,” ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said at a regular news briefing in Beijing.
China’s role in Afghanistan “could be very beneficial,” Seraj said, as long as any deals between the two countries are made in the interest of the Afghan people.
“If the interest of the people of Afghanistan is taken into consideration, then China is a fantastic resource. Why not?” she said. “They are interested in what we have, they are our neighbor, we can work with them. I don’t see any problem.”
Though she worries about her safety and sometimes gets discouraged, Seraj said she has no plans to leave Afghanistan.
“My responsibility towards the women in my shelter is huge,” she said. “I love those girls. I cannot just leave them and go somewhere and do something else.”
Seraj said she wants Afghanistan to stay in the global spotlight, but not as a “disaster.”
Rather, she said, she hopes it will one day be seen “as a country with possibilities, as a country that can go on and can be alive, and maybe one day can thrive.”
Jennifer Jett is Asia digital editor for NBC News, based in Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, the political analysts called the Islamic Emirate’s efforts with counter-narcotics effective.
The Ministry of Interior said that nearly 15,000 counter-narcotics operations were conducted in 2023, during which the security forces seized around 8,200 tons of narcotics.
“In 2023, around 15,000 special raids were conducted regarding counter-narcotics, we had good achievements in this regard,” he said.
During these operations, nearly 8,500 suspects were arrested and nearly 14,000 hectares of lands were cleared of drug-producing crops.
MoI spokesman Abdul Matin Qani criticized the lack of attention of the international community in providing alternative crops for the farmers.
“The international community has not had effective cooperation to provide alternative crops to the farmers,” he said.
Meanwhile, the political analysts called the Islamic Emirate’s efforts with counter-narcotics effective.
“The world should send a delegation to Afghanistan to monitor where the cultivation still continuing. When the cultivation dropped by 95 percent, there should be an alternative for the farmers,” said Mohammad Matin Mohammad Khil, a political analyst.
Last October, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Secretary General, Imangali Tasmagambetov, at the joint meeting of the Council and the 16th plenary session of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly in Moscow expressed concerns about the increase of terrorist group activities, drug smuggling and smuggling of weapons in Afghanistan.
Nearly 15,000 Counter-Narcotics Operations in 2023: MoI
The UN special rapporteur voiced concern over the deterioration of human rights within the past two-years.
In 2023, the human rights issue, especially the women and girls, was one of the issues that faced reactions of various countries.
Compliance with human rights especially women’s rights and the girls going to school and universities, is the issue that the world says is a condition for recognition of the Islamic Emirate.
Speaking to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, said: “The donor community has said there will only be aid where women are involved. Where women are not involved, the aid will not be present. So, the pressure goes on in order to guarantee that we have women working in the humanitarian sector. In the public services, only very few women are working and we are fighting hard to increase it.” (14/03/2023)
At the UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Afghanistan, the US deputy ambassador to the UN, Robert Wood, said: “The United States hears their requests and will not consider any significant steps toward normalization of relations with the Taliban until women and girls have meaningful access to education, the workforce, and other aspects of social and political life. Indeed, the international community as a whole has spoken out against these indefensible restrictions.” (21/12/2023)
The UN Special Rapporteur for Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, said the recognition of women’s rights by the interim government officials in Afghanistan would help towards greater legitimacy for the interim government.
He made the remarks in an interview with TOLOnews.
“If the de facto authorities recognize women’s rights they would stand a better chance. It would be a step towards not recognition, I don’t really use that word very much, but it would be a step towards a greater legitimacy,” Bennett said.
He said that no country in the world is treating women the way the “de facto” officials in Afghanistan do.
The UN special rapporteur voiced concern over the deterioration of human rights within the past two-years.
One of the main reasons for the deterioration of human rights, he said, “is the treatment of women and girls.”
“In fact, today, there was an index that was produced by the Georgetown institute for women, peace and security which rates every country for their treatment of women and girls and Afghanistan came last in the whole world,” he said.
Bennett further said that the treatment of women is causing mass concerns among members of the international community. (27/10/2023)
But the Islamic Emirate has always said that women’s rights are protected within the framework of Islamic laws in the country.
The deputy spokesman for the Islamic Emirate, Bilal Karimi, denied the “concerns” regarding the human rights situation, saying that the rights of all Afghans are preserved within an Islamic structure.
“The Islamic Emirate as a responsible government ensures the rights of all citizens of the country and takes steps based on beliefs and Islamic values. No side should be concerned in this regard,” he said. – 07/03/2023.
As the final exams of the fall semester are held in government universities, some female students said that they are currently in despair.
“Social justice is the survival of a government. If governments do not respect social justice, a social crisis will arise, which will cause the downfall of the same system,” said Fazila Sarosh, a women’s rights activist. – 06/11/2023.
