The UN warns Afghanistan faces a worsening drought crisis, urging urgent aid as millions struggle with food, water, and livelihood shortages.
Tom Fletcher, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and head of OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), has issued a grave warning about the intensifying drought crisis in Afghanistan. In a video message released on Thursday, May 1, Fletcher shared details of his visit to Spin Boldak district in Kandahar, where communities are struggling with severe water shortages and failed crops.
Fletcher announced that the United Nations has allocated $17 million to provide emergency food, clean water, and livelihood support for affected populations. He stressed that this funding is only a fraction of what is required to address the needs of millions who face hunger and displacement due to ongoing climate-induced disasters and economic collapse.
According to Fletcher, climate change is having an increasingly devastating impact on Afghanistan’s rural population. Farmers are no longer able to grow staple crops like wheat, leaving entire families without food security. He emphasized that humanitarian action must be paired with long-term climate adaptation and resilience-building strategies.
This warning comes amid additional concerns over the mass return of Afghan refugees from neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran.
The forced deportation of tens of thousands of Afghans adds further pressure on already strained local resources and humanitarian services, intensifying the ongoing crisis. OCHA and other UN agencies have raised alarm over the potential for widespread displacement, food insecurity, and disease outbreaks.
Fletcher has previously warned that the reduction in international aid to Afghanistan could result in the death of millions. With humanitarian funding in sharp decline since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, many NGOs and UN agencies have faced operational constraints, despite the urgent and growing needs across the country.
In response, agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF have echoed OCHA’s concerns, urging the international community not to abandon Afghanistan during a time of worsening climate shocks and displacement. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has also confirmed that prolonged drought conditions now threaten over 25 out of 34 Afghan provinces.
To prevent further deterioration, humanitarian leaders have called for renewed international cooperation, flexible funding, and unhindered access for aid workers. Without sustained investment in both emergency relief and long-term resilience, Afghanistan may face one of the worst climate-driven humanitarian crises in the region.
UN warns of worsening drought and rising humanitarian needs in Afghanistan
This comes as the National Workers’ Union of Afghanistan announced yesterday that nearly 1.5 million workers are currently unemployed in the country.
Today (Thursday), May 1st, marks International Workers’ Day.
At a ceremony held in Kabul to mark the occasion, officials from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs announced that efforts are underway to send some Afghan workers abroad.
Mohammad Zahid Ahmadzai, deputy minister for labor affairs, stated that a department has been established to handle workers’ complaints in order to address their challenges and ensure their rights.
He said: “The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has created a department to handle workers’ complaints so that all concerns can be addressed. No one has the right to mistreat workers.”
Abdul Matin Molawezada, acting head of the National Workers’ Union of Afghanistan, said: “Officials and employers must ensure decent jobs, fair wages, and adequate livelihoods for workers. Society must treat them with dignity and respect and provide them with support.”
At the same event, Tite Habiyakare is a Senior Statistician at the International Labour Organization (ILO), said that due to economic hardship, one in every five children in Afghanistan is forced into hard labor.
He said: “They are half of the society, and without their participation, there can be no true progress nor sustainable development and no meaning for future for any nation.”
Safiullah, a laborer, commented: “Although our work is relatively easy and mostly machine-operated, there are workers engaged in extremely difficult and exhausting labor. We urge their employers to provide them with more support and facilities.”
This comes as the National Workers’ Union of Afghanistan announced yesterday that nearly 1.5 million workers are currently unemployed in the country.
Afghan Govt Seeks to Send Workers Abroad Amid High Unemployment
SIGAR quoted UNICEF, saying: “Lack of education contributes to the shortage of female health workers.”
A report of the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) said the suspension of US humanitarian and development aid to Afghanistan has created challenges for its citizens. The organization warns in its report that if the suspension continues, the health, education, and livelihoods of the Afghan people will further deteriorate.
According to SIGAR’s findings, the United States has provided over $3.83 billion in aid to Afghanistan since 2021. The report states: “The United States has been the single largest donor to programs supporting the Afghan people, having disbursed more than $3.83 billion in humanitarian and development assistance since the Taliban takeover in 2021.”
“This humanitarian and charitable aid can at least reduce poverty and temporarily resolve part of the economic problems. But if the aid had been economic in nature, the government could have implemented strategic programs and stimulated developmental processes. In that case, the aid could have served as a stable source of income,” said Abdul Nasir Rishtya, an economic analyst.
The report, citing the United Nations, states that without additional funding, about 7 million people may lose access to essential health services by 2025. Due to the shortage of female staff in health services, UNICEF has predicted around 1,600 maternal deaths and over 3,500 infant deaths in the current year.
SIGAR quoted UNICEF, saying: “Lack of education contributes to the shortage of female health workers.”
“We have always relied on foreign aid, and there’s no doubt about that. The reduction in aid can directly affect patients’ lives, which is a worrying development. We need to find an alternative. The Ministry of Health must have an adequate budget,” said Mujtaba Sufi, a doctor.
On security, SIGAR reported via the Ministry of Defense that in the past three months, 7,920 individuals joined the army and 10 joined the air force. The total estimated but unverified number of military personnel is around 200,000, while the number of police officers is reported to be over 219,000.
In response to the report, the Islamic Emirate’s Ministry of Economy reiterated that humanitarian aid should not be politicized by the United States. Ministry spokesperson Abdul Rahman Habib said: “Humanitarian assistance, based on global laws and respect for international principles, is vital. In emergencies, disasters, economic crises, and for vulnerable individuals, such aid plays a key role in providing food, water, and access to services. This aid must not be used by some countries as tools of political pressure.”
