Birds of a Feather, in Ideology: What is the relationship between the Islamic Emirate and Hamas?

Thomas Ruttig

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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Before the 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas on Israel and Israel’s continuing war in Gaza, the relationship of the Islamic Emirate towards Hamas could be described as cordial, but not actively supportive. AAN’s Thomas Ruttig (with input from Roxanna Shapour) wanted to look at whether this standpoint has changed since those attacks. By combing through official statements and Afghan media reporting, he has explored the dynamics at play and the context. His report starts with one of the key events of this year, the assassination, likely by Israel, of the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in neighbouring Iran, on 31 July 2024 when he came to Tehran to see the inauguration of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian.
Acting Deputy Prime Minister, Abdul Ghani Baradar, and Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, meet Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran on the sidelines of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral. Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 23 May 2024

The Emirate on the assassination of Haniyeh

Kabul was among the few capitals to issue an official statement regarding the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. The statement was released in the name of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), rather than from a specific entity or official, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or IEA spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid. This may suggest that the supreme leader, Amir al-Mu’minin Hibatullah Akhundzada, likely approved it. Various Emirate-controlled media outlets, including the English-language government newspaper The Kabul Times, published the 267-word official statement on 1 August 2024 which expressed the government’s profound sorrow at his ‘martyrdom’.

Martyr Ismail Haniyeh was a distinguished, wise, and resolute Palestinian leader who made significant sacrifices in his successful struggle and Jihad, fulfilling his commitment in this manner. For a Muslim and a fighter, martyrdom represents a tremendous victory; he has succeeded and left behind a legacy of resistance, selflessness, patience, perseverance, struggle, and practical sacrifice for his followers.

The IEA statement is full of catchphrases central to the Taleban’s Islamist ideology, such as ‘mujahed’, ‘jihad’ and “martyrdom”: The “martyrdom of this great figure,” it said, was a “significant loss to the Islamic Ummah and the Jihadist cause” and “defending Hamas and the sacred land of Palestine” was “both an Islamic and humanitarian duty.”

The IEA strongly condemned the “atrocities, bombings, and genocide perpetrated by the Zionist regime against Palestinian Muslims as egregious crimes against humanity.” It makes no mention of the atrocities committed by Hamas during its 7 October 2023 attack on Israel. It also glosses over the presence of Christian Palestinians (now few in number in Gaza, but more, proportionally, in the West Bank, Israel and the diaspora), referring to the Palestinian people as Muslim only.[1] It called for action, although notably made no promises as to what Afghanistan could do:

We reiterate our call to influential parties, particularly within the Islamic and Arab world, to intensify their efforts to thwart the Zionist invasion and its associated atrocities. The ongoing crimes of the Zionist regime will undoubtedly lead to further instability in the region and its countries, with the resulting disturbances and adverse outcomes falling squarely on the shoulders of the invading Zionists and their supporters.

The statement did not explicitly call for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Whether this – and its avoidance of using the term ‘Israel’ in most statements indicates a tacit denial of Israel’s right to exist is difficult to answer.[2]

The Emirate’s response to Haniyeh’s assassination and several analyses by various media and median platforms that did not sound fully convincing or even biased led the author to want to delve deeper into its relationship with Hamas and its stance on Palestine/Israel in general. The analysis begins with the Emirate’s response to the 7 October attacks before looking back at relationship with Hamas before then. It then scrutinises how that relationship has developed.

The Emirate on Hamas/Palestine/Israel until October 2023 attacks

Until October 2023, little information was available regarding the relationship between the IEA and Hamas, even in specialised media outlets. However, shortly after Hamas attacked Israel, Afghan-born journalist Akram Dawi, working for the Voice of America (VoA), highlighted the “conspicuous silence of the senior Emirate official on the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza” in an analytical article (see here). He noted that neither the Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, nor acting Prime Minister, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, nor his three deputies had commented on the event, which he said was “in sharp contrast to the daily sharp comments from neighbouring Iran.” Dawi referenced (without direct quotes or cited sources) a statement posted on the social media platform X by the IEA’s chief spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahed, on 14 October, condemning “Israel’s siege of Gaza” and calling “on the international community to address the crisis.”

The IEA’s position on the issue, quoted in the Dawi article, was most pointedly summed up by acting Interior Minister Serajuddin Haqqani: “We do not interfere in others’ internal affairs, but we have faith-based sympathy with Muslims.” In short, the Emirate’s official messages were largely in line with “expressions of solidarity and support for the Palestinians” made by other Muslim countries, as Michael Kugelman of the US think tank Wilson Center told Dawi.

On key aspects, however, the statement clearly differs from the stated positions of other countries in the region, as pointed out by Shujauddin Amini, an author for the US-based Afghan news website Hasht-e Subh: “The Taliban did not call Hamas a liberation movement like the Turkish authorities, nor did they call Israel a usurper and infanticidal regime like the Islamic Republic of Iran. They also did not support the position of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in talking about the necessity of creating two countries in the pre-1967 borders.”

Sporadic contacts, no official relations

The Emirate does have official diplomatic relations with Hamas; their interactions, however, have mostly been limited to sporadic contacts and exchanges of greetings.

In August 2021, after the Emirate was re-established for the second time, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh called its deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani, also known as Baradar, to congratulate him on the “end of the US occupation,” as reported by the Turkish news agency Anadolu, citing the Hamas website. Haniyeh said the end of the United States occupation in Afghanistan was “a prelude to the demise of all occupation forces, foremost of which is the Israeli occupation of Palestine.” Baradar, for his part, thanked Haniyeh for his call and expressed his hope for a Palestinian “victory and empowerment as a result of their resistance.” He also conveyed his wishes for the “oppressed” Palestinian people to defeat their occupiers with God’s help and through their resistance. The Emirate also asserted that it was only able to defeat the USA “with God’s help,” see for example this speech by acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. He called on all countries to support the Palestinian cause.

A few weeks later, in early October 2021, Haniyeh called the Emirate again, as Anadolu reported. This time, he spoke to Muttaqi. He again praised the Taleban’s victory over the US, but also urged Muttaqi to keep the topic of Palestine present in his speeches, “especially Jerusalem and the ongoing [Israeli] violations there.” Haniyeh also expressed his hope that the Emirate “could have a role in supporting their brothers in Palestine to liberate Jerusalem,” according to the report. Anadolu reported that Haniyah “expressed his pride in the struggle of the Palestinian people and their steadfastness in Jerusalem,” but there was no indication of any promise of concrete support. This pointed to a cautious approach on the part of the Emirate to steer clear of a conflict far away from home and on the heels of their own victory in Afghanistan.

There have also been a few meetings between Emirate and Hamas officials. These were likely not the first such encounters and did not represent dedicated bilateral discussions, but were rather meetings as part of broader diplomatic or religious events. For example, in early October 2022, spokesman Mujahid met Hamas representatives, including Haniyeh, during a conference of Islamic scholars in Istanbul and reportedly discussed regional issues, including developments in Jerusalem and the West Bank, according to the US-based website The Long War Journal (LWJ). In April 2023, the IEA envoy to Qatar and Haniyeh met at an Iftar celebration in Doha, according to a report by the Indian think tank Observer Research Foundation (ORF).

While the LWJ described such meetings as “an attempt by the Taliban to expand ties with Hamas,” the initiative seems to have come from Hamas, perhaps in an effort to secure (at least verbal) support. Mujahid remained non-committal during his meeting with Haniyeh and referred to Palestine merely as an “issue for the entire Muslim Ummah,” according to a report published by the Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI). No concrete agreements or even arrangements were reported after this or similar meetings. In their May 2024 report published by ORF (cited above), Kabir Taneja and Shivam Shekhawat wrote:

The Taliban has not shown any proactive support for Hamas and has almost never mentioned them by name. … The Taliban has not been vociferous on the Gaza war. On the contrary, it has aired its views and made its position clear, but tried not to wade into either being overtly [in the same camp as the] pro-Iran or pro-Arab states.

