A Pay Cut for Afghan Women Working in the Public Sector: “What can you do with 5,000 afghanis?”

The order by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), Hibatullah Akhundzada, to cut the salaries of women on the public payroll to just 5,000 afghanis (70 US dollars) a month was a bombshell. The Amir’s order was short and ambiguously worded, driving anxiety and speculation: did it apply to all women working in the public sector – bureaucrats, teachers, doctors, policewomen, prosecutors – who go to the office every day? Or only those the Emirate has barred from coming to work, but who, up until now, have been paid in full? Jelena Bjelica and Roxanna Shapour (with input from the AAN Team) have been hearing from women who are or were working in the public sector about the Amir’s order and how it has affected their lives and family finances. They told AAN about the difficulties they already had making ends meet and their concerns about how they would weather the financial pressure if their salaries were cut.

News of the pay cap emerged in the last days of May 2024 after the acting Director of the Prime Minister’s Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA), Sheikh Nur ul-Haq Anwar, issued a circular instructing all government departments to set the salaries of all female staff at 5,000 afghanis. The circular had been prompted by an order signed by the Islamic Emirate’s Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, which said:[1]

The salaries of all female workers who were employed by the previous government and are currently receiving a salary from the Islamic Emirate should be set at 5,000 afghanis in all budgetary and non-budgetary units,[2] regardless of their previous wages (their salaries should all be the same). 

This sentence appears to have been the order in its entirety. It alone was quoted by many media outlets, on social media and in official letters, which were widely distributed (see, for example, BBC Pashto on 6 June and a letter from the Ministry of Economy below).

The news sparked confusion, concern, indeed fear, among Afghan women working in the public sector, which in Afghanistan is referred to as the civil service (see, for example, this report on teachers from ToloNews).[3] Women employed in the health sector in Herat and Kabul held protests, calling on the government not to reduce what they said were their already meagre wages (see, for example, Amu TV here). There was also condemnation from international human rights bodies; the United Nations Human Rights Commissioner, Volker Türk, called on the IEA to rescind the measure, saying “[t]his latest discriminatory and profoundly arbitrary decision further deepens the erosion of human rights in Afghanistan,” (the full statement, issued on 13 June 2024, can be read here).

The vagueness and lack of specificity in the Amir’s one-sentence order sparked questions by employees, the media, social media users and apparently even some state institutions, which urgently sought clarification. For example, the Ministry of Education’s internal correspondence, which was widely shared on social media (see the picture below), asked “whether the decree of His Excellency, the Supreme Leader, applies to all female employees or only those who are not reporting for duty.” The letter also explained that it would take time for the ministry to amend its automated salary payment system to accommodate the change. In response, the acting Minister of Education ordered that “the salaries of all female employees should be suspended until further notice,” presumably until the Amir’s office provided further guidance (see this post on X from 30 June and an English translation below).

Internal Ministry of Education correspondence seeking clarification. Translation by AAN

The confusion was only cleared up a month later, and then just partially, when on 7 July, ToloNews tweeted some “breaking news”:

[T]he Ministry of Finance confirms to Tolonews that female employees who come to work every day are currently receiving their salaries just like male employees.

The spokesperson of the Ministry of Finance adds that the monthly salaries of female employees who do not show up for their duties have been set at five thousand afghanis.

The following day, Pajhwok quoted the spokesperson of the Ministry of Finance, Ahmad Wali Haqmal: “Only those women who have been compelled to stay at home will be paid 5,000 afghanis … all [other] female government employees, including teachers and doctors, who report to their duties, will receive their salaries as before.”

However, as of this writing, no official written statement or new order clarifying the particulars of the Amir’s instructions has been issued.

The situation is still confused, because it is not clear how the order will be implemented. As the interviews below show, a month after the order, most female employees still did not know how much they would be paid.

What women say

To understand how the order is affecting female civil servants and their families, we interviewed 18 women. Our sample was based on accessibility, that is, we interviewed women in places where we had contacts and/or our network had access. Our interviewees included women who were currently working, those who had been told to stay at home, but were still receiving a salary, and two women who have lost their jobs since the Emirate takeover. We ensured geographic diversity by talking to women in the provinces – Daikundi, Kandahar, Zabul, Ghazni, Balkh, Bamiyan, Panjshir, Sar-e Pul, Farah and Paktia— both in rural and urban areas – and in the capital. The interviewees included a mix of professions – midwife, teacher, prosecutor, administrator, health professional, school principal, etc. The interviews were conducted between 2 and 11 July 2024 and comprised the following questions:

  1. How many people are contributing financially to your household?
  2. How much was your salary under the Republic?
  3. How much is your salary under the Emirate?
  4. Are you working from the office? Are you being paid, but not going to work?
  5. When did you last receive your salary?
  6. Was it 5,000 afghanis or was it the same amount you had been receiving under the Emirate?
  7. Do you normally get a salary top-up in addition to your base salary (for length of service, rank, qualifications, etc)?
  8. Have you been officially informed that your salary will be reduced?
  9. If there was a reduction in your salary, how will it affect the economy of your household and your life?

The table below highlights answers to some of these questions. We have intentionally omitted the occupation and location of interviewees from the table below to protect their privacy. Quotes later in this report do indicate the interviewee’s profession and province while providing no other identifying information.

*USD 1 = 70 afghani

As can be seen, 16 of our 18 interviewees were still on the public payroll. Of the remaining two, one had been fired in May 2022 and the other said she had not heard from her employer since January 2024. However, of the 16 employed women, only 11 were going to work; five had been sent home after the IEA came to power but continued going to the office to sign their attendance sheets as instructed by the Emirate. Of the 11 that were going to work, one had been hired after August 2021 and another who was told to stay home in August 2021, had, in the meantime, been called back into the office because of an increased workload.

The average number of members in a family in our sample was 7.2. Half of the interviewees – nine – were the sole breadwinners for their families.

Most of the women in our sample had already seen cuts in take-home pay in line with the Ministry of Finance’s December 2021 salary reductions, which applied to all workers, men and women. The cuts varied according to grade, but the average was a 9.8 per cent cut.[4]

Three women said they were still receiving the same salaries as under the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA). Three others had seen their salaries significantly reduced after August 2021 – one after being demoted from grade 2 to grade 3.

One interviewee said the Emirate had increased her salary, and later her pay was effectively increased again by an additional 1,000 afghani (USD 14) a month after the Emirate stopped deducting pension contributions in April 2024.[5]

None of our interviewees had received the reduced salary of 5,000 Afghani at the time of the interview, nor had they received their salary for the month of Saratan (22 June – 21 July). 10 out of the 16 had received their Jawza (22 May – 21 June) wages. Three had last been paid in Saur (22 April – 21 May), one in Hamal (21 March – 21 April) and two not since the final month of the last financial year, in Hut (22 February – 20 March). Such delays in the payment of salaries are not unusual.

How did the women find out about the cut?

Only three interviewees said their superiors had officially told them that their salaries would be reduced. A teacher in Farah province said they had been informed about the cut at an official meeting at the Department of Education and told to prepare themselves. She said the payment of salaries for the month of Saratan (21 June – 20 July) had been deliberately delayed because of the new order.

All other interviewees had heard about the planned reduction from their co-workers, group chats, the news or social media. Every interviewee described how anxious and fearful it had made them. For example, one woman working for the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in Sar-e Pul had heard about the news on a group chat:

An official letter [maktub] saying that the salaries of women who aren’t working will decrease to 5,000 afghanis was posted in a [WhatsApp] group. I don’t know much about it because I haven’t been officially informed, but the letter was posted in a WhatsApp group that was created to deal with the central government’s budgetary issues. There are employees from different government offices in the group. 

An employee of the National Statistic and Information Authority (NSIA) in Daikundi said she heard about the planned reduction on the news and social media. She was at a loss to explain why women civil servants who did the same job as their male colleagues would have their salaries reduced:

We haven’t received any official letters … but I’ve heard on the news and also on social media that a decree has been issued to reduce the salaries of female staff. It’s really upsetting for us because we work as hard as [our] male [colleagues], so why do they want to reduce our salaries? This is discrimination against women. Today, the finance manager said a letter had come saying women’s salaries will be 5,000 afghanis from the month of Jawza [22 May-21 June]. I hope it’s not true. Instead of [giving us] an increase, they [plan to] reduce our salaries! They shouldn’t do it. Delays in paying our salaries are normal, but the work pressure is the same as it was in the past…. This news will cause women psychological difficulties.

A prosecutor in Kabul who goes to work every day said she had heard about the salary cut from the media and despite her colleagues’ reassurances that the order would not affect her, the threat of a reduction in her wages had left her acutely anxious:

I first heard the news through the media. Later, an order came to our office. But officials in the department said it can’t be implemented [because] the decree doesn’t have a wareda and sadera [date of receipt or execution]. Until the issue is clarified, [they said]: Don’t worry. But it did really worry me. A few days later, an official letter did come from the Ministry of Finance and made it clear that the salaries of those who stay at home would be 5,000 afghanis and those who come to work every day would have the same salary as before – there would be no changes in their salaries. 

A midwife in Ghazni told a very similar story.

We haven’t been informed officially, but I heard from different sources and saw on social media that the government has decided to reduce the salaries of female employees. They’d already done it once [the December 2021 cuts to all employees’ wages] when they came to power and that’s already had its [ill] effects. People’s financial circumstances aren’t good. They can hardly manage to cover their daily expenses as it is. So, they shouldn’t reduce [our salaries] again.

If our interviews are any indication, the vagueness of the order’s wording caused a great deal of distress to female employees and their families, even those who might eventually discover they were not targeted for a wage cut. The fact that the order was not transmitted directly or officially to female employees, but was rather widely reported and discussed on media and social media, only exacerbated the confusion and concern.

Women in the public sector

The public sector in Afghanistan has been the biggest employer of women in the last 20 years. Under the last government, the number of women working in both the public and private sectors had been rising, precipitated in part by the Republic’s plans and policies designed to facilitate their access to jobs and other economic opportunities.[6] In those years, 18.5 per cent of Afghan women participated in the country’s labour force, but only 13 per cent of those women were in salaried positions, mainly in the public sector.[7]

The proportion of women working in the public sector, Afghanistan’s biggest source of paid work for both men and women, has fluctuated over the last 20 years between 18 and 26 per cent. In 2005 and 2020, for example, women accounted for 26 per cent of public sector workers, but in every year between 2014 and 2018, as well as in 2021, they accounted for 22 per cent.[8] A year after the fall of the Republic, the proportion was still 21 per cent (this was measured for the Afghan year, then 1401, equivalent to March 2022 to March 2023).[9]

Data taken from NSIA Afghanistan Statistical Yearbooks 2019 to 2022/23. Graph by AAN

Far fewer women were ever employed in higher grade positions; see the 2020 data in the graph below as an example. Furthermore, women’s participation varied significantly between ministries, with women underrepresented in all ministries except the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) and the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled. The IEA abolished Women’s Affairs in 2021 and transferred most of its female staff in the provinces to the provincial Directorates of Vocational Training, which itself has recently been merged with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Data taken from NSIA Afghanistan Statistical Yearbooks 2020. Graph by AAN

The total number of women working in the public sector under the Islamic Emirate remains elusive, with far higher figures than NSIA’s being reported by some government officials. For example, in its 23 July 2023 accountability session, the Ministry of Economy (MoE) said that “92,000 women work in the education sector and 14,000 in the health sector, they work in airports, banks, but as already mentioned, efforts are ongoing to prepare a suitable environment for women.” This would mean that some 106,000 women work in the education and health sectors alone, not taking into account women employed in other sectors. The figures are drawn from the AAN 2024 report ‘How The Emirate Wants to be Perceived: A closer look at the Accountability Programme’ (p 57). The same AAN report quotes the Ministry of Interior (MoI) saying that around 1,955 policewomen were serving in different fields and receiving salaries and the Ministry of Public Health reporting that women accounted for 22 per cent of its personnel (p 60).[10] It is not known, therefore, the potential number of women hit by the Amir’s order, but it is clear it is substantial.

