Afghanistan Peace CampaignSarral Sharma
Pak Plays Victim
First, Pakistan is presenting itself internationally as the victim of cross-terrorism allegedly originating from Afghan territory. Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Taliban-led interim government of harbouring the Tehrik‑i‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups that attack Pakistani armed forces. In the most recent round of talks in Istanbul (with mediation from Turkey and Qatar), Pakistan initially declared: “The dialogue…ended without any workable solution” and accused the Afghan side of being “indifferent to Pakistan’s losses”. However, the recent negotiations were extended due to third-party mediation efforts and finally concluded on October 30, with plans to hold the next round on November 6 in Istanbul. By emphasising its own sufferings and sacrifices, Pakistan is now portraying itself as a responsible, peace-seeking neighbour whose diplomatic overtures have been rejected due to the Taliban’s intransigence. This victim narrative gives Islamabad moral cover in international forums.
A ‘Peace Warrior’
Second, by pointing the finger at the Taliban and declaring its own peaceful credentials, Pakistan can claim the role of the peace warrior. The Pakistani side has claimed that the country had “always desired, advocated and immensely sacrificed for peace and prosperity for the people of Afghanistan” and warned that “Pakistan’s patience has run its course”. Whereas Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, warned the Afghan Taliban to choose between “peace and chaos”, and stated in January 2024, “when it comes to the safety and security of every single Pakistani, the whole of Afghanistan can be damned”. In doing so, Pakistan presents itself as both a willing negotiator and a powerful military force that reserves the right to act. This matters because the international community generally favours diplomatic negotiations over military solutions. Therefore, Pakistan’s argument that it engaged with the Taliban in Doha and Istanbul, but that the latter allegedly backtracked on commitments, gives Islamabad a diplomatic advantage and allows it to shift the blame away from itself and onto Kabul for bilateral tensions.
Look At What It Says To The World
Third, the failure of negotiations helps Pakistan mobilise external support from the West and some Islamic countries to pressure the Taliban. Islamabad has long argued with Washington that Kabul cannot be stable unless Pakistan’s security concerns (especially the TTP) are addressed. With the Taliban’s limited role in controlling militancy in Pakistan, which it considers the latter’s “internal problem”, Islamabad may use the uncertainty around peace talks as an example of the Taliban’s unreliability and solicit financial aid, intelligence, and military cooperation, or diplomatic backing from Western capitals on the issue. Notably, Pakistan remains a close counterterrorism partner of the United States and has strengthened bilateral security cooperation under the Donald Trump administration. With renewed support from Washington and ongoing tensions between the US and Afghanistan over the issue of the Bagram airbase control, Islamabad sees an opportunity to bolster its external support and portray the Taliban as a threat to regional and global security.
Justifying Its Aggression
Fourth, the diplomatic impasse gives Pakistan a convenient justification for an aggressive military strategy against Afghanistan under the pretext of counterterrorism operations against TTP and its affiliates. For example, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif threatened Afghanistan that Pakistan did not need “even a fraction of its full arsenal to completely obliterate the Taliban regime” if provoked further. The temporary breakdown of diplomacy between the two countries may lead to Pakistan using force and carrying out more and deeper strikes inside Afghanistan, such as in Kabul or Kandahar. In Pakistan, there are growing calls for ‘open war’ or redrawing the Durand Line by forcefully capturing some territories in eastern Afghanistan. Other options include increasing airstrikes on so-called militant hideouts, decapitation of top TTP leaders, and even attempts at regime change or a reshuffle in the current Taliban administration in Kabul. These options are possible as Pakistan is working to shape a global narrative that, if the ceasefire fails and peace talks with the Taliban break down, it reserves the right to take escalatory actions against Afghanistan.
Blaming India, As Usual
Fifth, Pakistan is also using the deadlock with the Taliban to further its propaganda that India is supposedly interfering via Afghanistan by supporting certain militant outfits. In its recent narrative, Islamabad is increasingly blaming India for influencing the Taliban regime to allegedly destabilise Pakistan’s western region. While Islamabad has failed to provide any evidence proving India’s involvement, this narrative serves the purpose of Pakistan’s military establishment: shifting attention away from its own counterterrorism policy failures, pressuring the Taliban, and placing India in the role of a destabiliser in the region. Pakistan is unsettled after the recent multi-day visit of the Acting Foreign Minister of the interim Taliban government, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to India. Muttaqi lauded India as a “close friend” that provides humanitarian aid, and announced Afghanistan’s desire for “mutual respect, trade, and people-to-people relations” with India.
Additionally, New Delhi recently agreed to upgrade its “technical” mission in Kabul to a full embassy. For Pakistan, the burgeoning India-Afghanistan relationship under the Taliban regime in Kabul is a clear failure of its decades-old “strategic depth” policy. To express its disapproval and frustration, Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kabul, allegedly targeting key TTP leaders, during Muttaqi’s visit to India. This shows Pakistan will not accept growing diplomatic ties between Kabul and New Delhi and may intensify pressure on the Taliban through military strikes and narrative warfare against India. Nevertheless, these tactics will not solve Pakistan’s core issues with the Taliban administration, improve the internal security situation, or address deep ethnic divisions within the country.
By combining these reasons, Pakistan may extract short-term gains from ongoing tensions with the Taliban. The third-party mediation from Qatar and Turkey provides Pakistan with an additional advantage to pressure the Taliban and shape the global narrative and outcomes of the talks in its favor. Here, Pakistan’s aim is to change the Taliban’s behaviour in its favor, limit Kabul’s ties with New Delhi, and use regional instability as a time-tested tool to garner international attention.
However, this approach also poses certain risks to Pakistan. By leaning heavily on military operations and coercive diplomacy, Pakistan may further alienate the Afghan Taliban, reduce its influence, and increase the probability of a broader armed confrontation. The Taliban may turn away from Pakistan and cultivate new partnerships within the region and outside. Unlike the first Taliban regime in the late 1990s, Taliban 2.0 does not want to accept Pakistan’s policy directives and expects respectful treatment from its neighbour. On the other hand, Pakistan is not ready to accept the Taliban’s independent policy lines, especially Afghanistan’s growing ties with India, and would continue to push for a malleable leadership in Kabul. Even after four years, Islamabad has still not officially recognised the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. This has generated serious mistrust in Kabul regarding Islamabad’s intentions and is one of the key reasons for tensions between the two sides.
‘Disappointment’ Is The Word
Since August 2021, Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan has shifted from one of triumph to one of disappointment. As the Taliban refuse to accept blatant subordination from Islamabad, Pakistan has decided to use coercive diplomacy, military measures, and the cross-border terrorism issue to create a narrative in its favour, which will allow it to justify its hard actions against Afghanistan in the future. This strategy may benefit Pakistan in the short term, as the Taliban’s international reputation is already struggling with credibility issues. However, Pakistan faces the following risks: losing influence over the Taliban in the long term, intensifying anger among Afghans, especially refugees and those impacted by Pakistani military actions, rising local militancy, and possibly consolidating the disgruntled members of the Pashtun community on both sides of the border.
Therefore, what remains to be seen is whether Pakistan’s aggressive policy on Afghanistan would ultimately pressure the Taliban and bring long-term peace to the two countries, or whether the regional instability would again help garner international attention and material support for Islamabad. One thing is clear: under Munir’s leadership, Pakistan’s military establishment is likely to use rising tensions on both its eastern and western borders as justification to further consolidate its power and deflect any calls for public accountability for its recurring counterterrorism failures and destabilising regional policy.
(Sarral Sharma is a Doctoral Candidate at JNU and a former Consultant at the National Security Council Secretariat)