Afghanistan Peace Campaign
In the Arab world, the term alem, plural ulema (Islamic scholar) implies an advanced degree of Islamic learning, rather than just someone who performs religious functions. However, in Afghanistan, it is used interchangeably with two other terms, mullah and mawlawi, the latter being an Islamic cleric with more advanced education.
This report refers to different types of Islamic schooling. At the apex is the dar ul-uloom or seminary, which is aimed at generating professional Muslim clerics. There are also madrasas, or Islamic schools, which teach all ages from basic Islam to primary-school aged children to advanced classes for young men (or women). There are also hujras, where informal Islamic education is given by a teacher, usually a village mullah, to children or youths. The author uses ‘school’ for non-madrasas.
Religious education has traditionally been the primary source of learning in Afghanistan, with the majority of Afghans – boys and girls – getting some religious education in mosques and madrasas. By contrast, the first schools were only established in 1903 by Amir Habibullah Khan. Until the early twentieth century, most religious education was also conducted outside the purview of the state. In urban areas, this was done through private madrasas endowed by wealthy citizens. In the countryside, as will be looked at in more detail below, there was a more informal system, where in each village, a teacher – usually a mullah – would instruct children and young men in specific religious texts, typically in a mosque, a hujra (a small room adjacent to a mosque, also used to host guests) or someone’s home. Modern Afghan rulers, recognising the importance of religious education to any state-building project, have tried to incorporate it into the state and bring it more closely under state control.
Abdul Rahman Khan (r1880-1901) was the first of Afghanistan’s rulers to establish a state-endowed madrasa, Kabul’s Madrasa-ye Shahi, where around 200 students enrolled at the expense of the state.[1] Abdul Rahman had strained relations with many religious leaders outside Kabul due to his attempts to centralise control of the country, but, under his successors, Habibullah Khan (r1901-1919) and Amanullah Khan (r1919-1929), this state-endowed madrasa produced many high-ranking and typically pro-government ulema and civil servants. In the interests of controlling the Islamic education received by those who would go on to be government functionaries, Amanullah Khan established two additional state-run madrasas in Kabul that would train all religious judges employed by the government. However, government madrasas remained limited to the country’s major urban centres and did not expand beyond them until the 1930s and 1940s. Even by the time of Daud Khan’s rule in 1970s, there were only 20 formal government-run madrasas in Afghanistan.[2] In addition to these, a few dozen private religious seminaries operated under the guidance of prominent religious leaders.
Given the scarcity of formal religious institutions in the country, many Afghans sought religious education in neighbouring countries. After the establishment of a seminary in the Indian town of Deoband in 1867, it replaced madrasas in Bukhara (in modern-day Uzbekistan), as the most popular destination for Afghan students.[3] The importance of the Dar ul-Uloom Deoband in Afghanistan was enhanced by the connections between its leadership and the so-called Frontier Mullahs, religious leaders guiding the militant struggle of the Pashtun tribes against British incursions in the North-West Frontier Province. Connections between the Afghan court and Deoband were also important during the reign of Amanullah, as Indian ulema who had studied there contributed to the development of the state-monitored madrasa curriculum and served as advisors to the court on religious matters.[4]
Religious education in rural areas before the Saur coup d’tat of 1978
In rural areas, little changed in the way of religious education for most of the twentieth century. There were limited options for those wanting a more formal, structured education who did not wish to travel outside Afghanistan. In the southeast, for example, there were a few government-sponsored madrasas, the first of which, Dar ul-Uloom Ruhani, was established in 1972 in a rural area outside Gardez in Paktia province. Some private madrasas were already active in the region. Two of these were in Ghazni’s Andar district – one founded in the 1880s by a prominent religious leader, Mullah Mushk-e Alam, in Shilgar[5] and a second, Nur al-Madaris, founded in the early 1940s.
