His alarm rings at 5 a.m. He wakes his 16-year-old brother, Arshad, and the pair arrive at Blake less than two hours later. After school ends at 2:30 p.m., wrestling practice runs for three hours. When that’s over, Shujaee works a five-hour shift at Costco. He gets home around 11:30.
On a typical night, Shujaee sleeps for about five hours. He said he doesn’t need much to feel refreshed.
The junior hasn’t had much time to rest since moving from Afghanistan 11 months ago. Shujaee works five days a week at Costco, practices wrestling for three hours a day and helps care for his three siblings. His coaches often praise his work ethic — it’s why they think he has a chance to wrestle collegiately. Shujaee hopes they’re right.
“We are new here. It’s hard to pay off our rent because it’s very expensive,” Shujaee said. “I want to be a champion in the future. … I am here to get a scholarship from a college and wrestle.”
Shujaee moved to the United States in January. His father had worked with the U.S. Army, meaning the Shujaee family — his mother, two brothers and sister — received special visas granted to those who aided the U.S. government abroad.
When he came to the United States, he brought with him a love of wrestling. He picked up the sport at 14 years old, hoping to lose some weight. In Afghanistan he practiced freestyle wrestling, the preferred international style. U.S. wrestlers use folkstyle. It is not too different from freestyle, but it is typically slower and more methodical. Shujaee said he found folkstyle easier, but he needed time to get accustomed to new techniques.
Upon arriving at Blake, he wanted to join the wrestling team immediately. But it was spring by then, and the season had just ended. Blake Coach Jim Potts connected Shujaee with local clubs, and he quickly began training at Capital Wrestling Club in Gaithersburg. Because of his unusual situation, the gym allowed him to train free.
“He was able to acclimate and learn the new rule set in a really short period of time, which I think is a testament to his athleticism and knowledge of the sport,” said Max Meltzer, co-founder and coach at Capital Wrestling Club.
Outside of the sport, Shujaee said, the biggest difference between the United States and Afghanistan is the price of goods. He could buy six pairs of shoes for $100 in Afghanistan. That barely covers a single pair of quality athletic shoes here.
Shujaee’s first meet of the season took place at the Mad Mats tournament at Magruder on Dec. 8. He used an old pair of wrestling shoes given to him by a friend. The black Rudis sneakers have small tears near the white sole. They didn’t stop him from defeating his first opponent by technical fall in just 2 minutes 15 seconds.But there wasn’t much time to celebrate. He grabbed his gray sweatshirt and rushed to an adjacent gym to cheer on Arshad, who had his first match of the day. After Arshad won, his brother was waiting with a hug.
“I enjoy having him here with me,” said Arshad, a sophomore. “He works very hard. He is really interested in wrestling and likes wrestling. He also works hard for our family.”
The work ethic that defines his wrestling skill set is the same that has him scanning the QR code on his employee ID to start his shift at Costco in Wheaton. It’s the same that helps him stock shelves through the evening.
“I can’t explain how proud I am of my son. I know he is a hard worker,” Mohammed Bashir said. “I want him to get everything he wants.”
On the second day of Mad Mats, Zahid lost in the championship round in a 12-5 decision in the 150-pound weight class. Despite his disappointment, he remains optimistic about the rest of the season. His coach shares his confidence.
“Being that it was a whole new thing and a whole different set of rules, I thought he did a great job,” Potts said.
Next year, Shujaee will be ineligible to wrestle with Blake as a senior because he’ll be 19 at the start of the season, putting him over the Maryland Public Secondary Schools Athletic Association age limit. Potts said Shujaee could become a team manager instead. He could also enroll in a postgraduate private school, allowing him to continue wrestling while also pursuing his high school diploma.
No matter which route he chooses, Shujaee knows he won’t stray far from the mat.
“This is my life,” Shujaee said. “This is something I learned. Wrestling is in my blood. I have to do this.”
After emigrating from Afghanistan, a young wrestler feels at home on the mat
An oasis stretched far into the desert, a vast sea of emerald stalks and scarlet poppy flowers that grew to the horizon.
The Taliban operated openly, running a social experiment unlike anything in the country. Tens — then hundreds — of thousands of people flocked here to escape the war and grow poppy, fleeing the American efforts to wipe out the crop.
The Taliban opened a trauma hospital to treat their wounded and earned a fortune, not just from opium, but also from methamphetamines and taxes on goods moving in and out of Afghanistan, bringing them millions upon millions of dollars every month.
During the war, this remote district became a laboratory for a future Taliban state, providing money for the war and a sanctuary for the men fighting it.
All that has changed. The Taliban boom town is rapidly going bust.
The same insurgents who embraced opium to help finance their war have put an end to it, ordering a ban that has all but cleared Afghanistan of poppy and other illicit drugs.
What the United States and its allies failed to do in two decades of war, the Taliban has managed in two years of peace. In an area where poppy once dominated the landscape, barely a stalk remains.
Hundreds of labs set up to process heroin and methamphetamines have been closed or destroyed. The drug bazaar that powered this part of southern Afghanistan has been all but emptied. And the nation, already reeling without international aid, has lost a sizable piece of its economy as a result.
On top of that, the Taliban government has stiffened its taxes, leaving residents bitter and angry. Many have moved away, except those too poor or invested to leave, like Abdul Khaliq.
“This is all coming to an end,” he said, waving his hand toward the emptying villages.
There was almost nothing in this district, Bakwa, when he arrived 25 years ago, just an empty desert plain. He built an empire out of sand, selling the pumps and solar panels that provided water for the opium boom, helping turn Bakwa into a frontier outpost for smugglers, traders and farmers.
Now his story, like Bakwa’s, has come full circle: the foreigners gone, the Taliban back in power, the earth stripped of poppy and the land returning to dust.
“It’s a matter of time,” he said.
The war in Afghanistan was many things: a mission to eliminate Al Qaeda and oust the group that gave safe harbor to Osama bin Laden; an ambitious drive to build a new Afghanistan, where Western ideals ran headlong into local traditions; a seemingly endless entanglement, where winning sometimes mattered less than not losing.
It was also a drug war.
The Americans and their allies tried again and again to sever the Taliban’s income and stop one of the world’s worst scourges: opium and heroin production.
The United States spent nearly $9 billion on heavy-handed eradication and interdiction, yet Afghanistan eclipsed its own records as the largest producer of illicit poppy in the world.
What did change was where that poppy was grown. Little by little, farmers flooded once empty deserts in southwestern Afghanistan, barren pockets of sand with almost no populations to speak of before.
Communities formed in starburst patterns along ancient irrigation lines, then moved farther into the desert to farm as they pleased. The Taliban followed, finding sanctuary in the utter remoteness of districts like Bakwa and their unnavigable roads.
At its height, the Taliban oversaw a narco-state here, a farm-to-table drug operation with hundreds of field labs processing opium into heroin and wild ephedra into methamphetamines for Europe, Asia and elsewhere. By the end of the war, Bakwa had become an entrepôt of the drug trade, home to the largest open-air drug market in the country.
The Taliban showed flexibility, too, both morally and financially. Despite banning poppy on religious grounds before the American invasion, the Taliban allowed farmers to grow as much of it as they wanted during the war.
