On 6 October 2025, the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted a resolution to establish the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Afghanistan (IIM-A). For those campaigning for this body, this is a huge win, which has at times looked uncertain amid a challenging global climate for human rights and fluctuating international attention to the ongoing human rights crisis in Afghanistan. This UN body will be tasked with collecting and preserving evidence of serious human rights violations and international crimes. The IIM-A will not act as a court or tribunal, but will function as a professional investigation hub, collecting, storing and analysing evidence and preparing files that can support future prosecutions in national, regional or international courts. It will complement and cooperate with other UN and international bodies, but it is an independent body.The IIM-A follows similar mechanisms for Syria and Myanmar, each with slight variations in mandate and oversight. These mechanisms are part of a trend towards supporting or incentivising national and international bodies to investigate and prosecute international crimes. Growing numbers of countries have enacted universal jurisdiction laws, allowing them to prosecute crimes wherever they have been committed, based on the principle that some crimes are so egregious they transcend borders. However, most national investigative bodies tend to have very limited resources, including investigators, country specialists and access to evidence. The International Criminal Court is also hampered by limited resources. By creating a kind of ‘one-stop shop’ for evidence, expertise and legal analysis, these UN mechanisms can boost the capacity of prosecutors to carry out investigations.
Given the sheer number of crimes, perpetrators and victims in Afghanistan, the hope is that the IIM-A can make it far easier for prosecutors – either at the ICC or anywhere in the world with jurisdiction – to take on the challenging work of prosecuting war crimes and other grave violations.
This report will examine the mandate of the new mechanism, explain what difference it might make and why civil society fought so hard for it. It will then look at some areas of ambiguity and identify potential pitfalls.
Mandate and scope of the IIM-A
The core purpose of the IIM-A, as set out in paragraph 25 of the Human Rights Council (HRC) resolution, is:
[T]o collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of international crimes and the most serious violations of international law, including those that may also amount to violations and abuses of international human rights law, committed in Afghanistan, including against women and girls, and to prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, in national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law[.]
The mandate of the IIM-A is very broad, encompassing a wide range of crimes, an open-ended temporal scope, a geographic scope limited to crimes committed in Afghanistan, in addition to a requirement to identify the perpetrators “with a view to ensuring that they are held accountable” (para 26(e)). Each of these areas is briefly explained below. (For the IIM-A’s entire mandate, see paragraphs 25 to 32 of the HRC Resolution 60/9.)
Crimes covered
The IIM-A covers international crimes, which are the most egregious conflict-related crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. Its mandate also covers “the most serious violations of international law, including those that may also amount to violations and abuses of international human rights law” (para 25), which apply in times of war and peace, such as torture, discrimination and other breaches of civil and political rights. When outlining this broad scope, the operative paragraph of the resolution notes international human rights law “including against women and girls,” which clearly indicates that the ongoing persecution of women and girls by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) is of concern.
Temporal scope
Importantly, the mandate is not tied to a specific timeframe, but covers past, ongoing and future crimes and violations. The issue of time limits is politically charged, given the decades and cyclical nature of war and abuse in Afghanistan, as well as the time limitations of other mechanisms. The ICC can only investigate crimes committed after Afghanistan joined the Rome Statute in May 2003 and the prosecutor has placed his emphasis on ongoing crimes, de facto limiting his investigation to the post-2021 situation for now at least (AAN). Similarly, the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur primarily focuses on ongoing violations and abuses (AAN), as does a potential case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), focused on breaches of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) by the IEA after August 2021 (AAN).
This leaves huge numbers of victims with no real avenue to justice. In theory, the IIM-A is authorised to examine the full historical record. However, the colossal number of potential crimes and perpetrators over decades of war and egregious human rights violations in Afghanistan will present a dizzying challenge to the mechanism. Combined with resource constraints, the IIM-A’s case selection policies will be critical (more on this later).
Place of conduct
The mechanism will have jurisdiction over crimes committed anywhere in Afghanistan, regardless of the specific province or district. This country-wide scope could enable the IIM-A to track patterns across provinces and years, drawing stronger connections between evidence, crimes and perpetrators. It may also allow for a more even-handed coverage of harms suffered by affected individuals and/or communities. However, crimes committed entirely outside the country but linked to the Afghanistan conflict are likely excluded, such as the alleged rendition and torture by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to multiple destinations (AAN).
