‘Books they love’: A Kabul graveyard library for two schoolgirls

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Al Jazeera

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Kabul, Afghanistan – One morning in early October last year, 16-year-old cousins Marzia and Hajar Mohammadi were laid to rest next to one another in a remote graveyard on the outskirts of Kabul. Among the roses on the girls’ graves, their grieving family members placed a few of the teenagers’ favourite books – a tribute to their love of reading.

Marzia and Hajar were among the 53 students killed last September in an attack on a Kaj education centre in Dasht-e-Barchi, a predominantly Shia Muslim and Hazara ethnic minority neighbourhood. A suicide bomber detonated his explosives in a crowded classroom among students who had gathered for a practice university entrance exam. Most of the victims were young women.

While no group has claimed responsibility for the attack, the affiliate of the ISIL (ISIS) armed group in Afghanistan, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province, ISKP (ISIS-K), has targeted places where Hazaras worship, study and work. In April 2022, explosions targeted two educational institutes attended by students in the Dasht-e-Barchi neighbourhood, killing at least six people. The centre where Marzia and Hajar were killed had been attacked before – in 2018, in a blast that killed more than 40 students. ISKP claimed responsibility for that attack.

Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, ISKP has claimed responsibility for 13 attacks against Hazaras and is linked to at least three others, in which at least 700 people have been killed or injured, according to Human Rights Watch.

A bucket list of dreams

A day after Marzia and Hajar’s funeral, their heartbroken uncle, 42-year-old Zaher Modaqeq, discovered a number of diaries and journals among the girls’ personal effects. Deeply moved by their writing, he shared some pages from Marzia’s diary on social media, including a bucket list of things she wanted to do in life.

“My Marzia and Hajar were such amazing girls, so different than others their age. I wish more people could have known their determination,” Zaher reflected. “They could have inspired many, I believe they still can.”

Although Hajar’s parents did not wish to share their daughter’s writing in public, Zaher says Marzia’s entries provide a glimpse into both their aspirations.

At the very top of their bucket list was meeting their favourite author, Turkish-British novelist Elif Shafak. Other unfilled dreams included visiting the Eiffel Tower in Paris and eating a pizza in Italy. On social media, Zaher posted Marzia’s entry about shopping for books after the Taliban takeover. And he shared how the girls’ siblings left books on Marzia and Hajar’s graves. The posts went viral on social media and touched a nerve in a country which continues to lose its young people to continuing violence.

After Marzia and Hajar’s funeral, their 22 siblings returned regularly to the quiet, dusty, hilltop cemetery. About a week later, they found several books – mostly in Persian, some in English, and all well-worn from years of reading – left behind by strangers.

“We always knew Marzia and Hajar really loved books,” explained 21-year-old Insiya, Hajar’s older sister and Marzia’s cousin. But after pages of Marzia’s diary were shared on social media others learned “how much they liked being surrounded by books, and people honoured them with these books”.

A photo of a small building with a drawing of two girls on it.
The orange outdoor library in a Kabul graveyard dedicated to Marzia and Hajar [Courtesy of the Mohammadi family]

Strangers’ books

Pages from Marzia’s diary, daily notes she wrote to herself in neat, legible handwriting in Farsi and occasionally in English, were shared by Zaher with Al Jazeera. More than half a dozen diaries – some battered notebooks, others leather-bound planners – filled with hundreds of entries, reveal a determined young woman who found strength in books amid the attacks on Hazaras, an historically persecuted group, and other Shia Muslim communities, and growing restrictions on women under the ruling Taliban.

Since the Taliban’s return to power, it has shut down girls’ secondary schools, affecting about three million students, restricted women from entering workplaces and imposed other curbs on freedom including requiring a close male relative to accompany any long-distance travel.

On August 23, 2021, about a week after the Taliban’s takeover, Marzia wrote, “Today I stepped out of the house for the first time since the arrival of the Taliban … I had a feeling of insecurity and dread.”

The teenager went to a bookshop and bought The Architect’s Apprentice by Shafak, the author Marzia and Hajar idolised. “Today I realised how much I love books,” she wrote. “I like seeing people’s joy when they see and read books.”

As Marzia and Hajar’s siblings came upon more books left behind by strangers they decided to create a small outdoor library.

One family member brought out an old cupboard that had fallen into disuse. They cleaned and painted it bright orange – the girls’ favourite colour.

Fatema Khairullahi, an Afghan graphic designer, made an illustration of the girls after they had died showing them with a pine tree – a symbol of strength and resilience – and shared it on social media. When the family decided to set up the library they contacted the artist who agreed to recreate the image as a mural in the centre of the cabinet.

Marzia and Hajar lived in the same household with several families. Books were always stacked around the room they shared with their siblings.

“We made this library because we know how much they loved being surrounded by books,” explained Insiya, who sat with other relatives including Zaher, on toshaks, or traditional Afghan floor cushions, in the sparsely decorated family room of the extended family home.

“We feel this is making them very happy” as reading and being around books is what they wanted in their lives, she added, tearing up as she spoke. “Hajar had written in her diary, ‘I feel so good when I am reading. I feel like I am part of that story’.”

A photo of Marzia and Hajar Mohammadi as children sitting on the floor.
The cousins were best friends and were motivated to continue their education despite growing restrictions [Photo courtesy of the Mohammadi family]

Constantly learning

Marzia and Hajar were not just cousins – they were inseparable friends. They both dreamed of becoming architects and writers like the authors they admired.

“Most of us just read the books that we are supposed to read for our school, but Hajar and Marzia were different. They would read lots of different books, constantly seeking more knowledge,” Insiya recalled with a sad smile. “They wanted to learn more than what we learned at school.”

“I am confident these books made them stronger even in times of adversity and restrictions. It taught them to not give up and continue fighting for their goals,” added Nooria, a medical student, and the first woman in the family to graduate from university.

“When the girls in our family learned that some of them would no longer get to go to school, they were all very upset,” recalled Zaher, a tall man dressed in a simple shalwar kameez.

He and Nooria gathered them one evening soon after the Taliban takeover. “I brought them a cake and had a long conversation with them about how they must not give up. I told them they need to be stronger, they have to be different,” he said.

“When I read their diary entries from those days, I saw how motivated they were to rise up despite the new restrictions and challenges. They wanted to continue their education and had hoped to take control of their future,” Nooria added.

While they were alive, the cousins hoped to attend university. With their high school graduation delayed due to the closures, Marzia and Hajar were determined to press on and start preparing for the university entrance exam, which at the time they could sit for.

In February last year, Marzia wrote, “I have to try harder than yesterday and last week. … I have to make a decision to change my future and my life. The only way to succeed in an emergency situation like this is to study.”

She wrote about passing the university entrance exam as being the “first step” to securing a scholarship abroad so she could leave Afghanistan.

“I have to believe in myself and God will help me.

Time 12:30 midnight

In an undated entry, she writes about needing to continue her studies “with or without electricity”.

In their first mock university entrance exam, Marzia and Hajar scored 50 and 51 percent respectively. Marzia was disappointed. She would aim for 60 in the next test. “Bravo Marzia!” she wrote after she got 61.

Zaher shared how her scores improved until she got 82 percent, a result she wanted to maintain. “But then…” he said, his voice trailing off.

“Marzia and Hajar turned to their education and books for solutions when the situation got worse. Even when it felt like there was no hope of university, and some people were saying girls might not even be allowed to sit for the entrance exams, they still continued to study, read and learn on their own,” said Marzia’s older sister, 23-year-old Parwana. “They inspired us.”

In late 2022, just a few months after they were killed, the Taliban banned women from university. In January, the Taliban ordered private universities to not allow female students to sit for upcoming entrance exams.

‘A lot of pain’

Even before the Taliban restrictions, it was not easy for the women in Marzia and Hajar’s family to access education. “We had to struggle for it,” Nooria said.

“Our parents are illiterate and they didn’t understand the importance of equality; the boys were valued more than the girls,” explained Insiya, sharing how she and Hajar’s eldest sister stopped going to school after her marriage as a teenager. “But since then we have been fighting these traditions and gradually changing perspectives of the elders in the family towards educating girls,” she continued, referring to the many conversations that Zaher and others had to convince older relatives to allow women in the family to study.

“We live in a society where such change is hard, but Marzia and Hajar’s parents really came around to the idea and had been fully supporting their daughters’ education,” said Nooria.

Today, their parents and the rest of the family are still grappling with their loss.

“There is a lot of pain,” Parwana said, pausing briefly to hold back her tears. She took a deep breath and continued. “But building this space, this small room for them, has given us the opportunity to channel our hurt in a way that would make Marzia and Hajar proud.”

Zaher chokes back tears while speaking about his nieces, repeating how “unique” they were.

When the Taliban retook power in 2021 there was a mass exodus of Afghans, particularly those at risk of persecution.

Zaher said the family chose to stay to play their part in shaping a brighter future and peaceful society in Afghanistan.

“This is why we stayed, so we and our children like Marzia and Hajar, could be catalysts for change,” he said.

Now he only hopes that the memory of his nieces can inspire some positive change when it comes to girls’ education.

A photo of a metal cupboard, with a mural of Marzia and Hajar Mohammadi.

A metal cupboard, with a picture of Marzia and Hajar, serves as a second library established in honour of the cousins. The inscription at the top reads: ‘Hajar and Marzia had dreamed of becoming architects. Girls, you should follow their dreams’ [Photo courtesy of the Mohammadi family]

Inspiring new readers

The graveyard library on the city outskirts is not easy to access – it can only be reached by car – and as such, has not received many visitors. The library’s collection is slowly growing.

“But the reaction to it has been overwhelming, because many people are now talking about the importance of reading and education, the values that Marzia and Hajar strongly believed in,” Insiya reflected. She recalled how an older neighbour visited the graveyard and returned with one of the motivational books from the library.

“She came to our house later saying that she was inspired and wanted to read and learn more.”

In February, the family set up another small cupboard library with about 30 donated books – mostly novels including Marzia and Hajar’s favourite titles – in a primary school in their village in Ghazni province.

The family hopes to eventually set up larger libraries in memory of the cousins in Kabul and other Afghan cities. “It was Marzia and Hajar’s vision for all Afghan girls to be able to continue their learning, even if they can’t go to school,” said Nooria. “For now, this library is a symbol of that message.”

‘Books they love’: A Kabul graveyard library for two schoolgirls
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High Representative Says EU Cannot Abandon Afghan Women by Cutting Aid

The Islamic Emirate’s Spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, called aid by the international community a right of the people of Afghanistan.

Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said that they “cannot abandon the Afghan women to be punished twice,” both by the decision of the Afghan government and with cutting of aid by the EU.

Borrell made the remarks at a press conference on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly’s meeting in support of the Afghan women.

“We cannot abandon the Afghan women to be punished twice. First by the Afghan government decision and second by us cutting development support,” he said.

The Islamic Emirate’s Spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, called aid by the international community a right of the people of Afghanistan.

“The international aid which is based on humanitarian purposes, should not be linked to the political issues. It should not be halted. The Afghan nation as a war-affected country, has the right to receive aid. On the other hand, some of the political issues are not only within the Islamic Emirate, but the policies of the international community are also not positive,” he said.

The political analysts said that the continuation of aid will benefit the people of Afghanistan but called on the caretaker government to show flexibility in engagement with the international community.

“The Islamic Emirate should not hide the current situation from the people of Afghanistan and it should not blame others for it,” said Janat Fahim Chakari, a political analyst.