Following the prohibition of women working in governmental and non-governmental organizations this year, on July 3, 2023, a one-month deadline was issued by the leader of the Islamic Emirate for Women’s Beauty Salons.
This deadline ended on July 23. With this decree, more than 12,000 Women’s Beauty Salons were blocked in the country.
“What is spiritual destruction or the apparent destruction of the society should be prevented,” said Akif Mahajir, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Virtue and Vice. – 22/07/2023.
This issue also led to protests by females who have Women’s Beauty Salons.
“What is our crime that we are deprived of school, universities and everything? What is our guilt?” said Marwa, a makeup artist. – 20/07/2023.
“We either leave the country, or we will go on the street and commit suicide. Or they put us under an atom bomb or execute us because we are women,” said Lida, a female makeup artist. – 06/07/2023.
Meanwhile, as in other years, the gates of schools and universities were not opened for girls in 2023.
The academic year of 1402 (solar year) started with the ringing of the bell of Amani High School for boys but no order was issued to return girls to schools
“It has been two years since we were deprived of school. We hope that schools become open for us,” said Zainab, a student. – 22/Mar/2023.
“In the past one year, not only me, but all the girls and students who were denied the opportunity to go to university are suffering from depression and an unclear future,” Huzaifa, a student, told TOLOnews. – 20/12/2023.
Although some officials of the Islamic Emirate emphasized education for girls in Afghanistan, no new decree was issued in this regard.
The Deputy Foreign Minister, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai said: “This is everyone’s right. This is the natural right which God and the prophet has given to them, how can someone take this right from them? If anyone violates this right, this is an oppression against the Afghans and the people of this country. Try to reopen the doors of the educational institutions for everyone. Today our only problem with the neighbors and world is caused because of the issue of education. If the nation is getting distant from us and upset with us, that is due to the education issue.” – 07/12/2023.
The closure of schools, universities and women’s work are sensitive and controversial issues, which were the focus and sidelines of some regional and global meetings.
These meetings were include:
“Women, Peace and Security”
“Doha Forum”
“Government in Afghanistan and Women’s Government in Afghanistan”
“US Institute of Peace (USIP)”
“1st Meeting – 53rd Regular Session of the Human Rights Council,” in Geneva
“The 78th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations”
The US special envoy for Afghan human rights and women, Rina Amiri, called for investment in the female education sector in Afghanistan, in a bid to provide the way for a modern and “inclusive Afghanistan.”
Speaking at a session at the Doha Forum, Amiri said: “It is a moral imperative and it is a strategic imperative. If we want Afghanistan to continue on the road to a modern and inclusive Afghanistan that is not a threat to itself or to its neighbors, invest in Afghanistan, invest in its education and its population, that is what we are collectively seeking to do,” she said. – 10/12/2023.
The president of the 78th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Dennis Francis, called on the “Taliban to reconsider” policies regarding the education and work of women and girls in Afghanistan.
Speaking at a press conference, he said that “keeping the girls” out of their schools is not going to strengthen the country.
“Women and girls have unalienable rights, human rights that must be upheld and honored. So I would urge the Afghan authorities to reconsider the policy and allow girls to go to school to get an education. So that they can play a role in the development of the community and the society,” Francis said. – 29/09/2023.
Based on the report of the US Institute of Peace (USIP), more than seventy decrees have been issued in the field of education, training and work for women since the Islamic Emirate came into power in the country.
But the Islamic Emirate has always said that women’s rights in Afghanistan are based on Islamic laws and has asked other countries not to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.
According to reports, the number of casualties was less than the casualties of the first three months of 2022.
In 2023, as a result of anti-security events, nearly 200 people were killed and wounded across the country.
According to reports, the number of casualties was less than the casualties of the first three months of 2022.
Security in the year 2023 was one of the key issues that the caretaker government has spoken of as an important achievement after its coming into power in Afghanistan.
In this regard, MoI spokesman Abdul Matin Qani, said: “In 2022, full security was provided, and in 2023, it had a 40% reduction, but still, unfortunately, we witnessed some security incidents in Badakhshan, Baghlan and Herat provinces and even in the capital.”
TOLOnews findings show that since the beginning of this year, more than ten suicide attacks and explosions occurred in Baghlan, Badakhshan, Balkh and Kabul provinces, in which fifty-six people were killed and 140 others were injured.
One of these incidents happened on the first day of the year 2023 near the gate of the military airport in Kabul, in which at least ten people died and eight others were injured.
On January 11th and March 27th, 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Emirate was attacked twice. In these incidents, several employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including diplomats, were killed, and these attacks were accompanied by strong international and domestic reactions.
