Recommended Reads on Afghanistan: From travellers’ tales to ‘peace negotiations’ to stories of oppression and resistance

AAN Team • AAN Guests

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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Today, we bring you some book reviews. We asked AAN writers and friends to recommend books about Afghanistan that they had enjoyed. Their choices are an eclectic mix, ranging from the scholarly to the journalistic, memoirs and travelogues to novels and short stories, and even a podcast. Our reviews begin with fiction: a collection of short stories by Afghan women and then three novels, followed by three travelogues (two Swiss women each writing about their journey to Afghanistan in the 1930s and an academic scrutiny of the ‘Hippie Trail’), a world history podcast, which often features Afghanistan, and finally a closer look at the Qatar-hosted negotiations between the Taliban and the United States. As we said, it is an eclectic mix …

Photo: AAN, 2025.

My Pen is the Wing of a Bird: New fiction by Afghan women, Grand Central Publishing, New York/Boston, 2022

My Pen is the Wing of a Bird is a collection of short stories by Afghan women translated into English, with an introduction by the famous BBC chief international correspondent, Lyse Doucet (who was based in Kabul in 1988-89 and has visited Afghanistan ever since) and an afterword by Lucy Hannah, the founder and co-director of Untold Narratives, a social enterprise that seeks to support writers from marginalised communities.

These are powerful and breathtaking stories that take you directly into the heart of society in Afghanistan. Although they are fiction, they reflect the realities of Afghan society, the economic problems Afghans face, and especially the hardship and struggle of Afghan women facing misogyny, patriarchy and domestic abuse.

All the stories are interesting. As I read them, I felt as if I was seeing some of the scenes with my own eyes. One story, ‘Ajah’, written by Fatema Khavari and translated by Zubair Popalzai, caught my attention. In the story, Ajah is a descendant of Ibrahim Khan ‘Gawsawar’ (the Bull Rider), the Hazara leader who stood against the oppression of the Afghan king and his prime minister, who were then unfairly taxing Hazaras.[1] She is nicknamed ‘Ajah Ayyub’ in her village because, despite not having children, she has come to be known as ‘grandmother’ (Ajar) and she is patient like the Prophet Ayyub (in English, Job), who resisted Satan’s temptations in the face of God’s trials. The story tells of Ajah’s many trials and how, with patient determination, she overcomes them.

Ajah, born in 1905 in the Chimtal district of Balkh province, was seven years old when a tuberculosis outbreak left her orphaned. The mullah of the village mosque looked after her and took her to see the land she had inherited from her parents. “I am too old now to help you farm this land,” he told her, “but can help you sell it.” Ajah shook her head in disagreement and told him he could help her plan an orchard instead. The imam was surprised and smiled at her: “An orchard is a good idea. The trees will grow together with you.” This short conversation illustrates how smart and ambitious the young Ajah already was and that she had foresight.

The final episode of the story is particularly compelling. An earthquake has struck the area. There are few men in the village because they are off serving in the army, so the women are tending the animals and farming the land. Soon after, Ajah travels to Shah Alborz, a mountain she climbs every year to harvest a medicinal plant, badra, and sees how the earthquake has opened a deep fissure stretching from the base of the mountain right down to her village. The village was in danger. When the snow melted, the new ravine would channel the water directly down to the village, flooding it and destroying both homes and crops.

When she returned home, she gathered the villagers together and showed them the gully, warning them of the impending flood. The village chief, Khalil, dismisses her concerns, saying he had never seen a flood in all his years, while Ajah kept insisting that the landscape had changed. Disaster was imminent.

“So, what do you suggest?” the old man sneered.  

“We dig a channel to divert the water and save the village.”  

“Who will dig? All the young men are gone. Should children and elders do it?”  

“The women will. We’ll take turns.”  

“Nonsense, Ajah. Digging is men’s work.”  

“Is it?” replied Ajah, adjusting her scarf as she walked away.

Ignoring mockery from Khalil and whispers from other women, Ajah began digging alone at the edge of the village. For a month she worked, until her channel reached the river.

When the heavy rains did come, floodwaters destroyed most of the village, sparing only Ajah’s house and orchard. “Days later,” the story continues, “in the dim morning light, she stood before her mirror, braiding her greying hair. She put on a green and yellow hat, covered it with a red floral scarf, and stepped outside where her chickens pecked in the courtyard.” Ajah had decided to dig a drainage channel from the base of the mountain. She began single-handedly, but not for long.

Other women, initially curious, soon joined her. Together, they dug a long trench. When the heavy rains returned, the new channel successfully diverted much of the floodwater away from the village, protecting their lands and proving the power of their collective work.

The narrative highlights the value of female cooperation and solidarity, since Ajah’s tenacity motivates others to work together with her. Their connections are strengthened and a sense of community is fostered by their shared experiences working together. In addition to saving their farmland, the successful completion of the diversion channel makes a strong statement about the efforts and capacities of women.

Anyone who wants to understand the human spirit behind the headlines should read this. Even after finishing the book, I could not get these stories out of my head. I highly recommend it.

Reviewed by Rohullah Suroush


Kamila Shamsie, Burnt Shadows, Bloomsbury, London, 2009

Burnt Shadows by British Pakistani author Kamila Shamsie begins in Nagasaki on the day of the bomb and ends in Guantanamo. The story moves between countries and continents, circling Afghanistan as it does so, before eventually crossing the border in the final third. The characters endure globally significant wars, invasions, occupations, other disasters and the fall of regimes, responding with marriage, migration and learning to live in new lands.

Shamsie draws her characters from different countries and continents. At the start, there is Hiroko, a Japanese teacher whose German fiancé is killed in the atomic blast, his sister, Elizabeth, who is living in pre-Partition Delhi, masquerading as fully English with her British lawyer husband, in the last days of the Raj and his clerk, Sajjad, who ends up teaching Hiroko Urdu. Afghans enter later. This is a big canvas, both in terms of time and geography, but Shamsie is a deft and compelling storyteller, managing to portray places and events for which only her imagination and research can have prepared her. Indeed, the portrayal of her native Pakistan was the least compelling in the book. Maybe she was less interested in it. Or maybe, like a fish swimming in the ocean, she found it more difficult to relay what was distinctive about her homeland, although she did take the reader on a memorable journey to Karachi’s fish market in the early 1980s, all stink and slipperiness.

Home is a major theme of this story of migrants: how a Japanese-Pakistani boy might finally feel at home among Afghans, how people find family among those who should be strangers and how a homeland under threat can drive resistance – and betrayal. The novel is also very much about place – an “impossibly blue sky,” the “light in Afghanistan. Like nowhere else,” recalls a refugee in exile. At the novel’s opening, we find Hiroko, because of the needs of the war, working in a munitions factory, where she “spends her days measuring the thickness of steel with micrometers, images of classrooms swooping into her thoughts the way memories of flight might enter the minds of broken-winged birds.” A place might, possibly, survive the sweep of history. On what the reader knows will be the eve of Partition, Sajjad, who is from Dilly (the local name for old Delhi), insists to his British employer:

‘Either way it won’t matter to me. I will die in Dilli. Before that, I will live in Dilli. Whether it’s in British India, Hindustan, Pakistan that makes no difference to me.’ 

‘So you keep saying. I think you’re talking nonsense.’ 

‘Why nonsense? The British have made little difference to the life of my moholla.’ At James’s look of confusion he translated ‘neighbourhood’, barely disguising his impatience at the Englishman’s failure after all this time to understand that all-important Urdu word. ‘It goes on as it has gone on. Yes, there are interruptions – 1857 was one, perhaps the departure of the British will be another – but believe me over the next century Dilli will continue to do what it’s been doing for the last two centuries – fade at a very slow, and melancholically poetic, pace.’ 

This exchange drives home another of the novel’s themes – who ‘gets’ a new place? Whether it is the British in India, the Americans in Afghanistan, or Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the United States – and whether that place itself will endure, buffeted, like the novel’s characters, by the whims of history.

Reviewed by Kate Clark


The Almond Garden of Kabul, Mandana Hendessi, Afsana Press, London, 2026

Mandana Hendessi’s The Almond Garden of Kabul is not an easy read. It is not meant to be. Set in Kabul’s main women’s prison Badam Bagh (which translates as ‘almond garden’) during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the novel takes the reader inside a world defined by systemic social, cultural and institutional discrimination, a justice system skewed against women – especially if they are poor – and plagued by rampant corruption. Hendessi is a British-Iranian women’s rights advocate who worked in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2016 (biography here). The novel draws on her experiences visiting Afghan prisons and hearing the stories of women she met while working for an international NGO.

An engrossing work of fiction, the novel unfolds like a detective story set within the confines of a prison. The novel follows two inmates – Sultan and Setara – as they join forces with a small group of other prisoners to uncover the truth behind a young inmate’s desperate act of self-immolation. While the story moves with the momentum of an investigation, it is rooted in the real experiences of women Hendessi encountered during her years working in Afghan prisons.

The novel begins with a fire. A teenage prisoner, Niloofar — unable to continue enduring rape and psychological abuse at the hands of a corrupt prison official who traffics young inmates to wealthy Kabuli men, and blackmail from the man who filmed himself assaulting her and now threatens to expose the recording — commits a shocking act of protest. She sets herself on fire in the prison yard. The incident is witnessed by one of the novel’s protagonists, Sultan, a transgender prisoner who “walked like a man and had once killed one – her abusive husband.” Sultan rules the prison “like a tribal chief: part protector, part tyrant, carved from the same stone that had scarred her.”

Determined to understand what drove Niloofar to self-immolate, Sultan forged an unlikely partnership with the prison’s letter writer, Setara – a teacher and artist who is in prison for a murder she did not commit. They are joined by several other inmates in their quest to piece together what happened to Niloofar. In doing so, the women begin to expose deeply entrenched injustices in the very institutions that are meant to protect them.

Niloofar’s shocking act of resistance drives the narrative from an individual act of protest to collective action, some detective work and ultimately to a reckoning – not a complete one, but one that leaves the reader with a measure of hope. While it does not offer a neat resolution, the novel ends with a suggestion that something has shifted, that the women have claimed their voices and that change, however tenuous, is possible. Along the way, there are moments of intimacy and tenderness: sharing a cup of tea and a piece of bolani, caring for a dying inmate, reading poetry together. The bonds that take hold between the women do not erase trauma, but they do transform the women from victims into active rebels.

The name of the prison, Badam Bagh, which also gives the novel its name, comes from the almond trees that surround it. They bloom in winter, something much admired by Sultan, who sees them “daring to bloom at a time when no other fruit tree would challenge the brutal Kabul winters.” The trees are thus more than a setting – they are a subversive presence. The imagery of trees blossoming in winter reminds the reader that survival is possible and that truth can emerge even in the harshest of seasons. This is a novel that lingers in the mind – unsettling, provocative and profoundly moving.

Reviewed by Roxanna Shapour


Jakob Hein, How Grischa Almost Triggered World Peace with a Daring Idea, Galiani, Berlin, 2025

For me, this hilarious novel by Leipzig-born Jakob Hein is the Afghanistan-related book of the season – although, I must be honest, it teaches you more about East and West Germany than Afghanistan.

It is the 1980s and the book’s hero, Grischa Tannberg, is an ambitious, fresh-from-university employee of the East German Ministry of Foreign Trade. He is condemned to what his boss, Ralf Burg, calls “artfully biding your time,” ensuring no one is aware that you actually have nothing to do. Burg tells Grischa why: “The Afghans have nothing. They would like to have books and machines from us and vehicles and consumer goods and fertiliser, everything we produce. But they have: nothing.” He is not fully right, and Grischa, unexpectedly, comes up with a daring idea for how the notoriously cash-strapped GDR can get its hands on some hard currency. It has to do with the variety of cannabis resin widely known as ‘Afghan Black’ (more on which in this AAN report) and it soon appears in the story:

“Put that away!” hissed the woman. “Do you want to get us both in jail? There are surely cameras everywhere here.”

“I know,” said Grischa. “But this is a perfectly legitimate shop, and I sell the medicinal cannabis completely legally. It’s a product of our brother state, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, top quality, and directly imported.” He showed her the item on the price list.

“But isn’t that illegal?”

“Perhaps it is in West Germany and West Berlin.”

Grischa’s idea – in order to not spoil the story, I will not outline it further – soon turns into a conundrum for West Germany. In the end, Grischa and his colleague, the attractive but unwavering biologist, Frau Dr Cornelia Frühling, go West, as part of a high-ranking delegation led by the (actual) infamous Stasi chief Erich Mielke to meet their capitalist German counterparts. The secret meeting takes place at the high-end farmstead-cum-restaurant, Alpenrose, owned by Mr Merz (haha!). With puns on the names of the current German chancellor and an actual Bavarian meatpacker (Josef März), the fictional Mr Merz is a character who has become rich (also in his real-life incarnation) selling East German meat in the West as “from the German lands,” without giving away its exact origin. Over dinner, which includes a spiked venison ragout, the two sides – East and West Germany – come to an agreement.

It is difficult to say what is fact and what is fiction in this novel. Afghanistan was indeed ‘democratic’ then, while hashish fields did indeed flourish. Grischa, while a fictional character, feels super real nonetheless. Like him, a fellow student of mine once ended up working at the GDR Solidarity Committee on Afghanistan, where, lacking much to do, he had to artfully bide his time. Another fact is that in 1983, East Germany was almost bankrupt and had to declare that to its creditors, while trying to raise hard currency by all means. That included selling weapons to both sides in the Iran-Iraq war, and possibly, although never proven, to the Afghan mujahedin, via a clandestine foreign trade company and the CIA.[2] Also, fresh meat had become increasingly scarce in East German shops. Erich Mielke was then the chief of the Stasi and – again fully true – while the arch-conservative and famously anti-communist Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss came to the GDR’s rescue with a billion-dollar loan, no one knew why. The loan – again, true – was negotiated by Merz/März through his East German meat-packing connections.

