Afghanistan Peace Campaign
Introduction
When we first came to Kabul in August 2021, people were terrified of us. They viewed us as strange creatures. I remember one man asking me if I was Afghan or Pakistani. Why? Because for twenty years, the media had been propagating lies about us. They portrayed us as Punjabis [Pakistanis], as brutal men with no respect for rules. We’d had no chance to speak for ourselves. People had been completely brainwashed. Now it’s necessary for people to know who we are and why we fought. These are the essential questions that the Emirate must answer.
These were the words of a Taliban official working in Kabul who spoke to the author in April 2023. He was expressing a common sentiment, that the movement had been, as another official, a member of the Islamic Emirate’s Cultural Commission explained to the author, “introduced to our people and the world by our enemies.” After two decades of ultimately successful insurgency, the Taliban have embarked on a different endeavour – creating narratives about themselves. This is an important milestone because, in terms of books and other publications, the Taliban have, until now, been viewed pretty solely from the perspectives of outside observers. Since coming to power again, they have felt the need to explain themselves to other Afghans, who are either unfamiliar with or hostile towards them. Hence, a cascade of books in Pashto, Dari and occasionally English have been published since August 2021 about the movement, its leaders and the war, all sponsored and promoted by the state.
That such writing was not done earlier is a function of what had to be prioritised, either running the country while continuing to fight the Northern Alliance, pre-2001, or organising rebellion and insurgency, thereafter. The world knew little about the movement on the eve of the United States invasion in 2001[1] and it maintained its reclusive nature after it launched its first attacks against the US in the early 2000s. Being secretive helped avoid enemies tracking them down, while enigma remained part of the Taliban ‘brand’. However, as the insurgency expanded and grew in strength and power, the Taliban did make sporadic attempts to record and archive their wartime experiences, detailing the lives of their fighters and the suffering of their families in the conflict, showing that they understood early on the importance of narratives in winning the war[2]While they remained focused on military warfare, the increasing effort they devoted to psychological warfare during the last decade of the insurgency represented a huge shift, perhaps inspired partly by similar efforts from jihadist groups elsewhere.
In countering the narratives of the Islamic Republic and US and NATO, and spreading their own propaganda in turn on social media, the Taliban had some successes (see for example this Empirical Studies of Conflict paper on Taliban’s use of social media). Their emphasis was, by necessity, very much on addressing immediate practical needs to do with the war effort, such as promoting their cause and focusing on the military aspect of the conflict, rather than on systematically documenting the history of the movement and the war it was fighting. In terms of documenting the insurgency at this time, their efforts were patchy and random and had limited influence on their intended audience. They were mainly led by a small group within the movement’s cultural commission (coupled with a separate and more resourceful media wing under the auspices of the Haqqanis). They had limited resources at their disposal and lived in constant fear of being targeted by US or NATO forces.
Since the re-capture of power in August 2021, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) has seized the opportunity to define itself through documenting its perspectives on the movement and the war and is putting resources into this effort. On 24 October 2024, the Ministry of Information and Culture announced that it had established a major new directorate under the name of the General Directorate for the Protection of Jihadi Values, which was tasked with documenting and safeguarding the history of the war. It will presumably have access to considerable state resources and build on the fragmented data previously collected by members of the Cultural Commission.
There have also been a number of books published by prominent Taliban members and supporters since August 2021 and these are the subject of this paper. The author has analysed the content of nine books that recount the history of the Taliban movement written by Talibs or their supporters, including its origins, the ideological and historical factors that led to its emergence, the fall of the Taliban’s first emirate in 2001 and what they see as their jihad against US and NATO forces.
This report opens with a summary of the books, before analysing their narratives. The author then discusses IEA attempts to construct an identity for their movement and the ways in which writers have documented the war they fought. The report also explores what lies behind these efforts to create the movement’s own narrative and how these narratives have been received and viewed by other Afghans.
All translations from the Pashto or Dari texts are by the author.
