Taliban Narratives (2) TV documentaries: The Emirate disseminates its history to the masses

The Islamic Emirate is seeking to document its history and shape a narrative that explains and justifies its rise back to power to the Afghan people. In this mini-series on Taliban narratives, part one looked at the Emirate’s written efforts – focusing on newly-published books that explore themes of history, ideology and identity. This second part scrutinises state-sponsored television documentaries that tell stories of Taliban heroism, victory with divine help and the suffering of Afghan civilians at the hands of the infidels. AAN’s Sharif Akram argues that the Emirate’s efforts in the visual realm have multiple aims: discrediting the legacy of the past two decades, legitimising the Taliban’s long armed struggle, their capture of power and continuing to rule, and providing role models for other Afghan men.

The villagers in Logar province speak to the state-run Radio Television Afghanistan about the US airstrikes in their area. A freeze frame from the “Documentary on American Atrocities in Logar Province”.The first part of this series is available here: “Taliban Narratives (1) Books: “Who we are and why we fought

Introduction

The author has watched more than a dozen documentaries, interviews and other programmes aired on TV channels and radio stations. They include: a series of documentaries detailing civilian casualties caused by United States and other foreign forces in more than 15 provinces; documentaries on major battles such as in Shahikot, Paktia province (2002) and Marjah (2010) and Shorab (2012), both in Helmand; a series profiling senior Taliban officials, including the now late Minister of Refugees and Repatriation, Khalil Rahman Haqqani, the (also late) commander and former Chief of Military Operations for the southeast, Mullah Sangin Fateh and former commander in Logar and current Ministry of Defence official, Ashraf Malang; and a TV series featuring Taliban members recalling their experiences in prison. Among the material surveyed were also a few ‘shorts’, clips taken from Islamic Republic-era media and repackaged on social media with the aim of discrediting the old regime, as well as radio documentaries and audiobooks.

A brief summary of the different themes of the audio-visual material

The first category of documentaries are compelling reports on the civilian casualties caused by the forces of the US and other foreign countries and the Islamic Republic in Afghanistan’s rural areas and have mainly been produced by state-run Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA). Those behind the series are well-trained and equipped journalists (many employees of RTA under the Republic who have stayed on in their jobs), who, accompanied by local Taliban officials, travel to provinces and districts and hear from locals about their experiences.[1] These documentaries also tell the visual story of the destruction, integrating footage from the time, where available. Some was filmed by the foreign forces themselves and show their operations – breaking down doors, body-searching civilians, including women, and interacting with locals. The film-makers mostly hear from people who are introduced as non-affiliated civilians and who recount their memories of night raids, bombardments and the killing and imprisonment of civilians. Interviewees often show old wounds and injuries, as well as photos of family members killed. Interestingly, women, mainly aged ones, are also interviewed and shown on camera, often without covering their faces, a choice unexpected from this ultra-conservative movement.

A freeze frame from the documentary ‘Atrocities of Americans in Kunduz Province’.

Major battles the Taliban have fought against US and NATO forces is a second theme often reflected in the documentaries. They show battles mainly from the Taliban perspective but also, to some extent, that of their adversaries, covering operational planning, the heroism of Taliban fighters, how they fought at close quarters and the damage they inflicted upon the foreign forces. They include ‘The Epic of Shahikot’, which recounts the battle, named Operation Anaconda, by the US, in which took place in March 2002 in Zurmat district of Paktia. It could either be seen as the last stand of the Taliban and al-Qaeda after the 2001 collapse of the first Islamic Emirate, or as the Taliban portray it, their first battle in the ’jihad’ against the foreign occupiers. In this, the Taliban managed to take down a US helicopter, kill eight US troops and wound 40 others. An unknown number of Afghans and foreign fighters were also killed and injured (see this CNN report from March 2002). This documentary, which tells the story of the operation from both the Taliban and US point of views, details the number of US soldiers involved in the operation, the aircraft, artillery, tanks and other weapons used as well as the Taliban’s strategy, number and planning from the perspective of those who participated. For example, Mullah Abdul Qayum, a close affiliate of Saif Rahman Mansur, who led the Taliban in the battle, recalls:

