45 minutes to pack up a lifetime as Pakistan’s foreigner crackdown sends Afghans scrambling

By ELENA BECATOROS
Pakistan wants to expel three million Afghans by the end of this year, saying they are in the country illegally, but many have lived there for decades. Returning refugees have been forced to head to a camp across the border, in Torkham, where thousands arrive every week and face a new future in a country they don’t know. Pakistan denies targeting Afghans and says everyone leaving is treated humanely and with dignity.

TORKHAM, Afghanistan (AP) — The order was clear and indisputable, the timeline startling. You have 45 minutes to pack up and leave Pakistan forever.

Sher Khan, a 42-year-old Afghan, had returned home from his job in a brick factory. He stared at the plainclothes policeman on the doorstep, his mind reeling. How could he pack up his whole life and leave the country of his birth in under an hour?

In the blink of an eye, the life he had built was taken away from him. He and his wife grabbed a few kitchen items and whatever clothes they could for themselves and their nine children. They left everything else behind at their home in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.

Born in Pakistan to parents who fled the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ensuing war, Khan is one of hundreds of thousands of Afghans who have now been expelled.

The nationwide crackdown, launched in October 2023, on foreigners Pakistan says are living in the country illegally has led to the departures of almost 1 million Afghans already.

Pakistan says millions more remain. It wants them gone.

“All our belongings were left behind,” Khan said as he stood in a dusty, windswept refugee camp just across the Afghan border in Torkham, the first stop for expelled refugees. “We tried so hard (over the years) to collect the things that we had with honor.”

Pakistan set several deadlines earlier this year for Afghans to leave or face deportation. Afghan Citizen Card holders had to leave the capital Islamabad and Rawalpindi city by March 31, while those with Proof of Registration could stay until June 30. No specific deadlines were set for Afghans living elsewhere in Pakistan.

Khan feared that delaying his departure beyond the deadline might have resulted in his wife and children being hauled off to a police station along with him a blow to his family’s dignity.

“We are happy that we came (to Afghanistan) with modesty and honor,” he said. As for his lost belongings, “God may provide for them here, as He did there.”

A refugee influx in a struggling country

At the Torkham camp, run by Afghanistan’s Taliban government, each family receives a SIM card and 10,000 Afghanis ($145) in aid. They can spend up to three days there before having to move on.

The camp’s director, Molvi Hashim Maiwandwal, said some 150 families were arriving daily from Pakistan — far fewer than the roughly 1,200 families who were arriving about two months ago. But he said another surge was expected after the three-day Islamic holiday of Eid Al-Adha that started June 7.

Aid organizations inside the camp help with basic needs, including healthcare. Local charity Aseel provides hygiene kits and helps with food. It has also set up a food package delivery system for families once they arrive at their final destination elsewhere in Afghanistan.

Aseel’s Najibullah Ghiasi said they expected a surge in arrivals “by a significant number” after Eid. “We cannot handle all of them, because the number is so huge,” he said, adding the organization was trying to boost fundraising so it could support more people.Pakistan blames Afghanistan for militancy

Pakistan accuses Afghans of staging militant attacks inside the country, saying assaults are planned from across the border — a charge Kabul’s Taliban government denies.

Pakistan denies targeting Afghans, and maintains that everyone leaving the country is treated humanely and with dignity. But for many, there is little that is humane about being forced to pack up and leave in minutes or hours.

Iran, too, has been expelling Afghans, with the UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, saying on June 5 that 500,000 Afghans had been forced to leave Iran and Pakistan in the two months since April 1.

Rights groups and aid agencies say authorities are pressuring Afghans into going sooner.

In April, Human Rights Watch said police had raided houses, beaten and arbitrarily detained people, and confiscated refugee documents, including residence permits. Officers demanded bribes to allow Afghans to remain in Pakistan, the group added.

Searching for hope while starting again

Fifty-year-old Yar Mohammad lived in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir for nearly 45 years. The father of 12 built a successful business polishing floors, hiring several workers. Plainclothes policemen knocked on his door too. They gave him six hours to leave.

“No way a person can wrap up so much business in six hours, especially if they spent 45 years in one place,” he said. Friends rushed to his aid to help pack up anything they could: the company’s floor-polishing machines, some tables, bed-frames and mattresses, and clothes.

Now all his household belongings are crammed into orange tents in the Torkham refugee camp, his hard-earned floor-polishing machines outside and exposed to the elements. After three days of searching, he managed to find a place to rent in Kabul.

“I have no idea what we will do,” he said, adding that he would try to recreate his floor-polishing business in Afghanistan. “If this works here, it is the best thing to do.”

45 minutes to pack up a lifetime as Pakistan’s foreigner crackdown sends Afghans scrambling
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US Defense Chief: Americans led majority of Afghanistan war effort

By Fidel Rahmati

Khaama Press

 

 

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told the Senate most of the Afghanistan war effort was carried out by American forces.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth sparked backlash after downplaying NATO allies’ contributions to the war in Afghanistan during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Wednesday, June 11. He asserted that “the vast majority of the effort was American,” minimizing the significance of international support in the two-decade-long conflict.

NBC News reported that Hegseth’s remarks drew immediate criticism from lawmakers, particularly Democratic Senator Chris Coons of Connecticut. Coons emphasized the sacrifices of smaller allied nations, such as Denmark, which endured high casualty rates despite limited military capacity. “To suggest that their losses were less meaningful is simply wrong,” Coons stated.

While Hegseth acknowledged the sacrifices made by coalition partners, he insisted that the United States bore the primary burden of the war. “We appreciate those contributions,” he said, “but the core of the mission was carried out by U.S. forces.”

A total of 32 countries participated in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. According to the U.K. Ministry of Defence, Britain lost 457 soldiers — the second-highest toll after the United States. Canada, Germany, and Italy also sustained notable casualties.

Critics argue that undermining allies’ roles damages trust and weakens future multilateral military collaborations. Former NATO commander Gen. Wesley Clark told PBS, “Solidarity among NATO partners is essential, especially when facing emerging global threats.”

Hegseth’s comments have reignited debate over America’s unilateralism in military affairs and the value of its alliances. With shifting global dynamics and rising security challenges, defense diplomacy may need a recalibration rooted in mutual recognition and shared sacrifice.

As the U.S. reflects on its post-Afghanistan military strategy, voices within and outside Washington urge a more inclusive narrative that honors the collective efforts of all nations involved. Dismissing allied contributions could hinder future coalition-building in potential conflict zones.

US Defense Chief: Americans led majority of Afghanistan war effort
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55 Afghan Refugees flagged on US Terror Watchlist, says Justice Department

Khaama Press

The U.S. Justice Department revealed that 55 Afghan refugees were flagged on the terror watchlist during entry or resettlement screenings.

A U.S. Justice Department watchdog has revealed that at least 55 Afghan refugees were on the terrorism watchlist either before entering or during their resettlement in the United States. The report highlights significant lapses in background vetting during the Biden administration’s resettlement efforts.

According to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), released Tuesday, June 11, security alerts and intelligence warnings related to these individuals were overlooked or mishandled during vetting by the Department of Homeland Security between August 2021 and May 2023. Some of the flagged individuals remained under surveillance even after entering the country.

The OIG report confirms that, as of July 2024, at least nine individuals remain on federal security monitoring lists, raising concerns about long-term risks and accountability in the refugee screening process.

In a strong rebuke, Senator Chuck Grassley, a Republican from Iowa, stated that “the Biden administration put American lives at risk” by ignoring previous warnings and failing to address known vulnerabilities in the vetting process.

An earlier report by the Department of Defense had already cautioned about serious flaws in the background checks for Afghan evacuees, pointing to individuals with significant security concerns being resettled without proper clearance.

These findings have reignited debates over the U.S. evacuation and refugee resettlement policy post-Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. Critics argue that while the humanitarian urgency was understandable, the vetting infrastructure was unprepared, compromising national security.

As the Biden administration continues to defend its handling of Afghan resettlement, calls for reform and stricter screening procedures are growing, especially with thousands of Afghan allies still awaiting entry through Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) and humanitarian parole pathways.

55 Afghan Refugees flagged on US Terror Watchlist, says Justice Department
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Afghan Refugees Urge Global Help as Pakistan Deportations Rise

Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior has also issued a statement saying that efforts to repatriate undocumented foreign nationals have been intensified.