The books reviewed
Abdul Satar Saeed, Knowing the Emirate: A Brief Introduction To the Emirate and A Description of the Emirate, Kabul, Hurryat Publishing House, 2023 (Pashto and Dari)
This is the most significant work by the prominent Taliban writer, intellectual and poet, Abdul Satar Saeed. It systematically documents the history of the Emirate and the context from which it emerged. Knowing the Emirate has been widely distributed and promoted, and translated into Dari; it has been reprinted five times in the past two years, an extremely rare indication of popularity for a book published in Afghanistan. The author, writing in eloquent Pashto, provides an account of how the Taliban movement was formed, based on his first-hand observations and discussions with those involved. The book denies the allegations that the movement was created with the help of Pakistan and explains how the global and local political landscape influenced it early on. It delves into the organisational structure and political bases of the Taliban and portrays the group as having saved Afghanistan from disintegration caused by the civil war.
Muhajir Farahi, Twenty Years in Occupation: Memories of Jihad, second edition, Zahid Welfare Foundation, 2022 (Pashto, Dari and English)[3]
Muhajir Farahi, a prominent member of the Cultural Commission and current Deputy Minister of Information and Culture, here describes the activities of the Taliban during the early 2000s in Afghanistan’s southern region. It presents personal accounts of battles with a focus on the heroism of Taliban members. It also explores the tactics the Taliban employed against the US and the NATO coalition and describes the support of local communities for the insurgency. The book discusses the financial status of the movement and the channels through which it secured financial resources over the last two decades.
Shamsul Haq Samim, Malawi Said Muhammad Haqqani, unknown publisher, 2024 (Pashto)
This book looks at the life of Said Muhammad Haqqani, a senior Taliban leader from Kandahar. Haqqani held numerous roles within the Taliban during the first Emirate, including deputy foreign minister and later ambassador to Pakistan. In the formative years of the insurgency, he was the deputy head of the movement’s important Cultural Commission. The book is a collection of essays from scholars and writers on Haqqani’s life and accomplishments. The book was compiled and edited by Haqqani’s son, Shamsul Haq, and has been well received within Taliban circles. Zabihullah Mujahid, who was directly appointed and mentored by Haqqani as the insurgency’s spokesman, contributed a foreword to the work.
Abdul Satar Saeed, The Third Omar, Third Omar Publishing Agency, 2021 (Pashto and Dari)
Saeed documents the Taliban’s history through a biography of its first supreme leader, Mullah Omar. Saeed refers to Mullah Omar as the “third Omar,” after Omar ibn al-Khattab and Omar ibn Abdul Aziz, two Islamic caliphs renowned for their bravery and justice[4] The author said he started collecting the material for this book during the insurgency; it is primarily based on conversations with senior Taliban leaders who were comrades of Mullah Omar. The book traces Mullah Omar’s life, from his childhood to his death in Zabul. Saeed also included Mullah Omar’s public announcements, decrees and interviews and a chapter of reflections from those who knew him personally, including non-Afghan authors such as the Syrian Al Jazeera journalist, Tyseer Allouni, Egyptian Islamic scholar, Hani Al-Siba’i and the director of the famous Haqqania Madrasa in Pakistan, Mawlana Anwar ul-Haq.
Shuhrat Nangial, Great Reformer, Grand Warrior: From the Pulpit to the Battlefield, from Wars to Assemblies, Kabul, Jalal Foundation, 2022 (Pashto)
This book is by a renowned historian of the Afghan-Soviet war and former head of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s media wing during the 1980s and 1990s. It is published by the Jalal Foundation, which was established by the Haqqanis and works outside state structures. It explores the life of Jalaluddin Haqqani, founder of the so-called Haqqani network, tracing his life from childhood, focusing on his time as a jihadi commander during the Soviet occupation and later his role as a peace broker among the various factions of the mujahidin that were engaged in the civil war of the 1990s. The book not only emphasises Haqqani’s qualities as a military leader, but also portrays him as a mediator for peace. A grand ceremony launching the book was held at the Academy of Sciences, attended by numerous scholars of literature and history, many of whom wrote reviews of the work. Notably, it was not written by a single author but was a collaborative effort, with multiple contributors – including non-Taliban authors – sharing their impressions of Haqqani.
Javed Afghan, The Storyteller Herself Was Martyred: Stories of Tragedies, unknown publisher, 2023 (Pashto and Dari)
In his first book, Javed Afghan, the head of the state-run Afghan Film Organisation and a member of the Taliban’s Cultural Commission during the insurgency[5], recalls tales of night raids, drone strikes and Taliban heroism through first-hand personal stories collected from various provinces. The book offers perspectives from fighters and civilians, highlighting their struggles and sacrifices during the conflict. The stories in the book are often dramatic and emotional. They include stories from women describing their experiences during the war, as per the book’s title.