While not all meetings between the Emirate and Hamas have been public, or written about, what is certain is that there are bound to have been numerous occasions for them to rub shoulders. Former Hamas representative in Syria, Lebanon and Iran, Mustafa Yusuf Al-Lidawi, is quoted by MEMRI as saying:

It is not unreasonable [to assume] that Afghanistan will become a new base of operations for Hamas… whose gains will multiply as a result the Taliban rule there. For Hamas met with the Taliban leadership for years during their joint stay in Qatar, and formed close ties with it that can be characterized as natural and expected. Hamas will also gain credit with its allies, its affiliates, those who benefit from its ties [with other elements] and those who seek to expand the resistance axis. Iran, [for example], has an interest in ensuring its security and the security of its border with Afghanistan, and Hamas can play a significant role in this context and gain considerable achievements that will count in its favor and burnish its reputation.

There is no confirmation that this assertion is correct from any other source, and – according to this author’s reading – the meetings were not particularly substantive at all.

Acting Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar meets with Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Doha, Qatar.
Photo: Globe Eye News via X, undated.
Emirate reactions after 7 October 2023

As elsewhere, interest in the Israel/Palestine conflict increased in Afghanistan after the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack and the all-out war Israel launched in response in Gaza and later southern Lebanon. In line with its thus far cautious attitude, the Emirate made no official statement at all about the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 – neither condemning nor approving it. Given the number of casualties on the Palestinian side and Israel’s concrete actions in Gaza and the West Bank, however, they, like others, also toughened their tone in official statements, however, without resorting to threats or considering entering the war.

In its various statements, the IEA and its officials have condemned specific Israeli attacks, which they deem “criminal.” For example, in October 2023, the Foreign Ministry “strongly condemned” (see this post on X) the bombing of a hospital in Gaza “by Zionist forces,” calling it “barbaric and a crime against humanity.”[3] It is probably using the term ‘genocide’ for the first time in this context: “We stand in solidarity with the Palestinians, and with countries and organizations calling for the immediate end of the ongoing genocide and bringing its perpetrators to justice.” Two months later, in December 2023, the foreign ministry condemned the bombing of the same hospital in almost identical terms and voiced concern about a regional conflict “spiraling out of control” and declared its “solidarity” with “the Palestinians.” The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Abdul Qahar Balkhi, also weighed in to condemn the United States’ veto of the Gaza ceasefire resolution at the United Nations Security Council on 8 December 2023:

IEA-MoFA deems position of the United States regretable and condemnable vetoing UNSC resolution & international consensus calling for a cease-fire in Gaza, thus openly making the United States complicit in the ongoing atrocities in Gaza (see his thread posted on X).

Acting Foreign Minister Muttaqi, speaking at what was billed as a High-Level Political Consultative Conference on Palestine in Tehran on 23 December 2023, introduced another element into the Emirate’s position, namely the parallels it sees in the West’s behaviour in Gaza and, before 2021, in Afghanistan (see the text of his speech on the IEA Ministry of Foreign Affairs website). He criticised the West’s “double standards” and spoke of a “paradox” that:

[I]n a world where countries are sanctioned under the pretext of the slightest violation of human rights or on political grounds through the instrumentalization of the human rights paradigm … at the same time, the unremitting genocide of a nation by a regime that is breaching all human standards in its war is not even dealt with the slightest objection!” He added that it was “grotesque to see my country, Afghanistan, being sanctioned by instrumentalizing of human rights – when we are taking steps towards security and stability following more than four decades of foreign invasions!

Indeed, Muttaqi questioned whether “the current world order with all these contradictions, founded following World War ll, could still “address the needs of people in the 21st century.”

However, he still did not go beyond condemning “the ongoing atrocities of the Zionist regime in the Gaza Strip and occupied Palestine,” describing “the struggle of the Palestinian nation as legitimate and legal based on the texts of Sharia and international law” and calling again on “the influential Islamic countries” to “play a more effective role in ending the murder of innocent Palestinians by the Zionist regime and holding the Zionist regime accountable.” He called for a “permanent and just” solution to the Palestine issue “that would ensure the Palestinian people have a state established in the historic land of Palestine.”[4] This, again, was neither a demand for a two-state solution nor that the whole land should be for Palestinians, nor that Israel should cease to exist.

Mutaqqi went on to stress that “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan stands ready, within its capabilities, to accompany the Islamic world in this humanitarian and Islamic issue.” Again, this statement does not include any suggestion of action, such as a threat against Israel or of the Emirate being willing to get directly involved.

The following year, on 2 April 2024, the IEA Foreign Ministry issued a statement slamming Israel’s airstrike on the Iranian diplomatic mission in Damascus, Syria. It condemned the strike “in the strongest possible terms,” calling it a “blatant violation of diplomatic norms and a provoking attempt towards escalating insecurity in the region.”

Following Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel on 14 April, Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Qahar Balkhi termed the action as Iran’s “legitimate right to self-defense” and accused Israel of diverting attention from the “genocide” it was committing against the people of the Gaza Strip by violating other countries’ airspace and thereby destabilising the region. He also reiterated the IEA’s call for “all influential world & regional states to expedite their efforts of halting the crimes of the Zionist regime in order to prevent further escalation of the crisis,” (see his post on X).

Similarly, the Eid al-Fitr message of the IEA’s Amir al-Mu’minin, published by Bakhtar News on 6 April, used the same language, albeit in more general terms:

The Islamic Emirate’s foundation lies on the principles of Islam and the well-being of the Muslim community. We share common faith, beliefs, and convictions, binding us together. In times of joy and sorrow, we stand united, supporting each other with equal participation and collaboration, leveraging our abilities to the best of our capabilities.

This is followed by a two-paragraph section titled “Palestine”:

The issue of Palestine is indeed a concern for the entire Islamic Ummah. We stand in solidarity with the people of Gaza against Israeli aggression and occupation. It is incumbent upon the Islamic Ummah to address the plight of the oppressed Palestinians and to collectively condemn any form of injustice or aggression perpetrated by Israeli invaders. We must mobilize our resources and support Palestine in every possible way to alleviate their suffering and work towards a just resolution of the conflict.

It is regrettable that the international community often falls short in effectively addressing the injustices faced by the people of Palestine. Despite claims of upholding human rights, there is a lack of meaningful action to curb the ongoing oppression and to hold perpetrators of these injustices accountable. This is indeed a source of profound sorrow, and it underscores the urgent need for all responsible parties to fulfill their obligations in addressing this grievous situation.

Individual IEA officials have expressed their support for Hamas, albeit on their personal social media accounts. For example, acting Deputy Education Minister, Mawlawi Sebghatullah Wasil, posted a video message on 8 October 2023, praising Hamas for “their recent operations in Gaza” and “ability to maintain the secrecy of their operations, their preparation, their speed of execution and their skill in carrying out their attacks.” (His statement was cited in a 9 October 2023 post on X by Afghan Analyst). Wasil reportedly stressed that Afghan youth and the ulema were in solidarity with Palestine and expressed their sincere support. He further stated, according to Afghan Analyst, that Hamas’ attack had strengthened the belief that the only viable way against oppression was jihad and resistance.

Similarly, acting Deputy Foreign Minister and the Taleban’s former chief negotiator in Doha, Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanikzai, posted a floral pattern and the word ‘Palestine’ laid into the borders of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza on X on 22 October 2023, accompanied by the comment (see here):

The victory march will continue until the Palestinian flag flies in Jerusalem and in all of Palestine. #FreePalaestin [sic]

The Emirate’s acting Deputy Prime Minister, Muhammad Abdul Kabir, had several meetings with various Iranian officials, including Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi, where, according to Tehran-based news outlet Khabar Online, on 2 August 2024, he said:

Afghanistan, together with the Islamic Republic of Iran, supports the oppressed people of Gaza, and perhaps if we had a common border with the occupying regime [Israel], we would have gone to war with the Zionists to defend the oppressed people of Gaza.

A handful of Iranian sources picked up this quote, but it was not widely reported by other news outlets, including the Afghan media. For the most part, media coverage of Kabir’s visit focused on strengthening Kabul-Tehran relations, Afghan refugees in Iran and counter-narcotics (see, for example, Omid RadioToloNews and the Iranian Students’ News Agency, ISNA). AAN was unable to find any IEA or other sources either confirming or denying Kabir’s comments.

While encounters between IEA officials and Hamas have continued since 7 October 2023, there has been no indication that these signify a strengthening of contacts. Both sides’ representatives met again in May 2024 when attending the funeral of Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi, who had died in a helicopter crash (see India Today). On the IEA side, acting Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and confidant of the late Taleban founder, Mullah Muhammad Omar, Mullah Baradar, attended. Photos of this event were distributed by deputy Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hafiz Zia Amin (see his post on X). Importantly, it does not appear that the IEA delegation had travelled to Tehran specifically in order “to meet the Emir of Qatar and the head of the Hamas Political Bureau,” as reported by the US think tank Jamestown).

