This report looks at the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s (IEA) relations with the following six local Hazara commanders, who either joined the Taliban before the collapse of the Islamic Republic or supported the movement during its final takeover of the country.

• Muhammad Ali Fedayi and Esmatullah Salehi are both from Miramor district of Daikundi province, and each joined the Taliban after being accused of murder, Fedayi in 2013 and Salehi in 2019. Fedayi served as the Taliban’s military commander for Shahristan before their takeover of the country. Together with Salehi, he carried out increasingly frequent attacks against the security forces in Daikundi in the months leading up to the fall of the Republic. Since August 2021, both men have served in various positions, including as district governors or police chiefs in different districts of Daikundi.

• Muhammad Aref Dawari served in the first Islamic Emirate as head of the Taliban’s reserve unit in his home district of Shahristan in Daikundi. He served in various capacities in Shahristan during the Republic before assisting the Taliban in their capture of Shahristan and Miramor districts in August 2021. He has since served as district governor, initially in his home district, until he was removed from his power base and appointed to Nawamesh district, also then in Daikundi, in late 2022.^[1]

• Muhammad Baqer Muballeghzada is from Ishtarlay district of Daikundi and, during the Republic, headed an ‘illegal armed group’, ie one that was not part of the insurgency and who also had no authorisation from the state to operate. Muballeghzada did not work for the Taliban until the final days of the Republic when he helped the movement capture Ishtarlay. Since then, he has served as head of the provincial Urban Development and Land Department in Daikundi. His relationship with the IEA has been fraught and he has been arrested and disarmed, re-appointed and finally removed from his post.

• Muhammad Ali Sadaqat comes from Khedir district and is one of the Hazaras in Daikundi who worked with the Taliban during the first Emirate (1996-2001). After they were ousted from power, he, like Muballeghzada, commanded an illegal armed group under the Republic. Sadaqat was reintegrated into the Republic several times but remained a destabilising force in Daikundi. Shortly before the fall of the Republic, he tried to form an anti-Taliban resistance group, but quickly surrendered the district to the Taliban on 14 August 2021. He then worked with the new authorities, but saw his forces disarmed and he himself, was also temporarily detained.

• The late Mawlawi Mahdi Mujahed was from the Hazara-majority district of Balkhab in Sar-e Pul province and joined the Taliban during the last years of the insurgency. Following the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate, Mujahed was appointed head of the intelligence department in Bamyan province but soon fell out with the new government after a dispute with another local official and/or because he supported girls’ education and opposed the establishment of a military base in Balkhab (accounts vary). He returned to his home district, where he was soon joined in opposition by other former commanders, including Muhammad Taher Zuhair, who had served both as governor of Bamyan and Minister of Information and Culture under the Islamic Republic. After a clash with the district governor over coal mine revenues, Mujahed seized control of the district. In response, the Emirate launched a military operation, forcing Mujahed and his men to retreat into the mountains. Two months later, in August 2022, Mujahed was reportedly arrested and executed while trying to escape to Iran. Zuhair remained in hiding until his surrender in May 2023.

This report is a follow-up to a February 2023 paper, The Politics of Survival in the Face of Exclusion: Hazara and Shia actors under the Taleban, in which the author discussed how the main Hazara and Shia Muslim^[2] leaders and factions inside and outside the country had adopted a ‘politics of survival’ following the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate.^[3] In practice, this meant that all leaders and factions ceased fighting the Taliban once the Republic’s fall became inevitable. Since then, they have avoided taking up arms against the new government and have instead chosen to engage with officials pragmatically and, in some cases, cooperate with them. The aim has been twofold – to minimise harm to their community under a government which is avowedly Sunni Muslim and to secure some form of political representation.

These ambitions have largely been unmet. The Islamic Emirate’s rhetoric has been full of assurances about inclusion, but in practice, the IEA has continued to exclude Hazaras and Shias from the cabinet and also to appoint Pashtuns to senior positions at the local level in Hazara-dominated provinces. The question of how the Emirate rules in provinces where it did not have a strong insurgent presence and a local cadre to draw appointed officials from is a wider one. AAN’s Fabrizio Foschini looked at this in detail in his September 2024 report, Ruling Uncharted Territory: Islamic Emirate governance in northeastern Afghanistan, which examined the various tactics used by the new administration to consolidate its rule in the provinces of Takhar, Badakhshan, Panjshir and Andarab in Baghlan. However, especially in Takhar and Badakhshan, while support for the insurgency was not deep or widespread, there were senior Taliban from those provinces able to draw on or be influenced by local non-Taliban elites. The commanders featured in this report were more like opportunists who joined the Taliban after falling out with the Republic, or as it collapsed.

Another difference is how the Emirate, an avowedly Sunni Muslim administration, has dealt with Shia Muslims. Since the takeover, it has taken policy decisions that appear aimed at reversing the legal recognition of the Shia (Jafari) sect. The Republic’s constitution, which did recognise Shia jurisprudence, was suspended and has not been replaced.^[4] After the takeover, the Emirate purged almost all Republic-era judges (see p 36 of this March 2023 AAN report on government spending), replacing them with Taleban judges, of necessity Sunnis trained in Hannafi jurisprudence; this was even in districts populated only by Shias. In spring 2022, acting Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani argued in his newly-published book, endorsed by Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, Al-Emarat al-Islamiya wa Nidhamuha (The Islamic Emirate and its System of Governance), that only judgements based on jurisprudence from the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam were acceptable.^[5] In June 2022, Shia jurisprudence was removed from the curriculum at Bamyan University and replaced with Hanafi (see this media report) and in April 2023, the higher education ministry rejected the Shia Ulema Council’s demand to include Shia jurisprudence in the curriculum. The ministry argued that multiple curricula would require separate classes and specialised lecturers and pave the ground for disputes among the students (see a BBC report here). Finally, in September 2023, supreme leader Akhundzada issued a series of decrees on the formation of Ulema Councils for provinces, including the Hazara-Shia majority provinces of Bamyan and Daikundi and mixed provinces of Maidan Wardak, Ghor and Sar-e Pul and appointed only Sunni religious scholars to these councils (see the Anis Daily report here and Etilaat Roz report here).