Javed Afghan, Behind the Prison Bars: The Battle for Liberation and Memories of Prison, unknown publisher, 2024 (Pashto)
This book captures the personal stories of Taliban members imprisoned during the insurgency, primarily in the notorious Bagram Prison, run until 2013 by the US military, which the author characterises as ‘Afghanistan’s Guantanamo’(see AAN’s dossier of reports on Bagram prison). It details their arrests and the harsh treatment they faced during their imprisonment. The narrative is designed to stir strong emotions, as it describes the torture and suffering endured by the prisoners. It also highlights the emotional strain on the families who visited them. The book features accounts of the imprisonment of several high-ranking Taliban figures, including member of the Political Commission Anas Haqqani, Deputy Chief of Army Staff Mali Khan Dzadran and IEA spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid.
Zia ul-Haq Hassan, The Morning After the Raid, unknown publisher, 2022 (Pashto and Dari)
This former Taliban fighter has written an autobiography describing his experiences during the insurgency in his home province of Wardak[6] The book describes the operations of US forces in Wardak, the killing and wounding of civilian and the bombing of homes. The second chapter focuses on the heroism of Taliban fighters and the third describes the ‘miracles’ attributed to the martyrs, recounting supernatural occurrences surrounding the deaths of Taliban fighters in Wardak.
Hasibullah Hewadmal, Stars That Have Fallen Out of the Orbit of Life: Biography, Deeds and Memories of Sheikhabad Valley’s Martyrs, Dajmir Dawoodzai Publishing, 2024 (Pashto)
Hewadmal, a resident of Wardak province who graduated from Literature and Human Sciences faculty of Laghman University and is currently a government employee, focuses on Taliban fighters who were killed during conflict in Shaikhabad a valley in Wardak’s Sayedbad district. The book details the backgrounds and memories of 165 fighters who were killed in the conflict. It explains their motives for joining the Taliban and focuses on their heroism before describing their deaths.
The emerging narratives
The nine books selected for this report can be divided into three groups. The first group comprises two works – Saeed’sKnowing the Emirate and Farahi’s Twenty Years of Occupation that deal with the history of the Emirate and the political history of the movement. The primary focus of these two books is how and why the Emirate was established and how it evolved.
Farahi’s book places emphasis on the Taliban’s status as a people’s movement, representing the Afghan people and supported by them:
In the initial days, we only had a few Russian-made Kalashnikovs, rockets and motorcycles. But as our jihad continued, our mujahedin received money from the people. They were helped by the mujahed nation.
Saeed’s book presents the Taliban as key players in the global geopolitical arena and emphasises their refusal to follow the US-led world order that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War.
The Islamic Emirate arose during the peak of America’s global position at a time when, after its victory in the Gulf War, the US claimed there was a unipolar system and referred to the 21st century as ‘the American Century’. In the new global order of the United States, no system other than Western liberal democracy was allowed to hold power anywhere on Earth. In particular, the Islamic system, which had long been seen by the West as its primary rival, was not allowed to hold power.
He argues that the US’s hostility toward non-liberal and non-democratic ways of life, stemming from its position as the sole superpower, was a key factor behind its hostile stance towards the Taliban and eventual invasion of Afghanistan. This hostility arose because the first Islamic Emirate refused to adhere to the standards set by the West and instead chose to pursue an Islamic model of governance.
When [the US] saw the firm commitment of the Islamic Emirate to its religious principles and the implementation of sharia law, they began to oppose it. This opposition initially began with one-sided, poisonous propaganda and later escalated into the creation of political, economic and other challenges, alongside strategies aimed at isolating the Emirate. Human rights, women’s freedom, narcotic cultivation and other issues were used to criticise the Islamic Emirate.
Saeed considers the hosting of Osama bin Laden and the subsequent September 11 attacks as mere pretexts for the US to invade Afghanistan.