Perpetrators
The IIM-A is mandated to investigate crimes attributed to both “individuals and entities.” So far, only the ICC has a mandate to look at individual perpetrators, something that will also be vital for universal jurisdiction cases. This means the IIM-A can focus on individuals with command responsibility within armed groups, as well as current and former Afghan authorities and military forces, in relation to multiple crimes. In the context of the ICC investigation, for example, this might mean identifying other individuals within the IEA who might be responsible for the crime against humanity of gender persecution, beyond the two whom the court has already issued indictments for (AAN piece on those indictments).
In addition, the inclusion of ‘entities’ means it can also look at the groups themselves (para 26(e)). This could encompass a very long list, from the Taliban as an insurgency and an authority; previous Afghan authorities or entities within authorities (such as intelligence agencies); the Islamic State for Khorasan Province (ISKP); various former mujahedin groups, multiple foreign forces over several decades, from the Soviets to the Republic era. Granting the IIM-A authority to investigate entities may lead to the exploration of corporate accountability, though this is still an emerging concept in international law, and many countries, including those with UJ laws, have yet to codify it.
Overall, this broad multidimensional scope mirrors the longstanding recommendations of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) for a comprehensive investigative mechanism. Fereshta Abbasi, Human Rights Watch’s Afghanistan Researcher, told AAN in October 2025 that it kept “a high moral ground” by not excluding any victims or creating a hierarchy among them. However, it remains to be seen how well the mechanism will deliver this broad scope.
Why the mechanism matters for Afghanistan
The IIM-A can support existing and future accountability pathways for Afghanistan, particularly in the long term, by sharing evidence, analysis and case files with prosecutors in multiple jurisdictions – from the ICC to national courts and universal jurisdiction efforts – as well as in legal proceedings of a non-criminal nature. Each will be considered in turn.
Unlocking more universal jurisdiction cases
The IIM-A could be highly impactful in the context of universal jurisdiction, based on the example of similar UN mechanisms that have already demonstrated their ability to contribute to UJ cases. Most European countries, as well as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Senegal and Argentina have UJ laws, though not all apply universal jurisdiction in practice (see Trial International’s map tracking UJ laws and use).
The Syria International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) has become a clearinghouse for national war crimes units, receiving hundreds of formal requests for assistance from multiple jurisdictions and contributing material to multiple domestic prosecutions. Its 2024 report states that it has supported 215 investigations, including publicly disclosed contributions to justice processes in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States (US), Slovakia and the ICJ.
Afghanistan has already featured in UJ practice in Europe, though the mixed outcomes – particularly weaknesses in evidentiary files – demonstrate why the IIM-A may be helpful. Dutch prosecutors have investigated six Afghan war crimes cases; only two resulted in final convictions for torture as a war crime. The Prosecutor closed two cases at the investigation stage due to inadmissible evidence or the death of one suspect. Judges acquitted two accused individuals due to insufficient evidence to prove their personal responsibility or command liability (AAN). In the United Kingdom, one Afghan individual is currently under investigation for a murder in 2015; details have not been published yet (Trial International, p 108).
The IIM-A can help turn these kinds of uneven results into a steadier pipeline of viable UJ prosecutions by collecting and preserving evidence before it is destroyed.
The International Criminal Court (ICC)
The ICC investigation into Afghanistan could benefit hugely from the IIM-A. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC is currently investigating alleged crimes against the Taliban and ISKP. It has already issued arrest warrants against the Emirate’s Supreme Leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada and its Chief Justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani, for crimes against humanity of gender persecution in Afghanistan. The Prosecutor has said that he hoped more warrants would follow.
The investigation scope is potentially broad, but in practice, it was limited to the Taliban and Islamic State by the OTP due to resource restrictions as well as the “gravity, scale and continuing nature” of their alleged crimes (ICC). The OTP has been criticised for this approach, given wider accusations of selective justice as well as the risk that it creates a hierarchy and unnecessary competition among survivors (AAN).
