Before the Deluge: How to mitigate the risk of flooding in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan’s rugged landscape, floods arise from a multiplicity of causes: torrential rainfall, rain on snow, the rapid melting of snow due to warmer weather, glacial lake outbursts, the overflow of natural ponds or even the breach of dams. Regardless of their origins, floods can destroy whole villages, ruin farmland and change the very landscape. Almost a quarter of all casualties caused by natural disasters in Afghanistan are due to floods, with the problem only likely to worsen, given that the climate crisis is predicted to bring heavier spring rains and more severe monsoons. This spring, above-average precipitation brought an end to the multi-year drought that had plagued Afghanistan, says AAN guest author Mohammad Assem Mayar,* but the considerable rainfall has also led to devastating flooding. In this report, he delves into what can be done to mitigate the risk of flooding in Afghanistan, both now and in the longer term.
You can preview the report online and download it by clicking the download button below.

As we were preparing this report for publication, heavy rain falling on land, parched dry and hard by drought, had caused flash floods, affecting most of the country. Northeastern Afghanistan (Badakhshan, Baghlan and Takhar) has been especially hard hit by intense floods which hit the region on 10 and 11 May. So far, they are known to have claimed the lives of at “least 300 people, including 51 children, with many more injured,” according to this UN report. Search and rescue operations were ongoing in Burka and Baghlan-e Jadid districts in Baghlan Province, where 80 per cent of the deaths recorded so far had occurred, according to UNOCHA Flash Update #1. It also said that roads in the three provinces had been “rendered inaccessible,” hampering humanitarian operations. The floods have also devastated infrastructure and farmland. According to the preliminary figures in the Update, in Baghlan province alone, “at least six public schools and 10,200 acres [4,128 hectares] of orchards have been destroyed, 2,260 livestock killed, and 50 bridges and 30 electricity dams damaged.”

They were not the first floods of the year. AAN had earlier heard how the joy and relief of farmers in Zurmat district of Paktia that the multi-year drought had finally ended with good rain and snowfall in late winter had been transformed; rain “not seen for 30 years” in mid-April brought flooding that wreaked havoc with roads, bridges, homes and farmland (report here).

This year’s floods, and the ones forecast for later in the season, have made the publication of this report even more timely. They have highlighted the urgent need for immediate action to help Afghanistan mitigate the ill effects of floods, to reduce the risk of them happening in the future and to lessen the damage they cause to human life, livelihoods and the nation’s infrastructure. Afghanistan’s geography, its mountainous terrain and vast plains, renders it exceptionally vulnerable to flooding. Unlike in the past, when a smaller population and scattered settlements reduced the number of casualties caused by flooding, the country’s rapidly growing population has put more people at risk of floods. Pressure on land has meant people building homes where there is a greater risk of flooding.

The report uses maps to help describe the various types of floods affecting the different regions of Afghanistan and to visualise their social and economic costs. It looks at the development of one key tool needed for effective action to prevent floods and reduce the damage they cause – Afghanistan’s first nationwide flood hazard map. This important report then details the three essential elements of any flood mitigation plan needs: preparation; response and recovery; and mitigation. It delves into what was done during the Islamic Republic to fulfil these requirements and what the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) is doing now to help affected communities and ensure the risk of flooding is reduced in the future.

It is a terrible irony that Afghanistan, one of the lowest contributors of greenhouse gases (179th out of 209 countries), is one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change (see a graphic illustrating this here). This disparity is further exacerbated by the non-recognition of the IEA, which means Afghanistan cannot access climate change funds designed to help the least developed countries adapt. The climate emergency will only exacerbate floods and their dire consequences for Afghans, underscoring the critical and urgent need for action.

* Dr Mohammad Assem Mayar is a water resources management expert and former lecturer at Kabul Polytechnic University in Afghanistan. He is currently a post-doctoral researcher at the Leibniz Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research (ZALF) in Müncheberg, Germany. He posts on X as @assemmayar1.

Edited by Kate Clark and Roxanna Shapour 

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking the download button below.

 

Before the Deluge: How to mitigate the risk of flooding in Afghanistan
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The world’s poorest didn’t cause the climate crisis, but they bear the brunt of it

Letters

The Guardian

Wed 15 May 2024 12.17 EDT

As the global thermometer relentlessly inches upwards, revelations by top climate scientists of 2.5C warming this century (World’s top climate scientists expect global heating to blast past 1.5C target, 8 May) paint a grim future of famines, conflicts and mass migrations fuelled by escalating heatwaves, wildfires, floods and storms. However, this so-called semi-dystopian future is already a harsh reality for millions on the frontline of climate change who bear the brunt of a crisis they had little hand in creating.

From farmers in sub-Saharan Africa battling year-on-year crop failures to communities in Pakistan and Afghanistan confronted by unprecedented flooding every rainy season, the impacts are immediate and devastating, bringing untold human suffering. This is not a problem for 2100, but a problem now, immediately, before our eyes. My organisation has witnessed these effects first-hand, and these few examples should serve as a stark reminder to the international community that the time for meaningful change is now.

Yet the response, as highlighted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, has been woefully slow. Addressing the climate crisis in these frontline communities requires a multi-faceted approach that goes beyond short-term fixes. It requires a huge increase in funding and all forms of investment in support of locally led adaptation solutions that allow households, communities and societies to adapt their livelihoods and lifestyles to new patterns of weather and extreme weather events. It also requires partnerships with governments and companies to speed up technology transfer for a fair shift to clean energy, promoting clean and inclusive economic growth where it is most needed.

The climate emergency is not a far-off reality for even rich nations. It’s happening now. We are the proverbial frog in the boiling pot of water. It is the marginalised who will be left behind in the face of this escalating climate crisis. As the climate scientist Dipak Dasgupta rightly points out, the plight of poor people cannot be overlooked if we are to avert catastrophe for all. We cannot afford to avert our eyes while the world burns. The time for meaningful change is now, and it is incumbent upon all of us to heed the call before it’s too late.

David Nicholson
Chief climate officer, Mercy Corps

The challenge to poor countries is not that they cannot raise funds from their own people (Poorer nations must be transparent over climate spending, says Cop29 leader, 6 May), it is that the financial approach to climate change only benefits countries that can lend, namely rich countries. Poor countries (that are in reality becoming poorer) cannot absorb any more debts. Twenty sub-Saharan countries are already paying more in debt repayments than they can devote to either health or education. More lending will worsen the situation. What is needed is more investment in human capital, educating the poorest not through formal schools, but through better popular education. Above all, the rich world must change the physical and social environment of smallholders to enable them to produce enough food. Better agriculture leads to better management of the physical environment.

Benny Dembitzer
London

The world’s poorest didn’t cause the climate crisis, but they bear the brunt of it
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Senior Study Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Final Report

When announcing the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in April 2021, President Joe Biden identified counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan as an enduring and critical US national security interest. This priority became even more pronounced after the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, the discovery of al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul less than a year later, and the increasing threat of the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISIS-K) from Afghanistan. However, owing to the escalating pressures of strategic competition with China and Russia, counterterrorism has significantly dropped in importance in the policy agenda. Following 9/11, the national security policy pendulum swung to an overwhelming focus on counterterrorism, but since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it appears to have swung in the opposite direction.
In 2022, the United States Institute of Peace convened the Senior Study Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan to examine the counterterrorism challenge from the region in light of the US withdrawal and growing strategic competition. The study group is a bipartisan group of experts, bringing a range of policy, scholarly, operational, and analytical experience related to terrorism, counterterrorism, and South Asia policy issues.In meetings from 2022 to 2023, the study group assessed the terrorism threat from Afghanistan and Pakistan and its bearing on US interests, as well as reflected on lessons from efforts to mitigate terrorism risks over the past 20 years. Members then examined what the components of a well-defined and sustainable counterterrorism strategy for the region could be to effectively mitigate existing threats, especially those directed against the US homeland and its allies and partners.

The study group came to the following two major conclusions on the stakes and direction of the terrorist threat and identified options for a new strategy in light of the group’s findings.

1. Rather than considering counterterrorism as an unwelcome distraction from strategic competition, policymakers could recalibrate their focus on counterterrorism to mitigate threats and shield the strategic competition agenda.

Some policymakers perceive counterterrorism efforts, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as a distraction from the intensifying strategic competition with China and Russia. However, terrorist groups in Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent in Pakistan, still harbor intentions and possess growing capabilities to target the United States and its interests. If terrorists succeeded in making those intentions a reality, it would not only result in the tragic loss of lives but also have significant adverse effects on America’s strategic competition agenda.

For one, a mass-casualty attack would exert significant pressure on policymakers to respond assertively, which would divert resources, leadership attention, and political capital from the current focus on strategic competition. The American public still expects the US government to take necessary measures to prevent terrorist attacks against Americans both at home and abroad.

Terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, particularly attacks originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan, would also undermine America’s alliances. Amid the 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, Washington assured allies and partners that the United States would retain the capability to mitigate terrorist threats from Afghanistan following the military pullout. Failure to prevent attacks against the US homeland, regional interests, and allies and major partners would tarnish America’s credibility and reputation.

Additionally, terrorist attacks from Afghanistan and Pakistan against a critical partner such as India could spark dangerous regional crises. A major attack in an Indian city by a terrorist group, for example, could trigger an India-Pakistan military standoff with the risk of escalating to a nuclear exchange. Such a crisis would also significantly distract India from focusing on the challenge presented by China.