Before the Emirate’s rule, Sheikh Osama arrived in Afghanistan during the reign of Burhanuddin Rabbani, at the invitation of several jihadist commanders from Nangrahar and with the agreement of the Rabbani government. The US did not make much mention of this issue during the Rabbani government’s rule, but when Kabul and the eastern parts of the country fell under the rule of the Islamic Emirate, the US began pursuing this issue under the pretext of opposing the Emirate. They gave Sheikh Osama widespread attention and presented him as the greatest threat to the US and the world.
He gives his explanation as to why the first Emirate refused to hand Bin Laden to the US:
It stated that the US must first present evidence and documents to prove the allegations against Sheikh Osama. If he had indeed committed such actions that violated Islamic laws, then an Islamic government existed in Afghanistan with courts and legal procedures that could handle the case because no one is above the law. However, the US was arrogant and demanded that Sheikh Osama be handed over without any conditions or evidence. This demand was not in accordance with any legal standards.
The second group of books – Nangial’s Great Reformer, Grand Warrior, Saeed’s The Third Omar and Samim’s biography of Malawi Said Muhammad Haqqani – are histories of the movement told through the biographies of two prominent figures. These books are based on interviews with the Taliban leadership, personal observations, etc.
Nangial’s book is an attempt to portray Haqqani as a strong military commander who contributed greatly to the defeat of Soviets and later the US and NATO. It emphasises his actions both as a military commander and as a neutral person brokering a peace agreement among the warring mujahedin tanzims [political-military faction] in the 1990s. Nangial describes Haqqani as a unifying figure who did not seek to monopolise the jihad against the Soviets for a single tanzim, but sought to unite all mujahedin under a single cause.
Mullah Jalaluddin Haqqani organised the resistance and jihad not on an ideological or organisational level, but as a national Islamic uprising within the framework of a popular uprising. … Therefore, in the centre of [his] Dzadran tribe, no flag of any organisation or group was raised, no invitation was made in the name of a tanzim or a leader, no call for recruiting into a [particular] tanzim was heard. In this way, the jihad in the Dzadran region was protected from the harm of party politics and factionalism.
Nangial also attributes Haqqani’s war against the US to his unwavering belief in an independent Afghanistan, prompting him to take up arms against any invader, whether Soviet or American.
In Haqqani’s view, there is no good foreign invader, no matter if their slogans seem noble, appealing, or different. Their goals and essence are the same, and the outcome, even for their puppets in the countries they invade, is nothing but treachery, betrayal and hostility. For him, the meaning of any foreign invader in the dictionary of faith and belief is the same and resistance to them is an obligation. Fighting any foreign invader is an inseparable part of his faith and of his Afghan identity.
The Third Omar provides a comprehensive account of Mullah Omar’s life, portraying him as the leader who rescued Afghanistan from the chaos and civil war of the 1990s. It outlines the situation in Kandahar and across Afghanistan in 1994, detailing the brutality and oppression of the mujahedin factions. Mullah Omar’s rise to power is thus portrayed as the dawn of a calm and safe period in Afghanistan’s history after years of violent chaos. The book highlights that Mullah Omar’s decisions, both personally and politically, were guided by Islamic principles rather than “worldly or material” knowledge. The author notes:
Mullah Omar, as a true believer, was a man committed to the teachings of Islam, considering sharia the highest principle in both his personal and social life. During his rule, he would first evaluate governmental actions in the light of sharia, consulting Hanafi scholars on the permissibility or impermissibility of decisions. He would not take any action until he received a fatwa confirming its permissibility. In contrast, the decisions of contemporary political figures and groups are often driven by personal desires, reason, material gains, or research centres and they do not regard Allah’s religion and sharia as ultimate and credible sources.
The author attempts to portray Mullah Omar as a miraculous figure, whose limited religious and political knowledge proved to be no disadvantage because of his deep faith in God and commitment to sharia, which guided both his governance and the insurgency
As with the first group of books reviewed, the biography of Mullah Omar culminates in the defeat and decline of a global superpower and the victory of a pious and righteous movement’s over it. The idea of the Taliban as a ‘people’s movement’, based on strong faith in the divine, that defeated an evil empire. is noticeable here too.