One of AAN’s interviewees,[6] a mullah from Muqur district of Ghazni province where no madrasa existed until the early 1990s, described the situation in those days:
There were no madrasas back then [in Muqur in the mid-twentieth-century]. Ulema had to travel to different cities and countries and leave their homes just to acquire knowledge. They were often poor and couldn’t afford to stay away [from their families] for long. Besides, knowledge didn’t hold much value at the time – people simply didn’t care about it.
Therefore, the most common form of religious education for mullahs remained an informal, traditional system in each village. In this setup, pupils, boys and girls, typically between the ages of 7 and 12 would study particular religious texts, often without a structured curriculum and usually from the village mullah. Those aiming to become a mullah would stay on and learn additional subjects. This pattern had persisted for generations, with one mullah having studied with another and then passing on his knowledge to the next. This type of education typically took place in mosques, hujras and village homes where only the very basics of religion, without a specific curriculum, were taught. While this informal system was the most accessible option for most would-be mullahs, it was far from equivalent to the structured religious education available elsewhere. Van Linschoten and Gopal described it as “far more eclectic and irregular than the Deobandi curriculum found in major Afghan and Pakistani madrassas.”[7]
Mullahs told AAN that the hujra system had limited their learning. They explained that formal institutions for religious studies were almost non-existent and resources scarce. One interviewee described how mullahs struggled even to find books and teachers:
I remember ulema would borrow books from ulema in another district. They read them and then after that return them. Even when they found books, they needed someone to teach them, but there was no one nearby. Travelling to other provinces or countries was difficult.
This lack of a formal curriculum and of trained teachers and institutional oversight meant that mullahs often acquired only a basic understanding of religious teachings from individuals who, in many cases, were themselves not qualified. They then relied on this limited knowledge to serve as spiritual leaders and educators. As a result, the overall level of religious knowledge among many rural mullahs remained low for many years. Several interviewees who were not mullahs agreed that becoming a mullah required little in-depth religious knowledge. One put it plainly:
If you have a paj [white turban], long clothes, know some Arabic texts and understand a few basic elements of Islam – Congratulations, you’re a mullah. You can do the imamat of a village. It’s that simple.
As this interviewee highlighted, mullahs typically studied a limited variety of religious texts. The most common were Khulasa (The Compendium), Shurut al-Salat (Conditions of Prayer), al-Mukhtasar al-Quduri (al-Quduri Abridged), Kanz al-Daqa’iq (The Treasure of Subtleties) and Nur al-Zulam (The Light of Darkness), all of which focused on fundamental aspects of Islamic faith and jurisprudence. For instance, Khulasa outlines the obligatory components of prayer, without which prayers are deemed invalid; Shurut al-Salat details the Sunnahs of the prayer, along with the wajibs and mustahabs (obligatory and preferred components) of prayer; and Quduri, written by Imam al-Quduri in the tenth century, this covers the basic essential elements of Hanafi jurisprudence, including to do with worship, business transactions, marriage, divorce, inheritance and criminal law.
Beyond religious studies, some mullahs in the southeast, who were Pashtun, also learnt Persian language and literature. Panj Kitab (The Five Books), a widely studied collection of spiritual and religious Persian poetry by poets such as Abdul Rahman Jami and Fariduddin Atar, played a crucial role in their education. Persian was then the official and administrative language of Afghanistan and proficiency in it was essential for reading and composing formal texts.
Overall understanding of Islamic theology among mullahs was therefore limited; often, their education only enabled them to lead prayers and perform basic rituals in the community such as nikah (marriage) and janaza (funeral prayers). Mullahs did also play an important role in local dispute resolution, acting not as scholars but as independent and respected members of the community. One interviewee recalled:
Just a few books of fiqh [jurisprudence] covered almost all the issues people faced in their daily lives, addressing matters such as nikah, zakat [alms] and janaza that were essential for the community. For more complex matters, they would seek guidance from senior mawlawis.
