How ISIS-K leader forged one of Islamic State’s most fearsome groups

March 27, 2024

By ,  and 

Reuters

KABUL/PESHAWAR, Pakistan, March 26 (Reuters) – Sanaullah Ghafari, the 29-year-old leader of the Afghan branch of Islamic State, has overseen its transformation into one of the most fearsome branches of the global Islamist network, capable of operations far from its bases in the borderlands of Afghanistan.
Islamic State has claimed responsibility for Friday’s mass shooting at a concert hall near Moscow that killed at least 139 people. U.S. officials have said they have intelligence indicating it was the Afghan branch, Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), that was responsible.
Washington has said it had warned Russia this month of an imminent attack. A source familiar with this intelligence said it was based on interceptions of “chatter” among ISIS-K militants.
The discovery of Tajik passports on the gunmen arrested by Russian authorities suggested a possible link to Ghafari’s group, which has aggressively recruited from the poor Central Asian country, security experts say.
In recent years, his organization has also sought repeatedly to strike at Russia in retaliation for its intervention in the Syrian civil war, which helped to defeat ISIS’ regional operations.
Ghafari was initially reported killed in Afghanistan last June but escaped with injuries across the frontier into Pakistan and is believed to be living in its lawless Balochistan border province, two sources in the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban told Reuters. Pakistan’s foreign ministry did not respond to a request for comment on Ghafari’s whereabouts.
Named as emir of ISIS-K in 2020, Ghafari has reinforced the group’s reputation for hardline ideology and high-profile attacks.
ISIS-K grabbed global attention with a 2021 suicide bombing on Kabul international airport during the U.S. military withdrawal that killed 13 U.S. soldiers and scores of civilians. In September 2022, it claimed responsibility for a deadly suicide attack at the Russian embassy in Kabul.
But perhaps its most brazen operation to date came in January, with a double suicide bombing in Iran that killed nearly 100 people at a memorial for Revolutionary Guard commander, Qassem Soleimani – the deadliest militant attack on Iranian soil since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Little was known about Ghafari before the 2021 strike on Kabul airport, which prompted Washington to place a $10 million bounty on his head. The Taliban sources said he is an Afghan Tajik who served as a soldier in the Afghan army and later joined ISIS-K, which was formed in late 2014.
Reuters spoke to more than a dozen sources – including serving and retired security and intelligence officials in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and the U.S., as well as members of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban – who said that ISIS-K had exploited the Taliban’s failure to eliminate its safe havens in northern and eastern Afghanistan to expand regionally.
Under Ghafari, the group has used high-profile attacks as a recruiting tool and targeted ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks across Central Asia, rather than Afghanistan’s Pashtun majority, which forms the backbone of the Taliban, the sources said.
ISIS-K takes its name from an old Persian term for the region, Khorasan, that included parts of Iran, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, as well as areas of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its propaganda, translated into regional languages as well as English, vows to establish a caliphate spanning that area.
“ISIS-K … seeks to outperform rival jihadis by carrying out more audacious attacks to distinguish its brand, poach from rivals, and gain resources from potential supporters,” said Asfandyar Mir, a senior expert on South Asia security at the U.S. Institute of Peace, a government research body based in Washington.
Unlike previous high-profile suicide attacks by ISIS-K, the gunmen on Friday had sought to escape and were detained by Russian authorities some 300 km west of Moscow, stirring some doubts within Russia over whether they really were jihadists. In unverified images shown on Russian media, one of the alleged assailants told an interrogator he had been offered half a million roubles (a little over $5,000) to carry out the attacks.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said for the first time on Monday that radical Islamists had carried out the assault but he has not publicly mentioned ISIS-K in connection with the attackers, who he said had been trying to escape to Ukraine. Putin said “many questions” remained to be answered.
Colin Clarke, with the New York-based Soufan Center, a think tank for global security issues, said that there were a number of examples of Islamist militants escaping instead of carrying out suicide missions, like the ISIS gunmen who fled after attacking the Bataclan music hall in Paris in November 2015.
“They could have been interested in conducting a follow-on attack,” Clarke said, adding that the attackers may also have avoided buying or transporting explosives to lessen their chances of detection.
Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command – which covers Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as part of South Asia – said the Moscow attack was in line with ISIS-K’s long-term objective of increasing its foreign operations, including against the United States.
“They remain determined to attack us and our homeland,” said McKenzie, who was the head of U.S. forces in the region during the withdrawal from Afghanistan. “I think the odds of that are probably higher now than they were a couple of years ago.”

INTERNATIONAL RECRUITS

The State Department in its bounty announcement described Ghafari, better known by his nom-de-guerre Shahab al-Muhajir, as an experienced military leader who had planned ISIS-K suicide attacks in Kabul.
It separately identified Ismatullah Khalozai, who ran a network of informal money transfers, or hawala, from Turkey, as the group’s “international financial facilitator”.
A July 2023 report, opens new tab to the U.N. Security Council on the international threat posed by Islamic State said that ISIS-K numbered 4,000 to 6,000 people on the ground in Afghanistan, including fighters and family members.
Security experts trace the group’s expansion to the collapse of the parent Islamic State (IS) movement during the war in Iraq in 2017.
Many foreign fighters fled Iraq and reached Afghanistan-Pakistan to join ISIS-K, bringing expertise in guerrilla warfare that developed the group’s ability to launch attacks in Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan, according to a senior Iraqi security official, who asked not to be named.
Iraqi security believes that ISIS-K has been working to establish a regional network of jihadist fighter cells that could help execute international attacks, based on information from dozens of senior ISIS operators detained over the last two years, the official said.
Two senior Iraqi ISIS leaders arrested in Turkey in December and handed over to Baghdad told Iraqi intelligence that they would contact Ghafari for financial and logistical support by exchanging messages through two Tajik members of ISIS-K in Turkey, according to the Iraqi official, who is part of a security unit that monitors Islamic State activities in Iraq and neighbouring states.
A Taliban intelligence official estimated that 90% of ISIS-K’s cadre is now non-Pashtun. Tajiks and Uzbeks are the other large ethnic groups that populate the north of Afghanistan.
Mawlawi Habib Rahman, a former senior leader of ISIS-K who surrendered to the Taliban, told Aghan media outlet Al-Mirsaad in November that the group had also successfully recruited Tajik nationals.
“They are told you were infidels and you have now newly become Muslim (after joining ISIS-K),” Rahman said. Recruiters say the Tajik government is made up of “infidels” and that ISIS-K wanted to rescue oppressed Muslims, he said.
A Jan. 2024 UN report, opens new tab on the group noted it had stepped up its efforts to enlist foreign fighters and disillusioned members of the Taliban, with a special focus on Tajiks. It said that Tajik citizen, Khukumatov Shamil Dodihudoevich, alias Abu Miskin, had become an active propagandist and recruiter.
Tajikistan, a Persian-speaking and predominantly Sunni Muslim country, is home to 10 million people. After a brutal civil war in the 1990s, it remains one of the poorest former Soviet republics. Its economy is heavily dependent on remittances from over a million migrant workers in Russia.
Tajik officials have said that many Tajiks who live in Russia complain of mistreatment, making them easier targets for extremist recruitment while they are far from their homes.

RUSSIA AND THE WEST IN ITS CROSSHAIRS

A day before the Moscow attack, a top U.S. military officer told the House Armed Services Committee that Taliban efforts to suppress ISIS-K in Afghanistan were proving insufficient.
General Michael “Erik” Kurilla, the commander of US Central Command, said in written testimony that the Taliban had targeted some senior ISIS-K leaders but did not have the ability nor intent to maintain pressure on the group. This had allowed ISIS-K to regenerate its networks, he said.
“ISIS-Khorasan retains the capability and will to attack U.S. and Western interests abroad in as little as six months and with little to no warning,” Kurilla told a Senate committee hearing this month.
Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesman for the Taliban administration in Kabul, said ISIS-K had been seriously weakened by a security crackdown and was only carrying out rare operations against civilians. He denied the group was based on Afghan territory, but said it wasn’t clear where it was based.
The U.N. report in January said that a decline in attacks by the ISIS-K within Afghanistan probably reflected a change of strategy by Ghafari, as well as counter-terrorism efforts by the Taliban.
Authorities in several European countries made a spate of arrests of alleged ISIS-K recruits in July and December last year, accused of plotting terror attacks.
Christine Abizaid, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, told a House committee, opens new tab in November, that ISIS-K had so far used “inexperienced operatives” to attempt attacks in Europe.
France, which will host the Olympic Games from late July, said late on Sunday it was raising its terror alert warning to its highest level following the shootings in Moscow.
For the past two years, ISIS-K has been fixated on Russia, criticizing Putin for changing the course of the Syrian civil war by supporting President Bashar al-Assad against Islamic State, security experts said.
“ISIS-K has been plotting attacks within Russia for some time,” said Aaron Zelin, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute For Near East Policy, a U.S. think tank. He noted that recent attempts by the group to strike within Russia had been unsuccessful.
Russia’s FSB security service said on March 7 it had foiled an armed attack by the group on a synagogue near Moscow.
ISIS-K’s networks within the Tajik and Central Asian communities may have facilitated efforts to conduct operations in Moscow, with its large migrant population, Zelin said.