When America invaded Afghanistan and the Islamic Emirate retreated, the only district still controlled by the Taliban was Zurmat, led by Saif Rahman Mansur. He went to the Supreme Leader, Mullah Omar, and contacted him through a [two-way] radio and Mullah Omar told him to start the jihad and begin guerrilla operations. Many refugees from different provinces had come to Zurmat district. Saif Rahman Mansur gave me the responsibility to transfer them to a safe place. We [then] brought weapons from Gardez, such as RPGs and DShKs. The enemy planes flew around and patrolled [the Shahikot area] and they got confident that no one was there. And when they came and gathered, thinking no one was there, the commander ordered us to attack them. We launched a sudden attack from all sides and they were killed in large numbers. They panicked because they’d thought the area was empty. The reason they were killed in such large numbers was because the attack came suddenly and from every direction.

Another documentary, ‘The Epic of Shorab’, broadcast by RTA in August 2023, tells the story of a  Taliban raid on Camp Bastion, the largest British military base in Afghanistan, in Helmand’s Shorab district carried out in September 2012. In the attack, they killed two US marines and destroyed multiple military helicopters, causing 200 millions dollars’ worth of damage (for more details see detailed contemporary report by The Mighty website). Other documentaries detail multiple battles in a particular location, such as Helmand’s Marjah district, where, after President Barak Obama’s 2010 ‘troop surge’, 30,000 US troops were sent to this one district.

A freeze frame from ‘The Epic of Shorab’, which tells the story of a Taliban raid on Camp Bastion carried out in September 2012.

third category profiles Taliban leaders and commanders, detailing their personal lives, military achievements and roles in the broader armed struggle. Notable figures include Khalil Rahman Haqqani, the late acting Minister of Refugees and Repatriations, who was killed in a December 2024 Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) attack in Kabul. ‘The Man Who Came Out Alive from the Flames’ produced by the Haqqani-owned Jalal Foundation in December 2023, highlights Khalil Rahman Haqqani’s role in the war against the Soviets in the 1980s and later against the US, as well as his efforts to mediate between warring mujahedin factions, alongside his brother, Jalaludin Haqqani, in the 1990s. The documentary portrays him as a dedicated servant of the people, with his ministry’s doors always open to visitors – a gesture that ultimately cost him his life, when he was killed by a suicide bomber inside the Ministry’s mosque. Other figures profiled include Ashraf Malang, former Taliban commander in Logar and currently an official at the Ministry of Defence, known for capturing two American soldiers alive, and Mullah Sangin Fateh, who was in charge of military operations in the southeast and oversaw the 2009 abduction of US soldier Bowe Bergdahl.

A freeze frame from the documentary ‘The Man Who Came Out Alive from the Flames’ about Khalil Rahman Haqqani’s role in the war against the Soviets in the 1980s and later against the US.

A fourth category feature interviews with Taliban fighters, broadcast on radio and TV, and audiobooks by Taliban authors. Both RTA and another state-affiliated media platform, Hurryat, have aired programmes where Taliban members share their memories of the war. RTA’s programme, ‘The Twenty-Year Journey: Stories of the Sacred Struggle of Afghans’, features Talibs who recount their personal experiences and reflections on the conflict. Hurryat’s programme, ‘The Battle of Light’, which has been broadcast over its radio and social media platforms, focuses on the stories of Taliban fighters and the key battles in which they were involved: it largely centres on the Taliban’s war against ISKP, rather than the struggle against the Republic and the US. Fighters who were imprisoned by US forces over the last two decades are also given a voice in these programmes. Many speak emotionally about the torture and hardships they endured. They recall both psychological and physical forms of abuse, including beatings, sleep deprivation, electric shocks, insults to religious values and other forms of mistreatment. Other programmes focus on a specific book, which is narrated in audio format for half an hour, six days a week, often in a way that evokes strong emotional responses. Another, recent strategy employed by Taliban-affiliated social media platforms involves undermining and discrediting the Republic and US forces by clipping and re-broadcasting investigations by Western and Afghan media into corruption, crimes and political instability that were made during the Republic.

