The spokesperson for Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry urged the Taliban on Thursday to take immediate and effective action against Pakistani militants based in Afghanistan, deeming any support for them unacceptable.
Mumtaz Zahra Baloch warned the Afghan Taliban not to “test the patience of the Pakistani people.”
In a weekly press briefing reported by The Express Tribune, Mumtaz Zahra Baloch stated, “Afghanistan must not allow its territory to be used for terrorism against Pakistan or any neighboring country.”
She emphasized that besides Pakistan, Afghanistan’s other neighboring countries have also called on the Taliban to take action against terrorist groups using Afghanistan as a safe haven.
The spokesperson reiterated Pakistan’s demand that Afghanistan soil must not be used against Pakistan and other neighboring nations.
She warned the Taliban to take Pakistan’s repeated concerns regarding militants seriously and to “stop testing the patience of the Pakistani people.”
The escalating insecurity caused by deadly attacks from militant groups, particularly the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has fueled Islamabad’s frustration and anger toward the Afghan Taliban.
The growing insecurity in Pakistan due to militant activity, along with the Afghan Taliban’s perceived inaction, has heightened tensions between the two nations. Islamabad’s demands for accountability and action may lead to strained diplomatic ties, further complicating the regional security dynamics.
Meanwhile, India has been quietly increasing its engagement with the Taliban, focusing on economic projects and humanitarian aid. This growing relationship could shift the balance of influence in the region, as India positions itself as a key player in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and a counterweight to Pakistan’s dominance in the country affairs.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was summoned to a parliamentary inquiry committee on Thursday to address questions about the military evacuation from Afghanistan in 2021.
The committee is investigating the withdrawal of German forces and the country’s response to the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul.
As a witness, Chancellor Scholz is expected to answer questions posed by parliamentarians during the session.
According to Germany’s Deutschlandfunk news agency, the inquiry aims to scrutinize the circumstances surrounding the Kabul evacuation operation in August 2021.
The operation remains under examination due to the rapid collapse of Afghanistan and the Taliban’s rise to power.
At the time of the evacuation, Scholz served as the Deputy Chancellor and Finance Minister in Angela Merkel’s cabinet.
In addition to Scholz, former Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer has also been invited to the parliamentary session.
German media reports indicate that in December, former Chancellor Angela Merkel and former Foreign Minister Heiko Maas are also scheduled to testify as witnesses before the inquiry committee.
Reports suggest that due to Germany’s upcoming early parliamentary elections, the preparation of the final report might be expedited to meet time constraints.
Amid rising tensions, European countries, including Germany, have intensified the deportation of Afghan refugees, especially those with criminal records.
This reflects a broader shift in Europe’s immigration policies, where security concerns and public sentiment are driving stricter measures against asylum seekers.
The increased deportations are exacerbating the plight of Afghan refugees, many of whom face dire conditions upon return. Human rights organizations have raised concerns about the safety of deported individuals, particularly those at risk of persecution in Afghanistan under Taliban rule.
This trend underscores the challenges facing both host nations and refugees in navigating the complexities of global displacement.
German Chancellor summoned to address Afghanistan evacuation operation
It also reads that the Islamic Emirate leadership prefers de facto engagement and displays of diplomatic respect to de jure legitimacy.
A Foreign Policy opinion piece by Jens Vesterlund Mathiesen, Adam Weinstein, and Galina Mikkelsen says that the new US administration led by President-elect Donald Trump and the West will face renewed opportunities and challenges in their approach to Afghanistan.
Referring to the discontinuation of the position of the US special representative for Afghanistan in October, and the closing of Afghan embassies in Europe, the piece says that Donald Trump will inherit nearly “deadlocked US relations” with the Islamic Emirate.
The piece called for coordinated US-European diplomacy on Afghanistan and suggested that the West should accept the current reality of Afghanistan rather than hoping to fracture the ‘Taliban’ from within.
It also reads that the Islamic Emirate leadership prefers de facto engagement and displays of diplomatic respect to de jure legitimacy.