A number of Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan say that the forced deportation of Afghan migrants from Islamabad and Rawalpindi has intensified.

They once again called on the Islamic Emirate and organizations defending refugee rights to take urgent and practical steps to address the challenges faced by Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Atiqullah Mansoor, an Afghan refugee in Pakistan, told TOLOnews: “Arrests are continuing across all parts of Pakistan, but they are more severe in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. A large number of Afghan refugees are voluntarily ready to return to their country, but they are complaining about the limited assistance from UNHCR.”

Shabana, another Afghan refugee in Pakistan, said: “The arrests and forced deportations have negatively impacted the business and personal affairs of Afghan refugees. Once again, I call on the Afghan interim government and international organizations to recognize that voluntary repatriation is in the interest of both countries.”

Amid growing pressure on refugees, Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior has also issued a statement saying that efforts to repatriate undocumented foreign nationals have been intensified. The ministry added that since April 1, more than 216,000 undocumented migrants have been returned from Pakistan to their respective countries.

The Pakistani Ministry of Interior once again urged all undocumented foreign nationals, including Afghan citizens, to leave the country voluntarily.

The ministry’s statement as reported by PTV, reads: “Since the beginning of this phase, a substantial number of undocumented foreigners have been repatriated. The ministry reported that 216,103 illegal foreigners have been sent back to their respective countries since April 1st. This recent surge is part of a broader, ongoing campaign that initiated in October 2023.” The statement also said: “The Ministry reiterated its advice to all illegal foreigners, including Afghan nationals, to leave Pakistan voluntarily.”

Jumakhān Pouya, a refugee rights activist, told TOLOnews: “It is expected that international institutions will persuade the Pakistani government—based on international legal frameworks, ethical standards, and global commitments—to refrain from deporting individuals at risk, including Afghan refugees.”

Previously, the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation reported that since the return of the Islamic Emirate to power, more than 5.97 million Afghan citizens have returned to Afghanistan from neighboring countries.

Afghan Refugees Urge Global Help as Pakistan Deportations Rise
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Afghanistan remains one of the world’s most mine-contaminated countries, Says HALO Trust

Khaama Press

Afghanistan remains heavily contaminated with landmines, putting 6.4 million people at risk, mostly children, warns the HALO Trust.

The HALO Trust, a leading demining organization, has warned that Afghanistan remains one of the most heavily mine-contaminated countries in the world. According to its latest report, an estimated 6.4 million Afghans are still at risk from explosive remnants of war.

In a statement released on Tuesday, June 10, HALO Trust urged the international community to maintain its support for mine clearance in Afghanistan. The organization emphasized that decades of conflict have left vast areas littered with unexploded ordnance, posing a long-term threat to civilian lives.

Farid Hamayoun, a senior official with HALO Trust, cautioned that the crisis must not become a “forgotten humanitarian issue.” He stressed the urgent need for sustained global attention and funding to ensure continued progress in demining efforts.

The organization highlighted that 80% of victims of unexploded mines in Afghanistan are children. The lack of awareness and safe play areas in rural communities often results in tragic accidents, especially among minors.

So far, HALO Trust reports that 1,400 square kilometers of contaminated land have been cleared, benefitting over 17 million people across the country. These efforts have made many once-dangerous areas habitable and safe for farming, education, and development.

Despite progress, explosive remnants from decades of war continue to claim lives in various provinces. Children, in particular, remain the most vulnerable, as many of the unexploded devices resemble toys or ordinary objects.

Experts warn that without renewed international support, clearance operations may slow, putting millions of Afghans at even greater risk. Humanitarian organizations are calling for long-term investment in mine education, victim support, and advanced demining technology.

As Afghanistan faces political and economic uncertainty, aid groups argue that protecting civilians from explosive threats is not only a safety issue but a vital step toward national recovery and stability.

Afghanistan remains one of the world’s most mine-contaminated countries, Says HALO Trust
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Afghan SIV holders exempt from US Travel Ban, says State Department

Khaama Press

The U.S. State Department confirmed Afghan SIV holders are exempt from the travel ban, ensuring continued visa processing and resettlement support.

The U.S. State Department has confirmed that Afghan nationals holding Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) are exempt from the recent travel ban imposed by former President Donald Trump. This clarification brings relief to thousands of Afghans awaiting resettlement.

Speaking at a press briefing on Tuesday, June 10, State Department spokesperson Timmy Bruce stated that the consular processing of Afghan SIV applications continues uninterrupted at all U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide.

When asked about the growing threat of ISIS activity under Taliban rule in Afghanistan, Bruce declined to comment, stating he had no specific updates on the matter.

This statement comes shortly after the Taliban claimed to have killed two alleged ISIS fighters in Kabul earlier this week, asserting their ongoing control over insurgent threats within the country.

The travel ban, issued through an executive order by the President Trump, had included citizens from 12 countries, including Afghanistan. However, the exemption of SIV holders signals the U.S.’s continued support for those who aided American missions.

The SIV program was designed to protect Afghan allies such as interpreters, embassy staff, and military contractors who faced threats after the U.S. withdrawal.

Human rights groups have applauded the exemption, emphasizing that abandoning Afghan allies would have amounted to a serious breach of international responsibility.

With instability continuing in Afghanistan and threats from extremist groups rising, observers stress the importance of maintaining robust pathways for vulnerable Afghans seeking refuge and safety abroad.

Afghan SIV holders exempt from US Travel Ban, says State Department
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Russian Intelligence Chief warns of Rising ISIS Activity in Afghanistan

Russia has issued a stark warning about the growing presence of ISIS in Afghanistan.

At the 18th meeting of the heads of counter-terrorism agencies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) held in Moscow, Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), expressed serious concern over the rising activity of ISIS and its affiliated groups in Afghanistan. He emphasized that these developments pose a growing threat to regional security and stability.

Bortnikov attributed the resurgence of radical groups to Western geopolitical maneuvers. He specifically mentioned the West’s policies in the Middle East, which, according to him, have contributed to the spread of extremism. “The change of power in Syria, the conflict in Gaza, sustained pressure on Iran, and escalating tensions in Libya have collectively created fertile ground for the growth of radicalism globally,” he stated.

The Russian intelligence chief highlighted that Afghanistan has become a focal point for ISIS operations. He warned that the activities of the Islamic State and its branches are becoming increasingly aggressive in the region, particularly within Afghanistan territory, posing a threat not only to neighboring countries but also to Russian interests in Central Asia.

In addition to Afghanistan, Bortnikov mentioned rising ISIS-related threats in Syria, Pakistan, and the broader Middle East. He raised alarms about foreign fighters—especially those with Russian, Central Asian, or Caucasian nationalities—who were released from prisons in Syria and are now rejoining extremist ranks.

These concerns echo earlier warnings issued by Russia’s Ministry of Defense, which reported the presence of over 20 terrorist groups currently operating in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Russia has repeatedly stated its willingness to coordinate with the Taliban to eliminate ISIS cells operating in the country.

Meanwhile, the Taliban claimed two nights ago that they had eliminated an ISIS hideout in the city of Kabul. However, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Karen Chandler contradicted the Taliban’s claim, stating there is insufficient independent verification of their recent operation against ISIS hideouts in Kabul.

Russian Intelligence Chief warns of Rising ISIS Activity in Afghanistan
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Learning the Right Lessons from Afghanistan

By: Ronald Neumann

The National Interest

June 6, 2025

The conventional explanations for America’s failure to stabilize Afghanistan provide little help for future policymaking.

The American memory of Afghanistan is receding in the rearview mirror. Increasingly, the potential to learn lessons from the twenty-year campaign is being wasted, replaced instead by bumper stickers and slogans that pass for knowledge but are either incorrect or largely useless without a great deal of further reflection.

Three of the most common bumper sticker lessons are “don’t do democracy,” “don’t build an army in our own image,” and “don’t do nation-building.” The problems with each of these suggest the need for deeper reflection if we are to profit from the past and get beyond slogans for future policy decisions.

Democracy in Afghanistan

The debate over how actively the United States should promote democracy abroad is nearly as old as the Republic itself. It first emerged in the early 1800s during debates over whether or how actively the United States should support liberation movements in Latin America. It is likely to continue.