Given these stakes, the United States could consider recalibrating the focus on counterterrorism to safeguard the strategic competition agenda. Preventive investment in counterterrorism will enable a sustained focus on strategic competition.

2. Terrorist threats to US interests from Afghanistan and Pakistan are steadily rising—and Afghanistan presents growing opportunities for terrorist groups compared to the period before the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan are persistent, and some are gaining strength in ways that threaten US and allied interests as well as regional security. The post-US withdrawal environment in Afghanistan offers terrorist groups a range of new opportunities for regrouping, plotting, and collaborating with one another. These groups are positioned to tap into the vast pool of trained militant personnel in Afghanistan and to some extent in Pakistan. The groups also benefit from the reduced US monitoring and targeting capabilities in the two countries.

ISIS-K presents a rising threat with reach beyond the immediate region, greater than during the pre-withdrawal period. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorist group has also returned as a regional security threat. While the worst-case scenario concerning al-Qaeda’s reconstitution in Afghanistan has not materialized, that group and its South Asia affiliate continue to maintain ties with and receive support from the Taliban and to call for attacks against US citizens, allies, and partners (including India) and US interests.

The Taliban continue to support terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Despite commitments to the United States and regional countries to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist haven, the Taliban’s decision to host al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul and their continued provision of sanctuary and material support to terrorist groups such as the TTP suggest that the Taliban are unlikely to distance themselves in meaningful ways from their allied terrorists. The Taliban target ISIS-K and have substantially reduced the group’s violence in the country, yet in the past two years, ISIS-K has plotted attacks against regional actors and US interests, which is particularly concerning. It is not clear if the Taliban’s crackdown can alter ISIS-K’s external attack ambitions and sufficiently weaken its capabilities. The Taliban’s educational policies, such as the expansion of madrassas in the country and a revised curriculum promoting extremist ideologies, also present a counterterrorism challenge.

Terrorist groups are also attempting to destabilize Pakistan. The TTP—a group that has killed Americans and plotted attacks against the US homeland—is imposing significant losses in Pakistan from its sanctuary in Afghanistan; and, going forward, it may become a bigger threat for Pakistan and the region. At the same time, Pakistan historically has maintained relationships with anti-India terrorist groups, although it has restrained them in recent years. As India-Pakistan tensions remain high, violence by such groups against India could trigger Indian military action against Pakistan and, in turn, risk a regional war between two nuclear-armed states.

Revitalizing the US Counterterrorism Strategy: Main Policy Options

The United States can implement a new counterterrorism strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to address the rising terrorism threats from the region. This would not require the expansive counterterrorism posture of the past or a dilution of policymaker focus on strategic competition. The study group believes that it is possible to embed a counterterrorism approach with limited aims in the current strategic competition framework.

The group proposes the aims of deterring and, when necessary, disrupting terrorist threats in Afghanistan and Pakistan that target the United States and its interests overseas as well as its allies and major partners. The study group also proposes that Washington improve its preparedness to respond judiciously to a major terrorist attack; such preparation would help minimize the diversion of resources, leadership attention, and political capital from the focus on strategic competition. These priorities would create a sustainable end state for managing the terrorist threats from the region, in contrast to broad objectives of the past, such as the defeat and large-scale degradation of terrorist groups.

The study group’s main options for policymakers to consider include the following:

Continue to publicly pressure the Taliban to mitigate terrorist threats while maintaining communication channels for counterterrorism exchanges rather than adopting a cooperative approach with open-ended incentives or a pressure campaign that isolates the Taliban entirely.

Key steps to consider:

  • Developing a public reporting mechanism to document and disseminate the Taliban’s compliance with the counterterrorism terms outlined in the 2020 Doha agreement between the United States and the Taliban.
  • Holding a meeting of regional countries to codify the Taliban’s counterterrorism commitments to each country.
  • Adding to the federal terrorism watch list, before sanctioning (under US Executive Order 13324), Taliban leaders and personnel assisting terrorists in the country.
  • Building up dedicated diplomatic and intelligence counterterrorism channels with the Taliban to convey concerns and explore the possibility of exchanges on shared threats.

Improve military and intelligence postures to deter and disrupt terrorism threats against the United States and its interests, including those that the Taliban are unwilling or unable to contain in Afghanistan.

Key steps to consider: 

  • Making policies on military action against terrorist threats in Afghanistan—policies tightened by the Biden administration through a 2022 presidential policy memorandum that governs direct action counterterrorism operations outside areas of active hostilities—less restrictive, but not to the level of a conventional war zone or the level that was available to military commanders before the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
  • Increasing military and intelligence resources dedicated to counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but still keeping them well below the pre-withdrawal level.
    • Increasing the overseas operations and security cooperation resources of US Central Command (CENTCOM) by providing additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, as well as long-endurance alternate airborne ISR capabilities; and increasing counterterrorism-specific analytical capabilities consisting of analysts, linguists, and screeners and offensive cyber capabilities for over-the-horizon operations.
    • Maintaining intelligence collection on Afghanistan and Pakistan at an appropriate priority level as part of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s reporting about critical intentions and warnings on threats and operations.
    • Expanding the US Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program for Afghanistan and Pakistan by increasing the reward money for those currently listed as well as adding ISIS-K and al-Qaeda operatives currently not covered to generate leads.

Through appropriate legal authorities, leverage an enhanced military and intelligence posture to target terrorist groups while accounting for the risk of retaliatory actions and minimizing civilian harm.

Key steps to consider:

  • Targeting with lethal action in Afghanistan those groups that are planning or involved in plots against the US homeland and interests.
  • Employing shows of force through drones against Taliban leaders and personnel assisting terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.
  • Carrying out cyber intrusions to disrupt al-Qaeda’s and ISIS-K’s propaganda and communications.
  • After targeting a Taliban-allied terrorist leader, considering declassifying intelligence—insofar as it is practical—on the presence and identity of targeted terrorists to make the case that US actions were justified; this, in turn, could exert pressure on the Taliban to distance from terrorist groups and reduce the risk of retaliation.
  • To minimize the risk of civilian harm, controlling the targeting tempo of military operations, keeping it in line with available intelligence resources; to detect civilians in the targeting process and check confirmation bias, the US Department of Defense could create well-resourced “Civilian Harm Red Teams,” or groups of analysts that question assumptions and interpretations of information with an eye toward protecting against civilian harm.
  • Making what qualifies as legal authorities for counterterrorism operations more transparent by clarifying the executive branch’s interpretation of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks and Article II of the Constitution as they apply to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Improve the counterterrorism relationship with Pakistan while taking diplomatic steps to prevent a terrorism-triggered crisis in South Asia.

Key steps to consider:

  • Offering counterterrorism-specific security assistance and intelligence to Pakistan to (1) reduce the TTP’s threat as well as to obtain Pakistani assistance on top US counterterrorism concerns, (2) secure long-term airspace access for operations in Afghanistan, and (3) leverage reliable access in Pakistan in the event of a terrorist attack contingency. Such assistance should be calibrated to reduce the likelihood that Pakistan would find the assistance useful in attacking India.
  • Communicating to Pakistani leaders that if terrorists based in or backed by Pakistan carry out attacks in India, there will be serious negative repercussions for bilateral ties.
  • Offering assistance to promote peaceful coexistence among at-risk youth; to improve social cohesion by expanding the acceptance of religious, social, and political diversity; and to deradicalize underage children.

Prepare contingency plans for handling terrorist attacks in the homeland and overseas against major allies and partners such as India.

Key steps to consider:

  • Improving intelligence collection and analysis capabilities through the National Intelligence Priorities Framework for reliably attributing responsibility for terrorist attacks from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  • Providing stepped-up travel warnings to Americans exposed to threats while traveling and living in the region.
  • Improving US leverage in Central Asia and Pakistan through assistance programs with the aim of securing emergency basing and access options for military operations.
  • Enhancing the Indian government’s confidence in the US government’s process for attributing responsibility for terrorist attacks through intelligence, investigatory exchanges, and crisis war games; and preparing US policymakers for terrorism-triggered crisis management in South Asia through regular tabletop exercises.

By implementing these measures, policymakers could better safeguard US interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan, while preserving the overall focus on strategic competition.


The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Report

Senior Study Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan report cover
Senior Study Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Final Report
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After the Deluge: Personal accounts of rain and floods in Zurmat district

Sayed Asadullah Sadat

Afghanistan Analysts Network

 

The rain and snow that has fallen in recent weeks has eased the hearts of Afghan farmers and given them hope that the multi-year drought has finally ended. At the same time, heavy rain falling on dry, parched land has caused flooding in many areas of Afghanistan. Hundreds of people have been killed in recent weeks, homes and businesses have been destroyed and farmland inundated with floodwater and mud. In March, we spoke to farmers in different districts about their hopes for better weather this year. For this report, Sayed Asadullah Sadat has returned to one district, Zurmat in Paktia province, to hear how the longed-for rain has brought devastating flooding.

Our next publication will be a major report by guest author Mohammad Assem Mayar: ‘Before the Deluge: How to mitigate the risk of flooding in Afghanistan’. Floods cause almost a quarter of all casualties stemming from natural disasters in the country, and worse is set to come, with climate change predicted to bring heavier spring rains and more severe monsoons. Mayar will look at the causes of floods, how they vary across Afghanistan and what can be done to protect people, buildings and farmland both now and in the longer term. Here though, we hear some personal stories.