Several mullahs told AAN that many of their fellow mullahs struggled even with the basic recitation of the Quran. Instead of following the established tajwid (the elocution rules for Quranic recitation), they would read the Quran as though it were a normal Pashto or Persian text. Few mullahs, according to AAN’s interviewees, understood the meaning of the words they recited. One interviewee recounted multiple occasions in rural areas of Khost where the village mullah was unable to deliver funeral prayers and sermons (which should be in Arabic), so these were delayed until a more competent mullah arrived.
One interviewee, a community elder in Paktia, said he remembered a mullah who was unable to read a qabala (land ownership document) written in Persian. When villagers asked him to explain its contents, he had no answer. “The next day,” the interviewee recalled, “he went to another village to learn [the meaning of the document] from another mullah.”
That said, at the district or provincial level, there were usually some prominent mullahs who had a more advanced understanding of Islam, particularly of fiqh. Interviewees from Zurmat in Paktia province, for example, said there used to be five mullahs in the district who were recognised for their knowledge. When village-level mullahs encountered complex legal or religious issues, they would refer people to these scholars, acknowledging their own inability to answer such questions or provide adequate guidance.
Despite their limited knowledge, mullahs were still able to manage affairs and command respect in their communities due to the structure of Afghan society and the socio-economic context in which they lived. As one interviewee put it, “In the entire village, the only person who could read a text was the mullah.” Many of the social rules and norms that governed village life were not derived from Islam, but guided by long-held local customs and traditions that mullahs were not disposed to challenge. Mullahs could participate in this alternative value system without a deep knowledge of Islamic law and theology and therefore they were able to maintain influence in communities even if they had little formal Islamic education.
Conflicts bring drastic change: 1979-2001
A significant shift in education for mullahs was a consequence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. It forced millions of Afghans into exile, with over three million seeking refuge in neighbouring Pakistan alone, where they settled in refugee camps and adapted to life in their new environment.
In those camps, alongside schools, set up by the United Nations and NGOs, a new form of religious education began to take root. Muslims from around the world began visiting to join the fight against the Soviets, offering financial support and establishing madrasas and religious seminaries. These efforts were supported by both charities from around the Muslim world and donations from the Gulf states. As a result, hundreds of new madrasas were established and Afghan refugees enrolled in large numbers, as there were few other opportunities for education in the camps.[8] Mullahs who had previously only possessed basic knowledge of Islam now had the opportunity to deepen their understanding of Islamic theology in these newly established institutions, which offered a more advanced and diverse version of Islamic education than the education provided in Afghanistan’s villages. Most followed the Dar ul-Uloom Deoband educational model, which is Hanafi, the school which most Afghan Sunni Muslims follow, while others, particularly those run by Arabs, who also typically had deeper pockets, adopted a Salafi-Wahabi curriculum.[9] What was on offer, education-wise, also evolved as regular schools in the camps improved during the 1990s. The schools were largely primary, with a few high schools where pupils were selected on ability, and even a few scholarships to Pakistani universities. As the quality of the official camp schools improved, many parents preferred to send their children, especially their boys, to a school, rather than, or in addition to, a madrasa. That was also the case for girls in the 1990s: increasing numbers were enrolled and stayed in school, incentivised by families getting WFP tins of edible oil in exchange, something which helped break the taboo common in some communities against getting daughters educated.[10]
The migration to Pakistan also facilitated connections among people from different regions of Afghanistan. The concentration of diverse Afghans in refugee camps helped spread knowledge among previously disconnected communities. “Many people started learning from well-known mullahs who’d also became refugees. I began studying basic texts from Mullah Miraki from Kunduz [in northern Afghanistan],” one mullah from Khost, in the southeast, recalled. The availability of intellectual resources, particularly books, further supported this growth. “Unlike in Afghanistan, you could find many books there and read them. People would learn [from those books] what they couldn’t understand from another mawlawi,” another mullah explained.
