Afghanistan Peace Campaign
A U.S. Congressional report says strategic failures; dependence, corruption, and delayed peace talks, undermined Afghanistan’s institutions, leading to the Taliban’s rapid takeover after America’s withdrawal.
On the fourth anniversary of the Taliban’s return to power, the U.S. Congressional Afghanistan War Commission released its second report, concluding that America’s 20-year war in Afghanistan failed due to deep strategic miscalculations rather than battlefield tactics.
The independent body, established by Congress in 2021, found that despite Washington’s stated aim of fostering Afghanistan self-reliance, the country’s institutions remained dangerously dependent on U.S. military, financial, and technical support. Parallel systems led by American contractors and agencies bypassed Afghan officials, undermining sovereignty and entrenching fragility.
The report stresses that Afghanistan security forces, reliant on U.S. logistics and technology, were unable to operate independently. As U.S. aid declined after the Doha peace talks, their capacity collapsed, paving the way for the Taliban’s swift takeover. Negotiations with the group, the commission argues, began too late—after the U.S. had already lost crucial leverage.
It also points to Washington’s shifting and often contradictory policies. A mission that began as a counterterrorism campaign quickly transformed into state-building, but without coherent strategy. Conflicting priorities among the Pentagon, State Department, and USAID, compounded by corruption, disputed elections, and lack of political consensus in Kabul, left the Afghanistan government brittle and mistrusted.
The report highlights Pakistan’s “double game”: while providing U.S. forces with vital transit routes and cooperating against al-Qaeda, it simultaneously allowed Taliban sanctuaries, undermining international counterterrorism efforts and prolonging the conflict.
Testimonies from Afghanistan citizens and U.S. officials reveal that early optimism eroded into deep disillusionment. Civilian casualties, corruption, and disregard for Afghanistan’s political and cultural complexities—such as national identity, Islam’s role in politics, and local governance, further fueled instability.
Four years after the U.S. withdrawal, Afghanistan has once again become a haven for extremist groups. U.N. experts warn that ISIS-K now poses a growing threat to the U.S. and Europe, while al-Qaeda—long allied with the Taliban, is rebuilding.
The commission concludes that the war’s failure had no single cause but stemmed from a convergence of strategic errors. Analysts caution that unless these lessons are absorbed, future U.S. interventions risk repeating the same costly mistakes.