Ruling Uncharted Territory: Islamic Emirate governance in northeastern Afghanistan

The relationship between central government and political actors at the periphery has long been studied in Afghanistan in order to understand representation, legitimacy, patronage and conflict. In the years of the insurgency and since the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), the Taleban movement has remained a cohesive force in Afghanistan’s highly fragmented political landscape. However, the IEA faces challenges similar to those experienced by previous governments in how to rule, in a centralised way, a large and varied country beset by structural hurdles in terms of infrastructure and budget. This themed report focuses on northeastern Afghanistan, an area which, before August 2021, had never come under Islamic Emirate rule – the provinces of Takhar, Badakhshan and Panjshir, plus parts of Baghlan. In a new themed report, Fabrizio Foschini has been looking at the constraints and challenges that have been faced by the IEA in organising its administration there over the last three years.

A view of Ragh area, Badakhshan province. Photo by Fabrizio Foschini, 2012You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below.

The northeast of Afghanistan constitutes a case of particular interest, given its geographical, historical and socio-political specificities. In the years between 1996 and 2001, it saw the most effective military opposition to the first Islamic Emirate. In the years after 2001, political-military networks hailing from the region maintained their importance both locally and at the central level, reaping the rewards of having helped the United States topple the first IEA. The emergence of an insurgency and its ultimate conquest of state power has removed or marginalised these elites. Elsewhere, the Emirate had years of solid shadow administration with cadre ready to take over administrative and military posts, but in the northeast, core affiliates waiting to take over were less numerous or had limited social influence.

Also complicating central rule are four decades of internal conflicts and foreign interventions, which have left scars on Afghanistan’s political landscape at the sub-national level. In the northeast, the role of local politico-military powerbrokers, based on the key elements of regional/ethnic belonging, personal connection and shared economic interests and with strong ties to the centre, was particularly evident during the Republic.

Since 2021, the IEA has had to devise strategies to expand and consolidate its rule in this region, and safeguard against possible threats to its control. In some areas, such as Panjshir, this has been pursued primarily through military occupation. Elsewhere, in most of Takhar and Badakhshan, the emphasis has been more on co-option, seeking to appease local elites in order to prevent any thought of opposition and also to tap into their influence in local communities in order to strengthen and expand the status of local IEA commanders. In doing so, Kabul initially acknowledged the relevance of locally specific human and social features: for example, wherever possible, it selected senior local officials from among its own cadre from whatever group is locally in the majority, Uzbeks or Tajiks.

Starting from late 2022, once its hold on power at the national and local levels had been consolidated, the IEA began to adopt a more hands-on approach to sub-national governance in the northeast: appointments at the provincial level became less mindful of local origins and ethnic balances of power and many prominent Taleban commanders, initially tasked with mollifying their home areas, were transferred to other provinces, while their troops – recently expanded by new recruits with no record of previous allegiance to the Emirate – have been subjected to vetting. Instances of rebellion by local IEA commanders who felt wronged have been suppressed.

This appeared to show that the IEA is wary of the risk of infiltration by hostile groups or the accumulation of unsanctioned autonomy and power by its peripheral commanders. The change in IEA strategy also pointed to the emergence of another priority – reclaiming control of mines and other economic assets from local Taleban powerbrokers and centralising the extraction of revenue.

The single most coherent IEA policy aimed at enhancing its support among locals in the northeast and creating future loyal cadres has been the expansion of the religious education system. It is also counting on government-run madrasas to counter the influence of religious groups which it opposes or mistrusts, such as Hezb ut-Tahrir and the Salafis, of particular concern to the IEA in this part of Afghanistan as a possible medium for political opposition.

Currently, the IEA seems bent on enforcing tighter control over local appointments and resources and implementing its policies more uniformly throughout northeastern Afghanistan. In doing so, it may clash with the vested interests of some of its local supporters. Its willingness and capacity to rule this region in a more centralised way without stirring opposition is still unclear.

You can preview the report online and download it by clicking here or the download button below.

Ruling Uncharted Territory FINAL Download

Ruling Uncharted Territory: Islamic Emirate governance in northeastern Afghanistan

AUTHORS:

Fabrizio Foschini

Recent Posts