Even after the Soviets withdrew in 1989 and the Moscow-backed regime collapsed in 1992, the subsequent civil war among mujahedin factions left many Afghans preferring to remain in Pakistan. During this period, madrasas offered significant benefits to the (mainly male) teenage students, such as free schooling and food and board, at a time when ordinary Afghans living in the refugee camps struggled. Therefore, many young men who were not from families who had a tradition of sending their sons to become mullahs took advantage of the opportunity for them to acquire a religious education.
After the withdrawal of the Soviets and the fall of the communist government in Kabul, many mullahs who had studied in Pakistani madrasas returned with the idea of establishing similar religious schools in Afghanistan. This coincided with the rise of the Taliban, a movement founded by former mujahedin, mainly from greater Kandahar, who had been religious students (talibs), mostly in hujras in Afghanistan or (less commonly) Pakistani madrasas. The Taliban took over most of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, establishing their first Islamic Emirate.
The takeover of the state by talibs played a crucial role in promoting the establishment of more madrasas. The first Taliban government began building them in major cities such as Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad and their surroundings, prioritising religious education over schooling, and indeed adding more Islamic education to both school and university curricula, so that for example, medical students had to devote 50 per cent of their time to Islamic studies.[11] For the first time in Afghanistan’s modern history, both formal and informal religious education, were functioning on a massive scale. Hundreds of new private madrasas for boys and young men were established and thousands enrolled in them.[12] This was a time, when, according to an estimate by UNICEF in 2000, only four to five per cent of primary-aged children, girls and boys, in Afghanistan were going to primary school. (The Taliban had also officially banned all schooling for girls.) The numbers attending madrasas is not known.
Islamic education under the Republic: 2001-21
With the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, this trend slowed, as the new government showed less interest in religious education. Formal madrasas registered with the state were still operational, but not on the same scale as under the Taliban; the government attempted to regulate madrasa education but the majority remained unregistered.[13]
As the insurgency against the Islamic Republic and its foreign military backers intensified, and with mullahs often targeted by United States and NATO forces because of their suspected affiliation with the Taliban, many mullahs from rural areas chose to flee to Pakistan once again. There, they established new madrasas to provide religious education to their fellow Afghans.[14] However, as the insurgency began to gain momentum and control more territory, the Taliban could begin to provide political support to mullahs living in areas under their control inside Afghanistan.
Many Taliban-aligned mullahs, having completed their education in Pakistan, chose to return to Afghanistan and live in those Taliban-controlled areas, where they began establishing their own madrasas. In Paktia province’s Zurmat district alone, for instance, the author knows of a Taliban group commander who established two madrasas in 2014 and 2016, assigning local mullahs to lead them and using his position to collect funds from the community. In Paktika’s Mata Khan district, similarly, the author knows another Taliban commander who established a madrasa in the early 2010s where some 200 youths studied. The subsequent increase in madrasas seems to have met rising demand from communities as, according to our interviewees, a single madrasa would host hundreds of students. One interviewee related that in his home district of Deh Yak in Ghazni, more than a dozen large madrasas have been established in the past decade, each hosting over 300 students.
In rural areas, madrasas were an attractive option for many, because as articulated by one mullah: “When you have five sons, you can’t give them proper attention or education. Some [families] can’t even afford to feed them. So, they some send some to the cities, others abroad and the rest to madrasas, where they learn something and are protected from society’s evils.” Demographic factors have contributed to the trend. “In the past, said one interviewee, “families had many children, but half would die due to a lack of healthcare. Now, he said, “families have many children and no one is dying, so they send them to madrasas, where they are both educated and kept safe.”