“There’s no shortage of engagement with the Taliban by non-Western powers. Aaron Zelin of the Washington Institute has meticulously tracked all Taliban diplomatic meetings since August 2021, nearly 2,000 in their first three years in power, with meetings accelerating year on year,” the article reads.
The writers criticized the Western strategy of non-recognition and questioned the US’s and Europe’s distancing from Afghanistan while regional countries benefit from their engagement with the country.
The piece said that regional countries have achieved much from their engagement with Kabul.
The abandonment of Afghanistan by the West would be a mistake, the writers said, who encouraged face-to-face interaction with the current Afghan authorities rather than engaging from a distance.
“The United States and Europe could move beyond occasional engagement in Doha and sporadic meetings in Kabul to take a long-term approach by meeting with the Taliban and the Afghan people inside Afghanistan. By following the example of regional states in demonstrating respect through dialogue, Western diplomats can leverage the power of face-to-face interactions, recognizing that effective diplomacy is rooted in building personal relationships,” the article said.
Although the Islamic Emirate has repeatedly said that Daesh has been defeated in Afghanistan, the writers in the Foreign Policy piece wrote that the Islamic Emirate can be a counterterrorism partner of the West against their “shared” threat, ISKP.
The piece said that Donald Trump, as the architect of the Doha agreement, should pursue a forward-looking diplomacy, rather than return to the mistakes of the past.
This comes as the former US special envoy for Afghan peace, Zalmay Khalilzad, on X wrote that the reelection of Donald Trump is an opening for full implementation of the Doha agreement, and as Kabul is urging the president-elect to open a new chapter in US-Afghan relations.
Foreign Policy Piece Calls for US, West to Engage With Afghanistan
The Islamic Emirate has not yet commented on the matter.
Vedant Patel, Deputy Spokesperson for the US Department of State, has once again stated that recognition of Afghanistan’s interim government is contingent upon women’s participation in society.
In a press briefing, Patel said that as long as the interim government of Afghanistan continues to exclude half of the country’s population from social participation, it cannot achieve its goal of being internationally recognized.
The Deputy Spokesperson for the US Department of State said: “As long as the Taliban continues to essentially hold back 50 percent of its population from fully integrating in society, fully participating in society, it certainly is not going to be able to reach the international recognition that we know that they – that they’re seeking.”
The Islamic Emirate has not yet commented on the matter. However, it has consistently emphasized that women’s rights in Afghanistan are upheld within the framework of Islamic laws, and other countries should not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
Salim Paigir, a political analyst, said: “Although the countries that constantly talk about schools, universities, and women’s rights may not fully practice these values themselves, it is the responsibility of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to reopen schools and universities and provide work opportunities for women so that we can avoid the excuses made by the international community against us.”
Previously, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in a program held in Kabul expressed hope that the new US administration would reconsider its current policies toward Afghanistan.
Washington: Recognition of ‘Taliban’ Depends on Women’s Participation
U.N. cash dollars for humanitarian aid also buttress Afghanistan’s balance of payments and inject liquidity.
A cash squeeze could destabilize a fragile economic equilibrium.
With good policies, the Afghan central bank and external donors can mitigate risks posed by dwindling cash flows.
Afghanistan’s precarious economy is facing a new set of multidimensional risks as humanitarian aid — delivered in massive shipments of U.S. cash dollars — shrinks rapidly amid competing demands from other crises around the world. The dollar inflows, moved under U.N. auspices, have helped stabilize the Afghan economy, cover its mammoth trade deficit, and inject monetary liquidity into commerce. With much smaller cash infusions, in line with a general reduction in aid, the suffering of Afghanistan’s poverty-stricken population is likely to increase.
Minimizing the potential economic damage will demand sound macroeconomic management by the Taliban regime. Among other measures, the country’s economic policymakers will need to organize a gradual depreciation of the excessively strong exchange rate and ensure that there are adequate amounts of Afghani currency notes in circulation.