In 2023, several officials of the Islamic Emirate were also targeted in some anti-security incidents.
Among them, we can mention the 9th of March, when a suicide bomber exploded himself near the office of the governor of Balkh, as a result of which three people were killed, including Mohammad Dawood Muzamil, the governor of Balkh, with four others being injured.
On June 6, 2023, the acting governor of Badakhshan province was also attacked, resulting in his death and his driver’s, and injuries to six others.
Two days after this incident, at the funeral of Mawlawi Nisar Ahmad Ahmadi, there was another attack with fatalities, including Safiullah Samim, the former commander of Baghlan police, and 14 others, and more than 50 others were injured.
On October 13, a suicide bomber reached the Takiakhana Imam Zaman (place of worship) in Pol-e-Khomri and blew himself up among the worshipers, killing seven people and injuring seventeen others.
Two days after this incident, another blast also in Tabyan cultural center in Mazar-e-Sharif happened in which one person was killed and eight others were injured.
In this year Dasht-e-Barchi area of Kabul witnessed explosions on October 27th and November 8th, in which more than 10 people were killed and nearly 30 others were injured. ISIS has taken responsibility for most of the incidents.
The spokesman of the Islamic Emirate, Zabihullah Mujahid, said: “ISIS is a bad phenomenon that used to operate and hide in cities, especially big cities. A special operation was carried out against them, and immediately they fled to remote provinces and places.”
In 2023 rather than other years, Afghanistan had two conflicts with Pakistan and one border conflict with Iran, with the Pakistan skirmishes lasting for several days.
The spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior said that most of the conflicts that took place on the borders of the country were first started by the opposite side.
While the Islamic Emirate has always denied a ISIS presence in Afghanistan, Colonel General Anatoly Sidorov, Chief of the Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), claimed that the number of ISIS fighters in Afghanistan has increased to 6,500.
“The number of members of the Islamic State’s Afghan branch, Wilayat Khorasan (outlawed in Russia), has significantly increased to about 6,500, with up to 4,000 militants concentrated along Tajikistan’s southern border in the provinces of Badakhshan, Kunduz and Takhar,” TASS said, quoting Sidorov.
The head of US Central Command, Michael Kurilla, said that ISIS In Afghanistan will be able to attack American or Western interests outside the country in less than six months “with little to no warning,” as reported by Star and Stripes.
But, the Ministry of Defense said that a serious fight against terrorist groups has been carried out in Afghanistan, and currently the ISIS group has been defeated in Afghanistan.
On the last day of 2023, Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid, the Acting Minister of MoD, at the news conference of the Security and Clearing Affairs Commission, in the government media center, dismissed the claims and concerns of countries about the existence of terrorist groups as baseless and said that Afghanistan is in a safe state and will not allow anyone to disrupt the security and use of Afghanistan’s soil.
The acting Defense minister said: “Those who make such claims against us should be asked why they make such claims, and they do something that does not benefit any country.”
The United Nations says aid workers are still in a “race against time” to remove rubble and rebuild after the devastating earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan last month, killing at least 2,200 people and cutting off remote areas.
The 6.0-magnitude quake on Aug. 31 was shallow, destroying or causing extensive damage to low-rise buildings in the mountainous region. It hit late at night, and homes — mostly made of mud, wood, or rocks — collapsed instantly, becoming death traps.
Satellite data shows that about 40,500 truckloads of debris still needs to be cleared from affected areas in several provinces, the United Nations Development Program said Wednesday. Entire communities have been upended and families are sleeping in the open, it added.
The quake’s epicenter was in remote and rugged Kunar province, challenging rescue and relief efforts by the Taliban government and humanitarian groups. Authorities deployed helicopters or airdropped army commandos to evacuate survivors. Aid workers walked for hours on foot to reach isolated communities.
“This is a race against time,” said Devanand Ramiah, from the UNDP’s Crisis Bureau. “Debris removal and reconstruction operations must start safely and swiftly.”
People’s main demands were the reconstruction of houses and water supplies, according to a spokesman for a Taliban government committee tasked with helping survivors, Zia ur Rahman Speenghar.
People were getting assistance in cash, food, tents, beds, and other necessities, Speenghar said Thursday. Three new roads were under construction in the Dewagal Valley, and roads would be built to areas where there previously were none.
“Various countries and organizations have offered assistance in the construction of houses but that takes time. After the second round of assistance, work will begin on the third round, which is considering what kind of houses can be built here,” the spokesman said.
Afghanistan is facing a “perfect storm” of crises, including natural disasters like the recent earthquake, said Roza Otunbayeva, who leads the U.N. mission to the country.