Reporting by Mohammad Yunus Yawar in Kabul and Mushtaq Ali in Peshawar, Pakistan; Additional reporting by Asif Shahzad and Gibran Peshimam in Islamabad, Saud Mehsud in Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistan, Ahmed Rasheed in Baghdad, Maya Gebeily in Beirut, Olzhas Auyezov in Almaty, Idrees Ali and Jonathan Landay in Washington, and YP Rajesh in New Delhi; writing by YP Rajesh; Editing by Daniel Flynn

How ISIS-K leader forged one of Islamic State’s most fearsome groups
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Pakistan’s defense minister: Source of terrorist incidents in Pakistan is Afghanistan

March 27, 2024

Khawaja Asif, the Defense Minister of Pakistan, has said that considering the increase in terrorist incidents in the country, there is a need for fundamental changes in the situation along the western borders of Pakistan with Afghanistan.

Mr. Asif, on Wednesday, March 27th, said on his social media platform X: “The source of terrorist incidents in Pakistan is in Afghanistan. Despite our efforts, Kabul, although knowing that terrorism is being launched against Pakistan from its soil, has made no progress in this regard.”

The Defense Minister of Pakistan has said that with this situation, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan differs from the traditional borders of the world. The Defense Minister of Pakistan’s reference to the difference in the border between the two countries is the movement of Afghan and Pakistani citizens without visas and passports.

Khawaja Asif emphasized that in the current situation, where the Taliban are not willing to cooperate, Pakistan must enforce all international laws and norms at its border with Afghanistan, and “the movement of terrorists must be stopped.”

He has called for visas and passports to be mandatory for travel across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Mr. Asif’s statements come a day after a suicide attack on a vehicle carrying Chinese engineers in the city of Besham, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which resulted in the death of five Chinese engineers and one Pakistani driver.

According to reports, the vehicle carrying Chinese citizens was traveling from Islamabad towards a camp in the Dasu area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa when a suicide bomber targeted it.

Ensuring the security of Chinese citizens is particularly important to Pakistan, as the fate of most large and small Chinese projects undertaken as part of China’s “Belt and Road” initiative in Pakistan depends on ensuring the security of Chinese engineers.

Pakistan’s defense minister: Source of terrorist incidents in Pakistan is Afghanistan
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Kabir Discusses Economic Cooperation with UNAMA Deputy

March 27, 2024
Bibi Amina Hakimi
TOLOnews’ Reporter
27 March 2024

They said that they are also discussing the matter with countries around the world.

A number of United Nations officials, in a meeting with Mawlawi Abdul Kabir, the deputy prime minister for political affairs, discussed the release of Afghanistan’s frozen funds.

They said that they are also discussing the matter with countries around the world.

The deputy prime minister for political affairs, in a meeting with Indrika Ratwatte, the deputy special representative (development) for Afghanistan at UNAMA, said that the country is now ready for investment. Mawlawi Abdul Kabir also requested that the Asian Development Bank and other institutions complete their unfinished projects in Afghanistan.

According to the statement of the Prime Minister’s office, this United Nations official said that they have requested $3 billion dollars from donor countries to deliver humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan.

Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate, regarding this meeting said: “Of course, if this aid is realized, it will have a significant impact on enhancing our capabilities; but, we are not sure yet since the donor countries themselves are facing economic challenges and are also focusing on other parts of the world. So, if the aid is provided, it will be effective.”

Mawlawi Abdul Kabir emphasized in the meeting that security is now ensured in Afghanistan, and the cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotics have been eradicated.

Abdul Latif Nazari, Deputy Minister of Economy, said: “The Islamic Emirate, by ensuring overall security, eradicating corruption, and eliminating bureaucracy, has created an environment conducive to attracting investment in the country. We urge all domestic and foreign investors to take advantage of this opportunity and invest in the country.”

A number of economic analysts believe that lifting economic sanctions and removing banking obstacles play a crucial role in increasing investments and resuming the activities of global institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

“UNAMA can play a significant role in coordinating between the international community and the Islamic Emirate. Banking restrictions should be lifted, and major economic projects of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank should be brought closer,” said Sakhi Ahmad Payman, the First Deputy of the Chamber of Industries and Mines.

Since the Islamic Emirate came to power in the country, many institutions have halted their activities in Afghanistan, resulting in the suspension of projects funded by these institutions, like CASA-1000, in Afghanistan.

Kabir Discusses Economic Cooperation with UNAMA Deputy
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US Emphasizes Taliban’s Role in Fighting Terrorism in Afghanistan

March 27, 2024
Nazir Shinwari
Tolo News
27 March 2024

Political experts believe that terrorism is a major challenge against all countries and the fight against it should be conducted jointly.

The U.S. State Department spokesperson says that combating terrorist groups in Afghanistan is in the “Taliban’s” interest.

According to Matthew Miller, the U.S. is committed to fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and has once again emphasized that Afghanistan should not become a safe haven for terrorists.

“We have demonstrated our commitment to responding to terrorists in Afghanistan. But we have also made it clear to the Taliban that fighting violent terrorist groups within Afghanistan is in their interest.” Said Mathew Millwer, U.S. State Department Spokesperson.

On the other hand, the spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate says that the Islamic Emirate has trained forces for the fight against terrorism and does not need the cooperation of any country in this regard.

“We do not need cooperation from any side in this regard; we have trained forces with good experience. The Islamic Emirate has complete control over all the territory of the country. There is no area that is out of the control of the Islamic Emirate and that we would need help of others.” Spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate Zabihullah Mujahid told TOLOnews.

Political experts believe that terrorism is a major challenge against all countries and the fight against it should be conducted jointly.

“ISIS is the enemy of all, and when it is the enemy of all, then a joint fight against it is needed, including our airspace that must be protected,” said Muhammad Matin Expert, a military expert.

“ISIS is a phenomenon that destabilizes all countries, as we saw in Moscow where hundreds were killed and injured in attack. The same goes for Turkey and other countries.

Therefore, all countries need to cooperate to eliminate this harmful and negative phenomenon,” said Zohorullah Zaheer, a political analyst.

This comes as the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated yesterday (March 26) that in recent years, ISIS has targeted opponents of the United States, including “the Taliban”, and countries such as Iran, Russia, Syria, and others.

US Emphasizes Taliban’s Role in Fighting Terrorism in Afghanistan
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Al Qaeda Is Back—and Thriving—in Afghanistan

March 27, 2024
By
A columnist at Foreign Policy and an Australian journalist and author.
22 March 2024

Al Qaeda is back to its old tricks in Afghanistan. Much as it did before masterminding the 9/11 attacks, the terrorist group is running militant training camps; sharing the profits of the Taliban’s illicit drug, mining, and smuggling enterprises; and funneling the proceeds to affiliated jihadi groups worldwide.

An unpublished report circulating among Western diplomats and U.N. officials details how deeply embedded the group once run by Osama bin Laden is in the Taliban’s operations, as they loot Afghanistan’s natural wealth and steal international aid meant to alleviate the suffering of millions of Afghans.

The report was completed by a private, London-based threat analysis firm whose directors did not want to be identified. A copy was provided to Foreign Policy and its findings verified by independent sources. It is based on research conducted inside Afghanistan in recent months and includes a list of senior al Qaeda operatives and the roles they play in the Taliban’s administration.