When we interviewed farmers across the country just before Nawruz, we encountered great relief that the three-year drought had finally ended and hopes for the year ahead. Winter had begun with two desperately dry months. Then, it had rained. Our interviewee from Zurmat said that, finally, the karez[1] in his village was flowing with water again. “Agriculture,” he said, “is renewed. People are busy sowing crops, wheat, some are even planting trees. Everyone’s busy and happy. A few days ago, I was able to sow barley. The earth is soft and moist and the barley should grow very welI.” How different is the situation just a few weeks later when we returned to the district.

When the skies open

“I haven’t seen such rain in the past 20 years,” said Jamaluddin, a farmer in Kulalgo village in Zurmat. “Since just after Eid, it’s rained continuously.” Another slightly older farmer, Sultan Shah from Sar-e Char village, said he last saw “rain like this” 30 years ago. It rained continuously after Eid (which fell on 12 April), but then it stopped raining. If a cloud passed over the mountains, people became anxious, fearing the consequences could be disastrous if more rain fell. More rain did fall and flooding finally hit Zurmat overnight on 14/15 April.

People who live in Zurmat know that water levels rise quickly and can lead to erratic flash floods that sweep through the landscape, destroying homes, devastating agricultural fields, killing livestock and often taking lives. So when it starts raining heavily, as it did in April, they spring into action to avert the worst of the damage. They grab their shovels, pick axes and whatever tools they have and start digging trenches around their properties to try to ensure their families and homes stay safe and dry. They place sandbags around their houses and rocks to act as barriers and stem the force of the water. Then they wait, hoping the capricious waters spare their villages – not only their houses but also the fields that sustain them. They stay up all night and keep vigil so that they are not caught by surprise if the floods do come.

The district, located 35 kilometres southwest of Gardez city and bordering Paktika, Logar and Ghazni provinces, is largely flat and most residents are engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry. The waters of several rivers pass through Zurmat – from Kotal-e Tirah and the mountains around Gardez city on to Band-e Sardeh, a lake in the eastern part of Andar district in Ghazni province. But after three years of drought, dry riverbeds have been compromised through neglect or human activity, meaning there were insufficient clear channels for the water to flow through easily when the seasonal rivers came back to life.

Farmers in Zurmat are now dealing with the after-effects of flooding. The recent floods have destroyed dozens of homes in multiple villages, along with shops, roads and bridges. Most of the agricultural land, gardens and karezes were damaged. Hundreds of jeribs of land where wheat had been sown were left inundated: standing water weakens the wheat, ruining yields. Even worse, the floods deposited a thick layer of mud and stones onto some fields. Villagers who had planted rain-fed wheat in March lost this year’s crop and will have to cut their losses and look to other crops, tomato, onion and potato, which they can plant later in the season after the floods have receded and their fields are no longer waterlogged.

For farmers, who rely on the land for their livelihoods, recovering from floods is costly, time-consuming and labour-intensive. After the water recedes, they will have to manually clear the debris from their fields and hire tractors, which cost 3,000 afghanis (USD 42) per hour, to help clear the worst of the debris. They will have to dip into their savings, if they have any, borrow money from neighbours or ask family members living abroad to send funds to help get the fields ready for planting. In Afghanistan’s tight-knit rural communities, neighbour helps neighbour, and a farmer can always count on help to clear his land, but those who lack the financial wherewithal to rent heavy equipment are unlikely to clear their fields in time to have any sort of harvest this year. They will have to wait until next year.

One farmer, Sultan Shah from Sar-e Char village, described the destruction of his crops, especially wheat, when the river flooded the fields – although he was facing more immediate problems when the author spoke to him just after the flooding:

In the last two or three days, it’s become difficult to leave the house at all. The water has surrounded us and everyone is stuck at home, afraid to leave. We’re so scared. We stay awake and guard the house at night because we think if the water gets into our home, it’ll be damaged. We walk around the house with shovels and pickaxes so that if water threatens the house, we can make a barrier against it. All the small roads which connect our village to neighbouring villages were destroyed. Someone from our tribe living in another village died, but we couldn’t get to his funeral because the roads were all destroyed and it was raining heavily. Water was everywhere.

The recent flood destroyed the main road that goes from Zurmat to the provincial capital Gardez and in the Zaw area, it had damaged a large bridge. People waited for hours for the floodwaters to subside so that they could get to Gardez – or get home from Gardez. People trying to get sick relatives urgently to the hospital there were especially distressed by the sheer impossibility of travel.

A mixed blessing

Despite the flooding, most people were left in two minds about the rain. It is true that it caused flash floods that destroyed their crops and damaged homes and infrastructure, but it has also ended the devastating three-year drought. Jamaluddin, with around 30 jeribs (6 hectares) of land, mostly rain-fed and left uncultivated for several years, conveyed this attitude.

When it snowed and rained in the final part of winter, I sowed [wheat] on eight jeribs [1.6 hectares] of my rain-fed land. I said to myself: Inshallah, rain will water my land this year. But the flood came and my land was damaged. The floodwaters brought mud and stones onto my land. I can’t use it now. I was so upset. I’d expended a great deal of effort on the land. But … now, I’m generally happy because the drought is over.

The drought had hit him hard. Last year, he grew onions, which need a lot of water. However, the harvest failed for lack of rain, leaving him with a huge loss. He said the karezes in their area had been dry for several years and of his two solar-powered tube wells, one dried up last year and the water level in the second dropped so much there was not enough to water the fields. Even the well inside the house had dried up. “You know,” he said, “for a farmer, his land is everything and when there’s no water, the land is useless.” However, following the rain, all his wells had enough water. People reckoned the level has risen by three metres.

He worried that, although water from the recent rain had seeped into the ground and fed the underground aquifers, repeated droughts mean the water may not have penetrated the ground as well as it should have done and the rain that has fallen may not yet be sufficient to replenish the aquifers.

Meanwhile, another farmer in Kulago village, Mir Afghan, surveying the damage from the floods and worried that worse might be to come:

Roads, canals and karezes that irrigated agricultural lands have been destroyed. Farmers will face many problems this year because repairing these roads and canals costs a lot. Even in some areas, the floods have damaged the retaining walls, which were built during the Republic by NGOs at huge expense. This really worried people: they were built to protect our homes and villages, but now they’ve been damaged. The village is in danger.

Mir Afghan said the floods had destroyed some farms and caused a lot of financial loss, but overall, the damage was less than in some other provinces and it was also far less than when heavy rain comes in the summer: “In the months of Jawza and Asad [third week of June to third week of August], rain is very dangerous because the soil doesn’t absorb it during those months. If it rains a little, it turns into a flood that flows everywhere and can be very dangerous.”

Hoping for rain, planning for floods

Meanwhile, as local communities survey the damage done by the most recent floods, they balance relief that the drought has ended against the fears that more rain later in the summer could devastate their lives. They gather in mosques to discuss how to mitigate the worst of it. They pool their resources to rebuild fallen retaining walls and rehabilitate canals.

With one eye on the sky and another on their fields, they get on with the business of clearing their land and sowing seeds, hoping, always, that the harvests will be plentiful, and that their homes, fields and families will be spared more flooding.

Edited by Kate Clark and Roxanna Shapour


[1] Karezes are used in much of Afghanistan to bring irrigation water to cropland. A series of well-like vertical shafts, connected by sloping tunnels, tap into subterranean water to efficiently deliver large quantities of water to the surface by gravity, without need for pumping. More on this UNESCO website on how karezes “allow water to be transported over long distances in hot dry climates without loss of much of the water to evaporation.”

[2] For up-to-date reports on the floods nationwide, see reports from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), for example here from 17 April.

 

After the Deluge: Personal accounts of rain and floods in Zurmat district
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Why Counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan Still Matters

Washington should focus more attention and counterterrorism effort on Central and South Asia before it’s too late, says USIP senior study group.

In a new report slated for release on May 14, a USIP bipartisan Senior Study Group says that Washington needs to be prepared for a rising terrorist threat in the region and, crucially, the threat this poses to the U.S. homeland. The Senior Study Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan report evaluates ongoing terrorism threats from Afghanistan and Pakistan and assess options for a sustainable counterterrorism policy. Its findings identify dominant terrorist threats, stakes of the threats for U.S. interests, and policy options for the United States.Study group members Ambassador Anne Patterson, Dr. Tricia Bacon, Ambassador Michael P. McKinley, Dr. Joshua White and Dr. Brian Finucane reflect on the key findings and insights of the report.

Why is it important for policymakers to consider the insights and policy options identified in this report?

Patterson: I am one of many Americans who was deeply involved in the war on terror which saved many lives. But many of us also wonder that if due to the two-decade long focus on the war on terror, we forever lost the opportunity to successfully counter China. Unfortunately, our policy adjustment to this sentiment has overcompensated, resulting in dramatically reduced attention to counterterrorism in South Asia. Americans want to see Afghanistan and Pakistan in the rearview mirror. Even though American intelligence was able to give the Russians a stunningly precise warning about the recent ISIS-K attack in Moscow, our knowledge of threats from Afghanistan has and will continue to erode over time.

This report argues that more attention and counterterrorism effort should be focused on South Asia. It argues that stepped up, counterterrorism-focused regional cooperation can give us insights we don’t have and pressure the Taliban into curtailing space for terrorists. It argues that the India-Pakistan relationship and the China-India rivalry have complicated the counterterrorism picture in the region, increasing the potential for wider conflict triggered by terrorist violence. And it argues, alarmingly, that the U.S. is fundamentally unprepared for a terrorist resurgence in the region, including threats against the U.S. homeland. We must recalibrate our counterterrorism approach to better protect American lives and U.S. interests, prevent distractions by provocations, and shield our vital strategic competition priorities.