And they taxed it loosely, often whatever farmers could afford, adopting a hearts-and-minds strategy. They also taxed smugglers, who were happy to help fund a Taliban war machine that didn’t interfere with business.
Bakwa soon became an incubator for governance. Taliban courts adjudicated all manner of disputes, while millions of dollars flowed monthly to help finance the Taliban mission beyond Bakwa and the southwest.
Western officials took aim at that money. They began with eradication, then tried persuading farmers to grow legal crops, and ended with fighter jets bombing makeshift labs made of mud.
“At least $200 million of this opium industry goes into the Taliban’s bank accounts,” Gen. John Nicholson, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan in 2017, a year of peak poppy production, said at the time. “And this fuels — really pays for the insurgency.”
But the Taliban’s customs checkpoints were just as essential in Bakwa, or even more so, taxing goods to the tune of $10 million a month or more, according to Taliban officials.
“The money from agriculture, poppy included, funded the war” in these regions, said Haji Maulavi Asif, now the Taliban’s governor for Bakwa District. “But the money from the customs operation helped fund the entire movement.”
Now that poppy has been banned, the farmers the Taliban once relied on feel betrayed, while the Taliban is trying to govern without the money it brings.
“While economically, the decision to ban poppy costs a lot, politically it makes sense,” said Mr. Asif. “We are silencing the countries of the world who say we are growing poppy and participating in the global drug trade.”
‘Desert people’ to opium entrepreneurs
When the war started in 2001, Mr. Khaliq barely noticed.
He had only recently bought land on a roadless expanse in Bakwa that cooked under the summer sun. But just beneath the surface, there was water, so bountiful that reeds grew in some areas. Mr. Khaliq, a mechanic, opened a tiny workshop to fix water pumps.
There were no phones and few neighbors back then, so when the Americans invaded, he heard about it only weeks later.
“We were desert people,” he said. “We didn’t care about the war. That was the concern of city people.”
That changed quickly. Before the American invasion, the Taliban had banned poppy production, sending opium prices skyrocketing. Now that they were gone, Mr. Khaliq switched from growing wheat to poppy.
Others soon joined, and the desert took on new hues. Bright flowers and verdant stems softened the landscape. The money was good — so good that the new Afghan government came knocking.
One day, Bakwa’s new police chief showed up to marvel at how productive Mr. Khaliq’s poppy fields were.
“I bet there’s over half a ton of opium here,” Mr. Khaliq recalled the chief saying.
“I told him it wasn’t that much, but he charged me for that amount anyway,” Mr. Khaliq said with a laugh. “And then he also asked for a bribe.”
With the Americans in control of Bakwa, eradication programs gained momentum. The district governor soon arrived with great fanfare, bringing a tractor, cameras and an entourage of police.
He gathered the farmers and announced there would be no more poppy because the foreigners were serious about getting rid of Afghan opium.
Mr. Khaliq and others watched with quiet indignation as the tractor plowed through a neighbor’s field. But after a short exhibition, the tractor stopped and a photographer was summoned.
“They took pictures of the small destroyed area,” Mr. Khaliq recalled. “Then, they took bribes and left.”
So went the early American-backed eradication campaigns in Bakwa, and the farmers adapted right away. They began pooling their money to compensate whoever’s crops were destroyed for show.
As word spread, newcomers began arriving in droves. Unfamiliar faces turned up weekly to Mr. Khaliq’s garage, dragging motors for him to fix. He stocked spare parts and water pipes, and began selling gas.
“Our business grew with the population, but we never expected it to grow so much,” he said.
The Taliban’s ‘pivot’
Mr. Khaliq didn’t care much for the Taliban at first. He found them harsh and overbearing, propagandizing about their faith while turning on the people around them.
“They were killing people and denouncing them as spies, even visitors who came to see family,” said Haji Abdul Salam, one of Bakwa’s largest landowners.
But they learned from their mistakes as they notched military gains. By 2006, a resurgent Taliban was carrying out its first major offensive since being ousted, laying waste to nearby districts in Helmand Province.
A steady stream of refugees arrived in Bakwa, and more Taliban followed, from fighters to mullahs, seeking shelter and opportunity.
“I moved to this area because it was safe,” said Haji Naim, Mr. Khaliq’s cousin, a Taliban fighter.
Bakwa turned out to be a great place to hide. The terrain was flat, making it easy to spot incoming raids. The ground was silty, which made planting roadside bombs simple. The roads meandered with such arbitrary vigor that only locals knew how to navigate them.
“There is not a single straight road in Bakwa,” said Mr. Khaliq. “If you spot a Taliban, you can’t even chase him.”
As they claimed more territory, the Taliban “learned to pivot,” said Mr. Salam, who helps oversees the main tribal council in Bakwa. “They began to prosecute their own officials and brought real justice and accountability.”
The Taliban eventually squeezed the Afghan government into a tiny corner of the district, forcing it to abandon any pretense of control over the area.
Hundreds of workers descended on Bakwa to collect opium sap each harvest, while an industry of buyers and smugglers coalesced around an open-air drug market known as the Abdul Wadood Bazaar.
The bazaar drew thousands at times, a vast collection of frontiersmen trading in illicit goods. An entire logistics network developed to serve the trade.
The Taliban ran neither the market nor the drug trade but taxed all of it.
The money added up — and caught the eye of the Americans.
Solar panels and mobile courts
Eradication wasn’t working. In 2007, the peak of the effort — with officials reporting 19,000 hectares of poppy destroyed — Afghanistan still broke a record for poppy cultivation.
Increasingly, the Americans and their allies began prosecuting a more conventional drug war in places like Bakwa, staging raids on smugglers and their networks. Violent interdiction became the norm, infuriating residents.
The Taliban, by contrast, endorsed the drug trade, at least while it was serving their interests. Though they had banned poppy before, they didn’t seem to worry much about the contradiction during the war. To the contrary, they appointed Islamic scholars who delivered sermons on the importance of supporting the jihad and expelling foreigners.
“The secret to their success was religious propaganda,” said Haji Abdullah Khan, a lifelong Bakwa resident. “People didn’t like the Taliban, but they didn’t want Christians or Jews here.”
On more administrative matters, the Taliban also assigned a district governor. Such shadow governors, as they were called, were high-value targets for the Americans and Afghan forces. But Bakwa was so safe for the insurgents that it became a magnet for senior Taliban leaders.
The Taliban established mobile courts, with judges riding around the district, meting out justice on the road. Prisoners would be locked in cars while the officiants went about their business, including the execution of thieves and murderers.
Sometimes, the Taliban would ask locals to host the courts, including Mr. Khaliq. Too frightened to refuse, he said he held more than a few on his compound, just as he sold them gas and offered them tea whenever they came through. But he never warmed to the insurgents.
Which made it all the more frustrating to him when U.S. forces, who operated out of bases in nearby areas, raided his home on multiple occasions.
“I just did what I needed to do regardless of who was in power,” he said.
A constant stream of visitors came to Mr. Khaliq’s expanding compound, which by about 2014 included new storage units, a new garage and a small kiosk selling snacks and sodas.
Lines of customers waited in his courtyard — sometimes for days — to purchase the most revolutionary piece of farming technology to emerge during the war: solar panels to run Bakwa’s ubiquitous water pumps.
“We must have sold tens of thousands of units,” Mr. Khaliq said.