Anxieties about an uncertain future

The abrupt nature of the Amir’s order put a spotlight on the precariousness of many Afghan women’s lives, in this instance, those working in the public sector. Their lives were already difficult, but they would have counted themselves among the lucky few who still had a regular income. Trying their best to keep their heads above water and provide for their families, this latest incursion on their right to a livelihood threatens to remove a safety net because, as one said: What can you do with 5,000 afghanis?

The quotes below reflect answers to the last question from our questionnaire: If there was a reduction in your salary, how would it affect the economy of your household, and your life? All interviewees said a salary cut would affect their lives dramatically. Many said they would have to leave their jobs because they could not survive on the reduced income. The midwife from Ghazni, for example, was concerned about how the anxiety was affecting their quality of work.

If someone is worried about their own life and expenses, how could they think about doing their job properly? People are already anxious about the news and, if it really happens, they’ll be hit hard. I’m the only person working in my family. No one else works because unemployment has increased. The cost of everything is very high – there’s the house rent, the electricity bill and other expenses. How can we manage if they reduce our salaries? They should have a thought for the people and if they don’t help or increase their salaries, at least, they should not reduce them.

Another midwife, from Kandahar, who sometimes gets paid by an NGO,[11] said she would leave her job if her salary was cut:

We hope the reduction won’t take place. We’re barely keeping on top of the necessities now. If the salaries are reduced, this’ll definitely harm the economy of our household badly. I’ll leave my job. So far, the salary [I get] from the NGO has supported our household. But if the NGO stops paying my salary and the government reduces my wages, I won’t go to the hospital even though leaving the job and losing even this 5,000 afghanis will badly affect my family’s finances, but it’s also very difficult to work full-time and do night shifts. 

A policewoman from Kabul, who had already taken her son out of school so that he could work and help support the family, told us that if the Islamic Emirate really does reduce salaries, it will be extremely hard for women, especially widows like her who have no adult man to support them and are not qualified for any work other than their current occupation:

My son sells plastic bags because I can’t cover all the family’s expenses with my income. He has to work even though it’s not his time to work – he should be in school. He only makes 50 afghanis (USD 71) a day, with a lot of difficulty, and sometimes he can’t sell any bags. It’s been a month since he fell ill and we’re wondering what to do. The cost of living is very high and our income is low. 5,000 afghanis would only be enough for the rent and electricity. The taxi for me to go to and from work is expensive. Sometimes, I get sick and have no money to go to a doctor. 5,000 afghanis can’t cover all our expenses. I hope this is only a rumour or a lie and they won’t reduce my salary. 

I ask the Islamic Emirate not to reduce the salary of any employee who’s working, whether she’s a policewoman, a doctor or a teacher. We’ve been serving our country. We carried on with the wages we got and lived with many problems. If they don’t increase the salaries, at least I hope they don’t reduce them.

The NSIA employee in Daikundi said that reducing the salaries of female civil servants amounted to an injustice:

If they really reduce the salaries of female employees, it will be a great disservice to women. It’s an injustice that’s done to them. Instead of reducing salaries, they should increase them because everything is expensive and we manage our lives with the wages they pay us. For example, from my salary, I pay 1,500 [USD 21] a month for the car fare to and from work. I also pay 1,500 afghanis a month for lunches. All our colleagues pay this much for lunches because the government doesn’t provide us with lunch and doesn’t pay for it either. My family is big and we have a lot of expenses. The price of goods has reached its peak. I spend 5,000 afghanis a month to buy flour, rice and oil. If the government pays us 5,000, we can’t do anything with it. It is really upsetting and so discouraging.

She appealed to the government:

We ask the government, if it has made such a decision, they should change it. Let us work in our country alongside men. Women work like men, so why should their income be reduced? 

A teacher in Paktia said that all female teachers in her province were working because there was a teacher shortage:

The salaries that I and other teachers receive are very low and not enough for our families. We have teachers who are their families’ breadwinners. What can they do with a salary of 5,000 afghanis? They cannot meet their needs…. What should they do with their children’s school expenses, illnesses, food and clothes? These decisions cause problems for everyone.

She went on to talk about the plight of female public sector workers who have been forced to stay home since the re-establishment of the Emirate:

In general, all women [civil servants], whether they go to work or [have to stay] at home, should return to their duties because women have [only] stayed at home according to the decision of the Emirate. I have friends who are suffering immensely because they’re at home. They want to return to their duties. We need women in every department and they should pay the salaries of all women.

She went on to expand on the overall economic situation and compared the current circumstances for public sector workers to life and work under the Republic:

In general, the people’s economy has been badly damaged. People have become unemployed…. government offices are closed to women. Most of those who worked in the previous government are now unemployed. They’ve not been asked to come to their duties again. People’s purchasing power is weakened. Security is good, but security alone cannot change people’s lives…. Poverty and hunger can also kill people. Unemployment is a big problem that all people struggle with … but especially women. This recent decree regarding the reduction of women’s salaries will make their lives worse…. Under the previous governments, if the salaries were low, they provided other facilities for their employees. For example, they gave them coupons. The rents were lower, the price of goods was not so high and people could manage their lives with lower wages.

The prosecutor in Kabul talked about the entreaties of her female colleagues who are still forced to stay at home and came to the office only to sign their attendance sheets:

Many of them developed psychological problems when they heard their salaries were going to be reduced. Most are the only breadwinners of their families – they’re widows, or they don’t have anyone else [in the household] who can work, or they can’t find work. Every day, our colleagues call and ask what changes have been made regarding salaries. Just last week, our colleagues who had come in to sign [their attendance sheets] were crying and begging the head of our department to convey their message to the authorities not to reduce their salaries. You can’t do anything with 5,000 afghanis. They asked the head of our office to ask the authorities how women who are breadwinners can live with 5,000 afghanis.

The teacher in Farah said news of the salary cut had been a blow coming on top of the cost of transport to faraway locations where teachers had been transferred to:

Recently, there have been forced transfers. The IEA has forced some of us to go to teach in the districts and villages. They say: You should go and teach in remote areas; that is your jihad and if you don’t have a mahram, you should leave your job. A lot of women did leave their jobs because the locations were far away and they didn’t have a mahram. For women who teach far away [from their home] areas, 5,000 afghanis can’t cover even the car fare. What about their other expenses? Most women like me are the only breadwinners of their families because their husbands are unemployed now. It’s also natural that we get sick sometimes and we need to pay for doctors and medicine. How can we cover all these expenses?

A high school teacher from Mazar-e Sharif who, like everybody else, had already seen her salary reduced since the Emirate took power, was particularly bleak about the future:

My salary has already been cut and that has had an ill effect. My purchasing power has already weakened. It’s not my fault. They’ve forced us to stay home and not teach. Now, they’re going to reduce [the salary] again. They want us to die gradually, and that is all it is.

From being told to stay home to cuts in pay

Two days after it took power, spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said that men and women would be working “shoulder to shoulder” in the Islamic Emirate.

The issue of women is very important. The Islamic Emirate is committed to the rights of women within the framework of Sharia. Our sisters, our men have the same rights; they will be able to benefit from their rights. They can have activities in different sectors and different areas on the basis of our rules and regulations: educational, health and other areas. They are going to be working with us, shoulder to shoulder with us. The international community, if they have concerns, we would like to assure them that there’s not going to be any discrimination against women, but of course within the frameworks that we have (see full transcript on Al Jazeera).

The pledge had been echoed earlier in the day by a member of the Taleban’s Cultural Commission, Enamullah Samangani, when he announced not only the IEA’s general amnesty for those who had worked for the Republic, but also that they were ready to “provide women with [the] environment to work and study, and the presence of women in different (government) structures according to Islamic law and in accordance with our cultural values” (see France 24).

A week later, the IEA appeared to change its stance: Mujahid said women should stay at home, the BBC reported on 24 August 2021: “Our security forces are not trained (in) how to deal with women – how to speak to women (for) some of them,” Mr Mujahid said. “Until we have full security in place … we ask women to stay home.” He called it a “temporary procedure.” Reports soon started emerging in the media that women working in government were being denied access to their places of work (see, for example, The Guardian on 19 September 2021).

In televised debates, in news and on social media, women raised concerns about their future under IEA rule and predicted that the qualifier “according to Islamic law and in accordance with our cultural values” would be used to deny them their rights as would the IEA refrain that they merely wanted to create an appropriate environment for women to be active in the workforce (see for example this 27 August 2021 Afghanistan International debate between the Republic’s last Deputy Minister of Education, Victoria Ghauri and a member of the Emirate’s Cultural Commission, Anamullah Samangani and this 10 September 2021 ToloNews Farakhabar programme with women’s rights activist, Tafsir Siaposh and Islamic scholar Abdul Haq Emad debating the right of women civil servants to return to work).

Finally, on 20 September 2021, the Emirate ordered women working for the government to stay home until further notice.[12] What emerged was a situation where most jobs previously filled by women were handed over to men and only those women whose jobs could not be carried out by a man, such as primary school teachers and health workers, were allowed to continue working.

The situation continued much the same until the recent order, although with greater pressure on women workers created by the Amir’s ban on women working for NGOs, international organisations and embassies issued in December 2022, the closure of universities to girls in the same month and the firming up of the ban on girls’ education beyond primary school. In the Accountability Sessions in summer 2023, there was even boasting about continuing to pay women who were at home, for example, by Director of the Secretariat of the Supreme Court Mufti Abdul Rashid Saeed:[13]

Despite these limits [imposed by foreigners, presumably a reference to sanctions], the Islamic Emirate continues to pay the salaries of all the employees who serve in the government. Women are at home, but the Islamic Emirate is dedicated to upholding their rights and according them the privileges they once enjoyed. Women continue to occupy the majority of office positions. In accordance with sharia, we grant women full rights.