“The Islamic Emirate should also show some flexibility in its policies and it should have engagement with the international community, so that Afghanistan can stand on its own feet,” said Abdul Malik Afghan, a political analyst.

This comes as the Islamic Emirate’s decree barring women from higher education and working at NGOs faced a strong reaction by the international community.

High Representative Says EU Cannot Abandon Afghan Women by Cutting Aid
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The global aid system failed Syria just as it did Afghanistan. How long can this go on?

The Guardian
Mon 20 Feb 2023

We must make humanitarianism a global agenda, just like climate change, press freedom and gender equality

Under domestic pressures and international politics, there is a stark disparity in the way international rescue, relief and rehabilitation aid has been delivered to thousands of Syrians in comparison with their peers deserving equal care and attention in Turkey.

Timing and reach free from barriers are the key to a humanitarian response in a disaster. I learned this from some of the dedicated individuals at the Victorian Emergency Management Institute while mocking a rapid response exercise in an imaginary country.

I am a former war correspondent in Afghanistan and the week-long essentials of humanitarian practice course in Melbourne helped me explore the history of many of our household names in this sector, how they are coping or failing to cope with the ever-changing dynamics of international politics.

The setup designed for the training was imaginary, but what we are witnessing in places like Syria and Afghanistan is not a mock exercise of calamities of the worst forms but a toxic cocktail of egoistic human policies overlapping with natural disasters. For this, our global humanitarian ecosystem has no solutions, it seems.

The latest twin earthquakes of 6.4 and 5.8 magnitude in Turkey is just another reminder of the power of nature beyond state boundaries, and that a humanitarian response must be without limitation.

Generally speaking, the Syrian regime is at odds with much of the rest of the world – and of course with so many of its own citizens. It is one of the main hurdles stopping aid convoys and volunteers from reaching the needy, according to reports from the Syrian opposition-run rescue group, the White Helmets.

The Assad regime has only given the UN access to two border crossing entry points from Turkey for the thousands of earthquake victims, when much of the critical time to save lives has already been lost. We can add this to the list of atrocities committed by the regime in Damascus.

Does that mean we take this experience as a point of no hope and give up on critical humanitarian responses that are above and beyond all political boundaries? Definitely not.

The first Geneva convention of 1864 laid the foundations for many of the rules governing the mandate of humanitarian actors. Since then we have seen an array of large institutions emerge, such as the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross and many more. Our complex world today needs more robust and binding laws globally to be effective in stopping the conflicts in the first place and ensure a universal authority and access for humanitarians to the needy wherever, whenever.

Afghanistan is another dreadful example of humanitarian support left to the mercy of a brutal regime after the west abandoned the country to the Taliban, neglecting the needs of the country and its people. Now the sanctions imposed on Kabul, particularly its banking sector, make delivery of crucial aid for the war-ravaged country nearly impossible.

Destruction in Jindires, north-west Syria
‘Where are they?’ Anger in north-west Syria at slow earthquake response.

The blanket ban on a number of international non-government organisations in Pakistan following the killing of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden is another example of humanitarian assistance falling prey to politics.

All this makes headlines but so far hasn’t led to a more efficient and humanitarian system where no individual, group or country can hinder the delivery of lifesaving support in any corner of the world.

UN agencies as well as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies with its 192-member national societies comprises a wonderful global institutional network ready to come for the rescue of humanity when local governments somehow fully or partially fail. Still, the potential of these bodies is used mainly because of the contesting political influences that undermine the actual immunity for the humanitarian workers on the ground.

These groups need to have enough resources and power to replace persistent appeals for aid with a more sustainable method.

Whenever there is tragedy – like the current one in Syria and Turkey – we feel the senseless curbs on humanitarian activities and then forget. We need to make the idea of free humanitarianism a truly respected global agenda, just like climate change, press freedom and gender equality. In order to achieve this, we must do some soul-searching and find a way to end all barriers for aid in future.

Otherwise what is happening now will happen again.

  • Shadi Khan Saif is an Afghan journalist based in Melbourne
The global aid system failed Syria just as it did Afghanistan. How long can this go on?
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Is Pakistan Poised to Take on the TTP?

The Pakistani Taliban’s late January attack in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, claimed the lives of more than 100 worshipping at a police compound mosque. The bombing was claimed by a faction of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban) initially, but later denied by the TTP’s central leadership. It was the group’s deadliest attack since its 2021 resurgence after the Afghan Taliban took power in Afghanistan. As Pakistan struggles with a major economic crisis, the fallout from the deadly floods of last fall and an ever-turbulent political scene, the TTP’s growing threat presents yet another challenge for the struggling nation.

USIP’s Asfandyar Mir, Andrew Watkins and Tamanna Salikuddin weigh in on what the attack indicates about the strength of the TTP, how Islamabad could respond, the Afghan Taliban’s posture toward the TTP and the options for U.S. policymakers.

What does the Peshawar bombing indicate about the scale of the TTP’s threat to Pakistan?

Mir: The Peshawar attack, conducted by a faction of the TTP, is one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Pakistan in recent years. Its lethality and the ability of the attackers to penetrate deep inside what should be the most secure part of Peshawar suggests that the TTP has re-constituted a critical capability of urban attacks. The attack follows an escalation in the TTP’s violence including IED explosions and targeted attacks since late last year when the cease-fire between Pakistan and the TTP collapsed. Taken together, this signifies the steadily ascendant trajectory of the TTP, presenting a major medium- to long-term challenge for Pakistan.

The TTP’s escalating campaign of violence is a function of its growing political and material strength — reflected in its political cohesion, expanding cadre of trained fighters, suicide bombers, weapons and equipment. Much of the TTP’s political leadership and capability is based in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, the TTP has regained some territorial influence in southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, like South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Tank, Bannu and Lakki Marwat. The TTP is able to fundraise through extortion inside Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan — across provinces, there are fundraising drives for the group’s so-called jihad.

The Afghan Taliban remain very supportive of the TTP and are providing the group with a permissive safe haven. The TTP also has a lot of popular support in Afghanistan, where both Taliban and non-Taliban constituencies get behind the TTP due to a fervent dislike for Pakistan. Some Taliban fighters are also joining the TTP, and there are reports of some recent bombers being Afghan. A handful of Taliban leaders, in particular Taliban Interior Minister Siraj Haqqani, have restrained the TTP on Pakistani requests on occasion. Yet the balance of opinion within the Taliban is strongly in favor of the TTP and its campaign. In particular, Taliban Amir Hibatullah Akhundzada agrees with the TTP that Pakistani system is “un-Islamic.”

Could this attack shift the Afghan Taliban’s calculus regarding its TTP’s ties? How is the Afghan Taliban likely to respond going forward?

Watkins: The Afghan Taliban appear unlikely to shift their strategic calculus on providing support to the TTP. In the weeks prior and days after the attack, their public messaging has been almost defiant, offering the weakest of condemnations and painting Pakistan as ultimately responsible for militancy within its borders. Speaking to a gathering in Kabul two days after the attack, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, warned Pakistan against “pointing fingers” or “sowing the seeds of enmity.”

This undiplomatic rhetoric underscores the Taliban’s determination to continue supporting the TTP, even in the face of intensified pressure from Pakistan. In January, Taliban security officials leaked a memo to local press that offered a description of training camps allegedly based in Pakistan and supported by the Pakistani security establishment, where thousands of Islamic State fighters were preparing to attack Afghanistan. In effect, the Taliban’s response to being confronted about their support for TTP has been to level counteraccusations — which does not signal an impending shift away from that support.

These rhetorical signals are matched by anecdotal reports from U.N. officials and other observers of TTP individuals moving freely and conducting business in Afghan cities. Meanwhile, interlocutors with access to Kandahar report that the emir and his close advisors are unlikely to waiver in supporting the TTP on ideological grounds.

However, in spite of the Taliban’s firm strategic calculus in favor of the TTP, their leadership appears to understand the importance of maintaining a functional relationship with Pakistan — or at least preventing tensions from deteriorating into full-scale conflict. The Taliban’s posture moving forward will likely appear like a tug-of-war, alternating between moments of tension and de-escalation.

How is Pakistan likely to respond?

Mir: Pakistan’s response to the TTP’s resurgence remains incoherent — and it is unlikely to improve in the near-term. After downplaying the TTP’s strength as well as the Taliban’s influence on and relationship with TTP for several years, Pakistani leaders now seem to be contending with the depth of Taliban support for the TTP. Yet Pakistani officials still seem to be searching for a deal — ideally a cease-fire arrangement — through the Taliban. The military and intelligence leadership, as well as officials at the Foreign Ministry, appear to want to work with the Taliban, viewing it as more favorable than the former republic government — which is indicated by Pakistan continuously asking the international community to engage the Taliban. But the Taliban’s uncompromising commitment to the TTP means that Pakistan has to either ignore the violence or concede to the TTP to maintain a relationship with the Taliban.

Another key factor shaping the Pakistani response is the country’s deteriorating economy, which is on the brink of a default. That limits Pakistan’s military options. Pakistan can carry out raids and undertake defensive actions inside the country, but it doesn’t have the resources for a sustained high-intensity campaign. Pakistan has flirted with the idea of cross-border airstrikes again, which it last conducted in April 2022. There is some growing pressure for action, as parts of the Pakistani political spectrum are framing the terrorism resurgence as a conspiracy by the military to block former prime minister Imran Khan’s return to power and to get American aid. Yet economic pressures and the risk of a conflict spiral, especially amid reports of Taliban fighters joining the TTP, may induce doubts in Pakistan about such a cross-border operation.

Does the TTP threaten U.S. interests?

Mir: While the TTP’s threat to Pakistan is clear, the threat it poses to American interests is nebulous. When the group first emerged in 2007, it posed a direct threat to the United States in several ways. It was supporting the Taliban’s insurgency against the U.S. military and the now defunct Afghan government. It was attempting to — and at times actually killing — U.S. personnel in complex attacks. For example, in December 2009, in a joint operation with al-Qaida, the TTP succeeded in flipping a spy sent by the CIA to infiltrate al-Qaida leadership in Pakistan’s Waziristan region, dispatched him back to his CIA and partner government handlers with a suicide bomb at a forward base in eastern Afghanistan, which killed multiple CIA officers. In 2010, the TTP attempted an attack in New York City’s Times Square, which failed.

In 2023, the TTP doesn’t pose such a direct threat to the United States, at least in the near-term. In contrast to the past, TTP messaging makes the point that it has no direct aims against the United States. In general, the group appears more focused on its local agenda against Pakistan. One of the main reasons for this shift is the current leader of the TTP, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.

In Mehsud’s diagnosis of the decline of the TTP from 2011 to 2017, the biggest setback for the group was its targeting by U.S. drone strikes, which eroded the TTP’s combat potential. Mehsud is deterred from taking on the United States by the fear of drone strikes. So, he is steering clear of provocations and plotting against the United States, in the hope of not triggering another campaign of drone strikes against his group. The TTP’s calculus could always change with new leadership. And even under Mehsud, some risk remains as the TTP is unpredictable, having undertaken attacks that belie its stated targets including against Chinese diplomats in Pakistan.

With that said, the TTP continues to incubate other direct threats to the United States. For one, elements of al-Qaida and its South Asia affiliate continue to shelter behind the TTP in Afghanistan. In general, the TTP remains helpful to al-Qaida — although perhaps less so than in the past. If the TTP gains territory in Pakistan, al-Qaida will look for space in territories controlled by the TTP. There are other foreign fighters in Afghanistan with varied regional agendas, who will find a haven in Pakistan should the TTP make major territorial gains. The more important way in which the TTP can threaten U.S. interests is by seriously destabilizing Pakistan. This possibility is real yet not imminent. If it were to materialize, it will raise the specter of eroded Pakistani nuclear security, broader regional instability and migration concerns.