And, when it comes to Afghan Black: the first East German ambassador I served under once told me (long afterwards) that an official of the PDPA government had actually suggested to him to fly hashish to Berlin in the empty planes that were transporting East German aid supplies to Kabul. The ambassador said he refused …

Has author Jakob Hein, the psychiatrist-turned-writer, finally solved the riddle of why the anti-communist Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss, against his ideological convictions, saved the East German communist state for almost another decade? Unfortunately, this is unlikely. Grischa’s idea is just too good to be true.

There is one thing that Grischa’s boss, and Hein, get wrong: the Afghans don’t have nothing, even apart from hashish and opiates. The real-life Afghan-East German trade relationship was much more cynical than Hein presents it: what Afghanistan was then licitly exporting were the same products as today, fruit, dry fruit, carpets, etc. They were able to sell these products for hard currency, and the dollarless East Germans were interested but simply unable to become regular customers. Only before Christmas would Afghan raisins suddenly show up in East Berlin shops, bartered against whatever the Afghans were interested in. East Germany, for its part, wanted to sell Afghanistan ‘everything it produced’, but preferably for hard currency, too. Before Strauss’ mega-loan, many a mickle made a muckle, as the Scots say, for East Berlin.

Finally, there is just one real problem with this book (for most of AAN’s audience): it is only published in German. No English – or Pashto or Dari – translation so far. Any takers out there?

Reviewed by Thomas Ruttig


Ella Maillart, The Cruel Way, William Heinemann, London, 1947

Annemarie Schwarzenbach, All the Roads Are Open: An Afghan Journey, translated by Isabel Fargo Cole, Seagall Books, Calcutta, 2021

Originally published in English in 1947, The Cruel Way by Swiss adventurer and travel writer Ella Maillart is an account of her journey from Switzerland to Afghanistan with Swiss journalist and photographer Annemarie Schwarzenbach. Schwarzenbach’s own account of the journey, a lyrical travelogue, All the Roads Are Open, was published posthumously in German in 2000 and translated into English in 2011. The pair began their journey on 6 June 1939, just three months before the Second World War began in Europe.

Both women came from wealthy Swiss families. Maillart, the daughter of a fur trader, was a gifted sportswoman who competed in the 1924 Summer Olympics in yacht racing, while Schwarzenbach, who came from one of the richest industrialist families, was an accomplished intellectual, earning a doctorate in history at just 23. Both were progressive and modern for their time. However, the timing of their journey left many wondering whether this journey “was a means of escape from the impending doom of the war, especially given that they were both anti-fascists, or whether it was instead an attempt to cure Schwarzenbach of her addictions.”[3]

Despite the ensuing turmoil in Europe, they set off from Geneva on the 6,000-kilometre journey in Schwarzenbach‘s new Ford, a car with 18 horsepower,[4] to journal along the way, sample local cuisine and admire the landscapes. From Switzerland, they travelled to Italy, then through Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to Istanbul, where they took a boat across the Black Sea to eastern Turkey, and from there, via Azerbaijan and Iran, finally to Islam Qala, the Afghan border town. From Islam Qala they drove to Herat, and from there they continued on the then-newly built road, driving to Bala Murghab, Shebarghan, Andkhoi, Balkh and Mazar-e Sharif. They then headed south to Kabul, via Pul-e Khumri, Bamiyan and Band-e Amir and finally from Kabul east to Peshawar.

From the first edition of Maillart’s book, a map on the back inner cover.

Although their travel accounts are very different in style and tone, the two women shared a deep admiration for the rough beauty of Afghanistan’s rugged landscape. Schwarzenbach, for example, wrote:

Travelling journalists like to tell each other: “Spend six weeks in a country, and you’ll blithely write a book about it. Stay six months, and you’ll struggle to finish a few articles. If you stay six years, you’ll have nothing more to say.” … But the exceptions prove the rule, and the first time, coming from the north, from Turkistan’s blazing plain, when I reached the Hindu Kush and crossed its grandiose, historic passes, I was sorely tempted to write a hymn and nothing else. A hymn to its name, for names are more than geographic labels, they’re sound and colour, dream and memory, they’re mystery, magic… 

Both authors write about the landscapes, culture, food, customs and people, as well as the difficulties they encounter on the journey, such as having to dig the car out of mud – and the local people who helped them – and the peculiar collection of tools they ended up with from the countries they drove through. Maillart wrote about a car incident in Islam Qala:

We approached a sandy ridge: spreading out like a pleated skirt, its base had covered the track and we launched the car through it since we had to reach a culvert forty feet ahead. It took us three hours to cover that distance. 

Would we have started work if we had known our efforts would be so back-breaking? … We played with gears; the wheels backed, sank, whizzed; we sat studying the situation; we blistered our hands on our Yugoslav shovel; we pushed the Teheran gutters under the tyres; sweated like coolies under the hats from Trieste; we cursed in Russian and Swiss-German: each great offensive only gained us the length of the gutter.

Maillart’s book, which also features great photographs from the journey, is full of stories about particular places, be it local legends or historical accounts. For example, she recounts the legend of the Band-e Amir lakes:

King Barbar, an infidel, was oppressing his subjects. A man who had been searching for Hazrat Ali and found him near Haibak [sic], was ordered to bind that saint and bring him as a slave to the king. Ali was then asked to perform three tasks — kill the dragon of Bamian, build dams in a valley and lastly, save his own head. The dragon was killed. With mighty rage a rock was hurled down which built the Band-i-Haibat or Dam of Wrath [usually translated as ‘awe’]; while with his sword he clove the Band-i-Zulfikar, the Dam of the Sword [Zulfikar was the name of Imam Ali’s double-tipped sword]. Then Ali told Barbar to load him with chains. When he had rendered everybody senseless by reciting the Muhammadan profession of faith, he freed himself and converted King Barbar.

Maillart was fascinated by Afghans, much like Dame Rebecca West was by the Serbs (more on her book below) but her sentiments are often knotty and troubling to the modern reader – for example, the use of the derogatory word ‘coolie’ in the quotation above, or so many examples in the paragraph below:

Here, where the pattern of life remains unchanged, where the son thinks as his father did, men are still proud to be men. Meanwhile in the West where there is nothing but change, no-one knows what to think, nobody feels secure – least of all the rich – and that even in so-called peace time. Here, no more high-heeled sluts in short frocks: you’ve come to the country where women are not seen, where men are capped with snowy muslin and walk with heavy shoes like gondolas. You’ve come to a country that has never been subjugated – neither by Alexander the Great nor by Timur the Lame, neither by Nadir nor by John Bull. It is the Switzerland of Asia, a buffer-state without colonies or access to the sea, a country whose great hills shelter five races speaking three totally different languages, a country of simple hillmen and well-bred citizens …” 

She admires what she sees as the Afghans’ unchangingness (were they really?) and their unbeaten strength – like her own nation, the Swiss – but also, apparently, that women are in purdah, while at the very same time, she castigates (other) rich European women for being loose, even as she herself enjoys the freedom to travel.

Both of these books belong to a different time and sentiment, a time of great female adventurers to what were then seen as the unknown, mysterious and to some extent savage parts of the world, captured in books like Dame Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia, a book based on a six-week journey through the former Yugoslavia in 1937 (the book was published in 1941). West’s infatuation with my compatriots, the Serbs, which she saw as archetypes of courage and endurance, matches that of Maillart’s views about the Afghans, the fascination with ‘noble savages’. The two books under review are therefore not the smoothest of reads, belonging as they do to the era before Edward Said established Orientalism[5] as a critical lens for viewing Western accounts of ‘the East’ and of wider concerns about ‘othering’ in literature. Even with that caveat, however, they represent European women’s literature and travel writing of the early twentieth century.

Reviewed by Jelena Bjelica


Sharif Gemie and Brian Ireland, The Hippie Trail: A History, Manchester University Press, 2017

“Afghanistan seems to be the country that most affected the hippie trail travellers: it really seems to occupy a special place in their hearts.”

What was the Hippie Trail? Or rather, who were the travellers along this route and what were their experiences? Were they on a journey of spiritual enlightenment, on a hedonistic voyage of sex and drugs, or on an unremarkable tourist trip to foreign lands? The Hippie Trail of the 1960s and 1970s followed an overland route through Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, with about half the travellers continuing on to Nepal. It has a place in Western culture as what the authors describe as a “minority experience” (with long-distance travel not being anything close to a universal European or American experience at that time). The trail was ephemeral and disordered, and as the authors argue, has not been studied in any satisfactory way:

…the trail had no official existence. No ceremony marked its opening or its collapse; no flag identified its territory; no organisation directed its travellers; no leader wrote its manifesto; no prominent philosophers attempted to make sense of it; no major novelists have written about it; and no archive has been created to preserve its memory.

The cultural artfacts left behind are mostly scattered memoirs and interviews with those who made the journey. The authors of The Hippie Trail: A History have assembled and analysed these stories and accounts, showing a diverse range of motivations and experiences of the young Western men and women who travelled east. Sharif Gemie is a retired professor of history who focuses his research on minority experiences in society and the lives of marginalised peoples. Brian Ireland is a cultural historian and former university lecturer whose research interests include popular culture and social transformations in the 1960s. Together, they bring the perfect skill set for researching the phenomenon of Western travellers on the Hippie Trail.

This book is the first academic analysis of the Hippie Trail, with previous publications having been stories of individual journeys, brief anecdotes, or collections of interviews. It is not, however, an attempt to analyse the local societies along the Hippie Trail in any comprehensive way, as the authors admit. Nor does it prominently feature the thoughts and feelings of locals about the foreign tourists travelling through their countries. Rather, for this cultural history of the foreign travellers along the Hippie Trail, the authors created a database of 80 journeys for their analysis of the ‘hippies’, even as they note that the majority of travellers rejected this label and described themselves as backpackers, hitchhikers, overlanders, nomads, shoestring travellers and by various other terms. The interviewees find the label ‘hippie/hippy’ to be a “a plastic, manufactured, artificial word” or to have a negative connotation of having a “wild, disorderly attitude.”

For the Hippie Trail, the authors use a start date of 1957 and an end date of 1978 – with Afghanistan soon entering a state of war and post-revolution Iran to close its borders to tourists. The authors note that eventually “the gentle, exotic dreams of enlightenment or joy in the East no longer made sense.” What is left is a collection of memories and life experiences that many participants found transformative. And in these memories Afghanistan stands out as a travellers’ favourite, versus the hectic and overpopulated India and Pakistan, and – surprisingly to modern travellers who have travelled in Iran and Turkey in recent years – an unfriendly society in Iran and the interviewees’ least favourite: eastern Turkey, with its aggressively unfriendly locals.

For readers looking for stories about travellers’ experiences in 1960s and 1970s Afghanistan, this book provides plenty of anecdotes and accounts. About a quarter of hippie trailers admitted that easy access to affordable narcotics was a motivation for their journey, and Afghanistan provided cheap, easy access to hashish, or harder drugs (like raw opium) if that was desired. However, those few addicted to hard drugs were generally disliked by most other travellers, and “the drug addict was scorned, not admired.”

It is not just drug use that has been over-exaggerated in the popular imagination, but also sex. There was the occasional sexual libertine, but Gemie and Ireland find that in general “There were few signs of a sexual revolution thriving on the trail,” and that “most found the weeks or months they spent on the road surprisingly austere and sexless.” Amusingly, the authors identify the men of the Hippie Trail as generally not being the sort of men to be successful with women or to be sexually active, neither at home nor on the road. In terms of the lack of free-love, accounts by disappointed men emphasised the poor gender ratio even in the later years, when women increasingly appeared on the trail (a 5 to 1 or even 10 to 1 male-to-female ratio, with many of the women not being single), plus the total lack of privacy for budget travellers. For the women, in addition to unwanted attention from fellow travellers, they noted the regular threat of harassment and assault by locals along the journey, but that Afghanistan was a relief compared to other countries along the Hippie Trail, with women often reporting “that they were left mercifully alone there” (mostly, but not completely).

Overall, the authors find that “Afghanistan seems to be the country that most affected the hippie trail travellers: it really seems to occupy a special place in their hearts.” The attitudes of travellers towards locals were usually positive, but obvious contrasts could be found, such as with a group of three Australian men who, annoyed by their bus stopping for prayers, mocked Afghans as “monkeys” and attempted to start a fight with them. The more common sentiment was “a warm affection for Afghanistan,” but not an accompanying admiration for Islam in the same way that the travellers had for the ‘Eastern mysticism’ of Hinduism and Buddhism (with an occasional exception for Sufism).

Gemie and Ireland also briefly entertain the argument by some writers who blame the decadence of the hippies for simultaneously causing the rise of Marxism in Afghanistan, by driving horrified locals into their communist arms, while conversely causing the Islamic Revolution in Iran. They quickly dispatch this idea as it gives far too much credit to tourists for events which were political-historical processes long underway well before their arrival.

The Hippie Trail does however, in the authors’ words, stand out as having a broader important effect on world travel, as “it was based on an astonishing change in attitudes to travel; it could be defined as the moment when young people suddenly became aware that it was possible to travel, without great difficulty, to places which had seemed as impossibly distant as India and Nepal.” For Western Europeans, British, Americans, Australians and others, it became apparent that world travel for purposes of leisure (as opposed to war, trade or religious pilgrimage) was no longer confined to a wealthy elite (eg, the ‘Grand Tour’ of Europe by upper-class young men in the 17th-19th centuries). For the travellers as individuals, they were “near-unanimous in their affirmations of the life-changing nature of the experience,” citing factors such as the exposure to new cultures, gaining an insight into different ways of living, and new forms of community (eg, groups of travellers). The authors’ view is that “the hippy trail should be considered as a form of secular, possibly spiritual, pilgrimage.”

Gemie and Ireland’s book is an academic analysis, with all that means for style of writing, extended argumentation and provision of evidence. Yet it is also an entertaining collection of stories and anecdotes that engages the reader, bringing to life and personalising the experiences of a generation of travellers who experienced the Hippie Trail – all within its appropriate analytical context.

Reviewed by Christian Bleuer


Empire: World History podcast, presented by William Dalrymple and Anita Anand

Empire is a podcast that romps entertainingly through world history, illuminating a great deal of Afghan history along the way. Its hosts are Anita Anand, a lively BBC broadcaster and author, and William Dalrymple, a jovial but renowned historian.