Statements from various officials indicate that the plan to reduce salaries will affect only those women who have been forced to stay at home. The government’s motivation must be cutting costs. Pressure on the budget, which was only approved two months into the financial year, indicating a wrangling over the public finances, has been reported elsewhere, for example by the World Bank, which said in May that increased planned spending for 1402/March 2023-24 had left a budget deficit of 18.4 billion afghanis (USD 2.6 m). In earlier years since the Emirate took power, it said, quoting “anecdotal information,” the deficit had been covered by “treasury cash reserves left over from the republic era.” However, especially given the Emirate lacks borrowing options to finance its deficit, “the only viable strategies are to increase domestic revenues or cut unnecessary spending.”[14]

Cutting the wages of women compelled to stay at home may make budgetary sense and it is a relatively easy way, politically, to cut costs, given they are a group with little political clout or public voice. However, for the women themselves, the loss of income will be a heavy blow, especially as they have been forced to be economically inactive through no fault of their own. They feel they are left out in the cold. Moreover, it should be stressed that, nearly two months after news broke that the IEA planned the salary cap, there is still no official word about how it is to implement its plan and who, exactly, it applies to. Even if women fortunate still to be working in the public sector continue to be paid their salaries in full, the vaguely worded order and lack of clarity ever since has left them and their families needlessly racked with anxiety about the future.

Edited by Kate Clark 


References

References
1 All English language translations are by AAN.
2 A budgetary unit is a state entity, such as a ministry, that by law can have allocations in the national budget, whereas non-budgetary units do not have explicit allocations in the national budget (budget codes) and are often, by not always, established for a specific time period and purpose.
3 The government of Afghanistan defines all government employees except military personnel as civil servants.
4 In December 2021, almost all government workers, male and female, saw their salaries cut by the newly re-established Islamic Emirate. University professors appeared to be the only group who received a pay rise. See Figure 6 on page 30 of this AAN 2023 report, ‘What Do the Taleban Spend Afghanistan’s Money On? Government expenditure under the Islamic Emirate’.
5 The Amir’s order followed another made in April 2024 that had abruptly abolished the government’s pension system. Since the fall of the Islamic Republic, retired public sector workers have not been paid their pensions. However, the Amir’s April 2024 order, which meant that pension contributions were no longer deducted from current workers’ salaries, signalled the unlikelihood that the state would start paying retirees their pensions ever again. See AAN reporting on the difficulties faced by Afghanistan’s public sector pensioners here.
6 These included the 2007-2017 National Action Plan for Women (NAPWA), the 2015 National Action Plan on Women Peace, and Security, and the 2017-2021 Women Economic Empowerment National Priority Programme.
7 The World Bank defines the labour force as comprising: “people ages 15 and older who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. It includes people who are currently employed and people who are unemployed but seeking work as well as first-time job-seekers. Not everyone who works is included, however. Unpaid workers, family workers, and students are often omitted, and some countries do not count members of the armed forces.” 

The figures quoted in the text are from the Bank’s 2018 Afghanistan Issues Note: Managing the Civilian Wage Bill, which cited the 2013-14 Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS) that indicated that only 18.5 per cent of women were then participating in the labour force. “Within this small, employed population,” it said, “only 13 per cent of female labour is in salaried positions, suggesting that female participation in the civil service is an important anchor for female participation in formal sector salaried employment.”

8 The data is taken from figure 5 on page 12 of the World Bank’s 2018 Afghanistan Issues Note: Managing the Civilian Wage Bill; table 1 on page 2 of 2020 ‘Women’s Inclusion in Afghanistan’s Civil Services’, published by Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS), as well as NSIA Statistical Yearbooks here.
9 See the NSIA Statistical Yearbook 2022/23, published on 5 February 2024.
10 In its 2023 accountability session, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI) said it had provided 7,263 business licences in the previous year, 1,000 of which were to women.
11 In Afghanistan, sometimes an NGO pays teachers or health workers. When that happens, the government does not pay their salaries for the months they get paid by the NGO. Then, when the NGO stops paying, they go back onto the government payroll.
12 See ‘Tracking the Taliban’s (Mis)Treatment of Women’, published by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and an AAN report which scrutinised the legal basis for activists’ calls for the Emirate to be taken to the International Criminal Court over its policies on women and girls, ‘Gender Persecution in Afghanistan: Could it come under the ICC’s Afghanistan investigation?.
13 See pp 49-50 of the AAN’s How The Emirate Wants to be Perceived: A closer look at the Accountability Programme.
14 See the Bank’s May Economic Monitor.

A Pay Cut for Afghan Women Working in the Public Sector: “What can you do with 5,000 afghanis?”
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The Daily Hustle: Going on a picnic with your family, if you’re a girl 

Going on a picnic and spending time with your family, enjoying Afghanistan’s natural beauty, is a favourite pastime for Afghan families, especially in springtime. However, since the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) has imposed many restrictions on women and older girls, public parks in the country have largely become no-go areas for them. AAN has been hearing from one girl about the hoops she had to jump through to get permission from her father to go on a family picnic and how the simple pleasures of life, like spending the day with your family in northern Afghanistan’s lush green hills, are not so simple anymore. 

 

We used to go on outings several times a year, especially during Nawruz,[1] but that was before. In those days, women in our family would go to parks by themselves, but nowadays people are uneasy about being stopped and questioned by the Taleban. So, we stopped going. But this year, for the first time in two years, we did go on a picnic.

I’m 18 years old and I’d just finished grade 11 when the Emirate stopped girls going to high school. I used to study English at a private institute, but those courses are also no longer open to girls. Before the Emirate came to power, I was taking a public speaking course at an institute near my house, but the Emirate closed the institute down. So, I enrolled in another one, but after a few months that institute closed too.

I come from a big family – three brothers and five sisters. I live with my parents, three brothers and my younger sister in Mazar-e Sharif. My brother’s wife and my niece also live with us. When my father lost his job, he set up a food stall outside our house. My eldest brother is a motorcycle mechanic and is the only person in my family who has a job, but he doesn’t live with us.

I recently joined a carpet-weaving course, but I don’t think I’ll keep going. There are too many girls working in the same room, so it’s very stuffy. It’s hard to breathe with all the wool dust floating around in that poorly ventilated space. Plus, the heat is just overwhelming and I worry it’s not good for my health.

That’s why I was really excited about heading outdoors for an outing this year. It had been ages since my family enjoyed a picnic and I’d been craving a change of pace and some fresh air.

Longing for a day out 

We’ve managed just two outings since the Taleban came to power. The last time was a picnic in Tang-e Marmul, which is a lush green valley just an hour’s drive south of Mazar-e Sharif. We went with three other families, each with at least three men. But we couldn’t walk around because there were groups of men there who were picnicking, grilling kebabs and playing cards. The armed Talebs who were patrolling the area didn’t say anything to them, even though playing cards is not allowed. We chose a place well away from them to eat our food and then quickly left the area.

All last winter, I’d been dropping hints to my father about going on a picnic for Sizda be Dar, when most families in Mazar-e Sharif go picnicking in the green areas. But we couldn’t go because it was during Ramadan and we also had family staying with us. Later, in spring, my amma (paternal aunt) announced that she and her family planned to go on a day’s outing to spend some time in nature now that everything had turned green and the weather was good. I asked my father if he’d allow us to join them. But my father didn’t think the situation was good and said he didn’t want to risk us having any trouble while we were out.

Getting permission to go on a family outing 

This is how things are not just in my family but in most families. People don’t want any trouble and are reluctant to go on outings. I don’t know how other families decide to go, but in my family, it’s my father who makes the final call. He said we couldn’t go because he was busy with renovations to our house and couldn’t join us, but this was just an excuse. My father’s never been very keen on picnics. In fact, I don’t remember a single time when he joined us on one.

It took the extended family around three weeks to get everything sorted for their visit to Dasht-e Shadian in Tang-e Owlia. It’s a delightful picnic spot just an hour from Mazar-e Sharif and easily accessible with a good road. My aunt and other family members kept calling my father, hoping to change his mind, but he was firm in his decision, with an unwavering resolve.

I was very upset. I cried every time someone mentioned the outing and took to locking myself in my room. Finally, he relented and said we could go.

The morning of the outing, I woke up early to help prepare things for our day out. I offered my namaz (prayers) and took a quick nap afterwards before going to help my sister-in-law cook for the picnic. But when I got to the kitchen, she looked crestfallen. She told me my father had changed his mind and we wouldn’t be allowed to go after all.

I called my aunt, my older sister and two of my cousins to let them know that my father had decided that we couldn’t go after all. Then my aunt called my brother and asked him to intercede with my father, but my father was firm in his decision. Since my father is the elder in our family, no one can oppose his decision, but they told me they would do their best to persuade him to relent. All morning, there were phone calls to my father and hushed conversations between him and my older brother. Finally, around 11 o’ clock, my sister-in-law told me to start getting ready to leave for the picnic. He wasn’t happy about it, but my father had finally agreed to let us go.

It was too late to cook anything to take with us, so we told my aunt we’d pay for half of the food and beverages she’d bought. We also bought four big bottles of pomegranate juice and some bread.

There are many reasons why families don’t go on outings. Some, like many of our neighbours, can’t afford to. Other families, like mine, are conservative and have strict fathers. Then, there are the lucky, open-minded families who go on outings regularly. I don’t know why my father was so against letting us go this time; he’d allowed us to go with extended family in large groups before. Maybe it was because he was preoccupied with the house renovations, or concerned about the costs, or worried about potential dangers related to the Taleban.

We are going on a picnic 

We went in one of the two motar-e barbari-e kalan (large lorries) that my cousin owns because our group was large and some of our relatives don’t have a car. This way we could travel together in the same vehicle and share the cost of the petrol. We laid a carpet down on the back and sat together in the open air, enjoying the fresh breeze and the luxuriantly green scenery.

Some of the relatives had gone ahead of us in another lorry and our little group – my sister-in-law and me, as well as my little brother, who’d come along in case we were asked about a mahram – joined my aunt and her three sons, their wives and children in the second lorry. My mother was in Kabul and couldn’t join us. My aunt’s son-in-law and some of his relatives also came along. Altogether, we were about 40 to 50 people.

As we expected, we passed many checkpoints. There was even one at the entrance to Dasht-e Shadian and Taleban foot patrols everywhere. But they mostly searched vehicles with lots of male passengers and weren’t very inquisitive about vehicles with many female passengers. So, they didn’t stop us or ask any questions.

When we left the city behind, we’d started clapping with excitement. It was a joyful ride. There was no music, but there was the sound of our clapping and the wind in our hair as it gently loosened our headscarves. Whenever we neared a checkpoint, our cousins would remind us to fix our hijabs and we’d stop clapping and tighten our headscarves. But we’d resume our cheerful clapping again as soon as we cleared it. Originally, we’d planned to bring something to play music on, set on a low volume, but the male family members vetoed the idea, worried about attracting the Taleban’s attention. Women like to play music, clap and enjoy themselves, but men don’t allow them to do it. So, we satisfied ourselves with clapping and lively chatter.

Making the best of a day out in nature 

It was gone one o’ clock in the afternoon by the time we reached Dashte-e Shadian. The picnic area was teaming with people. There were many single men and some families as well. There were boys selling dayras (a type of tambourine). They were making a racket pounding on the dayras to attract customers, but without much luck. I only saw one boy buying a dayra. Most people looked on but didn’t buy. They were probably too afraid of getting into trouble with the Taleban because music is not allowed.