This comes amid reports that Donald Trump, upon returning to power, signed an order suspending US foreign aid, including to Afghanistan.
SIGAR: US Aid Halt Has Created Serious Challenges for Afghan People
At the same time, the acting minister of economy also met with the head of a Qatari charity organization to discuss humanitarian support for returnees.
Mawlawi Abdul Kabir, acting minister of refugees and repatriation, in a meeting with Roza Otunbayeva, head of UNAMA, called on the United Nations to assist in equipping residential settlements for migrants.
In addition, Mawlawi Abdul Kabir emphasized the Islamic Emirate’s readiness to engage with the international community, stating that such engagement must occur within the framework of Islamic law.
Abdulmutalib Haqqani, spokesperson for the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, said: “At the end of the meeting, the minister made it clear that the Islamic Emirate is willing to engage in dialogue with the world and is prepared to establish relations with all parties within the framework of Sharia.”
According to the ministry’s spokesperson, the head of UNAMA also promised that the UN mission would work to mobilize more financial resources to support Afghan migrants and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Meanwhile, Stéphane Dujarric, spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General, referred to a UNHCR report warning of the forced deportation of Afghan refugees from neighboring countries and described it as a potential trigger for a deeper humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.
Dujarric told reporters: “Amid the current funding uncertainties, the UNHCR today called for $71 million to respond to this crisis across the region for a nine-month period.”
At the same time, the acting minister of economy also met with the head of a Qatari charity organization to discuss humanitarian support for returnees.
Abdul Rahman Habib, spokesperson for the Ministry of Economy, told TOLOnews: “The head of the Qatari charity pledged that, in coordination with relevant committees, they will assist in meeting the urgent needs of returnees, including health services, shelter, and the construction of water supply networks.”
Earlier, the World Health Organization reported that more than 130,000 Afghan migrants had returned from Pakistan and Iran in the past thirteen days.
Islamic Emirate Urges UN to Aid Returnee Housing and Services
Tom Fletcher arrived in Afghanistan on April 27, and his six-day trip is set to conclude tomorrow (Friday, May 2).
Tom Fletcher, the United Nations Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, stated Afghan women do not want to be saved—they want their voices to be heard.
During his visit to Kunduz, Tom Fletcher warned that the suspension of aid has led to the closure of health centers and made it more difficult for women to access medical services.
He said: “And here in Kunduz, hearing from women who are losing everything because of the cuts that we’ve been forced to make even since April. The nearest medical facility is now 3 hour cycle away. The clinics have all been closed nearby. And so I’m hearing from women who have had to cycle while very very heavily pregnant back to the nearest hospital and they’ve lost their children as a result.”
“In dealing with the international community, regional countries, and internally, there is a need for greater flexibility. They must share Afghanistan’s real situation with the world so the global community understands their severe condition. The Afghan people also need to know that their issues are being communicated to the world,” said Ismail Zadran, an economic analyst.
Meanwhile, Farhan Haq, Deputy Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General, stated that Tom Fletcher was also informed of the negative impact of reduced funding on demining efforts during his meetings in Kunduz.
He said: “The Under Secretary General also heard how funding cuts are crippling lifesaving mine action work in Afghanistan. Landmines killed and injured 55 people every month on average in the country, 80% of them children often hurt while playing or going to school.”
“They must make significant investments and provide economic support to the demining sector, continuing this cooperation. We have not yet achieved peace. Our children and livestock are still being killed by mine explosions. Afghans continue to be victims of landmines,” said Kamran Aman, a military analyst.
Tom Fletcher arrived in Afghanistan on April 27, and his six-day trip is set to conclude tomorrow (Friday, May 2).
During the visit, he met with Islamic Emirate officials in Kabul, Kandahar, and Kunduz, emphasizing the continuation of UN humanitarian cooperation.
Fletcher: Afghan Women Want Their Voices to Be Heard
Regarding regional ties, Muttaqi said the Islamic Emirate seeks no tension between India and Pakistan and supports direct dialogue for resolving disputes.
The acting foreign minister said that after Donald Trump’s return to power, direct communications with the United States resumed, and he expressed hope that relations between the two countries will improve.
In an interview with Al Jazeera, Amir Khan Muttaqi emphasized that the Islamic Emirate has fulfilled its commitments under the Doha Agreement. However, he noted that some obligations on the American side—such as removing the Islamic Emirate’s name from the blacklist—have yet to be fulfilled.
He also highlighted the development of relations with regional countries including Russia, Qatar, India, and Pakistan, and reiterated the Islamic Emirate’s commitment to a balanced foreign policy.
Muttaqi stated: “We have repeatedly stressed that the United States must adopt a realistic view of the current situation in Afghanistan. There is no security threat, no drug trafficking, and no use of Afghan soil against others. If reality is seen instead of propaganda, there is a good opportunity to improve relations.”
Wais Naseri, a political analyst, said: “A de facto relationship—meaning practical ties—has existed with all countries, especially the United States, Russia, India, China, and Pakistan, over the past three years and eight months. However, a legitimate, state-to-state relationship has not yet been established, mainly due to global conditions and the positions of the US, Russia, India, China, Pakistan, and the UN Security Council.”
Muttaqi called Russia’s recent move to remove the Islamic Emirate from its list of banned organizations a “positive step” toward expanding relations, particularly in the trade sector.
He added: “We consider Russia’s recent decision a significant step. Now, more economic cooperation is possible. Afghanistan’s geographic location can also be advantageous for Russia.”