The Emirate’s final encounter with Haniyeh came when acting Deputy Prime Minister, Mawlawi Abdul Kabir attended the inauguration of Iran’s newly elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian, on 30 July (see al-Emarah). From there, Kabir went to Doha to attend Ismail Haniyeh’s funeral on 4 August, accompanied by Muhammad Na’im Wardak, the charge d’affaires of the Emirate’s embassy in Qatar (see ToloNews). There, he “met with former Hamas chief Khalid Mashal, deputy chief of Hamas Musa Abu Marzooq and Ismail Haniyeh’s son Abdul Salam Ismail Haniyeh, to express condolences,” as Afghan broadcaster Ariana reported.

Possible fake report about Taleban fighters in Palestine

There have been reports of a more active role for the Emirate in supporting Hamas/the Palestinians. They caused a stir, but ultimately proved dubious. On the very day of the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, a post on social media caused a stir. An X-account calling itself “Taliban Public Relations Department,” which has since been suspended, claimed that the IEA foreign ministry had contacted Iran, Iraq and Jordan to obtain transit permits for Taleban fighters to travel to Palestine to support Hamas. VOA reported the tweet on 9 October 2023:

This evening, the foreign office contacted his counterparts in #Iran, Iraq and Jordan, asking for permission for our men to cross their sovereign territory on their way to the holy land. We are preparing and hoping for the good news from our neighbors.#Gaza #Israel #Palestinepic.twitter.com/ZuHTMeQc7q — #FreePalestine 🇵🇸 (@TalibanPRD__) October 7, 2023

The author could not find this tweet and the account has been inactive since 14 October 2023. Moreover, an institution under such a name does not exist in the IEA system; rather, there are public relations departments in various ministries. There are, however, several other accounts on X with almost the same name, such as “Taliban Public Relations Department, Commenitary” (sic) under the handle @TalibanPRD1 (see here), which on 12 October 2023, claimed that an Afghan “mujahid” from Khost had been a “martyred” in Palestine (see here ).

The Emirate was quick to deny that it was trying to facilitate getting it fighters to get to Palestine to support Hamas; the same VOA report quoted the head of the IEA political office in Doha, Mohammad Suhail Shaheen, as saying the “information” was “inaccurate” and spokesman Mujahid reiterating that the IEA’s position had not changed.

It appears that, in October 2023, the IEA had blocked any member from trying to get to Palestine: an order instructed the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) to tell its staff to prevent Taleban fighters leaving Afghanistan for ‘jihad’ in Palestine. The order stressed that the “ideological mujahedin” must remain in Afghanistan and that those who disregarded this order would be punished (see a copy of the letter posted by Afghan Analyst on X).

Also in October, acting Interior Minister Serajuddin Haqqani stressed that: “The Taliban, as the IEA, are prohibited from engaging in Jihad outside Afghanistan,” said Afghan Analyst in a 15 October 2023 post on X. He also went on to note that there were discussions on “internal WhatsApp groups … about supporting about assisting individuals with [obtaining] passports for attending Jihad in Palestine.”

“Numerous pro-Taliban accounts,” Afghan Analyst reported more recently, on 20 March 2024, had claimed that a certain “Yasir, also known as Abu Yosuf al-Afghani,” was killed on 18 March during fighting with Israeli forces in Rafa. According to these sources, Yasir had travelled from Afghanistan to Syria in April 2023 and joined the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir ul-Sham there. In January 2024, he allegedly moved to Palestine “with other Arabs” and took part in fighting there (see the post on X). Afghan Analyst, however, casts doubt on the veracity of this claim by pointing out that his death had already been reported months earlier. He quoted a post by Afghan journalist Wais Barakzai highlighting “recent propaganda efforts by pro-Taliban accounts, which involve misinformation and disinformation.” In his post, Barakzai identified the individual shown in photos posted by various social media accounts and that he was a person “from Syria and was killed several months ago, was also introduced as a Taliban” (see his post on X.

“The authenticity of this claim [is] not known,” said Director of Research at The Khorasan Diary, Riccardo Valle, which focuses on the “greater ‘Khorasan’ region” (broadly speaking, a region that encompasses West and Central Asia) (see his post on X). Valle stressed that the “only source of information has been Afghan Taliban and TTP accounts, it could be a PR move. However, infiltrations [of individual Afghans into Gaza] can be possible.”

It remains unclear whether the episode happened as reported, or even at all. Presumably, Israeli sources would have reported such an incident prominently if there was any truth to it. An internet search yielded no results except a MEMRI report, which also referred only to the posts on X.

The ‘Yasir, also known as Abu Yosuf al-Afghani’ post could be the work of activists involved in – probably mostly private – psychological warfare operations by the Emirate’s opponents. They know that something like this would be picked up and quickly circulated, often without fact-checking, by those who believe the Emirate capable of anything. High-ranking politicians such as the Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republican Michael McCaul, certainly proved the point when he told VoA that he had seen ‘“indications that the Taliban want to come to ‘liberate Jerusalem,’ in their words, to ‘fight the Zionists.’”

Public sentiments in Afghanistan 

It is difficult to glean real public sentiments regarding Palestine from Afghan media reports. It can, however, be assumed that Afghans feel a great deal of sympathy for Palestinians not only as fellow Muslims but also as people who have suffered decades of conflict and occupation. That the GDI appear to have put in place procedures to stop Afghans trying to go to Palestine suggests sentiments were strong enough to make some men at least talk about travelling to fight. The younger generation, regardless of their support for the Emirate or lack of, is likely very sympathetic to Palestinians, which could mirror public sentiments in neighbouring Pakistan. “Pakistani society almost universally feels solidarity with the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. But that doesn’t rub off on Hamas. Very few people here show solidarity with them,” head of the German Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Pakistan, Birgit Lamm, told German broadcaster Deutsche Welle:

In early August, the Emirate held a public rally to mourn Haniyeh’s death at Kabul’s Eidgah Mosque, where the IEA and Palestinian, but not Hamas flags, were displayed (see Afghan Analyst’s post on X). The rally attracted “hundreds” of participants who carried “banners denouncing the injustices perpetrated by the Israeli occupation and the repression faced by Palestine and Gaza,” according to reports in the pro-Emirate media (see, for example, this Hurriyat Radio post on X).

There were also earlier pro-Palestinian street demonstrations, for example, in Kabul one week after the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack and Israel’s military response (see ToloNews).

It is difficult to determine how much of this was organised by the state and how much was a genuine expression of solidarity by the Afghan public. The Emirate certainly does not permit any public expression of opinion that diverges from their views.[5]

The Emirate does, however, allow rallies supportive of it, or its stances. For example, see a pro-IEA women’s gathering on 11 September 2021 in a Kabul university (see this New York Times report) or street protests in Khost against Pakistani cross-border attacks that killed Afghan civilians in April 2022 (see VoA).

Some IEA officials are more strident on social media than they would be in official statements. The Ministry of Higher Education’s Director of Publications, Information and Public Relations, Hafiz Ruhullah Rohani, for example wrote: “We, God willing, will come to the aid of our oppressed Palestinian brothers from the land of the graveyard of empires. It just takes some time,” in a post on his personal X account in early August (see quote and screenshot here):

Some “prominent Taliban propagandists,” ie not officials, have started a “Boycott Israeli Products” campaign on X, Afghan Analysts reported on 3 July (see this post on X). It is unclear if Israeli goods are even on the Afghan market, or whether such utterances represent online bravado or could translate into concrete action or even an indication that the IEA’s official, previously reserved position might be about to change.

Conclusion

Following Hamas leader Haniyeh’s assassination, various media and news platforms – both Afghan and international – discussed the relationship between the Taleban/Islamic Emirate and Hamas. Much of the analysis seemed to the author at least partially superficial, while some sounded biased, insinuating a much closer – and sinister – relationship then was the case in reality.