The desert was transformed once more, now with the black tiles of solar setups. Water reservoirs became the norm, an incredibly wasteful method of irrigation that uses open-air pools, which evaporate quickly in the desert heat.
Newcomers claimed even more pieces of desert. The growth was so rapid that international experts on poppy cultivation, like David Mansfield, tracked it via satellite imagery, monitoring the stamps of green invading a sea of brown.
“The Americans and their allies pushed the farmers and sharecroppers into the desert, where they were greeted by the Taliban and welcomed with open arms,” said Mr. Mansfield, an analyst on Afghanistan.
By 2016, he added, more than 300,000 acres of land were being cultivated in Bakwa, a sixfold increase from 2003. The population more than quintupled to an estimated 320,000 people.
The Taliban grew with it. That same year, they finally claimed the district center in Bakwa, the last remaining symbol of the Afghan government.
The squat concrete building had been constructed with American money just four years earlier, in 2012. (Insurgents had burned down the previous one.) Once in control of the $200,000 facility, the Taliban turned it into a hospital.
“The hospital would treat 200 to 250 patients a day,” said Abdul Wasi, a nurse there. “It was a trauma center for the Taliban. Fighters from all over the region would come here.”
The local Afghan government, having abandoned the district altogether, moved to a few containers along the side of a highway.
Heroin, meth and taxes
Bakwa became a Taliban financial capital, collecting taxes like any other formal authority.
Though the American-backed government controlled the official customs checkpoints in and out of Afghanistan, the Taliban set up their own.
They placed them on highways leading to and from Iran, Turkmenistan and Pakistan, charging hundreds of dollars per commercial vehicle. The Taliban even issued receipts.
The money, estimated at around $10 million a month, overshadowed the taxes from poppy farmers and smugglers, local Taliban officials say — and it was all administered from Bakwa.
The district changed yet again. Poppy had been like an anchor tenant in a vast drug emporium. Next, labs began sprouting up to process heroin, a more lucrative venture. Those, in turn, gave way to new labs producing methamphetamines.
The labs proliferated along the edges of the open-air market. Some used cough medicine, draining amber bottles of pseudoephedrine and cooking it down. But ephedra, a shrub that blanketed the central highlands of Afghanistan, soon transformed the industry.
Hundreds of people, if not thousands, worked in the burgeoning meth trade, transporting, milling and producing the drug from the wild ephedra crop.
Mr. Mansfield estimated that hundreds of tons of meth were produced in Bakwa alone, even as poppy continued breaking records. In 2017, Afghanistan cultivated more opium than in any year since the start of the war.
The United States, desperate for a forceful response, redoubled its efforts. Fighter jets and B-52 bombers launched a two-year campaign to destroy labs across southwestern Afghanistan, including in Bakwa.
An estimated 200 labs were destroyed, many of them mud huts and lean-tos leveled by munitions that cost many times what they had obliterated. Little changed. By 2020, hundreds of labs were still churning out heroin and meth..
A drug market turned ghost town
The collapse came as quickly as the boom. One year, it seemed to Mr. Khaliq, business was bountiful. The next, Bakwa was practically empty again.
He noticed the change before many of his neighbors. Fewer customers came. Solar panel orders got smaller. Some were being canceled altogether.
It was 2019, not long after U.S. airstrikes in Bakwa killed 30 people, including many women and children, he said. Yet all anyone wanted to talk about was water.
There had been so much water, for such a long time, that no one considered it might run out. Experts commissioned by U.S.A.I.D. in 2009 had found a huge aquifer under Bakwa, one that seemed destined to last.
“I was surprised at the amount of water they had in the area,” said Darren Richardson, who had commissioned the study. “That was a significant aquifer.”
And yet, only a decade later, the water was growing scarce.
Despite the American airstrikes and water worries, Bakwa remained a center of the drug trade. Poppy had a long shelf life once harvested. Its watering needs coincided with the spring snowmelt from the neighboring mountains. The trade could hold on, residents reasoned.
But then the war ended.
The Americans withdrew for good in 2021 and the Taliban took over. Months later, the supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada, declared that poppy cultivation was “absolutely prohibited in the whole country.”
The Taliban claimed to have arrested numerous traffickers, seized nearly 2,000 tons of drugs and raided hundreds of heroin labs. In 2023, the Taliban destroyed dozens of labs in Bakwa, setting them ablaze.
Where the Americans had cherry-picked from the sky, killing or injuring innocents along the way, the Taliban removed nearly every laboratory in Bakwa. The Abdul Wadood Bazaar hollowed out.
With ruthless efficiency, the Taliban did what the United States had hoped for. They got rid of poppy farming, and in doing so, severed one of their economic lifelines.
The remnants of the boom haunt the landscape: abandoned well derricks, stark against the acid sky; old food wrappers and animal droppings desiccated in vacant courtyards.
Farmers blame the Taliban for their misery. For nearly 15 years, their poppy — and the taxes the Taliban collected from it — supported the insurgents’ war to establish a government.
Now that the Taliban got what they wanted, they have forgotten the people of Bakwa who made it all possible, residents grumble. Farmers too poor to leave now send their sons to work on harvests elsewhere, renting them out as labor.
“We have no choice but to stick it out,” said Haji Hawaladar, who had moved his entire family to Bakwa, trading his herd of goats for land. Now, he added, “we could not even give this land away for free.”
The Taliban seemed to have no reservations about leaving. Today, the district is largely empty of administrators and fighters. Many have moved on to bigger roles in other places.
“This was like a test, or an exam,” said Mr. Asif, the district governor. “Trusted people got important positions. The people who did well in Bakwa were top of that list.”
In Mr. Khaliq’s compound on a recent evening, as a honeyed light washed over the desert, nieces and nephews played in the courtyard, while a son stood idly by the gas pumps, waiting for customers who never came.
A few years earlier, his grounds would have been teeming with life. Today, he is selling a tenth of what he once did.
“The only thing that might help would be growing poppy with the water that is left,” said Mr. Khaliq. “But those who tried, the Taliban came and destroyed their crop.”
A few farmers have turned their fields to wheat, and shocks of green punctuate vast brown fields. Mr. Khaliq’s neighbors have moved away, leaving him alone with his crumbling fortune.
Like others, Mr. Khaliq holds the Taliban responsible. They could have enforced water rights agreements, as exist all over Afghanistan. They could ease their ban on poppy to keep the farmers afloat.
“The Taliban did not solve the biggest issues, water and the economy,” he said.
Like others, he knows some people are still hoarding opium reserves to sell at a high price, given the ban. Prices have more than quintupled since 2021, and some are still getting rich.
But everything he owns has lost value: his land and equipment, and hundreds of solar panels that sit in tidy rows, waiting for farmers who will never come back. The barren furrows of earth swirl like fingerprints over a monochromatic desert, a reminder of what was.
“This is life,” he says. “Everything ends. I will be done one day, too. But even if this ends, somewhere else will be beginning.”
Azam Ahmed is international investigative correspondent for The Times. He has reported on Wall Street scandals, the War in Afghanistan and violence and corruption in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean
The Once Booming Drug Town Going Bust Under Taliban Rule
Living in constant fear of kidnap. Making up stories at Taliban checkpoints. Being separated from his family to be questioned.
These are experiences that Parwiz Bakhtari, an Afghan man who is being housed by the British military in south Oxfordshire, said he was hoping to put behind him.