To facilitate its ambitions, al Qaeda is raking in tens of millions of dollars a week from gold mines in Afghanistan’s northern Badakhshan and Takhar provinces that employ tens of thousands of workers and are protected by warlords friendly to the Taliban, the report says. The money represents a 25 percent share in proceeds from gold and gem mines; 11 gold mines are geolocated in the report. The money is shared with al Qaeda by the two Taliban factions: Sirajuddin Haqqani’s Kabul faction and Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada’s Kandahar faction, suggesting both leaders, widely regarded as archrivals, see a cozy relationship with al Qaeda as furthering their own interests as well as helping to entrench the group’s overall power.

The Taliban’s monthly take from the gold mines tops $25 million, though this money “does not appear in their official budget,” the report says. Quoting on-the-ground sources, it says the money “goes directly into the pockets of top-ranking Taliban officials and their personal networks.” Since the mines began operating in early 2022, al Qaeda’s share has totaled $194.4 million, it says.

AFTER REGAINING POWER IN AUGUST 2021, the Taliban integrated a large number of listed terrorist groups that fought alongside them against the U.S.-supported Afghan republic. The Biden administration, however, has persistently denied that al Qaeda has reconstituted in Afghanistan or even that al Qaeda and the Taliban have maintained their long, close relationship.

Those denials ring hollow as evidence piles up that the Taliban and al Qaeda are as close as ever. The U.N. Security Council and the U.S. Congress-mandated Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) have consistently reported on the Taliban’s symbiotic relationship with dozens of banned terrorist outfits, including al Qaeda.

Few experts believed Taliban leaders’ assurances, during negotiations with former U.S. President Donald Trump that led to the ignominious U.S. retreat, that the group’s relationship with al Qaeda was over; bin Laden’s vision of a global caliphate based in Afghanistan was a guiding principle of the war that returned the Taliban regime, which one Western official in Kabul said differs only from the previous regime in 1996-2001 in that “they are even better at repression.”

The historic relationship hit global headlines when bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was killed on July 31, 2022, in a U.S. drone strike as he stood by the window of a Kabul villa. The property was linked to Haqqani, the head of the largely autonomous Haqqani network and a member of al Qaeda’s leadership structure. He is also a deputy head of the Taliban and its interior minister, overseeing security. He is believed to harbor ambitions for the top job of supreme leader, with aspirations to become caliph.

Now that they can operate with impunity, the reports says, the Taliban are once again providing al Qaeda commanders and operatives with everything they need, from weapons to wives, housing, passports, and access to the vast smuggling network built up over decades to facilitate the heroin empire that bankrolled the Taliban’s war.

The routes have been repurposed for lower-cost, higher-return methamphetamine, weapons, cash, gold, and other contraband. Militants from Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and the Palestinian territories also circulate through the al Qaeda training camps that have been revived since the Taliban takeover. Security is provided by the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence.

The report includes a list of al Qaeda commanders, some of whom were bin Laden’s lieutenants when he was living in Afghanistan while planning the attacks on the United States. Those atrocities precipitated the U.S.-led invasion that drove him, and the Taliban leadership, into Pakistan, where they were sheltered, funded, and armed by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency.

The report’s findings “demonstrate that, as expected, the Taliban leadership continues to be willing to protect not only the leadership of al Qaeda but also fighters, including foreign terrorist fighters from a long list of al Qaeda affiliates,” said Hans-Jakob Schindler, the senior director of the Berlin- and New York-based Counter Extremism Project and an expert on terrorism. “It is clear that the Taliban have never changed their stance toward international terrorism and, in particular, al Qaeda.”

Many analysts believe President Joe Biden’s decision to stick to Trump’s withdrawal deal led to Afghanistan becoming an incubator of extremism and terrorism. Leaders of neighboring and regional states, including Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and countries in Central Asia, have expressed concern about the threat posed by the Taliban’s transnational ambitions. U.N. figures, including Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett, have repeatedly called out Taliban suppression of rights and freedoms and the imprisonment and killing of perceived opponents.

In February, the George W. Bush Institute released the first report in its three-part Captured State series titled “Corruption and Kleptocracy in Afghanistan Under the Taliban,” which recommends action by the United States and the U.N. to rein in Taliban excesses. It calls on the United States and allies “to pressure foreign enablers of Taliban corruption and reputation laundering to stop facilitating corrupt economic trading activities, illicit trafficking, and moving and stashing personal wealth outside Afghanistan.”

Pointedly, it says the U.N. and other aid organizations “should demand greater accountability for how aid is spent and distributed” and urges international donors to support civil society, which has been decimated by the Taliban.

It’s a reference to the billions of dollars in aid that have been sent to Afghanistan since the republic collapsed—including, controversially, $40 million in cash each week, which has helped keep the local currency stable despite economic implosion. The United States is the biggest supporter, funneling more than $2.5 billion to the country from October 2021 to September 2023, SIGAR said. Foreign Policy has reported extensively on the Taliban’s systematic pilfering of foreign humanitarian aid for redistribution to supporters, which has exacerbated profound poverty.

The Bush Institute paper is one of the few comprehensive studies of the impact of the Taliban’s return to power to publicly call for the group to face consequences for its actions. It suggests, for instance, the enforcement of international travel bans on Taliban leaders, which are easily and often flouted.

Recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan “would reinforce the Taliban’s claim to power and strengthen their position” by giving them even greater access to “cold, hard cash,” the report says, a warning that comes amid growing fears that the United States could be preparing to reopen its Kabul embassy, which the Taliban would see as tacit recognition.

By “capturing the Afghan state, the Taliban have significantly upgraded their access to resources,” the Bush Institute argues, putting the group “in the perfect position now to loot it for their own individual gain.”

That plundered resource wealth also appears to be boosting the coffers of like-minded groups. The London firm’s unpublished report identifies 14 al Qaeda affiliates—most of them listed by the U.N. Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team—that are directly benefiting from the mining proceeds. They include seven inside Afghanistan (among them, the anti-China East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the anti-Tajikistan Jamaat Ansarullah, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which is fighting the Pakistani state) and seven operating elsewhere: al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al Qaeda in Yemen, al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in Syria, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, al Qaeda in the Mahgreb, and al-Shabab, largely active in East Africa.

For Western governments that might be pondering a closer relationship with the Taliban regime or even diplomatic recognition, Schindler of the Counter Extremism Project sounded a note of warning. The Taliban, he said, are “not a viable counterterrorism partner, even on a tactical level.” Instead, the group “remains one of the prime sponsors of terrorism” worldwide.

Lynne O’Donnell is a columnist at Foreign Policy and an Australian journalist and author. She was the Afghanistan bureau chief for Agence France-Presse and the Associated Press between 2009 and 2017.

Al Qaeda Is Back—and Thriving—in Afghanistan
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Female journalists in Eastern Afghanistan persist despite economic hardships

March 26, 2024
Khaama Press

Female journalists in local media in Nangarhar say that despite economic difficulties and recent changes making work conditions tougher, they continue working in the media.

They mention that media outlets offer minimal benefits for the work they do. They receive this compensation for their extensive work while work conditions for women in local media in this province are severely restricted.

Female journalists in this province say that conditions are worsening daily, and restrictions are increasing.

It’s worth noting that in Nangarhar, apart from national radio and television, two private televisions and 14 private radios are operating daily.

The presence of female journalists in Nangarhar media

With the fall of the Republic system in Afghanistan and the resurgence of the Taliban administration, restrictions against work, education, and movement for women have been put into effect through separate orders.

This situation has left many female journalists and media workers unemployed. Most of them are now concerned about their uncertain fate.

A journalist who has lost her job and is now confined to her home spoke to Khaama Press, saying, “They show some sensitivity towards women. We hope with continued work, this situation will change and improve. We hope to see equal opportunities for women’s involvement and job opportunities. We hope the restrictions will be lifted.”

Despite financial problems, unemployment, and lack of access to information, female journalists in this province are grappling with additional challenges that restrict their media activities.

Fatima Samimi, a journalist in a private media outlet, told Khaama Press about her daily challenges: “The subject of reporting often changes due to pressures, and sometimes the reports remain incomplete.”