What are the key terrorist threats and trends in the region identified by the study group, and why is it important for policymakers to take stock of them?

Bacon: The study group identified the key terrorist threat in the region as the Afghanistan-based affiliate of the Islamic State, ISIS Khorasan (ISIS-K). Unfortunately, that threat did indeed come to fruition with the Moscow attack as the study group completed its assessment. Policymakers must take stock of the ISIS-K threat above all because the group has ambitions to directly strike the United States. ISIS-K is opportunistic and will look for ways to strike that do not require building extensive capability. Moreover, it is highly indiscriminate and thus willing to attack soft targets that even most fellow Sunni jihadist groups eschew.

Beyond the direct threat to the United States, ISIS-K’s attacks stoke regional tensions, breed mistrust between governments and distract allies from strategic competition. Concerningly, the threat from ISIS-K shows no signs of diminishing. Counterterrorism cooperation against the group has been hampered by international rivalries and mistrust. And though the Taliban has incentives to counter ISIS-K, its ability to conduct multiple attacks outside of Afghanistan demonstrates that the Taliban is either unable or unwilling to fulfill its pledge in the U.S.-Taliban Doha agreement to prevent terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.

At the same time, long-standing threats in the region persist and, in some cases, have worsened. Al-Qaida and al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent are seeking to exploit the war in Gaza to rebuild their safe haven under Taliban rule. In addition, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has been emboldened by the Taliban’s victory. It is using its sanctuary in Afghanistan to pose a growing threat to Pakistan at a time when the country is grappling with political and economic instability. Finally, though the Pakistani security establishment has restrained anti-India militant groups in recent years, a terrorist attack in India with links back to Pakistan still has the potential to ignite a conflict between the two nuclear-armed states.

What is the study group’s assessment on the Taliban’s role in fostering and curtailing terrorist threats in Afghanistan and Pakistan and beyond, and the counterterrorism challenge presented by Taliban rule in Afghanistan?

McKinley: The debate since the fall of Kabul in August 2021 is whether Afghanistan could be a base for new attacks on the United States at home and abroad. What the study drives home is that the terrorist groupings supported by the Taliban in South and Central Asia can challenge broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. It acknowledges the primacy and importance of responding to greater international challenges like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the conflict in Israel and Gaza, and the emergence of China but underscores that the United States can and should do more to monitor and, where feasible, counter the Taliban’s support for regional terrorism.

The report offers practical suggestions on strengthening the United States’ counter-terrorism capabilities, keeping in mind the resource constraints and challenges of working on a threat emanating from a country where we no longer have a presence. The recommendations are also timely: recent developments in the Middle East and elsewhere make crystal clear that extreme terrorist attacks can surprise even the best prepared of governments.

What kind of counterterrorism relationship with Pakistan does the study group propose, and why might such a relationship be more effective at mitigating regional terror threats?

White: It is undeniable that the United States’ attention on Pakistan has waned since the chaotic withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021. That is understandable given the pressing global imperatives that have resulted from China’s dramatic rise. This study group therefore sensibly proposes a set of modest recommendations for U.S. policy toward Pakistan, designed to ensure that the counterterrorism relationship — however fraught it might be — can be sustained as a way of hedging against the very real risk of heightened terrorist activity in the region focused on the United States and its partners. Part of this involves recognizing that there can be some measure of reciprocity in the counterterrorism relationship, as Pakistan struggles to deal with the violent anti-state TTP and, to a lesser extent, ISIS-K.

What are some of the policy safeguards and legal provisions proposed by the study group to make the counterterrorism approach toward the region sustainable and lawful?

Finucane: Despite recent regional attacks attributed to or claimed by ISIS, the prospects for renewed U.S. counterterrorism direct action (capture or lethal targeting) in either Afghanistan or Pakistan appear slim. If the Biden administration foresees a continued need for the use of military force for counterterrorism in this region, or more generally, the study group recommends it should work to clarify the scope of the use of Authorization for the Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF) to improve political accountability of U.S. military operations. This can be done by reforming the 2001 AUMF, which is out-of-date.

The administration should work with Congress to update and better specify groups and the locations of operations, as well as introduce a sunset provision to the 2001 AUMF. Another option, which is not mutually exclusive, is to share publicly the executive branch’s interpretation of the scope of authority under both the 2001 AUMF and Article II of the Constitution for counterterrorism direct action. In addition, should the United States resume direct action in Afghanistan or Pakistan, it should incorporate lessons learned on avoiding and minimizing civilian casualties, particularly since the tragic August 2021 strike in Kabul. The study group, for example, honed in on the importance of checking confirmation bias and interrogating assumptions on identities amid military operation.

Why Counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan Still Matters
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The Daily Hustle: The ancient art of making surma

In Afghanistan, surma (kohl) has been used since ancient times by both men and women to enhance the eyes, for its healing properties and to protect the wearer against the evil eye. Traditionally made by grinding stibnite rock into a fine power, the use of the black concoction to line the eyes also has a religious aspect. According to accounts in the Hadith, the Prophet Muhammad used and recommended a form of surma, both for its medicinal qualities and as an adornment. It is therefore halal and its use permitted, or even encouraged. In recent times, however, this millennia-old practice has fallen out of favour with urban dwellers who are increasingly opting for imported eyeliners. There are also concerns about potential health hazards, if the surma has been made in unhygienic facilities, or, as is the case with some preparations, contains high levels of lead. AAN’s Sayed Asadullah Sadat has spoken to a man whose family has been supplying surma to Kabul’s residents for five generations about how the coveted black paste is made and what the future holds for this centuries-old tradition.

Surma, the family business

I’ve been selling surma in Kabul all my life. It’s a trade my brother and I inherited from my father 30 years ago, as he had from his father. My family has been selling surma for five generations and we have a reputation as among the most trusted vendors in Kabul.

There are four kinds of surma in Afghanistan. The best come from stibnite (ithmid) rocks from the mountains in Badakhshan and Ghorband.[1] These are the rocks I use to make my surma. I buy them from trusted traders who bring them to Kabul. The antimony from Badakhshan is a lightweight, ‘moist’ rock that makes for a true black surma. They say Badakhshi surma is ‘hot’[2] in nature and so good to use in winter to warm the eyes against the cold. The rock from Ghorband is heavier and it’s a ‘dry’ rock. It’s more difficult to grind into a fine powder and the colour is not a deep black like the surma the rock from Badakhshan produces. Ghorbandi surma is ‘cold’ and is best used in the warmer months. Both have healing powers and protect the eyes against all manner of ailments, especially air pollution.

There are other surmas, less expensive and of inferior quality on the market. One comes from Peshawar and is similar to the one from Ghorband. Another is imported from Russia. There are also commercial surmas, imported mostly from Pakistan and India, that are made by burning things such as apricot kernels into charcoal, but these don’t have the same benefits as rock surma and are also not considered halal.

Making surma then and now

As a boy, I learned how to make surma at my mother’s knee. Once a month, she would make surma from the rocks that traders brought from the mountains. First, she’d put the rocks in the fire to burn off the impurities. Then, she would grind them into a fine powder in her brass Russian-made mortar and pestle, sifting the powder several times through a mesh until she was satisfied with its fineness. Next, she’d melt beef fat, skimming off the foam until there was a clear liquid, the colour of gold, which she’d drip slowly into the powder until she had a paste. Finally, she’d wrap the paste into several paper parcels, which she weighed on a tarazu (traditional scale) to make sure they weighed three grams each. These little paper packets were my father’s stock for the month. He’d carry them in a small pouch on his route as he walked the streets of Kabul, hawking or calling at the homes of his regular customers.

In those days, my brother and I would sit next to my mother as her hands deftly turned rock first into fine powder and then into paste. She’d tell us the story of surma – where it came from, what it was used for and about the ancient people in distant lands who used it.[3] Slowly, as she recited verses from the Hadith about how the Prophet Muhammad used antimony, she’d line our eyes with surma to keep us healthy, ward off the evil eye and thank the Prophet for the bounties his gift was affording our family.

I still prepare surma much the same way my mother did, except modern appliances have made the job easier and faster. I now use a gas stove instead of a brazier, an electric grinder instead of my mother’s mortar and pestle, a battery-operated scale to weigh the packets and little plastic pouches instead of paper.

Health concerns and changing fashion

Business these days is not as good as it used to be in my father’s time. Many urban women, who used to wear surma as part of their makeup, have stopped using it in favour of eyeliner pencils imported from the West. They frown on surma, saying it’s old-fashioned and unhygienic. There are doctors and reports in the news that say it’s bad for the eyes and could lead to infections or even blindness, that surma contains lead and could poison the blood and cause all kinds of diseases. But I don’t think they’re aware that our surma, which comes from the antimony rocks of Badakhshan and Ghorband, does not have lead.[4] Anyway, my family has been selling surma for five generations, and in all this time, there’s never been a case of anyone having any trouble with our product.

We still have about 70 regular customers. Some shopkeepers buy from us and sell at a profit in their stores. We also do a fair amount of trade selling on the streets of west Kabul and sometimes customers call me on my mobile and ask for a delivery. Many families still use surma regularly. People still use surma at weddings and when babies are born. People also use it when they make a sacrifice, lining the eyes of the sheep [to be killed] with surma. This is not based on sharia, but it’s according to our own customs in Afghanistan.