The third and possibly most interesting group of books are the four based on oral histories and interviews with ‘ordinary people’. They include one autobiography. These books, especially those recalling the night raids, drone strikes and killings of civilians, could be accused of sensationalising the tragedies they present. They deal with the human side of the war, rather than its military aspect and aim to present the fight against the US and NATO as one in which the entire nation participated, not only the Taliban. In documenting the civilian casualties caused by US and NATO troops, the movement aims to expose what it sees as the hypocrisy of the US, in that the US used the rhetoric of human rights to condemn others whilst committing extreme violations of these rights itself. The Taliban, claimed the author of The Morning After the Raid, have exposed “the true side of the people who claim to have championed human rights and to be beacons of progress and development.”
The stories of civilians killed and the destruction of their homes and property are vividly portrayed in these books, which clearly implicate the US and Republic in targeting civilians. Here, again, the Taliban are presented as a people’s movement, a running narrative in all the books reviewed. To this end, these authors pay considerable attention to the support Afghans provided to the Taliban during the war. They recount many occasions in which civilians helped Taliban fighters evade night raids and search operations, gave them information on Afghan military movements and provided financial support.
The pain of Afghans who lost family members is another common theme. In The Storyteller Herself Was Martyred, the author recounts the following story:
The Afghan nation has experienced both bitter and sweet moments over the last two decades, but the bitterness was probably far greater. The price of blood became so devalued that an animal and a human became indistinguishable. Those who called themselves the leaders of the nation only showcased the good side while hiding resentments from the public. We heard the voices of people villages in Andar district [Ghazni province] and we now share these with you.
We were sitting with a number of elders in Gabari village. I asked the eldest, “Uncle, how much did your village suffer damage over the last 20 years?”
He fell silent when he heard my question and turned his face away. His silence continued; I thought some bad memories had probably made him unable to speak.
Another man who introduced himself as the son of the first elder said, “We were subject to dozens of raids and bombardments. Over 40 of our fellow villagers were martyred and a large number of others wounded.”
The author here recounts his entire conversation with the village elders. Moving from his position as outsider-interviewer, he becomes an active participant in the story, a technique that allows him both to express his feelings and share in the stories of others. This style, which is both personal and immersive, is popular in Pashto literature. The author of Behind the Prison Bars deploys a similar technique to narrate the story of a prisoner receiving a family visit:
After a brief silence, Qari Sahib [who was imprisoned in Bagram] said, “In my last visit, my little son, Rafiullah, came to see me. I don’t know if it was my seventeenth or eighteenth visit. He was very young when the Americans captured me, only about a year and a half old, but when I saw him this time, he had grown. When the translator came and said, “Your time is up, let’s go!” my son, who had grabbed hold of my prison clothes, asked, “Father, where are you going? I’m going with you too!”
I said, “I have to go!” and I cannot say what happened next. I cried even more, and for the first time, I saw tears in the guard’s eyes. The room became chaotic and I told my family I would be free soon, by the grace of God. About a month and a half later, I was released.”
As he finished his story, Qari Sahib’s voice changed and his tears became even more obvious.
I, too, was silent for a moment and then bade him farewell.
Alleged miracles performed by Taliban fighters are another recurrent theme in these works. The inclusion of these supernatural occurrences is intended to portray the fighters as divinely blessed and thus imply that their cause was divinely approved and supported. In The Morning After the Raid, the author claims that the blood of a Taliban fighter killed in conflict with US troops pooled on the ground and formed the word, ‘Allah’. Later, the author reports that a family who hosted Taliban fighters experienced many blessings: “The family said that when the mujahedin were there, there was abundance in everything; even the sheep and cows gave milk more than normal.”
Women are also mentioned in the books, although only as wives, daughters or mothers and never as fighters. The author of The Morning After the Raid, for example, recalls:
The invaders, after killing the father of an innocent family, turned their weapons on his two young daughters and gunned them down. The elder daughter of Mualim Nur Agha had recently become engaged in Goda Khil village and the marriage was planned for the following month. She had waited for the celebration of her wedding with many hopes and dreams, not knowing that the so-called defenders of human rights would not let her dreams come true. Her hands, that should have been painted with henna, were painted instead with her own blood.
Behind the Prison Bars, deals with the tales of prisoners and their experiences of torture.
During the Western invasion, the biggest human rights defenders of the world (!), America and its allies, built prisons in and outside of Afghanistan such as Abu Gharib, Guantanamo, Bagram, Pul-e Charkhi, 90 and 40 directorates [of the NDS} and many other torture houses in provinces and capitals in order to detain the Afghan Muslim youth, to torture, beat and imprison the defenders of Islamic values, Afghan traditions and national norms. Due to the massive torture, many of the prisoners went mad. Their mental health would be severely damaged and many, who had been caught during the raids, wished themselves dead.