Despite strongly disapproving of the Taliban’s destructive policies on gender, other countries and international agencies can play a supportive role by facilitating production of more Afghani banknotes as needed and allowing investment income from the Afghan Fund in Switzerland (comprising part of Afghanistan’s frozen foreign exchange reserves) to be used for macroeconomic stabilization. This can be done without turning any funds directly over to the Taliban.
Other countries and international agencies can play a supportive role … without turning any funds directly over to the Taliban.
How did Afghanistan arrive at this point?
After the severe economic shock that accompanied the final withdrawal of U.S. troops and the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, international humanitarian aid ramped up and helped stem a months-long economic freefall. Humanitarian aid funding totaled $3.8 billion in 2022.
With normal international financial transactions blocked and some $9 billion of Afghan central bank reserves frozen after the American pullout, much of the aid had to be delivered in shipments of U.S. cash to a private Afghan bank. The bank, in turn, made the funds available to U.N. and other aid agencies to run their programs, pay salaries and distribute assistance. The cash shipments totaled $1.8 billion from December 2021 through 2022.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the deliveries replaced pre-2021 Afghan central bank (Da Afghanistan Bank, or DAB) imports of U.S. cash of a similar size. But serious technical and programmatic problems are associated with the cash shipments, including high costs from fees and overhead charged at each stage and risks that include potential security failures.
A Steep Decline in International Support
Previous advocacy for a gradual, pre-programmed reduction in humanitarian aid was belied by a sharp drop in assistance after 2022. Funding fell by half in 2023 to $1.9 billion and remains low this year, having reached only $1.2 billion by mid-November. By all indications, the U.N. cash shipments remained high last year, reflecting the pipeline of undisbursed assistance and the lag time between funding commitments for aid and actual delivery. But their level is falling now, probably by at least half in line with the decline in overall aid.
Various observers as well as this author have expressed concerns that the waning of cash injections, which have financed part of Afghanistan’s large official trade deficit, will destabilize the economy. The balance of payments issue is only part of the story, however; U.N. cash shipments also play an important monetary role.
Key features of the situation:
The Afghan economy functions largely on cash, with very low bank deposits as a share of GDP and little financial intermediation. Cash and hawala (informal money exchanges and transfers) are king.
The economy is also heavily dollarized, with U.S. currency circulating freely and used for sizable transactions. (The Taliban seem to have made progress in curtailing the use of Pakistan rupees and Iranian currency in the west and south respectively, but not so much with respect to the U.S. dollar nationwide.)
The Afghan banking system is largely dysfunctional, still suffering from the public’s loss of trust after the Kabul Bank disaster in 2010. Much of it is mired in bad loans, depositors are withdrawing funds within DAB-imposed limits. Furthermore, the system is hobbled by international banking restrictions that are due more to perceived reputational risks than to sanctions per se.
DAB faces great difficulty in implementing macroeconomic policy, having lost access to its substantial foreign exchange reserves, and perhaps continuing to encounter obstacles in printing domestic Afghani currency banknotes.
Finally, the large and growing official trade deficit is financed in part with humanitarian aid.
These economic characteristics leave U.S. cash comprising a core part of Afghanistan’s money supply and providing the liquidity needed to lubricate business and personal transactions. Indeed, the injections of U.N. cash shipments are akin to a central bank augmenting the money supply. Especially in the kind of recessionary situation Afghanistan finds itself, a too-constrained money supply is likely to exacerbate the economic downturn and may result in harmful deflation (i.e. price declines), which Afghanistan has been experiencing.
The U.N. cash shipments also have supported the exchange rate. In particular, DAB from time to time conducts foreign currency auctions — selling U.S. dollars that have accrued to it indirectly from the U.N. shipments — in exchange for Afghani currency. By injecting dollars and removing Afghanis from circulation, these auctions strengthen the exchange rate (the Afghani appreciated by some 25 percent against the U.S. dollar in the three years since the Taliban takeover, with some further appreciation since then).