However, Sadiqullah Qureshi, the information officer of the Taliban’s Information and Culture Directorate in Nangarhar province, assured female journalists that no one could prevent them from working under the conditions of the Taliban government.

But Ms. Samimi says, “When we inquire about their views on our reports from government officials, they do not share information with us. Experts and the public refrain from sharing information due to fear, leading us to change the subject. Although our subject is not sensitive, we change it because our report remains incomplete.”

An employee of the Gender Equality Department of a media-supporting institution in Nangarhar province, commenting on the problems female journalists face, said, “The presence of women in the media has decreased due to recent economic constraints and limitations. According to her, the economic downturn in Nangarhar has hit some media outlets hard.

Currently, most media outlets in Nangarhar are facing economic difficulties, which have negatively impacted female journalists’ work.

Mursal Ahmadi, a journalist who is the sole breadwinner for her family of eight, is active in media in Nangarhar province.

She used to work in a media organization with a salary of $600 before the Taliban’s takeover, but now she works with a local radio station for a monthly salary of only 1,500 Afghanis.

It is worth mentioning that following the current conditions, many media outlets in the province have dismissed many of their female reporters, correspondents, and staff.

It is worth mentioning that in the previous republic system, there were 530 active media outlets in Afghanistan, including 70 television stations, 300 radio stations, and the remaining print media and news agencies where hundreds of female journalists worked, and the field was conducive to women’s media activities.

Female journalists in Eastern Afghanistan persist despite economic hardships
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ISIS Affiliate Linked to Moscow Attack Has Global Ambitions

March 26, 2024

Reporting from Washington

The New York Times

The Islamic State in Khorasan is active in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and has set its sights on Europe and beyond.

Five years ago this month, an American-backed Kurdish and Arab militia ousted Islamic State fighters from a village in eastern Syria, the group’s last sliver of territory.

Since then, the organization that once staked out a self-proclaimed caliphate across Iraq and Syria has metastasized into a more traditional terrorist group — a clandestine network of cells from West Africa to Southeast Asia engaged in guerrilla attacks, bombings and targeted assassinations.

None of the group’s affiliates have been as relentless as the Islamic State in Khorasan, which is active in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and has set its sights on attacking Europe and beyond. U.S. officials say the group carried out the attack near Moscow on Friday, killing scores of people and wounding many others.

In January, Islamic State Khorasan, or ISIS-K, carried out twin bombings in Iran that killed scores and wounded hundreds of others at a memorial service for Iran’s former top general, Qassim Suleimani, who was targeted in a U.S. drone strike four years earlier.

“The threat from ISIS,” Avril D. Haines, the director of national intelligence, told a Senate panel this month, “remains a significant counterterrorism concern.” Most attacks “globally taken on by ISIS have actually occurred by parts of ISIS that are outside of Afghanistan,” she said.

Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, the head of the military’s Central Command, told a House committee on Thursday that ISIS-K “retains the capability and the will to attack U.S. and Western interests abroad in as little as six months with little to no warning.”

American counterterrorism specialists on Sunday dismissed the Kremlin’s suggestion that Ukraine was behind Friday’s attack near Moscow. “The modus operandi was classic ISIS,” said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The assault was the third concert venue in the Northern Hemisphere that ISIS has struck in the past decade, Mr. Hoffman said, following an attack on the Bataclan theater in Paris in November 2015 (as part of a broader operation that struck other targets in the city) and a suicide bombing at an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester Arena, England, in May 2017.

Islamic State Khorasan, founded in 2015 by disaffected members of the Pakistani Taliban, burst onto the international jihadist scene after the Taliban toppled the Afghan government in 2021. During the U.S. military withdrawal from the country, ISIS-K carried out a suicide bombing at the international airport in Kabul in August 2021 that killed 13 U.S. service members and as many as 170 civilians.

Since then, the Taliban have been fighting ISIS-K in Afghanistan. So far, the Taliban’s security services have prevented the group from seizing territory or recruiting large numbers of former Taliban fighters, according to U.S. counterterrorism officials.

But the upward arc and scope of ISIS-K’s attacks have increased in recent years, with cross-border strikes into Pakistan and a growing number of plots in Europe. Most of those European plots were thwarted, prompting Western intelligence assessments that the group might have reached the lethal limits of its capabilities.

Last July, Germany and the Netherlands coordinated arrests targeting seven Tajik, Turkmen and Kyrgyz individuals linked to a ISIS-K network who were suspected of plotting attacks in Germany.

Three men were arrested in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia over alleged plans to attack the Cologne Cathedral on New Year’s Eve 2023. The raids were linked to three other arrests in Austria and one in Germany on Dec. 24. The four people were reportedly acting in support of ISIS-K.

American and other Western counterterrorism officials say these plots were organized by low-level operatives who were detected and thwarted relatively quickly.

“Thus far, ISIS-Khorasan has relied primarily on inexperienced operatives in Europe to try to advance attacks in its name,” Christine S. Abizaid, the head of the National Counterterrorism Center, told a House committee in November.

But there are worrisome signs that ISIS-K is learning from its mistakes. In January, masked assailants attacked a Roman Catholic church in Istanbul, killing one person. Shortly afterward, the Islamic State, through its official Amaq News Agency, claimed responsibility. Turkish law enforcement forces detained 47 people, most of them Central Asian nationals.

Since then, Turkish security forces have launched mass counteroperations against ISIS suspects in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Several European investigations shed light on the global and interconnected nature of ISIS finances, according to a United Nations report in January, which identified Turkey as a logistical hub for ISIS-K operations in Europe.

The Moscow and Iran attacks demonstrated more sophistication, counterterrorism officials said, suggesting a greater level of planning and an ability to tap into local extremist networks.

“ISIS-K has been fixated on Russia for the past two years,” frequently criticizing President Vladimir V. Putin in its propaganda, said Colin P. Clarke, a counterterrorism analyst at the Soufan Group, a security consulting firm based in New York. “ISIS-K accuses the Kremlin of having Muslim blood in its hands, referencing Moscow’s interventions in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Syria.”

A significant portion of ISIS-K’s members are of Central Asian origin, and there is a large contingent of Central Asians living and working in Russia. Some of these individuals may have become radicalized and been in position to serve in a logistical function, stockpiling weapons, Mr. Clarke said.

Daniel Byman, a counterterrorism specialist at Georgetown University, said that “ISIS-K has gathered fighters from Central Asia and the Caucasus under its wing, and they may be responsible for the Moscow attack, either directly or via their own networks.”

Russian and Iranian authorities apparently did not take seriously enough public and more detailed private American warnings of imminent ISIS-K attack plotting, or were distracted by other security challenges.

“In early March, the U.S. government shared information with Russia about a planned terrorist attack in Moscow,” Adrienne Watson, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council, said on Saturday. “We also issued a public advisory to Americans in Russia on March 7. ISIS bears sole responsibility for this attack. There was no Ukrainian involvement whatsoever.”

Russian authorities on Saturday announced the arrest of several suspects in Friday’s attack. But senior American officials said on Sunday that they were still digging into the background of the assailants and trying to determine whether they were deployed from South or Central Asia for this specific attack or if they were already in the country as part of the network of supporters that ISIS-K then engaged and encouraged.

Counterterrorism specialists voiced concern on Sunday that the attacks in Moscow and Iran might embolden ISIS-K to redouble its efforts to strike in Europe, particularly in France, Belgium, Britain and other countries that have been hit on and off for the past decade.

The U.N. report, using a different name for Islamic State Khorasan, said “some individuals of North Caucasus and Central Asian origin traveling from Afghanistan or Ukraine toward Europe represent an opportunity for ISIL-K, which seeks to project violent attacks in the West.” The report concluded that there was evidence of “current and unfinished operational plots on European soil conducted by ISIL-K.”

A senior Western intelligence official identified three main drivers that could inspire ISIS-K operatives to attack: the existence of dormant cells in Europe, images of the war in Gaza and support from Russian-speaking people living in Europe.

One major event this summer has many counterterrorism officials on edge.

“I worry about the Paris Olympics,” said Edmund Fitton-Brown, a former top U.N. counterterrorism official who is now a senior adviser to the Counter Extremism Project. “They would be a premium terrorist target.”