As someone who spent time in rural Afghanistan in the 1980s, I had long seen the country as the back of beyond, a land of tribes little touched by the outside world until the Soviets invaded. I was mistaken. It has been a place of world-shaping, world-shaking cultures and conquests since the time of Alexander. It sat along the world’s richest intercontinental trade routes, perched next to what were then the world’s most developed economies, China and India. Kabul has been a hotspot of learning and the arts for a millennium. It was from Kabul that Babur swept down to conquer much of India and establish the Mughal Empire. All the while, though, he yearned for Kabul and made it his summer capital.

The Empire podcast has touched on Afghanistan’s trade with ancient Rome, the architecture of its Buddhist period, the spread of Islam there, from Genghis Khan’s rampage all the way to Dalrymple’s conversations with former president Hamid Karzai in Kabul. Several episodes explored the blunders of the Great Game and the various Anglo-Afghan wars. The podcast covers many other topics beyond Afghanistan with equal verve. Anand and Dalrymple are especially well-versed in South Asian history and its latest discoveries. Both hosts are thoroughly prepared and bring in guest historians with eye-opening perspectives.

Empire is available on YouTube, Apple Podcasts, Spotify and other platforms. Episodes average about 50 minutes in length.

Reviewed by Roger Helms


Sansom Milton and Ghassan Elkahlout, Gulf to Global: The Rise of Qatar in Conflict Mediation, Hurst, 2026

Over more than two decades, the geographically tiny but financially potent Gulf emirate of Qatar has emerged as an active mediator in a number of regional conflicts, from Lebanon and Darfur to Gaza. At times, it has reportedly also used its financial mettle for military purposes; in Sudan, it reportedly backs the regime of General Abdel Fattah al-Borhan in its fight with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ‘Hemedti’(Crisis Group). By contrast, Qatar has managed to disengage itself from Yemen, where it had initially been part of the Saudi-led military coalition against the Houthis.

Most prominently, Qatar hosted the talks between the United States and the Taliban over 11 rounds. Those talks publicly starting on 31 July 2018 and culminated in the highly controversial 29 February 2020 agreement that ended what in the US is called ‘America’s longest war’.[6] In the media, the agreement is usually named after the host city, as the ‘Doha agreement’.

A new book, Gulf to Global: The Rise of Qatar in Conflict Mediation by Sansom Milton and Ghassan Elkahlout of the Qatar-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, published by Hurst, looks at the negotiations related to the five conflicts mentioned above, giving a chapter to each. Over almost 30 pages, the authors deal with Afghanistan and the 2020 agreement. They are informed by access to the “testimonies and experiences of high-level Qatari mediators and the Afghan parties,” as well as the “co-authors’ experience in scholarly and practitioner engagement with the Afghan peace process and their support for various Qatari initiatives in Afghanistan.”

This adds some novelty, as Qatar – like the neighbouring oil-rich Gulf states of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – has not been known for transparency about its diplomatic activities. At the same time, it also limits what the reader is able to glean from the Afghanistan chapter as the authors seem largely to reflect what the Qatari authorities want us to know – and what they do not (more about the latter below).

The start of Qatar’s mediation

Qatar’s role in the US-Taliban negotiations did not start in July 2018. “In the early 2010s, Qatar quietly assumed a mediating role, notably by hosting the Taliban’s political mission in Doha,” the authors state. The official request to facilitate and later mediate, they say, came in 2011, “particularly” from the US government.

This is only part of the story. Veteran Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid showed in a 2011 Financial Times blog that it was the Taliban who had requested Qatari participation in 2009 after they had successfully approached Germany to facilitate contacts with the US. While the US and Germany both had troops in Afghanistan, the Taliban trusted Qatar, Rashid wrote, as a Muslim country they considered to be “neutral,” as it had never “interfered in Afghanistan, nor has it ever backed any of the regional countries who have taken sides in Afghanistan’s conflicts in the past such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, India, Turkey or Iran” (see also AAN reporting). Rashid had been told this story by the German diplomat central to the initiative. After the US became involved, both sides continued without the Germans.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE had recognised the first Taliban regime (1996-2001), but later withdrew that recognition under US pressure following the 9/11 attacks. The UAE later even sent policemen to support ISAF. This diplomatic flip-flopping did not go down well with the Taliban. Qatar, by contrast, had avoided both recognition and its withdrawal, and had not – according to the authors of this book – supported any particular mujahedin party. Nor had it hosted any of the ulema meetings condemned the Taliban’s use of terrorist means as ‘un-Islamic’, as Saudi Arabia did (Atlantic Council briefing)There are some undertones reflecting Qatar’s tense relations with the Saudis and UAE in this book.

The Taliban’s original reach out to Germany may have come through the Qatari royal family, as suggested by the Danish Institute for International Studies. The book under review, however, does not confirm this.

“Qatar accepted the role and agreed to formally host the Taliban’s representation in a political office in Doha in 2011,” the authors write. The office had existed unofficially since January 2012, but its official opening the following year did not go smoothly – this is missing from the authors’ account. Protocol blunders, such as the raising of the Taliban flag and a signboard saying ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ (to which the Taliban claimed Qatar had agreed), led to the office having to formally close almost immediately after it opened. A two-year rupture in US-Taliban talks followed, although the office continued to function unofficially. At the time, AAN wrote: “Whatever the cause of the fiasco, and what actually happened, may become clearer (or not) as time passes – one result is that the prospect of holding meaningful negotiations has become significantly slimmer.” In short, precious time was lost and previous confidence-building efforts were wasted. In practice, the office remained operational, much to the chagrin of President Hamed Karzai in Kabul. It finally became the channel through which the US resumed talks in 2015.

The Doha agreement – but no political transition

The authors reveal that Qatar did not only act as hosts for these talks but also at times mediated, and was involved in drafting the 29 February 2020 Doha Agreement, including the withdrawal timeline. At one point, the authors write, the Qataris had literally to hold the Taliban’s then chief negotiator, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar’s hand to prevent him walking out after a US general used rude language in his direction. And they remind us that Qatar supported the travel of sanctioned Taliban leaders to the talks in Doha and “subsidised Kabul-Doha flights” for Afghan government delegates, as well.

In their conclusion, the authors note the widespread condemnation the Doha agreement has come under, as it led to the collapse of the internationally recognised government. A paper by the Atlantic Council, for example, pointed out that Qatar’s role as the facilitator of the 2020 US-Taliban agreement has cost it “its untainted image as a neutral third party among some segments of the Afghan population,” particularly those opposing the agreement and the Taliban in general. However, the authors defend the agreement. “Without the Doha Process and the subsequent orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces, the Taliban takeover could have been far more chaotic and violent,” they insist. It had, in their view, saved “numerous lives by supporting a swifter, less violent transition and preventing another cycle of destruction.”

Whether that was due to the agreement and Qatar’s role is questionable. The outcome, namely the Taliban taking Kabul without a fight, was more likely due to President Ashraf Ghani unilaterally leaving the country. This left no one in place to share power with. The authors blame the keenness of the US and its allies to withdraw – and on the Afghan government, which, according to “an agreement, facilitated by Qatar … about the military elements of the transition of power,” had been responsible for securing both the capital and its international airport. They admit that the Taliban’s return to power was “not an expected product of the [Doha] agreement.” Indeed, they say, that Doha, as the mediator in the Intra-Afghan talks, failed to broker a handover of power to a broader government.

Failed intra-Afghan talks

The authors attribute the failure to hand over power to a broad-based government, the authors attribute to both the weakness of Kabul and to the Taliban who “refused to engage constructively,” having been “emboldened by their de facto legitimacy,” provided by the Doha agreement. Indeed, the more the US troop drawdown progressed, the more the Taliban showed “little willingness to compromise … driven … by an expectation that their terms would be met, given their perceived [military] upper hand.” Paradoxically, then, the very success of the Qatari-brokered US-Taliban Doha agreement was the reason Qatar failed to achieve a power-sharing agreement between the Taliban and the then Afghan government.

One would be curious to know what Qatar thought about the US chief mediator, Zalmay Khalilzad’s dropping of the formula he had proclaimed when the negotiations started, that “Nothing is agreed, until everything is agreed” (he unilaterally proclaimed this, ie, without the Taliban’s consent). In any case, this led to the Taliban-driven exclusion of the government in Kabul from the talks. A political transition involving some form of power-sharing between the Taliban and other political forces never happened. Also, Qatar was unable to deliver this. It proved that its ability “to influence the [Taliban]’s behavior” had “limitations,” as a 2025 Stimson Center paper concluded.

Apropos of the ‘transition’ that never was: the authors confirm that “one month prior” to the fall of Kabul, ie, in mid-July 2021, “the Islamic Republic initiated discussions with Taliban negotiators in Doha about a formal transfer of power.” This is not new, as this episode has been rendered by many involved in it, although in contradictory versions. The authors, however, do not specify who exactly spoke in the name of the Islamic Republic and offer no new clarification on this point.

Overall, the book’s Afghanistan chapter provides some interesting insights, but it would have been far more interesting if it had provided some detail that were  surprisingly left out. This is particularly, although not exclusively, true for what happened in the aftermath of the Doha agreement.

The authors hail Qatar’s role, after the fall of Kabul, as a transit hub for many nations evacuating citizens and Afghans and that Qatar immediately provided humanitarian aid (no numbers given). They praise Doha becoming a “venue for humanitarian diplomacy” and a “strategic meeting point” for nations which did not want to reopen their embassies in a Taliban-controlled Kabul, as well as for US, UN and humanitarian organisations to maintain contacts with Taliban officials, and they like its role in negotiating the release of a number of Western individuals held by the Emirate, some say as hostages or bargaining chips. They do not, however, mention something described by Sultan Barakat, one of Qatar’s facilitators in the intra-Afghan talks, as Qatar’s laudable “readiness to escort individuals through Taliban-controlled Kabul [which] notably enabled evacuees to access the airports and seek safety” (International Review of the Red Cross). Also missing is any word on Qatar’s role in facilitating the more recent deportation of rejected Afghan asylum seekers from Europe, mainly, so far, from Germany. Also omitted is Germany’s role as co-facilitator in the intra-Afghan talks – through the Berlin-based think tank, the Berghof Foundation, which specialises in conflict mediation.

Aftermath: a cooling of Taliban-Qatar relations? 

The authors do not mention that the Taliban do not seem fully grateful for Qatar’s role in brokering the US withdrawal, for example when the Emirate reportedly blocked a group of 14 people from attending a meeting of the Afghanistan Future Thought in Doha, an initiative comprising former government officials, civil society activists, and academics, living both in and outside the country in early 2025 (facilitated by Barakat in his role as professor at the Qatari College of Public Policy).

The authors also make no mention of probably the biggest mystery of Qatar’s reported actions in today’s Afghanistan – whether it has (or has had at some point) access to the Taliban Amir in Kandahar, something other diplomats and the UN have tried, in vain, to get. In mid-2023, Reuters reported that the Qatari prime minister Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman al-Thani had “held secret talks with the supreme leader of the Taliban … on resolving tension with the international community” in Kandahar on 12 May that year, referring to “a source briefed on the meeting.”

Finally, the book does not include one interesting episode attributed to one of the book’s co-authors, Sansom Milton. In a July 2025 Guardian piece by Nesrine Malek, Sansom recounts how “in [early] 2020, the Qataris were able ‘to fly in 400 Taliban delegates to Doha at short notice’ to work on the final stages of the agreement for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.”

If true, this episode would show just how many Taliban leaders were necessary to underwrite their agreement with the US, despite the presence among the negotiators of the Amir’s main confidant Abdul Hakim Haqqani – aka Abdul Hakim Shar’i, aka Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai – now the Emirate’s Chief Judge and Minister of Justice. It also throws a different light on the Taliban ridiculing the government in Kabul planning to send 250 delegates to intra-Afghan talks in April 2019, when they quipped that the talks were an “orderly and prearranged conference … and not an invitation to some wedding … at a hotel in Kabul” (The New Arab). But maybe that was already too much detail for the Qatari sponsors of this book and its series.

Reviewed by Thomas Ruttig

Edited by Kate Clark

References

References
1 The story mistakenly says that Ibrahim Khan stood against Abdul Rahman Khan (r1880-1901), which would fit in with the date of Ajah’s birth (1905) in the story. However, the oppressively taxing king was actually Zahir Shah (r1933-73) and , the prime minister, his uncle, Hashim Khan (1933-46).
2 This was ‘Operation Black Eagle’ (1982-85), possibly carried out within the CIA’s Operation Cyclone (1979-89) more on this in this paper by Nolan Kraszkiewicz), which supported the mujahedin, most famously with the delivery of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. It clandestinely procured Warsaw Pact-made weapons and delivered them to the anti-Soviet fighters, while providing some form of plausible deniability to Eastern European arms sellers, mainly vis-à-vis the USSR. The operation came to light during the 1986 Iran-Contra scandal, which involved covert US arms deliveries to Iran and from whose proceeds the administration of Ronald Reagan financed anti-Sandinista guerrillas (the Contras) in Nicaragua.

Incidentally, the real meatpacker of März’s East German connection was the man who presided over East Berlin’s network of covert hard currency-generating trading companies in East and West, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski. He was also involved in negotiating a huge loan, so he should have been at the Alpenrose, too. He spent his final years at Bavaria’s Lake Tegernsee, one of Germany’s most affluent regions, and also the neighbourhood of Strauss, März and Merz.

More detail on the CIA-East German arms deals can be found in Thomas Scheuer’s Schalck-Golodkowskis Pipeline zur CIA (Schalck-Golodkowski’s pipeline to the CIA) published by the German news outlet, Die Tageszeitung, on 5 December 1990.

This author was also privy to documents with hints to this particular trade operation when he was a delegate to the Round Table on Development Policy, a multi-party institution installed during the East German transition period in 1990 and operating until 1994 that looked into East Germany’s ‘Third World’ policies. The Round Table did not manage to investigate this further.