Islamic education since 2021
Since the Taliban’s return to power, madrasa education sponsored by the state has expanded even more. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) has been both registering informal madrasas that are supported by local charities and communities and providing them with resources, and establishing new, state-run madrasas. Since the 2021 takeover, the IEA’s Ministry of Education has announced that it will establish a large government-supported madrasa in every province, with free food and accommodation for the (male) students and high salaries for the teachers (Radio Azadi). The Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs has also announced separate plans to establish two madrasas in every district (TOLO News). Interest in madrasas comes from the very top of the Taliban government, with many high-ranking Taliban also running their own religious schools. For example, acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has a madrasa in Kabul’s city’s Shash Darak, acting Deputy Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs Ali Jan Ahmad a madrasa in Musahi district in Kabul province and acting Minister of Water and Power Mullah Abdul Latif Mansur a madrasa in Zurmat in Paktia.
Meanwhile, since the Taliban’s return, many mullahs without formal non-religious education have enrolled in bachelor degree programmes in fields such as computer science, political science, business administration and economics. The author knows more than a dozen such mullahs who are members of the Taliban who are now attending university programmes. The IEA government, to support this, has announced that those who have completed the wara dawra(twelfth grade) in informal madrasas are now officially recognised – after an exam – as high school graduates, which makes them eligible for university enrolment (BBC).[15] Moreover, according to the author’s information, they have also offered those who fought for the Taliban movement and did not have the chance to study in madrasas or schools, the chance to complete high school in a single year without even attending every day.
What do Afghan mullahs learn in madrasas?
As the number of madrasas increased, the nature of religious education also began to evolve. Firstly, hujras are scarcely to be found any more, having been driven out of business by the rise of the madrasa. Secondly, pupils and students in madrasas follow more rigorous curricula and are taught by better-trained teachers. When it comes to the curriculum, the majority of Afghan madrasas (whether formally state-registered or informal) follow the Dars-e Nizami curriculum developed at Dar ul-Uloom Deoband, with some variations, as some madrasas put greater emphasis on non-religious subjects than others[16] This system emphasises traditional Islamic subjects, while also incorporating certain other disciplines such as mathematics, computer science and English. Students study the Quran, focusing on proper tajwid and tafsir (Quranic interpretation). They also study the Hadith – the sayings and actions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, documented in collections such as Sahih ul-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim. Fiqh is taught using the foundational texts of the Hanafi school, such as Hidayahand Radd ul-Muhtar.[17]
In addition, students learn Arabic language and literature, including sarf (morphology) and nahw (grammar), classical texts and poetry. Classical Persian poetry, including works by figures like Rumi, are also included. Mantiq and hikmah(logic and philosophy) are taught, incorporating elements of classical Greek and Islamic philosophical traditions, as well as the study of belief. The curriculum also covers rhetoric (balagha), focusing on Arabic literary studies. The curriculum incorporates elements of the teachings of classical Sufi scholars, particularly from the Naqshbandi tradition.[18] Sirat (the life of the Prophet Muhammad) and early Islamic history are also important components of students’ education in madrasas.
This curriculum differs significantly from the one followed in the hujras and the traditional student-teacher method. For instance, it introduces a modern grading system where students study within a structured framework, complete with defined schedules, specific timeframes and exam systems, much like those found in schools and universities. Upon completion of their studies, students are awarded certificates, which allow them to officially claim certain titles that reflect the level of knowledge they have attained. For example, those who acquire only a basic knowledge of Islam are given the title of mullah, while those who pass the fourteenth grade of the Dars-e Nizami curriculum are referred to as mawlawi. After this, students who choose to specialise in jurisprudence are called mufti – they are considered qualified to give fatwas, religious rulings – while those who opt for the advanced study of Hadith are given the title sheikh ul-hadith, or of the Quran, sheikh ul-Quran.
In addition to this more rigorous curriculum, exposure to different discourses on Islamic sciences and the availability of a more diverse literature has, according to interviewees, broadened mullahs’ understanding of the various Islamic schools of thought in recent years. Our interviewees discussed this evolution, many attributing it partially to time spent as refugees in Pakistan, whether studying there or now. One interviewee, a mullah from Nangrahar province, explained:
Madrasas in Pakistan played a key role in spreading [religious] knowledge in Afghanistan. In the past, there were many issues in Hanafi jurisprudence that our ulema had either never heard of or didn’t have the capacity to understand. Now, praise be to Allah, thanks to these madrasas, our ulema have a comprehensive understanding of every aspect of the sharia of the Prophet Muhammad. They are experts in sirah, tafsir, tajwid, mantiq, ilm al-kalam [study of Islamic doctrine], balaghah, and ifta [delivering fatwas].