We found a quiet spot away from the bustling crowd to set up our blankets and start a fire for my sister-in-law to cook, even though it was getting late. Some of the girls who weren’t busy with preparing lunch decided to take a walk around a nearby field, where we saw kids flying kites, playing football and selling energy drinks and toys. A man was offering horses for rent and we noticed a few boys who’d fallen and were injured. There were women dressed in lovely outfits and wearing makeup. They’d briefly remove their headscarves to take a photo and then quickly put them back on. For myself, I had a shorter dress on beneath my abaya (long overcoat).

Every family brought food they’d prepared in advance for the picnic – manto (dumplings), qabuli palaw (rice with carrots and raisins), qurma (meat stew), vegetables, fruit and beverages. After we finished eating lunch, the main part of our outing started. We took pictures and went for walks in nature chaperoned by some of the men in our group.

The last time we went on an outing, we’d gone to a beautiful spot covered with vibrant red flowers. This time, we decided to visit Dasht-e-Shadian, as it’s closer to the city and has better security. But to our surprise, the ground was full of holes spaced just a few meters apart. Also, there were only a few trees and the greenery was sparse except on the top of the hill. There were gardens and houses, but they were privately owned and off-limits to visitors. Unfortunately, the area was littered with cans, tablecloths, and bottles – remnants of previous picnics where people had failed to clean up after themselves.

A disappointing outing is better than no outing

Going on the outing refreshed my mind. It was great to catch up with relatives and fascinating to people-watch and see how other people interacted with each other in public. I admired what some of the other girls were wearing and made a mental note to sew similar dresses for myself.

But I didn’t enjoy this outing as much as the ones we’d had in previous years.

In the past, my sister, who works in Kabul, would join us, along with my mother and all of my siblings. Those were truly family affairs and were always so much fun. Time used to fly by without us even realising it. This time, it was just me and three of my close family members, so the experience wasn’t as great. It was scorching hot and the picnic area wasn’t so pleasant. Some of our female relatives fell ill with heatstroke because we couldn’t wear the kind of light clothing that’s appropriate for that kind of weather. We had to wear long black abayas and our headscarves tight on our heads.

The women didn’t walk around much. If we wanted to go anywhere, we had to ask one of the men in our group to chaperone us. Some of the men wandered around and explored the hills, played football and cricket and flew kites. But they, too, felt uneasy because the morality police were walking around and surveying the crowd. We heard some gunfire – we couldn’t tell where it was coming from – but the sound scared people.

In the past, when we went on outings, all the boys and girls in the family could play football and take part in other pastimes. The girls were allowed to fly kites if they wanted to, or just sit around and talk, or take pictures or just walk around in nature. It was disheartening to watch all the boys in the family running around and having fun and not be able to join their games. I asked the girls in our group to play football with me but they refused. They said they didn’t want to risk the men in the family getting into trouble with the Taleban because of our behaviour.

In the past, women were free to go out without a mahram, but nowadays, even the city parks have rules about when and how we can visit. We can only go on specific days of the week and must be accompanied by a mahram who waits outside. We can’t visit the Roza-e Sharif (Mazar-e Sharif shrine) at all anymore. Back then, my family didn’t pay much mind to what my sisters and I wore, or if we put on makeup or if some of our hair was showing, but now they admonish us, telling us to wear our scarves neatly, avoid makeup and put on the abaya. It’s all about safeguarding our namus(dignity and honour), they say.

That day, whiling the time away with my family, I was happy to be out in nature, exploring the countryside. There is a famous hill called Tepa Allah there that I was very keen to climb. We girls didn’t eat well because we couldn’t wait to go up Tepa Allah and after lunch, four girls and four men from our family went for a look. It was difficult to climb to the top and we didn’t stay there long because there were lots of men around. The male members of our family insisted we leave since there were so few women there. It was starting to get dark, they told us, and we should head back to the city.

As we piled into the lorry to make our way back to Mazar-e Sharif, I thought about all the trouble everyone had gone through just to make this day possible. It didn’t turn out to be the great adventure I’d imagined it was going to be. Still, a disappointing outing is better than no outing at all.

Edited by Kate Clark

References
1 Nawruz marks the start of the Afghan year and coincides with the vernal equinox on 21 March, the first day of spring. The holiday is celebrated for 13 days, and families traditionally go on picnics on Sizda be Dar, the 13th day of the new year, to deflect the bad omen associated with the number 13 and celebrate the arrival of spring.

 

The Daily Hustle: Going on a picnic with your family, if you’re a girl 
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‘Hollywoodgate’ Review: Inside the Taliban

The New York Times

Hollywoodgate
Directed by Ibrahim Nash’at
Documentary, War
Not Rated
1h 32m
A man with a red scarf stands next to a barrier that reads "Hollywood Gate 4." Mountains are in the distance.

The risks required to make “Hollywoodgate” also highlight its limitations.Credit…Fourth Act Film

Nash’at, an Egyptian journalist based in Berlin, traveled to Afghanistan in 2021 shortly after American troops had left. He negotiated a tenuous arrangement with Mawlawi Mansour, the new commander of the country’s air force, to film him and a lieutenant named M.J. Mukhtar.

In a voice-over at the outset, Nash’at explains the terms. He has been forbidden to film anyone who is not Taliban, he says, and he is under constant surveillance. In return for access, he adds, “I must show the world the image of the Taliban that they want me to see.” But he hopes simply to show what he saw.

Nash’at, who handled his own camera and sound, is, to his credit, transparent about some gaps. When going to inspect a group of aircraft, Mansour doesn’t want the filmmaker to show them. (Nash’at nevertheless zooms in toward a few planes across the tarmac.) During a nighttime operation in which Mukhtar apparently hopes to root out people hostile to the Taliban, Nash’at is instructed, “The cameraman stays here.”

What remains are Mansour and Mukhtar presenting themselves with varying degrees of self-consciousness (it is amusing when Mansour, after trying out a treadmill at a former American gym, asks that one be sent to his home so he can lose belly fat), and the Taliban’s public pageantry. Nash’at notes at the end that he was kept from filming the daily suffering of regular Afghans. The frustration of “Hollywoodgate” is that it could only ever feel incomplete.

Hollywoodgate
Not rated. Running time: 1 hour 32 minutes. In theaters.

‘Hollywoodgate’ Review: Inside the Taliban
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What’s Next for the U.N.’s Doha Process on Afghanistan?

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Taliban attendance and Afghan civil society’s exclusion at Doha 3 meeting was heavily criticized.
  • Western states want Taliban to uphold human rights, but regional powers are more focused on Afghanistan stabilizing.
  • Still, Doha 3 made progress toward more coordinated international engagement.
At the end of June, envoys and representatives from more than 25 countries and international organizations gathered in Doha, Qatar, along with representatives from the Taliban under an U.N.-facilitated framework. This meeting was the third of its kind, widely referred to as “Doha 3,” and part of a process to establish a more coordinated and coherent global approach to Afghanistan’s challenges and the Taliban’s rule.
It did not produce decisive outcomes, other than the commitment of all countries to continue such meetings — still a significant agreement in the current geopolitical climate. Meanwhile, Western donor states and human rights defenders strongly criticized the latest gathering for the U.N.’s inclusion of the Taliban, and perceived concessions to the group.The first meeting took place in May 2023, and the second was held this February. The first two meetings were chaired by U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, who delegated this third meeting to Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo. These meetings were oriented around the U.N. Security Council’s call for an independent assessment of international engagement with Afghanistan, mandated last spring and delivered to the Council last November. The Security Council accepted the assessment’s recommendations in late December, though with Russia and China abstaining — and the Taliban protesting strongly against a few key provisions.

Western donor states and human rights defenders strongly criticized the latest gathering for the U.N.’s inclusion of the Taliban.

The Taliban were not invited to the first meeting, where Guterres worked to identify global common ground on how to engage the Taliban. In February, the Taliban rejected the U.N.’s invitation to attend the second meeting, objecting to the appointment of a U.N. special envoy, protesting the U.N.’s invitations for Afghan civil society to attend, and complaining of matters of protocol. In short, the Taliban demanded to be treated, at least de facto, as the government of Afghanistan.In preparations for the third gathering, the U.N. took pains to persuade the Taliban that attending was in their best interests. DiCarlo visited Kabul and met with Taliban leaders beforehand, as did a number of Western and regional diplomats. In these consultations, the Taliban made demands that largely reiterated their position on Doha 2.Notably, the U.N. offered an agenda that seemed tailored to the Taliban’s interest — as well as the key interests of neighboring states and regional powers like China and Russia. The U.N. proposed three topics, two of which were ultimately selected: (1) economic issues, especially the question of support to the Afghan private sector, and (2) counternarcotics.

Significant Criticism

The focus on securing the Taliban’s attendance for Doha 3 prompted a groundswell of criticism from Afghan civil society and human rights defenders. In the weeks leading up to Doha 3, officials from a number of donor states expressed frustration, and several even pondered the possibility of downgrading or cancelling their attendance.

The criticism was leveled on two different planes. Publicly, much of the backlash against the U.N.’s planning focused on the lack of civil society representation at the main event, highlighting the absence of Afghan women. The lack of women’s rights on the public version of the meeting’s agenda was seen as a further, unnecessary concession to the Taliban.

It is worth noting that states discussed women’s rights extensively with the Taliban at Doha 3, and the U.N. always planned on this.

It is worth noting that states discussed women’s rights extensively with the Taliban at Doha 3, and the U.N. always planned on this — keeping the topic off the public agenda was an attempt at compromise. Moreover, at the previous two meetings, Afghan civil society did not participate in the main events (at Doha 2 in February, a voluntary side meeting took place with six Afghans involved in activism, journalism and development). But faced with the prospect of the Taliban sitting down with the international community under the U.N.’s banner, many insisted that Afghan women must also have a seat at the table. A campaign of advocacy and journalistic coverage swamped Doha 3 preparations with negative publicity, and complicated the positions of participating Western states.Some nations disagreed with details of the U.N.’s approach but were willing to give the U.N. room to maneuver, at least in principle. Their complaint was structural: Frustration with a lack of U.N. coordination or even communication of goals and strategy. In weeks leading up to the meeting, more than one donor state official privately expressed doubt as to whether U.N. leadership had a strategic direction for this meeting format and the process it was meant to support.

Reactions and Reasoning

Less than two weeks before Doha 3, a group of major donors, including the United States, drafted a collective communique to the U.N. The letter, not made public but leaked widely, was a sternly worded rebuke on both the substance and planning process for the impending meeting.

The signatories emphasized the importance of not marginalizing Afghan civil society and noted domestic political demands to hold the Taliban accountable on human rights. One Western official described the signatories’ perception that regional countries’ interests seemed to carry more weight in the U.N.’s decision making than those of the largest donors supporting aid and development in Afghanistan.

This letter implicitly threatened that donor states (including signatories such as Canada, the U.K. and France) might scale down their participation in the gathering. In particular, the signatories insisted on engagement with civil society in some form. The U.N. accommodated this demand — some U.N. officials privately noted that it had always been their intent to involve civil society, at the same level as they had been during Doha 2, and it was simply a matter of careful negotiation with the Taliban to ensure they would not pull out. But the U.N. also preserved the originally proposed agenda, and largely stuck to its approach.