The problem with using the case of Afghanistan to argue against democracy promotion as a policy goal is that it rests on the false premise that spreading democracy to Afghanistan was the principal goal of the US campaign there. In fact, the real aim throughout the Bush, Obama, and first Trump administrations was how to withdraw from Afghanistan militarily while leaving a more or less stable country behind where terrorism could not return. To do so required a basis of legitimacy on which the government could be organized. Short of returning to civil war, which had previously characterized the country, some form of peaceful allocation of power was necessary. Hence, democracy was a practical, rather than an ideological, necessity if the country was to be governed by consensus rather than bullets.

There were numerous problems in building Afghan democracy, including the time needed to establish a supporting culture and institutions, the incorrect choice of electoral system, and the difficulty of holding elections in insecure conditions. However, the problem with Afghanistan was not that democracy promotion was an unrealistic goal but rather that there were few alternatives to it.

In any case, policymakers did not frame the problem in these terms; leaving soon was a goal, but democracy was a sort of default reaction on how to achieve this. Whether that was the right choice is debatable—if one has an alternative governance model. But to conclude that the case of Afghanistan proves that the United States should refrain from democracy-building is to refuse to think about the options that were, or were not, available at the time.

No Model Army

The problems of constructing a foreign army in our own image have bedeviled US policy since the Vietnam War. Scholars have long documented how US-trained armies were not well suited to their purposes. In Vietnam, the South Vietnamese force was designed for a conventional war with the North rather than a demanding counterinsurgency.

In Afghanistan, the United States constructed a force so dependent on foreign support that it could not function without it. To take only one example, the supply system we built in Afghanistan was sophisticated, digitized, and heavily dependent on foreign expatriates, all of whom we removed at the end. However, the problem is not the truth of the slogan but rather the need for an alternative.

One cannot send large numbers of US military personnel to train the army of another country without having an organizing doctrine for training. We have no such doctrine for training a force radically different from our own, with large limitations on literacy and education. Building an army in a different model will require extensive thought and development. Without undertaking such thinking, we will be left either unable to assist in building a foreign army when one is needed or to repeat past mistakes. Thus, the phrase by itself is no help for future decisions.

State-Building, Not Nation-Building

“Don’t do nation-building” is arguably the most problematic “lesson” to emerge from recent American history. Firstly, the phrase “state-building” would be more accurate, as Afghanistan has existed as a defined state since 1747. The first Bush administration, and particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, had drawn the lesson from the Balkans that nation-building was a mistake.

The result was a resistance to any commitment to institutional strengthening in Afghanistan immediately after the 2001 war when the Taliban was essentially defeated and security problems less acute. This opportune period, when foreign influence was at its peak, was largely wasted. No attention was given to building institutions. American assistance was limited to humanitarian aid only, and the first, very inadequate, developmental assistance did not begin until 2004.

In Iraq, there was an assumption that when the Saddam Hussein government was removed, Iraq would simply evolve into a democracy with very little help. The disaster of this belief has been amply documented. But the notion of not doing nation-building continued to bedevil the United States. The long-lasting second Afghanistan policy review in the Obama administration concluded that the United States would limit its goals to destroying the Taliban and not do nation-building (or state strengthening).

The problem with this formulation was that the Taliban was a regenerative movement. To keep it suppressed would require an army. But armies are part of a state, and a state needs a functioning economy and infrastructure. All of these considerations led to an enormous increase in the development budget, deployment of districts and provincial reconstruction teams, and a massive effort to increase the civilian advisory presence. The logic of these steps was unmistakable, and they unquestionably amounted to state-building, even as the administration declared it would not do so. The contradiction was not helpful to policy, to say the least. 

The Real Lessons

Twenty years of warfare leave an almost endless number of decisions for debate. Tactical issues, basic governance concerns, strategies for defeating the Taliban, and shifting policies of different administrations all provide food for thought. However, there is also room to reflect on whether there are more fundamental lessons worth considering. Three recurring problems in American policymaking arise: building a learning organization, creating reasonable timelines, and identifying local partners.

Building a Learning Organization.

One important problem that is rarely, if ever, addressed is the need to build a “learning organization.” An interesting book by Georgetown professor Lise Moraj Howard compares relatively successful United Nations peacekeeping operations to search for common lessons. One lesson she drew from the successful UN missions is the need to build an institution that develops enough knowledge of the local culture and politics to implement its policies effectively.

Building a learning organization requires certain key components. The first is long-term leadership. An organization needs enough time and leadership continuity to make mistakes and climb the learning curve. In Afghanistan, the rapid turnover of ambassadors and generals, along with the deployment of a new division every year or two, was the antithesis of building a learning organization. Similarly, short tours, generally limited to one year, were also common among most military and civilian personnel.

The result was frequent changes in operational policy on the ground, in addition to the broad policy changes that came from Washington. Afghan officials grew cautious about investing too much effort in new approaches, as it was likely that, within a few months or a year, a new US official would alter the approach. When this problem is repeated over and over, it becomes increasingly difficult to get full support for any policy from the locals.

US policymakers should reconsider the length of service, particularly for generals and ambassadors, as well as the frequency of rotations for major troop units and subordinate units. Rapid rotations tend to emphasize short-term goals. Structuring organizations around the attainment of long-term goals should have been the first step in US Afghan policy.

Expedient vs. Realistic Timelines

It is essential to consider the time required for policy success. This is particularly true when establishing a new form of government or rebuilding a society after a civil war. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with US policy, which tends to be driven by “politically feasible” timelines rather than ones designed to solve the problems at hand. The gap between these timelines needs to be examined and policy modified accordingly. Timelines considered politically inexpedient should not be rejected outright.

There are examples of successful change from corrupt autocracies into functioning democracies with strong armies. South Korea is an example of a country that moved from a corrupt, kleptocratic government to the democratic, economically successful one it is today. Taiwan is another such example. These cases suggest that decades are necessary for such change. While the United States spent 20 years in Afghanistan, it never had policy thresholds that extended beyond one administration. The result was, as John Paul Vann famously said in Vietnam, “We don’t have 12 years’ experience. We have one year’s experience 12 times.” In Afghanistan’s case, the US presence had one year’s experience 20 times.

A realistic understanding of the time needed for social change, anti-corruption measures, and democracy to take root could have led to commitments over a much longer period, perhaps with expenditures more drawn out and less concentrated in a year or two. Such a policy would have required very different public policies to explain the timelines and to build appropriate expectations for the pace of progress. Instead, the constant demand for rapid progress and the pretense that it was happening had the result of undercutting policy support over time.

Alternatively, if such commitment was not possible, a realistic understanding of essential timelines might have led to a variety of different ways to leave earlier, even if what we left behind was unsatisfactory. In any event, the refusal to look realistically at the time requirement meant that we were trapped in unrealistic policies over and over. This lesson is worth learning because a realistic appraisal of the time required for operational success will be necessary in the future.

The Importance of Local Leadership

In Afghanistan, as in Iraq and Vietnam, the United States found itself with local partners who were not up to the requirements of the situation. They could neither address the seeping corruption nor control infighting among their supporters. Consequently, the field was wide open to insurgents. Two potential lessons can be drawn from this problem.

One is that we will need to be realistic in judging whether we have local partners who are up to the broad requirements of whatever policy we are engaged in. They may exist—President Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines was such a leader, and the result was a successful counterinsurgency and nation-building. In the absence of such leadership, the United States has a long record of trying to compensate by either making policy in Washington or deposing the leader. We attempted both in Vietnam and Afghanistan but failed in both places.

Many examples of the problem with local partners not meeting the needs of the situation are found in the book Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency. Over and over again, American officials identified problems and devised policies to address them but were unable to obtain lasting local buy-in. Whenever American officials rotated, funding ran out, or a particular local partner was killed or transferred, the situation returned to square one.

The same pattern repeated itself in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Obama surge in Afghanistan produced not only Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) but also District Support Teams (DSTs) and a significant effort to increase the number of civilian advisors. This was intended to produce a significant change in governance within a very short time. As observers noted at the time, the Afghan government lacked the institutional capacity to capitalize on the progress achieved.