The surma market is indeed dwindling, but there’s still enough custom for us to make a living. We buy the stibnite for 400 afghanis (USD 5.70) per kilo and can make about 1,000 afghanis (USD 14.90) per kilo after we process it. These days, we make about 7,000 afghanis (USD 99) a week, which my brother and I divide equally.

Surma, a dying tradition

My sons and nephews don’t want to take over the business. They say it’s a dying market and they don’t want to live hand to mouth. Two of my sons are in Iran chasing their dreams for a better future on construction sites along with their cousins. I have two other sons who are still here in Kabul. One works as a guard and the other as a driver. We always thought that at least one of the boys would carry the family tradition into the future. We wanted to modernise our operation, expand the wholesale side of the business, start selling to more and more shops and maybe even export to Pakistan and Iran. We had plans to buy some machines to do the grinding and mixing and invest in nicer, professional-looking packaging.

Now, my brother and I sit together to grind the rock and make surma in a melancholy mood and lament the end of our family as a long line of trusted vendors of surma. We will keep the tradition going as long as we can, hoping that at least one of our boys will come to see this tradition as a legacy worth saving.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour


References

References
1 Stibnite, an antimony-sulphide metalloid compound (Sb2S3), is the main natural source for the chemical element, antimony (atomic number 51).
2 In Afghanistan, as in the wider region, there is a belief that foods and other things ingested by humans have a hot (garm) or cold (sard) property, with a unique impact on the human body.
3 Just how ancient is testified to by the modern words used for surma. The Arabic name, koḥl, which was borrowed into English in the eighteenth century, was earlier used in Akkadian, another semitic language spoken 3,500 years ago. Greek and Latin borrowed a word from ancient Egyptian to get stibium. The Persian word, surma, comes from Azerbaijani – ‘to draw along’ (see Wikipedia).
4 Surma made from an alternative source, the rock, galena (lead sulfide), would contain lead.

The Daily Hustle: The ancient art of making surma
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Despite Daunting Economic Headwinds, Afghan Private Sector Shows Signs of Life

Three years after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, the country’s economy remains in a dismal state marked by depression-level price deflation, high unemployment and a collapse of GDP. Still, while the bad news for Afghans is well known, less visible are some green shoots in the country’s private sector that, if properly encouraged, could mitigate the situation. These range from small business activity to Taliban plans for major projects to the potential for an uptick in investment. Clearly nothing in those developments can stimulate a strong economic revival.
Yet should the Taliban, foreign donors and agencies, and the Afghan private sector manage to do more in their respective spheres, there is reason to hope for greater economic stability. That should benefit the Afghan people and the country’s neighbors, not least by easing pressures on Afghans to out-migrate in search of incomes.Signs of increased activity for Afghan businesses can be detected in projects underway and nearing completion; in missions abroad by trade and business delegations; in some new private investments; and in the fact that a few Western companies are operating again in Afghanistan. The percentage of small companies reporting a return to full operations after years of war and disruption has doubled in the past year amid a number of startups.  Announcements by the Taliban regime of mining, infrastructure, and other projects are significant. On the international side, recent initiatives like the World Bank’s “Approach 3.0” are intended among other things to support the Afghan private sector.

But the broader headwinds facing the macro-economy remain formidable. The continuing impacts of the shocks stemming from the August 2021 Taliban takeover — most notably the abrupt cut-off of development aid and security assistance — have been compounded by the Taliban’s rigorously enforced ban on poppy cultivation, declining humanitarian aid, and compulsory return of many Afghans from Pakistan.

Business Activities in Afghanistan

The stirring of the Afghan private sector was evident at a private sector conference in Istanbul on March 4, organized by the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce and joined by USIP, and at individual meetings with Afghan business leaders there and subsequently in Dubai.

  • The Taliban are reporting new business creation in Helmand, where some 67 manufacturing firms — mostly in agro-processing — are said to have started operations in the past three years, along with similar reports from some other provinces. At a broader level, the number of private enterprises surveyed by the World Bank that reported being fully operational rose from 28 percent in May-June 2022 to 57 percent in March 2023, with 31 percent of firms in the subsample that responded to both surveys reporting their operating status had improved versus 16 percent reporting a decline.
  • The sole remaining Afghan private airline, Kam Air, has an expanding fleet of 12 aircraft with commercial flights operating among four Afghan cities and between Afghanistan and Dubai, Istanbul, Delhi and other regional cities. Several foreign airlines have resumed scheduled international flights to Kabul.
  • The Taliban retendered and awarded to a Chinese company the major Amu Darya oilfields project, with production reported to have started up. There are also reports that small-scale oil refineries are back in operation, using locally extracted crude oil purchased by the Taliban and then auctioned to refiners.
  • The Taliban have contracted three sizable cement projects, two with Afghan companies and one with a Qatari investor, with a reported total investment of $450 million. This presages significant progress toward self-sufficiency in a sector where it eminently makes sense given Afghanistan’s resource base and the high cost of transporting cement long distances from neighboring countries. The contrast with the previous government, which could not get major cement investments going due to a variety of reasons, one being corruption, is striking.
  • Numerous mining contracts have been issued, though many of them may be simply validating and taxing ongoing activities while the prognosis for large new projects is uncertain. There is clearly considerable ongoing activity in smaller-scale extraction of resources such as coal, talc, chromite, dimension stones, gemstones and lithium, the latter including at least for a time involvement of Chinese entrepreneurs.

On the international side, some larger Chinese companies appear to be expressing interest in the mining sector and infrastructure, and there are even a few U.S. and European businesses operating in Afghanistan. For example, a California-based telecom services company is actively supporting a major Afghan mobile phone company.

The World Bank’s Approach 3.0, announced in February, modestly expands the Bank’s engagement with Afghanistan, while maintaining its “principled approach” embodied in Approach 2.0, which is intended to ensure participation of women and girls in bank-financed projects. Approach 3.0 authorizes: (1) resumption of World Bank International Development Association (IDA) grants to Afghanistan, which had been stopped since August 2021, to complement continuing funding by the Afghanistan Resilience Trust Fund (ARTF); (2) completion of the $1.2 billion CASA-1000 project to transmit electricity from the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan; (3) bank staff to engage in technical meetings with senior Taliban officials; and (4) financing of small and medium-sized private Afghan businesses by the World Bank, including a recently approved microfinance project, and its private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

Afghan Economic Doldrums

Despite these positive signals, private sector activity along with Taliban business promotion is running up against the formidable challenges faced by the Afghan economy as a whole, enumerated above: plummeting humanitarian aid, the Taliban’s opium ban and the last year’s forced repatriation of Afghans from Pakistan (which appears to be resuming after a pause). These new shocks are reverberating atop those stemming from the August 2021 Taliban takeover — loss of more than $8 billion a year of civilian and security aid, the run on Afghan banks, freezing of some $9 billion of Afghan central bank assets in the U.S. and elsewhere and the stoppage of financial transactions with foreign banks, among other things.

The impact of all these shocks on aggregate demand in the economy, and on Afghans’ incomes, has been dramatic. GDP declined by more than a quarter in 2021 and 2022 and there is no sign of significant recovery in 2023, nor on the horizon in 2024 and beyond. According to the World Bank’s Afghanistan Welfare Monitoring Survey, the unemployment rate among surveyed households was close to 20 percent as of April-June 2023, and there is no reason to believe that more recent trends will be any better.

A striking symptom of low demand and lack of purchasing power in the country is the ongoing economy-wide price deflation. Headline inflation (year-on-year) started to decline in mid-2022, went below zero about a third of the way through 2023, and since then has been negative — reaching nearly minus 10 percent as of February 2024. These kinds of price declines are only seen in countries facing a deep economic recession, such as the U.S. Great Depression in the early 1930s when prices declined by 25 percent between 1929 and 1933. Mirroring these price declines is the appreciation of the exchange rate of the afghani by 20 percent vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, which discourages exports and encourages imports — the opposite of what is needed given Afghanistan’s large trade deficit which calls for higher exports and lower imports.

What To Do?

Afghanistan’s economy will remain weak for the foreseeable future despite private sector activity and business interest in some projects. It would require major, unlikely actions to change this bleak picture.

On the Taliban side, reversing or at least mitigating their restrictions against female education and women working would, in addition to its direct benefits for Afghanistan’s economy and development, help loosen restrictions affecting international financial transactions and economic relations. And at least a de facto relaxation of the Taliban’s problematic, unsustainable opium poppy cultivation ban would restore part of the more than $1 billion a year in rural small farmers’ and wage laborers’ incomes that have been lost. Unfortunately, major changes like these do not appear to be on the cards.

Short of such game-changers, the Taliban administration should reverse recent price deflation and ensure that the Afghani exchange rate is not too strong. Reducing the amounts of U.S. dollars sold by the Central Bank at foreign currency auctions, and moderately increasing the printing and circulation of afghani banknotes, is the correct macro policy stance and would at least stop worsening the recession.

Second, avoid overtaxing the private sector. The regime has been successful in mobilizing tax revenue, especially customs receipts. However, actually collecting all the taxes on the books, which the previous government did not exploit due to lax effort and widespread corruption, would impose too heavy a burden on the private sector and further dampen economic activity. The Taliban should review of the existing panoply of taxes, simplify by abolishing duplicate and excessive taxes, and not impose new levies.