Some donors went further: Canada published a reprimand of the U.N.’s approach to the conference — though they also ultimately attended.

In the end, on the second day of Doha 3, a side event was held with five Afghan women and two men, most of them residing inside Afghanistan — similar in scope to the inclusion of civil society at Doha 2.

Speaking to the press from Doha, DiCarlo hinted at the logic underlying U.N.’s approach, saying the brief was to bring the Taliban together with the world’s envoys in these meetings. This was an intriguing, almost misleading representation of the Security Council’s resolution in December 2023. Yes, the U.N. was encouraged to continue facilitating the envoy meeting format, but with very little detail specified. Where did this brief, which seemed to privilege the Taliban, come from?

The U.N. was compelled to find a balance between the agendas of Western states, many of which demand to see the Taliban adhere to international standards on human rights before proceeding any further with development assistance or economic normalization, and those of regional powers, eager to see nearby Afghanistan stabilize. Sources suggest that key regional states — including permanent Security Council members Russia and China — saw little reason to continue engaging in a U.N. process that did not include the Taliban. In other words, while Western frustrations over the U.N.’s direction spilled into public view, regional states may have been even closer to abandoning the meeting format.

There was a basic theory of change underpinning Doha 3 preparations: the U.N. assessment, and all of its recommendations, were intended to break free from the deadlock that had overtaken international relations with the Taliban. To move past this deadlock, U.N. officials have said the most difficult demands should be set aside until later in this engagement process. For now, they assert, discussion should focus on overlapping interests. Only after much more trust has been built between the suspicious Taliban and a host of doubtful states, do these officials feel it makes sense to bring the most contentious issues to the table.

The counterargument is that such sequencing awards the Taliban legitimacy and emboldens their repressive policy agenda. The rebuttal to this view, however, is that waiting for the Taliban to meet demands before expanding assistance, knowing the Taliban are unlikely to budge, is a decision to cut off 40 million Afghans from the rest of the world. These arguments on how to approach engaging with such a difficult regime are not new — they remain much the same as before the U.N. assessment proposed a roadmap to move past them.

Now What?

Undersecretary-general DiCarlo and other U.N. leaders have stressed that Doha 3 is but one meeting in a long-term process. But privately, officials have made clear that DiCarlo and other U.N. leaders do not have the bandwidth to continue managing the Doha meeting format, much less any broader process it might spur. The negative reactions and public controversy around Doha 3 have only lessened the U.N.’s enthusiasm to occupy center stage as host and facilitator.

The most efficient solution is one that has been mired in Security Council politics from the beginning. Last year’s assessment recommended appointing a U.N. official for Afghanistan, an envoy or coordinator in addition to Special Representative Roza Atunbayeva who manages U.N. presence in the country, to carry out the obviously full-time job of organizing an international engagement process. However, the Taliban’s objections to such an appointment, along with the lack of Russian and Chinese enthusiasm, may prove to be insurmountable.

In spite of the controversy beforehand and the difficult path ahead, Doha 3 did make concrete progress toward more coordinated international engagement. Attending nations tentatively agreed to establish technical-level working groups on the chief agenda items: private-sector economic issues and counternarcotics. More work remains before the concept can be finalized, and so this outcome was not formally announced from Doha. But such working groups will open new channels of dialogue between donors, regional states and technocrats from Taliban-run ministries — with the aim of streamlining and improving assistance to the Afghan people.

The Taliban have thus far kept mum about the conference, other than claiming that the world heard and accepted their messaging. Their chief spokesman, who led the delegation to Doha, declined to commit to participation in future meetings, saying that each time, Taliban leadership would determine if the engagement would be beneficial.

The controversy surrounding Doha 3 revealed that, while most countries (and the Taliban) are willing to entertain discussion about a difficult roadmap forward, many are also still insistent: the other side must give something first. Neither Western donor states nor the Taliban’s leadership are likely to bend when it comes to the group’s draconian domestic policies, at least not in the foreseeable future.

These high levels of mistrust require a delicately managed process, in which all sides cautiously inch forward, testing each other, assured that all sides will benefit if they continue to move forward together. Doha 3 illustrated how badly such a process requires an empowered, dedicated individual or office to keep all sides incentivized to do so.

The U.N. is uniquely positioned to provide this sort of leadership; with a growing gap between the approach of donors and regional states, there is no alternative. But is the U.N. itself, as a vulnerable institution increasingly underfunded and under siege, sufficiently incentivized to try and provide that sort of leadership, while under constant criticism?

U.S. national interests are best served through careful, principled engagement with the Taliban.

For its part, Washington should encourage the U.N. to not let the Doha meeting format wither on the vine. In spite of flaws in planning and execution, and the controversy these have drawn, the international coordination these meetings seek to build remains vital. U.S. national interests are best served through careful, principled engagement with the Taliban: the counterterrorism threat in the region remains critical and cannot be wished away, and the Afghan people’s dire economic conditions and food insecurity threaten regional stability (even Europe, through transnational migration).Doha 3 made clear that the current meeting format, and how it is facilitated, requires some structural change. Change would ideally come in the form of the U.N. appointing a dedicated official to manage this complex process, but as noted above, the Taliban are fiercely opposed to the idea, deeming it a downgrading measure meant for conflict-riddled countries. If such an appointment proves impossible, creative solutions — such as empowering the U.N. mission based in Afghanistan to facilitate some of this process, and more robust coordination between donors seeking to transition from emergency aid to sustainable development — should be pursued.
What’s Next for the U.N.’s Doha Process on Afghanistan?
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The Fate of the Village Councils: The Emirate’s effort to institute hegemony over rural Afghanistan

Jelena Bjelica • AAN Team

Afghanistan Analysts Network

Afghanistan’s Community Development Councils (CDCs), which were established under the Islamic Republic by the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and its successor Citizen’s Charter, have been abolished by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Government bodies have been told to coordinate economic projects with ulema councils instead. Afghanistan, however, has a longstanding tradition of grassroots, collective, decision-making and problem-solving bodies called shuras or village councils that long predate the CDCs. These shuras have played a crucial role in village life, praised, for example, by the late anthropologist Louis Dupree, for carrying “the country safely over its post-1933 internal power crises.” AAN’s Jelena Bjelica and the AAN team interviewed villagers across Afghanistan between November 2022 and June 2024 to learn how their shuras had fared under IEA rule. Many interviewees reported that even before the ban, their shuras had become non or barely functional, ignored by a government which prefers to work with village heads, often ones it has handpicked.

A Community Development Council (CDC) meeting in Herat province. Source: National Solidarity Programme/Flickr, 15 November 2010

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or on the download button below.

The picture that emerged from our research was of the slow demise of village councils/CDCs (interviewees tended to use the terms interchangeably) since the Islamic Emirate returned to power. It has preferred to work with individuals or groups, either head men (maleks or arbabsor ulema councils, which, in general, it had appointed or at least approved.

Even before Amir Hibatullah Akhundzada’s May 2024 abolishment of the CDCs, the Emirate’s intentions had been discernible in the way it had diminished and marginalised the councils, in many cases, rendering them inactive. In addition, very few shuras had managed to keep their female members -–both the NSP and Citizens Charter programmes had mandated the equal participation of women in the CDCs. However, more than half of our interviewees rued this loss, if only for practical reasons, such as the shura’s inability to ascertain and address issues concerning women in the community.

The letter abolishing CDCs also indicated that future delivery of aid would have to be coordinated with ulema councils. NGOs, the World Bank and United Nations agencies, which have premised their work on working with CDCs, may now face problems. The relationship between the Emirate and the aid industry was already fraught. Navigating this latest blow to what many aid actors had considered a mechanism for ensuring equitable, local aid distribution will take some careful footwork.

Over the past century, shuras have undergone many changes, but one thing has remained a constant– they have always been a bridge between the community and external players – shielding, negotiating and trying to get resources. The Emirate’s move to abolish the shuras in favour of state-appointed or approved head men or ulema councils points to a redrawing of local-level power dynamics.

Whether this is a final nail in the coffin of Afghanistan’s village councils does, however, seem unlikely. In rural Afghanistan, shuras have survived the test of time because of their centrality to village life. They did not begin with the Soviet occupation or the Islamic Republic and it is highly questionable whether they will cease to exist with the IEA’s order to abolish them.

Whatever the future brings, if history is any indication, shuras will re-emerge as an integral part of Afghanistan’s social fabric as key local self-organised and self-governing structures. Once the initial jolt of the Amir’s ban has faded, we may see village shuras, as before, reinventing themselves under a new banner and perhaps with redefined horizons.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour and Kate Clark 


You can preview the report online and download it by clicking the download button below.

 

The Fate of the Village Councils: The Emirate’s effort to institute hegemony over rural Afghanistan
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Let Afghan women join the UN talks next week. It’s what the Taliban fear most

The Guardian

Since it became clear that the Taliban will be the only Afghan voices at the table and women’s rights will not officially be on the agenda at the UN meeting on Afghanistan in Doha, I have received thousands of messages from women inside and outside the country expressing their deep despair, shock and disappointment.

There is increasing concern about the tone that the international community – especially the UN mission in Afghanistan, Unama – have adopted to normalise the human rights violations in Afghanistan in an effort to secure the Taliban’s participation in the Doha talks.

The agenda for next week’s meeting will focus on counter-narcotics and the private sector, two peripheral issues chosen to ensure Taliban participation by putting nothing more contentious on the table.

This means the conference will ignore the fundamental issues of holding the Taliban accountable for their unprecedented violations of the basic rights of Afghan women and girls to have education, employment and active participation in society.

On Wednesday, in response to the outpouring of criticism, UN undersecretary-general Rosemary DiCarlo said that Afghan women’s rights, among other key issues, will be raised in every meeting with the Taliban. She conveniently ignored the fact that the whole world, including Islamic scholars, have been raising the same issues with the Taliban for more than three years to no avail, while the the group continues to impose more bans and restrictions on the women of Afghanistan with impunity.

The agenda also clearly contradicts the UN’s own charter and the security council resolutions 1325 and 2721, which call on the UN secretary general to appoint a special envoy for Afghanistan and to ensure participation of all sides, especially Afghan women’s groups.

It also disregards the lack of a legal framework and an inclusive and accountable governing system that ensures participation of all sides. Without a resolution to these two key issues, Afghanistan will never cease to be the centre of narcotics production and drug trafficking, nor will the country’s private sector develop without full participation of women – the two items on the UN’s agenda. According to the UN’s own assessment, the Taliban bar on women’s employment is costing the Afghan economy more than $1bn a year.

If Unama and others in the international community see the Taliban as the only reality for Afghanistan, they need to look at our history. Millions of Afghans risked life and limb to cast their votes in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections, despite threats, fraud and irregularities. They believed in the democratic values and principles which the international community propagated to them for more than 20 years.

Yet Afghans today are bewildered that the same international community which championed free elections and women’s rights is willing to compromise its own moral values to cave in to an extremist ideological group. A group that represents a ruling armed clerical regime which has established gender-apartheid in Afghanistan and directed the subjugation of more than 20 million women and girls into an abyss of hopelessness.

