March 19, 2026
When these countries become arenas for militancy, the repercussions reverberate far beyond their borders
Pakistan’s recent bombing of a Kabul drug rehabilitation hospital killed hundreds — while the Taliban has responded with drones and cross-border raids. Two key issues are fuelling the animosity: the harbouring of militants and the tortured history of the Durand Line — a colonial-era border that divided ethnic communities.
Pakistan’s longstanding use of militant groups as tools of regional policy — from the Afghan mujahideen of the 1980s, to the Taliban during the war with the US — now seems to be coming back to haunt it. The Taliban’s presence in Pakistan’s tribal areas, and their shared ideology, has created deep links between the Taliban and the militants — known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — who have been attacking Pakistan’s security services since 2007. A long-smouldering insurgency in Pakistan’s Balochistan region is adding to the tensions. At the core of the current impasse is the Taliban’s refusal to end the refuge these TTP fighters enjoy in Afghanistan. At the same time, the Taliban accuse Pakistan of backing anti-Taliban elements including the local Islamic State affiliate. Mutual suspicion has now hardened into open confrontation.
Yet Afghanistan and Pakistan ultimately need one another. Their economies remain deeply intertwined through trade corridors, transit routes, energy flows and cross-border labour. Neither can achieve stability in isolation. More than 23mn Afghans require humanitarian assistance, with roughly 17mn facing acute food insecurity. Vital trade with Pakistan has been cut since October 2025. Heavy reliance on Iran for transit and goods is an uncertain bet amid escalating regional war.
Pakistan, meanwhile, faces its own reckoning as it struggles with economic stagnation, inequality and political instability. This region has historically served as a sanctuary for militants and could do so again amid the war in Iran, as extremist figures displaced from hiding could once again look towards Afghanistan’s loosely governed frontier. An isolated and impoverished Afghanistan serves neither its own people nor the wider world.
Chronic instability and economic collapse create fertile ground for radicalism in a country where 63 per cent of the population is under the age of 25. This demographic reality could become either a dividend or a destabilising force. As a first step, both nations should build on the recently announced Eid ceasefire — brokered with support from Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia — and work to extend it into a more durable cessation of hostilities backed by credible mediation. The Taliban must move beyond entrenched positions towards a more inclusive governing model — one that abides by Afghanistan’s international obligations on human rights and girls’ education; the 2020 Doha Agreement, which the Taliban say they respect, provides a foundation for renewed engagement and a roadmap towards normalisation.
For its part, Pakistan must commit to peaceful settlement, choosing communication over force, and embrace a broad vision of economic co-operation between the two nations. The late Shah of Iran once championed regional economic co-operation among Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. That vision never fully materialised. After the guns fall silent in the region, it merits renewed consideration in a new form that includes Central Asia — backed by multilateral institutions that can underwrite infrastructure and private-sector growth. The past half-century offers a stark lesson. When these nations become arenas for proxy competition and ideological militancy, the consequences reverberate far beyond their borders. Lasting stability will rest on economic interdependence that makes conflict irrational and co-operation profitable.
Afghanistan Peace Campaign