3 The quote is from Julia Szołtysek’s How to Disembark Completely: Annemarie Schwarzenbach’s and Ella Maillart’s Afghan Journey, 1938. Schwarzenbach was a morphine addict. The trip to Afghanistan was partly meant as a fresh – also unsuccessful – attempt to free Annemarie from morphine, according to historical accounts. See also the article, Swiss writer’s life was stranger than fiction, published by SWI swissinfo.ch, the international online service of the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SBC).
4 To put this in perspective, I once drove from Serbia to Portugal, which is ‘only’ about 3,000 kilometres, in a car with about 100 horsepower on 21st-century European roads, and although it was a great road trip and undertaken with a friend, it was exhausting to drive 500 kilometres every day for about a week. By contrast, it took about eight and a half weeks for Annemarie Schwarzenbach and Ella Maillart to drive 6,000 kilometres in 1939, including crossing the Black Sea by boat.
5 Orientalism by Palestinian-American academic, Edward Said, was published in 1978 by Pantheon Books, New York.
6 Some sources cite 12 July 2018, when US diplomat Alice Wells met with Taliban representatives in Doha, as the first direct contact preceding the formal negotiation rounds (Military Times).

 

Recommended Reads on Afghanistan: From travellers’ tales to ‘peace negotiations’ to stories of oppression and resistance
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Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule Makes the World Less Safe

By Nazila Jamshidi and Annie Pforzheimer

The Diplomat

Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule Makes the World Less Safe
The world has shifted focus away from Afghanistan, much as it did in the lead-up to September 2001, giving dangerous networks room to rebuild.

The Taliban regime is expanding its provision of national sanctuary to terrorist groups with regional and international aspirations, according to the United Nations’ Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s 2025 annual report, issued in December 2025. The report notes that the Taliban continue to allow al‑Qaida and its violent offshoots, such as the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to operate. It details the existence of terrorist training camps, extremist religious schools, and safe houses linked to lethal TTP attacks across the border in Pakistan.
The Taliban deny this reality. The international community is fooling itself if it assumes that this threat is contained. Avoiding a repeat of 9/11 requires tightening worldwide sanctions on the Taliban, supporting Afghan political forces advocating for non-violent change, and providing safe haven to Afghan allies with a well-founded fear of persecution, torture, or execution if they were returned.The Taliban’s claim that their government has controlled the activities of al‑Qaida, a condition of the 2020 Doha Agreement with the United States, is negated by the U.N.’s findings. The Monitoring Team reports that al‑Qaida “provides ideological guidance” to other terrorist groups and acts as “service provider and multiplier” for them. The report highlighted the operation of religious schools (madrassas) in eastern and northeastern provinces, where al‑Qaida “indoctrinates children and trains them to become fighters.”

The threat therefore is not only immediate but generational. A separate late 2024 report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), highlighted ongoing security challenges in Afghanistan and the limitations of reconstruction and counterterrorism efforts under Taliban control, underscoring concerns about safe havens for extremist groups such as al‑Qaida. Under the al‑Qaida sanctions regime, yet another U.N. report openly referred to the Taliban as “continuing to host and support the group.” Al-Qaida itself in 2024 referred to Afghanistan as a “safe haven.”

Meanwhile, while the Taliban have taken some effective actions against the Islamic State, the U.N. notes that its “Khorasan” or Afghanistan wing is “resilient and continues to pose a threat, both internally in Afghanistan and externally.”

The TTP, linked to al‑Qaida, is particularly a growing and extra-regional threat, experts warn. The Monitoring Team’s report estimates around 6,000 TTP fighters are harbored in Afghanistan. There were more than 600 TTP attacks in Pakistan in 2025 alone, mainly against military and government targets, causing dozens of deaths and many more injured.

The Pakistani government has taken military reprisals against what it claims are TTP targets within Afghanistan, leading to the deaths of at least 50 Afghan civilians, and around $1 million a day in cross-border trade has been lost to the Afghanistan economy by Pakistan’s punitive border closing. These tensions are further inflamed by India-Pakistan rivalry, potentially destabilizing the South Asia region, while attacks from groups within Afghanistan have hit Chinese business interests and cross-border targets in Tajikistan.

The Taliban’s systematic repression of human rights further compounds these risks. The exclusion of women from education, employment, and public life removes moderating social forces and consolidates ideological control at the household and community levels. Early and forced marriages, now widespread, sever girls from education while reinforcing extremist authority structures. The persecution of ethnic and religious minorities deepens grievances that transnational terrorist groups have historically exploited for recruitment. Repression and terrorism are not parallel outcomes; they are mutually reinforcing.

The world has shifted focus away from Afghanistan, much as it did in the lead-up to September 2001, giving dangerous networks room to rebuild. The Taliban are becoming an inspiration to other groups and the safe haven of choice. It is a mistake to consider following Russia’s route of recognizing the Taliban regime while these threat dynamics persist.

Worldwide sanctions are already in place, but tightening those measures is vital. The U.N. Security Council must insist on stronger sanctions, with rigorous monitoring of complaints, until concrete, verifiable counterterrorism progress is made. There are three immediate tasks for the Council: add new Taliban leaders to the pre-9/11 sanctions list; push back on free travel of known terrorist leaders such as Sirajuddin Haqqani; and place the Taliban leadership, especially the intelligence chiefs widely acknowledged as the handlers for foreign terrorists, under the separate al-Qaida sanctions regime.

Sanctions alone will not push back extremism. This takes creativity, patience, and motivated allies. It is time to expand international outreach to members of Afghanistan’s civil society and its leaders in exile, in support of a roadmap to an Afghanistan at peace with itself and committed to regional stability. This was the recommendation of the Independent Assessment presented to the Security Council in 2023, that “sustainable peace and social, cultural and economic development after 45 years of armed conflict” would require the international community to support inclusive and representative Afghan participation in a political dialogue.

Finally, to achieve these goals and learn our 9/11 lessons, those Afghans who believe in inclusivity and human rights must be protected – to the extent possible inside Afghanistan, where they are virtual hostages, and also in countries where they have taken refuge. Sending Afghans who worked with the West back into Taliban control is signing their death sentences in some cases. In other cases, it neutralizes our natural allies in the fight against extremism.

It is time for the United States to pass the “Enduring Welcome Act,” which would protect Afghan relocation and family reunification efforts, while providing transparency through regular reporting to Congress and rigorous national security vetting. It is time to keep our promises, while learning our lessons.

Nazila Jamshidi

Nazila Jamshidi is a social justice professional specializing in inclusive international development and democratization. With over ten years of experience in Afghanistan, she monitors human rights issues and advocates for gender apartheid to be recognized as a crime against humanity. Nazila’s work has been featured in outlets such as Business Insider, The Hill, The Diplomat, and BBC among many others. She holds a bachelor’s degree in Government and Justice and Peace from Georgetown University and a Master’s in Human Rights in Foreign Policy/Diplomacy from Columbia University.

Annie Pforzheimer

Annie Pforzheimer is a non-resident associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She is currently an adjunct professor at the City University of New York and a commentator and advocate on foreign policy matters. A retired career diplomat with the personal rank of minister counselor, Annie was the acting deputy assistant secretary of state for Afghanistan until March 2019, and from 2017 to 2018 was the deputy chief of mission in Kabul.

Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule Makes the World Less Safe
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What’s Driving Pakistan-Afghanistan War? Islamabad’s Never-Ending Cycle Of Insecurity

Harsh V. Pant

NDTV

Opinion

Feb 28, 2026

Long-simmering tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have now spilled into open confrontation along the contested Durand Line. What was once a theatre of proxy maneuvering is, at least momentarily, being shaped by direct state-to-state hostility. On February 21, Pakistan launched airstrikes on alleged militant sanctuaries in Nangarhar, Paktika and Khost, claiming to target Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS-K elements. Kabul responded on February 26 with ground offensives against Pakistani positions across six provinces. Islamabad escalated further with “Operation Ghazab Lil Haq”, striking targets in Kabul and Kandahar, as Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared that Pakistan’s “cup of patience has overflowed”.

Casualty figures remain contested and unverifiable – Islamabad claims 274 Taliban fighters have been killed and 12 soldiers lost, while Kabul asserts 55 Pakistani soldiers are dead and 13 of its own fighters have been killed. Yet, beyond the numbers lies a more consequential reality: a structurally unstable frontier has entered a new and potentially dangerous phase.

Durand And Its Discontente

The crisis cannot be reduced to episodic violence. Its roots lie in the unresolved question of the Durand Line – the 2,600-kilometre boundary drawn in 1893, never formally recognised by successive Afghan governments. The line bisects Pashtun tribal lands, embedding a historical grievance into the geography of the modern state system.

After the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Pakistan initially anticipated strategic dividends. It expected Kabul to curb the TTP, whose ideological affinities with the Afghan Taliban are well documented. Instead, TTP attacks intensified, with over 2,400 Pakistani security personnel reportedly killed in 2025 alone – the highest toll in a decade. Islamabad’s frustration stems not merely from security losses but from the perception that its long-standing leverage over the Taliban has eroded.

Recent attacks in Islamabad, Bajaur and Bannu – attributed by Pakistan to Afghan-based militants- served as immediate triggers. Ceasefire efforts mediated by regional actors in October 2025 collapsed amid persistent skirmishes. The Taliban’s reluctance to confront the TTP reflects both shared Pashtun solidarities and a pragmatic fear of internal fragmentation, including defections to ISIS-K.

Layered atop these tensions is a geopolitical recalibration. Islamabad has accused Kabul of drifting into an “India colony”, a charge that was further sharpened following Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to New Delhi last year and a joint statement condemning regional terrorism. For Pakistan, this diplomatic thaw between Kabul and New Delhi represents not merely optics but a potential strategic encirclement. The recent escalation thus appears as much a coercive signal as a counterterrorism operation.

Nobody Wins This War

The immediate fallout is economic and humanitarian. Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on Pakistani ports for transit trade, while Pakistan derives revenue and strategic depth from its western corridor. Border closures risk paralysing economic activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Flagship connectivity projects – from the TAPI gas pipeline to broader Eurasian transport initiatives – face renewed uncertainty. China’s investments in Pakistan, particularly under CPEC, could confront heightened security vulnerabilities if militancy spills over.

The humanitarian dimension is equally stark. Civilian casualties, displacement and potential refugee flows compound Afghanistan’s already dire socio-economic crisis. Prolonged instability could embolden Baloch separatists, invigorate ISIS-K, and fragment militant ecosystems further. For external stakeholders – China, Iran, Russia and Turkey – the escalation threatens to upset a precarious regional equilibrium.

Yet, a full-scale conventional war remains unlikely. Afghanistan lacks airpower and conventional depth; Pakistan, for its part, cannot afford a protracted two-front contingency. The logic of escalation is, therefore, bounded by structural constraints, even if tactical brinkmanship persists.

Where India Stands

For India, the crisis is both opportunity and risk. New Delhi’s public messaging has emphasised Afghanistan’s sovereignty while criticising Pakistan for externalising its internal security failures. This aligns with India’s calibrated outreach to the Taliban – focused on humanitarian assistance, trade facilitation and connectivity initiatives such as the Chabahar corridor.

A distracted Pakistan may ease immediate pressure along India’s western frontier and dilute Islamabad’s regional manoeuvrability. However, instability in Afghanistan carries spillover risks: extremist mobilisation, threats to Indian development projects, and disruptions to connectivity ambitions linking India to Central Asia. Pakistan’s escalation can plausibly be read as an attempt to deter Kabul’s deepening engagement with New Delhi. Over time, sustained India-Taliban ties could narrow Pakistan’s diplomatic options.

No More Pretences

The current crisis marks a qualitative shift – from deniable proxies to overt confrontation. Tactical de-escalation, possibly under regional mediation, appears probable. However, absent movement on core issues – the Durand Line dispute, TTP sanctuaries, and the broader contest for regional influence – the frontier will remain combustible.

For Pakistan, the message from this latest flare-up is unmistakable: it can no longer afford the strategic ambivalence that has defined its Afghan policy for decades. Security dilemmas rooted in history and identity will not be resolved through episodic airstrikes, coercive signalling, or the habitual externalisation of internal failures. So long as Islamabad oscillates between tactical accommodation and punitive retaliation, it will remain trapped in a cycle of insecurity of its own making.

If Pakistan seeks stability on its western frontier, it must fundamentally recalibrate its approach – abandoning the logic of selective militancy, investing in sustained political engagement with Kabul, and addressing the structural drivers of radicalisation within its own borders. Durable security will not emerge from managing proxies or manufacturing deterrence narratives, but from credible commitments and regional cooperation. The imperative, therefore, is not merely de-escalation, but introspection in Islamabad – without which no meaningful regional equilibrium can take root.

(Harsh V Pant is Vice President for Studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

What’s Driving Pakistan-Afghanistan War? Islamabad’s Never-Ending Cycle Of Insecurity
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Inside the Islamic Emirate’s Penal Code: Crime, punishment and authority in Afghanistan

The Islamic Emirate has circulated a new penal code to Afghanistan’s courts, standardising punishments for everything from insulting the ulema to forgery, taking and giving bribes and casting the evil eye. The Code was leaked to the human rights organisation, Rawadari, by someone in the government, presumably concerned about its implications for human rights and the rule of law, prompted perhaps by its casual mention of slaves, the permission it gives to husbands to beat their wives and teachers their pupils, and its class-based discrimination. Alongside publishing a translation of the Code by Deoband seminary graduate and former BBC journalist John Butt, AAN’s Kate Clark has taken a closer look at what is in the Penal Code for Courts, its implications for human rights and what it reveals about the Emirate’s priorities when it comes to crime, punishment and control.
AAN’s unofficial translation of the Penal Code for Courts can be read here

The Penal Code for Courts in context

The Emirate’s new Penal Code for Courts[1] deals largely with what in Islamic law are called ta’zir punishments. These are not fixed by the Quran or Hadith (fixed punishments are known as hadd, plural hudud), nor are they forms of retributive justice (qisas).[2] Rather, they are discretionary, decided on by a judge or ruler, in this case, specifically by “the Imam”– assumed to be the man who signed off the Code, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada.