What policy options does the United States have?

Salikuddin: Unlike the TTP’s previous terror campaign from 2007 to 2014, this time the Afghan Taliban are in control in Afghanistan and the United States has no military presence in the region: two factors which make U.S. policy options against the TTP far more limited. In previous years, the United States had the intelligence and military posture to be able to help the Pakistani government and military when it went after the TTP. Today, the United States is far more constrained even in its understanding and capacity to help in any kinetic action against the TTP. As mentioned, the threat to the United States from the TTP is also far more nebulous — a reality that will not make this growing threat a U.S. policy priority. On the flip side, the United States does not currently factor in the TTP’s calculus, and any direct policy options which would change that and make the United States a target of the TTP or even the Afghan Taliban would not be palatable in Washington.

Given the current economic and political crisis in Pakistan, U.S. policymakers may be well placed to have conversations with Pakistani leaders about the need to focus and develop a clear counter-TTP plan. However, Washington’s ability to shape or assist on such a plan will be limited. Continued U.S. support to Pakistani police and other law enforcement agencies, including training and tactical equipment, may be useful in the fight against TTP. The larger question will be how Pakistan will handle the Afghan Taliban who provide safe haven to the TTP. It is unlikely that the Pakistanis will heed any U.S. suggestions to pressure the Afghan Taliban in Kabul (let alone break ties). If Pakistan takes action within Afghanistan and against the Afghan Taliban, it will be because of decisive move emanating from Islamabad, and not at the behest of the United States.

Is Pakistan Poised to Take on the TTP?
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The story of Shazia Ramzan, Malala’s schoolfriend, shows why education must be a right for all children

Gordon Brown is chairman of the UN’s Education Cannot Wait fund and was UK prime minister between 2007 and 2010

The Guardian

12 Feb 2023

As a child, Ramzan’s fight for an education almost cost her her life. Worldwide, there are 222 million children out of school who urgently need our help

Shazia Ramzan has spent most of her young life fighting for her right – and the right of all girls – to go to school. In 2012, at the age of 14, sitting alongside her friend Malala Yousafzai on a bus that was going from school to her home, in the Swat valley in the north of Pakistan, she was shot at by an extremist intent on stopping girls from getting an education. She suffered injuries from which she, Malala and their friend Kainat took months to recover.

Now completing a nursing degree at Edinburgh University, and preparing to start her own nurses’ training school in Pakistan, Shazia almost always has the needs of girls in her home area in her thoughts. In her time between classes, she is raising funds for Pakistani charities that are quietly but effectively helping Afghan girls who have been losing out on their education since the Taliban shut them out of the country’s secondary schools.

There are 5 million girls in Afghanistan who are currently out of school, and they urgently need our support. Many have risked everything by demonstrating in the streets of Kabul. While sooner or later the regime will find that they cannot forever oppress brave women who have known what it is like to be free, for now the young protesters face arrest and torture.

Shazia Ramzan
‘Between classes, she is raising funds for Pakistani charities that are quietly but effectively helping Afghan girls.’ Shazia Ramzan.

Theirs is an untold story of courage and resilience. Girls in Afghanistan are also at risk of punishment beatings if they attend underground schools run by their parents and teachers. Many more are fleeing across the border into exile in Pakistan in the hope of an education.

But, sadly, those who have crossed the border are joining Pakistan’s ever-lengthening queue for schooling that is already 23 million children long. This is not just because of the country’s recent floods, which have closed 27,000 schools, but because of Pakistan’s long-term failure to invest in girls’ education.

Step back and the picture becomes even graver: these girls are only a fraction of the world’s 222 million crisis-affected children who are in dire need of educational support. Of them, 78.2 million, including 42 million girls, do not go to school at all, while the others are suffering so many disruptions in their education that they fail to acquire even the most basic literacy and numeracy skills.

Their numbers, so large that they already exceed the combined populations of Germany, France and Britain, are rising every year. More than 100 million people are refugees or internally displaced because of conflicts and civil wars, from Ukraine and Myanmar to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.

A large number of children today, though, are exiled from their homes not because of war but because they are the victims of droughts, floods and other climate-induced disasters, or of natural disasters. In Turkey and Syria the dead are still being counted, but we must also address the urgent needs of the living, all those forcibly displaced by a 7.8-magnitude earthquake from which it will take years to recover. Even if we manage to feed, shelter and treat the victims, there will be little cash left over to provide temporary schooling, unless we do better than in the past; the child victims of the earthquake could spend years excluded from education.

In Turkey and Syria, as elsewhere, it will be girls who will suffer most: they are 35% more likely to be out of school than their male contemporaries, according to data from Unesco. And we have been warned to expect that by 2030 many of them – an additional 10 million girls – will have been forced into child marriages, the number of girl brides rising yet again after years when forced marriage was on the decline.

Children should not have to wait for wars to end, or for the effects of natural disasters to subside, for the opportunity to learn and thrive. It is to finance the education of the forgotten 222 million that Education Cannot Wait (ECW), which I chair, was created in 2017. Its replenishment conference will take place in Geneva this week in the presence of Andrew Mitchell and other international development ministers from all over the world.

Seeking to bridge the divide between humanitarian aid, only 2% of which was spent on education, and development aid, which always comes too late to deal with refugee crises, ECW is asking donors for $1.5bn to support its new strategic plan. Initiatives that will prevent child labour, early marriage and trafficking include the provision of safe schools in countries where Boko Haram still abduct girls from their classrooms; the expansion of online learning; and of double-shift schools that, piloted in Lebanon, use school buildings more effectively by teaching local children English and French in the morning and Syrian refugee children Arabic in the afternoon.

We know from unspeakable recent tragedies that hope dies when food convoys and rescue workers cannot get through to besieged towns, and when flimsy boats carrying refugees capsize at sea. Hope also dies when children are locked out of education and denied the chance to plan and prepare for their future. At the age of 11, 12 and 13, young people should be optimistic and excited about great opportunities that lie ahead, but I cannot forget hearing from charity workers in a refugee camp in Moria, Greece, who had discovered three refugees in their early teens so desolate that they were planning a joint suicide. For them, behind barbed wire in an insanitary camp with no schooling and little else, there was only the bleakness of despair.

But hope can come alive, even in the harshest and least promising places in the world, if we offer children the chance of an education. It is the one way to honour the international community’s as yet unredeemed promise set out in sustainable development goal 4 – to be the first generation in history where every single boy and girl, stateless or not, goes to school. As Shazia’s work of mercy reminds us, it is also a moral obligation that we owe to the next generation. Instead of developing some of the potential of only some children in some parts of the world, we should be developing the potential of every child everywhere.

The story of Shazia Ramzan, Malala’s schoolfriend, shows why education must be a right for all children
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The Politics of Survival in the Face of Exclusion: Hazara and Shia actors under the Taleban

Ali Yawar Adili

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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Since the Taleban’s return to power, an array of Hazara and Shia Muslim groups and individuals have tried to position themselves vis-à-vis the new order in an effort to protect a community that feels particularly vulnerable. The struggle over who gets to speak for the community has revived old intra-communal rivalries and factionalism, weakened their position and rendered them susceptible to division and manipulation. So far, the Taleban’s public messaging towards Shias and Hazaras has largely been conciliatory, as they sought to establish control, but has not been backed by positive action. Ali Yawar Adili (with input from Martine van Bijlert) provides an overview of the main Hazara and Shia political actors and their positions as they advocate for protection, political inclusion and religious recognition.

This thematic report looks at the leaders and groups that have scrambled to respond to the Taleban’s dramatic takeover and domination of Afghanistan. They are a mix of leaders and officials from the old mujahedin factions, marked still by old rivalries and enmities, along with new politicians who emerged from the churn of electoral politics, large protest movements, the university and clerical establishment. There are even one or two Hazara/Shia Taleban. They include:

  • The old guard leaders who held senior government positions under the Republic and were leaders or senior members of mujahedin groups (Muhammad Mohaqeq, Muhammad Karim Khalili, Sarwar Danesh and Muhammad Sadeq Mudaber). They are outside the country but maintain in-country contacts through their aides and party networks. Initially, they did not support armed resistance, hoping instead that the Taleban would form a government inclusive of Hazaras/Shias, but have since become more vocal in their criticism of Taleban policies and behaviour. Although they have hinted at the possibility of armed resistance, they have not taken any concrete steps so far.
  • Three aides to Mohaqeq, Khalili and Mudaber who remained in Kabul and formed an ad hoc coalition early on to engage with the Taleban in order to secure Hazara/Shia representation in the government. All three are longstanding acquaintances of the Taleban and used to serve as their leaders’ focal points with the movement. Two have recently been appointed to government positions.
  • Several cleric-led Shia organisations have sought to represent the community, including the old Shia Ulema Council of Afghanistan, the newer General Council of Hazaras, which was established by Kabul-based Grand Ayatollah Vaezzada after the Taleban takeover, and the Assembly of Shia Ulema and Influential Persons of Afghanistan led by Sayed Hassan Fazelzada; it had already lobbied in favour of the Taleban before the takeover. Sayed Hashem Jawadi Balkhabi, a rare Shia member of the Taleban, is included in this section because he is close to Fazelzada. He has been speaking on behalf of the Taleban since the takeover and was given a role in defusing tensions between the Kuchis and villagers in the spring of 2022.

Several newer politicians who have been seeking to expand their influence, including former MP Jafar Mahdawi and Deputy Minister for Economy Abdul Latif Nazari. Both have academic backgrounds and were in contact with the Taleban before the takeover. Since then, they have discouraged Hazaras from any confrontation with the Taleban.

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking the link below. 

The Politics of Survival in the Face of Exclusion: Hazara and Shia actors under the Taleban
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Afghanistan: single women and widows are struggling to find their next meal under Taliban restrictions

Professor of Gender & Development, University of East Anglia
The Conversation
February 3, 2023

Jamila*, a widow living in Herat, lost her husband in a suicide attack about eight years ago. She has an 18-year-old daughter who is blind and a 20-year-old son who lost both legs in a mine blast.

Jamila used to be a housemaid and bake bread for people in their homes. With this income she was able to feed her daughter and son, according to research carried out by Ahmad*, a former lecturer at the University of Herat and shared with me.

Since the Taliban gained control of the country, Afghanistan has been on the brink of universal hardship. As many as 97% of people are now estimated to be living in poverty, up from 72% in 2018.

The recent Taliban ban on women working in international and national organisations and women moving about public spaces has also affected women being able to find employment.

Because of the current situation Jamila has lost her clients and is now struggling to cope. She could not pay her rent and the landlord asked her to leave her home. She now lives in a small room that a kind family gave her in their yard. She has no source of income.

Previously about 10% of educated women in Afghanistan worked in national or international organisations to support their children. If less educated, they had a range of formal and informal jobs including working as housemaids, baking bread, washing clothes, cleaning bathrooms and babysitting, and in rural communities rearing small livestock and growing wheat, maize and vegetables.

Jamila said that previously under the former government her family received a monthly salary from the state ministry of martyrs and disabled affairs, which pays families of military veterans or those killed in the fighting, and that gave them enough money for bread.

The new government (the Taliban) has now stopped this salary … they don’t believe our lost ones are martyrs.