The author’s earlier report looked at how Hazara/Shia community leaders were trying to navigate the new polity, largely in order to protect their community and promote its interests. The six commanders featured in this report are somewhat different. All but one, who fell out with the new authorities almost immediately, were appointed to government jobs by the Emirate, but it is moot whether local people would have chosen them as their ‘representatives’ vis-à-vis central government or the provincial authorities: all had been, to a greater or lesser degree, at odds with the Republic and several have criminal records. This assessment of the fate of the six Hazara commanders featured in this report is therefore different from the first report: it does not look at how successfully they have managed to work on behalf of their communities, but rather, how easily it was for them to survive and prosper in the new dispensation. All were initially showcased, as proving the inclusiveness of the Islamic Emirate, but how well have they actually fared in practice since the takeover?

The five Daikundi commanders: Dawari, Fedayi, Salehi, Muballeghzada, Sadaqat

These five men, all local Hazara commanders from Daikundi province, joined the Taliban during the insurgency, actively fighting the forces of the Republic, or in the Republic’s last weeks or days, helping the Taliban capture their localities and consolidate their rule there. After August 2021, all but one was appointed to a government position and were a useful symbol of local Hazara representation as the Emirate established its writ in this Hazara-majority province.

Fedayi and Salehi, the two early joiners

Muhammad Ali Fedayi and Esmatullah Salehi both joined the Taliban well before the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate, Fedayi, as early as 2013, and Salehi in 2019. After the takeover, they were rewarded with district governor positions.

Fedayi, who is from Charkh village of Miramor district, joined the Taliban after he was accused of killing the director of Shahristan district prison, Ghulam Ali Mujahed, along with his son.^[6] The accusation was made by another of the commanders featured in this report, Muhammad Aref Dawari, who was then an advisor to the district chief of police. The murder victim, Ghulam Ali Mujahed, a former commander, was affiliated with Dawari, while the alleged murderer, Fedayi was supported by Dawari’s rivals, such as MPs Raihana Azad and Muhammad Nur Akbari (also a former senior commander) and the influential figure, Dr Muhammad Ali, who became deputy governor of Daikundi under the Republic.

Fedayi rejected Dawari’s accusation of murder, saying his intention was to defame him. He fled to Kabul and then to Quetta in Pakistan, where he joined the Taliban. The Taliban subsequently released a video in 2013, introducing him as “one of the famous Hazara commanders of Shahristan district.” In the video, Fedayi claimed he had joined the Islamic Emirate with 50 commanders and mujahedin (though he only named four who were with him in Quetta).^[7] He said the Taliban represented the law and were Muslim, that jihad against the US was the same as jihad against the Soviets and that reports that the Islamic Emirate “beheaded and cut the throats of the Hazaras” was enemy propaganda. The video aimed to portray the movement as multi-ethnic and nationwide.

Esmatullah Salehi joined the Taliban in 2019. Originally from Siyah-Dara of Miramor district, Salehi had been working as a bicycle mechanic in Jawz Bazar, Miramor, after spending a few years in prison for adultery. In June 2019, he killed three relatives in an ambush in Siyah-Dara over a legal dispute, according to a former prosecutor from Daikundi. When the government tried to arrest him, he fled to Jalrez district of Maidan Wardak province, where he joined the Taliban. Later, he moved to Ghazni, where the Taliban told him to join Fedayi whom he was already close to.

Fedayi and his forces, now including Salehi, started carrying out attacks against the Republic’s security forces in Miramor in 2020 (see for instance, this 10 July 2020 report by Hasht-e Sobh).^[8] In the months leading up to the fall of the Republic, Fedayi’s attacks became more frequent. For instance, on the night of 16/17 June 2021, Fedayi and Salehi attacked a security post in Jawz Bazar of Miramor district but were repelled by security forces (see this RTA report).^[9] On 14 July 2021, RTA, quoting district governor Aref Yasa, reported that a police vehicle had been destroyed by a mine planted by the Taliban in Tirah Bargar village, also of Miramor. Less than a month later, Fedayi and Salehi’s forces had attacked security posts in Chahar Sad Khana of Miramor but were again repelled, according to Yasa, quoted in this Bakhtar news report. Salehi was wounded and went to Ghazni, where he had just recovered when the Islamic Republic government collapsed.

Fedayi received a promotion on 18 July 2021, appointed as military commander of Shahristan (see this video on social media showing Fedayi in the Khalaj area of Gizab district with an appointment letter from the Taliban’s shadow governor for Daikundi).

Aref Hussein Dawari, a local strongman under all regimes

Aref Hussain Dawari was one of the three commanders who helped the Taliban forces as they seized control of Daikundi in 2021. He had been a powerful and sometimes destabilising force in his district under the Republic. Dawari comes from a powerful family affiliated with Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami and is from the Olqan area of Shahristan. He and his two brothers effectively ruled Shahristan from 1994 to 2001.^[10]

When the Taliban took over the area in 1998, Dawari cooperated with them and was appointed as the head of their reserve unit in Shahristan. He was accused of numerous human rights abuses during the jihad, the civil war years and under the previous Taliban government; under the Republic, alleged victims and their relatives petitioned the courts in Daikundi and Kabul to put him on trial, including for the alleged murder of 39 people, and for rape and looting, in Shahristan and Miramor districts (see this detailed article from 2018 in Hasht-e Sobh). Under the Republic, Dawari, who was considered close to Mohaqeq, served as Shahristan district chief of police, chief of NDS and head of criminal investigation. His wife, Shirin Mohseni, an MP from Daikundi, was a senior member of Mohaqeq’s party.