A freeze frame from the RTA’s programme ‘The Twenty-Year Journey: Stories of the Sacred Struggle of Afghans’.
How documentaries attempt to promote the Emirate

The Taliban’s efforts in documentary-making are deeply rooted in their desire to promote their own narrative both within Afghanistan and beyond (some documentaries have English subtitles for a wider audience in the Muslim world and around the globe), aiming to counter the two decades of foreign, predominantly Western perspectives on their movement and the war. The narratives found in Taliban documentaries are closely aligned with those of their written works, which featured in part 1 of this mini-series on Taliban narratives. Both books and documentaries dwell on the harms done to the Taliban, or by the foreigners to Afghan civilians, side-stepping the harm the Taliban also inflicted. Civilians were killed and injured by all parties to the conflict, including the Taliban: those victims do not appear in these documentaries.[2] There are also gaps in the historical narrative: Dasht-e Laili, the desert in Jawzjan province, for example (see below), was the site of mass graves from three large-scale massacres, two of Taliban (1997 and 2001) and one by Taliban (1998).[3]

Discrediting the US narrative 1: A struggle against the infidels

Central to the strategy is the framing of their struggle as not just a fight for Afghanistan’s liberation, but as a central battle in the larger war between Muslims and infidels, who, according to the Taliban, sought to dismantle a system built on Islamic principles. For example, the head of the Logar Institute of Higher Education is featured in a half-hour programme, ‘The Oppression of American Soldiers in Logar Province’, which aired on RTA in November 2022:

In 2001, when the United States and the NATO coalition decided to attack Afghanistan and US President George W Bush explicitly declared that “Our war is a Crusade” – a war against Islam. From their statements, it was clear that it was Bush, the United States and NATO that started the war against Islam and to confront Muslims. Secondly, they were scared of our dear country, which is the heart of Asia and where, at that time, the Islamic Emirate was in power and there was an Islamic system. Therefore, they feared that if this system were to strengthen, it would become a problem for the infidels and the Western world. For this reason, they began the war against Islam and Muslims.

The Taliban are cautious about specifically referring to the Islamic Republic as a party to the conflict in their documentaries. Their narrative frames the core issue in Afghanistan not as a battle between Afghans, but as a struggle against foreign forces. The Taliban believe the real fight was against foreign invaders who were hostile to the establishment of an Islamic system. The Republic, in their view, was a puppet regime – an unfortunate result of the US presence in the country.

These documentaries often call US military and intelligence capabilities into question. Accounts of key battles like Shahikot in 2002 and Shorab in 2012, highlight how Taliban fighters were successful not only in carrying out significant attacks against the US, but also in successfully defending themselves and resisting US operations directed at them. They showcase how the foreigners’ advanced security measures were disrupted and dismantled, suggesting that military power is no match for faith when the cause is just. The narrators interpret their victories as stemming from divine help that was given because their war was righteous. When describing the battles in Marjah in Helmand, at the height of the US presence in 2010, the narrator in the documentary, ‘The Battle for Marjah, which is produced in October 2024 by UrojPublishing Agency, uses the Pashto equivalent of the present narrative tense to heighten the immediacy of his tale, which pits mighty America against those relying on God:

2010 is one of the bloodiest years for American soldiers, a year that brought bitter memories to thousands of foreign soldiers in Afghanistan. This year, America sends thousands of fresh troops into the Marjah district of HelmandBarak Obama’s personally leading the war operation and intends to defeat the mujahedin in this district. But he’s unaware that his soldiers are stuck in the bog and death is waiting for them at every step.

Another documentary, ‘Sangin: The British Hell’, also produced by Uroj in December 2024, focuses on the experience of war in Sangin for the Taliban and the British forces, who were responsible for security in this district between 2006 and 2010. The narrator argues that “not only fire from projectile, rockets and homemade bombs, but also the very stones of Sangin district, like the fountains of hellfire, took their toll from the invaders.” It is as if the very land was part of the struggle against the infidels. A Taliban member, speaking with barely a pause for breath, recalls:

Helmand province, especially Sangin district, even the world says was hell for [the British]. Once, an unbeliever asked me why they call this place hell. I answered that you don’t know hell [where] there is no rest, no sleep, no comfort. In Sangin district, we fought against them everywhere from above and below. We used to fight against them with mines and fidayin [fighters willing to sacrifice themselves; in this context, suicide bombers] and in different ways. Even the women were by our side and hid our weapons so that we could pass.