My son also had a job with the municipality office in a city parking lot, taking care of vehicles and collecting money from people parking their vehicles there. There were many handicapped people doing this kind of job. But now all of them, including my son, have lost their jobs.

The Taliban has appointed their own personnel in these parking areas. We have very few options left. A neighbour now drops my son near a bridge in the city where he begs people to help him with coins. He brings him back here in the evening. With the coins he brings, we can get only bread to survive until the next day.

Jamila is not an exception. She is one of thousands of women who have lost their jobs as a result of the new decrees. Many are acutely malnourished and don’t know where their next meal is coming from.

Single women and widows have practically no way of earning money. On-the-ground reports reveal that many households are supported by women as male members of their family were either killed or injured in the ongoing conflict.

It is not just food, but also shelter, water, fuel and warmth that contribute to survival, especially in bitterly cold temperatures. Ahmad, the former lecturer in Afghanistan, said:

Since COVID-19, my wife and I have tried to raise funds from friends to help poor families (especially widows). Very cold weather has been forecast for the western zone of Afghanistan in February.

There has been snow and the temperature has dipped to -25℃ at night early in 2023. One of my friends, who is in the US, helped us with some money locally to buy charcoal to help poor widows like Jamila cook food and warm up their rooms. My wife is also very frustrated and helpless in the current situation.

But, the plight of women-headed households, lacking adult males, is especially dire. In the absence of any social connection, they are increasingly food insecure, with few options to feed and care for their children.

Girls writing down work in notebooks.
The Taliban have stopped girls going to school in Afghanistan. ton koene/Alamy

This follows Taliban decrees banning women from education at the secondary and university level and not allowing them to travel without a mahram (male close relative as chaperone). The Taliban also ordered the closure of all beauty salons, public bathrooms, and sports centres for women, important sectors of employment for women.

Overall, the dire situation in Afghanistan has increased the incidence of extreme hunger and malnutrition for both men and women, but women without husbands are being pushed into even more extreme poverty.

According to UN resident and humanitarian coordinator Ramiz Alakbarov, “a staggering 95% of Afghans are not getting enough to eat, with that number rising to almost 100% in female-headed households”.

The January 2023 high-level UN delegation led by Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed called on the Taliban authorities to reverse the various decrees limiting women’s and girl’s rights for the sake of peace and sustainable development. While the backlash against women’s rights needs to be urgently addressed, the crisis of food and nutrition security facing single women, widows and separated women, is not being recognised by many outside the country.

According to the 2015 Demographic Health Survey, only 1.7% of Afghan households were headed by women. The January 2022 report from the UN World Food Programme places this at 4%.

As a former employee of the Afghanistan Central Statistical Organisation, responsible for population data collection in four districts of Bamiyan province, told us: “It is very difficult to collect accurate population data.” She said that previous data concerning women-headed households was now likely to be invalid.

While women’s rights are under attack in Afghanistan, the full effect of the ban on women’s work and mobility on single women, widows and separated women, is yet to be fully recognised. While appeals for help to the United Nations by teachers, professionals and civil society activists are rising by the day, negotiations are not progressing, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance is becoming increasingly challenging.

It’s difficult to estimate how long local communities, themselves struggling to survive, can keep women-led households and their families alive.

**All names in this article have been changed for security reasons

Afghanistan: single women and widows are struggling to find their next meal under Taliban restrictions
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Talking with the Taliban: a necessary exercise in frustration

By Edward Girardet

Global Geneva

UN Humanitarian Chief Martin Griffiths meets with Taliban leaders in Afghanistan. (Photo: UN)

UPDATE: At a UN press conference in New York on Monday 30 January 2023, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths stated that they were hopeful the Taliban would rescind at least some of their constraints, but could not say when or to what extent. “Our job is to identify the opportunities (of persuasion by the international community, local populations and within the Taliban themselves) and to advocate constantly for a fair and just Afghanistan,” he said.

While United Nations humanitarian chief Martin Griffiths appears to have made headway in convincing the Taliban to loosen some of their recently imposed constraints against women, it still looks as if everyone is shooting themselves in the foot when it comes to dealing with Afghanistan. The country’s hard-line rulers, whose dogmatism is not necessarily shared by all the movement’s factions, see no reason why they should buckle as they were the ones to have won the war. The international donors cannot be perceived as engaging with any hint of official recognition, while Pakistan, Iran and other regional players are not stepping up to mediate. For the UN, International Red Cross and 100-odd non-governmental organizations still operating out of Kabul, they must figure out how to help Afghans survive. As pointed out by knowledgeable sources, the only pragmatic option is to focus – to cite Winston Churchill – on long-term and discreet ‘jaw-jaw’ on multiple fronts if Afghanistan is to emerge from its dire humanitarian and economic imbroglio, including the possibility of renewed ‘war-war’.

“It’s a brutal situation because none of the key players are willing to back down,” said the representative of an international organization with several decades’ experience in Afghanistan and the region. “You cannot go in and tell the Taliban what to do. They’ll only hunker down even more because they don’t care what outsiders think. And the Americans and Europeans only want to talk about girls’ education and women’s rights, so that’s not going anywhere. The Taliban hardliners did not fight all these years to re-impose an equitable society. That’s the sad reality, but once this is recognized then perhaps the international community can start moving forward.”

As both he and other experienced observers point out, there is no single approach that will convince the Talib leadership to change its policies. The international community may be looking at months, possibly years, to achieve even limited reforms with different initiatives by respected groups and individuals ranging from international NGOs, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, to the UN itself.

At one point, too, countries perceived as neutral such as Switzerland, Norway, Finland and Iceland might emerge as possible long-term mediators. When asked to comment, the Swiss Foreign Ministry maintained that while it remains in touch with key actors in Afghanistan and across the diaspora, and is fully prepared to offer its good offices, “any mediation requires a mandate and the consent of the parties to the conflict.” Switzerland has mediated in the past and played a crucial role in talking to all warring groups during the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. There is also pressure that ‘International Geneva’ embrace a more engaged mediation rather than messenger role(See SwissInfor article)

The Swiss government helped bring representatives of the mujahideen, or holy warriors, to Geneva for talks during the late 1980s to promote peace negotiations with the Soviets. For its part, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had begun supporting Afghan rebels in July 1979 to fight the communist regime in Kabul. It drastially increased its military and funding backing when the Red Army invaded a few months later. (Photo: Wikipedia)

How to get the mediation process moving

“But it may take a respectedfigure – whoever that be, Afghan or otherwise – to initially open the door,” noted Michael Keating, executive director of the European Institute of Peace (EIP) in Brussels who first became engaged with Afghanistan during the UN’s Operation Salaam in the late 1980s leading to the Soviet Red Army withdrawal. “This will mean someone highly knowledgeable regularly visiting or even based in Kabul who is respected by the Taliban. We’re talking about a lot of tea-drinking and patience.”

“You can talk an Afghan into going to hell, but you can’t talk him into going to heaven.” (Afghan proverb)

Some believe that former president Hamid Karzai, a Pushtun from Kandahar, or Abudullah Abdullah, a Tajik-Pushtun from the Panjshir and former Chief Executive during the NATO occupation, could emerge as possible candidates. Others disagree arguing that neither command sufficient credibility or trust. While the last western-backed Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, has proposed himself as a contender, he is widely regarded as corrupt and arrogant with little or no leverage left. As a result, finding a reputable Afghan with standing remains a critical challenge. As one analyst put it quoting an old Afghan saying: “You can talk an Afghan into going to hell, but you can’t talk him into going to heaven.”

British businessman and former journalist Peter Jouvenal (left) meeting with Taliban to discuss possible private sector investment prior to his arrest in Kabul in autumn, 2021. Despite being on good terms with various Taliban leaders, Jouvenal may have been the victim of factionalism within the Taliban and the principal reason behind his six-month detention. Despite his ordeal, Jouvenal believes that constant dialogue may prove the only way for the international community and the Talib leadership to come to terms with each other. (Photo: Peter Jouvenal family)

Some, too, including within the international aid and conflict resolution community, believe that the private sector could play a significant role. Peter Jouvenal, a British businessman and former journalist engaged with Afghanistan since 1980, who was arrested and held last year for six months by the Taliban, sees it as capable of nudging the current regime toward greater openness. “If the Taliban are able to see that more open investment is one of the only ways of helping the country back to recovery, then they may agree to re-establishing certain rights,” he said. “But they will only do it on their own terms, not if they’re pressured.” (See Global Insights article)

As for China, India, Turkey and Qatar, they are all exploring investment possibilities, notably mineral resources with an estimated worth of up to three trillion dollars yet remain hesitant as long as the Taliban go against the international flow. “The Chinese are not particularly looking to help resolve the Taliban’s political problems but are quite happy to engage with economic initiatives that can be exploited regardless,” said one international aid source in Kabul referring to Beijing’s efforts to develop the Mes Aynak copper mine, one of the world’s largest with up to 12 million tons of reserves. “We’re looking at significant potential investment initiatives, but these may drag out for years.”

Russia is reportedly seeking to purchase sophisiticated military hardware and ammunition abandoned by NATO forces in the summer of 2021 for its war in Ukraine. (Photo: TASS)

Russia, which previously supported the anti-Taliban resistance leading up to the US-led invasion in October 2001, is believed to be negotiating with the cash-hungry Taliban for the purchase of sophisticated military equipment for deployment in its war in Ukraine. Abandoned by NATO forces during their calamitous withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, much of it, including ammunition, is lying in guarded but often exposed storage locations.

Many majority Muslim countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, which had diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in the past, disagree with the Taliban’s backtracking on women’s education and their right to work. As pointed out by one Dubai-based international lawyer, “some openly consider such constraints as un-Islamic and have made this point to the Taliban.” To date, no country recognizes the Taliban regime. and hence there is insufficient lobbying to generate the official representation at the UN that the de facto regime in Kabul seeks. Various Afghan diplomatic missions such as Geneva and Washington are still represented by pre-regime ambassadors, several of whom see themselves as possible players toward bringing about rapprochement, although it is unlikely that the Talib hardliners will cooperate with them.

Afghanistan is running out of time

For Keating, the main objective now is restoring economic activity. “Humanitarian aid is essential but not the answer. And western development aid is politically impossible,” he adds. “A complete collapse in trade, investment, jobs will deepen the humanitarian crisis, will not resolve the human rights situation and will make women and children even more vulnerable. Rebooting the banking system and investments to create jobs is fraught with complexity but may increase the chances of the kind of change the international community is seeking.”

According to UN estimates, a staggering 97 per cent of Afghans are now living in poverty, while two-thirds require basic humanitarian aid to survive. Out of a population of 40 million people, half face acute hunger. So Afghanistan, which now represents the world’s largest humanitarian operation with 28 million receiving aid, is running out of time.

As Martin Griffiths, head of the UN’s humanitarian operation (OCHA), maintains: “Without women working, we can’t deliver for the people who are in fact the primary objects of humanitarian assistance – women and girls. So it’s a practical matter. It’s beyond rights.” With many years’ experience dealing with the Taliban, Griffiths, who has just completed a dialogue foray to Afghanistan as part of an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) team, expressed hope that the leadership would be willing to rescind their recent ban on women working with international aid organizations. (For the moment, this does not affect Afghan women employed by the UN).

The Afghan Red Crescent Society providing humanitarian relief in Afghanistan. (Photo: IFRC)

“I think they’re listening,” Griffiths told the BBC of the Talib ministers he had met. “They told me they will be issuing new guidelines in due course which I hope will help us reinforce the role of women.”At the same time, Griffiths is fully cognizant that any long-term reforms may take a lot of subtle, under-the-radar negotiation to convince the Taliban.

