Afghanistan Peace CampaignAfghanistan Analysts Network
Acting Deputy Prime Minister, Abdul Ghani Baradar, and Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, meet Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran on the sidelines of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral. Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 23 May 2024
The Emirate on the assassination of Haniyeh
Kabul was among the few capitals to issue an official statement regarding the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. The statement was released in the name of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), rather than from a specific entity or official, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or IEA spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid. This may suggest that the supreme leader, Amir al-Mu’minin Hibatullah Akhundzada, likely approved it. Various Emirate-controlled media outlets, including the English-language government newspaper The Kabul Times, published the 267-word official statement on 1 August 2024 which expressed the government’s profound sorrow at his ‘martyrdom’.
Martyr Ismail Haniyeh was a distinguished, wise, and resolute Palestinian leader who made significant sacrifices in his successful struggle and Jihad, fulfilling his commitment in this manner. For a Muslim and a fighter, martyrdom represents a tremendous victory; he has succeeded and left behind a legacy of resistance, selflessness, patience, perseverance, struggle, and practical sacrifice for his followers.
The IEA statement is full of catchphrases central to the Taleban’s Islamist ideology, such as ‘mujahed’, ‘jihad’ and “martyrdom”: The “martyrdom of this great figure,” it said, was a “significant loss to the Islamic Ummah and the Jihadist cause” and “defending Hamas and the sacred land of Palestine” was “both an Islamic and humanitarian duty.”
The IEA strongly condemned the “atrocities, bombings, and genocide perpetrated by the Zionist regime against Palestinian Muslims as egregious crimes against humanity.” It makes no mention of the atrocities committed by Hamas during its 7 October 2023 attack on Israel. It also glosses over the presence of Christian Palestinians (now few in number in Gaza, but more, proportionally, in the West Bank, Israel and the diaspora), referring to the Palestinian people as Muslim only.[1] It called for action, although notably made no promises as to what Afghanistan could do:
We reiterate our call to influential parties, particularly within the Islamic and Arab world, to intensify their efforts to thwart the Zionist invasion and its associated atrocities. The ongoing crimes of the Zionist regime will undoubtedly lead to further instability in the region and its countries, with the resulting disturbances and adverse outcomes falling squarely on the shoulders of the invading Zionists and their supporters.
The statement did not explicitly call for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Whether this – and its avoidance of using the term ‘Israel’ in most statements indicates a tacit denial of Israel’s right to exist is difficult to answer.[2]
The Emirate’s response to Haniyeh’s assassination and several analyses by various media and median platforms that did not sound fully convincing or even biased led the author to want to delve deeper into its relationship with Hamas and its stance on Palestine/Israel in general. The analysis begins with the Emirate’s response to the 7 October attacks before looking back at relationship with Hamas before then. It then scrutinises how that relationship has developed.
The Emirate on Hamas/Palestine/Israel until October 2023 attacks
Until October 2023, little information was available regarding the relationship between the IEA and Hamas, even in specialised media outlets. However, shortly after Hamas attacked Israel, Afghan-born journalist Akram Dawi, working for the Voice of America (VoA), highlighted the “conspicuous silence of the senior Emirate official on the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza” in an analytical article (see here). He noted that neither the Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, nor acting Prime Minister, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, nor his three deputies had commented on the event, which he said was “in sharp contrast to the daily sharp comments from neighbouring Iran.” Dawi referenced (without direct quotes or cited sources) a statement posted on the social media platform X by the IEA’s chief spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahed, on 14 October, condemning “Israel’s siege of Gaza” and calling “on the international community to address the crisis.”
The IEA’s position on the issue, quoted in the Dawi article, was most pointedly summed up by acting Interior Minister Serajuddin Haqqani: “We do not interfere in others’ internal affairs, but we have faith-based sympathy with Muslims.” In short, the Emirate’s official messages were largely in line with “expressions of solidarity and support for the Palestinians” made by other Muslim countries, as Michael Kugelman of the US think tank Wilson Center told Dawi.