A freeze frame from the ‘Sangin: The British Hell’.
Discrediting the US narrative 2: They brought neither human rights, nor women’s rights, nor development

Another theme shaping the narratives in these documentaries are challenges and attempts to discredit rationales made by the US to try to legitimise its invasion, including America’s claim to have upheld human rights. The documentaries expose the deaths and injuries caused to civilians by the US and its allies, through night raids and drone strikes. Footage of airstrikes, captured at the time, is combined with eye-witness accounts, who describe the unfolding horror of an attack. For example, in the RTA documentary, ‘The Oppression of American Soldiers in Kunduz Province,’ broadcast in November 2022, one interviewee recalls an attack on his village:

It was evening when I heard the firing. I’d been in Iran and didn’t actually know what a raid was like. My brother, who was later martyred, went outside, but fearing the bullets, he came back in. My father got angry with him and told him to come inside quickly. Later, my mother felt pain and fainted. I carried her inside the room. After some time, we were lying down, trying to sleep at home [while the firing continued in the village]. That whole night, there were explosions, both artillery fire and airstrikes.

The narrator, as he continues speaking about the raid, becomes emotional and tearful. He explains even minor details in a soft voice.

An hour passed, and at 12:30 am, the planes dropped a bomb on our house. My father was martyred. My son, who was lying next to me, was hit in the hand with shrapnel. He screamed that his hand had been blown off. When I picked him up, his hand dangled behind him. I told him to run, as another bomb was coming. My mother sat up and asked what was happening. At that moment, another bomb hit the house. We all ran to the walls [seeking some protection], but the walls collapsed. When I got up and picked up my son, I saw my mother, my daughter and my wife buried under the rubble. My son was asking for water and told me he was thirsty. His hand had been [almost completely] severed [from his wrist] and was hanging [by a small piece of tissue]. My mother called out for me to get her out, as she couldn’t breathe and was going to die. When I reached her and pulled her out of the rubble, the planes dropped another bomb and a piece of shrapnel hit me in the back. I fell into the mud. My mother screamed again for me to get her out, saying she was going to die. When I rescued her, my six-month-old daughter also started crying under the rubble. My mother told me to go and get the little girl.

As he was pulling his daughter out, he said, another bomb dropped and a piece of shrapnel hit his face. When he looked into other rooms, his father, brother and nephews were lying in blood and some of them had lost hands or feet and his three-month-old nephew had been struck in the head with shrapnel, which had shattered his head.

To back up the claims, the camera focuses on the interviewee’s son whose hand had had to be amputated and we hear directly from the child:

My hand was severed in the raid. The planes came and bombed in the evening. We were trapped under the rubble and I was hit by shrapnel. Later, they took me to the doctor and my hand was amputated. Now, at night, my hand still comes to me in my dreams and I get scared.

These documentaries explicitly push for a rejection of the claim that the US brought development and prosperity to Afghanistan – which the Taliban perceive as a key US justification for its presence. For example, the narrator on the RTA documentary on Logar says:

In the last two decades, the presence of US air and ground forces brought nothing to Afghans except suffering and poverty. By invading Afghanistan, the United States took away even the most basic opportunities for survival from the people of this land. Instead of reconstruction and development, their night-time operations turned thousands of homes into ruins and it must be said that, in addition to homes, they also bombed hundreds of religious schools, mosques and madrasas. People from all walks of life in this province fell victim to them.

The Taliban also directly refute US claims to have brought human rights and women’s rights to Afghanistan. One approach they have taken is featuring Afghan women, using their voices to challenge the idea that foreign intervention brought them prosperity or rights. Women who have lost their sons and daughters speak on camera, recounting the hard times they endured and the emotional toll of their losses. For example, RTA’s documentary, ‘The Oppression of American Soldiers in Zabul Province’ from October 2022 features an old woman who speaks about an attack on her home:

The Americans raided us one evening, at twelve o’clock midnight. [The raid continued] all that night, the next day and the following night. Now, though we’re poor, we thank God that He saved us from those hardships and hard days. At that time, we’d moved away from here to the neighbouring village and then had come back to our village. After spending two nights here, the raid came upon us. It was very hard and difficult for us. Our lives were in such a state that the Americans would come and enter our homes. Now, thank God, even though we’re poor, we sleep peacefully at night. 

A freeze frame from the RTA’s documentary ‘The Oppression of American Soldiers in Zabul Province’.

One element of confronting US claims to be champions of human rights are TV interviews with those who were captured and held prisoner. Former detainees recount disturbing experiences of torture, mistreatment and blatant disregard for their religious values.