Mr Bakhtari worked for the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces, a department of the Afghan government that was deposed by the Taliban in 2021.
After a “nightmare” journey into Pakistan, Mr Bakhtari, his wife and teenage daughter were finally given the protection of the British military in Islamabad, before being flown to the UK.
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Before the Taliban came to power, Mr Bakhtari worked as an intelligence officer for the Afghan government, working alongside British forces. As such, his job made him a high profile target for reprisals.
“We lived in constant fear that the Taliban might kidnap our family members,” he said. “My office was attacked several times.
“I was not harmed. Tragically, several of my colleagues were not as fortunate.”
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When the Taliban swept to power, Mr Bakhtari was faced with the decision to flee his home in Kabul on his own, or take his family with him and try to make it to Pakistan. He chose the latter.
“I couldn’t bear the thought of leaving them behind knowing the Taliban could easily target them,” he said.
The journey to the Pakistan border was highly dangerous. On the way, he faced the real prospect of detention at Taliban checkpoints.
“Fortunately, we didn’t have any identification documents on us,” he said. “We made up different stories at each checkpoint.”
Once they reached the border crossing, they were questioned by Pakistani police.
After being given accommodation in Islamabad by the British military, he and his family arrived in the UK.
‘Debt of gratitude’
They were resettled under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) for Afghan citizens who worked for or with the UK Government in Afghanistan.
Operation Lazurite has seen the British army find housing for Afghans and their families, before local councils help them to find more permanent homes.
Mr Bakhtari and his family are currently staying in military accommodation in Watchfield, near Shrivenham.
South Oxfordshire District Council said its housing needs team was working with landlord to find Afghan families private rented accommodation.
Major James Cooke-Rogers, who has been part of the operation in south Oxfordshire, said: “These people risked their lives and their families lives and everything to try and support our forces.
“We owe them that debt of gratitude to look after them and provide them that safety away from persecution.”
Mr Bakhtari is now looking forward to a brighter future for his children, despite the pain of having to leave his home country.
He said: “To leave everything behind, a country that I’ve grown up in, that gave me [an] education and my wife and kids, was a nightmare.
“But now I’m lucky to be able to send my daughters to school and give them [everything] they deserve.”
The Islamic Emirate has not yet commented on the contents of this report.
The Swedish government has stated that there are “few hopeful signs” in Afghanistan’s current situation, and the country no longer receives the same level of international attention as it once did.
In a report titled “Experiences and Lessons Learned,” Sweden expressed concern about the current state of women and girls in Afghanistan.
The report examines Sweden’s engagement with Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021 and notes: “The current situation in Afghanistan shows few hopeful signs. For women and girls in the country, the situation is particularly dire. Afghanistan is no longer the object of as extensive international interest as it once was. Other international crises and conflicts are now in the foreground.”
The Islamic Emirate has not yet commented on the contents of this report.
The Swedish government, in the report, highlighted the activities of various Swedish organizations, including the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, and mentioned that over the past 20 years, Sweden has had extensive and long-term engagement with Afghanistan, working alongside many other countries to support Afghanistan and improve the living conditions of its people.
Salim Paigir, a political analyst, told TOLOnews: “When NATO and US forces were in Afghanistan, it was natural for Afghanistan to receive special attention from those countries. But when they left Afghanistan, naturally, their interest in the Afghan people and the interim government declined.”
Najib Rahman Shamal, another political analyst, said: “We hope that the officials of Afghanistan’s interim government will take practical and necessary steps to address issues and meet the demands of the international community.”
Meanwhile, Sweden’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently requested Abbas Noyan, the former Afghan government’s ambassador in Stockholm, to conclude his work in the country.
According to Abbas Noyan, his mission will end at the end of this month at the host country’s request, and the embassy’s assets will be handed over to Sweden’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Sweden: ‘Current Situation in Afghanistan Shows Few Hopeful Signs’
The Islamic Emirate has not yet commented on this matter.
Matthew Miller, the spokesperson for the US Department of State, said during a press briefing that Washington engages with Afghanistan’s interim government to advance its own interests.
The State Department spokesperson told reporters: “We have engagements with the Taliban to advance United States national interests, and we have engagements with HTS to advance United States national interests, including of course finding and returning home the American journalist Austin Tice.”
Sayed Qareebullah Sadat, a political analyst, said: “US engagement with the Islamic Emirate equates to global engagement. If the US decides to recognize the Islamic Emirate tomorrow, within a week, 40 or 50 countries might recognize Afghanistan as well.”
Janat Faheem Chakari, another analyst, said: “The US and Europe, as the world’s leading powers, are capable of successfully pulling Afghanistan out of its political and economic quagmire.”
Although the Islamic Emirate has not yet commented on this matter, it has previously expressed its willingness to engage with various countries, including the United States.
US ‘Has Engagements’ With Islamic Emirate to Advance ‘National Interests’
According to the report, the approved law allows Russia’s Supreme Court to suspend the ban on groups that have been blacklisted by Moscow.
Reuters has reported that the Russian parliament passed a law yesterday paving the way for normalizing relations with Afghanistan’s interim government.
According to the report, the approved law allows Russia’s Supreme Court to suspend the ban on groups that have been blacklisted by Moscow.
Reuters stated in part of its report: “Russia’s parliament passed a law on Tuesday that would allow courts to suspend bans on groups designated by Moscow as terrorist organisations – paving the way for it to normalise ties with the Afghan Taliban.”
Idris Mohammadi Zazi, a political analyst, commented on Russia’s move, saying: “I commend this decision by the Russian parliament in the current context. It can further strengthen political and economic relations between Russia and Afghanistan and enhance political stability in Afghanistan and the region.”
Earlier, the lower house of the Russian parliament, the Duma, approved a bill on the 20th of this month, enabling the removal of the “Taliban” name from the country’s blacklist. Afghanistan’s interim government called this a significant step in expanding relations between Russia and the Islamic Emirate.
Sayed Akbar Sial Wardak, another political analyst, said: “There are many positive aspects to this. It builds political trust at the regional and global levels, which could lead other countries to make similar decisions regarding the Islamic Emirate in the future.”
Meanwhile, two Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have removed the Islamic Emirate from their list of terrorist groups earlier this year.
Russia Passes Law to Normalize Ties with Islamic Emirate
Earlier, some Iranian media outlets, quoting officials, reported that Iran has expelled over 1.5 million illegal migrants in the past year.
Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate, urged Afghan citizens to refrain from illegal migration, emphasizing the government’s ongoing efforts to create job opportunities and improve the domestic economy.
Mujahid said: “Afghans should not try to leave the country. Many of our migrants in Iran have returned to their homeland. On the other hand, the Islamic Emirate is making serious efforts to create employment opportunities and improve the country’s economy to address the people’s economic challenges.”
Earlier, some Iranian media outlets, quoting officials, reported that Iran has expelled over 1.5 million illegal migrants in the past year.
“Over the past year, we have expelled more than 1.5 million undocumented individuals from cities and villages and started biometric and technical processes, such as fingerprinting, to prevent these individuals from returning under different identities,” the report reads.