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades.

ISIS Affiliate Linked to Moscow Attack Has Global Ambitions
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IS-K: Who are the Islamic State jihadists blamed for Moscow attack?

March 26, 2024

By Frank Gardner

BBC security correspondent

March 25, 2024

Despite attempts by President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s state-controlled media to pin the blame for Friday’s deadly Moscow theatre attack on Ukraine, more details are emerging about the jihadist group IS-K, believed to have been behind it.

Who or what is IS-K?

IS-K is an abbreviation of Islamic State-Khorasan – a regional affiliate of the Islamic State group, which has been proscribed as a terror organisation by governments across the world.

It is focused on Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan and into Central Asia.

The group has given itself the name Khorasan as that was part of an historic Islamic caliphate spanning that region.

IS-K has been around for nine years but in recent months it has emerged as the most dangerous branch of the Islamic State group, with a long reach and a reputation for extreme brutality and cruelty.

Along with what is left of the group’s wider leadership in Syria and Iraq, IS-K aspires to a pan-national Islamic caliphate ruled through an ultra-strict interpretation of Sharia, Islamic law.

In Afghanistan it is waging a sporadic but still deadly insurgency against the country’s rulers, the Taliban, who it opposes on ideological grounds.

Has IS-K carried out attacks before?

It targeted the chaotic evacuation from Kabul airport in 2021 with a suicide bomb, killing 170 Afghans and 13 US servicemen.

The following year it targeted the Russian embassy in Kabul, killing at least six people and injuring others.

The group has carried out indiscriminate attacks on a maternity ward, bus stations and policemen.

In January this year, IS-K carried out a double bombing of a shrine in Kerman, Iran, killing nearly 100 Iranians.

In Russia it has carried out numerous small-scale attacks, the most recent being in 2020 – and already this year the FSB, Russia’s internal security service, says it has stopped several terror plots.

Who were the Moscow attackers?

According to Russian state media at least three of the men are Tajiks from the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan, which used to be part of the Soviet Union.

It is obvious from their battered and bruised appearance in court that they have been especially harshly interrogated to the point of torture.

The problem with that is according to international norms, their confessions will be worthless – people will say anything to make the pain stop, including confessing to a narrative that is simply untrue.

Reports have emerged that one of the men was seen carrying out surveillance of the venue in early March, around the time the US warned Russia there was an imminent threat of a terrorist attack on a public space – a warning the Kremlin dismissed at the time as “propaganda”.

Another report says at least two of the attackers arrived in Russia recently, implying that this was a “hit team” sent by IS-K, rather than a sleeper cell of residents.

Why did they target Russia?

There are several reasons.

IS-K consider most of the world to be their enemies. Russia is high up on their list, along with the US, Europe, Israel, Jews, Christians, Shia Muslims, the Taliban and all rulers of Muslim-majority states, who they consider to be “apostates”.

Islamic State’s hostility to Russia goes back to the Chechen wars in the 1990s and early 2000s, when Moscow’s forces devastated the Chechen capital Grozny.

More recently, Russia entered the Syrian civil war on the side of its ally, President Bashar al-Assad, and the Russian air force has carried out countless bombings of rebel and civilian positions, killing large numbers of Islamic State group and Al-Qaeda-linked fighters.

In Afghanistan, IS-K view Russia as being an ally of the Taliban, which is why they attacked the Russian embassy in Kabul in 2022.

They also bear a grudge for the 10 years of brutal Soviet occupation of that country from 1979-89.

Then there is the situation inside Russia itself.

Russia is viewed by IS-K as very much a Christian country and their video posted after the Moscow attack talks about killing Christians.

Tajik and other Central Asian migrant workers are sometimes subject to a degree of harassment and suspicion by the FSB as it seeks to head off terrorist attacks.

Finally, Russia – a nation currently distracted by its full-scale war with its neighbour Ukraine – may simply have been a convenient target of opportunity for IS-K, a place where weapons were available and their enemy’s guard was down.

What do we still not know about the Moscow attack?

There remain a number of unanswered questions about this whole episode.

For example, why were the attackers able to wander at will around the Crocus Hall with absolutely no apparent sense of urgency?

In a country where the police and special services, notably the FSB, are omnipresent, these gunmen behaved as if they knew they were not going to be interrupted by a police SWAT team.

Then there are the weapons – not just handguns but powerful, modern automatic assault rifles. How were they able to acquire these and smuggle them undetected into the venue?

Unlike many jihadist gunmen on a raid like this, these men were not wearing suicide vests or belts, in the manner of those who prefer death to capture.

And yet, it did not take long for the Russian authorities – the same Russian authorities who failed to stop the worst terror plot in 20 years unfolding beneath their noses – to round up the suspects and put them on trial.

All this is prompting some analysts to speculate about some sort of so-called “inside job” by the Kremlin, or a “false flag operation” to garner popular support for the war on Ukraine.

However, there is no hard evidence to support that theory and US intelligence has confirmed that in their view, it was Islamic State behind this hideous attack.

IS-K: Who are the Islamic State jihadists blamed for Moscow attack?
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Finally, Rain and Snow in Afghanistan: Will it be enough to avert another year of drought?

March 26, 2024

Kate Clark • AAN Team

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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The last few weeks have finally seen rain and snowfall in Afghanistan, raising hopes for farmers and herders that this year could be better than the last three drought years. Afghans typically categorise a drought year as one where the low amount of precipitation causes problems for agriculture – a poor harvest or crop failure or not enough grazing for livestock. At its worst, a drought also affects drinking water. The long-term future for Afghan agriculture is grim: scientists predict the global climate crisis will bring more severe droughts more frequently. But this year, AAN’s Kate Clark found, together with Ali Mohammad Sabawoon, Rohullah Sorush and Sayed Asadullah Sadat, farmers hope there might be enough rain and snow to, at least, avert another year of drought.
Afghanistan has had three consecutive drought years (khushk sali), with terrible consequences for many farmers and herders. Winter and spring is when most precipitation in Afghanistan should fall, but this winter began with two dry months. Since then, there has been some good snow and rainfall, but coming into the Afghan new year, Nawruz, which falls on the spring equinox, cumulative precipitation was still only creeping up towards average levels. See the Food Security Outlook for Afghanistan from the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), which this report will quote from extensively, for more detail.

Afghans usually view drought through the prism of agriculture,[1] not surprisingly, given it is the backbone of the Afghan economy, providing jobs, income, food for households and more than a third of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[2] Those cultivating rain-fed land (lalmi) are most vulnerable to drought, but farmers who have access to irrigation also suffer the consequences of low rain and snowfall, with springs drying up or streams running dry at times of the year when they should not. The greater variation in the rain-fed wheat harvest when there is drought, compared to the irrigated crop, can be seen in the chart below, which shows Afghan annual wheat production from 2005 to 2020.[3] Lack of snowfall on the mountains, or higher spring temperatures leading to premature snowmelt, can also result in a shortage of irrigation water downstream at critical times.[4] Herders are also hit hard if pasture is too little to sustain their flocks and herds. Scientists modelling the effects of greenhouse gases on the climate forecast that Afghanistan will see more frequent and harsher droughts, as well as warmer temperatures, a general shift from snow to rainfall, and heavier spring rains.[5]

Annual Afghan wheat production, rain-fed and irrigated, 2005-2020
Annual Afghan wheat production, rain-fed and irrigated, 2005-2020. Data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock; chart compiled by Mohammad Fahim Zaheer, FEWS NET regional scientist with the University of California, Santa Barbara Climate Hazards Center.

For this report, we spoke to farmers in Helmand, Daikundi, Ghazni, Paktia, Laghman and Kunduz to get a sense of their outlook for the coming year. Most had some access to irrigated, as well as rain-fed land, and many also had a small number of livestock.[6] We found that after the distressingly dry early winter, there is renewed hope that this year will be wetter and crops and pasture might flourish. Still, most famers we spoke to worried that spring rains would not fall in enough quantity or not at the right time to ensure a healthy crop and fear for the longer-term future.

The interviews were conducted in mid-March, just before the Afghan New Year (Nawruz). Farmers refer to the Afghan months: the last month of winter, Hut (20 February to 19 March) and the three months of spring: Hamal (20 March to 19 April), Saur (20 April-20 May) and Jawza (21 May to 20 June).