One could certainly argue, though, as MEMRI does, that the (sparse) Hamas-Emirate relations are inspired “by the shared position of jihadism” and by their experiences of “occupation.” When, in 2017, AAN guest authors, Anand Gopal and Alex Strick van Linschoten looked into how Taleban ideology had developed since the fall of the first Emirate, Hamas was one of the movements they compared it to, along with Ahrar al-Sham in Syria and al-Nahda in Tunisia, similar in how their “Islamic Nationalism … was focused on the goal of ‘national liberation’.” Hamas has never been active in Afghanistan and the Taleban have shown little interest in becoming actively engaged in Gaza or the wider Middle East conflict, or indeed any country outside Afghanistan. Both groups are focussed on their own country, not interested in others’ affairs, except as it affects them. In an interview with al-Jazeera in August 2022, an IEA spokesman did not even seem to rule out diplomatic relations with Israel in principle since they have no [immediate] problems with Israel (quoted by MEMRI TV).

Given the geographical distance between Afghanistan and Israel/Palestine, intensive interaction between the two is unlikely. Historically, many volunteers from Arab countries, including some Palestinians, participated in the mujahidin’s fight against the Soviet occupation, a segment of which later became the Taleban. But no particularly close relationships emerged from this. Signs that this might be changing are hard to find beyond some individual online statements.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour and Kate Clark

References

References
1 According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, there are some 40,000 Palestinian Christians living in the West Bank, 850 in the Gaza Strip, and 4,000 in Jerusalem (quoted by Anadolu Agency). The US Department of State’s ‘2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Israel, West Bank and Gaza also provides a figure of 138,000 living inside Israel. Even greater numbers live in the Palestinian diaspora.
2 We were only able to find one exception, in an Islamic Emirate statement posted on X by spokesman Mujahid dated 13 October 2024, where the terms ‘Israel’ and ‘Israelis’ were used. States and individuals especially hostile to Israel typically do not name it, using such phrases as ‘Zionist entity’, instead.
3 The statement referred to an attack on the al-Ahli hospital, formerly the al-Mamadani. The cause of the explosion is actually contested, with some sources including Israel, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Canada saying they believe it was a result of a failed rocket launched from within Gaza by either the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) or Hamas (see, for example, The Guardian and Al-Jazeera). Other sources, such as Goldsmith University’s Forensic Architecture, assert that the blast was the result of “a munition fired from the direction of Israel” (see here). Several other organisations have since examined satellite imagery and eyewitness accounts, but so far have been unable to determine who was to blame for the attack on the hospital with certainly (see, for example, The New York Time’s ‘A Close Look at Some Key Evidence in the Gaza Hospital Blast’). The hospital was established by theAnglican Church’s Church Missionary Society (CMS) in 1882 and is currently operated by the Anglican Diocese of Jerusalem (for more information on the hospital and its history see Barnett, Carlton Carter, Anglo-American Missionary Medicine in Gaza, 1882-1981, Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 2021 available on the Wayback Machine here).
4 Muttaqi was not explicit about the geographic boundaries when he referred to “the historic land of Palestine.”
5 Shortly after taking power, on 19 September 2021, the IEA published an 11-point code of conduct for the media (see Reporter without Borders and UNAMA’s November 2024 report ‘Media Freedom in Afghanistan’), which stipulates that all reports “must be in an Islamic format and in accordance with Afghanistan’s tradition” and align with the “national interests.” The code includes the vaguely worded warning: “If there is any illegal action, it will be addressed” (see ToloNews). What precisely constitutes a contradiction of Islam and Afghan tradition, however, is left open to interpretation by the rulers. The Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law, issued on 21 August 2024, tasks the virtue and vice ministry’s muhtasiban (enforcers) “to ensure that those working for the press and news organisations” comply with these stipulations (see AAN’s basic translation). In September 2024, the IEA imposed additional restrictions on the media. According to a report by the Afghanistan Journalists Center (AFJC), they included prohibiting criticism of the IEA’s laws and policies, as well as banning the broadcast of live political shows. Media bosses were informed of the new guidelines in a meeting on 21 September, where they were told that the Emirate must first approve topics for political shows. Furthermore, they were told, that they could only interview guests from an approved list, which includes 64 individuals designated by the IEA (see the list of 64 individuals who have been approved by the IEA to be interviewed by the media in this Zamzam News tweet).

 

Birds of a Feather, in Ideology: What is the relationship between the Islamic Emirate and Hamas?
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Taliban accuse Pakistan of conducting strikes inside Afghanistan


Taliban authorities accuse Pakistan of carrying out airstrikes in Barmal, a district in the Afghan border province of Paktika, that resulted in several civilian casualties, including women and children.
Taliban authorities accuse Pakistan of carrying out airstrikes in Barmal, a district in the Afghan border province of Paktika, that resulted in several civilian casualties, including women and children. 

Taliban authorities said Tuesday that Pakistan carried out airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan that resulted in several civilian casualties, including women and children.

The Taliban Ministry of National Defense condemned the late-evening attack in Barmal, a district in the Afghan border province of Paktika. It asserted via the X social media platform that Pakistani refugee families residing in the area were the victims. The claims could not immediately be verified from independent sources.

“The Islamic Emirate considers this brutal bombing a violation of international principles and a clear act of aggression,” the ministry said, using the official title of the Taliban government. “This cowardly attack will not go unanswered,” the statement warned without elaborating.

The Taliban’s reaction came hours after security officials in Pakistan anonymously confirmed to reporters that their forces had launched multiple aerial strikes against suspected terrorist targets in Barmal.

The officials, who were not authorized to speak to the media, asserted the military action destroyed a training facility and eliminated several key militant commanders linked to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP.

The globally designated terrorist organization is waging deadly attacks against Pakistani security forces and civilians from its alleged Afghan sanctuaries. Pakistan has struck suspected terrorist targets inside Afghanistan in recent months.

It was not clear whether Pakistani fighter planes or unmanned aircraft, known as drones, were employed to conduct Tuesday’s strikes.

Pakistani military spokesmen were immediately not available to comment on the reported counterterrorism cross-border strikes. They came two days after heavily armed TTP militants stormed a security outpost in South Waziristan, a Pakistani district adjacent to Barmal, and killed 16 soldiers in one of the deadliest attacks on Pakistan’s military in recent months.

Tuesday’s alleged strikes came on a day when Taliban leaders hosted meetings with a high-level Pakistani delegation, marking the resumption of such interactions after a yearlong pause due to terrorism allegations.

Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, left, and Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan Mohammad Sadiq led their respective teams at talks in Kabul, Dec 24, 2024. (Courtesy - Taliban)
Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, left, and Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan Mohammad Sadiq led their respective teams at talks in Kabul, Dec 24, 2024. (Courtesy – Taliban)

Mohammad Sadiq, Pakistan’s newly appointed special envoy for Afghan affairs, led his country’s team at the talks in Kabul with Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, among others.

Muttaqi’s office said in a post-meeting statement that the delegations focused on enhancing diplomatic, trade and transit relations between the countries, which share a nearly 2,600-kilometer border.

The chief Taliban diplomat stated that his government “desires positive relations” with Islamabad.

Muttaqi said without elaborating that to further develop trade and transit ties, both governments “must enhance mutual coordination, facilitate travelers’ cross-border movement and address issues straining relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Taliban’s statement quoted Pakistani envoy Sadiq as saying that his mission was to “bolster” bilateral political, economic, commercial and transit relations.

“Held wide-ranging discussions. Agreed to work together to further strengthen bilateral cooperation as well as for peace and progress in the region,” the Pakistani envoy wrote on X.

Sadiq’s predecessor, Asif Ali, visited Kabul in September 2023 when Pakistan was experiencing a dramatic rise in terrorist attacks attributed to the outlawed TTP, with Islamabad persistently alleging the militant group was orchestrating the deadly cross-border violence from its Afghan “hideouts.”

TTP attacks have since intensified and killed hundreds of Pakistani civilians as well as security forces, leading to a further deterioration in relations.

“Given the current circumstances, we must expedite our collaborative efforts to safeguard the relationship between our peoples and ensure regional stability and development,” Haqqani’s office quoted him Tuesday as telling the Pakistani delegation.

He stressed “the urgency of accelerating joint efforts to resolve security and political challenges,” according to the statement.

Taliban leaders have consistently denied allegations that Afghan territory is being used as a launching pad for attacks. The de facto Afghan government maintains it does not support the TTP or any other foreign militant group, describing the violence in Pakistan as an “internal problem” for the neighboring country to resolve rather than blaming Kabul for the crisis.