Discrediting the Republic

While the Emirate’s film-makers often attempt to avoid referencing the Republic, they have recently sought to discredit the entire two-decade period by highlighting the political instability and mismanagement that characterised those years. To achieve this, they have adopted a new tactic: they use materials and reports produced by independent media during the Republic to delegitimise it. The Emirate has been posting on a newly established account on the social platform X, apparently unrelated to the state and with no explicit affiliation, repackaging old reports on issues such as corruption, civilian casualties, crimes and the worsening situation of women as evidence that the Republic and US forces were responsible for and complicit in the corruption and chaos. They have also gathered footage of abuses and disorder from social media. For example, one post on X, with the video of a victim linked, reads:

Do you remember the times when the arbitrary actions of officials and their men dominated every street and alley? It was a situation where ordinary people were faced not with safety, but with terror. The horrifying incident on Wazir Akbar Khan Street is a clear example: a father and son, who were taking a sick relative to the hospital, were beaten to death without any reason or crime by these arbitrary officials. The situation was so brutal that even the police could not intervene and the perpetrators walked away from the scene without any trouble. According to ordinary citizens, the previous government committed such atrocities against Afghans that even Israel, in its entire history, has not inflicted upon the Palestinians.

In another post on X, Niqab Media references a 2014 TOLO News report (linked to the post) on the number of generals in the Ministry of Interior during Hamed Karzai’s presidency who were promoted based on political interests and who lacked even basic literacy (although it is worth bearing in mind that the Emirate also appoints mullahs with only religious knowledge to even purely technical and professional state positions). The post reads:

During the previous administration, 180 generals were appointed within the Ministry of Interior, most of whom were illiterate and were tied to specific provinces. A report published in 2014 stated that Afghanistan had turned into a factory for producing generals, many of whom neither deserved the rank nor were qualified to hold it.

Promoting the Taliban as exemplars for Afghan men

The documentaries dedicated to the biographies of senior Taliban officials, commanders and fighters mostly feature those with stories of heroism and sacrifice to tell. Here, the personal says something broader about the Taliban movement’s history and identity. The protagonists are mainly portrayed as righteous people who took up arms for a just cause. For example, Mullah Mahbub, a Taliban commander from Herat province, in the documentary about his life, A Lifetime in War, broadcast in January 2024, says he joined the movement in the 1990s, seeing it as a jihad “to eliminate corruption,” bring peace and eliminate chaos.

A freeze frame from the documentary ‘A Lifetime in War’.

Men like Mullah Sangin Fateh, who led the movement’s military operations in the southeast and was a powerful commander with influence stretching beyond the Durand Line to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on the Pakistani side, are portrayed as heroes whose tactics, sacrifices and command proved crucial to the Taliban’s victory over their enemies. Sangin’s role in abducting US soldier Bowe Bergdahl is given particular emphasis. A September 2024 documentary about his life named after him, ‘Mullah Sangin Fatih’, portrays his kidnap of Bergdahl and success in keeping him for years, despite massive US attempts to locate and rescue him, as an act of heroism. Bergdahl was eventually freed in exchange for five Taliban held in Guantanamo in 2014 (see Guardian reporting from 2009 here). Similarly, a biographical film on Ashraf Malang, ‘Open the Hand’ produced by Jalal Foundation and aired by Shamshad TV in May 2024, highlighted his abduction of one US soldier and killing of another in Logar province (see the Al Jazeera reporting from 2010 here). Malang is portrayed as an extraordinary military leader who was able to avoid being targeted by US raids and operations, despite almost a dozen attacks on him.

These profiles appear intended to serve as models for Afghan men. By showcasing the bravery and leadership of these fighters and commanders, the Emirate aims to present them not merely as figures who will have historical significance, but as ideals to be looked up to and followed should a similar crisis ever arise in the future. They aim also to inform the Afghan public about the cost of establishing the Islamic Emirate. The life stories are presented as evidence that the Emirate is not the result of a mere political struggle or a deal, but rather of massive sacrifice and suffering by their fighters and the entire Afghan nation. They seek to reinforce the idea that the movement is built on the blood of the martyrs and it is said explicitly, that fighters should remember this: it cautions them against straying from the cause, misusing resources, or betraying the sacrifices made by those who have given their lives for the cause.