Farming in uncertain times

The winter of 2023/24 was unremittingly dry, until finally, in the month of Hut (beginning on 20 February), rain or snow fell, and it has rained or snowed several times since.

A farmer in Zurmat district of Paktia, said those two dry months at the start of winter had made people worry if there would even be drinking water this year. He has ten jeribs of irrigated and three jeribs of rain-fed land, plus five jeribs shared with a neighbour; he grows wheat for the household and maize, beans, onions, tomatoes and potatoes to sell. He also has two cows and a 20-strong flock of sheep and goats. After so many dry years, he said he had not bothered to sow winter wheat on his rain-fed land in the autumn. Those few people in the village who had saw the wheat dry up, or be eaten by birds or, at best, it had cost more to get it to harvest than it brought in.[7] The snow that fell in the last month of winter had come too late to save the winter wheat, but at least there was hope for the spring crops and people had been spurred into action:

The weather was cold, but it made the people happy. It snowed four times in all, although not more than 30 cm in depth. Then, it rained and the snow melted. As a result, the underground water level has increased a little and there is water in the wells. Water in our village’s karez is running again because water has come down from the mountains.[8] Agriculture is renewed. People are busy sowing crops, wheat, some are even planting trees. Everyone’s busy and happy. A few days ago, I was able to sow barley. The earth is soft and moist and the barley should grow very welI. I hope it will rain again so that we get a good harvest.

Another farmer,from Jaghatu district of Ghazni province, who is landless and cultivates irrigated land as a sharecropper, said they had had about 40 cm of snow, enough for drinking water and the animals (he has 25 sheep, four cows and a calf) and a slight improvement for the crops.

In years when there’s more water [than average], we can get a harvest large enough not only for my family and the landlord, but also with a surplus to sell. But for the last three or four years, we just didn’t get enough rain and snow and I’ve only been able to meet my family’s needs. We’ve had so many losses – we weren’t able to grow winter wheat and had to buy flour and potatoes and I’ve had to reduce the herd and flock by half, while the price of animals had gone down.

A farmer in Qarghahi district of Laghman said, “It recently rained so much that it went a long way towards quenching the earth’s thirst – not enough yet to meet the needs of farmers, but much better than last year or the year before.” He grows wheat for household use and a second crop of barley for sale on three jeribs and vegetables – cucumbers, chives, green onions and cauliflowers – all for sale on another two jeribs of his own land, as well as on six jeribs which he rents with his brother. He also has five cows and ten sheep grazing on his land and grows fodder crops for them. Laghmani farmers, he said, generally have access to water for irrigation from the Kabul and Panjshir Rivers and, in some areas, canals. Despite that, he said, rain is invaluable:

Compared to water from the river, rain can double the harvest. It functions like fertilizer. Last year, we grew winter wheat, but it dried up due to a lack of water and we had no harvest. When it snows on the mountains for three consecutive months, the water in the rivers increases and the groundwater level rises. When there’s no snow or rain, the water level drops. In the summer months when it gets hot, the water level in the river also goes down and people face a water shortage. When there’s a lot of rain, of course, the water in the springs that was reduced or dried up increases again and the springs flow.

Prospects had also turned for a farmer from Nad Ali district of Helmand Province who cultivates winter wheat on 5.5 jeribs to feed his household, and spring crops on another one-and-a-half jeribs – vegetables to eat and sell and cotton to sell. He also has 10 goats. The dry winter followed a long drought – not a single drop of rain had fallen in spring 2023, he said, and that had badly affected his winter crops.

The wheat turned yellow because of the lack of rain and was very weak. It was only around ten centimetres tall when the grain started to fill out and the cumin was about to dry up. [But then], it rained in the month of Hut, the wheat turned green again and began growing taller and the cumin got better. The wheat and cumin crops are happy now, very happy. We hadn’t watered our crops for around 50 days because the canal was dry.

The rain in Hut, he said, had “more than 90 per cent” addressed the drought. A local well-digger had told him the water table had risen from a depth of about 18 to 20 metres to 11 metres. “People are now ploughing their land,” he said, “and preparing to sow the new crops.” However, elsewhere in the province, the rain in February had come just in time, and the situation remains precarious:

The population of some districts of Helmand like Washer, Nawzad, Kajaki and Musa Qala were about to migrate because of the shortage of water. They were lacking even drinking water. Now the karezes there are full of water again. In Nawzad and Washer districts, snow fell. If the rain continues, I mean if it rains occasionally in Hamal [began 20 March], the drought in those districts will be addressed. If not, they will still have severe problems irrigating their crops.

Changing and chaotic weather patterns and ‘untimely rain’

Precipitation is crucial at various points in the growing cycle. Wheat, for example, needs water to germinate and for the initial growth, and then for flowering and finally for the grain to swell. The farmers stressed that it was not only the overall amount of rain and snowfall that was crucial, but also its timing and whether it was in or out of sync with what used to be the normal weather patterns – which their crops are adapted to. One interviewee in Daikundi province referred to the problem of ‘untimely rain’ (bidun-e mowqa), ie rain falling at the wrong time. He could also have referred to ‘untimely warmth’ and ‘untimely cold’ as equally serious problems brought about by climate change.

Two fruit farmers from the same province, from Khadir and Kiti districts, both described how untimely warmth had affected their fruit trees, especially almonds. The dry early winter had been unseasonably warm (that is, such warmth was unseasonable prior to climate change). Sudden snow and rain had prompted the fruit trees to come into blossom early. Then, a cold snap devastated the blossom. As a result, they said there would be no crop of almonds or stone fruit, or only a very poor crop, this year. “The experience of the past few years,” one added, “has shown me that changes in the weather, and late rains are usually more harmful than beneficial. They also increase the likelihood and number of pests, which people don’t have the capacity to deal with.”

The farmers in Paktia and Laghman both also described the harm of rain that is too heavy. In spring 2023, such rainfall had caused flooding and damage to the crops. The interviewee in Laghman warned that rain in the third month of spring, Jawza (21 May-20 June), was also problematic; the earth cannot absorb the water, he said, and it can lead to floods. Indeed, it is generally difficult for the soil dried out by the multi-year drought, to hold and absorb water, especially if it rains heavily. With Afghanistan now likely to see more droughts, warmer springs and heavier spring rainfall, catastrophic run-off and more frequent flooding is forecast (an upcoming report will delve into this). The other major change affecting agriculture is snow melting too early and too quickly. That causes a sudden rush of meltwater when farmers need it to come gradually, so they can use it for irrigation across the growing season.

Storing water

Pressure on water resources is not only due to the climate crisis, but also changing water use. The development of turbo wells, whether powered by diesel or solar, has enabled farmers to draw water up from deeper levels than was previously possible and expand the area of cultivation – crops can now even be grown in the dasht (desert) if water can be drawn up from the deep aquifers. As a result, groundwater is being extracted at a rate greater than it is being re-supplied by precipitation or run-off, only adding to the risk of water shortages and crop failure.[9] Many of our interviewees mentioned the water that was ‘stored’ in the environment, whether in reservoirs, canals, or aquifers, or as it flowed in springs, streams and canals. Most said the recent rain and snow was not yet enough to end their worry over whether they could count on water being available in the coming months.

The farmer in Zurmat, for example, said he only has access to irrigation from the public karez and because water levels are low everyone only gets their turn every 12 days, which is not sufficient. People have mostly been using water from wells, deploying solar power, he said, but again, water levels are low in the wells as well.

If it had snowed at the beginning and during the winter, it would have been useful, as the water storage could get full. The snow and rain in the month of Hut is not that effective, but it’s still good. If it rains and snows for three months in winter, we can call that year a water year because the springs and ground water come alive with it. [In that case] there will be enough water in the wells and the water will be flowing during the month of Jawza and Saratan [21 May to 20 July] and people will be able to irrigate their lands. However, this year, there was snow only at the end of winter, and then it rained and the snow melted. The greater the quantity of snow on the mountains and on the ground and the longer it remains, the more useful it is.

Re-charging the streams and aquifers and the very soil itself after three years of drought will take prolonged precipitation, as the farmer from Jaghatu explained. Following the recent snow fall, he said the water in their small spring [saqawa] had increased, but so much more was needed.