The underlying problem was not only the lack of time but also the willingness of the political leadership in Afghanistan or Vietnam to make necessary changes on their own. The problem was aptly captured in the famous, leaked “NODIS” telegram from then-US Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, who observed that the basic problem with the proposed strategy was that we had no local partner.

Without adequate partners on the ground, policy frequently fails. Equally consistent has been our reaction to the lack of local partners. Either we try to build our own policies, as described above, or we change the leadership. In South Vietnam, the United States supported a coup that resulted in President Ngo Dinh Diem’s murder in 1963. In Afghanistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke tried to remove President Hamid Karzai, an effort that failed and further alienated the Afghan president. The US approach is not only arrogant and mechanistic but also completely unsuccessful. After 70 years of consistent failure, it is time for policymakers and academics to understand that foreign policy cannot be made without regard to foreigners.

There will not be a single solution to this problem in the future. It may not even be clear that the problem exists until the United States is deeply immersed in a country and its choices are limited. However, addressing the issue will require acknowledging that the problem exists and debating solutions in both academic and policy forums. Discussing policy failure without examining the underlying attitudes and approaches of local leaders has been a repeated phenomenon in many different administrations and countries, yielding the same poor results. There are underlying problems like these that extend beyond individual policy choices. Recognizing the importance of local leadership would be a starting point for making better choices in the future.

Policing: Paramilitary or Civil?

Building an effective police force has been a key issue in the insurgencies America has confronted. Professor Howard’s book also noted that police training is among the most challenging problems across various UN missions. When a problem recurs repeatedly, it is time to consider whether there is a deeper issue beyond the operational or organizational decisions in a particular country.

Several key points must be understood to develop a new approach to police training. One is that the United States is particularly badly placed for police training. We have no national police force. We have no national doctrine for police training. We have no established source of recruitment for police trainers, except for a limited number of retired police officers. Most active police forces do not want to give up their personnel to foreign missions.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the debilities were exacerbated by the argument over whether the police force should be more along paramilitary or civilian lines. Of course, the answer was that both were necessary. Without proper law enforcement training, the police force could not act as a source of justice or public safety. However, the Afghan police still had to face large, heavily armed insurgent groups.

Mixed civil and paramilitary forces do exist in France, Italy, and Spain, but not in the United States. But these examples never made it into police training in Afghanistan. The international training mission drew Italy and France into training the Afghan border police, but not for regular police training.

The time given for police training was also too brief. In the United States, the average time for police training is 21 weeks, and this training is typically provided to at least high school graduates in established police forces who are not involved in counterinsurgency operations. In Afghanistan, training rarely exceeded several months, with recruits who were frequently illiterate and unable to perform basic reporting or record-keeping tasks.

There are some examples of comparatively successful police training. Robert Perito’s book The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations notes the necessity of an adequate ratio of police trainers to police recruits. Nothing in the length of time US and international forces devoted to police training in Afghanistan (or Iraq, for that matter) suggests that we learned this lesson.

The need to strengthen a local police force may arise in many cases that do not involve counterinsurgency or state-building efforts. Hence, Afghanistan’s lessons still matter. The resort to an outmatched Kenyan police force in Haiti, a country overrun by armed gangs, does not suggest we have even tried to take this history to heart.

No doubt there are other important lessons to be learned from Afghanistan. To profit from them, academics, as well as policymakers, need to go beyond catchphrases. They will need to consider that repeated failures reflect deeper, structural problems in our approach. If we cannot solve the problems of local leadership quality or the need for realistic time horizons, we must at least begin by acknowledging that these problems exist and recur. Only then will we be able to formulate better approaches for the future.

Ronald E Neumann was the US Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005 to 2007, as well as Ambassador to Algeria and Bahrain. He served as an infantry officer in Vietnam and a senior officer in Iraq (2004–2005).

Learning the Right Lessons from Afghanistan
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‘We were friends of the US’: Fearful Afghans face Trump travel ban

Mallory Moench and Flora Drury

BBC News
9 June 2025
Ahmad has been hiding in Afghanistan for years.

The former Afghan military employee is living in fear of being found by the Taliban, which seized power in 2021 as US forces withdrew from the Central Asian nation.

As a result, Ahmad is unable to get a job or access medical care, relying on donations from friends outside the country to survive. His son, 12, is unable to go to school.

If they are found, Ahmad says, the Taliban “will remove” him.

His hope had been refugee resettlement in the US, but – with just a medical check to complete – the process was put on pause by the Trump administration.

Still, he hoped. Then, on Thursday he woke to the news that US President Donald Trump had issued a new order banning the entry of Afghan passport holders to the US, citing national security threats.

“I am not a threat to the United States,” Ahmad told the BBC. The BBC is not using his real name because of concerns about his safety.

“We were friends of the United States,” he added.

Trump’s sweeping travel ban came into force on Monday, blocking people from Afghanistan and 11 other countries, including seven from Africa, as well as countries like Haiti and Yemen, from entering the US. There are partial bans on seven other countries.

According to the ban, Afghanistan was included because the Taliban are considered by the US government to be a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, and the country does not have “a competent or co-operative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents”, or “appropriate screening and vetting measures”. It also notes a relatively high rate of people overstaying their visas.

The Trump administration has, however, recently dropped temporary protected status for more than 9,000 Afghans living in the US, arguing its assessments showed the security and economic situation in Afghanistan had improved.

But those living in Afghanistan are faced with a series of restrictions brought in by the Taliban government in line with its strict interpretation of Sharia law.

The ones affecting women – including the enforcement of head coverings, restrictions on travel and education over the age of 12 – amount to a “gender apartheid”, according to the United Nations. The Taliban says it respects the rights of women in line with Sharia and Afghan culture.

A different UN report from 2023 found there were credible reports that hundreds of former government officials and armed forces members had been killed since the group returned to power in 2021, despite a general amnesty. The Taliban has previously said all Afghans could “live in the country without any fear” – and those abroad should come back and help rebuild the country.

“There is a general amnesty,” Mohammad Suhail Shaheen, Taliban ambassador to Qatar, told the BBC earlier this year. “Countrywide security is prevalent in Afghanistan. Every citizen and traveller can travel to any corner of the country without any obstacles or any difficulties.”

There are exceptions to Trump’s ban – including for Afghans who worked directly with the US military before the Taliban back took control of the country in 2021.

But Ahmad, whose application for resettlement was backed by a former US service member, does not qualify for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) because he did not work directly for the US.

And he is far from the only one.

Some 200,000 Afghans have been resettled since the US military’s chaotic withdrawal, but there are still tens of thousands more waiting for a decision.

Many have fled across the border to neighbouring Pakistan to wait for a decision to be made on their application.

Samira, who spoke to the BBC’s Afghan Service, is currently in Pakistan – which has been expelling tens of thousands of Afghans in recent months. If the path to the US is closed to her, she is not sure what to do next.

“Returning to Afghanistan is not an option for us – it would be incredibly challenging,” she said. “Our children have already lost years of education, and we have no hope of safely going back.”

More than 8,300 family members of US citizens are ready for an interview in Afghanistan, with more than 11,400 others awaiting family reunification, according to US Department of State data shared by AfghanEvac.

Mojo, who asked to be identified by his nickname, is one of the 200,000 Afghans who have already reached the US, because he worked directly for the US military. He is now a US citizen.

His sister, however, remains in Afghanistan where she and her husband are “living in a hide and seek game”, he says. They change their address and city every couple months in order to stay safe.

They passed the background and medical checks for refugee resettlement, but like the others who spoke to the BBC, they became trapped when the process was paused in January.

This latest order has made Mojo, who lives in Houston, Texas, and the rest of his family lose “all our hope completely” .

“I wish that he would change his mind, make some exception, change the rules or take his order back and let people have a peaceful life,” he said.

The ban also affects Afghans who are not trying to reach the US for resettlement.

Zarifa Ghafari is studying at Cornell University in New York state, but is currently in Germany for the summer with her young child.

She said she began a “frantic” race back to the US on Thursday in order to continue her studies, before the start of the travel ban on Monday.

The ban has put her under “immense pressure” and has made her feel “very vulnerable”, the the 30-year-old former politician told the BBC.

What makes it worse, she said, was that she regularly had to return to Germany every few months to maintain her residency status there too. Describing her situation as “precarious”, she said she worried about how she could make her regular trips to Germany when the travel ban began.