The IIM-A could share evidence and analytical products in ways that meet the OTP’s evidentiary and analytical requirements and add immediate value to the ICC’s current line of investigation into the Taliban and ISKP. It could also help address the apparent resource constraint that led it to deprioritise other aspects of the Afghanistan investigation by expanding its investigations to include additional perpetrators and examining cases before 2021.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
The IIM-A is also expected to cooperate with any future cases heard by the International Court of Justice relating to international human rights law. A case against Afghanistan is expected: in September 2024, four countries, Australia, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands, announced that if the Taliban did not stop violating the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), they would initiate a case against Afghanistan before the ICJ (AAN). Since the ICJ is a state-to-state legal proceeding, any support from the IIM-A to the ICJ’s potential process would go through the state parties to the dispute.
Domestic accountability for military crimes abroad
Countries that deployed troops to Afghanistan under the Republic are expected to investigate and prosecute crimes by their own nationals that took place on Afghan soil. Some countries have already conducted military police investigations or launched public inquiries, but the results remain limited. For example, in Australia, an inquiry into alleged war crimes by the Australian special forces did result in a criminal investigation, but only one former soldier has been charged with the war crime of murder so far (Associated Press). There are concerns that the longer the time between the crime and the investigation, the lower the likelihood of multiple prosecutions (ABC). In the UK, military police investigations have been criticised for their slow start, premature closure, failures to explore all evidentiary avenues and political interference (BBC, Guardian). An independent inquiry currently underway may recommend further investigations, but prospects for justice for the victims of crimes that took place two decades ago seem slim.
The IIM-A can accelerate cases in domestic courts in two ways. First, its existence may encourage states to step up their own investigations into allegations against their forces before the IIM-A gets involved. Second, the IIM-A can contribute to ongoing or future domestic investigations or inquiries by collecting, analysing and sharing evidence. National prosecutorial teams with limited or no access to Afghanistan could benefit from the IIM-A’s greater flexibility to work with civil society documentation efforts, combining the experience and access of CSOs with the IIM-A’s technical capacity.
Transitional justice
The open-ended time frame is important given Afghanistan’s prolonged history of systematic and systemic violence and crime through multiple eras of conflict. While current circumstances in Afghanistan do not allow for the implementation of a transitional justice programme, when this changes, the country will need a foundation of evidence and analysis (see AAN’s report on Afghanistan’s transitional justice process). The IIM-A’s work could make a significant contribution to future transitional justice efforts, particularly by preserving evidence archives. This could be invaluable for eventual national reconciliation and institutional reform. Abbasi told AAN, “When an opportunity for transitional justice arises, the IIM-A’s authentic records will be readily available, enabling Afghanistan to act quickly and not miss another crucial opportunity.” Although much of the IIM-A’s work will not be publicly released (unlike the more public-facing reporting of the UNSR or UNAMA, for example), it could share evidence and information with future Afghan domestic proceedings, assuming certain conditions are met, such as fair-trial standards and witness protection.
How the IIM-A was born: civil society advocacy
The establishment of the IIM-A comes after years of advocacy by CSOs, gradually gaining support from UN experts and member states. Before the collapse of the Afghan Republic, voices from inside the country were urging an international investigation mechanism. A turning point occurred on 8 May 2021, when a bombing at the Sayed ul-Shuhada girls’ school in Kabul killed 85 mostly Hazara schoolgirls (see victims’ profile on the Hazara Genocide Archive website). The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) publicly condemned the attack in a statement and appealed for an independent UN-led investigation. Shaharzad Akbar, who was the commission’s chair at the time, explained her reasons for this call to AAN in October 2025, stating that she had little faith in the domestic justice system.
The call for a new UN mechanism grew after the collapse of the Republic in August 2021, though it was often thwarted. The HRC held a special session on 24 August 2021, in recognition of the human rights emergency, during which calls for an additional mechanism were repeated but not adopted. Nasir Andisha, who has been Afghanistan’s permanent representative to the HRC, told AAN in September 2025 that the outcome of that special session was not what he expected: “It was very weak and inadequate to the critical human rights situation of Afghanistan.” However, in October 2021, the HRC established the United Nations Special Rapporteur (UNSR) for Afghanistan, with Richard Bennett appointed as the UNSR in 2022. Alongside this mandate, Afghan and international NGOs pushed for an independent investigative mechanism, a call which the UNSR echoed. Repeated open letters signed by dozens of NGOs were sent to the Human Rights Council (see this one, hosted by the International Commission of Jurists).Behind the scenes, the European Union was scoping member states’ interest in moving forward with the mechanism, encountering only pockets of resistance (primarily from former troop-contributing nations, more on this later).