Afghanistan is landlocked, relying heavily on Pakistani overland routes and seaports to conduct bilateral and international trade. Tensions over terrorism charges have led to a significant decline in Afghan trade and transit activities through Pakistan in recent months.

The Taliban swept back to power in 2021, but no country has officially recognized them as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan.

Taliban accuse Pakistan of conducting strikes inside Afghanistan
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Behind Afghanistan’s Fall, U.S.-Backed Militias Worse Than the Taliban

Azam Ahmed, a former Kabul bureau chief for The Times, returned to Afghanistan after the Taliban took control to report on the secrets the Americans left behind. He reported this story from Kunduz, Afghanistan.

Trump blamed Biden. Biden blamed the Afghan military. Our investigation found that the U.S. unwittingly laid the groundwork for the Taliban’s victory long ago.

The Taliban were inching closer, encroaching on land that had once seemed secure, the American officer warned. Four of his men had just been killed, and he needed Afghans willing to fight back.

“Who will stand up?” the officer implored a crowd of 150 Afghan elders.

The people in Kunduz Province were largely supportive of the Americans and opposed to the Taliban. But recruiting police officers was slow going and, by the summer of 2009, local officials and the American officer — a lieutenant colonel from the Georgia National Guard — landed on a risky approach: hiring private militias.

A murmur of discontent passed through the crowd.

“I don’t think this is a good idea,” an old man stood up and said, according to four people at the meeting. “We have seen this before. The militias will become a bigger problem than the Taliban.”

Over the grumbling, a onetime warlord named Mohammad Omar sprung up and denounced the others as cowards.

“I will fight the Taliban!” he shouted.

The gathering in Kunduz, in northern Afghanistan, is not registered in any official history of the war. But people across the province say this seemingly unremarkable moment reshaped the conflict in ways that Washington has never truly understood.

For years, the Americans supported militias in the north to fight the Taliban. But the effort backfired — those groups preyed on the populace with such cruelty that they turned a one-time stronghold of the United States into a bastion of the insurgency. People came to see the militias, and by extensions the Americans, as a source of torment, not salvation.

Mr. Omar, for example, who was known as the Wall Breaker, became the poster child of an abusive militia commander, marauding his way into local lore by robbing, kidnapping and killing rivals and neighbors under the auspices of keeping them safe from the Taliban.

The consequences came to a head during the chaotic American withdrawal in 2021. The north was expected to be America’s rear guard, a place where values like democracy and women’s rights might have taken hold.

Instead, it capitulated in a matter of days — the first region to fall to the Taliban.

President-elect Donald J. Trump has blamed President Biden for the messy end to America’s longest war, vowing to fire “every single senior official” responsible for the disastrous exit. Mr. Biden, by contrast, blames the Afghans for surrendering to the Taliban so quickly.

“Political leaders gave up and fled the country,” Mr. Biden said after the withdrawal. “The Afghan military collapsed.”

But both renderings miss a more fundamental reason for the rapid fall: In places like Kunduz, a New York Times investigation found, the United States set the conditions for its defeat long before the Afghan soldiers laid down their arms.

For years, the Americans helped recruit, train and pay for lawless bands of militias that pillaged homes and laid waste to entire communities. The militias tortured civilians, kidnapped for ransom, massacred dozens in vendetta killings and razed entire villages, sowing more than a decade of hatred toward the Afghan government and its American allies.

The Afghan Army, already overwhelmed, recognized that it was defending a government with vanishingly little support. So, when the advancing Taliban offered Afghan soldiers a choice — their lives for their weapons — they lay down arms.

The regions plundered by Mr. Omar and other warlords were active battlefields during the war, mostly off limits to outsiders. But more than 50 interviews, conducted in Kunduz over 18 months, showed how American support for the militias spelled disaster, not just in the province but also across the rest of northern Afghanistan.

That state-sponsored misery was central to how the United States and its Afghan partners lost the north — and how, despite two decades and $2 trillion in American money, Afghanistan fell.

Other Times investigations this year have revealed how the United States underwrote atrocities by Afghan forces and recklessly killed its own allies, essentially authoring its own defeat in Afghanistan.

The fall of Kunduz in 2021 was the final word on another unforced American error — its use of criminals to carry out operations against the Taliban.

“The militias shot at civilians and killed innocents,” said Rahim Jan, whose mother, father and two brothers were killed by Mr. Omar, which other villagers confirmed. With no other choice, he said, “we supported the Taliban, because they fought the militias.”

Even the Taliban, normally eager to boast of battlefield exploits, credit their victory in the province to American missteps.

“The U.S. empowered bandits and murderers in the name of counterinsurgency,” said Matiullah Rohani, a former Taliban commander and the current minister of information and culture in Kunduz. “But it only pushed more people into the hands of the Taliban.”

Human rights groups, academics and journalists have published numerous accounts of atrocities by militias. But the extent of the abuse, and how it helped enable the Taliban’s swift takeover of Afghanistan, is a story the Americans left behind when they abandoned the country three years ago.

Today, with the militias gone, the scale of their acts — in both human and political costs — is visible.

Previous accounts have blamed Afghan officials in the north for raising their own militias. But The Times found that the United States had recruited militias in Kunduz far earlier than was known, with a fallout far worse than American officials have acknowledged.

During its 20-year war in Afghanistan, the United States pushed an ever-evolving series of programs to recruit, train and support local resistance to the Taliban. Some formally created armed groups under the auspices of the police, while other backing was ad hoc, with money and training provided here and there. In many cases, the Afghan government doled out American cash, giving militias the imprimatur of Washington’s support.

Almost all of the efforts were problematic. Militias soon grew too powerful to disarm. And while they did fight the Taliban, they fought one another even more, creating the kind of civil war turmoil that first helped bring the Taliban to power in the 1990s. Some Afghans were so disgusted by the predatory militias that they began to see the Taliban as their defenders and joined the insurgency.

One of the first militias was born in the Kunduz district of Khanabad, the brainchild of the Georgia National Guard officer desperate to beat back the Taliban. And one of the earliest efforts involved Mr. Omar, the Wall Breaker.

“There was no doubt in my mind that Mr. Omar was a leader in that community,” said the now-retired officer, Lt. Col. Kenneth Payne, of the Second Battalion, 121st Infantry Regiment of Georgia’s 48th infantry brigade combat team. “And I firmly believe that, at the time, he was saying all the right things.”

Colonel Payne had not been sent to the north to recruit militias. He was there to mentor the police. But he had a wide remit, and a big idea. He decided that activating Mr. Omar’s group was worth the risk.

“It was almost like, ‘If this works, if this is better for me, where I will get an advantage, then I will do it,’” he said.

Instead, he wound up unwittingly supporting the only group in the region less popular than the Taliban.

Months after the summer meeting, a Taliban fighter lay against the floor of a collapsed guesthouse. Outside, Mr. Omar, the newly minted militia leader, paced the street.

“Come out now, or I will blow the walls of this house down!” he shouted into a megaphone, as his men prepped mortars, witnesses said. “I am the Wall Breaker!”

The insurgent weathered round after round of mortars, each one collapsing nearby homes and terrifying residents with the indiscriminate explosions.

Finally, Mr. Omar retreated with his men, fearful that the Taliban might send reinforcements. But on the way out of town, for good measure, his militia looted a local store and roughed up a few locals, residents said, actions that turned much of the community against him.

Mr. Omar had waged an all-day battle, blasting his way through an entire village, to chase down a single Taliban fighter. And still, somehow, his target had survived.

But the Wall Breaker moniker stuck. The name captured Mr. Omar’s capacity for wanton violence, though not necessarily effectiveness.

And that early foray was among his least offensive, many locals say.

In another early mission, in a neighboring district, he stole so brazenly and abused so widely that residents cite it as the moment the entire area turned toward the Taliban. “He even took people’s dogs,” one recalled.

Mr. Omar, who had first taken up arms against the Russians decades before, used his renewed power to exact vengeance on his enemies from past wars and past decades.

Akhtar Mohammad said that his father, uncle and brother had been rounded up and summarily executed, ostensibly for attacking Mr. Omar’s convoy with a roadside bomb. But Mr. Mohammad denied that his relatives were involved in the bombing, which he said was just pretext; the two families had feuded for three decades.

“Being part of a militia meant having the power and authority to settle scores,” Mr. Mohammad said.