Fazl Rahman Oria, another political analyst, commented: “Afghanistan must adopt a balanced and completely neutral foreign policy between Eastern and Western powers, and protect its legitimate national interests accordingly.”
Regarding regional ties, Muttaqi said the Islamic Emirate seeks no tension between India and Pakistan and supports direct dialogue for resolving disputes.
He also stated that new opportunities for political, economic, cultural, and trade cooperation have emerged between Kabul and Doha.
Muttaqi: Direct Talks with the US Resumed After Trump’s Return
Many undocumented Afghan migrants have Pakistani spouses and have lived in the country for years. Nevertheless, the government says they must leave.
Every night in Karachi, a bustling port city in Pakistan, Fatima Bibi goes to bed in fear. The sound of police sirens from the streets outside makes her anxious. She wonders whether a knock at the door might tear her family apart.
Her husband, Sher Zada, is an Afghan refugee. His family fled conflict in Afghanistan when he was just a boy, in 1992, and Pakistan is the only home he knows. Ms. Bibi’s family long hoped that despite Mr. Zada’s undocumented status, his close ties to the country and marriage to a Pakistani national would eventually help him secure permanent residency, if not citizenship.
But to the Pakistani government, it is officially past time for Mr. Zada to leave.
On March 31, a government-imposed deadline expired for many Afghans in Pakistan to find another country of refuge. Those without legal status who remain in Pakistan, like Mr. Zada, now face repatriation. Less than three weeks after the deadline’s expiration, the Pakistani minister of state for interior, Talal Chaudhry, announced at a news conference that more than 80,000 Afghans had already been expelled.
The deportations could subject the refugees to perilous conditions under the heavy hand of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. And, if they are married to Pakistanis, it could mean leaving their families behind.
“What will happen to my children and me if Zada is taken away?” Ms. Bibi said.
The campaign to deport Afghans coincides with a resurgent conflict with India, Pakistan’s eastern neighbor and archrival. India has ordered almost all Pakistani citizens to leave the country, part of its response to a terrorist attack in Kashmir that it has linked to Pakistan. The Pakistani government, which denies any involvement in the attack and has asked for an international investigation into it, responded by canceling most Indian citizens’ visas.
Pakistan’s crackdown on Afghans follows years of tightening restrictions on Afghan residency. Recent U.N. reports indicate that over 910,000 Afghans have been deported from the country since September 2023.
The deportations have been motivated largely by officials’ frustration with the Taliban government, which they accuse of harboring Pakistani militants responsible for deadly attacks inside Pakistan. The Taliban deny those allegations, but tensions continue to rise.
Pakistan’s military said on Sunday that it had killed 54 militants trying to infiltrate the country from Afghanistan over the previous two nights. Pakistan said the militants had been “khawarij” — a term it often uses for the Pakistani Taliban.
The Pakistani government has also been emboldened by a tide of anti-immigrant sentiment around the world. It has drawn parallels to recent deportation efforts in the United States and various European countries to justify its own campaign.
Among the Afghans facing deportation in Pakistan are those who arrived after the Taliban seized power in August 2021 and now await resettlement in Western countries, including the United States. Pakistan extended the deadline for their relocation to another country to Wednesday, after which they will again face deportation.
Their fate became increasingly uncertain in January when President Trump issued an executive order suspending all refugee admissions to the United States. The decision left thousands of Afghans stranded in Pakistan with no clear recourse.
In October 2023, during an earlier wide-ranging effort to expel undocumented Afghans, Mr. Zada was detained. He narrowly avoided deportation only after Ms. Bibi’s father paid a last-minute bribe to secure his release.
This year’s renewed deportation campaign forced Mr. Zada and his family to leave their home. Ms. Bibi’s father offered them shelter, putting himself at risk. At the news conference this month, Mr. Chaudhry warned of strict repercussions for anyone who helped Afghans stay in the country illegally.
Rights groups say that the plight of refugees like Mr. Zada — Afghans married to Pakistani citizens — is one of the most overlooked aspects of Pakistan’s deportation drive.
While no official data on the subject is available, rights groups like the Joint Action Committee for Refugees, a Pakistani civil society network, estimate that thousands of Afghan-Pakistani marriages have taken place. They are especially common in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, Pakistani provinces that share a porous border with Afghanistan.
Such weddings are often conducted through tribal customs or informal community ceremonies. Though socially recognized, the unions frequently lack formal documentation, such as marriage certificates, making it hard for the Afghan spouse to obtain legal residency or citizenship.
Even in big cities like Karachi, Afghans with Pakistani spouses often face obstacles to formally registering their marriages or the births of their children.
According to Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority, or NADRA, foreign spouses of Pakistani citizens are eligible for a Pakistan origin card, which would grant them visa-free entry and the right to stay indefinitely and own property. But many Afghan applicants are denied the card.
Legal experts have told Mr. Zada that his marriage to Ms. Bibi gives him a chance, if a slim one, of staying in Pakistan legally. But the lengthy process and the high fees are prohibitive. Mr. Zada earns just $3 a day, he said.
Some Pakistanis married to Afghans have turned to the judiciary for relief from the bureaucratic obstacles. In July, a court in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ruled in favor of 65 petitioners, affirming that their Afghan spouses were eligible for dual nationality. But such cases are uncommon.
Umer Ijaz Gilani, an expert on refugee rights based in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, said the authorities had deliberately fostered the perception that refugees had few options for obtaining legal residency or citizenship, despite constitutional guarantees and numerous rulings from higher courts.