It was in the lead-up to the HRC’s 60th session (Sep–Oct 2025) that the drumbeat for a mechanism reached its peak. On 28 August 2025, a coalition of 107 Afghan and international organisations released yet another open letter urging the Council to “act where it has long failed” (accessible here on Amnesty International’s website). This time, the European Union felt it had the support it required from its members, with EU backing virtually guaranteeing the numbers needed for HRC to endorse the establishment of the IIM-A.
The final resolution was hailed as a significant victory for Afghan victims and a testament to the CSOs’ relentless advocacy. “After decades of pleas for justice, we finally have some hope,” Akbar told AAN. Abbasi told AAN, “One year ago, establishment of a comprehensive investigative mechanism seemed like a dream.”
However, both Akbar and Abbasi acknowledged that the hard job had just started for CSOs. According to Abbasi, the IIM-A’s access to information and witnesses inside Afghanistan is not guaranteed. Thus, the IIM-A will rely on CSOs, which will give renewed energy to their documentation efforts, but this comes at a time when many are struggling for funding. Akbar said that CSOs could continue advocating for funding for the IIM-A and their own funding requirements.
Operational framework: current design and early indicators
The realisation of this mandate and the potential impact outlined above will depend to a large degree on its operational framework. The Human Rights Council resolution provides the foundational elements of the IIM-A, including its independence, primary functions, and its place within the wider ecosystem of justice institutions, but plenty of questions remain.
The IIM-A is an “ongoing” entity within the UN system (para 25). Unlike the UNSR for Afghanistan and UNAMA, whose mandates are annually approved by the Human Rights Council (HRC) or UN Security Council (UNSC), the IIM-A’s mandate continues until the HRC decides to end it. While this does not guarantee long-term funding, it eliminates concerns about renewal, providing a relatively sustainable basis for the mechanism. This is crucial, since not only is the mechanism’s work time-consuming, but it should ideally also provide resources for prosecutors in multiple jurisdictions over a long period for maximum effect (allowing for the movement or discovery of perpetrators over time, for example).
It is an “independent” mechanism, meaning that it operates independently of UN agencies, including the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Secretary-General’s Office (para 25). Nevertheless, it will need to synergise its activities with other agencies (more on this below).
Investigative functions: collecting and preserving evidence, preparing case files
At its core, the IIM-A will function much like a professional team supporting a prosecutorial office, though it is not a police force, prosecutor or court. As an “investigative” mechanism, it is tasked “to collect, preserve and analyse evidence” and information and prepare case files to support criminal or civil law proceedings (para 25). Collecting evidence involves gathering diverse materials, such as witness statements, forensic samples, satellite imagery or digital media, before they are lost or destroyed. It is required to “consolidate” evidence, so that scattered archives from CSOs, UN bodies or individuals are gathered, analysed and stored securely.
Some of the biggest impediments to prosecuting international crimes are the erosion or destruction of evidence over time, making the IIM-A’s preservation function critical. It can maintain the integrity and ‘chain of custody’ of evidence by minimising access and the potential for tampering with each piece of evidence through secure storage, forensic protocols, and digital safeguards. Analysis might require experts to verify sources, identify patterns, connect acts to perpetrators or provide contextual and legal analysis.
Civil society will be crucial to the IIM-A’s work, particularly if the IIM-A is not permitted to visit Afghanistan (more on that later). Most NGOs do not typically collect ‘evidence’ to the standards required by courts, but the IIM-A can act as a filter and sorting house for their documentation.
Complementarity
The IIM-A is intended to be a bridge mechanism that works “in complementarity with, and without risk of prejudice to, competent and robust existing national and international processes” (para 26(h)). AAN understands that this language is there to satisfy the concerns of states that had military forces in Afghanistan and are wary of external investigations. A source told AAN in October 2025 that “The purpose is almost certainly to guide the IIM-A to avoid investigation of the same cases” under existing investigations. The legal concept of ‘complementarity’ recognises the primacy of national investigations, which would mean that, for example, as long as investigations or inquiries are ongoing in Australia and the United Kingdom into potential war crimes by their forces in Afghanistan, the IIM-A would have to be cautious about doing anything that might “prejudice” those processes.