What can foreign donors and international agencies do? Absent unlikely changes in policies such as formal recognition of the Taliban government or the outright removal of sanctions, international actors can mitigate the economic headwinds by:

  • Slowing and making more predictable the inevitable decline in humanitarian aid while increasing basic development assistance to the maximum extent possible (including newly authorized World Bank assistance under Approach 3.0);
  • Maximizing the effectiveness of aid and its benefits for the economy and private sector by prioritizing local procurement from Afghan companies while moving away from importing goods that can be produced in Afghanistan and aid agencies importing goods on their own account;
  • Reducing over time the U.N. humanitarian cash shipments, which are high-cost, risky, and optics-wise problematic, and gradually replacing them with a combination of normal banking transactions, swap arrangements, and use of digital currency and e-money;
  • Exploiting the authorization for the World Bank and IFC to provide financing directly to Afghan private businesses, and encouraging other aid agencies to do the same (funding well-vetted Afghan private companies is no more risky and probably less risky than other forms of aid);
  • Engaging with Taliban officials on technical macroeconomic policy issues by the World Bank (permitted under Approach 3.0) — in particular to encourage the authorities to shift to more expansionary monetary and exchange rate policies; and
  • Getting international authorization and facilitation — if necessary — to arrange manufacture and circulation of more afghani banknotes to increase the money supply moderately.

Regional countries should facilitate — not block — trade between Afghanistan and its neighbors. Border closures should be avoided and not used for political leverage. Business travel and contacts should be encouraged, building on earlier initiatives. Large-scale deportations of Afghans by neighboring countries need to stop. Beyond their humanitarian consequences, they are economically harmful — especially for Afghanistan but also for neighboring economies, which make use of Afghan labor, and potentially damaging as well for regional security.

From a longer-term perspective, Afghanistan will need to make more and better use of its water resources, for both irrigation and hydroelectric power, which in turn will support the private sector in agriculture, agri-business and other activities. This will require cooperation by regional countries and receptivity to fair water sharing agreements and mutually beneficial water conservancy projects, which can regulate water flows as well as provide electricity to multiple countries.

What can Afghan businesses do? Though the Afghan private sector can sometimes be effective in pursuing narrow commercial issues such as tax relief, it seems unable to engage in effective collective action in furtherance of broader economic goals, let alone to pursue changes in social policies.

Sizable businesses with ongoing activities in Afghanistan should strive to stay in operation, even if there are no prospects for expansion in the short run. They should proactively seek, as appropriate, contracts with the aid community to provide imported and, increasingly, domestically produced goods and services, which will foster private sector development and improve aid effectiveness.

Sizable and successful Afghan businesses based in neighboring countries should not lose interest in Afghanistan, and they may be able to support exports of Afghan agricultural and processed goods and enhancing their value chains, as well as investing in import substitution.

The large amounts of Afghan expatriate financial capital in nearby countries may become available to augment the leverage of IFC and other international financing, which is now authorized and hopefully will materialize in the future.

There are no “silver bullets” that will revive Afghanistan’s economy, let alone stimulate the robust economic growth that is essential for national development. But taken together, the above actions by the key stakeholders will make a difference. They can mitigate the weakness of the country’s economy and help promote critically needed economic stability.

Despite Daunting Economic Headwinds, Afghan Private Sector Shows Signs of Life
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The State of Research on Afghanistan: Too many poor quality publications and some real gems

Christian Bleuer

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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With the publication of the newest edition of the Afghanistan Analyst Bibliography, Christian Bleuer, who has been compiling and adding to it since 2004/5, looks at what it says about the state of scholarship on Afghanistan and comments on the past and future of research in this area. The problems with integrating scholarship and research into policymaking is discussed and he also notes some interesting new research while offering suggestions for reading.

The Afghanistan Analysts Bibliography 2024 is available for download in the Resources section on our website.

Many publications, but not many good publications

That there is a massive volume of English-language publications on Afghanistan is undeniable. The Afghanistan Analyst Bibliography now stretches to almost 8,000 publications, including books, academic journal articles, research institute reports, university dissertations and other entries: the first edition, compiled in 2006 included just under 1,000 publications. What is also undeniable is that the average quality of these publications is low – an assessment particularly noticeable in relation to the author’s research interests, governance, conflict and identity. As for quantity, the annual volume of publications in English did rise sharply after 2001 as the West focussed on Afghanistan, and will likely decline precipitously as that attention and funding diverts to other crises.

That low-quality assessment is, however, an average. Certain rare publications stand out as higher quality – some of the author’s favourites are showcased below. Usually the better publications stem from field research or in-depth archival research, backed by fluency in local languages. On the other hand, low-quality publications are all very similar, with most based on a brief survey of secondary sources of poor to average quality. There is a relevant computer science concept here: GIGO – garbage in, garbage out, meaning, if you put dud data in, you get dud results out. It could be applied to many publications on Afghanistan. It is just not possible to make a satisfactory study if it is based on previous poor quality studies, unless your research is on the phenomenon of bad scholarship. The author has published several articles in this category, for example, his 2014 report for AAN, ‘From ‘Slavers’ to ‘Warlords’: Descriptions of Afghanistan’s Uzbeks in Western writing’.

The importance of languages

Some research projects related to Afghanistan do not require fluency or even proficiency in Pashto, Dari or the other languages of Afghanistan, nor do they need to be based on lengthy field research or archival research. Examples here include military studies that focus on NATO/ISAF forces, analysis of American foreign policy decision-making (when Washington is the subject of analysis, not Afghanistan), technical agricultural reports and critical feminist studies of representations of Afghans and Afghanistan in the Western media. At the opposite end of the scale would be studies that can only be sufficiently analysed with local language fluency and deep knowledge of local history and society, with examples including studies on the ethnic and/or religious factors in local identities and political action, push/pull factors in decisions to emigrate from Afghanistan, ethnographic case studies and the examination of rural livelihoods and economic survival.

The comparison to area studies in other regions puts Afghanistan studies in a poor light. There are academic journals and publishers that would absolutely outright reject any submission by an author without language fluency demonstrated in the references and citations. This is especially true in Russian, Chinese and Latin American studies, among many others. Some fields are even more rigorous, if much smaller. The following anecdote is illustrative of this. Years ago, this author spoke to one recent university graduate who was hoping to do a PhD in Mongolian studies (with a focus on the 13th century), only to be dissuaded by a professor who said that for his proposed research he would need to become fluent in reading not just multiple forms of Chinese and Mongolian from different eras, plus Old Uyghur, but also French, German and Russian to access secondary sources from the 19th and 20th century. Compare this to most articles in the bibliography whose list of references include only English-language publications.

Other fields of research have a much higher share of publications that have another strength seldom seen in publications on Afghanistan – time, and plenty of it. So much about publications on Afghanistan is ‘instant analysis’, that is hurried and shallow as a result. This is not to deny that many authors have works that are a decade in the making, even if they are not getting daily attention.

The problem of good and bad scholarship underpins another question: Can even good literature on Afghanistan have any beneficial effect or make some positive contribution to policymaking and governance?

Should policy-makers read the literature on Afghanistan?

One publication can, in certain circumstances, have a major effect. It does not mean, however, that the effect is necessarily positive. An example of this is when President Bill Clinton likely based his decision to not intervene early on in the Balkan conflicts after reading the book, ‘Balkan Ghosts’, by journalist Robert Kaplan, a person with no local language skills or in-depth research background in the Balkans. The book presented a deeply flawed ‘ancient hatreds’ argument, long ago disproven in academia. The argument in the book went that the people of the Balkans have hated and fought each other based on ethnicity forever and will continue to do so, making any intervention or engagement futile (see this reporting in The New York Times). The counterargument, that Clinton did not read, expressed in a book review by the journalist-turned-historian Noel Malcolm, was that “The Bosnian war was not caused by ancient hatreds; it was caused by modern politicians.” Whatever one’s view on the NATO interventions in the Balkans, it is clear that policy should not have been made based on ahistorical and deeply flawed publications.

Knowledge can also be used in a way that is not for the broader public good, for many British colonial administrators spoke local languages and understood regional history very well, all in the service of the empire. Moreover, knowledge is not always power (good short background on that issue here). Knowledge about a problem does not, in itself, allow for it to be fixed. It is dubious to suggest that, for example, the creation of more knowledge on the local history, language and social trends in Palestine and Israel is going to facilitate solving the Israel-Palestine conflict in the face of contemporary local political intransigence on one hand and the lack of will on the part of outside powers on the other (not because of ‘ancient hatreds’).

Could Afghanistan have benefitted from any studies, or do all paths lead to failure such as Israel-Palestine? Or is this just another faulty line of argument similar to that of ‘Balkan Ghosts’, even if not exactly an ‘ancient hatreds’ argument? It is not possible to prove that more knowledge could have worked out better for Afghanistan, but it is undeniable that there was an early lack of large-scale violence post-2001 that was squandered by the disinterest of Western power brokers (now transfixed by Iraq) and by many local leaders working in their own narrow personal interests.

Nobody in any position of power or influence over Afghanistan in 2001 was following the guidelines of ‘evidence-based policy’, a concept that “advocates for policy decisions to be grounded on, or influenced by, rigorously established objective evidence” versus “policymaking predicated on ideology, ‘common sense,’ anecdotes, or personal intuitions” (more information on this concept here). This concept is practiced in medicine, advocated for in regards to energy and climate change and thoroughly ignored in foreign policymaking and state-building. While there may have been experts on Afghanistan who were ignored in 2001, it cannot be argued that there was some vital, comprehensive publication that policymakers could have read at that time that would have pushed them towards more sustainable and effective policies. However, even a cursory reading of human rights reports from the 1990s could have woken the US and others up to exactly who they were putting into power and there were different Afghan voices arguing cogently for different types of governance structures they deemed appropriate for their country.[1] Neither research institutes nor universities have the foresight or funding to regularly produce such work before an issue becomes policy relevant. Publications that were intended to inform policymakers only became common after 2001.