In Colonel Payne’s estimation, “things went very well for a while.” But his deployment ended soon after Mr. Omar’s militia began and the area “had a hard time after we left,” he said.

“It really bothered me because I thought we had made a difference,” he added.

The United States knew about the debacle unfolding in Kunduz. A diplomatic cable from the U.S. Embassy in November 2009 emphasized the importance of controlling the militias. If left to their own devices, they could “divide Afghan communities and spark additional violence,” the cable noted.

Two months later, the embassy seemed to confirm those fears: The government had no power over the militias, which fought among themselves and forced locals to pay them illegal taxes.

The cable mentioned Mr. Omar’s role in the chaos, but blamed an overzealous Afghan governor for hiring him. The diplomats seemed unaware that the Americans had empowered Mr. Omar themselves.

In 2013, four years after helping to arm the likes of the Wall Breaker in Kunduz, the United States left the north, handing control of security, and the militias, to the Afghan government.

In the criminal free-for-all that blossomed, new commanders emerged even worse than Mr. Omar. They leveled villages and massacred families, and fought one another, too: over territory or perceived slights.

The Times spoke with dozens of families who had lost loved ones to those men and others, killings that tallied into the hundreds.

Forced conscription was common, they said. Men were killed for refusing to join one militia or another. Charges of supporting the Taliban were leveled against those who refused to pay taxes, and many were jailed.

“The militias would label anyone they didn’t like ‘Taliban,’ and then abuse them so much they had no choice but to join the Taliban,” said Mohammad Farid, a shopkeeper who said he was imprisoned for refusing to pay Mr. Omar a share of the proceeds from the sale of his store.

The Americans did not direct the abuse, but they funded the government with billions of dollars in cash and weapons, which officials then used to hire and arm the militias. As far as the villagers were concerned, this was an American project. And the Taliban increasingly seemed like a better option.

Shahd Mohammad, a tailor by trade, said he endured more than a year of beatings and abuse before he finally sold his shop in 2013, moved his family to another district and joined the Taliban.

For the next six years, he led a unit focused on fighting the militias in Khanabad.

“I went from living my life as a tailor to fighting on the front lines,” he said.

President Ashraf Ghani took office in Afghanistan in 2014 and realized the militias were running amok. With the Americans by his side, he loudly promised to bring security to Kunduz by bringing people like the Wall Breaker under control.

The effort proved disastrous.

Some militias, now maligned in public, soured on the government, former Afghan officials said. Some militias even switched sides, joining forces with the Taliban.

Seizing the moment, Taliban commanders began secretly calling militia leaders, sowing distrust by telling them that the government viewed them as the enemy, according to Taliban officials and former Afghan officials with access to classified intercepts. They, like some others, spoke on condition of anonymity because they feared repercussions.

The psychological tactic worked. Some militias stopped fighting for the government, while others kept clashing with one another, clearing the battlefield for the Taliban.

“The split between the militias was crucial for us,” said Hesmatullah Zalmay, a Taliban commander in Kunduz.

Within a year of Mr. Ghani’s threat to curtail the militias, Kunduz was on the verge of collapse.

It was too late. In August 2015, the Taliban stormed Kunduz City. Government forces and its militias fled until American airstrikes and special forces could help them retake the city.

Far from drawing lessons from the failed militia strategies, the Afghan government doubled down. To maintain order, Mr. Ghani’s government turned to a man even more ruthless than the Wall Breaker.

In a province shattered by ethnic and political divides, where factions of factions fought other factions, everyone agreed on one thing: Haji Fateh was the worst, most notoriously violent of all the militia commanders.

Accounts of his medieval torture methods — branding people with hot metal rods, burying them alive or keeping them chained in underground dungeons — still haunt the residents of Kunduz.

Mr. Fateh was widely seen as a scourge, a villain who killed innocents and charged their families to retrieve the bodies.

He was also an ally of the Afghan government and, by extension, their American backers.

Two former Afghan officials and several former militia commanders described years of government support for Mr. Fateh.

“We had a complicated relationship,” said one former high-ranking government official in Kunduz. “When the district came under attack, we gave him money and weapons to fight.”

The transfers were conducted in secret, he said, because Mr. Fateh was a wanted man.

Before the Taliban emptied the prisons in Kunduz during their brief takeover, Mr. Fateh had been locked up for killing a police officer while robbing a Kabul Bank truck.

“We supported him, yes, but it wasn’t like he could come to the governor’s house,” the official said.

How much the United States knew about the payments to Mr. Fateh is unclear. The money was given at a time when Afghan officials were under heavy pressure from Washington to take charge of their own security. The Pentagon did not respond to a list of questions about the militias.

After fleeing prison, Mr. Fateh set down roots in the braided hillsides of Deh Wayran, an area that was largely free of the Taliban.

He operated from a torture castle, according to residents, and demanded ransom payments for his kidnapping victims — men like Haji Wazir, a contractor for the Americans who said he was nearly starved to death by Mr. Fateh.

Mr. Fateh’s criminal empire was built on cruelty and swept up entire communities as he waged a brutal turf war with a rival militia.

Dozens died in scorched-earth battles between the two sides. Militias fired rockets and mortars into hillside villages and laced roads with bombs. They blamed the attacks on the Taliban, though they had no real presence there.

Almost nobody in Deh Wayran worried about the Taliban, residents said. To the contrary, they worried about the fight between two ostensible American allies.

Gul Afraz lived with her family in the village of Dana, a small community of Tajik families numbering fewer than 150 people.

Mr. Fateh planted roadside bombs that killed her son and two of her nephews, she said. Fearing that the village might take revenge, Mr. Fateh bulldozed every home there, villagers said, sending survivors fleeing.

Rival militiamen moved in, committing their own offenses, a tit-for-tat brutality that pushed more of the locals who remained to support the one group that wasn’t murdering them — the Taliban.

Within a year of Mr. Fateh’s arrival, the entire village had all but been wiped out.

“There was no Taliban here at first,” Ms. Afraz said, “but I am so grateful they are here now.”

Mr. Fateh operated with impunity, running checkpoints along the highway and extorting motorists of thousands of dollars a day, according to his former friends who remain in the region.

In a cynical twist, Mr. Fateh’s abuses made him ever more essential to the government: The more he pushed people into the arms of the Taliban, the more the government needed him to fight them.

The chief of police, the intelligence service and the army showered him with money and munitions, according to the former government officials and militia commanders. Even the highly trained Afghan Special Operations forces were supporting him.

And because the Afghan government was practically insolvent, it meant the Americans were paying for it all.

“We tried to capture him many times,” said Sadat, a former special operations commander, who like many Afghans goes by a single name. “But then the government began to support him.”

Prosecutors in Khanabad issued more than 100 warrants for Mr. Fateh’s arrest as complaints of robbery, extortion and murder poured in. But the local authorities refused to act.

One prosecutor gave his federal counterparts in the Ghani government 150 case files bearing evidence of Mr. Fateh’s crimes, to no avail. Mr. Fateh was untouchable, and he knew it.

One day in 2020, the Shiite owner of an ice cream store in Khanabad complained that Mr. Fateh should stop stealing his ice cream. Mr. Fateh had the shop owner beaten in the street.

In response, Haider Jafari, a local Shiite leader, said he had no choice but to confront him. Mr. Fateh responded by shooting him in the chest, wounding but not killing him.

Mr. Fateh then burned Shiite homes in the town and ordered Mr. Jafari to flee. To reinforce his point, Mr. Fateh murdered his nephew, Mr. Jafari said.

“We went directly to the governor, and he could not do anything,” Mr. Jafari said. “We began to support the Taliban after that.”

In February 2020, when the Trump administration reached a peace deal with the Taliban, the die was cast: the Americans were leaving.

The Taliban went from district to district, using elders to encourage the Afghan Army to lay down its arms. It was not much of a negotiation. Thanks to the militias, the Taliban were stronger than ever, and there was no good will left for the government.

By the time the United States announced its timetable for the withdrawal in 2021, the Taliban had all but taken most districts in Kunduz.

Khanabad was different, in part because men like Mr. Fateh and Mr. Omar dug in.

The Taliban and the government traded control of Khanabad three times during the second week of June.

Mr. Biden met Mr. Ghani in Washington that month, insisting that the war’s final act had not yet been written.

“Afghans are going to have to decide their future,” Mr. Biden said.