Abdullah, a resident of Takhar province, who has been to Iran six times and faced harsh treatment before being deported, is once again preparing to leave for Iran to provide for his five-member family. Abdullah told TOLOnews: “This is the seventh time I am going to Iran. Each time, I get deported. We stay for five or six months, and then they beat us and send us back to Afghanistan. I have five children, and I am forced to go to Iran again for work.”
Fatima, a returnee from Iran, told TOLOnews: “Despite having legal documents, there is a lot of pressure. For instance, even I, who was born there, face difficulties—let alone those without documents.”
Previously, the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation reported that more than 900,000 Afghan migrants have returned from Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey over the past eight months.
Islamic Emirate Appeals to Citizens to Stay in Afghanistan
The Afghanistan Chamber of Industries and Mines described the leader’s recent decisions as impactful for Afghanistan’s economic growth and development.
The Economic Deputy of the Prime Minister’s Office announced on Tuesday that the leader of the Islamic Emirate chaired an extraordinary meeting of the Economic Commission, where decisions were made across eleven key sectors.
The meeting addressed issues such as identifying harmful customs, establishing industrial parks, allocating land for industrialists in all provinces, reclaiming seized land, distributing land for mineral processing factories, and constructing mosques for men and women along highways.
The statement outlined the decisions made in the meeting, which have been directed to the relevant institutions as follows:
Identifying harmful customs to reduce unnecessary expenses.
Developing a comprehensive procedure for reclaimed lands and townships confirmed as government property.
Facilitating construction activities for citizens.
Allocating land for light and small industries in the capital.
Establishing industrial parks in 29 provinces.
Leasing government lands near water sources to citizens.
Submitting the plan for the Kokcha River Canal to the Economic Commission.
Preparing the plan for the Hajigak iron ore project.
Preventing the export and import of goods banned by the Islamic Emirate.
Developing mechanisms to prevent the smuggling of medicines and food items.
Abdul Nasir Rashtia, an economic affairs analyst, commented on implementing these decisions: “One of the major challenges for industrialists has been the shortage or lack of land. If this program is implemented and land is provided to industrialists, undoubtedly, many factories will begin operations, creating more job opportunities for people.”
Meanwhile, the Afghanistan Chamber of Industries and Mines described the leader’s recent decisions as impactful for Afghanistan’s economic growth and development and emphasized the need for further facilitation for industrialists in the country.
Sakhi Ahmad Paiman, first deputy of the Chamber of Industries and Mines, told TOLOnews: “This new approach can create jobs in Afghanistan. At the same time, the industrial sector is facing land and energy shortages. If these facilities are provided to industrialists, we will see significant growth in the near future.”
In Asad 1402 (July–August 2023), the leader of the Islamic Emirate issued a three-article decree emphasizing the need to facilitate the private sector, promote positive engagement with traders and industrialists, and prioritize the use of domestic products.
Leader of the Islamic Emirate Overseeing Critical Economic Decisions
When Khalid Riaz turns off a dusty, single-lane road into a village in Guzara district, half an hour south of the bustling heart of Herat city in western Afghanistan, he is immediately greeted by a group of children.
Some barefoot and sucking their thumbs, the children surround the car as Riaz begins unloading bags of flour and rice from the trunk of a blue sedan. With the help of a fellow volunteer from a nonprofit group called Aseel, Riaz carries the bags over uneven ground, walking carefully through a maze-like jumble of homes built of sand-colored mud.
Looking down at his papers to check if he’s arrived at the correct house, Riaz lowers the food packages onto the fuchsia carpet of a local couple’s living room. That day’s delivery – an emergency donation of everyday necessities like grains and cooking oil – will hopefully be enough for the couple and their three young children to survive for the next few months.
Riaz sits down to greet the couple. But before he can speak, a dozen women and children begin crowding the doorway. The mother tries to wave them away but they refuse to leave.
“Please let me register. I have nine children,” says one of the women, waving a handful of loose papers in Riaz’s face. The air is stifling as more women arrive, all talking over each other as they plead for help.
“I’m sorry, we only have two deliveries today,” mumbles Riaz, the 25-year-old volunteer, shrinking into the corner of the room.
Through Aseel, a U.S. nonprofit started by an Afghan entrepreneur, individuals can donate around $100 for a single food package to be sent to a family in Afghanistan. But there are always far more people requiring aid than individuals donating.
“I don’t want to promise something to anyone,” Riaz says. “I can’t lie to them.”“Imagine Afghanistan as a body with no part unscathed, a body completely covered in wounds. We can only bandage some parts of it.”
With Afghanistan’s economy reeling and millions of people going hungry, nonprofit groups like Aseel are trying to fill a growing humanitarian void, providing aid to destitute families.
Reuters traveled around Herat city and surrounding villages in October, accompanying non-government volunteers delivering food and visiting nutrition clinics run by aid organizations like World Vision. Everywhere, there was a sense of desperation: Mothers begging aid workers for food. Young children working physically exhausting jobs on the street to feed their families. And doctors treating malnourished children and worrying what winter will bring in remote areas where people burn cardboard boxes to keep warm.
Afghanistan under the Taliban demonstrates the vital role non-government organizations play in keeping people alive in countries stricken by hunger. Like Aseel, these groups face arduous challenges in delivering aid, especially in conflict-scarred countries where they often navigate harsh government restrictions.
Afghanistan poses special difficulties: It has been shut out of development aid, because not a single foreign state officially recognizes the Taliban administration. Its treatment of women is impeding its path to recognition, Western diplomats say. Afghanistan’s leaders have said they respect women’s rights in accordance with their interpretation of Islamic law.
Source: OpenStreetMap contributors
These NGOs are part of a sprawling global network geared to detect and fight hunger and famine. Reuters is examining how this system is faring at a time when food crises have put hundreds of millions of people at risk of disease and death in places like Sudan, Gaza, Ethiopia and Afghanistan.
More than a third of Afghans are enduring dangerous levels of food deprivation. The world’s leading hunger monitor, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), said in a May report that while it saw “marginal improvements” in the food situation, an estimated 14.2 million people were experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity.
NGOs are required to comply with the law, said Abdul Rahman Habib, spokesperson for the economy ministry, responding to questions on Taliban rules about women who work in these organizations. But “there are no obstacles to the humanitarian aid activities of NGOs.” Aid, he added, shouldn’t be used as “a tool to achieve political objectives.”
‘Real need’
For two decades, Afghanistan was mired in a war that ended abruptly in August 2021 when the United States made its chaotic withdrawal. Today, the country is isolated by sanctions that affect the banking system and other measures. Economic output plunged 27% between 2020 and 2023.
Billions of dollars in foreign aid for development and security were also cut after the U.S. left. That money had formed the backbone of Afghanistan’s government finances. United Nations humanitarian funding is declining, too: As of December, only 45% of the Afghanistan plan drawn up by the U.N. and aid organizations for 2024 had been funded, leaving a $1.7 billion shortfall.
Other needy places face shortfalls as well. Afghanistan is competing for donor attention as wars in Gaza, Ukraine and Sudan draw humanitarian aid.
Heading back to his car after dropping off the food package at the couple’s home, Aseel’s Riaz is followed by the crowd of women trying to get his attention.
“Please, please help us,” begs one woman dressed in a dark purple abaya.