There is even a case of a powerful leader ignoring their own academic work. Two presidents of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani and Hafizullah Amin, both have/had advanced degrees from Columbia University. While nothing is known of Amin’s academic work while studying for his master’s degree in education, Ghani wrote an excellent anthropology dissertation and then much later co-authored a book with Clare Lockhart titled Fixing Failed States. This book, which was received favourably by reviewers, was ignored by Ghani once he became president, in favour of politics as usual. If policymakers will not or cannot take their own advice – advice they built a career upon – how do we expect them to take advice from others?

The problem of expert advice and scholarly literature being ignored is clear enough. Academics and their work have consistently been ignored or just not useful for policymaking (not counting outliers such as the ignored book mentioned above). Added to this is the communication problem where academics and policymakers speak different languages. Academic work is often too dense and filled with jargon and obscure theory. It is indigestible for those outside the field (and sometimes even for fellow researchers).

Unfortunately, the environment of university-based research is declining precipitously. This will mean that opportunities for research that existed for Ghani (Columbia University PhD) and Lockhart (Harvard and Oxford degrees, plus a lengthy Yale fellowship) will exist but in lesser numbers and in poorer quality.

The death of the university

Universities in the West are failing in their traditional goals, with opposite ends of the ideological spectrum offering competing explanations for why, with the mundane reasons being budgets cuts combined with an out-of-control university bureaucracy funnelling money towards itself at the expense of students and faculty. Of the many failures, of which students are the primary victims, are the relatively minor concerns of those early career researchers wishing to make a living from their work. The problem here as related to research on Afghanistan is that there was and still is a need for in-depth and long-term analysis of Afghanistan, but is there a market for it? Should young students and researchers invest time and money in earning an advanced degree scrutinising some aspect of Afghanistan, or train in data management or dentistry?

There are now many disincentives to invest so much in studies and language training. What is at the end of such a rigorous course of study over a decade? The statistics say that you should prepare for the likely scenario of retraining and employment outside the field of study you chose – and indeed outside of university employment in general. Even if a researcher is particularly dedicated and sticks with their PhD studies despite the negative forecasts, they may find only employment at the fringes of academia in a role known in the US as ‘adjunct faculty’, a type of low-paid part-time and/or short-term contract employment that puts at least one-third of teachers in this scheme under the poverty line (according to a 2020 study by the American Federation of Teachers. The equivalent positions in Canada, Australia and western Europe are not much better when you factor in the extreme cost in living in some of the cities and towns where competitive research universities are based. At the opposite end of the scale are the full-time permanent faculty position that comprise only 25 per cent of instructors at American universities, a phenomenon with equivalents in most other countries to varying degrees (see this blog from Inside Scholar on the rise of part-time and short-term contracts in universities).

How about scholars on a fast track, who do not need so much time to become proficient in the languages of Afghanistan and who already have a strong base of knowledge to build on? Obviously, Afghan researchers whether in Afghanistan or in the diaspora have a strong head start and could be the source of much needed quality analysis. However, this does nothing to fix the long-term problem of the decline of university research as a viable career choice.

Some interesting research

Failures and faults of Afghanistan research aside, there are some bright spots. Below are some publications from the last five years that have caught the eye of the author due to his personal research interests. They touch on governance, religion and ethnicity. If you are looking for recommendations on agriculture, military operations, gender or macro-economics, you will need to ask somebody else. The works selected are interesting for their high quality, or as an example of a new trend in research – and in some cases both.

If in 2001 there were only a few professors and prominent exiled Afghan political figures whom you could ask for their opinions on what sort of structure the Afghan government should have, over 20 years later, we now have Afghans asking Afghans that question in a rigorous manner:

Mohammad Bashir Mobasher and Mohammad Qadam Shah, 2022, ‘Deproblematizing the Federal–Unitary Dichotomy: Insights from a Public Opinion Survey about Approaches to Designing a Political System in Afghanistan’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol 52, No 2.

In this article, Mohammad Qadam Shah (Seattle Pacific University) and Mohammad Bashir Mobasher (American University, Washington DC) argue that “concepts such as unitarism, federalism, centralization and decentralization are highly politicized and often misunderstood when they enter the public discourse.” So, if you were hoping for an answer to the question ‘What system of governance do Afghans prefer?’, you will get an accurate but complicated answer, and certainly not an easy one. You may consider this debate moot with the return of the Islamic Emirate (Afghanistan’s current rulers prefer a unitary and highly centralised state), but the article may be useful in the future when and if the Taleban no longer rule Afghanistan.

If you are not a student or faculty at a university with subscription access, you can have ‘short-term access’ from Oxford University Press to this article for the very unreasonable price of 55 USD, or you can email the authors directly and ask for a PDF – a good example of the difficulty in accessing research on Afghanistan. There is, however, an article on the same topic (a general introductory work) that is available for free:

Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2019, ‘Pathologies of Centralized State-Building’, Prism, Vol. 8, No. 2.

There are also an increasing number of collaborative works between local and foreign researchers; I choose to note this one as it is, unexpectedly, by two researchers based in China:

Ihsanullah Omarkhail and Liu Guozhu, 2023, ‘The Trajectory of Islamic State Khorasan Province and Afghan Taliban Rivalry’, Small Wars and Insurgencies.

Related to my interest in ethnicity and religion – specifically the interplay between the two – there is an entire issue of an academic journal with 11 articles by Afghan, Pakistani and Western scholars on the theme ‘Ethnic Nationalism and Politicized Religion in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Borderland’.

There are also several books I want to eventually read, but cannot assess at the moment (due to constraints of time, money and library access). One is an English translation of a book originally published in German in 1975, for those interested in the deep history of the region:

Karl Jettmar, 2023, Religions of the Hindukush: The Pre-Islamic Heritage of Eastern Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan, Orchid Press.

On the subject of religion, there are more publications worth mentioning. The question of what exactly is the status of Sufism in Afghanistan at the moment is addressed in this book:

Annika Schmeding, 2023, Sufi Civilities: Religious Authority and Political Change in Afghanistan, Stanford University Press.

I also noticed a recent English translation of a 1970s ethnography by an Afghan. It will certainly read like a classic ethnography – both in a good and bad way, as it is a product of its time. But regardless, it should provide an informative view of the understudied ethnic Baluchis before the beginning of decades of war.

Ghulam Rahman Amiri, 2020, The Helmand Baluch: A Native Ethnography of the People of SouthWest Afghanistan, Berghahn Books.

Published by Berghahn Books and available for purchase at a price (USD 135) set for university library buyers, this book serves as a model for moving knowledge from local languages into English – in terms of content although not price. There are many other works by local scholars that would merit translation if funding was available.

Another book from the same publisher is a study of Afghans as a global phenomenon:

Alessandro Monsutti, 2021, Homo Itinerans: Towards a Global Ethnography of Afghanistan, Berghahn Books.

Anthropological studies of Afghans can no longer confined to the village, or even just to the territory of Afghanistan. That has been true for decades and even more so now. Alongside this book, one should consider reading this study of Afghan traders who turn up in surprising places across the Eurasian continent:

Magnus Marsden, 2021, Beyond the Silk Roads: Trade, Mobility and Geopolitics across Eurasia, Cambridge University Press.

For some reason, this book went unnoticed by the author when compiling the bibliography – an unfortunate incident that illustrates the need for a researcher to do their own search for sources that is not just confined to this bibliography. On a more fortunate note, the publisher has made this book free to download.

Notable over the last five years, at least in areas of research that this author favours, is that European researchers have made more contributions worth mentioning than Americans (for unclear reasons). In addition to Schmeding, Monsutti and Marsden above, I noted with interest these two new books, one already published and one forthcoming, in June of this year:

Florian Weigand, 2022, Waiting for dignity: Legitimacy and authority in Afghanistan, Columbia University Press.

Jan-Peter Hartung, 2024, The Pashtun Borderland: A Religious and Cultural History of the Taliban, Cambridge University Press.

The (bleak) future of research

Despite the positive contributions listed above, universities cannot be relied upon in the future to produce a sufficient base of knowledge. Is there an alternative? Options exist, but in a deficient form that would need to be reformed. Government-controlled research services such as Australia’s Parliamentary Library, the United States’ Congressional Research Service and the UK’s House of Commons Library are focused on rearranging existing research into digestible shorter products for government. They do not produce new knowledge and much of their work is tailored to individual MPs, ie it is never destined to be public. Nor does it appear that any of the most important foreign policy decisions has ever been affected by research from these types of institutions.

On the independent side, research institutes and thinks tanks have short time frames and in many cases unreliable or short-term funding, some of which reduces their independence. It is clear that there is no model waiting to take over the research role that universities have performed, even if it is and has always been overwhelmingly an ineffective role. If governments want access to timely research before and at the beginning of a crisis, they will need to start funding projects that can provide the evidence that is needed to craft effective policy. This funding will need a long-term component focussed on researchers who need some guarantee of long-term job security if they are to invest so much time, effort and money into research on what many will consider irrelevant topics (until the topic becomes highly relevant). This could take place in a university or in an independent research institute, but in a manner that negates the short-comings listed above.