Mr. Fateh apparently did not share that optimism. Taliban officials say he tried to switch sides and even called a Taliban commander to offer his cooperation. But by then, the government was on its heels, and the Taliban saw no point in granting him quarter.

The militias abandoned Khanabad for Kunduz City, taking residence in whatever areas they could find. Mr. Fateh positioned himself in a home near the eastern edge of the city. Mr. Omar emptied a madrasa of students and claimed it as his headquarters.

Afghan commandos were dispatched to Kunduz to beat back the Taliban.

“They have the capacity. They have the forces. They have the equipment. The question is: Will they do it?” Mr. Biden said in July 2021. “The likelihood there’s going to be the Taliban overrunning everything and owning the whole country is highly unlikely.”

But the fight in Kunduz was over before it began. Even as commandos fought to defend the city, the Taliban were negotiating with the Afghan Army to take over the province, Taliban officials said.

Everyone saw the writing on the wall. Even residents who loathed the Taliban were tired of years of abuse at the hands of militias. The Afghan military was easily persuaded not to die for a lost cause, former Afghan officials said.

“In the end, the militias were the undoing of the government,” said Abdul Rauf Charsari, a former police commander in Kunduz.

Some of the most notorious warlords and criminals who brought such misery to Kunduz — and ultimately did more to support the Taliban than defeat them — faded away without a final battle or trial.

Mr. Omar, the Wall Breaker, died of natural causes not long after the Taliban took over.

Haji Fateh fled to safety as the province fell and resettled in Iran, where he lives in a swanky home paid for by the money he earned brutalizing the people of Kunduz, according to one of his friends.

Mr. Fateh could not be reached for comment, but he welcomes visitors regularly for lavish meals or tea, said the friend, speaking on condition of anonymity out of fear of incurring his wrath.

Among his most frequent guests, the friend said, are former Afghan government officials, hoping to convince him once more to take up arms on their behalf.

Azam Ahmed is international investigative correspondent for The Times. He has reported on Wall Street scandals, the War in Afghanistan and violence and corruption in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean

Behind Afghanistan’s Fall, U.S.-Backed Militias Worse Than the Taliban
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In Afghanistan, Trump will have to play a balancing game

Aziz Amin

Fellow at Oxford Global Society

Taken too far, incoming US president’s pragmatic disengagement policy in Afghanistan could badly backfire.

Since Donald Trump’s re-election as United States president, there has been growing discussion about what his incoming administration’s policies towards Afghanistan might look like.

Many anticipate a tougher stance against the Taliban, but a closer look at Trump’s track record and statements on the issue indicates he is unlikely to make any drastic changes to the pragmatist and staunchly anti-intervention policies he pursued during his first term in power.

During his first term as president, Trump made his stance against protracted foreign engagements and especially the decades-long US presence in Afghanistan clear. He was the architect of the 2020 Doha Agreement between the US and the Taliban, which paved the way for the US withdrawal from the country and ultimately allowed the Taliban’s return to power.

The Doha Agreement was a major turning point in America’s Afghanistan strategy. Dissatisfied with the progress of his administration’s South Asia policy, frustrated by a perceived lack of accountability among military advisers and eager to prove to his voting base that he could indeed end one of America’s longest and most costly wars, Trump began to look for a fast way out of Afghanistan. And after all the traditional strategies failed to produce a workable exit plan, he entered into direct negotiations with the Taliban to end the conflict.

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After his re-election, Trump is likely to stick to this business-minded approach to foreign policy, which remains popular with his base, and favour pragmatic deals over costly confrontations and military entanglements in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The Taliban itself seems to believe the Trump presidency could be beneficial for its future prospects. For example, the Afghan government hopes the future Trump administration “will take realistic steps toward concrete progress in relations between the two countries and both nations will be able to open a new chapter of relations”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Abdul Qahar Balkhi said in a post on X in November soon after Trump’s victory in the US election.

The Taliban’s optimism for future relations stems from its positive interactions with the first Trump administration. After all, the first Trump administration negotiated directly with the Taliban, started the process of a US withdrawal from Afghanistan and prepared the ground for its return to Kabul.

However, although he has been more open to a pragmatic collaboration with the Taliban than President Joe Biden and firmly against any direct military confrontation, Trump is unlikely to let the Taliban do as it likes with the country or give it everything it needs without extracting a price. If the Taliban fails to make progress in fulfilling the commitments it made as part of the Doha Agreement, for example, Trump would likely curtail US assistance or condition it on tangible progress in specific areas.

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Trump has consistently argued for cutting back foreign aid as part of an “America First” approach, and he can also reduce US assistance to Afghanistan significantly without offering a reason or condition. He also would not hesitate to impose severe economic sanctions on the Taliban government if he concludes that it is harming American interests in one way or another.

US humanitarian aid amounting to about $40m a week since the Taliban takeover is an important lifeline to Afghanistan’s impoverished population. Any limitation or reduction in US aid would have significant consequences for its wellbeing and that of the fragile Afghan economy. Such a decision would deepen Afghanistan’s economic crisis and further erode progress in education, healthcare and food security.

Since Trump’s last term as president, global attention has moved away from Afghanistan. After the US withdrawal and with the beginning of globally consequential hot conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine, the country became somewhat peripheral to Washington’s foreign policy agenda. As an “America First” president who will have to spend considerable time dealing with crises in the Middle East and Europe, Trump is highly unlikely to treat Afghanistan as anything other than a problem he already solved.

However, Trump’s isolationist tendencies in foreign policy coupled with the aid cuts and economic sanctions he may impose on the Taliban could easily result in the collapse of the Afghan economy and once again turn Afghanistan into an urgent problem for the US and its allies.

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Afghanistan’s economic collapse could trigger a new migration crisis, significant regional instability and create fertile ground for extremist groups, such as the ISIL (ISIS) affiliate in Khorasan Province, to flourish.

While Trump’s noninterventionist stance appeals to an American audience wary of foreign intervention, the ripple effects of a weakened and further impoverished Afghanistan could present longer-term security challenges.

Such a scenario would also have severe consequences for the Afghan people – worsening economic hardship and causing a potential collapse of health services, renewed conflict and further isolation from the rest of the world.

Once Trump is back in the White House and trying to deliver on his “America First” agenda, Afghanistan is unlikely to be a priority in his mind. Nonetheless, the choices he makes regarding Afghanistan will have important consequences not only for the long-suffering Afghan people but also the entirety of the international community.

In short, in his second term, Trump will need to find the right balance between pragmatic disengagement and responsibilities of global leadership to be successful in his Afghanistan policy and ensure that his efforts to end one conflict do not create a worse one down the line.

Amin is a writer and analyst currently serving as a fellow at the Oxford Global Society think tank in Oxford, United Kingdom and the Brenthurst Foundation.

In Afghanistan, Trump will have to play a balancing game
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Stanikzai Calls for Regional Unity Against West

According to Stanikzai, the US and NATO are common enemies of Afghanistan and Iran, which necessitates stronger ties between Kabul and Tehran.

Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the Deputy Political Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasized a united approach among regional countries against the West, particularly the US and NATO, during a program in Kabul today (Monday).

The Deputy Minister, speaking at an event attended by Iran’s acting ambassador in Kabul, stated that the Western world is engaged in an economic war with Afghanistan and Iran, rather than an armed conflict.

According to Stanikzai, the US and NATO are common enemies of Afghanistan and Iran, which necessitates stronger ties between Kabul and Tehran.

During the program, Stanikzai said: “The US and the Western world, particularly NATO, are not in an armed war against us, but they are at war with us in politics and economics. They exhibit the same attitude and behavior towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, our enemies are mutual, and both countries need to deepen and strengthen their friendly relations.”

Stanikzai also mentioned that before the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, between 200 and 300 people lost their lives daily in conflicts across the country’s provinces. He noted that with the Islamic Emirate’s rise to power, war-related deaths have ceased. Additionally, he described the Afghanistan-Iran border as one of the safest.

The deputy minister stated: “Currently, the border between Iran and the Islamic Emirate, which spans more than 900 kilometers, as far as I have studied, is one of the safest borders between two Muslim countries, with no major incidents reported.”

A meeting between the leadership of the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Investment and Iran’s acting ambassador in Afghanistan was held late last night (Sunday) in Kabul.