At least the women aren’t trying to snatch the aid by force, Riaz says. Earlier this year, a few months after an earthquake had leveled homes and killed hundreds in Herat province in late 2023, angry villagers pelted Riaz with rocks when he told them to wait in an orderly line to receive their aid. It was chaotic, he says, but he can understand why the villagers acted this way.
“It’s coming from a place of real need,” he says.
Riaz was born only a few years before the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001. For most of his young life, venturing outside his hometown in Herat, one of Afghanistan’s largest cities, was unthinkably dangerous. He remembers his family worrying every time his late father, an engineer, traveled to remote regions of Afghanistan to build water treatment projects during the war.
The end of the war in 2021 has made it safer for Afghans like Riaz to travel around their own country. But many of his old professors and classmates have left, pursuing education and job opportunities abroad.
“It’s a fact that no one wants to abandon their home country,” Riaz says. For those who emigrate, “it’s a choice between bad and worse” – staying in Afghanistan with all its problems or abandoning home and family.
Riaz, who studied urban planning at Herat University, dreams of pursuing a master’s degree and eventually creating a nonprofit focused on improving Afghanistan’s polluted environment. To further his education and find people who can help him with his venture, he says he may need to leave, too.
Before the Taliban returned, Riaz had taught himself how to play classical guitar and the piano using YouTube videos. Now, there are restrictions on playing music in public.
On days he’s not volunteering for Aseel, Riaz tutors students online from home. He recently discovered German philosophers.
“Now’s the time to read Nietzsche!” he laughs, explaining that the philosopher helped him find his own meaning in what sometimes feels like an increasingly meaningless world.
Male guardians
Policies imposed by the Taliban regarding women have made it more challenging for nonprofits to operate, diplomats and humanitarian officials say.
Besides barring girls from attending school beyond sixth grade and requiring women to cover their faces, the Taliban prohibits women from traveling without a male guardian. It also issued orders to NGOs and the U.N. to stop their Afghan female staff from working. The government has made some exceptions, like in the healthcare sector.
Afghanistan’s donor base isn’t expanding, and the “restrictive policies towards women and girls,” along with competing crises around the world, have contributed to a “decrease in funding,” according to Indrika Ratwatte, the U.N.’s deputy special representative for Afghanistan and humanitarian coordinator for the mission there.
The U.S. Agency for International Development says it has provided more than $2 billion in humanitarian and basic needs assistance to Afghanistan since 2021. The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan was “a direct result of the Taliban’s draconian edicts and policies – which we condemn,” a spokesperson for the agency said.
The economy ministry’s Habib said Afghan women are involved in commercial and service-related activities “in accordance with the applicable regulations,” including health, education and banking.
On Aseel’s second delivery of the day, Riaz hangs back while Madina, a 19-year-old female volunteer, approaches a one-room house on the edge of another village outside of Herat. Madina, who prefers to go by her first name for privacy reasons, is joined by her 15-year-old brother Mohammad, who accompanies her as her “mahram,” or male guardian.
Inside the home, an exhausted mother sits on tattered carpets next to her two crying children. Flies buzz around the room and settle on empty bowls of food on the ground. The mother, a 21-year-old, lost her husband in the days following the earthquake last October when a destroyed wall collapsed on top of him. Madina fills out a form, then hands the mother an emergency food package.
Later, after she returns to a taxi idling outside the home, Madina explains that she can empathize with many of the young women and mothers she encounters because her family is also struggling.
“Like the families we distributed aid to today, we also compromise,” she says, sitting in the backseat of the taxi, squeezed in next to her younger brother. Her family can afford a few staples like rice and beans; meat is too expensive.
Madina’s father died two years ago and her mother lost her job at another nonprofit due to a lack of funding. After the Taliban returned to power, they barred girls from secondary school and Madina couldn’t finish her studies. Now, her family relies on a small stipend she receives from Aseel every time she completes a delivery.
Each time Madina volunteers for Aseel, her little brother has to leave classes to accompany her. Looking over at her, Mohammad says he doesn’t mind.
Young breadwinners
Back in Herat city, the taxi carrying Madina and her brother speeds down a busy market road. Shops filled with meat and other produce line the street. Despite the appearance of abundance, four wholesalers in Herat’s main market say sales are down significantly since the fall of the previous Afghan government.
A survey conducted by a nonprofit initiative called REACH found that more than three-quarters of Afghan families are in debt. Farmers have been hit hard by climate shocks like droughts and floods. That has hurt their ability to cultivate crops – leaving less money in their pockets. To stock up on food supplies before winter, they now must buy more on credit.
Many of these families have fled rural provinces to cities like Herat, where even middle-class Afghans have been pushed into precarity.
Nowhere is this more obvious than on the city’s streets, where large numbers of young children can be seen doing an array of menial jobs. Many are the primary breadwinners in their families.
As Madina’s taxi drives deeper into the city, more and more young boys can be seen outside, pushing carts laden with fruit, polishing shoes, or baking bread. Many have been forced to leave school to support their families. Most look several years younger than Madina’s brother.
Off the busy main road, in a quiet alley, over 20 girls sit behind neat rows of desks facing a whiteboard. The girls are all elementary school age and wear matching white hijabs as they learn Dari phrases in a small classroom. A family charity called Khana e Meher, which translates to “House of Kindness,” runs the school for young girls and boys. The charity’s founder, Abdul Qadir Salehi, is a longtime social worker from Herat.
His wife, Najiba, identifies working children from families requiring assistance, and their daughter helps teach classes. The goal of the charity, Salehi says, is to encourage the children’s families to let them study instead of work. Once they finish their studies, Salehi refers the boys to apprenticeships for skilled work like carpentry that can guarantee stability and more income in the future.
“Our role is like that of a father and mother for these children because their families don’t have anything to support them,” he says.
The children at the school fall into two categories: Those who are neglected by their parents and those who have lost a father or mother. Some of the children are still working: The girls make money cleaning houses or shelling nuts, while the boys work grinding jobs like making mud bricks for construction sites.
Even before the Taliban took power, Afghanistan had a large population of working children. But aid workers like Salehi say the number has jumped since 2021. A 2023 Save the Children survey of six Afghan provinces, which didn’t include Herat, found that more than a third of children had been pushed into work to help their families.
Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs are monitoring child labor and “advise employers to refrain from hiring children for arduous work,” said ministry spokesperson Samiullah Ibrahimi. Repeat offenders are “referred to judicial authorities.”
While there are more children in need of help, donations to Salehi’s charity have fallen. Middle-class Afghan families can no longer afford to be generous, he says. Women and men who used to live comfortably off jobs at international nonprofits or had other employment and income can no longer provide support. Before 2021, Salehi’s school enrolled 90 children. Now, with donations down, he can support 60.
Najiba, dressed in all black with a surgical mask hiding her face, listens to her husband while a young boy lingers next to her skirt. The boy, named Omar, was shining shoes and collecting trash on the street when Najiba noticed him walking with a limp.
“This little one, his father was killed, and he’s the oldest in the family,” Najiba says, squeezing the boy’s shoulder. At 11, Omar is his family’s only son and the sole breadwinner for his mother and two sisters.
Like many others, Omar’s family moved to Herat from a province in northern Afghanistan two years ago.
Omar would take home 40 or 50 Afghanis (about 60 to 70 U.S. cents) after working a full day on the streets, barely enough to buy a few pieces of bread for his family. When Najiba offered to enroll him in the school program, Omar was elated but explained he couldn’t attend because of his responsibilities.