Unspoken in this article and a topic that would merit a much longer discussion, is the collapse in opportunities for field research (as in the 1980s and 1990s). Will communication technology and inter-connectedness overcome this problem and reach into Afghanistan in a methodologically sound manner, or will rigorous and scholarly studies on Afghanistan be limited to refugee and asylum studies based outside of Afghanistan? Furthermore, the ability of local researchers to freely do their work and publish is doubtful. A report from January that the Islamic Emirate had conducted a mass confiscation of locals’ books in Dari and Pashto was not encouraging. Maybe this state of affairs will not be permanent, but, sadly, I see no bright future for research on Afghanistan. I hope to be proven wrong.

You can download the bibliography here.

Edited by Kate Clark


Note about the author, written by the author: Christian Bleuer left the field of Afghanistan studies in 2009-10 when it became clear that his planned fieldwork among ethnic Uzbeks in Kunduz Province was, due to security concerns, no longer possible according to his university’s guidelines for doctoral research fieldwork. Preparation for that fieldwork can be seen in this article on the local history of the Kunduz river valley. The eventual plan would have been to work from these (overwhelmingly English-language) sources to expand into field interviews and translation of local language sources and documents. The resulting article – basically a salvaging of a literature survey for a failed research project – fits in very well amongst the many other articles on Afghanistan that are based almost entirely on English-language sources.

His other work on Afghanistan has often been alongside Afghan researchers, with this AAN report being an example of one of the types of collaborative research he feels can be useful. The bulk of his research (mostly unpublished or uncredited as an anonymous author) is on former Soviet Central Asia. He eventually co-authored a history of Tajikistan.

References

References
1 For example, in October 2001, Afghan-American anthropologist M Nazif Shahrani argued in the Canadian online governance policy forum, Federations, against a highly centralised form of government, while the Afghan-Canadian economist Omar Zakhilwal (and years later, Afghan minister of finance and ambassador to Pakistan) argued exactly for it:

M Nazif Shahrani, 2001, ‘Not “Who?” but “How?”: Governing Afghanistan after the conflict’, Federations, October issue, PDF.

Omar Zakhilwal, 2001, ‘Federalism in Afghanistan: A recipe for disintegration’, Federations, October issue PDF.

 

The State of Research on Afghanistan: Too many poor quality publications and some real gems
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Married at 10, abused and forced to flee without her children: an Afghan woman on life under the Taliban

Mahtab Eftekhar, as told to Zuhal Ahad

The Guardian

At the age of 10, while still in the third grade, I received news from my mother and stepfather that we would travel to Helmand province for my brother’s wedding. Little did I know, it was to be my own wedding, as my family had arranged my marriage to my cousin and sold me for 40,000 Afghanis [£500], without my knowledge or consent.

That night, after the wedding, I went to sleep beside my mother and little brother, only to wake up next to my cousin. Trembling from confusion and fear, I fled the room in tears and screams. But my mother and her sister coerced me back into that room. It was then that I was told I had been married to my cousin.

It was the beginning of an agonising nightmare that shattered my childhood and adult life.

Two years later in 2007, aged 12, I became a mother for the first time, but my child was born premature and disabled. She soon passed away. The next year, I gave birth to and lost another daughter. My husband’s family had refused to take her to the doctor when she was unwell because she was a girl, and not the boy that they had wanted so much.

In 2010, when I was still only 14, my third daughter was born. She was also sick and below average weight. She got weaker day by day and her skin was getting increasingly yellow.

Relentless abuse from my husband for the misfortune I kept bringing to the family left me exhausted, but the fear of losing my child gave me the strength to flee to my mother’s home in Kabul. After months of treatment at a public hospital, my daughter recovered from jaundice.

I thought moving away from his family, who had encouraged him to mistreat me, might put an end to the physical and mental abuse but it continued nonstop. The fear of losing my children kept me from leaving or seeking a divorce.

Kabul presented a fresh start and better opportunities, especially for my daughter, Zahra, who began attending school. From then on, my primary focus shifted to her education. I would study alongside her, reading her lessons before teaching them to her every evening.

Today, at 14, she excels in English and has a great talent for drawing. When she was younger – and before the Taliban takeover in 2021 – she was invited to participate on television programmes and often talked about the hardships I and many women like me endure in Afghanistan. I relived my childhood and dreams by bringing up such a strong and smart child as Zahra.

At this time, I also took tailoring and beauty courses that led to me gaining work at a nearby salon. Starting with basic tasks such as eyebrow trimming, I eventually established my own beauty parlour in Kabul. Unfortunately, my only source of income and hope was closed by the Taliban after they regained power in 2021.

“If you breathe, you belong to me; otherwise, you belong to the earth,” he told me.

Mahtab Eftekhar, pictured with her daughter Zahra, who is now 14 years old and still living in Afghanistan. Photograph: Handout

After the Taliban regained power, my daughter was also barred from attending school. As the physical and verbal abuse from my husband intensified, I submitted a formal complaint at the Taliban’s police station, detailing the abuse and how I was forced into a child marriage.

When my husband learned of this, he took my children to Helmand and asked me to drop the case if I wanted to live with them again.

After many days apart from my children, I couldn’t bear it any more and reached out to my daughter. I coordinated with her on the phone to set a meeting time. I travelled to Helmand and, with the help of a family that I met on the bus, I passed all the Taliban checkpoints and was able to reunite with my children.

But on the journey back, near Kandahar city, the Taliban forced me and my children out of the vehicle and took us to a police station. Instead of helping me they beat and verbally abused me for travelling alone.

At first, I did not tell them anything, but then I saw my husband and his family at the police station and understood that they had reported me to the Taliban. My husband’s mother hit me with a rock and accused me of adultery, and abandoning the house and my responsibilities.

I froze as I knew what the consequences of such an accusation could mean for me. If it was proven that I had committed adultery, I would be flogged or stoned to death by the Taliban. I felt as though the entire world was against me.

I tried to defend myself and told the Taliban about my complaint and request for divorce. I pleaded my innocence with the authorities at the station, but they did not listen to me. They had already judged me guilty without any proof. As punishment, they beat me with rifle butts, plastic pipes and whips.

Fearing the consequences of defying the Taliban, I reluctantly agreed to go back with my husband’s family. They told me that my husband would divorce me and that I could keep my daughter but they would take my son. Hoping to secure at least my daughter’s future, I agreed.

But my trials were far from over. During my divorce hearing, the mullahs [Taliban clerics] decided that as a woman who had demanded a divorce, I lost all rights, including obtaining the mahr [dowry] and custody of my five-year-old son. The mahr refers to the money or assets given by the husband to his wife. It is considered the exclusive property of the wife, which she can use to support herself during the marriage or after divorce.

Although I tried to appeal against the verdict in other courts, I got nowhere.

After my divorce was finalised in 2023, I joined women protesting against the Taliban and their oppression of women. Despite my activism, my thoughts never strayed far from my son. Unfortunately, my husband took my son back to Helmand, leaving me devastated.

I sought help from the Taliban’s police, but each time, they refused. Instead, they accused me of adultery and flogged me as a punishment.

Soon after our divorce, my husband brought our son to visit me in Kabul, only to use the opportunity to kidnap our daughter, taking them both back to Helmand.

Mahtab with her daughter, Zahra, who was kidnapped by her father and taken to back to his family in Helmand province. Photograph: handout

I was left with no reason to live. No one would rent me an apartment due to my being alone and single and I could not work as women were barred from jobs. So, I put away all my belongings – and the sorrow of losing my children – and left for Iran.

I am now 26 and I have lost everything: my childhood, youth, health and my children. Yet I am grateful to have found my voice. In Iran, I am earning a living working in a tailors’ shop and, at the same time, advocating and amplifying the voices of women in my country.

I am not afraid of dying on this journey to justice. Rather I embrace it, knowing that at least I will be an example for thousands of women enduring similar hardships and inspire them to stand against tyranny.

Married at 10, abused and forced to flee without her children: an Afghan woman on life under the Taliban
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The Durand Line and the Fence: How are communities managing with cross-border lives?

Sabawoon Samim

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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The Durand Line, which serves as the de facto border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, has never been officially recognised by any Kabul government. It cuts through the heart of Pashtun tribes, who share family ties, religion and traditions. For most of its existence, it made little practical difference to the lives of the people living on either side. However, Pakistan’s decision in 2017 to fence the entire Line, a project which is now almost complete, has physically split communities. In this report, guest author Sabawoon Samim looks at what that has meant to the lives of those living on the Durand Line, exploring the damage done and some of the partial solutions found by locals, albeit at some cost and some risk.

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking the download button below.

Many of the interviews for this report described the fence built by Pakistan as “passing not through the land, but through [our] hearts.” It follows the 2,640-kilometre-long Durand Line, signed in 1893 between the Afghan king, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, and the British foreign secretary for India, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. Much has been written about how the agreement was reached, its legal status and how it affects the politics of the two countries. However, there is a dearth of information about the damage done to local communities, socially, economically and culturally, by Pakistan’s fencing of the Line. This report, based on 16 in-depth interviews with Afghan nationals from the border provinces, tries to remedy that.

After providing a brief historical background, it delves into who the local communities are and the bonds between them. It examines the recent restrictions put in place along the Durand Line, particularly Pakistan’s fence, and how it has split communities and prevented what used to be normal travel. It explores how locals are coping with losing the freedom of movement they used to enjoy and the means they employ to try to cut through, go under or otherwise, circumvent the fence – and the risks and costs that entails.

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking the download button below.

The Durand Line and the Fence: How are communities managing with cross-border lives?
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