Afghanistan Peace Campaign| Guest: | Gene Aloise |
| Title: | Acting inspector general, SIGAR |
| Summary: | SIGAR was born in 2008 to fill a critical gap in accountability for U.S. reconstruction efforts. Its last report distills hundreds of audits into hard truths: systemic weaknesses that outlasted the mission and reforms that never fully took hold. |
Interview transcript
Terry Gerton You are the Acting Inspector General for the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction. That’s about to stand down, but tell us the origin story of the organization.
Gene Aloise Well, SIGAR was created around 2008, got started around 2009. We were created especially to look at Afghanistan. We’re the only IG created to look specifically at Afghanistan. Our legislation created us as an independent agency. We worked directly for the Congress and the administration. We’re not housed in any other federal agency, which made us very independent, which helped us do the work we did.
From the Marine Corps to state CIOs, tech leaders agree: Transformation must begin with mission alignment, empowered teams and secure, data-driven systems. Download our new e-book, sponsored by Maximus, now!
Terry Gerton Was there a specific gap or incident back in 2008 that prompted Congress to stand this up?
Gene Aloise Yes, Congress was getting concerned that there was so much money going into Afghanistan and they really didn’t have a special IG to look at it. They had other IGs going on, but they wanted a specific focus on Afghanistan.
Terry Gerton Over your nearly two decades, you’ve issued hundreds of audits and lessons learned reports. Are there any that stand out as significant and consequential, maybe the most consequential for U.S. Policy or operations?
Gene Aloise I think our final report summarizes all our work in the past 17 years. It lays out where the money was spent, how it was spent, what our audit work covered, what our investigations covered, and what our lessons learned report covers. It’s a very first-time-only comprehensive collaboration of all our work.
Terry Gerton As I read through it, one of the themes I took away was there were a lot of missing internal controls. Processes could have been organized and designed better from the beginning that would have prevented some waste. Could you give us some examples there?
Gene Aloise There are a lot of examples of missing controls. The problem with Afghanistan is we spent, and this is often said, too much money, too fast in a country that couldn’t absorb it. So there was, you know, a lack of agency control over the money going in there. We had too many people rotate too frequently to keep track of all the money. And so it was really easy — I use that term — for SIGAR to go in and find negative findings because of all the money that was going over and the lack of accountability for it.
Terry Gerton One of the things that really struck me was a description of sort of a misapprehension of the problem from the beginning, and it’s reflected in your name, Afghanistan Reconstruction, but we weren’t really reconstructing, we were constructing. What difference did that make in how the process played out?
Gene Aloise When you think about what we were trying to do, build a vibrant economy and democracy in a severely undeveloped country with high illiteracy rates, high poverty rates, it was really a Herculean task. And it wasn’t really reconstruction, as you mentioned, it was construction. We actually constructed the Ministry of Defense building, all the ministerial buildings over there we constructed. There was nothing there.
Terry Gerton We constructed institutions as well. How did that play out?
Gene Aloise Not well. I mean the government we created in Afghanistan, we being the United States and the donor countries, was basically a white collar criminal enterprise because of the corruption that was there. It was a good faith effort, but for many years we ignored, the United State and others, ignored the corruption. And by the time we created a government over there, it was endemic. Corruption was endemic.
Terry Gerton Did you notice in your final report that any of the previous reports and findings led to measurable change?
Gene Aloise Our reports led to about 30 legislative achievements, either specific legislation or amendments to legislation, to correct problems. We made over 1,500 recommendations to agencies. About 73% of them were implemented. We did change programs for the better. We did save money. About $4.6 billion we were able to save. So yeah, our reports had impact.
Terry Gerton Did you see that in real time or only in looking backwards?
Gene Aloise No, sometimes in real time. We stopped the purchase of UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters at a tune I think of $40 million, or there was infrastructure that was being built that we thought was not warranted. We stopped that. The report goes in just lists of a series of things we were able to stop.
Terry Gerton I’m speaking with Gene Alois. He’s the acting inspector general for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Despite all of those accomplishments, the report also notes some systemic issues that were never fully resolved. What were the toughest problems to fix, and why did they persist?
Gene Aloise A lot of it dealt with agencies’ pushback to what we were trying to do. We were a very aggressive IG, probably the most aggressive IG in Washington, D.C., but a lot of people didn’t like that, that we were so aggressive. So sometimes we had a battle to get things done. We had a lot support on the Hill. We had, I think, 24 hearings over our time span, and we were able to get things done, but it wasn’t easy. For example, under the Biden administration, they delayed our work for over a year because they said in 2021 the troops left, your jurisdiction is over. But our jurisdiction was always follow the money. It was never tied to the troops. So that delayed our word for about a year.
Terry Gerton And how did you pick that back up then?
Gene Aloise Through a bipartisan congressional effort that got the administration to start cooperating with us.
Terry Gerton Well, speaking of following the money, your charter, I guess, sunsets in 2026, but there’s still money out there. Who will pick up the responsibility for tracking what’s left?
Gene Aloise For Afghanistan? We’re talking about the DOD IG and the State Department IG. We’ve transferred a lot of our material over to them. And they will pick up what’s left over there. But money has stopped. The Trump administration has stopped funding to Afghanistan.
Terry Gerton In this transition, how will you be able to protect the lessons learned? You’ve done a lot of reports about lessons learned. Where will those go?
Gene Aloise Hopefully, policymakers will look at our lessons learned reports and our other reports and use that to learn from, because if we go into Gaza and we go in Ukraine, they’re going to be facing the same challenges. I can guarantee you, as we sit here today, there are corrupt individuals, corrupt corporations, corrupt tribal leaders, ready to get whatever reconstruction money is going to go into those places. Look at SIGAR’s work. Look at our recommendations. Look at what we’ve discussed for 17 years. And it will give you what you need to do to prevent that.
Terry Gerton Do you think that there are specific legislative actions that would help prevent that in the future if we do create new contingency responses?
Gene Aloise Yeah, I think the best thing they could do is create another SIGAR-like organization because only an independent organization that is not feeling the pressure from an agency head or whatever to not report the facts is going to do what we were able to do in Afghanistan.
Terry Gerton What about on the front hand in terms of designing those contingency response missions? Are there particular lessons you wanted to put a pin in right now for people who are thinking about those?
Gene Aloise Here’s one, think about what you’re gonna do and if it really has any chance of success because what we saw in Afghanistan is really, did we ever have a chance for success in Afghanistan? I mean, the mission was so difficult to do. So be realistic about what you’re going to try to do in these countries that you’re going to pour lots of money in.
Terry Gerton Is that realistic assessment something that the government can do itself? Does it need outside red teamers to help it with? How do you really get a comprehensive realistic assessment?
Gene Aloise Plenty of smart people in the State Department, Defense Department, and other agencies that could sit down and lay out a strategy for wherever country they’re going into that yeah they can figure this out. You know, it’s not rocket science, it is a lot of common sense.
Terry Gerton Would you have a handover book for the next acting IG, for the next contingency IG?
Gene Aloise Yeah, once again, I’ll use our final report. Take a look at that. And it references all the other work we’ve done in the past. You couldn’t have a better plan than what we’ve laid out for the past 17 years or so.
Terry Gerton Well, now you’ve documented the lessons. Here’s hoping we learn them.
Gene Aloise Yes, I agree.