“I asked him, ‘Do you go to school, son?’ and he replied, ‘No, I don’t go to school because if I do, who will provide bread for us at home?’”
When Najiba visited Omar’s home in a particularly impoverished area of Herat city, his mother was using street trash as kindling to bring water to a boil. The family’s only food was bread and tea, Najiba says, pausing to wipe away tears.
In the past, the Salehis were able to distribute food to families of the working children twice a month but they now only give out food once a year as they don’t have enough donations. Providing lessons and a haven for children is what they can offer now.
“It’s the smallest service we can do for our country,” says Abdul Salehi, her husband.
“Imagine Afghanistan as a body with no part unscathed, a body completely covered in wounds,” he says. “We can only bandage some parts of it.”
Salehi unlocks his phone to show a stream of desperate messages from people asking for assistance.
“In Israel and Palestine there’s a war, where we see blood being shed,” he says, tucking his phone away in his jacket pocket. He pauses and swallows.
But the suffering of the Afghan people is invisible, he adds.
“They are suffocating and dying from poverty, yet, unfortunately, the world doesn’t see it. It’s like we’re experiencing the end of the world.”
Malnourished children
The U.N.’s World Food Program, a major food aid distributor that plays a vital role in Afghanistan, says a lack of funding means it will reach just over six million hungry people this winter with emergency food aid – less than half of those who need it.
Among children, malnutrition is on the rise. An estimated 2.9 million Afghan children will suffer acute malnutrition in 2024, according to the Humanitarian Response Plan for this year. Another 570,000 children are expected to become malnourished next year, according to Harald Mannhardt, the WFP’s deputy country director for Afghanistan.
Doctors at remote clinics run by international nonprofits are among the first to catch the most desperate cases.
Just a few minutes outside of Herat city, crowded markets and leafy boulevards give way to vast skies and sand-colored dwellings that look as though they’re carved into the arid landscape. Goats and sheep roam over desert terrain that resembles the rocky surface of Mars.
About two hours drive along the wide asphalt road that connects Herat to the Turkmenistan border is a health clinic called Yaka Dokan. It’s run by World Vision, a nonprofit active in Afghanistan for over two decades. The clinic, housed in several adjoining white shipping containers, serves 16 villages with a combined population of 5,400 people. It sees up to 150 patients a day, mostly children.
One weekday in October, more than an hour before the Yaka Dokan clinic is scheduled to open, a dozen women in billowing black burqas wait outside the gates. They huddle against the white wall circling the clinic, trying to shield their children from the bitter wind. By the time World Vision doctors drive up to the clinic in their minivan, more than 20 women and a dozen of their male guardians are assembled outside.
A few minutes after the clinic opens, dozens of women with babies and toddlers are queued up outside the office of Gulnisa, a 28-year-old doctor who serves as a community nutrition promoter for World Vision. Gulnisa and the other doctors interviewed for this story asked that only their first names be used, in line with the media policies of their organizations.
Wearing a white coat and a tartan scarf to cover her hair, she begins pulling out worn notebooks. A mother cradles a nine-month-old baby while another child sits quietly beside her.
Gulnisa instructs the mother to roll up the baby’s sleeves so she can use a color-coded tape to measure the boy’s upper arm. The baby begins to wail loudly as the doctor helps the mother lay him on a small scale. A wooden measuring device is then used to check his height. Once the boy is back in the mother’s arms, Gulnisa carefully touches his feet to see if there is any swelling visible on his limbs, an indicator of acute malnutrition. The doctor checks the measurements against a chart, which helps her determine whether the boy is malnourished.
The baby is too small for his age and is on the cusp of moderate malnutrition, Gulnisa tells the mother.
“He cries day and night and doesn’t sleep,” the mother says as she tries to hold the wiggling child in her arms. They have traveled from a village several hours away.
“Auntie, come sit down,” Gulnisa says, waving at a gray plastic chair. “Is he breastfeeding?”
“I give him goat’s milk,” the mother says in a tired voice.
“Why not breast milk?” Gulnisa asks. Informational posters about basic hygiene and the myriad benefits of breastfeeding cover the doctor’s walls.
“How can I? I have no milk at all,” the mother replies.
The doctor hands the mother a plastic bag with 15 sachets of therapeutic food supplements. Leaning over her desk, she demonstrates how to knead the small red and white sachet before cutting it open to squeeze out the supplement.
“Before giving him the food, you need to wash your hands with soap. Not only your own hands, but you must also wash your child’s hands,” Gulnisa says, explaining in detail how to also try and feed the boy soft foods like porridge.
“You must also collect the packaging and bring it with you when you come back. Every 15 days, which is two weeks later, you should come here on a Wednesday,” she says. “What day should you come? How many days later?”
“After 15 days,” the mother repeats after her.
“You must give the food only to this child and no one else, understand? Who should you give the food to, Auntie?”
“This child,” the mother replies.
If doctors were to screen an average of about 50 patients in a day, they’d find 20, sometimes 25 cases of moderate malnutrition, says Nisar Ahmad, another doctor at the clinic. An additional 10 patients or less would have severe malnutrition. Of those most severe cases, three or four of the children will have complications caused by a lowered immune system that need to be referred to a larger hospital.
“The situation is moving toward a crisis,” says Nisar Ahmad, 31.
Both doctors worry about what the winter will bring. Gulnisa spent last winter working in an even more remote clinic several hours northeast of Herat city. She says many families in far-lying villages there only had dry bread or potatoes to eat.
“In the villages where we work, things have gotten worse,” Gulnisa says.
Since the Taliban returned to power, the number of sites treating malnutrition has quadrupled, health ministry spokesperson Sharafat Zaman told Reuters. “We are fully prepared for this winter,” he said.
‘We have nothing’
When doctors at rural clinics like Yaka Dokan find a child suffering from severe malnutrition with medical complications, they are referred to the Herat Regional Hospital, where medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders, or MSF) operates a pediatric emergency room, an intensive care unit and an inpatient therapeutic feeding center.
On a late October day, the hospital, which stands behind a brick and concrete gate in the center of the city, is a hub of activity. Women and children pace around the parking lot, walking past rows of tents set up by families who cannot afford to stay elsewhere while their child receives treatment.
Inside, MSF doctors rush around the intensive care unit and adjoining feeding center, where dozens of babies and toddlers lie in cots next to concerned mothers and grandmothers.
Sediqa, an MSF doctor who works in the emergency room, says the number of patients with severe acute malnutrition and other complications is increasing daily. These children, most under two, have chronic conditions like congenital heart disease and neurological disorders, as well as severe issues like pneumonia, measles or sepsis.
Some of the children require surgery or other treatments that aren’t readily available in Afghanistan. Those with congenital heart defects in the MSF-supported pediatric department are usually put on a waitlist for surgery. In early November, 41 were awaiting cardiac operations.
“The capacity of treatment and surgery is low, so we have lots of patients who are dying while they are on the waitlist,” Sediqa, 26, says.
She makes her rounds in one of the wards of the therapeutic feeding center, where four babies lie in their cots. She leans over one, a two-and-a-half-month-old called Haliza, who balls her fists and cries when the doctor carefully lifts her yellow lace dress to check her heartbeat. A tiny breathing tube sits under her nose.