Given the moral collapse of the international community when it comes to upholding their own values for human rights, women’s rights, and equality for all, most Afghans feel there is no chance of a fair and transparent intervention by global bodies such as the UN to seek a reasonable and durable solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.

They question the international community’s commitment to women’s rights when their own fundamental rights were so easily bartered in exchange for geopolitical convenience during the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

Two rows of bearded men sit at a conference table.
Shutting Afghan women out of key UN conference to appease Taliban ‘a betrayal’

Taliban members, who came to power with guns, can hold on to power through violence but will never subdue the will of a nation which has never been colonised. Our people, men and women, need education, employment and the prospect of liberty for achieving their dreams in order to realise their full potential. And if the Taliban hope that by sticking to their gender-apartheid vision and forcing the morally compromised internationally community to grant them some level of recognition, will help them achieve their aims they are also wrong.

It is the Taliban who launched their war on the women of our country. Women are half of our population, and the country cannot move forward without full participation of Afghan women, incorporation of the magnificent diversity of our country, and the incredible talent and potential of our youth who are now fleeing Afghanistan because they do not see any future under Taliban rule.

The Taliban have silenced women’s voices inside the country using violence and torture. And by excluding women’s participation at the Doha meeting, the UN and others in the international community have enabled the Taliban to try to silence our voices outside Afghanistan, too.

If the international community and the UN want to be useful, let the women of Afghanistan directly talk to the Taliban. This is something that the leaders of the gender-apartheid regime fear the most.

  • Fawzia Koofi is a politician and women’s rights activist who was the first woman vice-president of the Afghan parliament and chair of its women’s affairs and human rights commission.

Let Afghan women join the UN talks next week. It’s what the Taliban fear most
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Women’s rights will be raised at the UN meeting being attended by Taliban, UN official says

By Richard Bennett

Mr. Bennett is the U.N. special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.

The New York Times

June 28, 2024

In May 2022, nine months after the Taliban retook power in Afghanistan, I visited a girls’ secondary school that was still open in the north in spite of a ban on education for girls above sixth grade. Communities in the area, which has a long history of valuing education, had refused to comply. I met with a group of 11th-grade math students who told me about their hopes for the future. “I don’t want to end up trapped at home and condemned to a domestic life,” one female student told me. “I want to finish school and become a teacher so that I can help my family and others.”

I ended that visit to Afghanistan with hope that perhaps the situation would not become as dire as I — and many Afghans — feared. But when I returned a year later, everything had changed. The school was closed. Instead of attending lessons, the student and her classmates were forced to stay at home, their teachers transferred to a primary school. Now, among the many other challenges facing girls and women under the Taliban’s rule, a mental health crisis has gripped the country. Girls report anxiety, depression and hopelessness, and there have been reports showing an alarming surge in suicides.

It is against this backdrop that the United Nations will convene a third meeting of international special envoys in Doha, Qatar, next week to discuss a political path forward for Afghanistan. The Taliban have accepted the U.N.’s invitation to join. (They declined to attend February’s meeting.) After discussions with the Taliban, the meeting’s agenda will focus on fighting narcotics and helping the private sector — and does not include human rights or women’s issues, and neither women nor Afghan civil society representatives will be included.

If these exclusions are the price of the Taliban’s presence in Doha, the cost is too high.

When the Taliban retook power in August 2021, its leaders initially said that education for girls above the sixth grade would be suspended until conditions were suitable under Islamic rules. Now, more than 1,000 days later, school remains off limits for girls older than 12, and restrictions on education have expanded to universities. The Taliban now say education is “an internal matter,” and it remains unclear when — or if — schools will reopen to girls.

Denial of education is just one of many Taliban decrees against women. Female civil servants were instructed not to report to work when the Taliban retook power. Women are now barred from working at nongovernmental organizations and humanitarian agencies, including the United Nations. Some female-owned businesses, like beauty salons, have been shuttered. Women and girls need to be accompanied by a male relative to travel.

The net result is that today, women and girls have been virtually erased from public life, deprived of their most basic rights. Afghan women began describing the Taliban’s policies as gender apartheid in the 1990s, and they and many others, including me, want such policies to be criminalized under international law.

The Taliban’s institutionalized oppression is devastating not only for the current generation of Afghan women and girls. If left unchecked, it will inflict irreparable harm on future generations of Afghans as well. Boys, raised in a system that legitimizes the dehumanization of women and girls, may follow their leaders’ example and continue to treat women badly, and they are vulnerable to radicalization, sowing seeds for security concerns that extend beyond Afghanistan’s borders. The crippling gender policies and their violent enforcement are also severely depriving L.G.B.T.Q. people of their fundamental rights.

Despite all of this, Afghan women and girls are pushing back. Some have protested in the streets to demand the restoration of their rights, risking arrest, detention and violence. In the face of shuttered schools, girls with access to the internet, who are a minority, are taking classes in English, math and science, and female entrepreneurs are moving online, finding creative ways to circumvent restrictions on their movement. “We did not create the Taliban, but we are the ones who have to live with them in control,” one woman told me. “There is no other choice than to find ways to survive and learn.”

It would be easy to leave these women to carry on their struggle alone, citing the excuse that the international community has done enough damage in Afghanistan and should stay out of the nation’s affairs. But that would be a grave disservice both to those women and girls showing defiance and to many others who do not have the economic capacity to fight back. We have an obligation to meet their bravery with increased protection, support and solidarity.

The focus on politically neutral topics at the upcoming meeting in Doha was designed to entice the Taliban to the table. A formal discussion of human rights will be missing, despite the fact that Afghans who disagree with the Taliban’s ideology have made clear that respect for human rights, especially the rights of women and girls, must be a prerequisite for any engagement with the Taliban. This is happening despite the fact that an independent assessment requested by the Security Council last year advised any road map for Afghanistan’s reintegration into the international community should include measurable improvements in human rights.

Afghanistan has suffered more than four decades of conflict and had a questionable human rights record during the 20 years of the Islamic republic. But since retaking power, the Taliban has not only attacked the rights of women and girls; they have been responsible for wide-ranging violations and abuses — including killings, disappearances and arbitrary detentions — as well as a campaign of retaliation against former enemies, despite their claim of an amnesty. People from minority communities are especially at risk.

Also conspicuously absent at the main Doha meeting will be any representation of non-Taliban Afghans. Though some civil society and women’s groups will be included in meetings on the sidelines, this representation appears to have come only after significant external pressure, but it should have been baked in from the beginning. This is not the first time non-Taliban Afghans have been sidelined from political discussions, though history has repeatedly shown that failure to include all Afghans in political processes undermines their credibility and sustainability.

The Taliban are not recognized by the United Nations as a government and should not be treated as such. They must not be allowed to use the threat of backing out of the talks to dictate the terms of this conference or any future international process. It is a mistake to measure the success of this meeting by whether the Taliban show up.

The bravery, dignity and perseverance of millions of Afghans in the face of such gross injustice must be matched by strong, principled and effective international leadership. Afghan women and girls have often said to me that their greatest fear used to be that the Taliban would return to power. Now they say that they fear the Taliban will be recognized simply because of their power, in disregard of their cruel policies and practices.

The international community must insist on reversing the restriction of Afghan women’s and girls’ rights, on women’s meaningful participation in decision making and on accountability. Having these issues explicitly on the agenda in Doha would still be an important first step.

Richard Bennett was appointed by the U.N. Human Rights Council as special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan in April 2022. He was the head of the human rights component of the U.N. assistance mission in Afghanistan and a long-term adviser to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission beginning in 2003.

Women’s rights will be raised at the UN meeting being attended by Taliban, UN official says
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How to Support Female Entrepreneurs in Afghanistan

BY: Belquis Ahmadi;  Afsana Rahimi
As envoys discuss normalizing relations with the Taliban while respecting human rights, it’s important to consider if women benefit from private sector development and how it can empower them. Despite claimed support for women in the private sector, the Taliban’s approach lacks essential elements for genuine economic empowerment.

Exclusion of Women a Drain on Afghanistan’s Economy

Excluding women from education, public spaces and employment severely hampers the Afghan economy. Sustainable prosperity is unattainable without the contributions of half the population. Banning women from education beyond sixth grade cuts the qualified labor force by half, and further restrictions on educated women limit the country’s productive capacity even more.

Studies have shown that gender inequality in the workforce can have a substantial negative impact on a nation’s gross domestic product. The World Bank estimates that gender inequality in earnings alone costs the global economy $160 trillion. A 2024 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report concluded that restrictions on women’s rights and employment are significantly hampering economic recovery in Afghanistan. The report notes women’s participation in the workforce dropped dramatically — from 11% in 2022 to just 6% in 2023 — as a consequence of restrictions placed on them by the Taliban.

While the Taliban ostensibly support women working in the private sector, the gender segregation enforced by the Taliban poses a significant obstacle to women’s businesses and their employment in the private sector. Female entrepreneurs are encountering significant obstacles in acquiring or renewing their business licenses under the Taliban’s rule. Moreover, a significant number of established, professional and trained female entrepreneurs have left the country due to the Taliban’s restrictive policies and the ban on education.

In Afghanistan, women have historically played an important role in running businesses and creating jobs for both women and men.

In Afghanistan, women have historically played an important role in running businesses and creating jobs for both women and men. As more and more men took up arms after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, women were compelled to become the primary breadwinners for their families. More women started entering the workforce and pursuing educational opportunities. Many women in both urban and rural communities turned to income-generating activities, establishing micro and small businesses. Women in rural areas have long been involved in dairy production, the clothing industry, embroidery, food processing and handicrafts. In these communities, education and professional expertise in entrepreneurship were not necessarily prerequisites for success, as marketing and the financial aspects of the businesses were handled by male family members.In a survey conducted in 2020, the Afghanistan Women’s Chamber of Commerce and Industries (AWCCI) identified 2,471 formal businesses owned by women across 32 provinces, excluding Nuristan and Paktika. Formal businesses are defined as those that have acquired a license from the Ministry of Commerce and Industries. Additionally, there were 56,000 informal women-owned businesses. The survey found that all together these businesses had created over 130,000 jobs.

The AWCCI’s initiatives have played a crucial role in empowering female entrepreneurs and supporting inclusive job creation, demonstrating the substantial impact of targeted investment in women’s economic activities. In 2017, the year the AWCCI was established, the total amount of investment by businesswomen was estimated at $87 million. The chamber connected Afghan women to regional and global platforms. By 2020, the investment by businesswomen had increased to $90 million.

Prior to the Taliban taking power in 2021, women-owned businesses included a diverse range of products and services, from carpet weaving to construction, as well as nontraditional businesses such as media outlets, technology, agribusinesses and import and export. With technical and financial support from donor agencies and land provided by the government, women-only markets were constructed in 13 provinces. Women-owned kiosks and fast-food restaurants in parks were also dedicated to women and families.

Afghan women participated in domestic trade fairs across multiple provinces. They successfully entered the global market, showcasing their products at regional and international trade fairs in countries such as India, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates, expanding their market reach and entrepreneurial opportunities.