In contrast, the ICC is likely to be more welcoming towards the IIM-A. In 2023, the Prosecutor, Karim Khan, announced a new strategic focus on cooperation and complementarity, shifting the OTP from being the “apex” of the Rome Statute to a “hub” within a network of accountability efforts, with a view to greater cooperation with other accountability mechanisms and national authorities. The OTP may still want to protect certain lines of inquiry from duplicative efforts that might “prejudice” its work, but given the scale of the task it has, it is not hard to see how the IIM-A and the ICC can have a constructive engagement.
The history of how complementarity is used at the ICC, however, also shows how states can abuse the principle to avoid accountability. The ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes if a state with primary jurisdiction is “unwilling or unable” to investigate (article 17 of the Rome Statute). Ideally, the threat of an ICC investigation can spur a state into a meaningful investigation. However, states can defer an investigation by claiming that they are investigating, even if that is more of a façade of superficial or inadequate investigations, much as the Afghan government did under the Republic when it sought to block the ICC’s investigation, even though its own ability and willingness to investigate war crimes were extremely doubtful.
A lack of clarity over these boundaries could create disputes between the IIM-A and states or other bodies over case selection, without further elaboration, as well as highlighting the need for a dispute-resolution mechanism in the event of disagreement about complementarity.
The IIM-A and the Special Rapporteur
The resolution goes some way to specify how the mechanism will work with the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan under paragraph 26(b). It directs the IIM-A to “Build on the work and findings” of the UNSR and make use of relevant information, “with consent of information providers as appropriate.” (This will likely include obtaining additional consent from victims, which will be challenging, even with goodwill.) Once the IIM-A becomes operational, the ‘collection and preservation’ part of the UNSR’s mandate, which was added to his initial mandate in 2022, will transfer to the IIM-A. This appears to be a logical use of resources — the UNSR was never adequately resourced to conduct large-scale, criminal-grade evidence collection and preservation. However, the core work of the UNSR’s initial mandate – to “seek, receive, examine and act on information from all relevant stakeholders pertaining to the situation of human rights in Afghanistan” – will continue after the IIM-A is operational. This means that the UNSR can focus on public reporting on the human rights situation and on engaging with civil society, while the IIM-A operates discreetly in support of criminal accountability.
The resolution calls upon the entire United Nations system to fully cooperate and respond promptly to the IIM-A’s requests (para 31). UNAMA, in particular, has gathered extensive information and potential evidence on human rights violations and international crimes over many years. However, the extent to which such information has been preserved – with a clear chain of custody or the required consent – is less clear.
The resolution also calls for the cooperation of states, civil society, business enterprises and other stakeholders to provide any information and documentation they hold or may later obtain (para 30). As noted, the work of CSOs will be particularly important, especially if the IIM-A’s field engagement is hindered due to the de facto authorities’ lack of cooperation. CSOs are able to operate (discretely) inside Afghanistan and possess a rich archive of materials, including victim testimonies and datasets. Victim-ce
ntred, gender-responsive and multidimensional approach
The mandate requires the IIM-A to adopt procedures that are survivor-centred and gender-responsive (para 26(d)). Afghan women and girls have suffered disproportionately under the IEA rule, as demonstrated by the arrest warrants for Taliban leaders for gender persecution as a crime against humanity. This will likely mean that the mechanism will ensure they have the relevant staff and procedures to ensure that crimes like sexual and gender-based violence are prioritised and that the experiences of women, girls and minorities inform its investigations.
The IIM-A is also tasked with adopting procedures which are “multidimensional.” Although this is not defined, it could imply that the IIM-A should approach its work through multiple, interrelated lenses, including the historical, political, economic and social dimensions, as well as intersectional grounds.
Budget and staffing
There are two funding sources for the IIM-A: initial support from the UN to establish a start-up team and a Trust Fund for voluntary (state) contributions that will provide long-term support. The estimated 2026 budget is approximately USD 2.5 million, increasing to USD 3.5 million in 2027 and 2028, with an anticipated increase to around USD 9 million from 2029 onwards (Oral Statement by the UN Office of Programme Planning, Finance and Budget). None of this will be guaranteed, however, until December 2025, when it is subject to budgetary review and approval at the UN (the Fifth Committee, UN press statement).