Muhamad Ali Sadaqat

Sadaqat has switched sides many times over the years, including spending periods of time with the Taliban. He is originally from the Posht-e Roq area of Khedir district and started as an ordinary fighter at the beginning of the civil war in the early 1990s, slowly becoming an influential figure at the district level (according to this 2019 report by Etilaat Roz). When the Taliban took Daikundi during the first Emirate, Sadaqat was, according to Niamatullah Ibrahimi, one of their “most significant” allies, along with Dawari, but he did not have an official position within the administrative or military structure.^[11]

After the Taliban were ousted from power in late 2001, many key positions were doled out to former jihadi commanders, but Sadaqat was not given a post. In response to this perceived affront, he turned against the Republic, sometimes in open confrontation, operating in the districts of Khedir, Ishtarlay and Sang-e Takht wa Bandar (as then-chief of police of Daikundi Abdul Rezaq Elkhani noted in this November 2012 Radio Azadi report). Sadaqat was persuaded to join the Republic’s various peace and reintegration initiatives several times over the years and was even offered the rank of brigadier general in command of the Badghis-Faryab highway brigade in October 2012, a post he never took up (see BBC Persian report). He was an unsuccessful candidate in the 2018 parliamentary elections and continued to be a troublesome presence in the area.

In April 2021, as the Taliban offensive started to gain strength, Sadaqat gathered his men in the Ghamqul area of Khedir. On 13 April 2021, the head of the Labour and Development Party, Zulfiqar Omid, posted photos of himself and Sadaqat with a caravan of armed men, whom he described as “the most experienced guerrillas,” who had formed what they called the “Dai Chahar unit.” Omid described them as part of the “Second Resistance Front,” about which there was much talk at the time (the name echoes what the anti-Taliban forces of the United Front, more commonly known as the Northern Alliance, called their fight against the first Emirate, the ‘resistance’ ­– see AAN reporting here). Then, in a murky chain of events, Republic security forces arrested five of Sadaqat’s men and confiscated their equipment  — guns, AK-47s, blankets, a Wi-Fi system, a solar panel, Second Resistance Front posters and cash (Radio Nasim).^[12] It appeared that Sadaqat’s initiative had not been authorised. Indeed, a resistance front in Daikundi never did materialise. Instead, Sadaqat surrendered the district to the Taliban on 14 August 2021 and went to the provincial capital Nili the day after.

Baqer Muballeghzada

Muballeghzada is the third Hazara commander in Daikundi who switched to the Taliban during the last days of the Republic. He is the son of the Harakat-e Islami commander, Sheikh Anwar Muballegh, from Ishtarlay district, who was locally influential. The Muballeghzadas’ allegiance to the Republic government was always in question, but according to a former prosecutor, Muballeghzada really turned against it after he lost his seat in the 2014 provincial council election; although he had a high number of votes in the preliminary results, another candidate, Sayed Zakaria Hashemi, affiliated with former MP Nur Akbari, was declared the winner.^[13]

In the last years of the Republic, the government made several attempts to either co-opt or defeat the Muballeghzadas. On 27 June 2019, a clearance operation was launched in Ishtarlay district to disarm Baqer Muballeghzada and hisbrother and their men, which resulted in four dead, six wounded and two arrests (see this report by the then governor’s office). In October 2020, an attempt was made to find a peaceful settlement, with a 19-member delegation comprising members of political parties, the provincial council, ulema council, the security agencies, women, civil society activists and judges, sent to Ishtarlay to talk with the ‘illegally armed men’ (see this Radio Nasim report quoting Daikundi governor Zia Hamdard). The negotiations did not succeed.^[14] On 18 May 2021, Muballeghzada issued a statement in response to another incursion by security forces from Ishtarlay, Sang-e Takht and Khedir in which he warned that if the local government did not give up its unacceptable behaviour, he would take ‘necessary actions’ against it.

As the Taliban were poised to take over Daikundi in August 2021, Muballeghzada – like Sadaqat – is said to have collected weapons and supplies from Ishtarlay and its surrounding districts. He then helped the Taliban capture Ishtarlay on 14 August 2021. A few days later, according to local sources, he travelled to Nili and announced his support for the new Taliban governor of Daikundi.

How Daikundi’s Hazara commanders have fared under the Taliban

After their return to power, the Taliban authorities appointed four of the five commanders from Daikundi discussed in this report to local government positions: three as district governor (Dawari for Shahristan, Salehi for Miramor, and Fedayi for Ishtarlay)^[15] and Muballeghzada as provincial head of the Urban Development Department. Two of the five – Dawari and Sadaqat – had already worked for the first IEA in the 1990s.

Sadaqat was not given any position after the takeover. Indeed, he fell out of favour with the Emirate almost immediately. He moved into the provincial capital, Nili, before the Taliban arrived. It had turned into a ghost town, he said, and he wanted to “serve as a bridge between the Taliban and the people” (see this August 2021 interview with Radio Nasim). The following day, after Emirate forces had also arrived, he was detained with several of his men after an altercation. According to most accounts, the argument began when Sadaqat and his men carried the body of a man they said had been killed by the Taliban to the governor’s office building to demand an explanation. There, they were reportedly mistreated by the guards. Sadaqat and his men returned to the temporary base he had set up in the building of the mostofiat, or finance department, where they were subsequently surrounded, disarmed and detained (see, for instance, this Radio Nasim report).^[16]

The following day, 17 August 2021, a large group of elders from Nili and Khedir requested the new Daikundi governor, Amanullah Zubair, to release Sadaqat. Zubair told them that Sadaqat must first hand over his weapons and ammunition. However, the chief of police, Sediqullah Abed, refused to allow Sadaqat to go, saying he had, Radio Nasim reported, “taken up arms against” him the day before. Sadaqat and his men were eventually released on 18 August (see Radio Nasim reports here and here).^[17]

During a press conference on 19 August, police chief Abed dismissed the incident as insignificant and a “personal issue” and said that Sadaqat himself had released his men and had acknowledged that what they had done constituted “a rebellion according to the Islamic Emirate’s principles.”^[18]

Sadaqat was not appointed to any formal position after his release but continued to work with the new authorities, at least in the early period immediately after the takeover. According to this Etilaat Roz report, he led the Taliban forces in an incident in Khedir on 30 August 2021, where the attempted disarmament of former government security forces resulted in the death of 13 people – two civilians and 11 former members of the security forces (according to Amnesty International, 9 of the 11 former ANDSF were executed after they had surrendered). Sadaqat spent some time in Iran shortly after the Khedir incident, but ultimately settled back in Daikundi. Despite not having any official role in the local administration, he was again accused of assisting the Emirate forces in another controversial raid, this time in Sewak Sheber village in the provincial centre on 22 November 2022 (see media reports here and here), an accusation Sadaqat has denied (see his media interview here). In that raid, the Emirate forces executed nine members of a family, including three children, a woman, and five men (see the statement by a family member here). On 8 August 2024, Sedaqat survived a targeted attack by unknown men in the Kotal Siwak area in Nili, which killed one of his affiliates and wounded two other people, including his wife. Sedaqat himself was only slightly injured (see media report here).