Life for Women under the Taliban

Since 2021, the Taliban have issued decrees severely restricting women’s employment opportunities, undermining genuine economic empowerment. The UNDP’s April 2024 report highlights significant barriers for female entrepreneurs and employees, including limited market access, reduced mobility, regulatory restrictions and discrimination. Many women-owned businesses face challenges such as reduced customers and logistical issues.

The Taliban’s restrictions disrupt social networks, increase isolation and stress and erode women’s sense of identity and purpose.

These restrictions disrupt social networks, increase isolation and stress and erode women’s sense of identity and purpose. They cause profound emotional and psychological impacts, including feelings of hopelessness, diminished self-esteem, anxiety and depression among women. The ban on girls’ education above sixth grade limits educational opportunities and stifles aspirations, leading to long-term detrimental effects on women’s mental health, confidence and overall well-being.A female entrepreneur in western Afghanistan who owns a small business told us her monthly income dropped from $2,000 to zero. Another business owner noted the country’s rapid decline into poverty and famine. “The situation on the ground is deteriorating rapidly,” said this person, who, like others interviewed for this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity. “Intellectuals [are] fleeing and the economy collapsing. The authorities are exacerbating the crisis by imposing excessive taxes and coercing people to contribute more, even going as far as shutting down some businesses and enterprises.”

Despite the Taliban’s apparent support for trade fairs, female entrepreneurs face significant challenges. Restrictions on attendance to women who lack the financial means to purchase goods reduce the fairs’ profitability for female entrepreneurs. Some women have turned to online businesses or WhatsApp groups to promote their products, but these efforts are limited compared to men’s access to investors and buyers. This glaring disparity highlights women’s ongoing challenges in accessing markets and financial support.

Additionally, female laborers in the private sector face severe restrictions. In December 2023, for example, the Taliban ordered pine nut processing factories in Paktia province to terminate the jobs of female laborers, affecting several hundred women. In January, a similar order in Nangarhar province led to the dismissal of around 300 women from a pine nut processing factory. These policies target and undermine women’s workforce participation, exacerbating economic hardships and impeding their ability to sustain livelihoods.

Exodus of Female Entrepreneurs Impacts Economic Stability and Growth

A significant number of established, professional and trained female entrepreneurs have left Afghanistan due to the Taliban’s restrictive policies, especially the ban on education for women. They have been forced to seek refuge or migrate to other countries to secure educational opportunities for their daughters. This exodus has caused a brain drain, depriving the nation of skilled female entrepreneurs and leaving those who remain without the necessary resources and support to run successful businesses. The restrictive environment further stifles innovation and growth, leading to a decline in the quality and sustainability of women-owned businesses.

“For 15 years, I proudly owned and operated a successful business, offering employment opportunities to over 100 women and men,” said a former business owner who was forced to leave Afghanistan in search of better opportunities. “I now find myself displaced in a foreign land, grappling with the challenges of starting anew. I chose to leave everything behind so that my daughters could pursue their education,” she added. Her story highlights the broader issue of economic resilience and potential being diminished by the loss of entrepreneurial leaders.

The lack of role models and mentors discourages new female entrepreneurs, undermining economic diversity and stability and reversing progress in women’s economic empowerment.

Conclusion and Recommendations

A stronger economy is a shared interest among the Taliban, the Afghan people and the international community, but it is also a battleground for gender discrimination against women, a critical aspect that needs full consideration in the Doha discussions. Women have historically participated in the economy, providing practical benefits. Despite the Taliban’s claims of supporting women in economic roles, their actions contradict this by restricting opportunities in both public and private sectors. These include bans on public sector employment, wage reductions and restrictions on hair salons, gyms and public baths, as well as licensing and capital requirements. Indirect social constraints like mahram rules and potential future education bans further limit women’s economic prospects. The international community must ensure that development aid does not discriminate against women or become inefficient due to their exclusion.

The international community must ensure that development aid does not discriminate against women or become inefficient due to their exclusion.

In Doha, meeting participants will discuss ways to implement the recommendations of the U.N. special coordinator of the independent assessment mandated by United Nations Security Resolution 2679 (2023) in January. The report noted: “adherence to principles of non-discrimination and inclusion, respect for women’s rights and efforts towards their meaningful participation and respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of all Afghans should be ensured and advanced.” In Doha, participants should also consider the following recommendations:

  • Ensure Afghan women have unrestricted access to domestic and global markets: The Taliban must allow Afghan women full access to both domestic and international markets by lifting all existing restrictions. This will enable women to participate freely in economic activities, helping Afghanistan to utilize its full workforce potential, stimulate economic growth and improve societal well-being.
  • Provide safe spaces and opportunities for capacity building for female entrepreneurs: Capacity building for female entrepreneurs is impossible without safe environments. The Taliban must stop intruding on and disrupting training efforts, ensuring that women can develop their skills and businesses without fear. Creating secure spaces for learning and growth is essential for empowering women and fostering economic development. Empowerment activities should focus on enhancing skills related to entrepreneurship, leadership, financial literacy and technology.
  • Establish comprehensive benchmarks to measure contributions of female entrepreneurs: Donor communities should establish comprehensive benchmarks to evaluate the economic growth and contributions of female entrepreneurs. This involves setting clear metrics and conducting regular evaluations to monitor progress. By systematically tracking the performance of women-led businesses, donor communities can identify areas for improvement and provide targeted support.
  • Ensure women’s participation and empowerment in humanitarian aid and private sector development: Donor communities should benchmark humanitarian assistance to ensure it promotes both the rights of women to participate in the assisted sectors and tangible increases in women’s actual participation in the private sector. This involves setting clear criteria for evaluating how well aid initiatives support women’s inclusion and empowerment. By systematically measuring and tracking women’s engagement in these sectors, donors can ensure their assistance is reaching women.
  • Empower women by giving them comprehensive access to macro-finance and global markets: Institutions like the World Bank, alongside Islamic microfinance initiatives, must ensure Afghan women have access to macro-finance and global markets. This goal demands robust, long-term strategies and unwavering political commitment. Without such measures, current support systems will only address women’s immediate needs, falling short of fostering sustainable economic independence and growth.

Afsana Rahimi is the chairperson of the Afghanistan Women Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the vice chairperson of the Afghanistan International Chamber of Commerce. She is also the co-founder of Global Afghan Women Trade Caravan and senior vice president of the Afghanistan Business Council–USA.

How to Support Female Entrepreneurs in Afghanistan
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As Taliban Poppy Ban Continues, Afghan Poverty Deepens

The U.S. and other governments and agencies, who will be discussing counter-narcotics and livelihoods at the U.N.-hosted international meeting in Doha at the end of this month, must face the facts about the ban:

  • It is not sustainable. There is no sign of a shift to cash crops, horticulture, livestock and non-farm activities that could replace opium, and the Afghan economy is too weak to generate significant numbers of other jobs.
  • Enforcement will prove increasingly difficult as landed interests start to suffer from the ban and pressures intensify to resume cultivation.
  • Political tensions with local interests and possibly within the Taliban are likely to grow, perhaps leading to violent conflict beyond what the protests already seen.
  •  So-called alternative livelihoods projects have not worked in the past and will be of little help in mitigating the adverse effects of the poppy ban, let alone creating a sustainable path away from dependence on opium production.

International actors need to ensure that their policy recommendations, and in particular proposed financial support, if any, do not feed into harmful, unsustainable Taliban approaches. They must be sure to avoid inadvertently supporting better-off rural core constituencies of the Taliban, or fueling unrealistic narratives about the success and longer-term prospects of a ban as pressures to resume more poppy cultivation intensify. On the positive side, there may be scope for cooperation with the Taliban on expanding and improving treatment programs for Afghanistan’s numerous drug addicts, and it may be worth exploring the potential for a confluence of interests in strengthening interdiction efforts to curb opiate processing and exports.

An Unprecedented Second Year of Success Against Poppy Cultivation

The Taliban’s comprehensive ban against opium cultivation, production, processing and trade, announced by their emir in April 2022, achieved a more than 85 percent reduction in the total national area of poppy cultivation in the 2022-2023 growing season, predominantly by deterring farmers from planting the crop. All in all, households with an estimate of almost 7 million people were prevented from cultivating opium poppy in that season.

International actors need to ensure that their policy recommendations, and in particular proposed financial support, do not feed into harmful, unsustainable Taliban approaches.

Vigorous enforcement of the ban has continued in the 2023-2024 growing season. The national picture will not be complete until satellite imagery for Badakhshan province and other higher-altitude, late-harvesting areas becomes available, but all indications point to an unprecedented second year of very low opium poppy cultivation. Indeed, the national figure quite possibly could be below last year’s level of 31,000 hectares — the most accurate estimate of the 2023 poppy harvest based on an analysis of satellite imagery for all agricultural land in the country by the geospatial firm Alcis. This compares with national cultivation typically exceeding 200,000 hectares during the previous decade.As in past successful Afghan poppy bans at regional and national levels, these massive reductions were achieved predominantly by discouraging farmers from planting opium poppy through pressure and threats reinforced by small amounts of eradication, as well as occasional action by law enforcement against poppy farmers. The general pattern in 2023-2024 is no different, characterized by special efforts to deter planting in areas where some cultivation had remained in 2022-2023, for example remote areas of Nangarhar that had resisted the ban in the previous year.

The glaring exception again appears to be Badakhshan province, which had largely escaped the ban and saw a significant increase in poppy cultivation in 2022-2023. Large-scale planting has occurred in Badakhshan in 2023-2024 despite some efforts to deter it. Eradication activities appear to have been limited and sparked open resistance, including violent protests by farmers and perhaps an IED attack on a Taliban convoy traveling to an eradication site. But even if there is a second year of expanding poppy cultivation in Badakhshan, this would not detract from the low overall national cultivation.

Unlike the first Taliban opium ban in the year 2000 which applied only to poppy cultivation, the current ban encompasses all stages of illicit narcotics production including trade, processing and exports. Earlier there were some signs that the Taliban might be serious about seeking to curtail the trade beyond the cultivation stage. However, available evidence suggests that trade, processing and exports are continuing at high levels, fueled by landowners and others selling off their accumulated inventories of opium cultivated in the past.

Analysis by David Mansfield indicates that such inventories, left over from bumper harvests in 2022, 2021 and earlier, can support the overall trade in opiates for several years when combined with ongoing opium production in Badakhshan. Indeed, high prices triggered by the ban mean that landowners and others holding opium inventories have accrued large capital gains and can comfortably support pre-ban income levels with gradual sales. Concentrated in the south and southwest, these landowners are happy with the ban (as long as their inventories last) and comprise a core constituency of the Taliban.

But the Ban is Harmful for Large Numbers of Poor Afghans, and Unsustainable

The story for poorer rural households is very different. With no or limited land, they depended on opium to make ends meet — through sharecropping, tenancy and wage labor — and benefited from the buoyant rural economy engendered by high levels of poppy cultivation and its demand for workers.

This large segment of the rural population has been suffering greatly from the ban and is bitterly opposed to it, a sentiment which often spills over into negative views toward the Taliban more generally. Given Afghanistan’s economic weakness and limited prospects for recovery let alone robust growth, the poppy cultivation ban is akin to an additional humanitarian shock from an approximately $1 billion loss of income annually for this part of the population.