The budget is significantly lower than the Syrian mechanism’s budget, which was around USD 25 million in 2024 (Justiceinfo.Net), while the annual budget for the Myanmar mechanism is around USD 15 million (Reuters). The oral statement suggests this may reflect, at least in part, the cost-efficiency of sharing data processing, cybersecurity, and other systems between the existing mechanisms and OHCHR. However, a staff of 43 is envisaged for the IIM-A, to be appointed over three years, while the Syrian mechanism was allocated a team of 100 (IIIM 2023 Results Report, p14). It presumably also reflects a backdrop of a significant reduction in resources for the UN, with the Secretary-General warning in October 2025 that the UN could “race to bankruptcy” (UN News).
Risks, limitations and mitigation factors
The mandate reads well on paper, but delivery will be shaped by real-world constraints, including limited access inside Afghanistan, political pushback on cooperation, lean staffing and restricted funding. Experience from the ICC’s Afghanistan engagement, as well as the IIIM and IIMM, suggests that these factors will define what the IIM-A can achieve. The most relevant risks and limitations are set out below.
Managing scope and expectations
The IIM-A’s expansive scope is a strength, but broad mandates can collide with finite resources, cooperation limits and political headwinds, producing disappointed constituencies when some victim groups are left behind. This has been seen in the ICC’s Afghanistan engagement – first because of how slowly things have moved, and second, in the narrowing of investigative focus, as discussed. The IIM-A’s remit is even wider than the ICC’s, covering pre-2003 conduct and serious violations of the International Human Rights Law (IHRL) that may not amount to international crimes, magnifying the risk of over-promising relative to staffing, funding and longevity.
The case selection procedure for the IIM-A has not yet been defined, except for a direct reference to crimes against women and girls in the operative paragraph of the resolution and it will likely be developed and published when it is operational. It has been directed to take a “gender-responsive and victim-centred approach,” which should allow for some degree of proactive case selection to meet clear victim/survivor demands. Some Afghan victim/survivor communities advocate for a ‘representative coverage’ model, which would include at least one feasible, high gravity case from different periods and parties, to provide some equity for victim/survivor communities (the author participated in relevant discussions).
Resourcingandphased capacity development
As discussed, the IIM-A rollout will happen amid a UN liquidity crunch, which may already have influenced the proposed budget for the IIM-A, which starts at a fairly low level. Beyond core UN contributions, which are limited, the mechanism will rely on a voluntary Trust Fund, which could leave it vulnerable to unpredictable donor cycles and political conditionalities. In recent years, funding for human rights accountability work has generally decreased and for Afghanistan in particular (OHCHR’s 2025 annual report and AAN’s report on assistance cuts in Afghanistan). Donors may attempt to fund specific types of cases, excluding those they do not wish to support, which risks politicising the mechanism.
Universal jurisdiction is highly state-dependent
UJ cases rise or fall on the will and capacity of states to prosecute, which in turn depends on a wide range of factors, including their legal frameworks, access to evidence and witnesses, the ability to identify perpetrators and, in many cases, the requirement for perpetrators to be present in the jurisdiction of the state. In addition, the advocacy and involvement of diaspora communities, as well as other civil society and donors, can all be influential.
The impacts of the Syrian (IIIM) and Myanmar (IIMM) mechanisms are quite different, though there are multiple reasons for this. The IIIM has received 500 information sharing requests, mainly from European states, while the IIMM has received only one, from Argentina. However, unlike the Syrian mechanism, the IIMM also cooperates with the ICC, so universal jurisdiction is not its primary focus.For the Syrian mechanism, there is a greater presence (or potential presence) of perpetrators and victims in relevant jurisdictions, which relates to migratory flows as well as citizens travelling to take part in hostilities abroad (mostly to join sanctioned terrorist groups) and returning to their home country.
The presence of the accused is not always necessary, however. A number of states, including Argentina and Germany, allow prosecutors to investigate and issue arrest warrants even when the suspect is abroad (though neither country will hold trials in absentia). In France, not only can warrants be issued in absentia, but trials can also be held without the perpetrator present: three senior Syrian officials were tried in absentia and found guilty of war crimes in 2024 (Reuters). France also issued an arrest warrant for Bashar al-Assad in 2024, once he was no longer a head of state (an earlier warrant while he was still in office was ruled invalid, see this Reuters report).