If there’s wet, heavy snow [tarbarf] and it snows four or five times during the winter and each time it is more than 50 cm, that’s good and we’ll have enough water. However, because there’s been drought for several years and the land is completely dry, it has to snow a lot and for the entire winter for us to say the drought has ended.

Looking to the past… and to the future

Every farmer we spoke to had stories of just how different the weather was not so long ago. The farmer in Kunduz, who is 50 years old, said that when he was a child, it had snowed a great deal in Dasht-e Archi and the canal behind his home had frozen in winter, so hard that the cows could cross it. “My family returned from Pakistan around 15 years ago,” he said, “and I haven’t seen the canal frozen since.” The farmer in Laghman, now in his early 40s, also recalled colder and wetter winters in his childhood, which meant that “every valley in Laghman flowed with water. In recent years, that’s much reduced. The water level in the wells used to be three metres and you could easily get water out, but now they’re down to 25 metres.” The interviewee in Paktia also recalled:

When I was a child, there was so much snow that even the street to the mosque was blocked and the people in the neighbourhood would gather to clear it and open up the way. We used to get at least one metre of snow, but now, it’s not more than a span [a hand’s width). We’d take water from our well with a jar: you could just put the jar in the water and get it out. Now the level is down to 50 metres. Winters used to be very cold. Now, they’re warm.

The farmer in Ghazni remembered how, during his childhood, it would start snowing at the end of autumn.

It snowed through the entire winter and we could have snow even during the first full month of spring. There was more than enough water, but now climate change has had its effect and there has been severe drought. As a result, we can’t keep a lot of animals and we can’t grow enough.

Those days of regular plentiful rain and snow in most years falling at the right time, are gone. Yet, how to respond, said one interviewee from Daikundi, is complicated by the fact that the crisis facing Afghan agriculture and the rural economy goes wider and deeper than ‘just’ climate change. There are now more people to feed, he said, and at the same time, natural resources are damaged, diminished or lost. He spoke about the loss of vegetation, soil and upland forests and the lack of a plan to restore them. He described how the loss of ground cover meant that when it does rain, or the snow melts, water now runs off the hills and is not absorbed by the soil. Avalanches and spring floods have destroyed cultivated land, orchards and water resources. At the same time, the people lack water storage in the foothills and around the sources of springs. And all of this, he said, is the backdrop to a growing population and expanding villages:

A patch of land on which a hundred man [450 kilogrammes] of grain could be grown, fifty years ago, would support one family. Now, that same patch of land is expected to support at least five and even up to ten families. Agricultural land can no longer, in no way, answer the food needs of the local people.

While Afghans can do nothing about the changing climate – Afghanistan is one of the lowest emitters of greenhouse gasses – there are ways to minimise the ill-effects. Better water management is urgent, to ensure what water there is goes further and that flooding and loss of soil in run-off is minimised. Measures include harvesting water in reservoirs, ponds, diversion dams and check dams,[10] changing irrigation methods, growing cover crops to reduce transpiration and ensuring there is vegetation cover, including trees, planted at the higher altitudes to reduce and slow down run-off.

There should be international help for this: the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement recognised that countries like Afghanistan are suffering out of all proportion to the contribution they have made to damaging the planet’s atmosphere and climate. Yet, as AAN guest author Assem Mayar reported in 2022, Afghanistan is largely blocked from accessing global funds dedicated to helping poor countries mitigate the effects of climate change because their government, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, is not recognised.

Hopes and worries for the next few months

In the short-term, the outlook this spring is better than it has been for the last few years. The deficit in cumulative precipitation from October 2023 through to the end of February, of 60 per cent below-average and 70 per cent below-average in the driest areas, as reported by FEWS NET, is now reducing because of the recent snow and rain. If there is average precipitation from March to May, FEWS NET said, the cumulative deficit will be further reduced and there will be enough moisture to support the all-important spring wheat crop.

However, FEWS NET also has a warning: the snowpack, which is the mass of lying snow that is compressed and hardened by its own weight, whose melting is so important for providing irrigation water to many communities, will likely be below-average. “Near-record low snow-water volumes,” it said, “have been recorded through much of the winter.” It said the snowpack needs to develop in March and April to ensure “water availability in the summer for downstream areas where irrigated crops are cultivated.” However, high temperatures are forecast for April and May 2024, which would result in early snow melt and high evapotranspiration rates and, potentially then, causing stress to both pasture and rainfed crops because of the lack of moisture in the soil.

FEWS NET also had other forecasts about harvests and livestock. This year, it still expects national wheat production and second-season crop production to be below-average, although vegetable and cotton production could be near-average. It also expects the condition of pastures to be near-average, although with a later decline in the warmer areas, and the bodily condition of livestock and production of milk to be below-average.[11] All of this means that even after the recent relief of rain and snow, the outlook for farmers and herders remains precarious.

Farmers everywhere are always acutely aware of the weather and the climate and pondering what to do for the best. That anxiety has been exacerbated by the chaos to weather patterns brought about by the climate crisis. In Afghanistan, where so many live on the breadline, the worry is especially acute. Watching the skies and hoping, they contemplate various futures this year, as one of our interviewees in Daikundi concluded:

If the spring rains continue to fall regularly, rain-fed crops and the grass and mountain plants will improve and thrive. The pastures and fields in our region will be green. But if the spring rains stop, pests will thrive and the harvest will be insignificant.

The recent rain and snowfall have turned despair into hope, but still, the fear lingers.

Edited by Martine van Bijlert

References

References
↑1 Scientists have different categories of droughts. Meteorological drought occurs when there is a prolonged period with less than average precipitation. Hydrological drought occurs when water reserves fall short in aquifers, lakes and reservoirs, run-off and stream-flow. In Afghanistan, drought usually refers to agricultural drought, when crops or pasture becomes stressed because of lack of moisture. That is often due to a meteorological drought, but could also be due to evaporation and low soil moisture.
↑2 This is from the latest World Bank GDP figures, from 2022.
↑3 FEWS NET reports that irrigated wheat typically makes up around 85 to 90 per cent of Afghanistan’s national wheat production, with rainfed wheat contributing around 10 to 15 per cent.
↑4 See also AAN’s earlier report on how climate change is melting Afghanistan’s glaciers, ‘Shrinking, Thinning, Retreating: Afghan glaciers under threat from climate change’ and the threat that poses to irrigation and drinking water, and of floods.
↑5 Modelling of what would happen to Afghanistan’s climate was carried out by WFP, UNEP and NEPA in 2015 and quoted in this 2022 report by AAN guest author, Assem Mayar The projections used what they called a ‘moderate’ scenario, which would see greenhouse gas emission peaking in 2040 and included:

Temperatures in Afghanistan would increase by more than the global average and there would be further melting of glaciers and snow cover, a shift in precipitation from snow to rainfall and a rise in demand for water for crops, with plants possibly requiring extra irrigation.

There would be an increase in drought and flood risks. Local droughts would become the norm by 2030, while floods would be a secondary risk.

Snowfall would diminish in the central highlands, potentially leading to reduced spring and summer flows in the Helmand, Harirud-Murghab and Northern River basins, while spring rainfall would decrease across most of the country.

In the northeast and small pockets of the south and west, along the border with Iran, there might be a five per cent or more increase in ‘heavy precipitation events’ that can lead to flash floods. However, these potentially devastating events might actually decrease across most of the south and other parts of the north.