Shawn VanDiver, of AfghanEvac, said the ban broke a promise Americans had made to Afghans over the 20 years they were in the country.

“This policy punishes people who escaped the Taliban, risked everything to support democracy, are already vetted, were told by the US government to wait,” he wrote on social media platform X.

“They’re not threats. They’re our allies – and they’re being left behind.”

Meanwhile, many of those still in Afghanistan have other problems to contend with.

As one Afghan man in Kabul told AFP news agency: “We don’t even have bread, why are you asking me about travelling to America?”

Additional reporting by Azadeh Moshiri and Gabriela Pomeroy

‘We were friends of the US’: Fearful Afghans face Trump travel ban
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Living a Mullah’s Life (1): The changing role and socio-economic status of Afghanistan’s village clerics

Sharif Akram

Afghanistan Analysts Network

In Afghanistan, where Islam has been the predominant religion for many centuries, local religious leaders, known as mullahs, are an influential group with significant say in almost every issue. While their influence is profound, their personal economic status and lifestyle have often been modest. In this first of two reports, AAN’s Sharif Akram looks at the changing status of village mullahs in southeastern Afghanistan from the pre-war era to the present day. He argues that over the past four decades, their lives and socio-economic situation have improved significantly, but asks where they now stand vis-à-vis their communities and the state.

A second part of this research will look at how mullahs’ theological education has changed and how this has affected how they are viewed by wider society.

The term ‘mullah’ is widely used in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to refer to religious leaders or prayer leaders within Muslim communities. A mullah is typically someone with a basic knowledge of Islamic teachings who is capable of leading prayers, teaching the fundamentals of religion and addressing common religious issues faced by his congregation. Some interviewees also spoke about ulema (singular – alem), usually understood as Islamic scholars, although they were still referring to clerics with the sort of basic training enjoyed by Afghan mullahs through the ages.

This report examines the personal lives of village mullahs, focusing on the changes in their economic status over time and the factors driving these shifts. It also explores the implications of an improved economic situation for mullahs. This study specifically focuses on the southern and southeastern regions of the country,[1] mainly rural and Pashtun, and with all interviewees being Sunni Muslim. The author notes that the lives of mullahs and their social status could be somewhat different in Afghanistan’s various regions, and that urban mullahs have almost always had a different trajectory, with far more control exercised by the state, including often being paid directly by it. The findings are based on more than 10 in-depth interviews with mullahs from Khost, Paktia, and Ghazni, as well as insights gained from conversations with community leaders and mullahs from other provinces in the south and southeast.

Background

Mullahs play an important role in their communities across southern and southeastern Afghanistan, even though their level of religious education is often limited. Most do not possess advanced or specialised knowledge of Islamic theology, nor do they typically hold degrees from formal religious seminaries or universities. Instead, their education has often been acquired through informal study or apprenticeship within local mosques or madrasas. Despite this, mullahs are often seen as trusted figures of authority and guidance in everyday religious matters. Their personal lives and economic status have traditionally been modest and they usually do not hold a privileged position. Mullahs have typically not engaged in other occupations, with religious guidance being their only profession, and have often been seen as separate from the general population, with little involvement in the social, tribal, or customary dynamics that shape people’s daily lives.

These local religious leaders have, however, occasionally played a powerful social and even political role in Afghan history, particularly in times of crisis or when religion was perceived to be endangered.[2] During such periods – whether it was for rallying people against the state or for organising resistance against foreign invaders — both local communities and the Afghan state, as well as its opponents, have regularly turned to mullahs to unite the population behind a common and higher cause. For instance, during the Anglo-Afghan wars, Afghan statesmen frequently relied on mullahs to legitimise their call to arms and rally support from local communities. By contrast, during the reign of Amanullah Khan in the 1920s, it was again the mullahs who, this time, catalysed the fight against his government, ultimately leading to the king’s downfall.[3] Their influence at times of crisis also stemmed from their perceived impartiality within a community: as mullahs were often originally outsiders in the communities they served, they were considered free from factional interests and uninvolved in familial or inter-tribal rivalries.

In normal times, however, outside their religious duties, mullahs were typically not given much importance by the community and their influence was largely limited to religious affairs. Due to their minimal involvement in practical or economic matters, mullahs were often the poorest segment of society, relying entirely on the community for their livelihood in exchange for providing religious and spiritual guidance. This dependence on other members of the community for their livelihood traditionally relegated mullahs to a separate and somewhat inferior status in the tribal society of southeastern Afghanistan. A well-known story from Pashtun rural areas, shared by one interviewee, clearly illustrates the modest economic status of mullahs, as well as their reputation for greediness often given by other villagers.

There’s an old saying drawn from a well-known story about a mullah who got stuck in a small river. A villager saw him struggling and came to help. He told the mullah to give him his hand so he could pull him out, but the mullah refused. The villager tried again and again, but the mullah still wouldn’t extend his hand. Finally, the villager told the mullah to take his hand, and the mullah quickly did so and was pulled out. This story has since become a proverb: ‘A mullah never gives something to someone; he is only ever a taker.’ 

This perception of mullahs was so deeply ingrained that one interviewee recalled, “On the first day of the [Taliban] victory, people in our area said that now the mullahs are in power, they “wouldn’t be paying the salaries of government employees because they are only takers, not givers.”

The reality of living in poverty was described by many of the mullahs interviewed for this research, for example, this interviewee from Khost’s Sabari district:

My father was the oldest brother [of the family]; the other two were younger than him. He studied religion and became a mullah, while his other brothers worked as mechanics. My father inherited some land from my grandfather. When the brothers distributed the land, he sold his share for very little money and we became homeless. My two uncles, who were earning money as mechanics, built themselves homes and started farming. My walid sahib [father], however, chose to become an imam [congregational prayer leader]. At that time, we only owned a cow and a bicycle. We had no home, no land, nothing else.

Another interviewee, a 45-old mullah from Paktia province, recalled:

We didn’t have our own house and would move from one village to another. My father only had two [sets of] clothes and we mostly ate buttermilk. He would spend one year in a village in return for zakat [the Islamic tax on the harvest] and sarsaya [a poll tax on individuals]. The villagers would also give him a house so that he could live in the village and get to prayers and other ceremonies on time. The house that was given to us was in the worst of conditions. It had only two rooms. The roof had cracks and the garden had no water source [to irrigate it]. I remember we didn’t know what money looked like because we didn’t have any. The zakat we received wasn’t in cash but in kind – wheat, beans, potatoes and other things. Sarsaya was also given as wheat. The villagers themselves didn’t have much money. 

A third interviewee, 50, from Gurbaz district of Khost, also recollects:

My father was a mullah. He had an imamat [position of imam] in many villages in Gurbaz district. Villagers were poor, but not as poor as the mullahs. They’d go to Lahore [Pakistan], India, or Arab countries to work as labourers and bring some money back, or they had land and they’d sell their crops. But the mullah had no land and no other work. His job was full-time and only limited to his imamat. In fact, mullahs didn’t have any other skills. Because of this, my father was dependent on the villagers all his life.

The life of the rural mullah had other complexities as well. Among them, mullahs needed to move from one village to another, leaving behind their birthplace and relatives, as one interviewee explained:

In the past, there were very few mullahs and people needed to find one from far away. Because people’s economic [situation] wasn’t good and transportation was poor, the mullah would usually move to their village. Villagers would give him a home, but it was often in such a bad condition that the villagers themselves wouldn’t live in it.

Another interviewee, in his late 40s, from Paktia, said:

Life was very hard because, after some time, the villagers would change their mullah. When they asked my father to leave his imamat, he would get another imamat in a different village, sometimes, in a different district. So, we’d move there [to the new village]. There, too, the house we lived in was no better than the one we had previously lived in. 

The fact that mullahs in rural areas relied on the communities among whom they resided, rather than being on the government payroll, often helped them maintain a significant degree of autonomy from the state and build closer ties to their fellow villagers. That meant, in the decades before the start of the Afghan conflicts from the late 1970s onwards, mullahs engaged only in their religious duties and escaped government control. That eventually won them appreciation in areas where state attempts at increased penetration were seen with suspicion. Some mullahs would later be able to capitalise on the trust and influence they enjoyed within their communities and take up roles of authority during the anti-Soviet jihad.