“The core problem lies in the government’s erratic and inadequate implementation of existing safeguards, not in the laws themselves,” Mr. Gilani said.
Refugee-rights activists also say that NADRA withholds origin cards from applicants who qualify, often citing the need for clearance from Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. NADRA officials declined to comment on those claims.
The Pakistani authorities remain firmly committed to the deportation campaign. Officials say that all undocumented Afghans must leave the country and re-enter on valid visas, regardless of marital or familial connections. But current immigration restrictions can make it almost impossible for them to secure visas after they leave.
Mukaram Shah, an undocumented Afghan migrant married to a Pakistani woman, had been living on the outskirts of Quetta, a city about 70 miles from the Afghan border. In December 2023, he was arrested by the police while working as a porter at a local vegetable market.
Without any legal proceedings, his family said, Mr. Shah was taken directly to the Chaman border crossing and deported to Afghanistan.
“We could not even say a proper goodbye,” said his wife, Palwasha, who, like many women from rural Pakistan, goes by a single name.
Her family, citing security and economic concerns, refused to let her follow her husband, believing he would return on a long-term visa. But under the current crackdown on Afghan refugees, that hope is fading.
“Every night, my children ask when their father will come home,” Palwasha said, her voice breaking. “I don’t have an answer. All I can do is pray.”
Families Are Split as Pakistan Deports Thousands of Afghan Refugees
Kenya is extraditing the Afghan commander and politician, Haji Abdul Zaher Qadir, to the United States, after arresting him at a hotel in Nairobi. The US has charged Haji Zaher with drug and weapons trafficking. He was a prominent police commander and then MP and deputy speaker of the Afghan parliament, and was accused, multiple times, throughout the Islamic Republic era of drug smuggling, running private militias and land-grabbing.Under the Republic, he was shielded from the rapacious US Drug Enforcement Agency, which had picked up numerous Afghans before him, often involving controversial sting operations. As Rachel Reid reports, Zaher’s arrest may signal that past political constraints on the DEA have been lifted.
Haji Zaher with members of his local militia, which at the time was slated to be incorporated into the Territorial Army. Photo: Haji Qadir Zaher via Facebook, 12 February 2016Until now, Haji Zaher Qadir had enjoyed an apparent immunity from prosecution, despite – or perhaps because – his political career was always intertwined with opium riches. He was described in 2014 by the HuffPost as the “most well-known and powerful drug lord in Afghanistan.” On 14 April 2025, his immunity finally evaporated. He was arrested at a hotel in Nairobi by Kenyan police soon after arriving in the country (Khaama). The Nairobi court which considered the extradition request heard that he was wanted by a court in the Southern District of New York after a criminal complaint was filed by the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for offences of “narcotics importation conspiracy” and “being in possession of machine guns” (Nairobi Times).Throughout the Republic era, Haji Zaher Qadir maintained a façade of respectability, alongside the notoriety of an illicit income. He had inherited both from his father, Haji Abdul Qadir, who was a member of the influential Arsala clan that had held positions in government for 150 years. Haji Qadir was a key commander with the mujahedin faction, Hezb-e Islami Khales, in the war against the Soviets and became governor of Nangrahar after the mujahedin captured Kabul in 1992. Later, after they lost power, he became one of the few senior Pashtun commanders to join the anti-Taliban United Islamic Front/Northern Alliance. After 2001, he helped shore up support among Pashtun representatives at the June 2002 loya jirga and was appointed by President Hamed Karzai as one of his five vice-presidents in the transitional administration. A month later, in July 2002, he was assassinated (Guardian). Qadir was also known for having amassed a fortune in the 1990s by taxing the booming opium trade and the transit trade in goods smuggled, customs-free, from Dubai to Pakistan via Afghanistan (RFE/RL).[1]
The son, Haji Zaher Qadir, commonly known as Haji Zaher, inherited a large share of his father’s dominion over Nangrahar, as well as its rivalries and dirtier politics. He was a prominent militia leader in the province from the early years of the new Islamic Republic onwards, described in a Human Rights Watch report from 2004 as operating “criminal enterprises and continue to engage in numerous human rights abuses, including the seizure of land and other property, kidnapping civilians for ransom, and extorting money.”
He also got a lucrative job – a perfect fit for his family business interests – Commander of the Frontier Brigade of the Eastern Region (see this 2005 UNDP report about him handing in mortars, heavy calibre weapon rounds and landmines as part of the Disarmament of Illegal Groups (DIAG) programme) and later Commander of the 8th Border Battalion based in Takhar Province. Both positions straddled important narcotics smuggling routes. According to a 2007 State Department report, he was asked to leave his post in June 2006 “due to allegations of corruption, but he refused to do so.” Even when his salary was stopped, he “continued to operate, reportedly using his own funds to pay officers’ salaries and funded more than 1,000 additional officers, essentially forming a private militia.”
He was finally forced out in 2007 after his cousin and assistant, Bilal, and four other border police were caught in Takhar province in a car loaded with heroin, described in a 2008 report by the State Department:
Five Afghan Border Police officers were arrested while transporting 123.5 kg of heroin from Nangarhar to Takhar Province. The heroin was seized outside Kabul. At the time, the officers were transporting the heroin in a Border Police truck. The officers worked for Border Police Commander Haji Zahir, also alleged to be a drug trafficker. Defendants in the case included his personal body guard and his nephew, who acts as his personal secretary.