Deploying Islamic law in this way is normal practice in Afghanistan: the Islamic Republic also used the classifications of hadd, ta’zir and qisas, while jurisprudence (fiqh) from the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, which the majority of Afghans follow, served as a fallback system of law.[3] However, said legal expert and former AAN colleague Ehsan Qaane, the Republic’s law “also drew on other systems of law, including international human rights law. And it didn’t limit itself to Hanafi fiqh, as this Code does, but also borrowed from other Islamic schools of thought.” The Emirate, by contrast, has said its legislation is compiled only using the Quran, Sunna and authoritative books of Hanafi jurisprudence. A Ministry of Justice statement on 27 January 2026 insisted that there is “no article, clause, section or ruling that is not in accordance with Islamic sharia and has no sharia source, but is completely in accordance with Islamic sharia.” Any objection to Emirate laws, the statement went on, is therefore “an objection to sharia,” a protest based on “ignorance or neglect,” and itself “a crime that will be punished.”[4] Such an offence – and its punishment – is, indeed, laid out in the Penal Code.

The Code has not been published (yet) in the Official Gazette, but it has been circulated to the nation’s courts, which the law says are “responsible for [its] implementation.” The name of the file leaked to Rawadari described the Code as mutahid, ie unifying, suggesting an intent to standardise judges’ decisions on crimes and punishments. Another way of looking at the Code is that it has taken away judges’ discretion on punishments and concentrated power further in the hands of the Supreme Leader.

The Code is split into three chapters: the first deals with ta’zir punishments for a whole range of offences, the second with punishments for forgers and those who adulterate food, medicine and other goods or fake state documents; and the third lays out punishments related to narcotics. The Code is written in Pashto. No Dari version has yet surfaced. Its publication in Pashto only, like its lack of publication in the Official Gazette, is unusual, given the status of both Dari and Pashto as official languages. The 119 articles of the Code are heavily footnoted, largely with references to back up the choice of laws drawn from Hanafi fiqh, much of which is in Arabic.

This report first summarises what is in the Code, the procedures and principles for the courts, and then the wide range of crimes and specified punishments it covers. It then looks at human rights and other concerns, including how the Code deals with women. Finally, it looks at the choices made by the Emirate – what it has banned or made obligatory, how seriously it takes these choices (as measured by sentencing) and what they say about its priorities and what it is most and least concerned about.

How to assess the Code

In some ways, however, it is difficult to assess this Code: What can it be compared to? This is the first time Hanafi scholars have run a country and been able to rule and legislate as they wish, unconstrained. Afghanistan is not the only country that claims to be ruling according to Islamic law, but elsewhere, power is never solely in the hands of the ulema, or indeed, one cleric, as it is now in Afghanistan. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the Quran and Sunna are the declared constitution and the king must rule according to sharia, but it is he (or currently, the Crown Prince) who has absolute authority, not Islamic scholars. Saudi Arabia also has a Basic Law, issued by decree in 1992 by the then King Fahd, which is akin to a constitution. In neighbouring Iran, there is also a Supreme Leader who is a cleric, but Iran also has a president, a Guardian Council, parliament, a constitution and an Assembly of Experts whose sole responsibility is to appoint, supervise and, if necessary, dismiss the Supreme Leader.

In today’s Afghanistan, complete executive, legislative and judicial authority is in the hands of Mawlawi Hibatullah, with obedience to him written into law and urged upon the population as an Islamic duty in speeches and statements. His writ runs far deeper even than that of Mullah Omar, leader of the first iteration of the Islamic Emirate (1996-2001), whose administration did not have full control of Afghan territory and was very much focused on fighting the Northern Alliance/United Front. Mawlawi Hibatullah, by contrast, has enjoyed a ‘peace dividend’, assuming power, as he did, over a country no longer fragmented by conflict and without the need to funnel government spending on fighting an armed insurgency. Unlike the war-devastated country the Taliban progressively took over in the 1990s, in August 2021, the movement inherited a fully functioning state.

Also important is that Mullah Omar considered himself a relatively junior scholar. Hibatullah, on the other hand, is an advanced scholar, a mawlawi, who signs himself not only Amir al-Mu’minin, but also Sheikh of the Quran and Hadith. In other words, he is confident about his ability and right to rule and legislate as he deems correct. Whether in Afghan history or by comparison with other countries, the current Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which has produced the Penal Code for Courts, is without precedent.

Chapter 1: procedures

As noted above, the Code is primarily concerned with ta’zir offences – discretionary punishments that fall within the authority of the Imam and may be delegated to judges. However, it begins in Chapter 1 with a little on procedure, particularly on the differences in dealing with hadd, qisas and ta’zir crimes and punishments, including acceptable types of evidence, who can administer ta’zir punishments (the Imam, understood here to mean the state, as well as husbands and the masters of slaves) and whether a punishment can be waived.

Much of the variation depends on who has been offended – whether the crime was an “affront to the right of Allah (haq Allah, plural huquq Allah),” defined by the Code as a right “not specific to any individual, but which benefits all the population equally” and because of that, “attributed to the Almighty,” or was an affront to the “right of the servant” (haq al-abd, plural huquq al-ibad), where an individual only is affected and “there is no relation to public welfare.” More detail on this is not given in the Code, for example, as to which offences are classed as offences against God or a person, despite this being an important distinction in how judges and the criminal justice system operate.

The Code says that a ta’zir punishment will be handed out for every crime that does not have a fixed (hadd) punishment, no matter if the criminal is “a free person or a slave, male or female, Muslim or unbeliever, adult or a child who has his wits about him” (although in the case of “a child who has his wits about them,” the punishment is handed out for disciplinary purposes) (article 15). However, article 9 of the Code orders judges to vary the ta’zir punishment according to the criminals’ class (jani). It says that, for ulema and those of a high social class, the judge should introduce his punishment by saying something like: “‘I have heard that you are doing things like this…’.” Nobles, such as tribal elders and merchants, should be summoned to the court, middle-class criminals should be summoned and imprisoned and lower-class criminals should be subject to threatening language and beating, although if an “extreme beating” is ordered, for example, 39 lashes, they should be delivered to different parts of the body and anyway, the head and private parts should be avoided.

Judges can order the death penalty for certain categories of people (with the authorisation of the Imam) “if the interests of the general public would be served” – those who “persist in disorderly behaviour (par fasad dawam kawunkay),” who spread disorder (sa’ii bi’l-fasad), heretics (zindiq), magicians, those who murder with a heavy object, who defend false doctrines, and who seek to win people over with false doctrines, such as ‘innovators’ (mubtadi’in) and wrongdoers (mufsidin). Out of expediency (maslihatan), the Imam may also authorise the death penalty for a person who persistently steals or “has intercourse other than through the frontal channel,” or repeatedly commits homosexual acts, or repeatedly strangles people. The Code says that fines cannot be given as ta’zir punishments, although the judge can order the destruction of a guilty person’s property or prevent them from benefiting from it. This means that, apart from the occasional sacking, most crimes listed in the Code carry punishments of imprisonment and/or flogging.[5]

Chapter 1: crimes, from disrespecting the Prophet to selling weapons

Most of Chapter 1 comprises a long list of offences and their sentences, starting with: disrespecting the Prophet Muhammad and any other prophet (death, or if there is repentance, six years in prison); disrespecting the “sacred days of Islam,” or Islamic scholars (three months in prison); laughing at the injunctions of sharia, or not accepting the verdicts of ulema (two years); insulting the Imam (one year, plus 39 lashes); and disobeying the Imam in matters that sharia deems permissible – more on this below (one month). Employees, soldiers and ‘mujahedin’ (ie Taliban who fought in or purport to have fought in the insurgency) can be punished for disobeying orders, and not accomplishing government work “at the proper time, or in the proper manner,” with repeat offenders punished at first according to their class (see article 9 above) and eventually any who are still recalcitrant should be treated as ‘lower class’ ie flogged. A person who abuses or humiliates a state employee or mujahed or who disrupts a court can expect ten days in prison; if the abused person is a senior official or judge, the guilty party will get six months in prison and 20 lashes.

The Code punishes those who do not report or take action against opposition activities (two years), grants refuge to thieves or rebels (five years and 39 lashes), leaves the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam (two years), trickster muftis and quack doctors (one month) and Islamic scholars and teachers who do not try their hardest or neglectful students (punished according to class), along with those who betray a trust, or embezzle or misuse state resources (six months).

A teacher who beats a child so badly as to break a bone, draw blood or leave them “black and blue” shall be sacked. A husband who beats his wife to the same extent, if a judge accepts her complaint, shall be imprisoned for 15 days. However, a person laying a hand on a parent and humiliating them will be sentenced to five months in jail and 30 lashes. The Code also considers a woman and her father or other relative whom she has repeatedly visited against her husband’s orders to be criminals (three months in jail for both parties).

Other crimes are also listed: calling a Muslim a pervert, evil or saying they had sexual intercourse with a cow or donkey (six weeks); having illicit relations with a woman (one year); looking at your female neighbour or asking after her (one month); harassing a neighbour (two months); frequenting “slanderous places” and sitting with thieves, the decadent and drinkers of alcohol (one month); not fasting during Ramadan (two months and 20 lashes); abduction (ten years), killing an abductee (death); human smuggling (one year); wounding (six months to allow repentance); stealing from a person one has intoxicated (five years), but also killing a person by poison (‘only’ five years, and not qisas); wounding a person so that they need a splint or bandage (six months so that he can repent); and the accused being a “well-known miscreant” (one year).

A judge who delays a verdict or decides it incorrectly should himself be jailed (ten days or three months, respectively) and if plaintiff and claimant come to blows in a courtroom, they will be jailed (three or five days). Other ‘courtroom’ offences are making a false claim (one or three months), giving false evidence (40 lashes)[6] and not accepting the verdict in an “unprincipled manner” (one month).

Other crimes that are detailed include: taking or giving a bribe (one year); a woman becoming an apostate (indefinite detention with ten lashes every three days until she re-embraces Islam); dancing (two months), committing a “homosexual act” (two years, or if habitual, the death penalty); destroying public property (two months); buying or selling body parts (one year); entering a person’s home without permission (two months); gambling (four months); accusing a child, mad person or unbeliever of adultery (two months),[7] harassing the household of an offender because of his crime (three months); bird or animal fighting (five months); hoarding goods (one month if he doesn’t sell his goods); escaping from prison (20 lashes) and if with help from a security guard, he should serve the term outstanding; appropriating property (one year); casting the evil eye (the judge should encourage the offender to desist, but if he refuses, put him under house arrest for a year).

The Code authorises particularly punitive punishments for buying or selling state-owned weapons (one year for each small arm, or piece of equipment such as radios and binoculars, sold or bought, two for a heavy weapon or an M4 assault rifle). Buying and selling privately-owned weaponry is also illegal but carries somewhat lighter jail terms.

Chapters 2 and 3: forgery and narcotics

The Code then has two chapters dealing with specific areas of law. Chapter 2 begins by detailing offences largely to do with deceitfully using the trappings of state, for example, producing fraudulent edicts and court orders, forging Emirate signatures, stamps and documents (with longer prison sentences the more ‘senior’ the object of forgery), but also forging documents from private organisations and NGOs, trademarks and banknotes. It also covers punishments for those making counterfeit goods, mixing high and low-quality products, or mixing faulty and non-faulty goods, those selling distasteful goods (makruh) like bad meat, and those selling haram meat and claiming it is halal.

The second part of Chapter 2 goes into punishments for adulterating goods, importing poor quality foodstuffs (higher prison terms the greater the quality and the worse the quality), importing medicines without a licence or the proper paperwork, aircraft staff importing goods, transporting goods without an import licence, importing traditional medicines without a licence, committing fraud in matters relating to the Standards and Quality authority and paying doctors (and for doctors, being paid) to distribute health products. Smugglers and any Emirate official found, on the basis of “incontrovertible evidence,” to have helped smugglers will receive the same punishment (ten years in prison).

The third chapter details punishments for growing and transporting opium and cannabis, harvesting ephedra plants and making methamphetamine, bringing in opium, hashish and other drugs and precursors into Afghanistan, and distributing and using narcotics.

Human rights concerns: inequalities expressed in the law

Concerns over human rights and the rule of law prompted by the Code are manifold, detailed especially clearly by Rawadari in its press release from 22 January 2026, which says the Code “legalizes and formalizes discrimination against religious minorities and the suppression of individuals’ basic freedoms, including violations of human dignity, restrictions on freedom of expression and thought, and arbitrary arrest and punishment” and is “incompatible with even the most basic standards of fair trial.”[8]

There are also many particular concerns. The Code first defines ‘innovators’ (mubtadi’in) as those “whose beliefs run contrary to those who associate themselves with the sunna and the larger community of Sunni Muslims (ahl as-sunna wa’l-jama’ah)” (article 2). Afghan Shia and Ismaili Muslims, along with non-Muslims, whom the Code calls dhimmis, are thereby apparently excluded from the community of Afghans who have ‘acceptable’ beliefs. Indeed, the Code goes on to rule that: “A judge should imprison for ten years those innovators who promote their innovations, either on a public level, or individually, and in this way cause personal or financial damage to the government and the public, or in this way endanger public safety” (article 27). Innovators judged to be seeking “to win people over to false doctrines” are one of the categories of people who can, “in the interests of the general public,” be executed by the state, after authorisation by the Amir (article 14).

In an interview with the BBC Afghan Service with an authorised IEA translation published on its website on 28 January 2026, Emirate spokesman Zabiullah Mujahed insisted that neither “[o]ur Shia brothers” who “have adhered to their religion from the beginning,” nor “followers of Hinduism and other religions in the country who are not even Muslims,” nor “[o]ther legitimate Islamic schools, such as the Shafi’i or Hanbali, which may not be present in Afghanistan but exist in the world, are respected,” are covered by this law. Rather, only Sunnis who depart from their sect, he said and “chose a deviant path” would be called innovators and be “subject to disciplinary action.” This explanation may not reassure non-Sunni Muslim Afghans, given that the Code and Mujahed’s words label their beliefs as “false doctrines” and “deviant.”