In the medium-term, the frequency of snowmelt-related floods in spring might increase simply due to accelerated melting associated with higher spring temperatures.
↑6 This report hears from those growing crops, who, typically, also have some livestock. The multi-year drought has also devastated livestock and the livelihoods of herders in Afghanistan. FEWS NET reported:

As a result of the early depletion of pasture and grazing areas last year and below-average straw availability following below-average domestic production, fodder availability for livestock in January and February, the peak of the lean season, is at below normal levels, which is negatively impacting livestock body conditions. Overall, herd sizes remain at below-normal levels as households are still recovering their herd sizes following the drought, but herd sizes are near average levels in the eastern, northeastern, and some parts of the southeast that were not impacted by the drought. According to field reports, the livestock sector has been significantly impacted by the drought in northern (Samangan, Faryab, and Jawzjan) provinces due to a lack of fodder and insufficient drinking water during the winter and the peak of the lean season, resulting in poor body condition and productivity.
↑7 FEWS NET wrote that despite the multi-year drought and dry soil, some farmers did sow winter wheat, “expecting better precipitation due to the ongoing El Niño. By late January, irrigated crops sown in October were stressed due to a lack of available water for irrigation, low rainfall, and poor soil moisture.” There was also early germination in some lower-altitude areas because of above-average temperatures from October 2023 to January 2024, “leading to a need for moisture earlier than normal during the agricultural season.” Better precipitation at the end of the winter, it said, was “supporting the recovery of previously stressed crops.”
↑8 A karez is formed from a series of well-like vertical shafts, connected by sloping tunnels, which tap into subterranean water to efficiently delivers large quantities of water to the surface by gravity, without need for pumping. More on this UNESCO website on how karez “allow water to be transported over long distances in hot dry climates without loss of much of the water to evaporation.”
↑9 Similar problems are seen in the cities, where a growing population and mismanagement of water supplies has drained aquifers to deeper and deeper levels, meaning the wealthier may be able to dig ever deeper wells, but not the poorest.
↑10 For an example of measures taken locally to conserve water in Faryab province, see this AAN report: ‘Kanda and Backyard Pools: Faryabi Ways of Coping with Water Shortages’.
↑11 The forecast from FEWS NET in greater deal was:

The spring rainfed wheat harvest is expected to be lower than normal due to the drier start of the wet season, a reduction in planted area for rainfed wheat production, low snowpack development that will be important for water for irrigation during the dry season, and high temperatures. However, irrigated wheat production is likely to be average. 

National wheat production is expected to be below average due to the cumulative impact of three years of drought and the poor start to the October to May precipitation season that negatively impacted winter wheat planting.

Vegetable production in eastern, southern, and central parts of the country is expected to be near average, with the harvest likely in April and May. Cotton production in southern Afghanistan is expected to be near average as it was not significantly impacted by the drier start of the wet season and is supported by groundwater. Second-season crop and horticulture production is anticipated to be below average due to limited water access for irrigation, high temperatures, and lower-than-normal water availability in the main water basins.

Pasture is expected to regenerate to at least average levels with the average March to May spring rains and remain at those levels through at least May. From May to September, pasture conditions in lower elevation areas of the country will decline and be below average due to high temperatures, leading to high evapotranspiration rates.

Livestock body conditions are anticipated to be below average from February to April due to lower-than-normal fodder availability and lack of grazing areas, specifically in northern, central, and western parts of the county. However, livestock body conditions will improve seasonally through September due to improved access to fodder and grazing areas following the anticipated average March to May spring rains.

Livestock milk production is expected to be below average nationally due to poor conception rates over the past three years. However, livestock milk production is expected to be better than last year as regenerating pastures during the March to May rains support livestock access to food.

Livestock prices are expected to be lower than the five-year average through most of the scenario period due to below-average body conditions, lower-than-normal demand, and below-average pasture conditions.

REVISIONS:

This article was last updated on 27 Mar 2024

 

Finally, Rain and Snow in Afghanistan: Will it be enough to avert another year of drought?
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Russian massacre suspects’ homeland is plagued by poverty and religious strife

March 26, 2024
BY JIM HEINTZ
Associates Press
March 25, 2024

TALLINN, Estonia (AP) — The four men charged with the massacre at a Moscow theater have been identified by authorities as citizens of Tajikistan, some of the thousands who migrate to Russia each year from the poorest of the former Soviet republics to scrape out marginal existences.

Along with grinding poverty, Tajikistan is rife with religious tensions. Hard-line Islamists were one of the main forces opposing the government in a 1990s civil war that devastated the country. The militants claiming responsibility for the Moscow massacre that killed 139 people — a branch of the Islamic State group in neighboring Afghanistan — reportedly recruit heavily from Tajikistan.

The four suspects who were arraigned in a Moscow court late Sunday on terrorism charges appeared to have been beaten or injured during their detention. One was wheeled in on a gurney clad only in a hospital gown.

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday described the suspects as “radical Islamists,” and he repeated his accusation that Ukraine might have played a role despite its strong denials.

Here is a look at the people, militant groups and political history connected to the Moscow attack:

THE SUSPECTS

The eldest defendant is Dalerdzhon Mirzoyev, 32, who may have been living in Russia illegally. He was shown sitting in a glass cage in the courtroom with a black eye and bruised face.

Mirzoyev reportedly had obtained a three-month residency permit in the city of Novosibirsk, but it had expired. In video of his interrogation shared on Russian social media, he reportedly says he recently was living in a Moscow hostel with another of the suspects. The court said he is married and has four children, but it was unclear if he was employed.

Saidakrami Murodali Rachabalizoda, 30, is apparently unemployed. Registered as a resident in Russia, he could not remember in what city, according to Russian news reports. When he appeared in court, his head was awkwardly bandaged after Russian officers reportedly sawed off one of his ears.

Shamsidin Fariduni, 25, apparently had the most stable life of the four suspects. He was registered in Krasnogorsk, the Moscow suburb where the killings took place, and worked in a flooring factory. He reportedly told interrogators that he was offered 500,000 rubles (about $5,425) to carry out the attack — the equivalent of about 2.5 years of the average wage in Tajikistan.

Mukhammadsobir Fayzov, 19, was brought into the courtroom on a gurney, with a catheter attached and one eye injured or missing, and he appeared to fade in an out of consciousness. He had worked as an apprentice in a barbershop in the declining textile-mill city of Ivanovo, but reports said he left that job in November.

ISLAMIC TENSIONS IN TAJIKISTAN

As many as 1.5 million Tajik migrants are estimated to be in Russia after fleeing the poverty and unemployment that plague their landlocked, mountainous country. An array of mineral resources are present in Tajikistan, but the industry has been slow to develop because of belated foreign investment and poor geological data, among other factors.

Although its nearly 10 million people are overwhelmingly Muslim, tensions connected to Islam are common.

Islamists were a key opponent during a 1992-97 civil war in which the government killed as many as 150,000 people and devastated the economy. When the war ended, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon took steps to sharply curtail religious freedoms.

The government limited how many mosques could be built, prohibited women and children under 18 from attending mosques at all, and banned religious instruction outside the home for children. Critics say the limits encouraged people to turn to underground and radical Muslim factions via the internet.

Tajikistan has not made any official statement about the arrest of the four men suspected in the attack. But Rahmon was quoted by his government’s press service as telling Putin in a phone call that “terrorists have neither nationality, nor a homeland, nor religion.”

ISLAMIC STATE VS. RUSSIA

Most attacks tied to Islamic extremists that afflicted Russia in the past quarter century were committed by Chechen separatists, such as the 2004 Beslan school seizure that killed more than 300 people — or were blamed on them, as in the 1999 apartment bombings that triggered the second Russia-Chechnya war.

But attacks that began in 2015 were claimed by or attributed to the Islamic State group. The group opposed Russia’s intervention in Syria, where Moscow sought to tip the balance in favor of President Bashar Assad’s forces.

The U.S. government has said it had intelligence confirming IS was responsible for the weekend attack in Moscow.

After IS declared a caliphate in large parts of Syria and Iraq in June 2014, thousands of men and women from around the world came to join the extremist group. Those included thousands from the former Soviet Union, among them hundreds from Tajikistan.

One of the most prominent figures to join IS was Gulmurod Khalimov, who was an officer with Tajikistan’s special forces before defecting and joining IS in Syria in 2015. In 2017, the Russian military said Khalimov was killed in a Russian airstrike in Syria.

IS claimed responsibility for the 2015 bombing of a Russian airliner that was bringing tourists home from the Egyptian resort Sharm al-Sheik. Two years later, it claimed to be behind the suicide bombing of a subway train in St. Petersburg that killed 15 people.

Two weeks before the Moscow theater massacre, Russian officials said they had wiped out members of an IS cell that was planning to attack a synagogue. Earlier in the month, it reported killing six IS fighters in the Ingushetia region adjacent to Chechnya.

Bassem Mroue in Beirut, Lebanon, contributed to this report.

 

Russian massacre suspects’ homeland is plagued by poverty and religious strife
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