Why have mullahs formed the poorest segment of society?

The mullahs’ low economic and social status had several structural causes. First and foremost, it was rooted in the overall economic decline that Afghan rural society had experienced during the mid-20th century. Mullahs did not engage in alternative economic activities and even when they tilled the land, they seldom owned sufficient amounts to survive. They also had no part in the management of or benefits from collectively-owned tribal land. Mainly, their livelihoods were rooted in support from the community. They were, therefore, directly and deeply affected by the overall economic conditions of local people, which, by and large, were still based on subsistence farming and barter. One interviewee, a community elder in his late 50s, from Ghazni province, described the situation:

When people don’t have much themselves, how much will they give to you? People didn’t have cash; they didn’t have extra houses or a lot of money that they could give to the mullahs. Society overall was poor and, imagine: How would it have been to serve as the mullah in such a poor society? The simple answer is that you would have been the poorest person. Since most people relied on farming for their livelihood and cash was unavailable, they could only provide for the mullah out of what they got from the harvest. 

Another interviewee, a 45-old mullah from Paktia, said:

The villagers paid the mullah from what they grew. They’d also only provide for basic needs like fodder and firewood for winter. My father always says he doesn’t remember getting a penny from the villagers. Those mullahs that had the imamat of major villages would get more from the harvest and then exchange some of it for other essential goods. 

Another reason for the mullahs’ poverty was the way the profession was passed down within families. Being a mullah was often a family tradition, with several generations of men in the same family becoming religious leaders. They would typically train their children in religious studies, either by sending them to madrasas or hujras (small, informal religious seminaries) or teaching them themselves. They rarely encouraged them to pursue other careers. One interviewee said, “My father was a mullah because my grandfather was also a mullah. Likewise, I’m a mullah because my father was a mullah. One of my sons is also a mullah.”

In traditional Afghan society, however, this pattern was not limited to mullahs alone; other professions also followed such a trajectory. The pattern typically began with one person in some exceptional case and continued through generations. One interviewee, a tribal elder, explained that in non-mullah families, parents would often send a son – usually the one who could not pursue other work – to a madrasa. Or, they might send him there in fulfilment of a nadhr (a pledge to do something good or dedicate something to God in exchange for a specific favour or blessing). In one particular case, shared by a tribal elder with the author, a man who did not have sons made a vow: if God granted him four sons, one of them would become a mullah. Once a man became a mullah, his sons would often follow the same path, and becoming a mullah then became the family’s profession for generations.

The ‘80s and ‘90s: Conflict and exile brings change

As Afghanistan became entangled in major global conflicts, particularly during the Cold War and later the War on Terror, the lives of its people and their social structures were deeply affected. The shift began with the Soviet invasion of December 1979, followed by Afghan resistance and the start of a prolonged war. This conflict led to the deaths, injuries and disappearances of hundreds of thousands of Afghans, while millions were forced to flee their homes and become refugees. Many of the mullahs interviewed identified this period of displacement as the point when their lives began to change. An official of the previous government who was also a mullah once told the author:

When we became refugees, all the people lost the status they’d had. The khan [tribal elder or richest man in a village] and the malik [the state-appointed head of a village] lost their influence, the mullah lost his influence, the rich became poor and the poor got new opportunities. Things turned upside down. What people had been doing [in their home communities] was no longer sufficient for survival. New horizons were opened to people. They saw a new world and everyone faced the quest for living among these challenges.”

Becoming a refugee meant losing one’s social standing, the traditional norms and often the community once belonged to. Along with the loss of social status, refugees also faced significant economic difficulties in the new country. For mullahs, whose role had been tied to religious and community leadership, survival was a particular struggle. Lacking other professional skills, many had to learn new ways of earning a living. This forced shift in livelihood also led them to rethink their place in the world and their understanding of survival outside their traditional role. With the collapse of Afghan social structures in exile, mullahs found it increasingly difficult to survive solely on their erstwhile status of religious leader, especially given their limited formal religious education. One interviewee from Paktia recalled, “When we went to Peshawar [as refugees], many of our comrades [fellow mullahs] joined the ranks of the jihad and many others started studying in madrasas, moving back and forth between madrasa and battlefield.” Others sought alternative employment or business opportunities, with some even migrating to Gulf countries. Migration to the Gulf was to become a growing trend among men originally from Loya Paktia in general (it was mentioned with increasing frequency by interviewees as happening in the post-2001 period).[4]

What is critical here is that mullahs played a significant role in the war against the Soviets, gaining prominence in the ranks of several mujahedin factions. In the context of jihad, the emphasis on religious duties and religious education increased among Afghan rural society in general and some mullahs found themselves well-positioned to play leadership roles. This was due to their cross-cutting influence within rural communities and their credentials as religious leaders, as well as the disciplined lifestyle they had led and their readiness to engage in military activities. Their role became even more prominent when the first Islamic Emirate took power in the 1990s: Sunni Muslim mullahs found themselves at the centre of power and in control of politics and society. While this bolstered their social influence, it had little impact on their economic status, as resources remained scarce during that period. In general, as well, with the early mujahadin, there was a strong emphasis on austerity: this was not a movement or government bent on accumulating worldly wealth.

New opportunities arise in the 2000s

The changes in Afghan society and the lives of mullahs did not end with the Soviet invasion. In the early 2000s, Afghanistan experienced another major shift, with the US-led invasion as part of its War on Terror. This event brought billions of dollars into the country in the form of foreign aid, military support and spending by foreign armies. There were new economic opportunities stemming from development projects, labour migration and business ventures. There were more jobs in government, NGOs and the private sector, contracts, civilian and military, work in construction and services, and money to be made from trade or imports.[5] Mullahs, like others in Afghan society, began to take advantage of these opportunities. Many started businesses or explored new ways of earning a living, reflecting a broader shift in economic thinking and adaptation. One interviewee, an IEA government-affiliated mullah from Logar, said:

My father was a mullah. He didn’t have other skills. He couldn’t farm, run a shop or engage in other businesses. In fact, he didn’t need any of that and chose a simple life and was happy with the little he gained from the community. That was enough for him. But nowadays, things have become more complicated. The pursuit of a better life and the desire to accumulate more wealth has become much more serious, shaping people’s behaviour and thinking. Mullahs, like everyone else, have become more worldly. They seek wealth and work for it.

Stories exemplifying this change and how it has unfolded were related by those among our interviewees who had chosen to pursue businesses instead of continuing their roles as religious leaders. One mullah explained:

I had an imamat in a village. What I gained from the imamat was good, praise God. However, a muqtadi [member of the congregation] once told me he could provide me with a visa to Saudi Arabia. I wasn’t sure at first, but after some consultations, I decided to go to Mecca to perform umrah and, if possible, also find work. The muqtadi covered all my travel expenses – may God grant him Paradise. Once I arrived, he told me I could work either in his store[baqala] or bakery and also lead prayers in the small mosque they had inside their market. I chose to work in the store and lead the prayers. Over time, as I became accustomed to the environment, I opened my own store. Now, praise God, I have a good income from my two stores, and I visit my home once a year for five months. My life is much better than it was during my time as an imam, but sometimes I miss my religious studies.

A mullah from Ghazni, who has established different businesses in Kabul and Ghazni provinces, also said:

I tell my sons to earn as much as they can, but I also tell them to distribute their wealth to the poor and help others. I tell them you are from a family of ulema [religious scholars], and you should be generous to people. Now, praise God, two of my sons have hawalas [money exchange shops] in Kabul and Ghazni. They earn good wages. We have our own house, our own car and no longer need what I earn from the imamat. I myself am the imam of our mosque, which my sons have built. 

After many years [living] in different villages, we have finally settled [in our own village]. We’ve got a status in society and respect. The real value of humans is not in how much they earn or how much they have but in how much they are dear to Allah. Unfortunately, in these times, standards are completely different. In society, you have no value and no respect if you don’t have money and power. People these days do not respect you. They respect your money. 

During the post-2001 period, many mullahs started engaging in business activities, expanding their income sources beyond religious duties. At the same time, the communities they led also saw improvements in their economic conditions. As local economies became stronger, mullahs benefited from increased financial stability and new opportunities. Since they enjoyed greater respect as religious leaders in the communities they served, the communities, that were benefitting economically, also provided the mullahs with more opportunities.