This is not the only way in which inequality is built into the Code. It also legalises various forms of discrimination against women. It sanctions domestic violence for wives. The sentence given to a husband who severely beats his wife, 15 days in jail, is one of the most lenient punishments set out in the Code and, indeed, far lower than the six months in jail ordered for those who wound anyone else (article 46). The Code also sanctions a woman’s confinement to the home; leaving repeatedly, even to one’s parents, without permission from a husband is a criminal offence. For women with violent husbands, says Rawadari, this provision “strips them of family and community protection.” Women’s testimony is also worth less than a man’s: two women are needed to make an accusation, rather than one man’s, again raising concerns, especially for those enduring domestic violence (article 2.12). This is made even more problematic because, if a woman has given evidence against a person, he will only be kept in custody while witnesses are checked if the offence merits a hadd punishment; in the case of a discretionary punishment, the accused will be free to go (article 4.8).

It is worth stressing that discrimination against women and girls was also deeply embedded in the way criminal justice was practiced under the Republic, when it came to domestic violence and other abuses, and the attitudes of lawmakers, police and the courts (see AAN’s dossiers on women published in November 2014 and July 2021, which include reports about domestic violence and injustice faced by women in the courts).

Throughout the Code, it addresses men. Women are almost invisible unless the regulation concerns what is done to them. In that case, they might be looked at, asked after, beaten, cursed, be the object of a man’s illicit affairs, or the mother of a child. In only one article, are they – albeit only as ‘girls’ – specified equally – along with ‘boys’ – in the crime of dancing (article 59).

Article 9 of the Code also legalises discrimination of offenders according to class, with Islamic scholars and nobles to be treated more leniently than those from the middle classes and especially the ‘lower classes’. In a footnote, the Code quotes a book of Hanafi fiqh, Radd al-Mukhtar ala al-Durr al-Mukhtar,[9] to justify this categorisation but offers no explanation. Emirate spokesman Zabiullah Mujahed again tried to clarify the intent of the law in his BBC interview. He said ta’zir punishments, which are “fundamentally for discipline and to prevent the repetition of a crime, not merely for punishment,” means that:

Some individuals are deterred from crime by just a warning, due to their high social standing and sense of honor. Others are not. They are repeat offenders and require more severe punishment. Sometimes a person will cease with a summons, while another will only be deterred by imprisonment. When society is diverse, it is natural that the methods of correction will also differ.

If a person has “high social status, self-respect, and understanding,” he said, “they may be deterred by a single warning. That one warning is as effective for them as imprisonment is for another.” Mujahed’s example of someone from the lower classes, who needs to be beaten, was “a repeat offender – for example, arrested multiple times for theft or who has committed numerous criminal acts and has not ceased despite warnings.” However, that is not what is written in the Code.

The BBC interviewer put to Mujahed that there was “a widespread perception that government officials will be dealt with differently [ie leniently].” Mujahed denied this would be the case. After insisting that such class-based variation in punishment was based on fiqh, he implicitly put government officials in the ‘nobles category’ by saying that this category was not limited to government officials, but could include sadat, (descendants of the Prophet), tribal elders and other influential figures.

The Code twice mentions slaves, which, as Rawadari comments, “constitutes the recognition of an absolutely prohibited legal status that stands in clear contradiction to the principle of equality, human dignity, and all fundamental standards of human rights.” Presumably, the centuries-old books of fiqh consulted by the Emirate’s ulema legislated for slaves and free people, given that slavery was then a fact of life, but to see it recognised in a modern law code is shocking. For Afghans who have more recent, family memories of enslavement, part of King Abdul Rahman Khan’s violent subjugation of the Hazarajat at the end of the nineteenth century, it must be particularly troubling to see this word so casually used by today’s government.[10]

Human Rights concerns: the lack of limits, safeguards and clarity

There are worries about the Code’s authorisation of who can administer punishments. While only the Imam (ie the state) can impose hadd punishments, ta’zir punishments may also be delivered by a husband to his wife and a teacher to a pupil. The severity of the beating is legally ‘limited’ to not breaking bones, wounding or leaving either wife or pupil black and blue. The penalty for going beyond that is 15 days in prison for a husband and being sacked for a teacher. A master can also beat a slave (no limits mentioned). Any Muslim who “sees someone sinning in a manner that affects the rights of Allah (huquq Allah), can also administer a ta’zir punishment on the spot because, says the Code, this is classed as “prevention of vice” (nahi an il-munkar) (article 4.6). Giving authority to any citizen to punish any other citizen, without any recourse to the justice system and without even specifying the crimes covered, seems extraordinary.[11]

There are few safeguards in the Code to ensure fairness in the courts. A crime can be proved, it says, based on any of the following ways (article 5): confession, proof, conclusive evidence or a khabr-e adl – an eyewitness account which may require an oath to be sworn as to its truthfulness.[12] Given the propensity for Afghan courts, both under the Republic and now, to accept a confession as the sole grounds on which to convict a person, as Rawadari says, this “significantly heightens the risk of torture, serious abuse and widespread violations of the rights of the accused.”[13] This is particularly problematic given that a ta’zir punishment will still go ahead if the accused retracts their confession (article 4.7) and can be delivered “even if there is doubt” of their guilt (article 4.2). The Imam can waive a discretionary punishment “if the case solely affects the rights of Allah” (article 4.9) (no grounds for this given), while being a “well-known miscreant” can also be used to augment the punishment of an individual convicted of a crime (article 47). Discretionary and qisas punishments are inherited by a person’s next of kin (article 4.13). A person can be sentenced to death in some circumstances if it is judged to be in the public interest or Hibatullah considers it expedient. No right to legal counsel is mentioned in the Code, nor any appeal mechanism.

Afghanistan remains a party to several international human rights treaties, including the Convention Against Torture and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and several provisions in this section of the Code – particularly those relating to corporal punishment and confession-based convictions – raise questions about compliance with those obligations.[14]

The lack of definition of many key words in the Code is worrying, including of the classes of people now deemed criminal. Under this Code, heretics (zindiq), spreaders of disorder (sa’ii bi’l-fasad), those who persist in disorderly behaviour (par fasad dawam kawunkay), wrongdoers (mufsidin) and innovators (mubtadi’in) can all be given the death penalty. Apart from the last – innovators are those outside the community of Sunni Muslims – none of these categories is defined.

On the major categorisation of offences, there is only a little definition in the Code: offences which are against huquq Allah it defines as “not specific to any individual, but which benefit the entire population equally,” while those against huquq al-ibad “refer to actions which affect an individual, whether by commission or omission; they are not related to public welfare.” Given this distinction affects so much of how the law is administered (what type of evidence is acceptable, prioritisation of punishments, whether a punishment can be waived, who can deliver it), much more detail would have been welcome, for example, which offences are classed as offences against God or an individual.

The waters appeared to have been muddied further by Zabiullah Mujahed in his BBC interview when he said the “laws related to rights and penalties are organized into three categories.” First are hudud, where punishments are “applied equally to everyone” and “all people are equal before the law.” The second type were huquq al-ibad, where one person has a claim over another and “no one is superior to another. Even if someone has a claim against the Amir-ul-Momineen and files a lawsuit, the court issues its decision according to the principles.” The third type, he said, were ta’zir punishments which are “fundamentally for discipline and to prevent the repetition of a crime,” “deterrence, not merely punitive retribution.” At least to this reader, this three-way classification was not apparent in the Code. Moreover, many of the offences listed in the Code are crimes against the state (insulting the Imam, not reporting on the opposition, forging state documents etc), which begs the question: Where do they fit in? The Code frames them as falling within the Imam’s discretionary ta’zir authority.

Significantly, the Code also makes the Amir the final arbiter of what is lawful, even when Islamic law considers an action permissible (mubah) – see article 19 and article 94, along with its accompanying footnote, which explains that obedience to the Amir is paramount because “Allah [has] commanded obedience to the ruler.” If the Imam decides an otherwise permissible action is forbidden and a person nevertheless goes ahead with it, they are liable to be punished. One can think of a number of actions which the Emirate apparently considers mubah, but which it has nonetheless forbidden, for example women showing their faces (see article 13.2 and accompanying footnote of the 2024 Vice and Virtue law) or banning women and girls from secondary and university education on grounds other than such education is contrary to sharia, which they have not even tried to argue. For Rawadari, the “primary concern is the generality of this provision,” which “provides the de facto authorities with unlimited powers.” John Butt, who translated the Code for AAN, who is a Deoband seminary graduate, also had concerns, albeit from a different perspective:[15]

‘Mubah’ signifies an action which does not necessarily carry any reward from Allah, as prayer, charity or fasting do. Neither is there anything wrong with it. Examples of such mubah actions are buying and selling, trading, doing a craft, or indeed pursuing any profession which does not include performing an act that is expressly forbidden in Islam. All such actions and professions are permissible. That means that no one – repeat no one – has the right to render them impermissible. …

There is a verse of the Quran – it is in Surah al-Taubah (9:31) – which states, with regard to the Christians, that “they have taken their priests and their monks as Lords besides Allah.” One Christian who had become Muslim – his name was Adi bin Hatim – came to the Messenger of Allah. He contested that the Christians had not taken their clergy and monastic community as Lords. They did not worship them, as they worshipped God. The Messenger of Allah clarified to Adi bin Hatim that, by following their priests and monks, when they prohibited what was permissible, and permitted what was prohibited, this constituted worship on their part. The point is, that only God has the right to make a permissible thing impermissible, and vice versa. This article of the IEA’s Penal Code would seem to delegate this sacred right to the Imam, which would not appear to be acceptable in Islam – Allah knows best.

What does the Code tell us about the Emirate’s priorities?

When this author looked at the decrees, edicts and instructions issued by Mawlawi Hibatullah in the period between when he became amir in 2016 to when the list was published in May 2023, one could trace the issues that had been important enough during both the insurgency and his early years of power to ban, make obligatory or otherwise regulate: there was a noticeable emphasis on trying to prevent land-grabbing and other types of corruption in the ranks, on controlling the insurgents and, after the takeover, organising them into the security services and purging their ranks, and on regulating the courts, lawyers and prisoners – torture, for example, was repeatedly banned. Hibatullah also found time to write extensively on the minutiae of the religious education curricula for university students, even referring to spelling mistakes.

Almost three years on, the scope of what the Code penalises is much broader than that covered by the list of decrees, but themes still emerge. If severity of sentencing and detail of offences are taken as metrics of how seriously the Emirate considers a matter, some matters loom large. There are punitive penalties for buying or selling state weaponry and long prison terms for forging state-related documents and state symbols, and for smuggling. Other key concerns appear to be the production and consumption of drugs (given a whole chapter) and the quality of food, medicine and other goods – apparent from the close detail given to the many articles dealing with the adulteration, import and transport of these goods and to defrauding of the Standards and Quality authority. The heavy sentences, up to and including the death penalty, and repeated outlawing of homosexuality and ‘non-vaginal sex’ also give the impression that this is a major concern for the Emirate. By comparison, severely injuring one’s wife is a trivial offence.

Several articles deal with what could be called not doing your job properly. For example, the Code criminalises “official Islamic scholars and teachers who do not extend their utmost effort in teaching Muslims the basic, necessary injunctions and the vital tenets of their faith,” as well as students who neglect their studies (article 28) and those who betray a trust (article 29). For government employees, soldiers and mujaheddin, disobeying orders is a crime (article 21), as is not accomplishing official work at the proper time (article 22). Judges can also be punished for delaying a judgement (ten days) or deciding a case incorrectly, turning the proceedings into fun and joking (three months) (article 49).

There are also a fair number of articles that deal with what might be considered of the order of neighbourhood disputes – looking at your female neighbour, harassing your neighbour, insulting another Muslim, casting the evil eye, cursing your wife – or very private: one wonders how the state could know how someone is having sex.

The overall impression of this Code, however, is that it is largely about protecting and augmenting power and centralising authority ever more fully within the Emirate. It outlaws insulting the Amir, disrespecting the ulema and not accepting their verdicts, ridiculing sharia injunctions and humiliating or being aggressive towards state employees, soldiers and Taliban. All of these actions are now criminal offences, punishable by (often long) prison sentences and/or flogging. The Supreme Leader has also taken upon himself the power to decide that the permissible can be forbidden. Altogether, these injunctions feel part and parcel of the Emirate’s drive to consolidate power in Afghanistan, to criminalise diversity of opinion, opposition, criticism or just laughing at the powers that be, and to institute a hierarchy where one man’s decisions are final, Afghans who are female and/or not from the Hanafi Sunni school of Islam are excluded, and punishments vary according to class.

AAN’s unofficial translation of the Penal Code for Courts can be read here

Edited by Roxanna Shapour

References

References
1 “‘The Penal Code of the Courts’ is the exact translation of the name given to the Code by the IEA, Da Muhakimo Jaza’i Usulnama,” wrote John Butt in footnote 1 to his translation, adding that ‘penal’ is “an accurate translation of the word jaza’i. The term for ‘criminal’, as this word has been translated elsewhere, would be janayati.”

The bulk of the Code does indeed list various crimes and their punishments, normally the stuff of a penal code, although some of it is about procedure, which elsewhere would be in a separate criminal procedure code.

2 Hudud punishments are viewed as fixed by the Quran or Hadith and are classed as offences against God; they include zina (sex outside marriage), accusing someone falsely of zina, drinking alcohol and some types of theft.

Qisas are retributive penalties, equal retaliation in cases of intentional bodily harm, including most types of murder; these crimes may also be forgiven by the victim or their family or resolved between families with blood money.