Policy Options for Afghanistan’s Economy
The normal policy response to the balance of payments shock from declining humanitarian aid and U.N. cash shipments would be a gradual depreciation of the Afghani currency. That would help balance the demand and supply of foreign exchange while potentially stimulating exports and curbing imports by making both more expensive when valued in domestic currency.
A managed depreciation could be brought about by reducing the amounts and/or frequency of DAB’s foreign currency auctions. If that results in excess dollars, accumulating them as in-country dollar reserves in DAB would be beneficial for macroeconomic management in the future. However, this will be challenging to manage if DAB does not have U.S. dollars in vault to flexibly deploy in foreign currency auctions to ensure a steady, gradual depreciation.
It is crazy to let the vagaries of humanitarian aid and the ups and downs of the U.N. cash shipments serve as a de facto instrument of monetary policy. The shipments fluctuate from month-to-month depending on program needs, and strong seasonal elements such as preparing for winterization are also involved, so they may have little relationship with the liquidity needs of the economy.
It is crazy to let the vagaries of humanitarian aid and the ups and downs of the U.N. cash shipments serve as a de facto instrument of monetary policy.
The desirable direction over the medium term is to move away from both dollarization and the cash-based economy, which will obviate the need for sizable inflows of U.S. cash.
In the short run, DAB could encourage or pressure the U.N. and other agencies operating in Afghanistan to use only Afghani currency in transactions, not U.S. dollars. Most expenses such as cash aid and staff salaries are paid in small amounts, so using Afghanis would be appropriate.
Boosting Local Currency
Withdrawing cash dollars from deposit accounts and then turning them over to the informal hawala money exchanges to convert into Afghanis or for other purposes is unnecessary and harmful. So, when cash withdrawals are made from private bank deposits created by the U.N. cash shipments, they should be in the form of Afghanis converted at the market exchange rate. Making payments through electronic transfers or digital currency transactions should be encouraged wherever possible. Similarly, if U.N. or other agencies transfer funds electronically to Afghan banks, any cash withdrawals of those funds should be in Afghani currency, not in cash dollars.
These measures would require DAB to have sufficient Afghani currency in its vault. Printing banknotes faced difficulties earlier, and if there are still shortages of Afghani notes, more should be printed. Any obstacles emanating from the international side that hinder printing of more Afghani banknotes, such those related to sanctions, need to be urgently addressed.
Another attractive option is to begin to deploy the investment earnings of the Afghan Fund in Switzerland — cumulatively approaching $400 million and accruing about $150 million annually — to support exchange rate stability. This would be a normal, well-justified use of the foreign exchange reserves for the benefit of the Afghan people by helping with macroeconomic stabilization. The Afghan Fund’s board of directors should make a decision to move in this direction, and then commission technical work to determine specifically how this can be done.
The Afghan Fund needs to avoid providing any financial resources directly to the DAB, which some board members would likely find objectionable. Moreover, such an action might well provide ammunition for U.S. plaintiffs seeking access to the other $3.5 billion of Afghanistan’s foreign exchange reserves that remain frozen in the United States, protected so far from the litigants. Workarounds could be explored, such as commissioning a reputable third-party entity to conduct foreign currency auctions using some of the foreign exchange belonging to the Afghan Fund. The fund could also consider ways to facilitate international financial transactions and trade. Both of these options would be fully consistent with the goals of the fund.
How Afghanistan’s Economy Can Survive Shrinking Shipments of U.N. Cash Aid
ISLAMABAD — The World Health Organization has labeled a forced repatriation of Afghan nationals from Pakistan as a “major setback” for polio eradication efforts, contributing to the regional resurgence of the paralytic disease.
Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan are the only two polio-endemic nations, reporting 49 and 23 cases respectively, so far this year, up from only six cases each in 2023.
The latest case in Pakistan was confirmed Thursday in the southwestern province of Balochistan, which sits on the Afghan border and accounts for half the cases reported in 2024.