This (and no doubt some US pressure) was enough to stymie his border police gig, but he himself managed to evade arrest (NYT, Globe and Mail). However, he and his uncle, Haji Din Muhammad, did manage to get Bilal sprung from jail in 2009 in the run-up to the presidential election: President Hamed Karzai was courting Din Muhammad and Zaher for support and the price was a pardon for Bilal – Karzai was to pardon many others when politics demanded (Boston News/Associated Press, Telegraph).[2]
Meanwhile, Zaher’s career changed track. Like many former commanders who lost posts due to allegations of criminality or abuse, he managed to get himself comfortably elected in the 2010 parliamentary elections and then went on to become a deputy speaker in 2012 (Pajhwok). The impunity Zaher enjoyed for his illicit activities, like so many of his power broker peers, was wired into the twisted Afghan state.
His notoriety did trigger some direct confrontations, however: in 2011 he was accused by the Attorney General of drug smuggling, charges he dismissed as trumped up by his enemies (AAN). In 2013, Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal (who was at the time himself under threat of impeachment) accused him in parliament of smuggling thousands of trucks of flour worth “$269 million” (RFE/RL). Zaher’s ‘defence’ was that he sat on such a huge fortune – USD 365 million – that he had no need to evade customs duties (prompting disgust from some Afghans quoted in this Tolo story).
In 2017, AAN reported on Haji Zaher having forces in the so-called ‘uprising’ militias, as well as the Afghan Local Police and Afghan National Border Police in Achin, Nazyan and Kot districts in Nangrahar that were involved in the fight against the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP). “Locals,” we reported, “have alleged that Zaher benefits from smuggling and illegal checkpoints and these ‘business interests’ have been hurt by the growth of ISKP and the Taleban, reducing the territory in Nangrahar under his influence.” The report also noted that forces loyal to Zaher had beheaded a number of alleged ISKP fighters and displayed their heads on the main road – an action which Zaher defended. Despite this, his ability to raise militias and anti-ISKP stance raised his value to the US government. At the time, Zaher did not take a known hostile position against the Taliban. In fact, AAN was told there were channels between the two parties.
America as self-appointed drug police to the world
Zaher is far from the first Afghan to be picked up by the long arm of American law, which respects almost no territorial boundary in its ‘war on drugs’, any more than in its ‘war-on-terror’.[3] It was President Richard Nixon who first declared a ‘war on drugs’ in 1971 (Time), described by the US social justice charity, the Vera Institute, as a “wrongheaded, racist policy decision,” given the subsequent decades of discriminatory practices towards minority communities in the US. The international reach of the Drug Enforcement Administration was initially focused on South and Central America, the effects of which are still felt today (Harvard International Review, Guardian). But it was the 9/11 attacks that made Afghanistan the epicentre of the DEA’s drugs war and what it called narcoterrorism.
Despite scant evidence that Osama bin Laden himself was directly connected to the Afghan drug trade, George W Bush declared that the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan was linked to heroin trafficking (CBS News). The DEA got a massive spike in funding, a new Counter-Narco-Terrorism Operations Center and an office in Kabul (ProPublica). But the DEA soon wanted – and got – wider powers. Most of the Afghan opiate trade was heading for Europe and Russia, putting some traffickers beyond the DEA’s reach. So in 2006, Bush signed into law a new statute that allowed the DEA to pursue drug trafficking anywhere in the world, whether or not it had a domestic US nexus, as long as it was connected to terrorism (ProPublica). One former DEA agent joked to reporter Ginger Thompson in a 2015 story for ProPublica that “The law was so wide open you could indict a bologna sandwich.”
Afghans targeted by the DEA
The DEA had successfully prosecuted Afghans prior to receiving their expanded authority, but the pace picked up after 2006. The first Afghan to be extradited to the US from Afghanistan was Baz Muhammad – which took place with the consent of President Karzai in October 2005 (Department of Justice). The DEA claimed that Baz Muhammad had been funnelling heroin profits to support the Taliban from 1994 to 2000 (Justice Department), with the head of the DEA at the time claiming that “This drug kingpin bragged that he waged jihad against Americans by poisoning them with his heroin” (Reuters).
In a number of instances, Afghans have claimed that they were informants or allies of the United States – as Zaher once was – before they found themselves picked up by the DEA. Haji Bashir Nurzai, for example, described by US officials as “the Pablo Escobar of heroin trafficking in Asia,” was (and is) closely connected to the Taliban, but also had ties to the United States before his arrest (FRE/RL). At his trial in 2008, he was sentenced to life imprisonment despite claiming a history of cooperation with Americans in the 1990s and after 2001. Nurzai was released in September 2022 in exchange for an American, Mark Frerich, who had been held by the Taliban since 2020 (Al Jazeera), which rather undermined his US ‘Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation’. The prisoner swap also revealed how important Bashir Nurzai was to the newly re-established Islamic Emirate, as did the hero’s welcome he was reported as having received from officials at Kabul airport on his return (Kabul Now).
Haji Juma Khan’s story is also of an ally or informant turned DEA target. When he was extradited to the US from Indonesia in 2008, he was also proclaimed a drugs kingpin and sentenced to two life sentences (Justice Department). That may have been true, but he was also reputedly a CIA and DEA informant (New York Times). Presumably, he was a useful one since he was quietly released in April 2018 (The Intercept). [4] Despite his release, the ‘Hajji Juma Khan Organisation’ remains listed and subject to sanctions, according to the US Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act (see also this US treasury organogram of the ‘New Ansari Network’ that Juma Khan is placed atop).