Strategy, reach and impact

The Emirate appears to be allocating more attention and resources to the production of documentaries than in the past and, comparatively, more attention to documentaries as a means of shaping its narrative than to writing and publishing books. The documentaries are produced professionally and are of high quality. Improved graphics are applied, along with maps. Typically, a narrator speaks off-camera, reading the script and explaining the themes professionally. The teams behind them are well-trained and equipped, often made up of former employees from the Ministry of Information and Culture, RTA and other Taliban-funded media outlets such as Hurryat Radio – which maintain an active online presence – and the Jalal Foundation and Uroj Publishing Agency.

In all these documentaries, interviewers’ questions are edited out and only interviewees’ answers are used. Efforts are made to support claims with as much evidence as possible. Footage, whether captured by the Taliban, US and NATO forces, or independent media, highlights notable events and incidents of destruction. Ongoing signs of devastation are pointed out and even children interviewed to support claims. Eye-witnesses or survivors recount, for example, when they were injured while archive footage shows the event they describe.

What is particularly interesting is that the Emirate chooses not to air some of these documentaries on state platforms. Instead, they may broadcast them through independent media outlets, hoping to reach a broader audience and avoid the label of state propaganda. For example, the documentary on Ashraf Malang was aired on Shamshad TV, the largest Pashto-language network in Afghanistan, which has been active for over a decade. Similarly, a 2023 documentary, ‘The Hidden Side of the War in Helmand’, detailing the civilian harm the war in Helmand province over the past twenty years was produced and aired by Ariana News, a major Afghan media network owned by the Bayat Foundation.

Emirate-affiliated film-makers have proved creative in reaching a broader audience and distancing their narratives from the movement, presenting them as independent. To achieve this, they are actively promoting their documentaries on social media, paying platforms to extend their reach. They have also been targeting independent TV channels and YouTube channels with large followings to air their content. The Taliban have even begun publicly advertising their documentaries before release. For example, in early November 2024, RTA erected over a dozen massive billboards in Kabul city promoting an upcoming documentary, ‘Dasht-e Laili’. It is named after a desert in Jawzjan province where thousands of Taliban fighters were killed by US-allied Northern Alliance forces in late 2001.

Such efforts have had some success, although measuring it precisely is difficult. However, one can gauge their reach through view counts on platforms like YouTube. For example, ‘The Epic of Shahikot’ garnered 288,000 views, although other documentaries tend to receive fewer views. The Ashraf Malang documentary, for instance, only reached roughly 23,000 views on Shamshad TV’s YouTube channel.

In addition, the Emirate has created channels that are officially non-affiliated to portray them as independent. By selecting independent media outlets to broadcast some of their content, they further distance the documentaries from being seen as state-produced. These efforts are aimed at presenting the content in an independent light, possibly in an effort to make it more acceptable to audiences in Afghanistan, the Muslim world and beyond.

How do documentaries and books serve the state’s desire to build its narrative? 

For the Emirate, publishing books is mainly about what could be called ‘structural narrative building’ – recording events and trying to ensure that its version of events is embedded as the accepted and official history of the last few decades for future generations. Documentaries and visual programmes may lack the depth and hoped-for permanency of written materials, but can have a far more immediate impact.

Unlike book-reading, which is rare and limited mainly to some Afghans in urban areas, television is popular and social media usage is widespread and increasing. Moreover, the Taliban had already engaged in successful social media campaigns during the insurgency and are well-versed in video. As the Emirate moves to further consolidate its rule, the visual is turning out to be an increasingly important medium for it to disseminate the version of history it hopes will last in the minds of fellow Afghans.

Edited by Kate Clark and Fabrizio Foschini

References

References
1 These documentaries are aired by the RTA and published on YouTube and other social media platforms, as well. Here is the link to the YouTube playlist of this series.
2 AAN reports on civilian casualties up to December 2019 were brought together in a dossier, Thematic Dossier XXIV: Ten years of reporting on civilian casualties, still no ceasefire. Our last report on this subject was published in July 2021, New UNAMA Civilian Casualties report: The human cost of the Taleban push to take territory.
3 For details of all three mass killings, see the Afghanistan justice Project’s Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 1978-2001.

Taliban Narratives (2) TV documentaries: The Emirate disseminates its history to the masses