“Until you get rid of polio completely, it will resurge and come back, and this is what we are seeing now in Pakistan [where] nearly half of the districts are infected, and in Afghanistan, a third of the provinces are infected,” Hamid Jafari, the WHO director for the Eastern Mediterranean, said Wednesday while discussing causes of polio resurgence in both countries.
“I think the major setback was a forced repatriation of Afghan nationals that led to a massive and unpredictable movement of populations within Pakistan and across both borders and within Afghanistan, so the virus moved with these populations,” Jafari told the virtual discussion hosted by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, or GPEI.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has said that Pakistan’s crackdown on undocumented foreign nationals has resulted in more than 730,000 Afghan migrants returning to Afghanistan since August 2023.
Jafari also mentioned other factors contributing to the rise of polio in Pakistan, including authorities’ inability to consistently carry out vaccination campaigns in areas affected by militancy, where children cannot be effectively immunized against the crippling disease. He also highlighted the presence of “significant vaccine hesitancy and community boycotts” rooted in public frustration over the lack of essential services in impoverished districts.
Pakistani and WHO officials say vaccine boycotts in some regions also result from the false propaganda that anti-polio campaigns are a Western plot to sterilize Muslim children. Additionally, anti-government militants in violence-hit regions occasionally stage deadly attacks on polio teams, suspecting them of spying for authorities, routinely disrupting vaccination drives in districts near the Afghan border.
Afghan polio ban
While sharing the latest polio situation in Afghanistan, the senior WHO official stated they are collaborating with various humanitarian actors and partners to promote vaccination against polio and all other diseases.
“We cannot implement house-to-house vaccination,” Jafari stated, referencing the ban imposed by Taliban authorities on polio teams over security concerns.
“The program is working closely with [Taliban] authorities to re-update micro plans and work closely with the communities and local officials to make sure children are mobilized to vaccination sites,” he added.
In September, the Taliban abruptly halted house-to-house vaccine deliveries in parts of southern Afghanistan, including Kandahar, without publicly stating any reason.
An independent monitoring board of the GPEI recently said that the Taliban’s action had stemmed from their “administration’s concerns about covert surveillance activities.” The report quoted de facto Afghan authorities as explaining that their leadership is living in Kandahar and has concerns about their security.
Jafari stated that Pakistan and Afghanistan are taking measures to address the challenges in their bid “to rebuild community confidence” and work closely with security agencies in both countries to be able to access all children.
He cautioned that the current resurgence of polio in Pakistan and Afghanistan does not guarantee a low point next year.
“We are confident that we will come very close to elimination, but the key is to make sure that in these final safe havens for poliovirus in insecure areas, among migrant and mobile populations, and vaccine-hesitant communities, we can finally overcome these residual challenges to make sure that finally polio is eradicated,” the regional WHO director said.
Polio once paralyzed an estimated 20,000 children in Pakistan each year until the country initiated national vaccination campaigns in the 1990s to control the infections, according to the WHO. In 2019, there were 176 reported cases in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2021 and 2022, however, the countries reported only one and two infections, respectively.
WHO links forced Afghan repatriation from Pakistan to polio resurgence
Earlier this year, I spent 10 weeks travelling with the photographer Kiana Hayeri across seven provinces of Afghanistan, speaking to more than 100 Afghan women and girls about how their lives had changed since the Taliban swept back to power three years ago.
Hayeri and I both lived in Afghanistan for years, and remained here after the Taliban took control in August 2021. In the past few years, we have seen women’s rights and freedoms, already severely curtailed, swept away as Taliban edicts have fallen like hammer blows.
In just over three years, Afghan women have been banned from nearly every aspect of public life: schools, universities, most workplaces – even parks and bathhouses. From Kandahar, the birthplace and political headquarters of the Taliban, the group’s leaders have dictated that women must cover their faces in public, always be accompanied by a man and never let their voices be heard in public.