The DEA has often been criticised for its reliance on sting operations, often luring targets into committing crimes, which several Afghans may have fallen foul of. Such tactics are used in both domestic and international cases, which the agency defends as allowing for a controlled means of arrest and evidence gathering. In this NYT piece about the DEA, a defence lawyer protests that for his client, “There were no drug dealers or drugs. There were not even any guns until the government, through repeated entreaties and enticements, convinced the defendants to obtain and bring them.”
Afghans picked up for ‘narcoterrorism’ who may have been trapped by similar tactics include Khan Muhammad, who in 2008 received two life sentences for attempting to distribute heroin in the United States, as well as using the proceeds to support the Taliban (Justice Department). The story revealed in this Department of Justice press release suggests a sting. The DEA investigation began after a tip-off via Afghan security forces from an Afghan farmer who said he had been approached by some Taliban to fire a rocket at Jalalabad Airfield. The farmer mentioned that he knew that one of the Talibs, Khan Muhammad, “had previously been involved in opium and heroin trafficking.” The DEA persuaded the farmer (presumably, paid him) to meet the Talib again, wearing a wire, through which he recorded further conversations about rocket attacks. It is over a series of conversations with the DEA informant “that Muhammed agreed to act as a broker for the purchase of opium,” which begs the question as to whether Khan Muhammad returned to the opium trade because the DEA invited him to, thus enabling them to arrest him.
The case of Haji Bagcho, too, revealed what appears to have been a stretch by the DEA. In 2012, Bagcho, dubbed a “heroin godfather” by a DEA agent (CNN), was convicted in a US court for conspiracy, distribution of heroin for importation into the United States and narcoterrorism. The DEA cited a ledger of Bagcho’s showing heroin transactions worth USD 250 million in 2006 alone, adding:
Based on heroin production statistics compiled by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime for 2006, the defendant’s trafficking accounted for approximately 20 percent of the total amount of heroin produced worldwide that year.
However, while the DEA appeared to have ample evidence for his role in trafficking, the evidence of his connection to the Taliban, according to court records, was based only on a DEA informant, who the DEA later admitted was “not credible.” In 2015, Bagcho’s lawyers successfully argued for a new trial (see court record), resulting in the narcoterrorism charge being dropped, though the two drug convictions remained.
The DEA operation against Haji Abdul Satar Abdul Manaf also relied on undercover DEA agents. In August 2024, Manaf was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for trying to import heroin into the US, as well as terror-related charges. A US Department of Justice official said: “Haji Abdul Satar Abdul Manaf used heroin as a weapon of war, funding the Taliban and Haqqani Network to spread terror and death.” Manaf had been sanctioned by the US in 2012, then arrested and extradited from Estonia in 2019 for “storing or moving money for the Taliban” through his business, the Haji Khairullah Haji Sattar Money Exchange (US Dept of Justice).
DEA agents had themselves enticed Manaf to supply to the United States, as made clear in this Department of Justice press release:
MANAF participated in in-person meetings, recorded telephone calls, and electronic communications with five individuals whom MANAF understood to be affiliated with an international drug trafficking organization. During those meetings, MANAF helped arrange to import large quantities of heroin into the U.S. with the assistance of—and recognizing that some of the proceeds of that narcotics trafficking would be provided to—the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. Four of these individuals were, in fact, DEA confidential sources. The fifth was an undercover DEA agent (the “UC”).
This proclivity for sting operations was the subject of a 2015 investigative report by ProPublica, which found a “disturbing number” of incidents where DEA undercover agents were themselves presented as evidence in “staged narcoterrorism conspiracies.” Another example reported included another Afghan, Taza Gul Alizai, who sold heroin to an undercover DEA agent who had been posing as a member of the Taliban (State Department). His lawyer said he had been lured to the Maldives with the promise of dental treatment, where he was arrested (ProPublica).
The DEA finally moves on Haji Zaher
Haji Zaher stayed in Afghanistan after the fall of the Republic, seemingly continuing some of his business activities. As noted above, prior to their return to power, the Taliban had reportedly reached a degree of accommodation with him, perhaps united by a shared enemy, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province, which Zaherhad directed his militias against (New Lines Institute). According to one source who follows illicit economies and armed groups in Afghanistan, his business had continued, “in harmony with the Taliban.”
Haji Zaher meets with the deputy head of the Tehreek-e-Islam Peace Caravan, Mawlawi Ahmad Shah on 10 September 2021. Photo: Haji Qadir Zaher via Instagram
As to what those businesses might be, the Islamic Emirate banned opium cultivation, processing and trade in 2022. However, the sharp drop in opium cultivation did trigger a surge in opium prices, making the substantial stockpiles highly lucrative. It may not be surprising then that, according to a March 2025 report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “drug trafficking in Afghanistan remains a highly profitable illicit trade.” Possibly Haji Zaher is still involved in his old trade.
The Nairobi court heard that there were also charges involving machine guns against Zaher: the Afghan trade in weapons, long intertwined with drug trafficking, is also going strong. In 2023, the UN Sanctions Monitoring team reported failings in IEA attempts to centralise weapons control, and reported that allowing local commanders to keep “20 per cent of weaponry captured” and the “gifting of weapons” were both widely practised. The February 2025 report by the same UN team found that al-Qaeda-affiliated groups “continued to have access to weapons seized from the former Afghan National Army, transferred to them by the de facto authorities/Taliban or purchased from the black market.” Research by the Small Arms Survey published in March 2025 found that arms trafficking continues, “likely with at least the tacit approval of low-level Taliban officials.”