On key aspects, however, the statement clearly differs from the stated positions of other countries in the region, as pointed out by Shujauddin Amini, an author for the US-based Afghan news website Hasht-e Subh: “The Taliban did not call Hamas a liberation movement like the Turkish authorities, nor did they call Israel a usurper and infanticidal regime like the Islamic Republic of Iran. They also did not support the position of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in talking about the necessity of creating two countries in the pre-1967 borders.”
Sporadic contacts, no official relations
The Emirate does have official diplomatic relations with Hamas; their interactions, however, have mostly been limited to sporadic contacts and exchanges of greetings.
In August 2021, after the Emirate was re-established for the second time, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh called its deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani, also known as Baradar, to congratulate him on the “end of the US occupation,” as reported by the Turkish news agency Anadolu, citing the Hamas website. Haniyeh said the end of the United States occupation in Afghanistan was “a prelude to the demise of all occupation forces, foremost of which is the Israeli occupation of Palestine.” Baradar, for his part, thanked Haniyeh for his call and expressed his hope for a Palestinian “victory and empowerment as a result of their resistance.” He also conveyed his wishes for the “oppressed” Palestinian people to defeat their occupiers with God’s help and through their resistance. The Emirate also asserted that it was only able to defeat the USA “with God’s help,” see for example this speech by acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. He called on all countries to support the Palestinian cause.
A few weeks later, in early October 2021, Haniyeh called the Emirate again, as Anadolu reported. This time, he spoke to Muttaqi. He again praised the Taleban’s victory over the US, but also urged Muttaqi to keep the topic of Palestine present in his speeches, “especially Jerusalem and the ongoing [Israeli] violations there.” Haniyeh also expressed his hope that the Emirate “could have a role in supporting their brothers in Palestine to liberate Jerusalem,” according to the report. Anadolu reported that Haniyah “expressed his pride in the struggle of the Palestinian people and their steadfastness in Jerusalem,” but there was no indication of any promise of concrete support. This pointed to a cautious approach on the part of the Emirate to steer clear of a conflict far away from home and on the heels of their own victory in Afghanistan.
There have also been a few meetings between Emirate and Hamas officials. These were likely not the first such encounters and did not represent dedicated bilateral discussions, but were rather meetings as part of broader diplomatic or religious events. For example, in early October 2022, spokesman Mujahid met Hamas representatives, including Haniyeh, during a conference of Islamic scholars in Istanbul and reportedly discussed regional issues, including developments in Jerusalem and the West Bank, according to the US-based website The Long War Journal (LWJ). In April 2023, the IEA envoy to Qatar and Haniyeh met at an Iftar celebration in Doha, according to a report by the Indian think tank Observer Research Foundation (ORF).
While the LWJ described such meetings as “an attempt by the Taliban to expand ties with Hamas,” the initiative seems to have come from Hamas, perhaps in an effort to secure (at least verbal) support. Mujahid remained non-committal during his meeting with Haniyeh and referred to Palestine merely as an “issue for the entire Muslim Ummah,” according to a report published by the Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI). No concrete agreements or even arrangements were reported after this or similar meetings. In their May 2024 report published by ORF (cited above), Kabir Taneja and Shivam Shekhawat wrote:
The Taliban has not shown any proactive support for Hamas and has almost never mentioned them by name. … The Taliban has not been vociferous on the Gaza war. On the contrary, it has aired its views and made its position clear, but tried not to wade into either being overtly [in the same camp as the] pro-Iran or pro-Arab states.
While not all meetings between the Emirate and Hamas have been public, or written about, what is certain is that there are bound to have been numerous occasions for them to rub shoulders. Former Hamas representative in Syria, Lebanon and Iran, Mustafa Yusuf Al-Lidawi, is quoted by MEMRI as saying:
It is not unreasonable [to assume] that Afghanistan will become a new base of operations for Hamas… whose gains will multiply as a result the Taliban rule there. For Hamas met with the Taliban leadership for years during their joint stay in Qatar, and formed close ties with it that can be characterized as natural and expected. Hamas will also gain credit with its allies, its affiliates, those who benefit from its ties [with other elements] and those who seek to expand the resistance axis. Iran, [for example], has an interest in ensuring its security and the security of its border with Afghanistan, and Hamas can play a significant role in this context and gain considerable achievements that will count in its favor and burnish its reputation.