In Khost, for instance, a well-known mullah named Ali Khan lived a modest life with no house of his own. He had five sons, all studying at a local madrasa. However, given the family’s dire economic situation, a villager helped Ali Khan send two of his sons to the United Arab Emirates, providing them with visas and covering their ticket costs. There, his sons began working for the villager and quickly started earning good wages. Within two years, two of Ali Khan’s other sons were also invited to the UAE on visas to join the business their brothers had established. Now, although Ali Khan has died, his sons own the largest villa in the village and lead luxurious lives.

One interviewee, a mullah from Logar, explained how the larger economy, post-2001, benefited villagers and, in turn, the mullahs in the village mosque:

Nowadays, people give a lot to the mullah. Instead of food that they’ve grown, they pay him in cash. With improved technology, people cultivate more and get bigger harvests. So their zakat is higher and the mullah gets good wages. The same is true for sarsya. Now, they calculate it in cash because people have found money. In addition, they now have respect for the mullah and give him occasional cash gifts. A friend of mine is a mullah and his muqtadis arranged for him to go on umrah. Youths and businessmen from the village bring him clothes, shoes and other gifts from the city or from abroad. 

Another interviewee said that even the poorest mullah now earns a good wage. With the increased population of the villages, the variety of crops, the better harvest and fair prices, the fact that people have money and businesses, all of this, he said, means they are able to pay their zakat, mostly to the mullah.

The overall improvement in the economic condition of mullahs can also be attributed to their family members choosing different professions. As families expanded and the general economic situation in Afghan society improved, the old pattern of inherited professions began to fade. Migration played a key role in this change, as people, including mullahs, moved out of their own communities to new environments where different norms existed. That includes migration of workers to the Gulf, which, as has been mentioned before, has been a strong trend for several decades from the southeast, where this research was largely conducted. In these new settings, the need to survive pushed many men to seek alternative livelihoods, pursue advanced education, and adapt to new ways of life. One interviewee, from Paktia, said:

In the past, a mullah’s son would be a mullah, a barber’s son would become a barber, and a carpenter’s son would become a carpenter. Now, on the contrary, in one family, people have different jobs. In an ulema family, one brother is an alem, another is a shopkeeper and a third is a mechanic. Or one son of a mullah is a hafez [a person who has memorised the Quran] and another is a businessman.”

Another interviewee mentioned his friend who is the imam in Dushakha village: one of his sons looks after the farmlands, while another is a schoolteacher who graduated from teaching college and his other sons are busy with various jobs. None are mullahs, only now the father. A third interviewee from Ghazni, who was born into a mullah family but is not a mullah himself, also said:

The mullah no longer wants all his sons to become mullahs. He wants them to learn other professions. He believes that his life as a mullah was one of poverty and he doesn’t want his sons to follow that path. Instead, he wants them to have other jobs and a better life.”

The interviewee also referred to how, in Afghan society, it is common practice for brothers to share any wealth they acquire equally. As a result, even if a mullah is not personally wealthy but his family is, the wealth is divided equally among them, and the mullah receives his fair share. This was the case, he said, for a well-known businessman from Khost, Gulab Khan Haji.

People from his family have been ulema for generations. His sons have all started their own businesses, and one of them is also a mullah. But that son has his own mosque, madrasa, and car. He doesn’t need anything and doesn’t work except teaching at his madrasa. Why? Because his brothers run a large business and have given him his share, which is more than enough for him.

Another mullah, from Paktia, said he had stayed serving as an imam while his brothers went to Dubai for work. All got a share when their parents died.[6]

They earned good money, bought shops in the bazaar, and established their businesses. When we divided the [inheritance], they also gave me my share, so I now have a good income coming from that as well. Life is going well, thanks to Allah’s blessings. I have my own home, a motorcycle, land, and a garden. Alongside that, I also have a small imamat.”

A mullah from Khost described a similar experience. His brothers are in Dubai, along with his two sons.

They have restaurants and bakeries and are earning enough. We built a new qala [a mud-built fort typically housing an extended family] in the village. A few years ago, they also sent me a visa and I spent two months there. What saddens me is that my father died in poorness. His life was very hard. I wish he was alive and could see how his sons are doing.

What is particularly interesting is that mullahs began finding new ways to generate income – or old ways at higher fees – within the context of their religious roles. They started charging people higher fees for services such as issuing tawiz (amulets),[7] performing nikah (marriages) and even providing legal advice or acting as intermediaries in disputes. One interviewee, for example, said:

There’s a well-known alem in our area named Miran Akhundzada. He was very poor in the beginning. He owned only a bicycle. Over the past ten years, he’s started writing statements for those involved in legal disputes. For each case, he earns 50,000 kaldar [Pakistani rupees, roughly USD 200] and writes more than two a day. If you calculate his earnings, you can get an idea of his growing wealth. He’s now established a photography and photocopying shop in the district bazaar for his son.

A community elder from Paktia said, “In the past, mullahs would teach the religion without asking for a penny, but now, they won’t teach a word of Allah without asking for a fee.”

Afghanistan has now moved into a new phase, with the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate in August 2021. Mullahs formed the backbone of the insurgency and the Taliban’s shadow government. Mullahs are now prioritised for state positions and are widely recruited. This trend actually began during the insurgency when the Taliban started paying civilian officials and members of their various commissions. However, the scope of privileges to be gained, now that the movement is in power, is far greater. That is also having knock-on consequences, as one interviewee commented: “We couldn’t find a mullah for our imamat because they’re all seeking state jobs and no longer want to be imams.” Mullahs are now working in all sorts of state sectors, both in security and the various civilian ministries, but also as (well-paid) members of ulema councils (which replaced the Republic-era provincial council) and teachers in state-funded madrasas.

How do mullahs view these changes?

The mullahs’ involvement in business and their improved living standards has allowed them to gain a stronger position in society, not merely as religious leaders, but as individuals who contribute economically. The mullahs’ influence in the past remained strictly limited to only religious affairs and they did not have much say on other matters, particularly economic affairs. A community leader from Khost said:

In the past, when people talked about the world, the government, or business, the mullah would just listen and didn’t really understand. The mullah only spoke about religious matters. Today, many mullahs are involved in business, interact with people and the government, and have their own opinions on various issues. They have moved from being passive listeners to active participants in these discussions.

One key implication of this change is the increased independence of mullahs in applying and conveying sharia-related issues. When the mullahs relied solely on the community for their livelihood, coupled with their lack of academic training and political power, they were unable to apply sharia fully. In cases like baad marriage, where a girl from one family is given in marriage to another to assuage a blood feud, that is in stark contradiction with Islamic rulings, but the mullahs typically opted not to interfere. Even if they knew it to be unIslamic, they would not go against the wishes of the people who supported them. In other minor cases, as well, the mullahs were said to prioritise the contentment of their congregation over applying sharia rules. One community leader told the author:

In villages, mullahs were very cautious in dealing with people who held significant influence or were rich, such as khans and maliks. When those men did something wrong, the mullahs wouldn’t tell them they were wrong with the same intensity as they would tell a poor villager because the poor are always powerless. Mullahs also prioritised the rich over the poor when it came to their judgments in disputes.

Another interviewee, a community elder from Pakita, also said:

When the mullah had nothing and relied on his congregation [for his livelihood], he’d be very careful not to piss them off. But now he’s independent and doesn’t need their zakat and sarsaya, so he blatantly tells them what is correct and doesn’t fear anyone.

Another key effect is that mullahs can acquire advanced Islamic education. One interviewee, a mullah from Khost province, said:

Nowadays, the ulema are able to travel to other provinces, purchase textbooks, and enrol in universities both inside the country and in other Islamic countries. Two of my friends are going to Khost [city] in their cars just to learn a new method of teaching sarf and nahwa [classical Arabic syntax and grammar]. Another friend went to the madrasa of Taqi Usmani Sahib [in Pakistan] because his family was in such a good economic condition he didn’t need to work. This was impossible in the past, as ulema didn’t have such opportunities.