Yet even this may not prove easy. As the Taliban’s head of Disaster Management, Mohammad Abbas Akhund, a cleric, told the BBC: “Men are already working with us in the rescue efforts and there is no need for women…” He strongly condemned the UN and other aid agencies for not respecting “our religious beliefs,” an allegation denied by Griffiths who said that such beliefs are always respected wherever the UN operates. Akhund further maintained that even if the UN halted its distribution of food to Afghanistan this would not change his government’s position.

For the moment, much of the work undertaken by UNAMA in Kabul is in the form of its own subtle diplomacy. “Maybe 95 percent of what we do is based on quiet discussions with the Taliban, ordinary Afghans and the different NGOs,” said one UNAMA representative. “This is the only way to know what really is going on.”

UN Deputy Secretary-General, British-Nigerian Amina Mohammed. (Photo: UN)

Nevertheless, UNAMA regularly helps organize official UN visits, such as the high profile four-day visit by a delegation in mid-January 2023 headed by UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed, a British-Nigerian Muslim, to “appraise the situation, engage de facto authorities and underscore UN solidarity with the Afghan people.”

While the largely female delegation, including the director of UN Women, an agency focusing on women’s issues, met with select Talib leaders in Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat, it was not received by any key figures. The most notable, Haibatullah Akhundzada, the fundamentalist Pushtun Islamic scholar, cleric and jurist considered to be the supreme leader of the Taliban refused to meet with them. But then, as one international source in Kabul pointed out, “this is not surprising as he does not even meet with some of his own ministers.”

While the UN delegation sought to reach out to Afghan women but also NGOs and other organizations to emphasize the international community’s committment to female rights, it was criticized for playing to the gallery without contributing toward any real change other than to aggravate the hardliners. While Griffiths’ trip was perceived by some as a “to do” intiative by someone with significant background to Afghanistan, Mohammed’s was referred to as one more “for show”.

A similar largely women’s visit conducted during the first Talib rule in 1997 produced equally limited results. When a delegation headed by the European Union’s Emma Bonino together with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour sought to highlight the plight of Afghan women by filming in a Kabul hospital, their highly mediatic presence only managed to anger the new Jihadist leadership who ordered the temporary arrest of all 18-members of the group.

As a businesswoman, Hassina (middle) has also been active with her support for women and children, including widows. (Photo: Hassina Syed archive)

“Perhaps I shouldn’t say this as a woman, but many Afghans were shocked by the way she (Amina Mohammed) went about her visit,” said Hassina Syed, an Afghan businesswoman, philanthropist and politician. Syed, who was evacuated from Kabul in August 2001 to the United Kingdom, remains in close contact with Afghanistan, including the Taliban. “We are all deeply concerned by what is happening and we want to help, but you need to be serious about connecting with the Taliban.” (See Global Insights article)

Syed further stressed that if one is to make headway in bringing about genuine change, then one needs to operate with the right background experience based on a close knowledge of the country. “You need to work with quiet diplomacy and be in Afghanistan fulltime. That’s the way Afghans are. It takes a long time to build trust. You can’t just go in there and talk about women’s rights. They’re not going to listen to you.”

Another concern voiced by Afghans and international aid representatives is that some international donors would like nothing better than to disengage from Afghanistan. This is primarily for budgetary reasons but also because of other more immediate distractions such as Ukraine. As some donors have already noted, the international community fought a pointless war and spent billions of dollars trying to support Afghanistan’s long-term recovery to no avail, except, as some maintain, its ability – largely the result of efforts by UNICEF – to send millions of girls to school and to university. (See Global Insights article)

So why continue? The fact that much of the responsibility for this horrendous failure must lie with the West’s managerial incompetence, lack of vision and often blatant corruption is becoming increasingly forgotten. “These governments simply want out,” said an aid representative. Or, as one former US diplomat seeking to justify the Trump-Biden fiasco put it: “Contact us in a hundred years if you’re serious about change. Then we’ll help you.”

The Taliban: A Revolutionary Franchise

French helicopters overflying Kabul during the 2001-2021 NATO occupation of Afghanistan. The US-led Coalition forces fought the Taliban for nearly two decades from October 2001 to the summer of 2021. (Photo: Edward Girardet)

Another problem is that there is no one Taliban. It is a movement – a “revolutionary franchise” as one UN representative aptly put it – consisting of different factions, commanders, and leaders. While perhaps a majority of Taliban in leadership positions in different parts of the country may disagree with the hard-line approach imposed by Kandahar, which is rapidly becoming the real capital of Afghanistan, they are too afraid to step out of line. Rifts are steadily emerging among Talib ranks, including in the Kabul government, to the point of violent altercations and even fistfights.

As various aid workers have pointed out based on their contacts with the regime, many Taliban have nothing against women working or girls going to school. “But you’re dealing with an extremely narrow-minded and traditionalist vision at the top seeking to impose its own version of what the ‘new’ Afghanistan should look like,” said one aid source.

In many ways, Afghanistan is witnessing a replay of when the Taliban first took power in Kabul in September 1996, eventually controlling nearly 90 per cent of the country prior to the US-led invasion of October 2001. The Ministry of Vice and Virtue regularly announced new ‘Tali-bans’ such as the prohibition of girls to attend high schools, the playing of music, the taking of photographs, the wearing of high heels that “make noise in the streets”, or even the flying of kites. And yet, many Taliban did not fall in line with what the leadership of the new Islamic Emirate declared. Travelling in Afghanistan at the time, the further away one got beyond Kabul the more young Talib fighters wanted their pictures taken. Or they listened to Iranian and Bollywood pop songs on tape cassettes.

As part of an initiative which may now be revived, a Swiss-based NGO, Media Action International (MAI), collaborating with the BBC created Radio Education for Afghan Children (REACH) in 1998 to support the clandestine home schooling of girls throughout the country. Talib commanders regularly – and surreptitiously – stopped by REACH’s office in Peshawar to pick up freely distributed course books for their children and communities. “A lot of the Taliban wanted their girls to be educated,” said a former MAI programme director.

It is no different today. Numerous Taliban have made it very clear that they want their girls to be educated, including at university level. According to UNICEF an estimated 200,000 girls are currently attending high schools in 12 out of 34 provinces, largely because of local pressure. As these Taliban stress, only female doctors, teachers, and community workers should interact with their women, not males. So this means ensuring that enough qualified women are trained. Many, too, want their wives to work. They desperately need the revenue. According to sources, both families and communities, many of whom have no jobs or means of survival, are increasingly pushing their leaders to resolve the current crisis in Afghanistan.

“The Taliban are going to have to do something about this. They can’t continue as before, and they know it. The Pushtun Kandahari leadership may be bloody-minded, but one needs to give them a way of getting out of this doldrum without losing face,” maintained an international source in Kabul.

One is also seeing a somewhat different Taliban in the manner with which the franchise is organized. The Taliban today are far more multi-ethnic, including minorities such as Tajiks, Uzbeks and even Shia Hazaras. There is also far less interference from outsiders such as the Arab Jihadists, Pakistanis and other Islamic interests which dominated the first Talib rule of the late 1990s. Pakistan, which played a double game through its powerful military InterServices Intelligence Service (ISI) backing the Taliban right up to the NATO withdrawal, has far less influence today. Several incidents along the Afghan-Pakistan border also recently broke out in which a number of soldiers on both sides were reportedly killed and wounded. The Taliban are also at odds with ISIS, Al Qaeda and other Jihadist elements.

Nevertheless, as some observers point out, an emerging reality is that the Kandahar leadership may seek to impose even more Pushtun dominance over the country. Traditionally, Afghanistan has always been run by tribal Pushtuns, who have tended to encounter trouble whenever they sought to push their own interests over others, including rival tribal Pushtuns. In the long run, such control is unlikely to be accepted by Tajik, Uzbek and other ethnic groups currently collaborating with the Taliban, particularly if the humanitarian and economic situation deteriorates further.

Talib commander Azizullah Asif and eight of his fighters in Baghlan Province who reportedly joined the National Resistance Front in the summer of 2022 citing “oppression, cruelty and crimes” within the Taliban as the reasons behind their defection. (Photo: NLFA)

Insurgent groups, such as the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRFA) headed by Ahmad Massoud, the son of assassinated guerrilla leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, have been attacking regime positions on a steady basis since last spring, 2022. So have various armed Hazara and other groups. They expect to increase their insurgency as soon as the snows melt. While resistance leaders met with US officials in December 2022 to discuss options, Washington, which backed the anti-Soviet mujahideen with weapons, training and funding during the 1980s, is cautious about whether it will again support armed revolt.

Another possibility is that the Taliban themselves could start imploding, particularly if former collaborators representing ethnic minorities in cities like Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Kunduz react to further imposition of hard-line Pushtun doctrine by Kandahar. For the moment, however, the emphasis is on peaceful resolution, possibly in the form of an internationally overseen Loya Jirgha, a traditional form of “grand gathering” bringing together all parties and ethnic groups possibly leading to a Swiss-style Federation of semi-independent regions. This system was proposed – and rejected – at the December 2001 Bonn talks by the leading donors in favour of top-down government from Kabul, a decision which may have cost Afghanistan long-term peace and the return of the Taliban.

Talking with the Taliban: a necessary exercise in frustration
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New Lives in the City: How Taleban have experienced life in Kabul

A large number of Taleban fighters have moved to Afghanistan’s cities since the movement’s capture of power, many of them seeing life in the city for the first time in their lifetime. These fighters, many of whom are from villages, had lived modest lives, entirely focused on the war. Their circumstances have changed entirely since the Taleban’s victory. Guest author Sabawoon Samim has interviewed five members of the Taleban who have come to live in Kabul, a city they had seen as being at the heart of the ‘foreign occupation’ with its ‘puppet government’ and a population degraded by Western ways. How have they found the actual Kabul and its people, and what do they think about having to earn a living for the first time, keep office hours and live in a city full of traffic and millions of other inhabitants?
In the aftermath of seizing power in Afghanistan in August 2021, a huge number of Taleban foot soldiers rushed to the country’s capital, Kabul. For many, born into rural families and with their adult lives spent primarily on the battlefield, it was the first time they had come to the capital. They had not even been born or were still children when the Taleban’s first emirate fell. Even their seniors, who had experienced life in a major city like Kabul, would find the Afghan capital of 2021 a very different place to when the Taleban had last ruled there – the ruins left by the civil war had long ago been re-built, the city itself had become vastly bigger and the population increased manifold. Some of those newcomers to Kabul have settled in the city and we wanted to find out how they had experienced this sudden shift and what they thought of Kabul – and Kabulis.

To this end, the author conducted in-depth conversations with five members of the movement about their new, post-takeover life. They ranged in age from 24 to 32 and had spent between six and 11 years in the Taleban, at different ranks: a Taleban commander, a sniper, a deputy commander and two fighters. They were, respectively, from Paktika, Paktia, Wardak, Logar and Kandahar provinces.

All the interviewees had spent their formative years within the Taleban, typically joining as teenagers. Following the fall of the Islamic Republic, they had secured jobs in the new government. Two were appointed to civilian roles, the other three to security jobs, one in the Ministry of Interior and two in the armed forces. All are now living in Kabul, without their families, and only return to their home provinces during vacations. Four out of the five interviews were conducted in October 2022 and the last in November, all face-to-face in Kabul. The interviews have been lightly edited for clarity and flow.