3 Article 2 of the Islamic Republic’s 2004 Constitution said that the “sacred religion of Islam” was “the religion of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” while also giving followers of other faiths the freedom “within the bounds of law” to “exercise and performance of their religious rituals.” Article 3 stressed that No law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan.” Hanafi fiqh acted as a default where statuary law was silent: “If there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws about a case, the courts shall, in pursuance of Hanafi jurisprudence, and, within the limits set by this Constitution, rule in a way that attains justice in the best manner” (article 130), albeit with a specific opt-out for Shia Muslim when it came to “personal matters” (article 131).
4 The Ministry of Justice statement outlined the process for formulating legislation:

The legal documents of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are edited and published by various delegations of the scholars of Afghanistan at the level of each ministry and related agency, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the office of the Amir al-Mu’minin, may God bless him and grant him peace, using the Book of Allah, the Sunna of the Messenger of God, peace be upon him, and the books of authentic Hanafi jurisprudence. The above-mentioned legal documents have been repeatedly examined in terms of their compatibility with the Islamic Sharia, and after that, the confirmation will be presented to the Supreme Leader of the Faithful, may God protect him. T

he Amir then signs and ratifies the law.

5 Significantly, the Code generally specifies 39 lashes or fewer, thereby keeping such punishments below the lowest fixed hadd penalty. As 40 lashes is generally seen by Hanafi scholars as the threshold before which a punishment is classified as hadd, limiting lashes to 39 ensures that the punishment does not encroach on the hadd boundary (see, for example, this explanation from the Middle East Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture).
6 This punishment of 40 lashes takes it over the 39 lash maximum for ta’zir (see FN5). By setting the penalty at this level, the Code places it at the boundary between discretionary taʿzir and fixed hadd penalties, suggesting that it may be intended as a hadd rather than a discretionary punishment.
7 This list also includes those unable to commit adultery, a woman who has a child whose father is unknown and a woman left with a child due to mutual cursing (see footnote 27 in AAN’s translation of the Code for an explanation of this).
8 Dozens of Afghan and international organisations have also expressed deep alarm at the Code in a detailed statement to be presented at the 61st Session of the UN Human Rights Council, saying it “represents a dangerous escalation in the formalisation and legal entrenchment of repression, with grave consequences for the protection of fundamental rights in Afghanistan.”
9 Diverting the Baffled to ‘The Chosen Pearl’ (Radd al-Muhtar ala al-Durr al-Mukhtar) by the 18th century Syrian scholar, Ibn Abidin, is an annotative commentary on a voluminous 17th century work of Hanafi jurisprudence, Al-Durr al-Mukhtar (The Chosen Pearl) by Ala al-Din al-Haskafi. Radd al-Mukhtar is considered the central reference for fatwas by Hanafi scholars.
10 For more on this, see Fayz Muḥammad Khan, The History of Afghanistan (Robert McChesney and Mohammad Mehdi Khorrani Eds), Brill, 2012; and Sayed Askar Mousavi, The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic And Political Study, Curzon, Richmond, Surrey, 1998. Slavery was formally abolished by King Amanullah Khan in the 1923 constitution (article 10).
11 For more on the Emirate’s Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, please read AAN’s full unofficial translation of the law, passed in July 2024, as well as an in-depth report about how it is being enforced: Kate Clark, Law, Control, Fear – and some Defiance: Citizens and enforcers talk about the ‘promotion of virtue and prevention of vice’, AAN, 21 December 2025.
12 These are the types of evidence listed to prove an offence against the rights of Allah. For an offence against the rights of man, the Code gives a slightly different list: confession, testimony, retracting one’s confession and conclusive evidence.
13 In 2014, AAN put together a dossier of all its reports dealing with detentions in Afghanistan: many concerned torture: Thematic Dossier VII: Detentions in Afghanistan – Bagram, Transfer and Torture. We continued to report on the use of torture by the Republic and on United Nations allegations in September 2023 that the Emirate was continuing the practice, New UN Report Charts the Emirate’s Treatment of Detainees: Allegations of torture and ill-treatment.
14 Afghanistan became a signatory to the Convention Against Torture in 1987 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1994; both treaties remain binding on the Afghan state. Saudi Arabia, also a state party to the Convention Against Torture and a state officially bound by sharia, abolished flogging as a ta’zir punishment in 2020, replacing it with prison terms or fines.
15 The episode concerning Adi bin Hatim featured in John Butt’s quote comes from the authoritative 14th century CE book of Qur’anic exegesis, Tafsir Ibn Kathir (published by Dar al-Ma’arifa, Beirut, vol II, p348).

 

Inside the Islamic Emirate’s Penal Code: Crime, punishment and authority in Afghanistan
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The Taliban are burning musical instruments in the name of morality. It is an assault on all culture

The Guardian
Wed 25 Feb 2026

The sounds of Afghan history are being erased to prevent music’s ‘moral corruption’ of the Afghan people. We can help keep Afghanistan’s music alive. Plus, Eliane Radigue’s deep listening, and the brilliance of Sinners’s score

The horrors of the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan are all-encompassing. New laws that effectively legalise domestic abuse means that every woman in the country now lives with the threat of state-sanctioned violence. In the context of the twin tragedies of the Taliban’s fundamentalist zealotry, and the rest of the world’s silence in the face of their atrocities, the fate of Afghanistan’s cultural life might seem a smaller catastrophe. Yet it’s equivalently devastating.

The recent burning of hundreds of musical instruments and equipment – reported last week on Afghan National Television – is the latest stage of the Taliban morality police’s ongoing mission to destroy all these artefacts. Last week’s pyre included tablas and harmoniums, instruments that are the bedrocks of Afghanistan’s unique tradition of classical music, as well as keyboards and amplifiers.

“Since their return in 2021, the Taliban have waged a war on music, claiming that it causes ‘moral corruption’,” writes Sarah Dawood in Index on Censorship. “The Taliban outlaws music, and criminalises performing or even listening to music. Musicians in the country live in fear of discrimination, humiliation, torture, imprisonment, sexual violence in the case of women and even death.”

This silencing of musical culture is another humanitarian nadir the Taliban are enforcing, an attempt to create a sharia-compliant, music-free country for which there is no precedent anywhere.

The bravest musicians I’ve ever met are the women of Zohra, the Afghan women’s orchestra of the Afghanistan National Institute of Music – based in Portugal now. Across its orchestras and its training, ANIM works for the “musical rights” not only of the 300 members of the institute, but for the country’s culture as a whole. In their orchestras and ensembles, there’s a mix of western orchestral and traditional instruments – like the lute-like Afghan rubab, whose repertoire is among the treasures of world music, a tradition of pieces and ways of playing passed down across the generations that’s today imperilled as never before and is sustained only in exile.

Meanwhile we can help keep their music in the forefront of our listening lives, renewing that radical activity that no-one in Afghanistan is legally allowed to do. Listen to the cry of hope of Dawn by Meena Karimi, composed for International Women’s Day 2021 and dedicated to Afghan women’s struggles for equality, or hear rubab virtuosos such as Homayoun Sakhi and Ustad Rahim Khushnawaz. There’s no more urgent musical emergency on the planet.

Listen to the Zohra orchestra

What does it mean to listen? I mean, really to listen to the infinite possibilities of every moment of our sonic lives? No composer in 20th and 21st century music asked the question more sensitively, or more profoundly than Eliane Radigue, who has died at the age of 94.

Radigue was a sonic pioneer. Pre 2001, her music was made exclusively for synthesisers, because the technology allowed her to get inside the world of sound, stretching individual pitches into seeming infinities of slowness and concentration, in a way that traditional composition didn’t. Listen to the epic scales of ever-changing changelessness – a paradox that makes sense when you encounter her music – of her Trilogie de la Mort to experience what I mean. As Pascal Wyse wrote in his interview with her, Radigue’s use of synthesisers meant that “the music didn’t contain sound: the sound contained the music”.

Radigue’s epiphany of working with acoustic instruments – and human performers – in the 21st century, and in her Occam Ocean pieces, brought a lesson in how to listen. These works are full of sounds of superficial slowness but they release teeming energy from their musicians.

The Bafta winners have been overshadowed by the row over the TV coverage, but congratulations to Ludwig Göransson, whose original score for Sinners won the Bafta on Sunday night. For me, the standout moment of Ryan Coogler’s film was Rafael Saadiq and Ludwig Göransson’s Oscar-nominated I Lied to You. Five delirious minutes on screen in which Sammie (played by Miles Caton)’s performance at the dance-hall draws the spirits of Black music from African griots and shamans to blues, jazz, hip-hop, and DJ culture to appear, all seamlessly woven into the shots of the dance-floor. You feel you’re there with the dancers and singers, a still point around which the roots and futures of the blues swirls, celebrating the truth that the song is all about: that Sammie loves the blues more than the Bible that his preacher father threw to him on that Mississippi road. That’s the film’s closest reference to the legend of the real-life blues pioneer Robert Johnson, in the mythology of his supposed deal with the devil at a crossroads in Mississippi, giving him his talent in exchange for his soul.

The vampires in the movie are as much musical as they’re supernatural: Sinners juxtaposes the blues with the folk songs, often Scottish and Irish, that the band of white vampires sings outside the dancehall. And as well as the blood and gore of its final act, Sinners is a satire on how the blues has lost its soul due to the vampiric forces of commercialism and appropriation: “White folks like the blues just fine; just not the people who make it”, as Delroy Lindo’s character, Delta Slim says.

The Taliban are burning musical instruments in the name of morality. It is an assault on all culture
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At Risk: Afghan Allies and America’s Credibility

Feb. 24, 2026
To the Editor:

Re “Congress Ends Visas for Afghan Partners, Closing a Path to the U.S.” (news article, Feb. 6):

By allowing the Special Immigrant Visa program for Afghan wartime partners to quietly lapse, Congress has placed America’s credibility, and thousands of vetted Afghan families, in jeopardy.

At Global Refuge, where we have resettled thousands of Afghan allies, we see the human toll of this uncertainty every day: in every child who lies awake at night worrying about parents still in hiding, in spouses separated by continents and in fractured families unsure if they will ever hold their loved ones again.

That they remain stranded overseas, vulnerable precisely because of their ties to the United States, reflects a monumental failure to uphold the commitments we made to our allies in America’s longest war.

This inaction also comes amid a broader dismantling of humanitarian protections for Afghans, including unprecedented cuts to refugee admissions, the termination of Temporary Protected Status and Afghanistan’s inclusion in sweeping travel and visa bans.

At the same time, the administration’s continuing “re-review” of lawfully admitted refugees is poised to throw even previously vetted Afghans into renewed uncertainty about their status.

Taken together, these decisions send a troubling message about whether our government intends to keep its word. America’s promise to those who stood alongside our service members was never merely symbolic.

For thousands of Afghan families and the countless Americans who stand in solidarity with them, it was a commitment that must still be honored.

Timothy Young
Baltimore
The writer is the director of public relations for Global Refuge, a national refugee resettlement nonprofit.

At Risk: Afghan Allies and America’s Credibility
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What’s behind the latest tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan?

By Reuters

ISLAMABAD, Feb 24 (Reuters) – Tensions have heated up again between Islamabad and Kabul this week after Pakistan launched airstrikes on militant targets in Afghanistan.
Pakistani security sources said the strike killed at least 70 terrorists, while the United Nations said at least 13 civilians were killed.
The attack threatens a fragile ceasefire following border clashes in October that killed dozens of soldiers, the worst fighting between the two countries since the Taliban took over Kabul in 2021.
WHY ARE THE NEIGHBOURS AT ODDS?
Pakistan welcomed the return to power of the Taliban in 2021, with then-Prime Minister Imran Khan saying that Afghans had “broken the shackles of slavery”.
But Islamabad soon found that the Taliban were not as cooperative as it had hoped.
Islamabad says that the leadership of militant group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and many of its fighters are based in Afghanistan, and that secular armed insurgents seeking independence for the southwestern province of Balochistan also use Afghanistan as a safe haven.
Militancy has increased every year since 2022 with attacks from the TTP and Baloch insurgents growing, according to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, a global monitoring organization.
Kabul for its part has repeatedly denied allowing militants to use Afghan territory to launch attacks in Pakistan.
Even as the fragile ceasefire has held there have been repeated clashes and border closures that have disrupted trade and movement along the rugged frontier.

WHAT SPARKED SATURDAY’S OFFENSIVE?

The day before the strikes, Pakistani security sources said they had “irrefutable evidence” that militants were using Afghan soil to attack Pakistan.
The sources listed seven planned or successful attacks by militants since late 2024 that they said were connected to Afghanistan.
One attack last week that killed 11 security personnel and two civilians in Bajaur district was undertaken by an Afghan national, according to Pakistani security sources. This attack was claimed by the TTP.

WHO ARE THE PAKISTANI TALIBAN?

The TTP was formed in 2007 by several jihadist outfits active in northwest Pakistan. It is commonly known as the Pakistani Taliban.
The TTP has attacked markets, mosques, airports, military bases, police stations and also gained territory – mostly along the border with Afghanistan, but also deep inside Pakistan, including the Swat Valley, where they later shot schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai.
They also fought alongside the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan and hosted Afghan fighters in Pakistan. Pakistan has launched military operations against the TTP on its own soil with limited success, although an offensive that ended in 2016 drastically reduced attacks till a few years ago.

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

After the attack, the Taliban warned “an appropriate and measured response will be taken at a suitable time.”
Analysts say this is likely to come in the way of cross-border action. Two attacks targeted security forces in northwest Pakistan in the days after Pakistan’s airstrikes.
On paper, there is a wide mismatch between the two sides. At 172,000, the Taliban have less than a third of Pakistan’s personnel.
Though the Taliban do possess at least six aircraft and 23 helicopters, their condition is unknown and they have no fighter jets or effective air force.
Pakistan’s armed forces include more than 600,000 active personnel, have more than 6,000 armoured fighting vehicles and more than 400 combat aircraft, according to 2025 data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The country is also nuclear armed.