Muballeghzada was appointed early on as the provincial head of Urban Development. Then, on 9 May 2023, provincial intelligence forces arrested him in Nili while Emirate forces conducted house searches in his home district of Ishtarlay. They besieged his house and, reportedly, confiscated weapons and vehicles. According to media reports (see Independent Persian here), one of Muballeghzada’s brothers and several nephews were arrested in the centre of the district, while one or two other brothers fled to the mountains. The trigger for the arrest seems to have been the discovery, or suspicion, that Muballeghzada had hidden weapons and military vehicles near his house in Ishtarlay (several reports mentioned the unearthing of two buried Humvees).^[19] Muballeghzada was released after several people from Ishtarlay, including his relatives and brothers, met the governor to seek his help. After Daikundi governor Aminullah Obaid, with whom Muballeghzada had good relations, intervened, he was acquitted and reinstated in his post. Reports on how long Muballeghzada was detained vary – from a few days to a few weeks. On 17 February 2025, he was replaced with Salehi (see the 17 February 2025 announcement by the press office of Daikundi governor here) and has not been given a new role since then.

When Muballeghzada was arrested, there were unconfirmed reports that the Emirate had also arrested Dawari (see, for instance, the Etilaat Roz article cited earlier), which turned out not to be true, although local sources reported that he had fled.^[20] Dawari has since returned to his post, but local sources from Daikundi told the author that Emirate security forces had arrested several commanders affiliated to him (includingHekmatyar, Sayed Habib, Jafari and Khoda Rahem) and confiscated their weapons.

Less dramatic, but still notable, is that the three other Hazara commanders working for the Emirate – Dawari, Fedayi and Salehi ­– have been moved out of their home districts, apparently in an effort to prevent them establishing a power base. In late December 2022, the Emirate removed Dawari from his district of Shahristan and appointed him as district governor of Nawamesh. After the Emirate declared, in April 2023, that Nawamesh was no longer part of Daikundi, but was now in Helmand province, there was talk that Dawari would be dismissed, but he apparently travelled to Bamyan and utilised his good relations with Bamyan governor Abdullah Sarhadi to keep his post.

The positions of both Fedayi and Salehi have also been changed, several times. Fedayi has so far served as district governor of Ishtarlay, chief of police of Pato district, chief of police of Miramor, deputy commander of the provincial police’s operational unit (mo’win-e kandak amaliati polis) in Nili, and, as of 18 February 2025, chief of the first police district in Nili. Salehi has been district governor of Miramor, chief of police of Sang-e Takht wa Bandar, chief of police of Kejran, head of state-owned Afghanistan Oil and Gas Corporation in Daikundi and is currently the director of the provincial Urban Development Department.

A local journalist told the author he believes the IEA keeps moving these commanders from one district to another so that they cannot establish a foothold or influence in any one place. While this seems to be the Emirate’s normal practice in its dealings with both Pashtun and non-Pashtun officials (see Foschini’s paper on the northeast cited earlier), the local journalist also said that the Daikundi commanders featured in this paper are also under surveillance, and are restricted and unable to do anything without the Emirate’s permission – especially since the local administration is dominated by the provincial governor and his men, who are mainly Pashtun.^[21] The former prosecutor told the author that, in his opinion, these local Hazara commanders were mainly focused on clinging onto their own positions within the administration and therefore unable to do anything for the local population, even if they had wanted to.^[22]

The case of Mawlawi Mahdi Mujahed in Balkhab

Mujahed, from Hush village in Balkhab, Sar-e Pul, also joined the Taliban during the insurgency after falling out with the Republic. In the early years of the Republic, as detailed in a previous AAN report here, a land dispute with Ali Joma Akbari – a local commander affiliated with Muhammad Mohaqeq’s Hezb-e Wahdat faction – forced Mujahed to flee to Iran. After his return in 2010, Mujahed and his associates abducted Akbari’s son. While local elders intervened to mediate in the case, Mujahed and his comrades were arrested and charged with kidnapping. Mujahed was sentenced to 14 years in prison and incarcerated in neighbouring Jowzjan province. During his time there, he came into contact with Taliban members, particularly Mawlawi Abdul Haq Mansur, and studied religious texts. When he was released in 2017, Mohaqeq wrote that he had sought to mediate and resolve the dispute. However, Mujahed started to furtively receive weapons and resources from the Taliban, based on his links from prison and began to fight the local government. He attacked Balkhab’s district centre six days before the 2018 parliamentary election to impede the poll. Following this incident, security forces carried out a clearance operation, pushing him into Taliban-controlled areas. Afterwards, he played a role in Taliban-led attacks in other parts of the Sar-e Pul province.

Mujahed gained increased public and media attention in April 2020 when the Taliban introduced him in a 25-minute video as their (shadow) district governor for Balkhab. What distinguished Mujahed from other Taliban commanders and officials that had been interviewed for their Al-Emarah website, as AAN’s Thomas Ruttig reported at the time, was his Shia Hazara ethno-religious background and the fact that the Taliban introduced him as such, in an attempt to portray themselves as a countrywide movement.^[23] In the video, Mujahed called on his Hazara and Shia followers to join the Taliban’s fight against the US-led “Jewish and Christian invaders” in the same way they had fought alongside their “Sunni brethren” against the Soviets from 1979 to 89. More importantly, he praised the Taliban as “inclusive” and devoid of ethnic discrimination.

Following the Taliban takeover of the country in August 2021, Mujahed was appointed head of intelligence in Bamyanprovince. It seemed that by appointing him to an important position in the heart of Hazarajat, the Taliban wanted to reward him for fighting in their ranks, to entice others into cooperating with them as they consolidated their writ, and to use him as a Hazara face for their rule.