Another interviewee, a mullah from Gurbaz district in Khost, said:
Our scholars are now as knowledgeable as the great Deobandi scholars. They can even write sharha [explanation of a classical Islamic text] … They’re skilled in Arabic and understand all the issues that are currently important. They know Islamic history, specialise in hadith, and are experts in Quran recitation and its proper recitation. All of this is a blessing from these madrasas, where knowledge has blossomed.
Mullahs and their position in society since the return of the IEA
The increasing understanding of Islamic subjects on the part of mullahs has had complicated consequences for their social status within communities. In part, it has led to increased respect for them and their work among rural conservative communities and the older generation. Among younger educated men, however, their authority and their claim to represent or champion religion and now also the state has been viewed with some scepticism; they may be criticised for being too conservative or for using religion to serve their own personal interests. This is reinforced by the preferential treatment they are given by the current government in hiring those with Islamic credentials. One consequence of this is that many families feel that a religious education for their boys is a more attractive option than in the past. Underlining this point, a university student from Kabul, told AAN:
These days, what gets you a job is not a university diploma but a turban, a beard and a madrasa certificate. If you have them, you can get a job wherever you want; if not, you won’t, no matter how qualified you are.
Mullahs also now feel more able to challenge society. “Ulema have now returned to their original role in society, one IEA official told AAN. “They are now able to abolish many norms that contradict Islam.” Other interviewees agreed and it seems that since the return of the IEA, many mullahs in the southeast have tried to leverage their position in society to challenge older customary norms that they feel are contrary to sharia. Some of the examples they gave are – perhaps surprisingly – progressive. For instance, several mullahs interviewed for this report said that they have been manoeuvring to extend religious education to women – a practice that remains unusual in Afghanistan’s rural areas and in particular those of the southeast, where traditional norms typically restrict female education beyond early childhood. One of the mullahs interviewed told AAN about efforts to provide religious education for women:
The ulema have done a lot of work in this regard. They’re trying to convince people that women, like men, have the right to get an education and that it’s obligatory. They’ve been talking about female scholars from [earlier Islamic] history and how they contributed to jihad in the time of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him). [Mullahs] are amongst the first people who demanded that wealthy folk build madrasas for women and made a safe environment for them to study in.
Mullahs also reported efforts to promote a woman’s right to receive inheritance in line with sharia, a practice rarely followed in Afghanistan. (For more on women’s inheritance rights, see this March 2025 AAN piece.) “Ulema are preaching about this issue,” said one mullah from Ghazni. “They’re trying to convince people to follow the principle.” Another interviewee from Nangrahar reported that several mullahs he knew of had given their own sisters their inheritance, as mandated by the Quran, in order to set an example for the community.
Similarly, some of the mullahs that AAN spoke to reported that they insist a woman must give her consent to marriage or else the marriage is considered invalid. In Afghanistan this has never been common, although the Quran mandates it. A mullah from Paktia province underlined that: “Getting the consent of the girl in marriage is the most essential element of a valid nikah. The consent must not be imposed on her but should be of her own will. If not, then the nikah is naqis[flawed].”
One other custom that both the IEA government and some mullahs have been trying to reform is the payment of bride price, the sum paid by the groom or his family to the bride’s family.[19] (This is distinct from mahr, the gift given – or promised – by the groom to the bride, as mandated by Islam.) For families with many daughters, high bride prices are valued, and the brides themselves may feel they are a mark of their worth. However, a mullah, who is also an IEA official, from Logar province explained that they also make getting married difficult and, he said, cause social problems:
If someone wants to marry, they need to earn large sums of money, and that created significant challenges. In our district, ulema gathered and explained, from a sharia perspective, how wrong this was and its negative repercussions. They convinced the people to reach a consensus, and the bride prices were lowered. This change has been widely implemented, and now people are very happy with it.