As foreign women, we still carried the rare privilege of freedom of movement (although I doubt we could now travel as we did at the beginning of this year), which has nearly disappeared for the 14 million Afghan women and girls across the country. Meeting women while ensuring their security was a daily challenge.
Mitra plays with children in Yamit district, near the Wakhan mountains. Her daughter and her cousin, who were both grade 11 pupils aged about 17, took their own lives in these pools last year
Each province we travelled to revealed different shades of oppression. In some areas – in the south and east in particular – women were already living under very restricted conditions before the Taliban’s official return, with many saying that now, at least, there was no more violence. In other places, the sudden loss of freedom has been devastating.
For many, the Taliban’s refusal to allow girls to attend secondary education has been the hardest blow.
We met Gulsom, 17, who survived a suicide attack on her school just a few months before the Taliban came back into power. Severely wounded and left unable to walk, she must now use a wheelchair and had to continue her studies at an underground school.
But Gulsom insisted: “My will to study and work hard has increased.”
In Gardi Ghos district, primary-school classes – which are still legal for girls up to the age of 11 – are set up by two main roads with no shade
Girls attend art classes at a shop inside a west Kabul shopping centre
Yet her younger sister, who is 14, seems to have lost hope. She has left the house only a few times in more than two years.
Gulsom said: “[In 2021] she went to school on the day they were supposed to open, but she returned crying. [The Taliban] fired [shots] to disperse the girls, as they were asking when will the schools would open. She said the Taliban beat two girls and warned them not to leave their homes.”
Since then, she has sunk into a deep depression. Gulsom said: “She always asks me, ‘What is the use of studying this much? At the end you will die. I don’t work hard, I will die; and you work hard, you will die too. I want to die in peace.’”
We spoke to many girls who no longer see the value of trying to continue their education at home when they cannot graduate from school, cannot work and cannot imagine a future for themselves.
For some of the young women we met, being barred from school now means they have to try to find a job or get married, like the young women in one province who spend their days sewing school uniforms for the young girls still allowed into the primary classroom.
Asaa, 21, and Nazbibi, 20, work at a women-led spaghetti factory in Kabul, set up in 2021 to create jobs for women unable to work or study
Sewing uniforms for younger girls in a Kabul garment workshop; right, Maryam, 14, was determined to continue her education but has had to become engaged to her landlord’s son in Jalalabad
We also saw how the economic crisis gripping the country since the Taliban took power has proved catastrophic for many girls and women.
At only 14, Maryam has been forced to become engaged to her landlord’s son in exchange for a well and solar panels, after her family could not find work.
Her family was part of the wave of returnees expelled from Pakistan in late 2023. As undocumented refugees, they were harassed into leaving by the Pakistani police. They are now struggling to rebuild their lives, with few job prospects and virtually no social security assistance.
Afghans who had fled the country but were forced to leave Pakistan last year have to live in tents in the city of Jalalabad
“I went to a madrasa in Pakistan, but here I cannot go,” she told us. “I’m good at reading and writing. When I heard that we were coming back to Afghanistan, we were very happy and excited, but I’d rather live in Pakistan – there I could at least pursue my education.”
In Zabul and Kabul, we visited hospitals and saw how malnutrition was one of the most corrosive effects of the poverty faced by many Afghan women and their families.
Fatima is only two and a half years old, and weighs 5kg (11lb). When we met her in a malnutrition ward in the suburbs of Kabul, she had been admitted to hospital for the third time because her family did not have enough money to buy food.
A European Union-funded clinic in Bakorzai offering women’s health services, such as antenatal and postnatal care, and family plannig
A female aid worker, chaperoned by her husband, arrives at work in a snowstorm in Patkheyl, Zabul; Fatima (left) was admitted to hospital in Kabul aged two and a half weighing just 5kg (11lb)
Gender inequality is fuelling this crisis: nurses told us that they were treating more female children because when food is scarce, families prioritised feeding the boys.
It was important for us to look beyond the traditional representations of Afghan women as passive victims of the Taliban and show them as active players in their own lives.