However, there were soon disputes and tensions. On 4 November 2021, there was a clash between Mujahed and head of the Bamyan Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Mawlawi Maqbul Waqas – a Sunni Tajik from Bamyan – over the possession of a government vehicle. The confrontation, during which three members of Mujahed’s forces were injured, required the deputy governor of Bamyan to mediate between the two sides. In a statement (available here), Mujahed called Mawlawi Waqas “law-breaking, extortionist and rebellious” and accused him and his men of an “assassination attempt and terrorist attack” against other “IEA mujahedin.” Mujahed identified himself as a senior member of the IEA and accused Waqas of stealing people’s vehicles and properties, something which he said would tarnish the government in the eyes of the people. He further warned Mawlawi Waqas against “misus[ing] the IEA name” and causing disorder. Mujahed said the incident had been reported to “the competent authorities” in Kabul and would be investigated.

A day later, the Taliban sent a delegation comprised of members of the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) and the Ministry of Defence from Kabul to Bamyan to settle the dispute. A report by Radio Nasim quoted the head of Bamyan’s Information and Culture Department, Mawlawi Saif ul-Rahman Muhammadi, who confirmed that the clash had been over a vehicle and said that it had resulted from “a misunderstanding.” There are no public reports about the delegation’s findings.

Mujahed’s relationship with the IEA began to sour in other aspects as well. He expressed his support for girls’ education in speeches in Bamyan and Balkhab at a time when secondary schools had not been officially allowed to open (they were officially closed in March 2022). During a trip to Balkhab in January 2022, for example, he visited the Fatemiya Girls’ School (listed as a secondary school by the Ministry of Education in 2019), where he encouraged girls to continue their education and distributed notebooks and pens (see the video of his visit here).

Mujahed also raised the Emirate’s ire by increasingly expanding his influence and support base in Bamyan and Balkhab and seeking a say in decisions about those areas, as journalist Ayub Arvain highlighted here. For example, when the Emirate decided to establish a military base in Balkhab, Mujahed called on the district elders to prevent non-local forces from entering the district and to allow such a base only if residents of Balkhab were recruited (see this media report).

The Emirate removed Mujahed from his position as head of Bamyan Intelligence Department in January 2022 and appointed him Deputy Director for Conflict Resolution in the General Directorate of Intelligence in Kabul. When Mujahed refused to accept the new position, he was summoned to Kabul where he met several officials (see this 27 January 2022 Etilaat Roz report here). In an interview with Subh-e Kabul daily on 17 February 2022, he said the reason for his dismissal from Bamyan was not clear and he could not say whether it had been due to the clash over the government vehicle with Waqas. He recounted that when he was summoned by the “Islamic Emirate seniors” to Kabul and had meetings with them, the only thing they told him was that he was the “only [ethnic Hazara] person who had stood by the people in the jihad [alongside the Taliban]” and that it was in Kabul that he would be best positioned to address the people’s myriad problems in the Shia-majority provinces. It seems that by appointing Mujahed to a government post in the capital, however, the Taliban wanted to sever him from his local power base to keep him in check.

Mujahed retreated to Balkhab where he began criticising the IEA for excluding Hazaras from the government. In an interview there, he said, “After the Islamic Emirate came to power, the Hazaras have suffered the most” and that Hazaras “cannot spend their entire lives like this, whether or not they want to now, one day the people will stand against the Islamic Emirate” (see this report by The New York Times).

Mujahed quickly came into confrontation with Balkhab’s district governor, Mawlawi Attaullah (a Tajik), in his home village, Hush, over the exploitation of the local coal mines. Attaullah had, according to this media report, increased coal mining to both raise revenues for the Emirate and safeguard his personal share, while Mujahed asserted his rights to the coal-mine revenues (despite no longer having an official position).^[24] On 31 May 2022, Mujahed and Ataullah’s forces clashed for several hours.

On 7 June, Mujahed used his connections to get one of his aides, Ali Hussain Hakimi, appointed as district governor of Balkhab (see this report by Hasht-e Sobh), wresting control of the district from Attaullah, who had been out of the district after the 31 May clash with Mujahed. In response, the chief of police for Sar-e Pul issued a statement putting his weight behind Attaullah as the district governor, until a new figure was appointed.

The Emirate dispatched several delegations to Balkhab in an attempt to entice Mujahed away from his home district and restore central authority, but he refused to leave the district. He told a delegation that he would stop working with the government and live as an ordinary person under Taliban rule (see this 11 June 2022 report by Etilaat Roz). In the meantime, former commanders and fighters from among the local Hazara and Shia communities continued to join Mujahed in Balkhab – by this time, he was becoming known as ‘Amir Mahdi, according to one of his aides, speaking to the author in June 2023. The aide claimed that Mujahed had, at that time, gathered up to 2,000 men under his command, showing a sense of grievance many Hazaras felt towards the current rulers, as hundreds of people, mainly locals, rallied around Mujahed as he sought to demand the Hazara community’s rights.

Hazara-Shia actors’ failed attempt at precluding the Balkhab conflict

As the tension between the Emirate and Mujahed escalated towards armed conflict, most of the main Hazara and Shia actors refrained from open support for him. Instead, many voiced concern, called for dialogue or attempted to mediate. Among the old guard leaders outside the country, Mohaqeq was the most vocal critic of the IEA’s treatment of Mujahed. In a Facebook post on 15 June 2022, he said the massing of forces around Balkhab demonstrated the Taliban’s determination to “purge” their ranks of commanders of different ethnic backgrounds. He called on them to resolve their issues with their only Hazara commander through dialogue and described the intended crackdown as a “war against the Hazara people,” which, he said, would grip all Hazara-majority areas. Sources close to Mohaqeq told the author at the time that he had privately ordered his affiliates in Balkhab to support Mujahed. (Mohaqeq is a member of the High Council of National Resistance to Rescue Afghanistan; the council had earlier announced general support for the “ongoing armed resistance” against the Emirate – but did not, explicitly, come out in support of Mujahed.)