There is no confirmation that this assertion is correct from any other source, and – according to this author’s reading – the meetings were not particularly substantive at all.
Photo: Globe Eye News via X, undated.
Emirate reactions after 7 October 2023
As elsewhere, interest in the Israel/Palestine conflict increased in Afghanistan after the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack and the all-out war Israel launched in response in Gaza and later southern Lebanon. In line with its thus far cautious attitude, the Emirate made no official statement at all about the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 – neither condemning nor approving it. Given the number of casualties on the Palestinian side and Israel’s concrete actions in Gaza and the West Bank, however, they, like others, also toughened their tone in official statements, however, without resorting to threats or considering entering the war.
In its various statements, the IEA and its officials have condemned specific Israeli attacks, which they deem “criminal.” For example, in October 2023, the Foreign Ministry “strongly condemned” (see this post on X) the bombing of a hospital in Gaza “by Zionist forces,” calling it “barbaric and a crime against humanity.”[3] It is probably using the term ‘genocide’ for the first time in this context: “We stand in solidarity with the Palestinians, and with countries and organizations calling for the immediate end of the ongoing genocide and bringing its perpetrators to justice.” Two months later, in December 2023, the foreign ministry condemned the bombing of the same hospital in almost identical terms and voiced concern about a regional conflict “spiraling out of control” and declared its “solidarity” with “the Palestinians.” The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Abdul Qahar Balkhi, also weighed in to condemn the United States’ veto of the Gaza ceasefire resolution at the United Nations Security Council on 8 December 2023:
IEA-MoFA deems position of the United States regretable and condemnable vetoing UNSC resolution & international consensus calling for a cease-fire in Gaza, thus openly making the United States complicit in the ongoing atrocities in Gaza (see his thread posted on X).
Acting Foreign Minister Muttaqi, speaking at what was billed as a High-Level Political Consultative Conference on Palestine in Tehran on 23 December 2023, introduced another element into the Emirate’s position, namely the parallels it sees in the West’s behaviour in Gaza and, before 2021, in Afghanistan (see the text of his speech on the IEA Ministry of Foreign Affairs website). He criticised the West’s “double standards” and spoke of a “paradox” that:
[I]n a world where countries are sanctioned under the pretext of the slightest violation of human rights or on political grounds through the instrumentalization of the human rights paradigm … at the same time, the unremitting genocide of a nation by a regime that is breaching all human standards in its war is not even dealt with the slightest objection!” He added that it was “grotesque to see my country, Afghanistan, being sanctioned by instrumentalizing of human rights – when we are taking steps towards security and stability following more than four decades of foreign invasions!
Indeed, Muttaqi questioned whether “the current world order with all these contradictions, founded following World War ll, could still “address the needs of people in the 21st century.”
However, he still did not go beyond condemning “the ongoing atrocities of the Zionist regime in the Gaza Strip and occupied Palestine,” describing “the struggle of the Palestinian nation as legitimate and legal based on the texts of Sharia and international law” and calling again on “the influential Islamic countries” to “play a more effective role in ending the murder of innocent Palestinians by the Zionist regime and holding the Zionist regime accountable.” He called for a “permanent and just” solution to the Palestine issue “that would ensure the Palestinian people have a state established in the historic land of Palestine.”[4] This, again, was neither a demand for a two-state solution nor that the whole land should be for Palestinians, nor that Israel should cease to exist.
Mutaqqi went on to stress that “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan stands ready, within its capabilities, to accompany the Islamic world in this humanitarian and Islamic issue.” Again, this statement does not include any suggestion of action, such as a threat against Israel or of the Emirate being willing to get directly involved.
The following year, on 2 April 2024, the IEA Foreign Ministry issued a statement slamming Israel’s airstrike on the Iranian diplomatic mission in Damascus, Syria. It condemned the strike “in the strongest possible terms,” calling it a “blatant violation of diplomatic norms and a provoking attempt towards escalating insecurity in the region.”