These households are trying to cope with the shock the opium ban has dealt their incomes and livelihoods, but unfortunately have to do so in counterproductive short- and long-term ways. Like poor households generally, common coping mechanisms include selling off remaining assets such as livestock, eating less and lower-quality food, foregoing healthcare and pulling children out of secondary school. Moreover, outmigration by family members to seek work abroad (ultimately in Europe) and send back remittances becomes an increasingly attractive option for those who can afford the cost, despite the associated risks.

While outmigration and remittances are good for the involved households and the Afghan economy, they give rise to tensions with neighboring countries and potentially European ones. Overall, the medium-term economic prospects for previously opium-dependent poor rural households are dim in the face of the general weakness of the Afghan economy and its limited growth potential. As long as the ban continues, their few remaining assets and coping mechanisms will be increasingly exhausted, making a recovery later all the more difficult.

Big-picture, replacing poppy cultivation with wheat — the common pattern in the past — is not a sustainable way forward. In the 2022-2023 growing season, for example, satellite imagery for Helmand — by far Afghanistan’s largest poppy cultivating province pre-ban — shows that virtually all of the massive 99 percent decline in poppy cultivation was replaced by sharply higher wheat growing as well as more land apparently left fallow. Primary reliance on wheat, a relatively low-value, low-labor and water-intensive crop, cannot support the country’s large rural population.

The well-known sustainable path away from dependence on opium involves high-value cash crops, labor-intensive horticulture, livestock and buoyant non-farm activities.

The well-known sustainable path away from dependence on opium involves high-value cash crops, labor-intensive horticulture, livestock and buoyant non-farm activities in rural areas, with wheat part of the picture but by no means dominant as it is now. If the predominance of wheat continues in 2024, it will further underscore the lack of sustainability of the poppy ban, though one advantage of wheat for cultivators is that it is easy to shift back to poppy at some point in the future.

What Donors Can and Should (and Should Not) Do

The U.S. and other foreign governments and agencies must be clear-eyed about the ban:

  • First, it is not sustainable over the longer term, there being no sign of a shift to the activities that could replace opium in rural livelihoods, and with the Afghan economy too weak to generate large numbers of jobs in other sectors. The prognosis, therefore, is for continuing, indeed deepening rural poverty and deprivation as the ban continues to unfold.
  • Second, it will prove increasingly difficult to fully enforce the ban as landed interests deplete their inventories and start to suffer, increasing pressures to resume cultivation, particularly if the anomaly of substantial poppy cultivation in Badakhshan continues. Thus, a return to significant levels of poppy growing seems likely in the next couple of years.
  • Third, it is likely to give rise to intensifying political tensions between the Taliban leadership and local interests, as well as possibly within the Taliban, potentially even leading to violent conflict. Small examples of this have already been seen in Badakhshan and Nangarhar provinces.
  • Fourth, “alternative livelihoods projects” — the default donor response in the past — have not worked and will be of little help in mitigating the adverse effects of the poppy ban let alone forging a sustainable path away from dependence on opium production. What is needed instead is broad-based rural development and robust economic growth, the prospects for which are dim in the near future.

Facing this reality, expectations must be kept modest for how much U.S. and other foreign donors can mitigate the effects of the poppy ban through their interventions and financial support. Offsetting the humanitarian shock caused by the ban would require well over a billion dollars a year given administrative overhead and other extra costs, a figure no one could possibly expect would be met, and in any case that would provide only a temporary band-aid. Even hundreds of millions of dollars of well-targeted development aid would not offset the headwinds facing Afghanistan’s rural economy, let alone reverse the economic damage from the opium ban. So, any financial support that donors may consider will at best have only a marginal impact.

Moreover, it would be only too easy to squander limited aid funds on alternative livelihoods projects that will not make a difference or even worse, would be counterproductive.

For example, distributing agricultural inputs, especially for staples like wheat, to farmers according to their landholdings would not help the poorer households that have suffered the most from the ban, and would foster unsustainable cropping patterns that easily could be reversed if poppy cultivation is resumed. And if aid is targeted at the provinces that have reduced poppy cultivation the most (notably Helmand and other nearby provinces in the southwest), and furthermore is distributed to landowners, it would end up supporting a core constituency of the Taliban that has already benefitted greatly from the ban as a result of capital gains on their opium inventories.

Any aid mobilized should foster broad-based rural and agricultural development and should be targeted at activities that will benefit the poorer rural households.

Any aid mobilized in response to the Taliban’s opium ban should foster broad-based rural and agricultural development and should be targeted at activities that will benefit the poorer rural households most affected by the ban. Examples include small livestock, horticulture and labor-intensive non-agricultural activities. But it must be recognized that realistic levels of rural development aid will only have a marginal effect and will not come anywhere near to offsetting the impact of the poppy ban.On a more positive note, there may be a confluence of interests with the Taliban on expanding and improving treatment programs for the numerous problem drug users in Afghanistan, representing a serious public health problem the authorities are well aware of and are trying to do something about. It may also be worth exploring possible common interests in stronger interdiction efforts against processing and exports of opiates, in cooperation with neighboring countries. But going after the opium inventories held by landowners and other elites — probably the most effective way of cracking down on post-cultivation stages of the trade — most likely would be a nonstarter from the Taliban perspective since it would directly harm the interests of a core constituency of theirs in rural areas of south and southwest Afghanistan.

As Taliban Poppy Ban Continues, Afghan Poverty Deepens
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The Daily Hustle: Eid-e Qurban, a time to reflect and be grateful

Ali Mohammad Sabawoon • Roxanna Shapour

Afghanistan Analysts Network

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Today is Eid-e Qurban, also known as Eid al-Adha, the Feast of the Sacrifice, which marks the most important religious holiday in Islam. On this day, Afghans, across the country will sacrifice cows or sheep in remembrance of the Prophet Ibrahim’s willingness to sacrifice his son Ismael in submission to God’s command and of the lamb which God provided as a substitute sacrifice. However in the current economy, the cost of honouring this important religious tradition is more than some cash-strapped Afghan families can bear. In this Daily Hustle, AAN’s Ali Mohammad Sabawoon spoke to one Afghan man who is unable to afford the ritual sacrifice for the third year running, but is, nevertheless, mindful of the Eid’s true meaning – reflecting on the life you have and thanking God for the bounties he has given you.

The Afghanistan Analysts Network wishes a joyful Eid-e Qurban to all its friends and readers and to all the people of Afghanistan.

A tradition dating back to Abraham

In the old days, I used to buy a sheep to sacrifice for Eid-e Qurban every year. Those days now seem like a lifetime ago, even though it’s only been three years since my fortunes changed.

I used to have a good government job with a good salary. Back then, my family and I shared the house we inherited from our father with my brothers and their families. I didn’t have rent to pay and my salary was enough to provide for my family. There was money for new clothes for all the Eids, new school bags and uniforms at the start of the school year, new clothes and chaplaqs (sandals) for the summer and winter coats.

Every year, a few days before Eid, my eldest son and I would go to the livestock market on the outskirts of the city to buy a sheep to sacrifice for Eid. It was our special outing. On the drive there, I would tell him the story of Ibrahim and how, in his dreams, he received a command from God to sacrifice his son Ismael to demonstrate his obedience. And how Iblis (the devil) tried to tempt him to disobey and how Ibrahim kept true to his faith and to God. And how, finally, God stopped Ibrahim in the end and sent him a lamb to sacrifice instead of his son. It’s important to me that my children know about our religion, where our traditions come from and what they mean. I knew that when we got home, my son, in turn, would tell the story of Ibrahim and the lamb to my other children as they gathered around the sheep we’d brought home.

On the day of Eid, we’d sacrifice the sheep and distribute the meat – some to the needy, some to our neighbours and some for the family to eat with guests who usually call to bring Eid tidings.

Life changes suddenly

after the fall of the Republic, everything changed. Many of us who had government jobs were afraid of what might happen to us now the Taleban had taken over the country. I stopped going to work and moved with my family to a neighbourhood where no one knew us. I rented a small house for my family, which cost 3,000 afghanis (USD 40) a month, and we started living off our savings. When the money ran out, I sold my share of the family home to my brothers for 170,000 afghanis (USD 2,300). It gave us enough funds to survive for a few more months. But money was tight and we had to be careful. No more new clothes or sandals for the summer. In fact, the only way we were able to manage is because my wife is so good with money. She knows how to economise and make the little money we have stretch to meet our basic needs. I was also looking for a job, but so was everybody else and finding work was more difficult than finding bird’s milk. [The full phrase is shir-e morgh wa jan-e adamizad, which translates as ‘bird’s milk and human life’, and signifies how precious or scarce something is).

A lifeline in the nick of time

I wasn’t having much luck finding work and we’d used up nearly all the money we had. Finally, one day, I answered a call from a number that wasn’t saved on my phone. I’d been receiving quite a few calls from that number but I never answered them because I was worried about who might be calling me. Finally, I decided to answer the phone and see what the caller wanted. It was my old boss. He said I should go back to the ministry, that my bast [grade] had been approved and that I was free to take up my old job again. It was like a miracle. God had heard my prayers and sent me a lifeline just in the nick of time.

So, a few days ago, I went back to the ministry. I was anxious and unsure about what I might find there. But when I arrived and saw so many of my colleagues were also back and working, all the anxiety I felt slipped away and was replaced by a feeling of homecoming. I called my boss and told him I’d arrived, and he instructed me to go to his office. He welcomed me with open arms and told me how happy he was that I was coming back to work. He introduced me to the new colleagues who had joined the department since the start of the Islamic Emirate and took me to Human Resources to sort out my paperwork.

The people at Human Resources said I could start working immediately, but they said that new government had reduced everyone’s salaries and mine would also be reduced by 30 per cent— from 10,000 afghanis (USD 133) to 7,000 (USD 93). Still, I was happy to have a job and a regular income.

Eid, a time to reflect and be grateful

There won’t be enough money for extras. After we pay the rent, there’s only 5,000 afghanis (USD 66) left over for our living expenses. It’s not enough for a family of five. But I know my wife can make it work so we can have a roof over our heads and food on the table. And at least I have a job. I’m better off than most.

So, there’s not going to be a sheep to sacrifice this year. We don’t have enough money for it. A couple of months ago, I had the idea of buying a young lamb to raise for Eid, but it seems everyone had the same idea. The price of lambs had soared to 13,000 afghanis (USD 173) each, almost as much as you’d pay for a full-grown sheep.

This will be the third year we haven’t been able to sacrifice a sheep and the fact that we haven’t been able to fulfil this important religious rite is heavy on my mind. I also worry about the example it sets for our children and also troubled that our traditions might be fading from our lives. My youngest is too young to remember the last time we sacrificed a sheep and celebrated Eid.

This year, there’s no money for the things we need to have on hand to receive guests, if anyone comes calling. No money for dry fruit or sweets and no money for new clothes or presents for the children.

Still, Eid is about more than sacrificing sheep, or buying new clothes or receiving guests. It’s about reflecting on the life you have and thanking God for the bounties he’s given you – the love of your family, good health and a job.

Edited by Roxanna Shapour

The Daily Hustle: Eid-e Qurban, a time to reflect and be grateful
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