The baby’s grandmother, who has traveled eight hours by bus from rural Farsi district to bring Haliza to the hospital, says the girl is suffering from pneumonia and convulsions. Gaunt and clad in a floor-length black abaya, the grandmother says it’s the second time the baby has been admitted to the ward for malnutrition.
Last time, Haliza spent 19 days here, she says.
Looking over at the hospital staff, the grandmother says her seven-year-old niece back in the family’s village is also malnourished.
“We took her to the doctor many times, but she still hasn’t recovered,” she says. “You must help,” she says, with more urgency. “We have nothing.”
In aid-starved Afghanistan, relief workers fight a forgotten hunger crisis
The most high-profile assassination in Afghanistan since 2021 has sparked questions over divisions within the Taliban.
The Taliban’s minister of refugees, Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani, was killed along with four others in a suicide attack in Kabul on Wednesday.
The deceased minister was a senior leader within the Haqqani Network, the Taliban’s closest ally which has jointly controlled power in Afghanistan since 2021.
Haqqani’s killing was claimed by the ISIL (ISIS)-affiliate in the Khorasan Province, ISKP, and marks the most significant assassination of a leader in Afghanistan’s Taliban-led administration since the ouster of the United States-backed government of former President Ashraf Ghani three years ago, say analysts.
The bombing, they say, has raised questions about internal tensions within the Taliban and its allies, the influence of the ISKP in the country and security in Afghanistan more broadly.
Who was Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani?
Haqqani was the uncle of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s interior minister and the senior-most leader of the Haqqani Network.
Before being appointed as the minister for refugees, Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani was first charged with the security of Kabul city immediately after the Taliban seized control of the country. He was previously the Haqqani Network’s operational commander aiding al-Qaeda’s military in Afghanistan, and was crucial to his network’s fundraising efforts.
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In 2011, the US Treasury Department designated him a “terrorist”, with a reward of up to $5m for information leading to his capture and prosecution.
“He was incredibly significant,” said Ashley Jackson, the co-director at the Geneva-headquartered Centre on Armed Groups, adding that he was “instrumental in the creation of the Haqqani Network”.
“Moreover, he had a strong power base … within the government. We saw him early in the administration making moves to exert authority over UN agencies, and he was fairly autonomous and did his own thing basically,” added Jackson.
Indeed, Haqqani’s appointment to the ministry raised eyebrows among Western officials in 2021, said Graeme Smith, a senior consultant with the International Crisis Group. “They remembered him as a tough commander during the war and they worried that the refugee ministry would require a softer kind of personality who works well with NGOs,” he said.
But inside the government, Smith added, Haqqani became known as a pragmatist. “He was reputed to be lobbying behind the scenes for girls and women to attend secondary schools and universities,” he said.
While the Taliban has imposed a number of restrictions on women’s freedoms since taking over, there has been a degree of internal resistance, largely coming from the Haqqani leadership, towards the complete ban on women’s higher education in Afghanistan, say analysts.
“He was a formidable figure within the Haqqani Network. And the loss of a member with [a] ministerial position would diminish Haqqani’s power,” Jackson said.
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Is the Taliban-led administration divided?
While the attack was quickly claimed by the ISKP, the stature and nature of the target have sparked speculation over whether the assassination was the result of an internal tussle within the Taliban-led administration in Afghanistan.
An attack targeting a senior member of the Taliban and the Haqqani Network would have required a degree of planning and, possibly, infiltration, Jackson said.
“One cannot just simply walk up to someone like Khalil Haqqani and do this. He was a man who was — by all reports — heavily armed himself and surrounded by people who are heavily armed. And I would think it was very unlikely that he would let strangers in close physical proximity,” she pointed out.
Ibraheem Bahiss, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, suggested that the timing of the attack, which came at a time of rumoured divisions within the leadership over the increasing restrictions on women, has fuelled speculation of infighting within the Taliban.
There are many different power bases within the Taliban-led administration, Jackson agreed, and the Haqqanis, she said, “are the most powerful faction with differences of opinion” over some decisions taken by Taliban’s supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada.
Sirajuddin Haqqani, she said, has in speeches signalled disagreements — albeit respectfully — on issues such as the “forceful implementation of some edicts in the southeast regions where the Haqqanis hold sway”.
But the Taliban has dismissed talk of fissures. Senior Taliban leaders, including Abdul Ghani Baradar, who is the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, attended Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani’s funeral, where he spoke of “love and friendship” among the movement’s leaders. He reportedly asked followers not to give credence to talks of a split within the administration.
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And even if some differences exist, security analysts say they are not significant enough to result in open violence between factions.
“Disputes are normal inside of any administration and the political disagreements among Taliban leaders are well-known,” said Smith. “But no significant battles have occurred between major Taliban figures over the last three years.”
Jackson agreed.
“I don’t think these divides at this point are wide enough to trigger violent conflict. There’s no indication that the Taliban is divided enough to turn on itself,” she said.
In fact, she said, the Taliban continue to present a united front for the most part. “There is this ethos of obedience to the emir within their movement, which has so far prevented splits and divides from opening up into violent conflict,” she pointed out, referring to Akhunzada.
Is ISKP’s influence expanding?
However, if the ISKP is responsible for Haqqani’s assassination, this would suggest that the ISIL (ISIS) faction — despite a major Taliban crackdown on it — remains a potent force and serious security threat to Afghanistan and the region.
“This is the most high-profile assassination in a long time that we’ve seen and really suggests that if you can get to someone like Khalil Haqqani, there are serious problems in your security,” Jackson said.
A UN monitoring report in July estimated that the ISKP’s presence in Afghanistan “has increased from 4,000 to 6,000 fighters, despite the loss of territory and attrition among leadership”.
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Analysts say, however, that the ISKP’s attacks have trended downward over the last three years. “The Taliban struggled to contain the group during the first months after August 2021, and then a series of well-targeted operations against ISKP leaders constrained them. Violence levels have been dropping,” said Smith.
The assassination “has to be viewed in the context of ISKP’s fight for survival against the Taliban’s powerful security apparatus,” he added.
Bahiss, however, argued that amid “serious setbacks”, the ISKP has become “a lot more strategic”.
“They’ve generally tried to either target foreign interests such as embassies, hotels and tourists, or they have gone after senior Taliban leaders and ideologues, or they’ve continued to target Hazara civilians,” he said, referring to the persecuted ethnic Afghan minority.
Meanwhile, the ISKP’s international footprint and threat capacity have increased, Bahiss said. The group claimed responsibility for an attack on a Moscow concert hall in March in which more than 130 people were killed.
“So, even though they might be struggling in Afghanistan, they have become a lot more dangerous from an international perspective. And killing senior Taliban leaders ensures that they remain relevant as a political actor even inside Afghanistan,” he added.
The UN report in July also noted that the ISKP had “improved its financial and logistical capabilities and intensified recruitment efforts”. The ISKP has also been known to recruit from within the Taliban’s own ranks.
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Bahiss suggested this attack was likely due to a gap in the Taliban security measures, exploited by the ISKP.
“The idea that ISKP will completely disappear from Afghanistan – I think it’s unlikely. It’s a generational challenge that the Taliban will continue to face,” he said.
SOURCE: AL JAZEERA
Taliban’s Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani killed: Why it matters