Other interviewees mentioned that mullahs are now better able to influence dispute resolution along the lines of Islamic principles. They described jirgas (tribal assemblies) in the past that would resolve matters not according to sharia but in line with Pashtun tribal norms for compensation known as nerkh (literally, price or exchange rate). As a mullah from Paktia said, things are now changing:
In the past, when someone would seize somebody else’s land, they would either fight each other or ask for help from the qawmi mashran [tribal elders], who would then resolve the matter through a jirga. But now, they refer to the ulema and ask for the resolution of the matter based on sharia.
However, another interviewee from Khost highlighted that mullahs’ efforts to enforce more Islamic practices in their communities often receive a less than positive response:
My friend who studied in Akora [Dar ul-Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan] got the imamat of Zangi Kala [a village in Khost]. When he went there, he summoned all the village elders and asked them to show how they perform the prayer and what they recite. Most of the elders didn’t know the correct way. My friend then told them that they should come every day after the night prayer and he would teach them the correct way. Many elders were upset with this and told him that they wouldn’t change what they’d learned from their ancestors, as it was completely correct.
Mullahs and the future of Afghan society
Mullahs have gained influence and power in recent years, beginning with the jihad against the Soviets and peaking with the return of the Taliban in 2021 – but their growing power has also created controversy over their role in society. Afghan rural society is not always opposed to the idea of religious figures as the key political force in society, but the degree to which communities accept their growing power varies greatly. Some Afghans feel that Islamic government by mullahs is the sole legitimate form of rule; others agree with this concept, but think that the interpretation of Islamic law by the Taliban government or by a particular mullah is incorrect. As the author concluded in the first part of this research, rural mullahs used to be economically dependent on their community and independent of the state. Their rising socioeconomic status has made them economically independent of their congregations, but they now often have greater connections with the state, or indeed have become part of the state, as ministers, governors, police, soldiers, teachers or officials. By chance, this has also gone along with greater Islamic learning.
The implications of being part of a political entity, making policies and running a government are complex for mullahs. On the one hand, they now possess greater political power, which may enable them to shape Afghan society according to their ideas. On the other hand, their new position makes them susceptible to criticism and has created a contradictory image of them in public opinion. Once aiming to be admired for their piety and neglect of worldly matters, mullahs now enjoy state privileges and – for some – a more lavish lifestyle. That attracts criticism, that they are manipulating state authority for personal gain, and also creates competition among the clerics themselves over privileges and influence. Furthermore, any shortcomings in governance are often attributed to the fact that this is a government of mullahs, which may erode the status of all as religious leaders.
Meanwhile, there are also new challenges to mullahs from within Afghan society, given the decades of comparative openness and connection with the broader world. As Afghans become increasingly more literate and gain access to religious education, mullahs are no longer the sole source of religious authority. Awareness of other interpretations of Islam, particularly amongst the younger generation, is growing. As one mullah explained:
In the past, no one would question a mullah on a religious issue because there were no other sources of information. But now, with access to the internet, religious books and scholars with different perspectives, things have changed. I remember once asking someone not to shave his beard, and he immediately showed me a video of an Arab mullah arguing that shaving your beard isn’t a problem.
Finally, some mullahs struggle to provide the younger generation with the guidance necessary for navigating the complexities of today’s world. Traditional madrasa education has not equipped them for addressing current issues. Many mullahs have also started to enrol in universities, pursuing studies in fields such as science, technology, international politics and diplomacy. It seems they now realise that traditional religious training is no longer sufficient to meet the challenges of contemporary life, but it is as yet unclear how and to what extent the Islamic Emirate government itself will adapt to the realities of the modern world.
