Afghanistan Peace CampaignIndeed, in the eyes of many Afghans, the year since the Taliban seized Kabul with little to no resistance has been shaped by a bewildering mix of half-realised hopes, unexpected blessings, many disappointments and devastating economic, social and political crises.
So what exactly were the many gains and undeniable losses and failures of the Taliban during their first year back in power?
US and the Taliban
Given the emphasis the 2020 Doha Agreement – which paved the way for the withdrawal of US-led foreign forces – places on the Taliban’s guarantees that it will not allow transnational armed groups to operate on Afghan soil, many observers concluded that the assassination, which exposed enduring ties between al-Qaeda and the new Afghan leadership, would lead to a total collapse of trust between the US and the Taliban and perhaps even trigger a new military confrontation.
However, the situation is much more complex in reality. To start with, the relationship between the two parties was never built on trust, but on a set of pragmatic interests which both are determined not to abandon even if pursuing them requires turning a blind eye to potential violations of the Doha Agreement.
Despite appearances, both parties are keen to protect their alignment around the strategic objective of preventing Afghanistan from becoming a failed state that could provide a haven to “terror” organisations such as the ISIL (ISIS) group and a base for the distribution of narcotics to the rest of the world.
A nation hostage
Despite efforts by the Taliban and the US to maintain a delicate relationship, however, in the past year Afghanistan experienced severe economic devastation, largely due to the ongoing efforts by Washington – and the rest of the Western alliance – to prevent the group from further consolidating power through economic pressure.
First came the sudden decline in international aid. Billions of dollars that were used to finance the war effort and to support a wide range of developmental projects, including funding a thriving civil society, in the past two decades have suddenly dried up, causing a sharp rise in unemployment, particularly in the public sector. Almost simultaneously, the country was isolated from the international financial system, which crippled local banking. Adding insult to injury, the US froze almost $9bn in Afghan foreign exchange reserves held abroad and started to float the possibility of using some of that money to compensate the families of 9/11 victims.
Although a serious threat of famine was averted last winter thanks to the Taliban’s willingness to cooperate with the international community – which provided the Afghan people with $1bn in humanitarian aid – the country still came to the brink of universal poverty soon after the change of government, with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) warning that as much as 97 percent of the Afghan population could sink into poverty before the end of 2022. Incomes dropped so starkly since the Taliban takeover that the World Bank said in April that about 37 percent of Afghan households did not have enough money to cover food while 33 percent could afford food but nothing more. Moreover, given Afghanistan’s dependency on imported food and skyrocketing global food prices due to the war in Ukraine, a deadly famine is still on the cards for Afghanistan.
As a result, while most of this economic devastation was beyond the control of the Taliban, many in Afghanistan – just like those in the West – are struggling to see any positives in the group’s year-one report card.
And yet, the group took some steps – and implemented some policies – that if they did not significantly improve the living conditions of most Afghans, at least helped avert bigger catastrophes.
Acknowledging Taliban achievements
Indeed, the country could not have absorbed the combined effects of the above-mentioned economic shocks if it was not for some of the Taliban’s achievements.
First and foremost, the security situation in Afghanistan has significantly improved since the Taliban’s takeover. After NATO forces left, the Taliban officially ended their armed struggle, declared a general amnesty for all political and military opposition and announced a nationwide decommissioning of weapons. As a result, civilians started to feel safe once again and mobility increased significantly across the country.
Second, at the regional level, except for some tensions with Pakistan, the Taliban have managed to maintain good relationships with all of Afghanistan’s neighbours. Despite UN sanctions, for example, China maintains diplomatic and economic relations with the Taliban and has plans to not only provide humanitarian assistance but invest in the country. Uzbekistan also has friendly relations with the new Afghan government and has opened its border to trade. None of the countries in the region is interested in supporting a proxy war in Afghanistan today.
Third, the Taliban managed to protect Afghanistan’s public sector institutions and infrastructure, including its security apparatus. Most public institutions maintained their employees and continued to provide a reasonable level of services. By far the most important institution the Taliban managed to protect was the Central Bank. Under the Taliban, the bank’s acting governor was given a good degree of independence and was allowed to work closely with national and international advisers to protect Afghanistan’s currency. As a result, the local currency was quick to recover much of its value against many international and regional currencies and newly printed bank notes were quickly brought from Poland to circulate in the local market. The Taliban government also managed to recruit almost 100,000 young men to the national army and up to 180,000 to the national police in the past year. Admittedly, many were former Taliban fighters, although not all were.
Fourth, in just a year, the Taliban, having lost international budget support, were able to put forward a national budget dependent only on national income. By tackling the culture of corruption that held the country back over the last 20 years, the Taliban were able to increase state revenue to the unprecedented level of $100 million per month despite the economic difficulties facing the country and the low tax base that this has resulted in.
While these achievements undoubtedly deserve some acknowledgement, it cannot be denied that they have all been overshadowed by the Taliban’s confused and regressive social policies. For example, while girls are still allowed to go to secondary school in several provinces, in most localities their access to education has been restricted to please a minority view within the movement. This combined with the crackdown on liberties, including press freedom, cultural expression (music and dance) and political activism has resulted in many Afghans feeling detached from the Taliban government and becoming wary of its rule. Counterproductive social policies also placed the country on a path to international isolation despite its officials’ occasional ability to participate in regional and international bilateral visits and conferences.