The Shia Ulema Council of Afghanistan announced on 16 June 2022 that it had appointed a delegation comprised of influential people from ten provinces to seek a “peaceful resolution of the Balkhab issue” and that “a high-ranking Islamic Emirate official” had assured them there would be no military action until the delegation had completed its work. Grand Ayatollah Vaezzada Behsudi had been asked to lead the delegation, as demanded by Mujahed, but Vaezzada introduced his chief of staff, Dr Yaqubi, as his representative and made a host of demands from the government, including “full guarantees” for the implementation of any agreement (see this Facebook post from 18 June 2022). It is unclear whether the Emirate accepted his conditions or not, but in the end, the delegation did not carry out its mission.

The most active mediators seem to have been Sayed Sufi Gardezi, Sheikh Madar Ali Karimi and Hussain Sangardost – the (former) aides respectively of Mohaqeq, Khalili and Mudaber, who engaged in several rounds of attempted mediation.^[25] Since the re-establishment of the Emirate, the three had been working together as part of an ad hoc coalition to represent the Hazara and Shia community to the new government (see AAN’s previous report for more details). In this case, it seemed they mainly tried to get Mujahed to comply with the Emirate’s orders. Sources in Kabul told the author at the time that a delegation including Madar Ali Karimi and Sufi Gardezi had asked Mujahed on behalf of the IEA to hand over Taher Zuhair, the former governor of Bamyan, who had come out of hiding to join Mujahed’s forces (more on Zuhair later). In June 2023, a supporter of Mujahed from Balkhab told the author that Karimi and Gardezi wanted Mujahed not only to come to Kabul but also to allow two battalions of Taliban forces to be deployed in Balkhab, with no local representation – thus asking him to accept one of the Emirate’s policies that had first sparked his opposition. According to this source, they told Mujahed there was no point in voicing his demands. They essentially sought to persuade him to give in to the Emirate’s demands.

After several high-ranking Taliban delegations failed to cajole Mujahed into returning to the government and coming to Kabul, the Emirate decided to take military action. It dispatched forces from neighbouring provinces and attacked Balkhab district on the night of 22/23 June 2022.^[26] The following day, Mujahed’s associates accused the Emirate of “imposing war” on the district and claimed their forces had successfully repelled two attacks in the Ab-e Kalan area of Qom-Kotal, one of the entrances to Balkhab district (see BBCreport here). Mujahed’s aides said that, in addition to carrying out air strikes, the Emirate had used a suicide bomber in the attack (who they said had self-detonated when Mujahed’s forces captured two Emirate fighters, thereby killing at least four people and wounding nine others) (see BBC report here).

Mujahed’s forces were unable to withstand the superior power of the Emirate. After three days, on 25 June 2022, the defence ministry announced that the “clearance operation” had ended, claimed its forces had captured the “areas where the rebels were present” without resistance and that clearance operations were ongoing in remote areas of the district “without obstacles.” Mujahed and some of his men fled to the mountains, where they laid low and refrained from further military activities, while “hundreds of others hid their weapons and melted back into their villages,” as reported by (The New York Times).

The capture of Balkhab by a dissatisfied Hazara commander from within the Emirate’s own ranks had been followed with great interest, both inside and outside Afghanistan, including by the National Resistance Front (NRF), led by Ahmad Massud and former Vice-President Amrullah Saleh. When IEA forces launched their incursion into Balkhab, NRF spokesman Sibghatullah Ahmadi described them on X as “occupiers” that had “carried out an assault … on the brave and justice-seeking people of Balkhab.”^[27]

Iran, on the other hand, accused the United States of orchestrating the conflict. Iran’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, wrote on X on 26 June 2022 that the conflict illustrated America’s priority to create “targeted chaos” in Afghanistan by inciting an “ethnic and religious war” in which Hazaras and Tajiks would be the main victims.^[28]

Following the IEA forces’ entry into the district centre, reports of human rights abuses emerged. For example, UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, tweeted that he had received “[d]isturbing reports of extrajudicial killings, civilian displacement, property destruction and other human abuses.” He said that an information blackout, internet cuts and denial of access to media and human rights monitors hampered verification. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission in exile said in a statement posted on its website (which is no longer active) that they had evidence the security forces had shot and killed a number of civilians, set fire to houses, killed detainees, including those who had surrendered, carried out airstrikes on civilian areas, caused displacement of families into the mountains, cut telecommunication and the internet and closed connecting routes. Etilaat Roz reportedthat it had received a list of more than 50 civilians killed by Emirate forces, 36 of whom had already been buried. A month later, on 19 July 2022, UNAMA reported that around 27,000 people had been displaced following the fighting, and that humanitarian partners had provided aid to “more than 10,000 people in Balkhab and 6,000 in Bamyan.”

The IEA rejected all such reports. For example, on 27 June 2022, in response to Amnesty International that had expressed grave concerns at “reports of summary executions and harm to civilians in Balkhab,” spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed called the reports “baseless” on X, saying there had been no cases of civilian harm in Balkhab.^[29]

A person from Balkhab who was based in Mazar-e Sharif told the author in June 2023 that, following the fighting, there had indeed been widespread arrests, which in many cases had involved people being required to pay money, hand over weapons or provide guarantees to ensure their release. He said the Emirate’s security forces continued to have a heavy presence in Balkhab a year after the clash: “There are groups of Taliban forces in almost every village. And they treat the people however they wish. There is no accountability.”

A few months after the fighting, Hussain Sangardost, a Hazara from Behsud district of Maidan Wardak, was appointed district governor, a move which could be seen as an effort to placate the local population. However, according to the same local source, Sangardost did not have much authority and could not do much to intervene with the Emirate forces in the area or help the local population, given the Emirate’s heavy military presence.