The interviewees refer to ‘the fatha’, pronounced fat-ha. This is the Arabic word for conquest or victory, used for when new lands are ‘opened up’ to Muslim victors, or lands ‘recovered’ from non-Muslims. The interviews also refer to the war as a jihad and themselves as mujahedin. They speak of going on ‘tashkils’, which are similar to deployments – specific periods of time when they were away fighting.

In the Taleban hierarchy, fighters were organised into ‘groups’, bands of a few dozen men under a sub-commander, known as a ‘sar-group’ (head of the group). Several groups formed a ‘dilgai’, headed by a senior commander, known as a ‘dilgai meshr’. He was directly associated with the Emirate’s Military Commission.

Throughout the text, the interviewees refer to their old commanders as ‘Mawlawi Sahib’, as a mark of respect, combining the term used for an advanced religious scholar with the word for ‘sir’.

Omar Mansur, 32, Yahyakhel district of Paktika province, married and father of five, head of a group

I was born in North Waziristan but spent my childhood in Yahyakhel. I started my education in the village mosque and then moved to a small madrasa that was built during the first emirate in the neighbouring district. At the time the Americans invaded, I was only 11 years old. Because of that invasion and the subsequent indiscriminate bombardments and night raids, I was determined that the jihad against the foreigners[1] was fard [obligatory in Islam]. I had only studied up to wara dawra [12th grade of madrasa] when I abandoned the rest of my madrasa studies, and for the next 14 years or so, I would go on tashkil.

The jihad was already in full swing in our district at the time. I did my first three tashkils in Yahyakhel and then relocated to Kunar province. The rest of my jihad was in various provinces, including Laghman, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika and Ghazni. I first became a deputy of our group in Mawlawi Sahib’s dilgai and then its commander.

Praise be to Allah, after the fatha, Mawlawi Sahib introduced me to the Minister of [name withheld] and told him to appoint me somewhere. I was appointed to a grade 3 position as head of office.[2]

I haven’t brought my family to Kabul. The rent of houses is very high for us since our salary is no more than 15,000 afghanis [roughly 180 USD]. It is fully sufficient for Yahyakhel but not for Kabul. As soon as, God willing, I have a good salary, I will bring my family here.

I had never been to Kabul before. We heard from the radio and people who travelled there that it was constructed very beautifully by the Americans and [Hamid] Karzai. But still, you know, it’s not as beautiful as it should have been. The Americans brought untold amounts of money, but rather than spending it on building the city to a higher standard,[3] most of it went into the pockets of [Marshal Qasem] Fahim [the late vice president and Shura-ye Nizar/Northern Alliance military leader], Karzai, and their like. Yet, I assume, it’s the most gorgeous city in Afghanistan. In contrast to Kabul, our Paktika seems very displeasing. It’s like the Karzai government only spent money on Kabul.

What I don’t like about Kabul is its ever-increasing traffic holdups. Last year, it was tolerable but in the last few months, it’s become more and more congested. People complain that the Taleban brought poverty, but, looking at this traffic and the large number of people in the bazaars and restaurants, I wonder where that poverty is.

Another thing I don’t like, not only about Kabul but broadly about life after the fatha, are the new restrictions. In the group, we had a great degree of freedom about where to go, where to stay, and whether to participate in the war.

However, these days, you have to go to the office before 8 AM and stay there till 4 PM. If you don’t go, you’re considered absent, and [the wage for] that day is cut from your salary. We’re now used to that, but it was especially difficult in the first two or three months.

The other problem in Kabul is that my comrades are now scattered throughout Afghanistan. Those in Kabul, like me, work from 8 AM to 4 PM. So, most of the week, we don’t get any time to meet each other. Only on Fridays, if I don’t go home, do we all go to Qargha, Paghman or Zazai Park. I really like Paghman and going there with friends makes me very happy. Such a place doesn’t exist in the entire province of Paktika.

What I like most in Kabul is its relative cleanness and how facilities have been modernised and improved, the buildings, roads, electricity, internet connection, and so many other things. You can find taxis even at midnight, hospitals are on the doorstep, and schools, educational centres, as well as madrasas are all easily available on every corner of the city. The other positive feature of Kabul is its ethnic diversity. You can see an Uzbek, Pashtun and a Tajik living in one building and going to the same mosque.

Some people have a very negative picture of Kabul. What I experienced here in the last years, though, is that one can come across the perfect Muslim and the worst. Unlike villages where a lot of people go to the mosque to impress others, people in Kabul go there just for the sake of Allah. Unlike the villages where people endeavour to be called generous, people here do charity for the sake of Allah – people know little about each other and so they don’t need to impress each other.

Similarly, there are plenty of bad and wicked people. They’re morally corrupt, Muslim only in name, sinners. I can’t make up my mind whether there are more good people or bad here, though there are both, and it’s up to you who you interact with. Living in Kabul could have either consequence; it could corrupt a very good mujahed or turn a very bad mujahed into a good man. It all depends on who you socialise with.

Huzaifa, 24, from Zurmat district of southeastern Paktia province, married and father of two, sniper

I grew up in Zurmat. I was around 13 years old when my father enrolled me in a nearby madrasa. I left it without finishing my studies after five years because a friend of mine convinced me to join him in the Taleban. My family tried their best to persuade, at first me to leave the Emirate, and then our commander to expel me from his ranks. They said if I came home, they’d get me engaged to someone. But once someone spends time in the group, leaving that friendly and endearing environment is difficult. There was love, sincerity and above all the thirst for martyrdom. Worldly pursuits were not even a minor part of life at that time. All we were doing was sacrificing in the way of jihad as hard as we could.

I was a lizari [sniper] and spent most of my time in Paktia, only on some occasions going to Khost and Paktika provinces. In the time of jihad, life was very simple. All we had to deal with was making plans for ta’aruz [attacks] against the enemy and for retreating. People didn’t expect much from us, and we had little responsibility towards them, whereas now if someone is hungry, he deems us directly responsible for that.

After the fathawe moved to Kabul and our dilgai meshr was appointed head of a police district and later head of a directorate at the Ministry of Interior. I, along with a few other friends, were given masuliat (official jobs) in the police district the day we arrived in the city, while other friends were sent to the MoI.

It was the first time I ever saw Kabul. I haven’t seen all the provinces, but people say Kabul is the most beautiful city in Afghanistan. When I joined my group, I was of the idea that Kabul would be full of bad people, but to be honest, in the last couple of years, after we met some of the people living here, I realised I was wrong. Of course, it has plenty of negative aspects, like their support for the occupation, women not wearing proper clothing, youths flirting with girls and cutting their hair in a style even people in America might not adopt, but these are the problems that nowadays exist also in the rural areas.

After we arrived in Kabul, we were stunned by its complexity, its expanse, its size. We didn’t know where to go. Everything was strange to us and of course, we were strange to the local people – to the extent that they were afraid of talking loudly to us. When we came to our hawza [police district] and saw the compound, the weapons and the security measures, it was unbelievable how they’d abandoned such places without firing a single bullet. We were stunned by the cowardice of the [former] army and police. If even a very small number of them had tried to fight us, we couldn’t have made it to Kabul for years, given its complexity and the weapons they had. Praise be to Allah, [the victory] was directly because of His help.

One thing I don’t like about Kabul is that people have moved here from all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and among them, a large number of criminals from across Afghanistan have made their way here and turned the city into a hub for their illegal activities. We face a lot of difficulties in eliminating crime, particularly robbery.

And the savageness of people against each other, in particular against women – dozens of women approach the hawza on a daily basis and register their complaints. They’re victims, subject to different forms of brutality. The head of the hawza and all other mujahedin pay special attention to solving their problems. During the first days when women approached us, many mujahedin, including myself, were hiding from them because never in our whole lives have we talked to strange women. In the days that followed, the head of the hawza instructed us that sharia does allow us to talk to them because we are now the authorities and the only people that can solve their problems.

I prefer to live in Kabul. It has its good sides and its bad, in fact, not only Kabul but everywhere has positive and negative features. In Kabul, what’s good is that you have access to every facility. Most importantly, our jobs are here now, and it’s necessary to move our families here as well.

What I don’t like about the city is that it’s like a closed society. People live cheek-by-jowl but don’t interact with each other. This is in part bad, as people don’t cooperate with each other, but also has a positive feature: unlike the village, no one bothers you about what you do, what you wear, who comes to your home and who leaves it. People don’t interfere in your life and don’t talk about you behind your back.

There is another thing I dislike and that’s how restricted our lives are now, unlike anything we experienced before. The Taleban used to be free of restrictions, but now we sit in one place, behind a desk and a computer 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Life’s become so wearisome; you do the same things every day. Being away from the family has only doubled the problem.

I’ve made friends with three guys who are from our province but have been living here [in Kabul] for more than 15 years. We sometimes go to Qargha, Bagh-e Wahsh [Kabul Zoo], Sarobi and Tapa-ye Wazir Akbar Khan. To be honest, every time I go with them, they pressure me to play and listen to music in the car. At first, I was resisting, but now I have given in, with the one condition that they turn it off when passing through security checkpoints because many other Taleban don’t like it, and it’s bad for a Taleb to be seen listening to it.

Although my new friends are from good families and are good lads, there are a lot of bad circles of youths in Kabul who smoke, use drugs and do bad things, so it’s hard for us to become friends with them. Our nature and values differ, and therefore most of our friends don’t make many friends in Kabul because we don’t fit in with them. Despite this, some Taleban have now become friends with such youths and are inclined to do many bad things, such as going hookah cafes [qilun khana].

Kamran, 27, Sayedabad district, Wardak Province, married, father of two, deputy group commander

I graduated from a government school in Sayedabad and then abandoned any other studies for the sake of jihad at the age of 19. This has been my 8th year in the Emirate. Most of the time, the areas our group controlled were in the various districts of Wardak province. I participated in many battles. Sayedabad was a place in which the Americans left dozens of dead bodies. The intensity of Sayedabad battles is well-known throughout Afghanistan.

In the last three years, I was deputy to the commander of our group, responsible for most of the day-to-day activities we dealt with since the head of our group was busy doing other non-military stuff.

During the jihad, the fear of drones followed us like a shadow, and the area where we operated was geographically very small in the early years. When travelling along the road to Ghazni city, we frequently attacked the Americans with RPGs, dashakas [DShK, a type of heavy machine gun] and roadside bombs, inflicting dozens of casualties on them. They then came after us in retaliation. Their drones often bombarded our positions. Everywhere we went, went the fear of drones. Even though the situation changed in the last two or three years [of the fighting] – the Americans and government army [owrdu] completely disappeared from the scene – the danger of drones still affected our movement. In fact, excluding their bombardments, we never considered the Americans and their puppets superior to us, [certainly not] in face-to-face battles.

Circumstances have now, Praise be to Allah, changed completely. We can go wherever we want. There is freedom and liberty in the entire country.

I’d been twice to Kabul before the fatha, once for treatment to a doctor in Baharistan [a neighbourhood in Kabul’s PD2].[4] Both times, I was in fear of being arrested. At that time, Kabul was occupied, and the police were harassing men if they had a beard. During one of my visits, I was going from the Kampani area to Kot-e Sangi, and our bus was passing through a checkpoint near the Kampani bazaar. When they saw me, they immediately stopped the bus and started asking me questions. I was about to be captured but, Praise be to Allah, I deceived them. From that day, I started hating Kabul. However, you see, I’m now here in Kabul, but it is not the same Kabul I visited before. It’s now liberated and belongs to us, not the Americans.