Following Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel on 14 April, Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Qahar Balkhi termed the action as Iran’s “legitimate right to self-defense” and accused Israel of diverting attention from the “genocide” it was committing against the people of the Gaza Strip by violating other countries’ airspace and thereby destabilising the region. He also reiterated the IEA’s call for “all influential world & regional states to expedite their efforts of halting the crimes of the Zionist regime in order to prevent further escalation of the crisis,” (see his post on X).
Similarly, the Eid al-Fitr message of the IEA’s Amir al-Mu’minin, published by Bakhtar News on 6 April, used the same language, albeit in more general terms:
The Islamic Emirate’s foundation lies on the principles of Islam and the well-being of the Muslim community. We share common faith, beliefs, and convictions, binding us together. In times of joy and sorrow, we stand united, supporting each other with equal participation and collaboration, leveraging our abilities to the best of our capabilities.
This is followed by a two-paragraph section titled “Palestine”:
The issue of Palestine is indeed a concern for the entire Islamic Ummah. We stand in solidarity with the people of Gaza against Israeli aggression and occupation. It is incumbent upon the Islamic Ummah to address the plight of the oppressed Palestinians and to collectively condemn any form of injustice or aggression perpetrated by Israeli invaders. We must mobilize our resources and support Palestine in every possible way to alleviate their suffering and work towards a just resolution of the conflict.
It is regrettable that the international community often falls short in effectively addressing the injustices faced by the people of Palestine. Despite claims of upholding human rights, there is a lack of meaningful action to curb the ongoing oppression and to hold perpetrators of these injustices accountable. This is indeed a source of profound sorrow, and it underscores the urgent need for all responsible parties to fulfill their obligations in addressing this grievous situation.
Individual IEA officials have expressed their support for Hamas, albeit on their personal social media accounts. For example, acting Deputy Education Minister, Mawlawi Sebghatullah Wasil, posted a video message on 8 October 2023, praising Hamas for “their recent operations in Gaza” and “ability to maintain the secrecy of their operations, their preparation, their speed of execution and their skill in carrying out their attacks.” (His statement was cited in a 9 October 2023 post on X by Afghan Analyst). Wasil reportedly stressed that Afghan youth and the ulema were in solidarity with Palestine and expressed their sincere support. He further stated, according to Afghan Analyst, that Hamas’ attack had strengthened the belief that the only viable way against oppression was jihad and resistance.
Similarly, acting Deputy Foreign Minister and the Taleban’s former chief negotiator in Doha, Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanikzai, posted a floral pattern and the word ‘Palestine’ laid into the borders of Israel, the West Bank and Gaza on X on 22 October 2023, accompanied by the comment (see here):
The victory march will continue until the Palestinian flag flies in Jerusalem and in all of Palestine. #FreePalaestin [sic]
The Emirate’s acting Deputy Prime Minister, Muhammad Abdul Kabir, had several meetings with various Iranian officials, including Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi, where, according to Tehran-based news outlet Khabar Online, on 2 August 2024, he said:
Afghanistan, together with the Islamic Republic of Iran, supports the oppressed people of Gaza, and perhaps if we had a common border with the occupying regime [Israel], we would have gone to war with the Zionists to defend the oppressed people of Gaza.
A handful of Iranian sources picked up this quote, but it was not widely reported by other news outlets, including the Afghan media. For the most part, media coverage of Kabir’s visit focused on strengthening Kabul-Tehran relations, Afghan refugees in Iran and counter-narcotics (see, for example, Omid Radio, ToloNews and the Iranian Students’ News Agency, ISNA). AAN was unable to find any IEA or other sources either confirming or denying Kabir’s comments.
While encounters between IEA officials and Hamas have continued since 7 October 2023, there has been no indication that these signify a strengthening of contacts. Both sides’ representatives met again in May 2024 when attending the funeral of Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi, who had died in a helicopter crash (see India Today). On the IEA side, acting Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and confidant of the late Taleban founder, Mullah Muhammad Omar, Mullah Baradar, attended. Photos of this event were distributed by deputy Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hafiz Zia Amin (see his post on X). Importantly, it does not appear that the IEA delegation had travelled to Tehran specifically in order “to meet the Emir of Qatar and the head of the Hamas Political Bureau,” as reported by the US think tank Jamestown).