Mawlawi Mujahed’s arrest and reported death

Two months after the operation in Balkhab, on 17 August 2022, the Ministry of Defence unexpectedly announced that the border forces had killed Mujahed in the area between Herat province and Iran “while he was trying to escape to Iran.” The statement called him “the leader of the rebels of Balkhab” and added that he had been “identified and punished for his actions.”^[30]

Hasht-e Sobh on 18 August 2022 quoted a Taliban source who said that Emirate forces had killed Mawlawi Mujahed hours after arresting him and after contacting Kandahar [presumably for instructions] and had buried his body in the mountainous border area between Iran and Afghanistan. According to the source, “They put a turban on his head, took his confession and then executed him.”^[31]

Mawlawi Mujahed’s aides responded to the Emirate’s announcement with confusion. They sent a message to the BBC confirming his arrest but said he was “still alive” and called on the Taliban to treat the captive “in accordance with Islamic instructions and human rights norms” and to not harm him without trial. They also provided details about his arrest, saying he had been arrested from Bonyad village at the Islam Qala border at 2 am on 17 August 2022 and transferred to the Herat intelligence department. Other sources close to Mujahed told Hasht-e Sobh that he had not been arrested or killed and that they would soon release a video of him (which they never did). Up till now, his aides and relatives have not been able to confirm his death. One of his supporters told the author in June 2023 that they still considered the report of Mujahed’s death merely “a claim” since the Emirate, other than their statement, had provided no evidence to support it.^[32]

Mohaqeq provided his own account of the circumstances surrounding Mujahed’s flight to Iran. After the Taliban’s assault on Balkhab, he said, Mujahed’s father and family had fled to Iran, along with thousands of other families. Mujahed, he said, had been travelling to visit his family when he was arrested in “an ambush” in Bonyad village and then summarily executed. Mohaqeq called the manner in which Mujahed was killed a war crime and warned that the seeds of resistance would now take stronger roots (see his Facebook post on 17 August 2022 here).

Former Vice-President Danesh, on the other hand, cast doubt on the Emirate’s report, saying the Taliban had provided no evidence for Mujahed’s death, but if it were true, his “martyrdom,” as a result of “torture, summary execution and without fair trial,” would be “a crime against humanity.”^[33]

Except for the criticism by Mohaqeq and Danesh from outside the country, the reaction from other Hazara and Shia leaders was, once again, muted. This aligns with the overall posture of Hazara and Shia leaders under the Emirate of avoiding any action that could provoke reprisals. It probably also relates to the fact that, after the routing of the resistance in Panjshir, these leaders did not believe there was any chance of an armed revolt being successful. The suppression and reported killing of Mawlawi Mujahed served as a clear indication – and warning – that standing against the Emirate would not be tolerated. Indeed, the whole Balkhab episode showed what could happen in response to a potentially legitimate demand – that local resources should, at least in part, benefit locals – and the figure making it – who had been praised when he served the Emirate’s interests, but who was in no way part of the core group. The escalation into violence, suppression and subsequent heavy-handed rule made Hazaras and Shia Muslims feel vulnerable. It has also proved a deterrent against them trying to assert their rights under the current rule.

Since then, people from Balkhab have accused the Emirate of continuing to target Mujahed’s supporters. For example, on 3 May 2023, Muhammad Hussain Ehsani, an influential figure from Balkhab, was, according to his relatives (cited by the Independent Persian here), taken from a hotel in Mazar-e Sharif by armed men and later tortured and killed. His body was delivered to his relatives at a hospital the following day. They were reported as blaming the Emirate^[34]

If the IEA was behind Ehsan’s killing, it is unclear whether he was targeted for his local political advocacy or his involvement in Mujahed’s uprising the previous year. He sustained a minor injury during the three-day attack on Balkhab in June 2022 and lost one of his bodyguards, according to a local source speaking to the author. He went on the run after the Emirate captured the district centre, but officials had apparently contacted him to offer assurances that he would be safe, the local source said.^[35] According to the Independent Persian report cited above, Ehsani had in the months before his killing lobbied officials in Kabul to persuade them to give Balkhab’s mine contracts to local companies so that residents of Balkhab would be employed. The local source confirmed Ehsani’s advocacy on behalf of Balkhab residents. His death had a chilling effect on the Hazara community.

On 6 November 2024, Yusuf Ali Rastagar, a local Hazara elder, was killed in Balkhab possibly because of his affiliation or what was believed to be his association with Mujahed.^[36] According to media reports, his body had been thrown down from the mountains. Reports vary about his affiliation. Some said Rastagar was affiliated with Mohaqeq and was returning from Iran to Balkhab hoping to benefit from the general amnesty under the Emirate. A second account indicated that Rastagar had recently met Ahmad Massud in Tehran and was sent to Balkhab to open a new front against the Emirate there. According to that account, his arrival was reported to the Emirate forces who attacked him; after he fled to the mountains, an Emirate infiltrator shot him and then threw his body down the mountain. Other media reported that he had been affiliated with Mawlawi Mujahed, led the resistance for a while after Mujahed’s reported death and then fled to Iran. He was said to be returning to Balkhab to resume the resistance when he was killed. A source from Balkhab confirmed this final account to the author on 14 January 2024.

Another Mujahed ally, Taher Zuhair, had earlier chosen to surrender, perhaps fearing he would meet the same fate as Mujahed. On 11 May 2023, the media reported that he had surrendered to the Emirate and published a photo showing him standing among local officials (see Etilaat Roz here; Tolonews here). Zuhair was the last governor of Bamyan under the Republic. He fled the provincial centre during the night of 14 August 2021, together with other government officials, after which the Taliban captured the city the following morning without any resistance (see media report here). During and immediately after the Taliban takeover, Zuhair rejected proposals by other Bamyan officials to leave Afghanistan, according to a 12 May 2023 report by the Independent Persian. Instead, he remained in hiding and later joined Mujahed as his adviser after he fell out with the Emirate.

Following the ousting of Mujahed by the Emirate, Zuhair made several attempts to exit Afghanistan through illegal routes and take refuge in Iran. However, after the reported killing of Mawlawi Mujahed in August 2022, he abandoned this plan, according to the Independent Persian report. The Emirate launched several search operations in Bamyan and Samangan to capture him, but failed to apprehend him – until his surrender on 11 May 2023.