However, prosecutors with limited resources may also want to know that there is at least the possibility of a perpetrator’s presence to justify their application of resources. In 2023, for example, the German Federal Prosecutor declined to open a universal jurisdiction case against Myanmar, which was filed by the NGO Fortify Rights and complainants from Myanmar, because the accused was not present in Germany or expected to be present (also noting the IIMM’s case building work). The decision that was criticised by Fortify Rights, which argued that the movement of persons of interest can be dynamic and unpredictable. More cynical observers might suggest that such pragmatism could be overridden only when high-profile arrest warrants align with foreign policy or business interests (Western states were criticised for many years for turning a blind eye to corporate oil and gas dealings with the Myanmar junta, for example, see this Guardian article).
Where does this leave Afghanistan? On the one hand, Afghanistan is of importance to the ICC, which is expected to welcome the IIM-A. In addition, Afghanistan is relevant to many European states, with large Afghan diasporas and a longstanding political and military engagement. Dutch prosecutors, echoing Dutch judges’ earlier decisions, told AAN in 2019 that a key driver of their Afghan docket was ensuring the Netherlands did not become a haven for war criminals (AAN). On the other hand, several factors may temper expectations related to Afghanistan.
First, under-resourced war crimes units in several jurisdictions may remain focused on Syria and Iraq; even with assistance from the IIM-A, Afghan files may sit lower on priority lists. Secondly, the ‘presence or expected presence’ determination may affect the prosecutor’s case selection. Many former Taliban commanders and IEA officials are subject to travel bans or do not travel to jurisdictions where they might be arrested. Similar considerations may come into play with regard to ISKP commanders. However, in both cases, mid or lower-ranking commanders can defect and travel, even under the status quo, while the longevity of the regime itself is hard to predict. As things stand, this could leave former Republic officials more vulnerable to investigation, given that many are already in countries with universal jurisdiction. This, however, is a relatively under-documented area, with political sensitivities for some in the Afghan diaspora, given the scale of past and ongoing violations by other perpetrators.
Thirdly, the growing political normalisation with the IEA, which in some European states is linked to questions of migration and returns, may dampen the appetite to pursue Taliban cases. Over time, some EU countries, such as Germany, have increased their de facto engagement with the IEA, apparently driven by a need for IEA cooperation to receive Afghan deportees (InfoMigrants). Other countries, like Norway, have chosen a path of engagement with the IEA despite the gravity of their rights violations. For example, in 2022, a senior IEA delegation visited Oslo, including Amir Khan Muttaqi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Anas Haqqani, a senior member of the Haqqani Network (BBC). While they were in Oslo, Afghan CSOs requested the Norwegian authorities to arrest them (NewsinEnglish.no).
Domestic inquiries and cooperation challenges
As discussed, there would almost certainly be resistance from former troop-contributing nations to the IIM-A opening investigations into potential war crimes that touch on their forces. States with potential exposure could narrow cooperation or seek to ring-fence sensitive files. The recent ICC experience with the United States is the most extreme example of a state’s backlash. The US imposed visa bans and financial sanctions on ICC officials over Afghanistan (2019 and 2020) and Israel (since 2025). Reports suggest that the US might even sanction the ICC as an institution (Financial Times). While US foreign policy under Donald Trump is far from the global norm, there are growing numbers of populist leaders as well as hostility to what is sometimes called ‘lawfare’ by conservative governments (including in the UK, see this article by the NGO Action on Armed Violence).
AAN obtained credible information that Poland, which eventually joined the EU consensus on the resolution, previously opposed the notion of proposing an IIM for Afghanistan during EU internal discussions over the last four years (the EU drafted and proposed resolution 60/9, which resulted in the adoption of the IIM-A). It is believed this was driven by concerns about allegations against the Polish military forces (in 2011, seven Polish soldiers were acquitted of war crimes in an incident in 2007, see this BBC report).
