Afghanistan Peace CampaignWhen the Taliban reclaimed control of Afghanistan in 2021, none of its Central Asian neighbors welcomed the group’s return to power, and none have formally recognized it since then. Nevertheless, geographic proximity made ignoring Kabul impractical, leaving pragmatic engagement as the only option.
As a result, over the past five years, all five Central Asian states have to varying degrees adapted to Taliban rule in Afghanistan and advanced their national interests through relations with the Islamic Emirate that are normalized in all but name. Of them, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which share borders with Afghanistan, have gone the farthest toward normalization of diplomatic and economic ties. Tajikistan—also an immediate neighbor—has remained the most skeptical, though it has still joined the regional trend of establishing working relations with the Taliban.
But for all the states in the region, the militant group’s return to power in Afghanistan has created complex realities that they are now forced to navigate.
Through a sustained political dialogue and functional cooperation with Kabul, Uzbekistan has become Central Asia’s leading interlocutor with the Taliban. Due to its prioritization of counterterrorism, border security and counternarcotics cooperation, Uzbekistan treats such engagement as a practical necessity.
But in addition to approaching Afghanistan as a security challenge, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also sees it as an economic opportunity. Tashkent has expanded bilateral trade, transport and energy cooperation through the Termez free trade zone, as well as through new investments and bilateral agreements, with the aim of increasing annual trade to a target of $5 billion from $1.7 billion in 2025. This strategy has been bolstered through high-level visits, including that of Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov to Kabul in August 2024, underscoring Tashkent’s commitment to engagement. In serving as a bridge between Afghanistan and the wider international community, Uzbekistan seeks to promote stability and connectivity despite the risks associated with Taliban governance, with the goal of integrating Afghanistan into broader regional economic networks.
For neighboring Turkmenistan, meanwhile, Afghanistan’s importance is defined by connectivity and energy cooperation. Underscoring this regional vision is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (TAPI), which, when completed, will connect Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas fields with South Asian markets through Afghan territory. Former President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow visited Afghanistan in October 2025 to review construction progress, underscoring the project’s continued importance. However, with Afghanistan and Pakistan at war since October 2025, and the Pakistan-India war having revived tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi, TAPI’s prospects appear increasingly uncertain. Beyond gas, however, Afghanistan remains a major importer of Turkmen electricity, highlighting significant energy interdependence.
Turkmenistan’s doctrine of non-interference and “positive neutrality,” which emphasizes dialogue and practical cooperation, guides its foreign policy toward Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Turkmenistan also stood out among Central Asian states for having not evacuated its diplomatic staff from Afghanistan amid the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2021, nor did it release negative statements about the Taliban at the time. To the contrary, it quickly established contacts with Kabul, embracing a business-oriented approach. Similarly, Turkmenistan’s government kept key border crossings open for trade and transport.
For neighboring Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy, security is the dominant concern along with economic and geopolitical interests. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has described the Taliban as a “long-term factor” in the region that Kazakhstan “must work with.” Reflecting this approach, Tokayev’s government transferred control of the Afghan Embassy to Taliban-appointed representatives in 2023. The following year, it accepted a Taliban-appointed chargé d’affaires and removed the Taliban from its list of designated terrorist organizations.
Kazakhstan has also sought to expand trade with Afghanistan from between $500 million and $1 billion annually to a target of $3 billion. To do so, the government has promoted business forums, established a trade house in the northwestern Afghan city of Herat and supported projects such as the Turgundi-Herat railway. Its policy has evolved from cautious engagement to active economic and diplomatic cooperation, even as it continues to avoid formal recognition of the Taliban government.
The Central Asian states hope that expanded trade with Afghanistan will enable greater economic and political influence over the Islamic Emirate in the years ahead.
Kyrgyzstan’s policy toward Taliban-ruled Afghanistan has similarly shifted from careful, security-focused overtures toward more open political and economic cooperation. Initially, the country limited contacts to security discussions and humanitarian assistance. Over time, however, concerns over regional security, extremist threats and economic initiatives such as CASA-1000—a regional infrastructure project for renewable energy—have encouraged deeper engagement with the Islamic Emirate.
A turning point came in September 2024, when Kyrgyzstan removed the Taliban from its list of banned terrorist organizations, signaling a willingness to establish stronger relations. By 2025, this approach had expanded into economic diplomacy, including ministerial visits, the opening of a Kyrgyz Trade House in Kabul and the signing of $156 million in trade agreements covering energy, mining, telecommunications, agriculture and logistics.
Finally, Tajikistan’s foreign policy toward the Taliban can also be characterized as a gradual evolution, in this case from outright hostility toward cautious engagement. Initially, President Emomali Rahmon’s government adopted the strongest anti-Taliban position among the Central Asian republics, refusing recognition, criticizing the Taliban’s lack of inclusivity, supporting Afghan Tajik opposition figures and portraying the Taliban regime as both lacking in legitimacy and constituting a major security threat.
Tajikistan’s concerns centered on militant groups such as Jamaat Ansarullah and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), as well as narcotics trafficking, with its major fear being the possibility of instability spreading across the Tajik-Afghan border. This hardline position reinforced Tajikistan’s image as a frontline state against extremism.
By 2024, however, the country began to move toward limited cooperation with Kabul without recognizing the Taliban. Since then, security concerns, electricity exports, and trade and connectivity projects have pushed Dushanbe further toward engagement. Over the past two years, cross-border markets have reopened, Tajik officials have held meetings with their Taliban counterparts and diplomatic contacts have become more visible. In sum, Tajikistan currently engages with the Taliban to manage security threats and protect national interests, even if it has maintained its reservations about the group.
Five years after the Taliban’s return to power, the Central Asian states have largely adapted to the new reality in Afghanistan. Although they vary in the extent of their de facto engagement with the Islamic Emirate, all five recognize that Afghanistan’s stability and economic interests are closely tied to their own. With regional infrastructure projects dependent on a stable Afghanistan and cooperation with Kabul essential to countering ISKP, Central Asian governments desire a regime in Kabul capable of acting as a stabilizing force both within Afghanistan and across the region.
The Central Asian states hope that expanded trade with Afghanistan will enable greater economic and, by extension, political influence over the Islamic Emirate in the years ahead. For their part, the Taliban have become increasingly oriented toward Afghanistan’s northern neighbors since the outbreak of the Afghanistan-Pakistan war in October 2025 and the subsequent closure of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
But while the Central Asian republics have compelling reasons to deepen their de facto ties with the Taliban, whether they will join Russia in formally recognizing the regime remains an open question. Recognition will probably depend on broader international developments. If China and perhaps the United Arab Emirates formally recognize the Taliban government, the Central Asian republics may well follow suit, aligning themselves with an emerging Eurasian consensus. Yet, these countries’ growing ties with the West mean they will remain mindful of the risks of moving too quickly to “legitimize” the Taliban, particularly given the potential for tensions with Western powers.
Although formal recognition would be symbolically significant, the more important trend is the continued deepening of practical ties between the Central Asian republics and the Taliban, reflecting a growing regional acceptance that engagement with the Islamic Emirate is not only possible but necessary.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO and founder of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy that focuses on the Middle East, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.