The Emirate’s final encounter with Haniyeh came when acting Deputy Prime Minister, Mawlawi Abdul Kabir attended the inauguration of Iran’s newly elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian, on 30 July (see al-Emarah). From there, Kabir went to Doha to attend Ismail Haniyeh’s funeral on 4 August, accompanied by Muhammad Na’im Wardak, the charge d’affaires of the Emirate’s embassy in Qatar (see ToloNews). There, he “met with former Hamas chief Khalid Mashal, deputy chief of Hamas Musa Abu Marzooq and Ismail Haniyeh’s son Abdul Salam Ismail Haniyeh, to express condolences,” as Afghan broadcaster Ariana reported.
Possible fake report about Taleban fighters in Palestine
There have been reports of a more active role for the Emirate in supporting Hamas/the Palestinians. They caused a stir, but ultimately proved dubious. On the very day of the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, a post on social media caused a stir. An X-account calling itself “Taliban Public Relations Department,” which has since been suspended, claimed that the IEA foreign ministry had contacted Iran, Iraq and Jordan to obtain transit permits for Taleban fighters to travel to Palestine to support Hamas. VOA reported the tweet on 9 October 2023:
This evening, the foreign office contacted his counterparts in #Iran, Iraq and Jordan, asking for permission for our men to cross their sovereign territory on their way to the holy land. We are preparing and hoping for the good news from our neighbors.#Gaza #Israel #Palestinepic.twitter.com/ZuHTMeQc7q — #FreePalestine 🇵🇸 (@TalibanPRD__) October 7, 2023
The author could not find this tweet and the account has been inactive since 14 October 2023. Moreover, an institution under such a name does not exist in the IEA system; rather, there are public relations departments in various ministries. There are, however, several other accounts on X with almost the same name, such as “Taliban Public Relations Department, Commenitary” (sic) under the handle @TalibanPRD1 (see here), which on 12 October 2023, claimed that an Afghan “mujahid” from Khost had been a “martyred” in Palestine (see here ).
The Emirate was quick to deny that it was trying to facilitate getting it fighters to get to Palestine to support Hamas; the same VOA report quoted the head of the IEA political office in Doha, Mohammad Suhail Shaheen, as saying the “information” was “inaccurate” and spokesman Mujahid reiterating that the IEA’s position had not changed.
It appears that, in October 2023, the IEA had blocked any member from trying to get to Palestine: an order instructed the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) to tell its staff to prevent Taleban fighters leaving Afghanistan for ‘jihad’ in Palestine. The order stressed that the “ideological mujahedin” must remain in Afghanistan and that those who disregarded this order would be punished (see a copy of the letter posted by Afghan Analyst on X).
Also in October, acting Interior Minister Serajuddin Haqqani stressed that: “The Taliban, as the IEA, are prohibited from engaging in Jihad outside Afghanistan,” said Afghan Analyst in a 15 October 2023 post on X. He also went on to note that there were discussions on “internal WhatsApp groups … about supporting about assisting individuals with [obtaining] passports for attending Jihad in Palestine.”
“Numerous pro-Taliban accounts,” Afghan Analyst reported more recently, on 20 March 2024, had claimed that a certain “Yasir, also known as Abu Yosuf al-Afghani,” was killed on 18 March during fighting with Israeli forces in Rafa. According to these sources, Yasir had travelled from Afghanistan to Syria in April 2023 and joined the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir ul-Sham there. In January 2024, he allegedly moved to Palestine “with other Arabs” and took part in fighting there (see the post on X). Afghan Analyst, however, casts doubt on the veracity of this claim by pointing out that his death had already been reported months earlier. He quoted a post by Afghan journalist Wais Barakzai highlighting “recent propaganda efforts by pro-Taliban accounts, which involve misinformation and disinformation.” In his post, Barakzai identified the individual shown in photos posted by various social media accounts and that he was a person “from Syria and was killed several months ago, was also introduced as a Taliban” (see his post on X.