US President Donald Trump made the Afghan weapons trade a priority. Trump reportedly told his first cabinet meeting in February 2025, “Afghanistan is one of the biggest sellers of military equipment in the world, you know why? They’re selling the equipment that we left. … but we want our military equipment back” (BBC). In the same month, Emirate spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid seemed to respond to Trump’s threat, saying: “We will use these weapons to repel invaders who dare to seize them” (VOA). A 2022 estimate by the US Department of Defence said that US-funded equipment worth USD 7.12 billion had been left in the hands of the Republic, most of which was seized by the Taliban.
For the DEA, this presidential enthusiasm for action at a time when political interest in Afghanistan is otherwise so low may have spurred it on. It has had an interest in Zaher well back into the Republic era – it is possible that much of the evidence they had against him predates whatever business dealings he has had under the IEA. The internal State Department reporting noted above suggests there was some US political pressure for his removal from his border police role in 2006-07. The source mentioned earlier that follows illicit economies and armed groups in Afghanistan told AAN that he was also aware of DEA requests to move Zaher on, much later, from 2014 to 2018, which were stymied by “high level” political opposition from within the US administration. This protection could have come from those in the US government who were focused on peace deals with the Taliban, since he had demonstrated some ability to reach an accommodation with them, or simply because the US military valued his forces – brutal, but effective – against ISKP in the east. That the DEA could move against him now, the source said, “is a Trumpian effect,” with the agency unfettered by competing State Department or national security priorities.
As for Zaher’s presence in Nairobi, Afghan smugglers may be less common in West Africa than, say, Turkey, but their trade has long had a global reach. A 2015 UN Office on Drugs and Crime report found that while trafficking of Afghan heroin in Africa had existed at low levels from the 1980s, there was a marked increase in interdictions after around 2009. However, as the stories of previous arrests of Afghans show, when it comes to the DEA, the possibility of a sting operation against Zaher also seems highly plausible.
The end of immunity?
If Haji Zaher appears in the Southern District of New York courtroom, he will have been many years and many miles from the parliamentary privileges and presidential protection that he once enjoyed. The DEA should finally get to put its evidence against him in a time and place where he has no leverage.
There are plenty of reasons to question the American ‘war on drugs’, both for its aggressive claim to universal jurisdiction as well as its selective application. Zaher himself was protected by the United States under the Republic, but not under the Emirate. Bashir Nurzai was a priority drugs ‘kingpin’ until he was a useful trade in a prisoner exchange: he is now back in Afghanistan and presumably enjoys some leeway to pick up his business dealings where he left off. The DEA and other US agencies have probably contributed to the enrichment of more Afghan drug traffickers than they have convicted, from informants to undercover agents to counter-terrorism security entrepreneurs.
At the same time, many will be glad to see Haji Zaher fall from grace. He was one of a generation of political figures who abused his successive positions of power to enrich himself, strike at rivals and grab land, helping to keep millions of Afghans trapped in poverty and the Republic mired in corruption. Other Republic-era profiteers may be revising their travel plans for fear that the DEA has more targets in its sights. There is a fairly extensive list of Afghans who once enjoyed covert US protection, who may now, finally, be vulnerable, at least on trafficking charges.
Edited by Kate Clark
References
References
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Barnett Rubin described in 2000 how the Arsala clan had become rich:
The Arsala clan (Haji Abdul Qadir and his brothers) was at the center of the commercial development of Jalalabad, profiting from Nangarhar province’s skyrocketing opium production and using the Jalalabad airport as a center for the import of goods from Dubai for smuggling into Pakistan in alliance with Afghan and Pakistani Pashtun truckers and the local administration of the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province].
Vanda Felbab-Brown also wrote about how the Arsala clan benefitted from Nangrahar’s position as the second largest provincial source of opium in Afghanistan, although she said he had done a deal with the United States to reduce opium production in exchange for development assistance. See ‘Shooting Up: The Impact of Illicit Economies on Military Conflict,’ PHD thesis, 1999, p398 (available as a PDF from MIT). This 2003 RFE/RL article also quotes Qadir as having criticised the dishonesty of internationals for not delivering on their promises to support farmers in exchange for them stopping growing poppy.
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Kate Clark and Stephen Carter’s 2010 report, No Shortcut to Stability Justice, Politics and Insurgency in Afghanistan, p33, details Karzai’s pardoning of rapists, a kidnapper of United Nations staff and drug smugglers. They reported Amnesty International’s Sam Zarifi’s estimate that Karzai was issuing 800-1,000 pardons annually and that, ahead of the presidential elections, the numbers had gone up, with most being granted to people associated with powerful families. Also, coincidentally on p33 of that report, then Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commissioner, Nader Nadery uses a discussion with a judge in Nangrahar to illustrate the impossibility of getting justice in Afghanistan. The judge named Haji Zaher and Din Muhammad as putting pressure to get the verdicts they wanted and asks: “’Why wouldn’t this happen, when I go on my bicycle to buy potatoes and they all have bodyguards and armoured cars?’”
Vice interviewed the former head of the DEA in Afghanistan who had been Juma Khan’s ‘handler’; he expressed both admiration for Juma Khan as well as shame for betraying him.
Losing His Immunity: Former Afghan MP Haji Zaher extradited to US on drug charges
A recent UN report highlights that 70% of women in Afghanistan struggle to access humanitarian aid due to various restrictions.
A recent report by the United Nations Women’s Division highlights that over 70% of women in Afghanistan face significant barriers to accessing humanitarian aid. The report points to a lack of female staff in humanitarian organizations and restrictions on women’s mobility as the primary reasons for this challenge.