I was appointed to a job in the Ministry of Interior. I’m sort of happy with my job but often miss the time of jihad. During that time, every minute of our life was counted as worship.

After the fatha, many of our friends abandoned the cause of jihad. Many others betrayed the blood of the martyrs on which foundation this nizam [the government] is built. Nowadays, people are fully busy gaining wealth and fame, more and more, in this worldly life. Previously, we were doing everything for the sake of Allah, but now it’s the opposite. The first priority of many is to fill their pockets and become famous.

If you ask me why I’m unhappy in the aftermath of the fatha, it’s that we immediately forgot our past. Then, we had only a motorcycle, a mukhabira, [a type of Walkie-Talkie] and a mosque or madrasa. Now, when someone’s nominated for a government job, he first asks whether that position has a car or not.[5] We used to live among the people. Many of us have now caged ourselves in our offices and palaces, abandoning that simple life.

I don’t interact with Kabulis much, given that here, the ministry is full of my fellow Taleban. Anyway, sometimes I sit with the employees of the former regime who still come to their jobs. They show themselves to be very good people and sincere to the Emirate, but I can tell you that, in reality, they hate us. I don’t exactly know why, but I’ve identified some possible reasons this past year. First, these employees were ‘doing business’ in the ministry, making illegal wealth through corrupt practices. Second, the Americans invested in them heavily, and they became so Westernised they now hate our real Afghan culture and Islam. When the Emirate came, their illegal business and corruption vanished entirely and they have nothing but their salaries. They are no longer able to make millions of afghanis. So, you tell me, why shouldn’t they hate us?

I’m very concerned about our mujahedin. The real test and challenge was not during the jihad. Rather, it’s now. At that time, it was simple, but now things are much more complicated. We are tested by cars, positions, wealth and women. Many of our mujahedin, God forbid, have fallen into these seemingly sweet, but actually bitter traps. They forgot their old comrades on whose shoulders they secured victory and instead seek the praise and approval of sycophants. The old, the real mujahed doesn’t know the meaning of sycophancy. So they are sidelined, while their places are filled by people who, until the past year, were against us in so many ways.

I’ve not considered living in Kabul [permanently with the family]. Of course, it’s beautiful from the outside, but it lacks tranquillity. In the village, people are with you in good times and bad, in life and death.[6] You have a community. You sit together with people, talk over problems and cooperate with them. In Kabul, it’s the opposite. People don’t have time to even give you directions, let alone help you, for example, with a wedding ceremony. People are hurrying and running after this worldly life. They feel like, if one day they don’t go to work, they would die of poverty. For me at least, I belong to the village, and I can hardly imagine surviving without it.

Abdul Nafi, 25, Logar province, Baraki Barak district, married, father of two, fighter

I grew up in Baraki Barak. I studied school up to sixth grade and then continued the rest of my education in a madrasa up to 12th grade, joining the Taleban from there – almost seven years ago.

At that time, we were doing jihad, it was a holy path and gave us real delight. During jihad, you couldn’t have known the difference between a commander and a foot soldier like me. We sat together, we talked without any inconvenience, and they were sympatric towards us. Our superiors fought shoulder-to-shoulder alongside us, and we all wept together for our martyrs. It was an environment of sacrifice. We fought the war with high morale and determination.

However, all that changed after the fatha. I am myself a mujahed, but now I struggle to get to see a small director, let alone a deputy minister or minister. This isn’t true of all of them, but many of the leaders have turned their backs on their comrades of the hard times.

On the second week of the fathaI made it to Kabul. I hadn’t been there before. It seemed a very big city and I worried about how we’d all find our way around. Now, I might better know the streets of Kabul better than many Kabulis. I go home once a month, sometimes twice. In the village, I look like a haji because when a haji comes back from pilgrimage, his skin looks soft and his face pale and I’ve, similarly, come back from pleasanter weather and the cleaner environment of Kabul.

In the first days [of our coming to Kabul], our dilgai meshr was assigned to a key position in the Ministry of [name withheld]. He told two other comrades and me to be his guards. The rest of our dilgai was strewn about in Kabul and Logar. Mawlawi sahib is a very kind man and hasn’t abandoned his old friends. For the first five months, I was with him with no official status. He paid some of my expenses from his own salary. After that, he told me he’d appoint me to a job in the ministry and registered the two other friends as official guards. He said I’d easily learn how to work. Thus, I was appointed to a grade 4 position as executive director, and in the meantime, I continued my job as his guard. I live with him in his house. It’s a big villa that [a senior leader, name withheld] has given him. He’s always telling me to bring my family and live on one of the floors. But I’m hesitant because of the cost.

When I started my job, I didn’t have a clue how to deal with the tasks. Mawlawi sahib told me to take a computer course and an English course. Almost four months ago, I started both courses near our Ministry. I learned many computer programmes during this period. Not only that, I quickly learned the tasks related to my job. All the staff, including Mawalwi sahib, have been happy with my work. People blame the Emirate for all the professional people fleeing the country, but when I see the employees in our ministry, they’re neither professional nor educated. All of them were appointed through wasita [connections] and knew little about how to manage and do their jobs. You might not believe me, but I now do my work better than many of them. You might not believe what I say about learning the various aspects of my job and mastering Kabul streets, but let me tell you a fact about the Taleban: We are very smart and intelligent, and we are fast learners.

I sometimes miss the jihad life for all the good things it had. Similarly, in the beginning, I yearned for the village, but I’ve now become accustomed to my new circumstances.

In our ministry, there’s little work for me to do. Therefore, I spend most of my time on Twitter. We’re connected to speedy Wi-Fi and internet. Many mujahedin, including me, are addicted to the internet, especially Twitter.

In those first days, when we sometimes came out of the ministry to Macroyan bazaar, there were a lot of women wearing indecent clothes. We anticipated they would wear hijab,[7] but after the initial days when women feared the mujahedin a lot, their attire has actually become less proper.

Now, they’ve become assertive to the extent they’re entirely heedless of us. Many of our friends say that, apart from us coming and replacing the police and officials of the former regime, little has changed from the Republic’s time in Kabul. During the first few days, many of my comrades and I hardly dared to make our way to the bazaar because of them [women]. We hoped the situation would soon get better, but it didn’t. Even worse, one of my classmates in his computer course is also a woman. We sit in the same classroom. Although I despise women that don’t wear proper clothes, nonetheless, I can’t turn my back on the bazaar or my class because of them. If they’re unashamed, let us also be so. This is the only thing I never imagined a Taleb would encounter in his lifetime.

In the first days, everyone feared us and we had the chance to change many things, but I think in the last year, people observed us, interacted with us, and now no longer fear us because they understand that Taleban are neither Punjabis[8] nor any other sort of strange human being.

What I dislike about Kabul is its traffic and what I fear is its thieves. We have never seen this much congestion, and in comparison to Kabuli drivers, we can hardly make our way through the streets. I don’t know how people live in such a mess. The other thing is Kabul’s thieves. Although Taleban have had the good fortune to capture [many], rather than diminishing, they increase in number, day by day. I keep my pistol on my person all the time after two of our comrades were robbed.

Abdul Salam, 26, Dand district of Kandahar province, married, father of three, farmer

I joined the Taleban when I was 20. At the time, I was helping my father in farming and only joined the Taleban after my elder brother was martyred. I studied neither at madrasa nor at school.

I did all of my tashkils in Dand, Maiwand and Shah Wali Kot districts [in Kandahar province]. The time of jihad was very good for us. I myself, for example, was not responsible for contributing to the livelihood of the family since my other brothers took care of it. They did so because they understood that jihad is obligatory.

Not only this, but at that time, people would also do their best to help, shelter and buy us clothes, shoes and petrol for our motorcycles.

However, everything has changed since then. The family wouldn’t tell you blatantly to bring home your entire salary so they can feed your children because it’s no longer a jihad, and you should take that on your shoulders, but you could feel from their behaviour that this is exactly what they mean. Furthermore, when sometimes I want to come from home to Kabul, for example, and I don’t have a vehicle to go with, I come to the nearby road so a passer-by could pick me up and drive me to Kandahar. But once an old man with his old Corolla stopped, I thought he did so to pick me up, but he didn’t. Rather, he mockingly told me that now the entire government is in your hands, so you no longer deserve help, adding that now it’s your turn to pay back all the help we have given you.

Whatever happens in Afghanistan, people blame us. Even a minor misdeed by us makes it to the media that the Taleban are doing this and that. It’s like the cameras of the entire world are watching us.

I came from Kandahar almost two months after the fatha. Our friends who’d arrived before me were given control of a police district. I was also given a job there. Currently, I, along with a few other mujahedin, man checkpoints on the road.

Around my second month, I became fed up with this life and intended to leave the Emirate and start a small business. My friends drew me back from that, saying: If we all leave, who will run the government and what will happen to the Emirate? Living in a place where you don’t understand the language and don’t fit in with its environment isn’t easy, especially for a mujahed. Praise be to Allah, it’s now more than a year since I’ve been in Kabul. I only go to Kandahar every four or five months. Unlike others, the people of Loy Kandahar [Greater Kandahar] are very resistant to being away from family.

I hadn’t visited Kabul before. I thought Kabul would be a city full of evil. In fact, it’s not as evil as we assumed. I don’t know if all that was eliminated by the mujahedin or if we were mistaken about that from the beginning.

In Kabul, it’s very difficult for us to live. When we sometimes go to Haji mullah sahib’s [referring to a senior commander] home, it’s a very small place with an inflated rent. Unlike homes in Kandahar, people only have three rooms in a pocket-sized apartment. There is no separate guestroom.

Although now we can go everywhere without fear, the war is over, and an Islamic system is in place, it’s still difficult not to miss the days of the jihad. At that time, we weren’t under strict supervision, we weren’t curbed because the Emirate needed us, and as a consequence, they provided us with more freedom. Now, on the contrary, they don’t need us as much as they did at that time. Besides, they pay us money. There is a proverb in our area that money is like a shackle. Now, if we complain, or don’t come to work, or disobey the rules, they cut our salary. Unlike jihad, now particularly, when the battles are long gone and the risk is zero, the Emirate could find countless people to work with them in return for a salary.

I spend most of my time with my fellow Taleban. On Fridays, we go on mila [picnic] to Qargha, Paghman, or other places. From Saturday to Thursday, we’re busy manning the checkpoints day and night, but I’m trying to get a job in Kandahar.

What do the interviewees’ experiences of their new life tell us?

At the end of the war, the gravest risks to which our interviewees had been exposed, of bombardments and night raids, evaporated. They were the winning party and, as such, these rural Taleban fighters were rewarded with government jobs and significant privileges. Yet, victory also precipitated many difficulties for them. City life is so absolutely different from what they were used to, presenting unexpected problems but also unexpected delights. Three of our interviewees said they were going to bring their families and live permanently in Kabul, whereas two said they would leave them in the village and are actually hoping to be able to leave Kabul themselves at some point.

Broadly speaking, all of our interviewees preferred their time as fighters in what they considered a jihad. Then, their lives were simple. They had few responsibilities or complications. Everything they faced was associated with war and the battlefield and their behaviour was bound by the strict norms of the madrasa. Our interviewees perceived the jihad as a religious duty and living such a life or dying in this way was deemed a form of worship and an honour.