“The authenticity of this claim [is] not known,” said Director of Research at The Khorasan Diary, Riccardo Valle, which focuses on the “greater ‘Khorasan’ region” (broadly speaking, a region that encompasses West and Central Asia) (see his post on X). Valle stressed that the “only source of information has been Afghan Taliban and TTP accounts, it could be a PR move. However, infiltrations [of individual Afghans into Gaza] can be possible.”
It remains unclear whether the episode happened as reported, or even at all. Presumably, Israeli sources would have reported such an incident prominently if there was any truth to it. An internet search yielded no results except a MEMRI report, which also referred only to the posts on X.
The ‘Yasir, also known as Abu Yosuf al-Afghani’ post could be the work of activists involved in – probably mostly private – psychological warfare operations by the Emirate’s opponents. They know that something like this would be picked up and quickly circulated, often without fact-checking, by those who believe the Emirate capable of anything. High-ranking politicians such as the Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republican Michael McCaul, certainly proved the point when he told VoA that he had seen ‘“indications that the Taliban want to come to ‘liberate Jerusalem,’ in their words, to ‘fight the Zionists.’”
Public sentiments in Afghanistan
It is difficult to glean real public sentiments regarding Palestine from Afghan media reports. It can, however, be assumed that Afghans feel a great deal of sympathy for Palestinians not only as fellow Muslims but also as people who have suffered decades of conflict and occupation. That the GDI appear to have put in place procedures to stop Afghans trying to go to Palestine suggests sentiments were strong enough to make some men at least talk about travelling to fight. The younger generation, regardless of their support for the Emirate or lack of, is likely very sympathetic to Palestinians, which could mirror public sentiments in neighbouring Pakistan. “Pakistani society almost universally feels solidarity with the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. But that doesn’t rub off on Hamas. Very few people here show solidarity with them,” head of the German Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Pakistan, Birgit Lamm, told German broadcaster Deutsche Welle:
In early August, the Emirate held a public rally to mourn Haniyeh’s death at Kabul’s Eidgah Mosque, where the IEA and Palestinian, but not Hamas flags, were displayed (see Afghan Analyst’s post on X). The rally attracted “hundreds” of participants who carried “banners denouncing the injustices perpetrated by the Israeli occupation and the repression faced by Palestine and Gaza,” according to reports in the pro-Emirate media (see, for example, this Hurriyat Radio post on X).
There were also earlier pro-Palestinian street demonstrations, for example, in Kabul one week after the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack and Israel’s military response (see ToloNews).
It is difficult to determine how much of this was organised by the state and how much was a genuine expression of solidarity by the Afghan public. The Emirate certainly does not permit any public expression of opinion that diverges from their views.[5]
The Emirate does, however, allow rallies supportive of it, or its stances. For example, see a pro-IEA women’s gathering on 11 September 2021 in a Kabul university (see this New York Times report) or street protests in Khost against Pakistani cross-border attacks that killed Afghan civilians in April 2022 (see VoA).
Some IEA officials are more strident on social media than they would be in official statements. The Ministry of Higher Education’s Director of Publications, Information and Public Relations, Hafiz Ruhullah Rohani, for example wrote: “We, God willing, will come to the aid of our oppressed Palestinian brothers from the land of the graveyard of empires. It just takes some time,” in a post on his personal X account in early August (see quote and screenshot here):
Some “prominent Taliban propagandists,” ie not officials, have started a “Boycott Israeli Products” campaign on X, Afghan Analysts reported on 3 July (see this post on X). It is unclear if Israeli goods are even on the Afghan market, or whether such utterances represent online bravado or could translate into concrete action or even an indication that the IEA’s official, previously reserved position might be about to change.
Conclusion
Following Hamas leader Haniyeh’s assassination, various media and news platforms – both Afghan and international – discussed the relationship between the Taleban/Islamic Emirate and Hamas. Much of the analysis seemed to the author at least partially superficial, while some sounded biased, insinuating a much closer – and sinister – relationship then was the case in reality.