What do the Taliban seek to achieve through these books?
The Taliban feel that history in Afghanistan has been highly politicised by previous regimes in power. This is now something the movement itself is now trying to counter. Those taking power – from the communists and mujahedin to the first and second Emirates to the Republic – have always rejected the legacy of their predecessors, labelling them as puppets or enemies of the nation. The Taliban now follow the same pattern, but with greater intensity, as one official explained:
There is no impartial history writing anywhere in the world. But Afghans have gone to extremes. The communists, who invited the Soviet occupation and imposed a foreign ideology, labelled freedom fighters as puppets and rebels, while they portrayed themselves as heroes. Then the Republic came and labelled the Emirate with the same names. They considered Amanullah Khan a hero for going against the norms of the people, while they themselves came [to power] on American tanks. They wrote books, made films and included this in school curriculums. This was very unfair.
One of the authors reviewed, Javed Afghan, writes:
It is a sad continuation of our historical mistakes that we have not documented the stories of the unjust invasions and their cruelties for future generations. I accept that Afghanistan has a 5,000-year-long history, but why haven’t we made fair efforts to preserve it? Why has our country been repeatedly invaded? Why are the stories of Afghan heroism, sacrifice and courage tied to unknown individuals?
How are these efforts viewed by the public?
The Islamic Emirate is actively seeking to shape the public’s perception of their history, particularly in relation to their conflict with the US-led coalition and the identity of their movement. They have not only been focused on documenting their version of history, but also on actively disseminating their newly polished narratives to the public.
One of their highest-profile initiatives has been book-reading competitions, organised by provincial Culture and Information Directorates since 2022. The Ministry of Education has also hosted similar competitions and seminars where participants would read a book assigned by the ministry and take a test on the material. Those with the highest scores were rewarded with various prizes, including cash, motorcycles and computers. These competitions have been held in nearly every province but seem to have been particularly frequent in areas where the Emirate lacks strong community support. In Panjshir province, the provincial Directorate Of Information and Culture organised such programmes not only in the provincial capital, Bazarak, but also in districts like Hesarak and Rukha where support for the National Resistance Front (NRF) has presented a problem for the Emirate.
Such book-reading competitions, along with major launch ceremonies for many of the books and high-quality printing (which is largely paid for by the state) are all part of a strategy to promote these newly published books to a larger and more diverse audience. One person who participated in a competition to read Saeed’s work, Introduction to the Emirate,said:
My perception about the Emirate had been different, but after reading this book, it changed. I understand what the Emirate is, why it was formed, whom it fought and why it rules Afghanistan. I really understand this. Like myself, most people sitting in this gathering may not have comprehended these issues. We want the Islamic Emirate to held more such programmes and explain its goals, strategy and why it is ruling. The Emirate fought for 20 years with basic weaponry against the most advanced militaries of secular states. The Emirate beat America and the 48 countries of NATO who never thought the Islamic Emirate would rule Afghanistan ever again.
However, based on conversations with booksellers in Kabul, these efforts have not yet been as successful as their architects hope. It appears their primary readership are Taliban members and their sympathisers. As one bookseller pointed out: “Most of the books produced by the Taliban are bought by people who look like the Taliban, or by the Taliban themselves. Very few non-Taliban, such as university students, purchase them.”
Several factors contribute to this limited readership. One significant issue is that most of the material is written in Pashto, and although there have been some attempts to expand into other languages, for example, Saeed’s book has been translated into Dari, the majority of the books are available only in Pashto. Secondly, the content is highly politicised and the authors are obviously closely aligned with the Taliban’s agenda, which appeals to Taliban supporters but is less attractive to others.
The situation is different in areas where the Taliban enjoy more support. For instance, Saeed’s book, of which over 5,000 copies were printed, sold well in some provinces in the south and east. A bookseller in Paktia province said he had sold 100 copies of Saeed’s Knowing the Emirate in less than a month, while in Kabul they still have copies left after a year.
As a general rule, as well, reading books is not a particularly popular pastime in Afghanistan, which is why the author will also be reviewing television documentaries and films, which get a wider audience. Nonetheless, written text are texts of ‘record’, more likely to be studied and to form part of what becomes accepted – or contested – history.