Edited by Fabrizio Foschini, Letty Philips and Kate Clark
References
| ↑1 | See Mohammad Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan: The reign of Amir Abdul Rahman, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1979, pp161-163. |
|---|---|
| ↑2 | Misbahullah Abdulbaqi, Madrassah in Afghanistan: Evolution and its future, Policy Perspectives 5, 2, 2008, pp130-159. |
| ↑3 | Kaja Borchgrevink, Beyond Borders: Diversity and Transnational Links in Afghan Religious Education, Oslo, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2010. |
| ↑4 | Sana Haroon, ‘Religious Revivalism across the Durand Line’, in Shahzad Bashir and Robert D Crews (eds) Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2012. |
| ↑5 | Senzil K Nawid, Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan 1919-29: King Amanallah and the Afghan Ulema, California, Mazda Publishing, 1999, p10. |
| ↑6 | The findings in this research are based on 19 in-depth interviews carried out in August, September and December 2024 with mullahs from the provinces of Khost, Paktia, Paktika and Ghazni, as well as insights gained from conversations with community leaders and mullahs from these and other provinces between June and December 2024. |
| ↑7 | Anand Gopal and Alex Strick van Linschoten, Ideology in the Afghan Taliban, June 2017. |
| ↑8 | For a detailed account of the rise and role of madrasas in the 1980s see, International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and The Military, 2002. |
| ↑9 | For more details on Salafi education and case studies on the type of education provided in Pakistani madrasas, see Borchgrevink, Beyond Borders, footnote 4. |
| ↑10 | Information about the refugee schools came from a former director of an NGO in charge of provincial education for Afghan refugees in one of Pakistan’s provinces. |
| ↑11 | For more on this era, including the ban on girls’ education and the greater Islamification of the curriculum of schools and university, see Said Reza Kazemi and Kate Clark, Who Gets to Go to School? (2) The Taleban and education through time, 31 January 2022. |
| ↑12 | Abdulbaqi, ‘Madrasas in Afghanistan’, p133. |
| ↑13 | Mohammad Osman Tariq, Religious Institution Building in Afghanistan: An Exploration, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2011. |
| ↑14 | Borchgrevink, Beyond Borders: Diversity and Transnational Links in Afghan Religious Education, pp 44-46 |
| ↑15 | Similar demands were made in the early years of the Republic by Jamiat-e Islami and other mujahedin factions whose members had been fighting in the ‘resistance’ against the first Emirate and therefore, they said, lost their chance for an education. Their members were then discriminated against when it came to proving their suitability to enter university and if in government employment, to get the bonus that went along with a university education. |
| ↑16 | For a detailed analysis of the system see Sabrina al Faarsiyyah, The Nizami Curriculum: A historical glimpse and critical proposals, unpublished PhD diss, Dar ul-Uloom Birmingham, 2020. |
| ↑17 | Al-Hidayah fi Sharh Bidayat al-Mubtadi, commonly referred to as al-Hidayah, is a 12th-century legal manual by Burhan al-Din al-Marghinani and is among the most influential books of Hanafi jurisprudence. Radd al-Muhtar ila al-Durr al-Mukhtar (Diverting the Baffled to ‘The Chosen Pearl’) by the 18th century Syrian scholar, Ibn Abidin, is an annotative commentary on an earlier, voluminous work of Hanafi jurisprudence, Al-Durr al-Mukhtar (The Chosen Pearl) by Ala al-Din al-Haskafi. Radd al-Mukhtar is considered the central reference for fatwas by Hanafi scholars. |
| ↑18 | The Naqshbandiyya has, for centuries, been the most popular Sufi order in Afghanistan, although others, namely the Qadiriyya and the Chishtiyya, have also been present. |
| ↑19 | For more detail on bride prices, including a district-wide move to reduce them, see this 2016 AAN report by Fazl Rahman Muzhary: The Bride Price: The Afghan tradition of paying for wives. |