We wanted to show their strength in the face of this absurd and brutal regime, including through acts of resistance: attending underground education networks or creating informal gatherings – whether it is a snowball fight, a birthday party, art classes or henna painting.
These acts, though small, are profound forms of resistance against the Taliban’s efforts to strip away and deny their humanity – perhaps the deepest form of violence that is being inflicted against millions of women and girls across the country.
Men picnic at Qargha lake in Kabul. Women are banned from visiting all park
Teenage girls at their friend’s birthday at her house in Kabul; girls dance at another Kabul birthday party. Music and dancing have been forbidden by the Taliban but, despite the ban, women continue to celebrate behind closed doors
Many are battling against a rising tide of despair. Zahra, a young women’s rights activist, organised online protests after the Taliban began brutally repressing demonstrations: “Since we cannot protest in the streets any more, we do it from home: with the masks, with the hijab, in front of the camera.
“Five to 10 women do these videos, and we then send them to the media, in order to still raise our voices,” she told us.
Yet in the months since we interviewed her in Kabul, she has lost hope that her activism could change anything and has left the country to live in exile. “Now I see there is no way to stay here; I would waste my time, waste my life,” she says. “There is no improvement possible. I cannot be a human being here. There is nothing.”
After 10 weeks of listening to women’s stories, we came away from Afghanistan certain that what is happening there is more than repression: it is an attempt to erase women completely.
On 18 June, Richard Bennett, the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Afghanistan, backed calls to codify gender apartheid in Afghanistan as a crime under international law, defining what was happening as “a profound rejection of the full humanity of women and girls” based on their gender alone.
Even in those provinces where more sympathetic Taliban commanders looked the other way, allowing underground schools to continue and for women to work and move around the streets more easily, their freedom is still dependant on the decisions and whims of men in power.
Zahra, 26, worked at the ministry of transport and aviation until the fall of Kabul in August 2021. She became an activist but has now left the country. ‘When they leave, we’ll come back,’ she said
In Afghanistan, where women’s every freedom has been repressed, where they cannot show their faces any longer or make their voices heard in public, it is more important than ever to carry their voices, ensuring they do not disappear into silence.
Today, their hearts are tightened not only by the weight of repression but by the indifference of a world that seems to have forgotten them. Their stories deserve to be heard.
Mannequins in wedding dresses. Shops are forbidden from showing any representation of women’s faces, even tailors’ dummies, so some shopkeepers cover their heads with plastic bags
All names have been changed to protect identities
This report was produced with the support of the Carmignac Photojournalism Award
How the Taliban are erasing Afghanistan’s women – photo essay
Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai further mentioned that the Islamic Emirate favors positive relations with all countries, including the United States.
Zalmay Khalilzad, the former US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, stated at a gathering at the University of Florida that the Doha Agreement is the only official agreement between the US and the interim government of Afghanistan.
Speaking at the Institute of Global and National Security at the University of Florida, the former US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation stressed that the interim government still claims to be committed to the Doha Agreement, which could serve as a basis for Washington’s engagement with Kabul.
Zalmay Khalilzad stated: “The agreement is the only thing that we have with the Talibs that is relatively authoritative. The Talibs still say they are adhering to the Doha agreement. So, from that point of view too, this might be a way. I don’t want to – as I said – raise expectations, but that may be among alternatives that exist. This framework would be one.”
Meanwhile, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Emirate also expressed during an event in Kabul that the caretaker government hopes the new US administration will reconsider its current policy towards Afghanistan. Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai further mentioned that the Islamic Emirate favors positive relations with all countries, including the United States.
Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai added in this program: “Our hope from the future US administration is that it will review its policy towards Afghanistan and the Islamic Emirate and take positive steps.”
Abdul Shukoor Dadras, a political analyst, shared his views on the implementation of the Doha Agreement, stating: “The Islamic Emirate also has criticisms, claiming that at times the United States and NATO interfere in Afghanistan in ways that violate the Doha Agreement.”