Stanikzai Calls for Regional Unity Against West
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Saudi Embassy resumes operations in Kabul after one-year hiatus

The Saudi Embassy in Kabul has announced that it has resumed its operations after nearly a year-long hiatus.

The embassy made the announcement on Sunday, December 22, stating that “the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Kabul has resumed its activities as of December 22.”

The Saudi Embassy in Kabul had suspended its activities in February of the previous year, citing security concerns.

In its statement marking the reopening of the embassy, Saudi Arabia mentioned that the embassy’s reopening is in line with the Kingdom’s desire “to provide all services to the brotherly people of Afghanistan.”

It is important to note that in August 2021, following the collapse of the previous Afghanistan government, Saudi Arabia evacuated its diplomats from Kabul. However, by November of the same year, it returned with limited diplomatic staff to provide consular services.

Over the past three years, Saudi Arabia’s activities in Afghanistan have been minimal, mainly focusing on humanitarian aid and addressing immediate humanitarian needs.

The Taliban regime has repeatedly urged regional and international countries to reopen their diplomatic missions in Afghanistan.

Currently, the embassies of several countries, including Russia, China, and Iran, are active in Kabul, while Western countries are conducting their diplomatic activities from outside Afghanistan.

While no country has yet officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, several regional countries continue to normalize their relations with the Taliban government.

Saudi Embassy resumes operations in Kabul after one-year hiatus
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UN supports over 80,000 women-led small businesses in Afghanistan

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has announced its support for over 80,000 small businesses led by women in Afghanistan, contributing significantly to the growth of local families.

In a video message shared on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter) on Sunday, December 22, Stephen Rodrigues, head of the UNDP office in Afghanistan, stated that their initiatives had not only supported these businesses but also provided employment opportunities for 900,000 people across the country. Additionally, he highlighted that 4.5 million people had benefited from these programs.

Rodrigues emphasized that UNDP’s efforts to empower women entrepreneurs have been crucial, especially after the restrictions placed on women and girls’ education following the events of August 2021. As a result, many women and girls have turned to small businesses to support themselves and their families.

Despite the challenges and restrictions placed on them, female entrepreneurs continue to thrive. The recent handicrafts and production exhibition in Kabul, where many women had a prominent presence, is a testament to their resilience and entrepreneurial spirit.

There has been a noticeable increase in interest among Afghan women, especially young girls, in business activities. Many are starting small and medium enterprises, seeing entrepreneurship as a viable path to financial independence and social contribution.

Meanwhile, the recent survey showed that women in Afghanistan are still facing severe discrimination and violations of their human rights, including profound discrimination, operational limitations, and a severely weak financial system, which has significantly limited women’s access to loans from banks. According to the report, out of 41% of more than 3,000 women who were interviewed, only 5% stated that they had received loans from banks or small financial institutions.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has reported that 73% of these women are unable to travel to local markets without a male guardian (mahram).

The report further states: “When asked about the limitations of running a business as a woman, 32% of women-led small and medium enterprises believed that gender discrimination created barriers to accessing markets for their businesses, 28% cited difficulties in procuring supplies, and 19% referred to challenges in securing formal loans.”

This data highlights the many barriers women in Afghanistan face in both personal and professional spheres. These restrictions not only hinder women’s economic independence but also contribute to their ongoing marginalization in society.

Addressing these issues requires significant reforms, particularly in the financial system and legal framework, to enable women to fully participate in the economy and regain their rights to equal opportunities.

International support and advocacy for women’s rights in Afghanistan remain critical, as they can help amplify the voices of Afghan women and work towards policy changes that can empower them to overcome these limitations.

UN supports over 80,000 women-led small businesses in Afghanistan
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Afghanistan Journalists Center confirms release of seven Arezo TV employees from prison

The Afghanistan Journalists Center reported that the employees of Arezo TV, who had been detained, were released after two weeks upon providing “guarantees.”

In a statement released on Sunday, December 22, the center announced the release of Amanullah Azimi, Khalid Barkazi, Amir Hossein Attryan, Zahir Faizi, Samir Ahmad Baik, Haroon Irfan, and Bektash Rofi, employees of Arezo TV, from the custody of Taliban.

It is worth noting that intelligence and the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice agents had sealed the Arezo TV office in Kabul two weeks ago and taken several of its employees into custody.

Seven of these employees were released after two weeks upon providing “guarantees,” but the TV station in Kabul has not yet been allowed to resume its activities. The trial for these employees is scheduled to take place in a week.

The Afghanistan Journalists Center welcomed the release of the Arezo TV employees and urged the authorities to close the case and allow Arezo TV to resume its operations unconditionally.

Arezo TV was established in 2006 in Mazar-e-Sharif, and its office in Kabul began operations in 2009. The TV station is considered one of the prominent media outlets in the fields of reporting, documentary production, series, and film dubbing.

The detention and subsequent release of Arezo TV employees highlight ongoing challenges faced by media outlets under the current political climate in Afghanistan. While the release is a positive development, the restriction on the station’s ability to operate freely raises concerns about media freedom in the country.

The call by the Afghanistan Journalists Center for the closure of the case and the unconditional reopening of Arezo TV reflects broader anxieties about press freedom in Afghanistan, with many hoping for a more transparent and supportive environment for journalists in the future. The situation serves as a reminder of the ongoing struggles for media independence in the region.

Afghanistan Journalists Center confirms release of seven Arezo TV employees from prison
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Greek authorities say boat capsizing victims and survivors were from Afghanistan. 2 Turks arrested

Associated Press
December 21, 2024

ATHENS, Greece (AP) — Greece’s coast guard said Saturday it was searching for survivors or victims of a speedboat capsizing a day earlier involving migrants off the eastern Greek island of Rhodes.

The capsizing, the result of the boat’s maneuvering to evade a patrol vessel according to authorities, left eight confirmed dead.

A total of 18 migrants — 12 men, three women and three minors — all Afghan nationals, were rescued, the coast guard said Saturday. The dead were also from Afghanistan, it said.

Some migrants remained hospitalized, with one in critical condition, authorities said.

Two Turkish citizens, ages 23 and 19, were arrested as the suspected traffickers. The boat sank after capsizing, the coast guard said.

The sinking off Rhodes was the second deadly incident involving migrants in the past week.

Seven migrants were killed and dozens were believed missing after a boat partially sank south of the island of Crete over the weekend — one of four rescue operations during which more than 200 migrants were rescued.

 

Greek authorities say boat capsizing victims and survivors were from Afghanistan. 2 Turks arrested
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New Restrictions in Iran Pose Challenge for Afghan Refugees

Some of these refugees are urging the authorities in the caretaker government to address these challenges seriously.

A number of Afghan refugees in Iran have expressed concerns about the newly imposed restrictions in the country, saying these limitations will make it challenging for them to find suitable jobs and shelter.

“We are facing serious problems in Iran, including not having a bank card, which means we can’t even buy bread at a bakery or shop for essentials,” said Jawad, an Afghan migrant.

Previously, Iranian media reported that according to a “new regulation,” the residence and employment of refugees in certain areas of the country have been prohibited.

Nader Yarahmadi, head of the Center for Foreign Nationals and Migrants Affairs, announced that East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Zanjan, Sistan and Baluchistan, and Mazandaran provinces are among the areas where the presence of refugees has been restricted.

A report from Iranian media stated: “According to this law, the provinces of East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Ilam, Lorestan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, North Khorasan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Sistan and Baluchistan, Khuzestan, and Hamedan are completely off-limits for foreign nationals to travel or settle. Some areas in other provinces are also designated as restricted zones.”

“In some cities, migrants without documentation or those with permission but no residence rights must ensure that they obtain clearance from the Kafalat offices before traveling to these provinces to avoid problems,” said Mohammad Khan Talebi, a migration rights activist.

A significant portion of refugees in Iran are Afghan citizens.

Meanwhile, Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate has called on host countries not to impose new restrictions on Afghan refugees.

The spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate, stated: “In general, we request that Afghan refugees be treated with kindness and not face restrictions or difficulties. Of course, we are making efforts to encourage and facilitate their return to Afghanistan. However, exerting pressure, imposing restrictions, and placing them under threats is not the right approach.”

Given the current situation, it is expected that this decision will have serious consequences for the lives of thousands of Afghan refugees in Iran, adding further challenges to their livelihoods and security.

New Restrictions in Iran Pose Challenge for Afghan Refugees
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