Reporting by Lucy Craymer in Islamabad and Saad Sayeed in Bangkok; Editing by Aidan Lewis

What’s behind the latest tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan?
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Forty-Five Days to Spain: One man’s journey from Afghanistan in search of a future

War has shaped the lives of several generations of Afghans, with many pushed to travel beyond the country’s borders, seeking sanctuary or opportunity in more peaceful places. That includes the hundreds of thousands who have embarked on the dangerous journey to Europe. In this instalment of The Daily Hustle, AAN’s Rohullah Sorush hears from one man who made that journey in 2015 when the Balkan route was the main land gateway to Europe for many Afghans. The route opened during the Syrian refugee crisis and stretched from Turkey via Greece, North Macedonia, Bulgaria and Serbia to the European Union. Over a million people travelled through the Western Balkans on foot, by bus, car or train in 2015 alone, including more than 250,000 Afghans. Our interviewee ended up in Spain, where he had uncles who helped him rebuild his life from scratch, and he went on to become a citizen and an entrepreneur. 

A new era, a new beginning

My family are from Baraki Barak district in Logar province, but I wasn’t born there. They’d fled to Pakistan during the civil war in Afghanistan before I was born. And this is how, in 1993, I came to be born in Parachinar in the Kurram district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

I was in grade four in 2003 when my parents decided to move the family back to Afghanistan. A new government had been installed two years earlier and people were saying that Afghanistan had entered a new era — one that promised hope and opportunity.

We settled in Kabul’s Dehdana area, where I finished primary school and then went on to the Ghazi Abdullah Achekzai High School. School was important to me. I enjoyed learning and did well in class. I got my high school diploma, sat the university entrance exam and was accepted into the Faculty of Accounting at Badghis University.

But life had other plans.

Stepping up for my family

The summer before I was meant to start my university studies, my father was diagnosed with cancer and had to stop working. I had to step up and start working to support my family. I didn’t go to Badghis. I had to stay close to home in Kabul, so I enrolled in a computer science course at Hazarat Muhammad Mustafa Institute.

My days were long and demanding. I went to school from seven in the morning until noon. After that, I got work tending my family’s livestock. We owned cows, sheep and goats. I looked after them, taking them to graze in nearby pastures and when there was no grass, I bought feed from the market. I sold the milk, yogurt and butter that we got from the animals to support the family.

Crossing borders in the dark

The promise of hope and prosperity in Afghanistan’s new era hadn’t lasted. Security had deteriorated and suicide attacks and explosions become commonplace, even in Kabul. Anxiety and fear were a part of daily life. So, in October 2015, I made one of the hardest decisions of my life. I left Afghanistan and migrated illegally to Europe.

It was a gamble — a dangerous one — but it was what I had to do to secure a better future for myself and my family. It was a long and exhausting journey. I travelled from Afghanistan to Pakistan, then to Iran and Turkey – much of it on foot, crossing borders under cover of night. From Turkey, I crossed the sea by boat to Greece. From there, I continued through Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Austria, Italy and France. And finally, 45 days after I had said goodbye to my family in Kabul, I arrived in Spain.

I could have been caught by border guards or police at any moment along the journey. But I was determined. I spoke some English and managed to make the journey mostly on my own.

A new life in Spain

When I arrived in Spain, I went to the police. They registered my fingerprints and biometric data and took me to a refugee camp in Getafe, Madrid. I stayed there for six months. During that time, I began learning Spanish and took a six-month course to learn how to make pizza and wait on tables.

With my certificate in hand, I began looking for work. I found a job in a small restaurant in Madrid. I made pizza and other snacks and learned how to prepare barista-style coffee. At first, I worked six hours a day, mostly in the afternoons. Later, I increased my hours. I worked from eight in the morning to four in the afternoon, took a two-hour break and went back to work until midnight – seven days a week. It was grueling, but I was determined to make a go of things. That job helped me improve my Spanish and start to understand Spanish culture.

Later, I found a job in a Pakistani restaurant. I worked there for two months – every day from noon to four in the afternoon and again from six in the afternoon until eleven at night. After that, I went to work in an Iranian restaurant in Madrid with a similar schedule. All in all, I worked in these restaurants for two and a half years. Then, a phone call changed everything.

The phone call that changed everything

I was working at the Iranian restaurant in Madrid when my maternal uncles – who’d been living in Spain since 2010 – called me and said they wanted to start a business and asked me to join them.

We began selling dry fruits, baklava and Turkish delight. We bought baklava from an Iranian company in Madrid and imported dried fruit and other sweets from Turkey and Belgium. We sold our products to shops and supermarkets across Spain.  We ran that business together for four years. I learned a lot about how to run a business in those four years, everything from imports to distribution, from negotiating prices to customer relations.

It was time for me to stand on my own two feet. So, with my uncles’ blessing I set up my own business. For the past three years, I’ve been importing and selling the same sort of products. It’s still a small business, but it’s mine. I work long hours and I travel across Spain, spending a couple of months in different cities – Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, Huesca, Alicante.

Loss, family and a new beginning

In 2020, my father lost his long battle with cancer. We’d done everything we could and spent a lot on his treatment, but finally we had to accept that there was nothing more we could do except make him as comfortable in the time he had left. I went back to Kabul that year to spend time with him before we lost him and support my family through that difficult period.

After my father passed away, I set the wheels in motion to bring my mother, sister and younger brother to Spain. I also got married and brought my wife here. Today, we have a son. Recently, I became a Spanish citizen — something I once thought was impossible. Through years of hard work and sacrifice, I’ve been able to grow my business, buy an apartment for my small family and another for my mother and siblings.

The long road home

When I look back on the journey from a refugee child in Parachinar to a business owner and Spanish citizen, I feel proud of how far I’ve come. Life has taken me across borders and brought me face to face with many challenges. But my story is not unique. I’m not the first person forced by circumstance to leave their home with nothing but the hope for something better, nor will I be the last. If my journey proves anything, it’s that even when life begins in hardship, it’s still possible, through determination, sacrifice, opportunity – and a bit of luck – to build something strong and meaningful.

But I couldn’t have made a go of things alone. Along the way, I was helped by the goodwill of many people who saw a chance to help and did. I now feel an obligation to help others, as I was helped. I know all too well that, given the chance to work and contribute, those who arrive as strangers can become part of the fabric of the place they’ve come to call home.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour 

Forty-Five Days to Spain: One man’s journey from Afghanistan in search of a future
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Pollution in Afghanistan: Air, water, waste and noise under weak governance

Kabul’s winters bring a suffocating haze, as residents burn coal, wood and even plastic to heat their homes and use outdated vehicles, releasing toxic fumes into the city’s dry air. However,  perhaps surprisingly, the worst air quality in Afghanistan is found not in the capital, but in the southwest and north, where dust storms, made worse by climate change, blow in across the borders. Pollution is also not confined to the air. In urban areas, open sewage channels spread foul odours across city streets, badly kept septic tanks contaminate groundwater and rubbish piles up, uncollected. Noise adds another layer of disturbance, with vendors’ loudspeakers blaring by day and stray dogs barking through the night. These overlapping forms of pollution leave Afghans exposed to multiple hazards and reflect the decades-long failure of state institutions to provide basic services, particularly in urban areas. In his new report for AAN, guest author Mohammad Assem Mayar* looks into the where and why of Afghanistan’s pollution crisis and lays out strategies for survival and mitigation.
You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below.

Afghanistan’s rapid population growth and urbanisation have overwhelmed its cities, which lack even basic infrastructure. Particularly Kabul, but also Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Kandahar, Nangrahar and Khost, have seen rapid growth, leading to the spread of unplanned settlements and peri‑urban fringes. These expanding informal and peri-urban settlements face chronic shortages of water, sewerage and waste services, exposing residents to multiple environmental hazards. Yet even in the city centres, pollution has become a defining feature of urban life, driven by winter heating fuels that spew acrid smoke into the air, exhaust fumes from the outdated vehicles that clog city streets, diesel generators, contaminated groundwater, unmanaged waste and persistent noise. In the southwest and west, north, and east of the country, dust storms blown in from across Afghanistan’s borders devastate the air quality in rural and urban areas alike. The climate crisis, making for more frequent droughts and a reduction in those natural cleansers of the air – rain and snow – has only exacerbated many of the hazards facing Afghans.
These environmental stresses carry profound social and economic costs. Preventable illness and premature deaths are widespread, with all the concomitant cost to the economy. Given the failure of state institutions to provide basic services or protection, households are left carrying the financial burden, with the need to purchase water, filters, masks and medicines. Yet private solutions can never substitute for state action. The persistence of polluted air, contaminated water, unmanaged waste and chronic noise reflects decades of weak coordination, uneven enforcement and a failure to reach even basic environmental standards.

This report, which consolidates the available scientific data into readable English, maps out the various types of pollution afflicting Afghans. It looks at whether and how pollutions is being monitored, and at government actions – or inaction – over the decades. It also lays out remedies.

Edited by Kate Clark and Jelena Bjelica

* Dr Mohammad Assem Mayar is a water resources management and climate change expert and former lecturer at Kabul Polytechnic University in Afghanistan. He is currently an independent researcher based in Germany. He posts on X as @assemmayar1.

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below.

Pollution in Afghanistan: Air, water, waste and noise under weak governance
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Afghanistan’s Institutionalized Silence and the Cost of Inaction

Children are denied education, women are barred from work, and minorities live under constant threat.

Four years after the Taliban returned to power, Afghanistan is experiencing what many call a “great muting.” This is not just the result of war or economic problems, but a deliberate effort by the Taliban to erase voices. In communication theory, a group is considered “muted” when those in power control the main ways people can express themselves, such as language, law, and media. This leaves marginalized groups unable to share their experiences in a way others can understand.

For Afghan journalists, women, and ethnic minorities, this is not just a theory; it is a daily reality enforced by the Taliban. The streets are quiet, not because there is peace, but because the Taliban has created a culture of silence where speaking out can cost someone their life.

Afghanistan once had one of the most dynamic media landscapes in South and Central Asia. Hundreds of television channels, radio stations, newspapers, and online platforms reported on politics, corruption, and social issues. Journalists risked their lives to hold the powerful to account. Today, fewer than 50 independent media outlets operate nationwide, down from over 400 in 2021. Human Rights Watch reports that dozens of journalists have been threatened, arbitrarily detained, or beaten in the past year alone. Female reporters, once prominent voices in newsrooms and on air, have largely been forced out. Many journalists report living in constant fear, aware that every article could provoke retaliation. In this climate, truth itself has become dangerous.

Targeting Women and Hazara

Women and girls have suffered the most dramatic and visible losses under Taliban rule. UNESCO estimates that more than 22 million girls are barred from secondary school and university, reversing decades of educational progress. Many will never see the classroom again. Women are prevented from working in most sectors, must travel with male guardians, and are constantly monitored by morality police. Public spaces, workplaces, and recreational areas have effectively been closed to them.

Observers describe watching an entire generation of girls vanish before their eyes. The consequences extend far beyond classrooms. Hospitals operate without female staff, businesses lose vital contributors, and families struggle to survive. In Afghanistan today, half the population is effectively silenced, unable to participate in shaping the society around them.

Amid these restrictions, Afghanistan’s Hazara minority faces a quiet but persistent crisis. Predominantly Shia Muslims, Hazaras have long endured discrimination. Under Taliban rule, forced evictions, land confiscations, and targeted attacks have intensified. Reports document extrajudicial killings, torture, and intimidation against Hazara civilians. Hazara women are particularly vulnerable, facing oppression both for their gender and their ethnicity. Many live under constant fear, with little protection from the state. Their plight is often overlooked internationally, yet it reflects a systematic targeting of a minority population and the fragility of rights under the Taliban.

The Taliban govern without elections, independent courts, or political parties. Laws are issued by decree, arbitrary detention is routine, and peaceful protests are violently suppressed. Journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens live in fear, weighing every word, every social media post, every public gesture against the possibility of retaliation. The absence of accountability has created a culture of impunity, where silence is often the only means of survival and courage comes at great personal risk.

State of Impunity and Economic Ruin

Economic collapse has compounded these hardships. International sanctions, combined with the reduction of foreign aid, have left millions at risk of hunger. Nearly half of Afghan households rely on humanitarian aid, and over 23 million people face food insecurity, including nearly 10 million on the brink of famine, according to the United Nations. Restrictions on women’s work have further reduced household income, while humanitarian agencies struggle to deliver aid because female staff are barred from many essential roles.

Children remain idle at home, schools are shuttered, and families struggle daily to survive. The country faces not just a humanitarian crisis but a social and generational one, as opportunities for learning, work, and basic freedoms vanish.

Four years under Taliban rule have left Afghanistan quieter, but not peaceful. Voices are silenced, not absent. International legal bodies, including the International Criminal Court, have begun investigating senior Taliban leaders for crimes against humanity, particularly gender-based persecution. Yet enforcement remains difficult. Meanwhile, ordinary Afghans continue to endure life under fear and deprivation.

What Can the World Do?

If the global order continues to treat the “silencing” of Afghanistan as a domestic Afghan issue rather than a violation of international norms, it risks setting a precedent that gender apartheid and minority persecution are acceptable costs of regional stability.

To break the current deadlock, the international community should consider these policy changes:

Make Gender Apartheid a Crime Against Humanity: The UN and its member states should back adding “gender apartheid” to the draft Crimes Against Humanity Convention. This would create the legal tools needed to hold Taliban leaders responsible for excluding women and girls as described above.

Set Up a Permanent International Monitor for Minority Rights: Because the Hazara community has been targeted, the UN Human Rights Council should create a dedicated, well-funded team to track and report on ethnic violence and land seizures as they happen.

Link Diplomacy to Media Freedom: No future diplomatic talks or technical assistance should occur unless the Taliban restores independent media licenses and ends the arbitrary arrest of journalists.

Back a “Digital Sanctuary” for Higher Education: International donors should move from building physical schools to funding strong, accredited online education platforms and satellite Internet. This will help make sure that the Taliban’s school closures do not create a “lost generation.”

Afghanistan today is a nation muted. Children are denied education, women are barred from work, and minorities live under constant threat. For many, hope has become a quiet, private act, hidden behind closed doors. But the people endure, they survive, and they wait. And in their silence lies a stark reminder: four years of Taliban rule have changed Afghanistan, and the world cannot ignore it.

Nasratullah Taban is a freelance journalist covering Afghanistan and Central Asia, with a focus on media, extremism, and human rights issues.

Afghanistan’s Institutionalized Silence and the Cost of Inaction
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