The report, released on Sunday, April 27, examines the gendered impact of humanitarian aid in Afghanistan. It states that the Taliban’s strict regulations on women, such as mandatory male guardianship and strict dress codes, have severely limited women’s participation in public life.
Additionally, the report emphasizes that the Taliban’s ban on women working for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies has restricted women’s access to essential services such as healthcare, education, nutrition, and protection. This has undermined women’s role in shaping effective and equitable responses within the community.
One of the most concerning findings is the ongoing restriction of education for girls, with only 43% of school-aged girls receiving education and virtually no girls in the 13-17 age group attending school. This contributes to the continued cycle of poverty in the country.
The report also reveals that economic pressures, particularly on households led by women, have intensified in 2024. Some families have been forced to resort to drastic measures such as skipping meals, pulling children out of school, and early child marriages.
Furthermore, the lack of female health workers has significantly reduced women’s access to healthcare services, worsening maternal health conditions. With limited decision-making power in society, Afghanistan’s women and girls face heightened risks of gender-based violence and early marriage.
Despite these challenges, women-led organizations have played a vital role in advocating for women’s rights, but they have struggled due to a lack of funding. The report recommends increasing the recruitment of female staff in humanitarian organizations and providing financial support to women-led institutions to help alleviate the situation.
The report underscores the critical need for international support to ensure that Afghanistan’s women can access the resources and rights they are entitled to. As the humanitarian crisis deepens, efforts to empower women and ensure their participation in the rebuilding process are crucial for Afghanistan’s long-term stability and progress.
UN: 70% of women in Afghanistan face barriers to accessing humanitarian aid
Pakistan’s Defense Minister stated that terrorism in the region stems from U.S. policies, which have supported militant groups for decades.
Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif recently reiterated his country’s stance on terrorism, acknowledging past support for terror groups. In a statement, Asif stressed that the roots of terrorism in the region can be traced back decades to Western policies, particularly those of the United States. He claimed that Pakistan had long been involved in a “dirty game” on behalf of the West, citing decades of collaboration with the U.S. and the U.K. in supporting terrorism.
Asif’s remarks come after previous admissions on Pakistani involvement in supporting terror groups during the Soviet-Afghanistan war and beyond. He confirmed that Pakistan had been complicit in facilitating terrorist activities for Western powers, asserting that Pakistan had engaged in this “dirty work” for over three decades, largely driven by U.S. interests in countering Soviet influence in the region.
The defense minister also discussed India’s accusations against Pakistan. He pointed out that while Pakistan was often blamed for regional issues, it had no involvement in the accusations leveled by India. Despite the tension, Asif stressed that Pakistan did not want to escalate the conflict, emphasizing that Islamabad had no desire to take the initiative in any military action.
In an earlier interview with Sky News, Asif went further to criticize Western policies. He underscored that U.S. and British support for terrorist groups had destabilized the region. His comments were part of an ongoing critique of Western interventions in the region, where Pakistan had historically been used as a strategic ally in the fight against the Soviet Union, only to face the consequences of those same policies.
Reports indicated that Pakistan supported terrorism and insurgent groups in Afghanistan both before and after the Soviet withdrawal, continuing even after 2001 with U.S. and NATO presence.
Asif also targeted India’s alleged role in supporting terrorism against Pakistan. He claimed that India was involved in training and equipping terrorists in Afghanistan, particularly through its consulates in the country. According to Asif, Pakistan had credible intelligence indicating that India was directly supplying weapons and explosives to groups like TTP to target key Pakistani cities.
Asif’s remarks reflect deep-rooted geopolitical tensions in South Asia, particularly the ongoing rivalry between Pakistan and India, and the complex role the West has played in the region’s instability. These historical dynamics, shaped by U.S. and U.K. actions during the Cold War, continue to influence current relationships and conflicts.
Pakistani Defense Minister: Terrorism is a result of US policies in the region
The United Nations says aid workers are still in a “race against time” to remove rubble and rebuild after the devastating earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan last month, killing at least 2,200 people and cutting off remote areas.
The 6.0-magnitude quake on Aug. 31 was shallow, destroying or causing extensive damage to low-rise buildings in the mountainous region. It hit late at night, and homes — mostly made of mud, wood, or rocks — collapsed instantly, becoming death traps.
Satellite data shows that about 40,500 truckloads of debris still needs to be cleared from affected areas in several provinces, the United Nations Development Program said Wednesday. Entire communities have been upended and families are sleeping in the open, it added.
The quake’s epicenter was in remote and rugged Kunar province, challenging rescue and relief efforts by the Taliban government and humanitarian groups. Authorities deployed helicopters or airdropped army commandos to evacuate survivors. Aid workers walked for hours on foot to reach isolated communities.
“This is a race against time,” said Devanand Ramiah, from the UNDP’s Crisis Bureau. “Debris removal and reconstruction operations must start safely and swiftly.”
People’s main demands were the reconstruction of houses and water supplies, according to a spokesman for a Taliban government committee tasked with helping survivors, Zia ur Rahman Speenghar.
People were getting assistance in cash, food, tents, beds, and other necessities, Speenghar said Thursday. Three new roads were under construction in the Dewagal Valley, and roads would be built to areas where there previously were none.
“Various countries and organizations have offered assistance in the construction of houses but that takes time. After the second round of assistance, work will begin on the third round, which is considering what kind of houses can be built here,” the spokesman said.
Afghanistan is facing a “perfect storm” of crises, including natural disasters like the recent earthquake, said Roza Otunbayeva, who leads the U.N. mission to the country.
Afghanistan Peace Campaign