The Emirate was quick to spin his surrender as an endorsement. The day after, Taliban-affiliated Hurriyat Radio tweeteda short video in which Zuhair said he had “trusted the Islamic Emirate,” something which had been difficult at first because of what he called “the widespread negative propaganda against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in the past years.” He addressed “all those who still insist on continuing the war,” saying that war and violence were not the solution to Afghanistan’s problems. Two days later, on 14 May 2023, Zuhair attended a press conference by Samangan provincial officials where provincial governor Abdul Ahad Haji Fazli welcomed him into “the fold of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” and called on the opposition inside and outside the country to denounce war. The Samangan head of intelligence, Muhammad Hashem Shafiq, said Zuhair had joined the Emirate as a result of mediation by a delegation from Upper Dara-ye Suf. Zuhair echoed Shafiq’s statement, saying he “joined the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” as a result of efforts by the governor and mediation by what he called “people’s peace delegation” (see this BBC Persian report).

There are contrasting reports, however, that say Zuhair surrendered under duress. Sources close to Zuhair told the media that the Taliban authorities had gained access to Zuhair after the arrest of one or more of his relatives (see this 12 May 2023 BBC report). This was also reported by Bamyan TV on 14 May 2023, which said the Taliban had arrested five of Zuhair’s family members about three months earlier, after which a group of elders negotiated an agreement with Emirate officials that Zuhair would denounce war and the Emirate would release his family members (see the video here). People close to Zuhair told the media that he had surrendered on certain conditions, including a “safe exit” from Afghanistan.^[37] Since then, he seems to have left the country and has started criticising the Emirate (for example, on 15 August 2024, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the fall of the Republic, Zuhair said in a Facebook post that capturing power by force in a multi-ethnic country would never bring stability.)

Zuhair’s surrender was met with approval from at least one senior Hazara, Asadullah Sadati, a former Daikundi MP and senior member of Khalili’s Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, who remains in Afghanistan. Sadati said in a Facebook post that, by surrendering, Zuhair had followed the Hazaras’ general policy of “opposing war and hostility,” which he said, “stemmed from the Hazaras’ collective wisdom under the current situation.” It was “exactly for the same reason,” Sadati said, that “the elders of our people cooperated in this case [Zuhair’s negotiated surrender].” Both Zuhair’s surrender and Sadati’s response illustrate the overall Hazara and Shia approach under the Emirate – of negotiation, acquiescence and avoidance of conflict.

While Mujahed’s reported death had already dealt a major blow to the continuation of the Balkhab resistance, Zuhair’s surrender more or less ended the possibility of a revival of the front, especially since the Emirate has kept a watchful eye on the district as evidenced by the recent killing of Rastagar. Zuhair’s surrender also dampened the potential for any other uprising against the Emirate among Hazara communities in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

The Taliban’s accommodation of local Hazara commanders in Daikundi province and Balkhab district of Sar-e Pul can be scrutinised in three phases: the insurgency years, the IEA’s initial consolidation period after 15 August 2021, and the current, more settled situation.

During the insurgency, the Taliban sought to co-opt Hazara commanders who were on the run from the government and showcase their allegiance in order to signal that the movement was nationwide, multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian. This was demonstrated by the release of promotional videos when Mujahed and Fedayi joined the Taliban. In this phase, the Taliban used these commanders against the former government in their respective provinces by appointing them as shadow district governors or military commanders and using them to destabilise these provinces from within. This was especially important because the Taliban had little or no local sympathy or support.

After their return to power, the Taliban went through a consolidation period. They were still fighting the National Resistance Front in Panjshir, intent on preventing armed resistance from spreading to other provinces, and solidifying their control of areas that they had been unable to significantly infiltrate prior to their return to power. During this phase, the IEA appointed five of the six commanders discussed in this report to local government posts (and may well have also appointed the sixth, had he not, almost immediately, fallen out with the new administration). These appointments seemed motivated by a number of reasons. First, the Taliban rewarded those who had fought in their ranks or assisted them in their final takeover. Second, given the Taliban’s political rhetoric of an “inclusive political system,” both before and after the takeover (see, for example, their then deputy leader Serajuddin Haqqani’s February 2020 op-ed for The New York Times), these commanders were useful in providing a façade of inclusiveness. Third, the Taliban may well have needed their help in disarming the population and seeking out former government forces (as can be inferred from Sadaqat’s involvement in the incident in Khedir just after the takeover that resulted in the death of 13 people).

Once the Emirate had routed the Panjshir resistance and established full control of the country, they entered a post-consolidation period. Now, their primary objective in areas where they had never had strong support, appears to have been to ensure that the local commanders they had relied on to establish their writ did not gain influence in their respective districts and provinces.

While Mawlawi Mujahed asserted himself and sought to have a say in the decisions about his home district, or province of assignment, it appears the commanders in Daikundi have so far avoided defying Emirate orders or being seen to seek autonomy. From the outset, the Emirate has reacted harshly towards behaviour that it regards as being too demanding (for example, detaining Sadaqat after he asked for an explanation for the killing of his bodyguard) or as amounting to disobedience or outright rebellion (as exemplified by the arrest and reported execution of Mujahed). The commanders in Daikundi have endured detentions and relocations, reflecting their extremely limited power. At the same time, their acquiescence seems mirrored by a Taliban posture of not pushing them too hard as long as they keep themselves in check, so as not to risk completely losing their support (as illustrated by the reinstatement of Muballeghzada after his arrest and the early mediation attempts in the conflict with Mujahed).

Whether the IEA accommodates or suppresses these commanders, it is all too often the local population that suffers. If the commanders get into trouble with the Emirate authorities, the consequence is often a broad targeting of people suspected of affiliation with them, regardless of whether they are, in fact, linked. If they keep their heads down, local people are still left with local leaders with murky records and limited political clout – who, if they did want to bring the needs of the people to the higher authorities, cannot lend much weight to these requests. The result is that little benefit has been seen for the Hazara and Shia citizens in areas where they hold office.

Edited by Martine van Bijlert and Rachel Reid

* Ali Yawar Adili worked for AAN from 2016 to 2021, including as Country Director, and is now a Non-Resident Fellow at New York University’s Centre on International Cooperation. He holds a master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia University in New York.