The mullahs we interviewed were themselves divided as to the balance between the positive and negative implications of entering business. Some see it as essential, arguing that a religious leader should be capable of managing his own life and business rather than relying on the community. They believe that religious leaders need to make a positive economic contribution to society, which, in turn, can enhance their spiritual role. An interviewee, from Khost province, for example, said:

Some people say that when you practice or master religion, you’ll face difficulties, as all ulema in the past were people who endured hardships. Therefore, some people may want to avoid that. Now, we’ve been seeing that this is wrong. You can be a religious scholar but also a successful businessman. If you go on the path of sharia, and also do business, you would be rewarded twice [compared to] the common people. Look, the Prophet Muhammad himself was a businessman. Usman [the third caliph of Sunni Islam and a companion of the Prophet Muhammad] was the richest person in the tribe of Quraysh. Islam is not only a religion full of hardships. But it has limits and within these limits, you can do business, work and other things. 

Another interviewee, from Ghazni province, in his late 40s, said:

The Prophet has advised people to engage in business. If I were in charge of the state, I’d mandate that all ulema have businesses, as this would make them free from financial need and allow them to implement the religion of Allah without fear of losing personal benefits.

A third interviewee, from Paktia, in his late 30s, said:

I’m a mullah myself, but it’s a truth that in the past, mullahs were often considered dependent on others. They didn’t engage in any work and, in many cases, lacked skills. They were entirely dependent on the community. However, praise God, things have changed. Today, the ulema have acquired many valuable skills. They are capable of engaging in any kind of business that is halal and are knowledgeable in practical fields such as farming, construction, and more. For example, I know an alem from Dzanzi Khil village who is not only an imam but also a skilled carpenter. Similarly, a friend of mine is an alem who serves as an imam and teaches maths at a private [educational] centre in the bazaar.

A fourth interviewee, 43 years old from Nangrahar, said:

In the past, a prevalent concept among ulema was that they should only preach the religion of God and couldn’t do business or pursue a worldly life. If a mullah graduated from a madrasa, but chose to go into business or another profession over getting an imamat, he’d be deemed a traitor. 

A second group of the mullahs interviewed argued against getting drawn into business or other professions. They believe that pursuing the worldly life is not a religious scholar’s responsibility as it could potentially lead one astray from religious practices. One mullah from Paktia province said:

Delving into the worldly life causes you to forget the religion of Allah and instead prioritise this worldly and temporary life. For a religious leader, who’s acquired an Islamic education, it’s necessary to devote his life to it and preach. It’s only natural that worldly matters distract one from the true path.

A second interviewee, from Sabari district of Paktia province, said:

This world is temporary and is passing quickly. Those who have more wealth are going to have a tough time in the hereafter and those who don’t have much will be made easy. For a Muslim, it’s not this world but the hereafter [that matters]. We should try to build our business there, not here. 

To sum up, Afghan mullahs now exercise far greater influence over society as they have become less dependent on their community and increased their exposure to the outside world. They have become a salaried class and fare better economically than in the past. This has, however, even wider implications for their status and the public’s perception of them.

Where do mullahs now stand vis-à-vis the state and society?

The forty years of conflict in Afghanistan have severely weakened the country’s social structures. The traditional power of khans and maliks has diminished, the tribal system has eroded and state authority has been challenged – although, it is currently in an unusually strong phase. However, one social group has emerged stronger and more influential during this period – the mullahs. Today, they not only hold religious authority but have also consolidated their political and social power, forming both the government and controlling the religious sphere.

Historically, except in urban centres, mullahs were largely shaped by their communities, relying on local support for both their livelihoods and religious standing. While successive governments – from Zahir Shah’s monarchy to the Islamic Republic – attempted to co-opt the mullahs by offering them financial support or making them align with state interests, these efforts largely failed. The state was unable to weaken the deeply entrenched position of the mullahs within Afghan society. They typically sided with their communities if they were in opposition to state policies, as they had little interaction with the central government.

However, the rise of the Taliban has shifted this dynamic. With the Taliban’s ascension to power, mullahs have become a salaried class, with many directly tied to the state, no longer outside the state apparatus; they are now central to it. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has also moved to institutionalise its control over the clerics by attempting to register mosques and imams, with plans to eventually pay them from the state budget. It has also introduced regulations on who can serve as an imam and how much local communities should compensate them.

The rise of the Islamic Emirate, a government of mullahs, marks another profound shift: mullahs, who were once independent of the state and largely aligned with their communities, are now deeply embedded in the state and its economic structures. From ministers to civil servants to soldiers, many are either in government or directly employed by it. Even those still working as village imams are subject to the state’s attempts to dictate who can engage in this work. If the government also succeeds in paying mullahs, it will have broken their economic independence. At the same time, mullahs are also entering formal, modern economic structures, either through businesses or employment, making many more independent of the communities they serve.

The IEA understands that integrating rural mullahs into the state apparatus is a strategic move to maintain their loyalty and also benefit from the influence they exert over their communities. For centuries, the mullahs’ reliance on community and the semi-independent position of these vis-à-vis the state allowed them to challenge government authority. Now, by providing livelihoods, education, and state-issued certification, the IEA is making mullahs increasingly dependent on the state, thereby curbing their semi-autonomous power. One example of this shift is the government-issued khutbah, or sermons, that mullahs are now required to recite during Friday prayers. Mullahs who deviate from the state’s narrative – such as criticising the government – are swiftly removed from their positions.

The value of mullahs and their moral standing within their communities has historically stemmed partly from their independence from government. For better or worse, the role and status of mullahs are now inextricably tied to that of the Emirate, how it is valued, respected, and has strengthening or weakening power. There has been a profound shift in the living standards, livelihoods, social status and power of rural mullahs in the last half century, but that carries its own potential for further change. What we see today may not be the end of the story.

Edited by Fabrizio Foschini and Kate Clark

References

References
1 Southern Afghanistan here refers to Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul and Uruzgan, also known as Loy (Greater) Kandahar, while the southeast refers to Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Logar and parts of Ghazni, also known as Loya Paktia. The majority of inhabitants in these two regions are Pashtuns and live adjacent to the Durand Line.
2 It is against the backdrop of this occasionally political role that mullahs have usually attracted the attention of researchers. On the transformations of the role of mullahs in rural Afghanistan in times of crisis, such as during the anti-colonial agitations of the late 19th century and the anti-Soviet jihad, see, for example, David B Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier, Berkeley University of California Press, 1996, p126; and David B Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad, Berkeley University of California Press, 2002, 156. The role and evolution of mullahs’ networks in the context of the anti-colonial struggle in the broader region between eastern Afghanistan and the current Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan has been analysed by Sana Haroon in her Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, Hurst, London, 2007.
3 Read a recent AAN report, marking the 100th anniversary of a major rebellion led by the mullah of a small village of southeastern Afghanistan against then king Amanaullah, the political reverberations of which are still relevant, The Khost Rebellion of 1924: The centenary of an overlooked but significant episode in Afghan history.
4 For more on this, including the socio-economic impact of the money sent home, see Sabawoon Samim, Sending Money Home: The impact of remittances on workers, families and villages, AAN, 2024.
5 This economy was not sustainable, given it was based on unearned foreign income, and the harmful side-effects were many. See Kate Clark, The Cost of Support to Afghanistan: New special report considers the reasons for inequality, poverty and a failing democracy, AAN, 2020.
6 In Afghanistan, it is a tradition that brothers and cousins sometimes split up when the parents and/or grandparents die. The wealth is divided equally among all the brothers.
7 The issue of tawiz, amulets often containing a written verse from the Quran, which some believe can heal or bring about a wish (a pregnancy, success in an exam, a spouse) is controversial among Islamic scholars, with differing opinions on whether it is permissible. In Afghanistan, it is a centuries-old practice and religious scholars often give them out. However, among the younger generation of mullahs, including some IEA officials, the practice is not widely accepted. They argue that relying on a tawiz for blessings and protection clashes with the belief in the oneness of Allah and the understanding that everything that happens is decreed by Him. For more on this, see AAN’s reporting of the death of Farkhanda, killed allegedly by a mullah whom she had challenged over his ‘sin’ of writing tawiz, Fabrizio Foschini and Naheed Esar Malikzai The Killing of Farkhunda (1): The physical environment and the social types party to her murder, AAN, 2015.

 

Living a Mullah’s Life (1): The changing role and socio-economic status of Afghanistan’s village clerics
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