Integrating into the formal order of government administration has turned into a major headache for our interviewees. The old structures with which they were familiar and comfortable vanished with the takeover and the dynamics of their lives changed utterly. Interviewees remarked on how their leaders and commanders, who used to live among them, have now shut themselves away in far-off offices. They also feel the degree of sincerity shown by fighters towards each other has faded. They lost many of the freedoms they enjoyed throughout the insurgency. The shift to working within government structures has forced them to adhere to official rules and laws they never faced before. They find ‘clocking in’ for office work tedious and almost unbearable, although some said they were now getting used to the routine.

The trouble that victory has brought to their lives does not end there: they also now need to earn money to support themselves and their families, something that was not needed during the insurgency when their own expenses were covered by the movement and they were entirely exempted from family needs. Now, Taleban must provide for themselves and contribute to the family finances. The jihad, a religious duty which exempted them from such everyday concerns, is over: they now have to work for the survival of their families like everyone else. The sudden reversal of roles experienced by Taleban fighters, from being able to foment popular discontent against the corruption of the Republican government to being cast as the cause of the country’s current economic woes has made a deep impression on the respondents. Three of them mentioned this in their interviews.

For our interviewees, despite all these problems and hassles, life in peacetime Kabul has had its pleasing sides. Interviewees were delighted by the city’s sights and development and nearby places of natural beauty like Paghman and Qargha. They thought Kabul far better than their native provinces in terms of development and modern facilities. Contrary to their assumptions, most had been surprised to find both good and bad people living in Kabul as in the rural areas, and at least one pointed out that the social ills that nowadays exist in Kabul also exist in Afghanistan’s villages.

The social influence of living in an urban context on these Taleban is noticeable. Our interviewees had a negative picture of Kabul before the takeover, but living in the city has changed their perceptions. Their interaction with women has come a long way from what one could expect, given the Taleban movement’s conservatism. Our interviewee with the female classmate, for example, spoke to the author in the company of a fellow Taleb who, after the interview, jokingly told him, “Why didn’t you tell him the story about when your female classmate started a conversation with you, and you talked to her quite comfortably?” On the streets of Kabul, Taleban fighters have often given interviews and spoken to female YouTubers, an act that would have been completely forbidden throughout the movement’s past (see for example thisthis and this video).

Some of our interviewees, and other Taleban, have slowly begun to look critically at their own attitudes and the way they dress and conduct themselves in public. One Taleban fighter told the author in early July 2022 that “I don’t know when we [Taleban] will learn to be like normal people. The style most of us have in Kabul [long hair and a style of wide, baggy piran tomban] is very strange at this time and in this situation. The time this style looked good is long gone and we need to adjust to these new circumstances.” The reduction in the number of Taleban carrying AK-47, M416 and M16 guns in bazaars is possibly also stemming from such considerations.

The Taleban Ministry for Promoting Virtue and Preventing Vice has been vehemently attempting to keep former fighters occupied with religious studies. This has been successful to some degree, but the bulk of the fighters are now both away from the strict environment of the madrasa and the movement’s rural bastions. Not only that, but working in ministries has meant their interest in religious studies has suffered significantly, with a considerable number registering themselves instead in English and computer classes, which they deem necessary if they are to strive in their new roles.

What may have prevented Taleban from undergoing a greater degree of change in attitudes and public behaviour is just how strong the norms established in the madrasa and the insurgency still are. This is in part due to the strict bonds of friendships the Taleban have built up. They still live and interact mostly with fellow Taleban and so there is a lot of mutual reinforcing of their social norms.

The conservative notions of our interviewees, who have interacted with non-Taleban, have eased a great deal. External influence and interactions with actual Kabulis have already made inroads into their thinking. However, the author has also encountered Taleban who have remained strictly within their old circles and say they dislike the city and condemn its inhabitants for not living in accordance with what they consider true Islam. They are also worried about comrades ‘back-sliding’. One scholar recently warned a gathering at a mosque in Kabul attended by the author that: “The mujahedin need to be ideologically and intellectually strengthened,” so, “they don’t fall into the traps of this shar ul-qurun [the worst of times.].”[9] Another Taleban-affiliated mullah at the same gathering said, “The possibility that we could go in the wrong direction is now at its highest, God forbid. I see many mujahedin turning away from the cause of jihad and sharia and instead chasing worldly pursuits.”

Maybe, some Taleban have wondered, should smart phones and the internet be banned for their former fighters, given they are, as claimed in an audio recording from one cleric that is circulating, among the biggest sources of “corrupt[ion] among the ranks of the mujahedin.” As to the reason why some Talebs from Kandahar prefer to stay there rather than getting jobs in the capital, according to a commander from that city who spoke to the author in December 2021, it is down to their concerns about “the immoral environment of Kabul [which] is very harmful to the faith of everyone, especially the mujahedin.”

Victory for the Taleban in August 2021 brought Afghans who had had little to do with each other suddenly face-to-face as the winning party took power in the cities. Rural and urban, fighters and civilians, madrassa and school-educated, victors and those they now rule, women outside in public with ‘open’ faces and men whose female relatives live in purdah are all now mixing.  Among some Taleban, the desire to keep the movement away from ‘city influences’ and indeed wrench the entire urban society ‘back’, as they see it, to true Islam, is strong. At the same time, others have come to have a more nuanced view of city life and a more realistic appreciation of its good and bad sides.

Edited by Kate Clark and Fabrizio Foschini

References

References
1 Literately, ‘Jews and Christians’, a term picked up from non-Afghan Islamist discourse and now used by Taleban generally to refer to non-Muslims.
2 Head and deputy of a directorate and head of a sub-directorate (amiriat) would be appointed as grades 1, 2 and 3 employees in a scale for civil servants going from 1 to 8, which the Emirate has kept from the Republic.
3 The post-2001 expansion of Kabul and other cities was the result of private and personal investment rather than overseas aid.
4 He did not talk about his second visit; perhaps it was for military purposes.
5 Directors and deputy directors are given a governmental vehicle.
6 ‘People are with you in your death and your life’ is a Pashto proverb which means that community members stand shoulder to shoulder with and help each other in ceremonies, funerals, weddings and in times of hardship.
7 ‘Hijab’ has a specific meaning in Afghanistan, as this AAN report explains: Strangers in Our Own Country: How Afghan women cope with life under the Islamic Emirate, stated:

Unlike other parts of the Muslim world, when Afghans refer to ‘hijab’, it is a reference to clothing that is bulky and covers both head and body and possibly face, either the chadori (burqa), which covers the face, or the abaya, with or without a niqab, or in some areas, an Iranian-style chador.

8 During the war, those opposed to the Taleban, government officials and others, used derogatory names for the Taleban, such as Pakistani and Punjabi, to imply they were so unpatriotic as to not even be considered Afghan.
9 Literally, the ‘evil of the centuries’. Many mullahs in Afghanistan say the world has almost reached its end and, 15 centuries since the Prophethood of Muhammad, which was khair al-qurun or the best of times, now is the worst when it comes to fitna (social disorder or chaos, which facilitates sin), immorality and irreligiousness.

 

New Lives in the City: How Taleban have experienced life in Kabul
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Winter has come for Afghanistan

By Ishaan Tharoor
with Sammy Westfall
The Washington Post

January 30, 2023

For much of the past year, the West’s policymakers and analysts were possessed by one haunting question: How bad will Europe’s winter be? Energy prices on the continent surged because of the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia’s energy industry. The prospect of a deep cold spell as European governments rationed gas supplies conjured images of a bleak winter from Lviv to London, with industry going dark and pensioners scavenging for firewood.

But consider another part of the world that has receded from the West’s attention over the course of the Ukraine conflict. Afghanistan is currently in the grips of its worst winter in more than a decade. Temperatures recently plunged to below minus-34 degrees Celsius (minus-29.2 degrees Fahrenheit). Officials in the local Taliban government said the cold has been lethal, leading to more than 160 deaths over the span of about two weeks, and killing more than 70,000 livestock.

My colleague Sammy Westfall noted the details at the end of last week: “Of the 162 people who have died because of the cold weather since Jan. 10, more than half died in the past week, said Shafiullah Rahimi, a spokesman for the Ministry of Disaster Management, Reuters reported Thursday. Afghans have been dying of hypothermia, as well as carbon monoxide poisoning and gas leakage, amid a widespread lack of heating systems, local outlet Tolo News reported.” The death toll is expected to rise as communities in rural areas dig themselves out of the snow.

The dismal conditions have struck a society ill-equipped to cope. Afghanistan is already buckling under the stress of a rolling humanitarian crisis, triggered by years of drought and the economic implosion that followed the Taliban’s takeover in 2021. The country’s foreign reserves are frozen by U.S. sanctions; its banking system has collapsed, partially due to the disappearance of foreign aid; and the price of ordinary goods — including firewood and coal — have skyrocketed. Two-thirds of the country’s 40 million people will likely require humanitarian assistance of some form in 2023, including some 15 million children. Roughly half the country may face acute food insecurity.

Afghanistan imports the bulk of its electricity from its neighbors and the country is accustomed to shortages and power cuts. But the blackouts this winter have proved all the more miserable, forcing families in some instances to choose between feeding themselves or trying to keep warm. Many are struggling to do either.

“If we buy coal and wood, then we won’t be able to buy food,” a woman named Maryam in Samangan province, north of the Hindu Kush mountain range, told Al Jazeera. “This is the coldest winter of my life, and I don’t know how we will survive it without food or heat.”

Sharafuddin, a resident of the city of Herat, told Radio Azadi last week: “During the cold nights, we are awake with our children and cannot sleep. It is already midday, and I have neither had breakfast nor drank tea. … I’m sitting here praying to God.”

The country’s hospitals are “on life support,” according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. A health worker in Kabul described to the New Humanitarian what happened when her clinic had to turn off its generator after continuous use: “We had to shut it for two hours, and we told the mothers to find a way to warm their newborns. If we kept them in the incubators without electricity they would freeze. If we took them out, they could have problems breathing.”

The difficulty of the situation is exacerbated by the defiance and extremism of the Taliban authorities. Since seizing power 18 months ago, the fundamentalist Islamist movement has set about reversing the legacy of two decades of U.S.-backed government, banning girls from secondary schools, then universities and most recently barring women from working in domestic or foreign-backed nongovernment organizations, many of which are instrumental in delivering what meager aid is available to the Afghan public.

The Taliban, whose pariah government in Kabul is not recognized by the international community, has shown little inclination to bend to either local or outside anger over these discriminatory moves. Individual governments, even those that have a long history of dealings with the Taliban, like Qatar and Pakistan, claim to have little leverage over the factions of the Taliban dictating policy on the ground in Afghanistan. The United States has limited diplomatic tools beyond more targeted sanctions to place more pressure on the Taliban.

U.N. officials have pressed the Taliban to allow exemptions for female workers in the health nongovernmental organizations, a concession that shows it’s possible to chip away at the Islamists’ entrenched position. “We have not seen the history of the Taliban reversing any edict,” U.N. Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed told reporters after visiting the country earlier this month. “What we have seen is exemptions that, hopefully, if we keep pushing them, they will water down those edicts to a point where we will get women and girls back into school and into the workplace.” She added that “a lot of what we have to deal with is how we travel the Taliban from the 13th century to the 21st. And that’s, that’s a journey.”

Martin Griffiths, the U.N.’s humanitarian chief who also recently traveled to Afghanistan, said it was important for his organization and other agencies to be able to work with women and necessary for the Taliban to make “practical exceptions” given the circumstances.

“We don’t have time,” Griffiths said. “The winter is with us, people are dying, famine is looming.”

Winter has come for Afghanistan
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