AAN also obtained information about the UK’s attempt to restrict the IIM-A’s scope during the informal discussions in September 2025. The UK apparently tried, but failed, to modify the wording so that the IIM-A would “be complementary with” existing national and international processes, while the wording in the draft was “working in complementarity with” those processes. A source suggested that the UK wanted to preclude the IIM-A from investigating crimes that a state has already investigated. (As noted, in December 2022, the UK established an Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistanto investigate potential war crimes in Afghanistan by its special forces.)
Access and witness protection
The resolution equips the IIM-A to conduct field engagement (para 26(c)). The IEA has not reacted to the IIM-A’s creation, though it is highly unlikely they would permit investigations into their own culpability. They might conceivably permit investigations into historical abuses against their own forces, such as the notorious massacre at Dasht-e Leili, though it would be equally hard to imagine the IIM-A travelling to Afghanistan to investigate only incidents by one perpetrator without compromising their own independence. Thus, it seems quite possible that the IIM-A will not have an on-the-ground presence. Recent practice points the same way. They banned the UNSR from visiting after critical reports following his visits in 2022 and 2023 (Reuters). They also publicly announced that they would not cooperate with the ICC (Al Jazeera).
The IEA’s control over territory, institutions and records means that site inspections, facility visits and routine subpoenas are unrealistic. As a result, crucial information archives inside Afghanistan, including court and prison ledgers, hospital registers, school and payroll records, procurement files and telecom records, may be unreachable, altered or destroyed, degrading their value as evidence over time. Very little forensic work has been done and what there is may not be admissible. Remote investigation tools, satellite imagery, secure digital intake and proxy interviewing across borders can be helpful, but they also come with trade-offs. Without on-the-ground corroboration, authenticity and chain of custody challenges increase; translation and cultural context errors also rise.
Consequently, working with diaspora witnesses and with CSOs working on human rights issues will be vital to the IIM-A. That said, in terms of witness protection and protection for human rights defenders, even Afghans in exile also face security threats to their extended families and associates. How the IIM-A navigates this will be of utmost importance.
Conclusion
The IIM-A marks a decisive upgrade from monitoring to case building for Afghanistan, raising hopes for greater criminal accountability in the years to come. It is the first UN body mandated to collect, preserve and analyse evidence to courtroom standards across all parties, all periods and in relation to International Criminal Law, International Humanitarian Law and the most serious International Human Rights Law violations. Other UN mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur and UNAMA, remain central for public reporting and advocacy and offer a good complement to the mechanism. Properly used, the IIM-A could encourage universal jurisdiction proceedings, enhance the capacity and potentially the scope of the ICC investigation, support a potential ICJ case and preserve evidence for future Afghan transitional justice.
The reality, however, will also be shaped by practical limitations. The same features that make the mechanism powerful – its broad scope, ongoing mandate and open-ended timeline – also carry risks familiar from Afghan civil society’s experience with the ICC. It could raise expectations that collide with finite resources, political headwinds, limited cooperation and access constraints. The IIM-A’s start-up budgets are lean and phased, cooperation may be uneven and field engagement inside Afghanistan may be limited or denied.
The decisions made by the IIM-A regarding its strategic lines of inquiry and case selection will be decisive for both the mechanism’s impact and its ability to be truly victim-centred. It will be a fine balancing act to reconcile the broad scope, limited capacity and significant expectations.
Responsibility does not rest with the IIM-A alone. Its operations and independence will depend upon predictable, preferably unearmarked funding and state cooperation. Much will also depend on the resources and interest of national war crimes units to proactively pursue UJ cases where the evidence leads. UN entities could play a significant role by enabling access to important files and aligning their future procedures, such as ensuring broader consent from their information providers, enabling them to share their documentation with the IIM-A.
Measured against Afghanistan’s decades of impunity, the IIM-A is far from a cure-all and it will not deliver justice quickly or evenly. Its contribution can be to help stop further loss of evidence, improve the quality and readiness of files for courts, encourage more prosecutors to take action and keep justice options open until judicial and political opportunities arise.
Edited by Rachel Reid and Roxanna Shapour
Afghanistan Peace Campaign
A Kabul street mural by the Afghan artist collective ArtLords reads: “A true Muslim is one whose words and actions do no harm to others (Hadith Sharif). Violence against women goes against the teachings of Islam.” Photo: ArtLords, 2017