One could certainly argue, though, as MEMRI does, that the (sparse) Hamas-Emirate relations are inspired “by the shared position of jihadism” and by their experiences of “occupation.” When, in 2017, AAN guest authors, Anand Gopal and Alex Strick van Linschoten looked into how Taleban ideology had developed since the fall of the first Emirate, Hamas was one of the movements they compared it to, along with Ahrar al-Sham in Syria and al-Nahda in Tunisia, similar in how their “Islamic Nationalism … was focused on the goal of ‘national liberation’.” Hamas has never been active in Afghanistan and the Taleban have shown little interest in becoming actively engaged in Gaza or the wider Middle East conflict, or indeed any country outside Afghanistan. Both groups are focussed on their own country, not interested in others’ affairs, except as it affects them. In an interview with al-Jazeera in August 2022, an IEA spokesman did not even seem to rule out diplomatic relations with Israel in principle since they have no [immediate] problems with Israel (quoted by MEMRI TV).
Given the geographical distance between Afghanistan and Israel/Palestine, intensive interaction between the two is unlikely. Historically, many volunteers from Arab countries, including some Palestinians, participated in the mujahidin’s fight against the Soviet occupation, a segment of which later became the Taleban. But no particularly close relationships emerged from this. Signs that this might be changing are hard to find beyond some individual online statements.
Edited by Roxanna Shapour and Kate Clark
References
| ↑1 | According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, there are some 40,000 Palestinian Christians living in the West Bank, 850 in the Gaza Strip, and 4,000 in Jerusalem (quoted by Anadolu Agency). The US Department of State’s ‘2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Israel, West Bank and Gaza also provides a figure of 138,000 living inside Israel. Even greater numbers live in the Palestinian diaspora. |
|---|---|
| ↑2 | We were only able to find one exception, in an Islamic Emirate statement posted on X by spokesman Mujahid dated 13 October 2024, where the terms ‘Israel’ and ‘Israelis’ were used. States and individuals especially hostile to Israel typically do not name it, using such phrases as ‘Zionist entity’, instead. |
| ↑3 | The statement referred to an attack on the al-Ahli hospital, formerly the al-Mamadani. The cause of the explosion is actually contested, with some sources including Israel, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Canada saying they believe it was a result of a failed rocket launched from within Gaza by either the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) or Hamas (see, for example, The Guardian and Al-Jazeera). Other sources, such as Goldsmith University’s Forensic Architecture, assert that the blast was the result of “a munition fired from the direction of Israel” (see here). Several other organisations have since examined satellite imagery and eyewitness accounts, but so far have been unable to determine who was to blame for the attack on the hospital with certainly (see, for example, The New York Time’s ‘A Close Look at Some Key Evidence in the Gaza Hospital Blast’). The hospital was established by theAnglican Church’s Church Missionary Society (CMS) in 1882 and is currently operated by the Anglican Diocese of Jerusalem (for more information on the hospital and its history see Barnett, Carlton Carter, Anglo-American Missionary Medicine in Gaza, 1882-1981, Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 2021 available on the Wayback Machine here). |
| ↑4 | Muttaqi was not explicit about the geographic boundaries when he referred to “the historic land of Palestine.” |
| ↑5 | Shortly after taking power, on 19 September 2021, the IEA published an 11-point code of conduct for the media (see Reporter without Borders and UNAMA’s November 2024 report ‘Media Freedom in Afghanistan’), which stipulates that all reports “must be in an Islamic format and in accordance with Afghanistan’s tradition” and align with the “national interests.” The code includes the vaguely worded warning: “If there is any illegal action, it will be addressed” (see ToloNews). What precisely constitutes a contradiction of Islam and Afghan tradition, however, is left open to interpretation by the rulers. The Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law, issued on 21 August 2024, tasks the virtue and vice ministry’s muhtasiban (enforcers) “to ensure that those working for the press and news organisations” comply with these stipulations (see AAN’s basic translation). In September 2024, the IEA imposed additional restrictions on the media. According to a report by the Afghanistan Journalists Center (AFJC), they included prohibiting criticism of the IEA’s laws and policies, as well as banning the broadcast of live political shows. Media bosses were informed of the new guidelines in a meeting on 21 September, where they were told that the Emirate must first approve topics for political shows. Furthermore, they were told, that they could only interview guests from an approved list, which includes 64 individuals designated by the IEA (see the list of 64 individuals who have been approved by the IEA to be interviewed by the media in this Zamzam News tweet). |