This comes as the Islamic Emirate and the US have repeatedly accused each other of violating the Doha Agreement. Previously, the White House stated that if the caretaker government seeks to lift sanctions and gain international legitimacy, it must adhere to its commitments under the Doha Agreement.
Khalilzad: Doha Agreement Can Serve as a Framework for Cooperation
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has reported that Afghanistan’s annual carpet production has surged to an unprecedented level, reaching an estimated value of around $330 million per year.
On Monday, November 11, USAID posted on its X page, emphasizing its continued support for Afghanistan’s carpet industry.
According to USAID statistics, annual carpet production in Afghanistan has grown from 1.1 million square meters to 3.3 million square meters.
The agency highlighted that this industry now supports around 1.2 million jobs, with women playing a crucial role, making up about 90 percent of the carpet production workforce.
USAID described Afghanistan carpets as “a powerful product with high economic value and extraordinary international appeal.”
Previously, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce reported that carpet exports to global markets had increased over the past year, reaching a total of $8.7 million.
According to the ministry, most Afghanistan carpets are exported to Pakistan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Italy, the United States, the United Kingdom, and several other countries.
This growth in the carpet industry brings vital economic support to Afghanistan’s workforce, particularly women, who are heavily involved in this sector.
Despite these achievements, the restrictions on education and employment imposed on Afghan women and girls exacerbate poverty and the humanitarian crisis in the country.
Additionally, these restrictions have led to a rise in forced and underage marriages, further worsening the plight of women and girls as they face limited opportunities for education and employment.
The resilience of Afghan women in sectors like carpet weaving contrasts sharply with the challenges they face, highlighting the urgent need for supportive policies to address gender inequity and safeguard their rights.
Afghanistan’s annual Carpet Production exceeds three million square meters
Askar Jalalian, Iran’s Deputy Minister of Justice for International Affairs and Human Rights, announced that within the next two months, 1,000 Afghan prisoners will be transferred to Afghanistan.
He also expressed intentions to visit Kabul to discuss the transfer of these prisoners and the repatriation of Iranian detainees in Afghanistan with the Taliban.
According to a report by ISNA on Wednesday, November 13, Jalalian stated that the agreement for transferring convicts between Iran and Afghanistan was established in 2006, and the Taliban are committed to this official accord.
He added, “I am now heading to Kabul to negotiate the transfer of Afghan prisoners in Tehran and the repatriation of Iranian prisoners in Afghanistan.”
Jalalian detailed that the Afghan prisoners, upon being handed over to the Taliban, will serve the remainder of their sentences in Afghanistan.
He noted that most of these Afghan inmates are convicted of drug-related offenses.
The Iranian judicial official claimed that the transfer of Afghan prisoners to their homeland is conducted with their consent.
Jalalian emphasized that if a prisoner does not consent, they will not be returned to Afghanistan. Additionally, these prisoners should not have private complainants or debts, and their sentences should not include execution or retribution.
Jalalian stated, “According to the latest statistics, the number of Iranian detainees in Afghanistan is less than ten, and we are striving to repatriate them through a logical process based on the agreement.”
Previously, when Afghan prisoners were handed over from Iranian prisons to the Taliban, concerns were raised that some of them might be opponents of the group and could face human rights violations.
The situation of Afghan refugees and detainees highlights significant human rights concerns. Many Afghan refugees, fleeing conflict and instability, often find themselves in precarious conditions without adequate legal protection.
The lack of access to legal representation and judicial institutions for prisoners exacerbates their vulnerability, leading to potential violations of their fundamental rights.
Ensuring that detainees have access to attorneys and fair legal processes is crucial in upholding human rights standards.
Addressing these issues requires collaborative efforts between nations to uphold international human rights obligations, ensuring that refugees and prisoners are treated with dignity and have access to justice.
Iran to transfer 1,000 Afghan prisoners to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan
Afghanistan Peace Campaign