The importance of listening to Taliban voices (as well as others’)
The Taliban’s main narratives have been carefully crafted to challenge mainstream portrayals of the movement and present their struggle as righteous. They focus on countering dominant narratives that seek to undermine their cause, asserting that their fight was not only just, but necessary. At the heart of these narratives is a deep sense of their own moral integrity. They emphasise that this is a ‘true’ jihad, one that no one should doubt. They frame their own history through stories of heroism, sacrifice and resistance to oppressive tyranny that was so bad, it could not be ignored.
They have also tried to present their struggle as divinely approved. Through tales of miraculous events and descriptions of the piety of their leaders and fighters, they seek to convey that their armed struggle was not just a political act, but a sacred mission supported by higher forces. In contrast, they depict the West’s democratic ideals as hypocritical lies, the tools of an evil enemy. They argue that their cause is not only morally superior but also a necessary defence against this evil. They stress that theirs was a popular struggle, not the work of foreign powers or partisan self-interested groups. It was a national fight for freedom, led by local leaders deeply inspired by injustice and a desire to free their people.
Despite the Emirate’s efforts, the degree to which their narrative will be accepted by other Afghans remains to be seen. Javed Afghan, author of The Storyteller Herself Was Martyred, asks the same question:
Why can’t we stop the younger generation from embracing the culture of foreigners? Why are yesterday’s invaders and killers today’s heroes? The truth is, we have nurtured the garden, but we have been negligent in harvesting its fruits.
Most readers will be aware that it is important not to treat these writings as neutral history or objective journalism. In the same way as most other regimes and movements, the Taliban are driven by a desire to shape and control the narrative about themselves. Consequently, the books reviewed lack the critical distance needed to provide an objective account. For example, it is rare to find an acknowledgement in these texts of the death and suffering experienced by Afghan civilians due to the Taliban’s use of IEDs and suicide attacks.
When wars end, the victors write their story, focusing on their heroic acts, while the defeated are typically silenced. But it is often the civilians – the ones who suffer the most between the different sides – whose stories go untold. The war in Afghanistan is far from a simple story and no full account of the conflict can be written solely by one side. The Emirate’s narratives are a new thread in understanding Afghanistan, important because they have rarely been written down before, but still, one thread among many.
Edited by Jelena Bjelica, Letty Phillips and Kate Clark
References
| ↑1 | The first books to shed some light on a reclusive movement were William Maley’s Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban (1998), Ahmad Rashid’s Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (2000) and Antonio Giustozzi’s Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban (2001). Other important books published at a later date were Alex Strick Van Linschoten and Felix Kuehne, An Enemy we Created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan and Anand Gopal’s No Good Men among the Living: America, the Taliban and the war through Afghan lenses. For a fuller list of books , especially those published at later dates, see AAN’s Bibliography. |
|---|---|
| ↑2 | To this end, the Taliban established a Cultural Commission (Farhangi Kamisun) in 2004 and tasked it with documenting alleged war crimes committed by US and Afghan government forces, countering the narratives of their enemies and disseminating information. From the early 2010s, the Taliban began broadcasting radio programmes, producing DVDs and running websites about themselves. Towards the end of the insurgency, members of the commission also began to work on a book about the life of their late amir and one of the movement’s founders, Mullah Muhammad Omar, which was completed just before the takeover in 2021. |
| ↑3 | The first edition of this book was published just a few months before the August takeover. |
| ↑4 | Omar ibn al-Khattab (r 634-44) was the second leader of the Muslim community (for Sunni Muslims) after the Prophet Muhammad and is known as ‘al-Faruq’ because of his discernment of right and wrong. Omar ibn Abdul Aziz was the eighth Umayyad caliph, ruling from Damascus (r 717-20) and is credited with establishing significant government reforms, making the administration more efficient and egalitarian. |
| ↑5 | Javed Afghan also played an active role in running the Taliban-owned radio station, Voice of Sharia, during the insurgency. |
| ↑6 | Hassan is also a former member of the Cultural Commission. He is currently serving as the director of the Invitation and Guidance department of the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice at the Paktika Police Headquarters. |
Revisions:
This article was last updated on 15 Mar 2025